ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

1274-1974

COMMEMORATIVE STUDIES

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Foreword
by
Etienne Gilson



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FOREWORD

For a rather short life (1225-1274) Thomas Aquinas has had an endless posterity of disciples, historians, and commentators; and let us not forget the editors of particular works, or even of Opera Omnia, *who can hardly wait for the end of an edition before declaring it out-of-date and undertaking a new one. In this Seventh Centenary of Thomas' death, the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies in Toronto wishes to join the many institutions and learned publications which, the whole world over, are commemorating the event.*

Some of these publications will chiefly testify to the faithfulness of the Thomistic school to its master, but most of them will rather express the conviction that, like Dante, Thomas Aquinas and his work are a landmark universally recognized in the history of western culture. There are also countless private readers who have become friends of Aquinas for life through the simple reading of the Summa Theologiae. *Many years ago, while in New York, I paid a visit to the author of* The Mediaeval Mind, a History of the Development of Thought and Emotion in the Middle Ages. *I knew that H. O. Taylor was not a professional historian, but a lawyer, and I wanted to ask him how, though not a Catholic, he had acquired such an insight into the spirit of the Middle Ages. I still hear him answering in all simplicity: "You know, I have read the whole* Summa Theologiae, *and when I came to the passage of the Third Part where the work was left interrupted, I actually cried."*

Whatever their inspiration, all the homages to the memory of the Angelic Doctor will be found to have in common one paradoxical feature, namely the diversity of their subjects. That diversity is typical of this many faced man. He has been, first of all, a theologian, but also a philosopher and a scientist, as this notion is found in the Aristotelian corpus, *which included the science of both nature and man. A mere glance at the titles of the essays collected in these volumes will reveal the astonishing variety of the subjects in which that theologian was interested. More remarkable still is the variety of the methods, points of view, and principles to which he resorted in handling them. To Descartes and his successors, philosophical method, scientific method, and mathematical method are one and the same; to Thomas Aquinas and his disciples, the method of each science, while respecting the common*

laws of logic, must adapt itself to the specific nature of its proper object: extension in geometry, number in arithmetic, motion and change in physics, life in the sciences of the soul and living things. This attitude is typical of the methodological realism of Thomas Aquinas, and the notion is easy to understand; but to see it at work and to conform to it is quite another proposition. Like Aristotle before him, and William James after him, Thomas Aquinas lived in the pluralistic universe which is that of all true realists. To them, the mind adapts itself to the native diversity of the universe instead of reducing it to the mind's own unity. The universe is far from lacking order, but its order remains that of an ordered diversity.

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I

THE LIFE OF ST. THOMAS

THE LEGEND OF ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

Edmund Colledge O.S.A.

TODAY it is impossible to write of the pious stories told and written about the holy men and women of old times without being influenced, knowingly or not, by the work of the Bollandists, and, in particular, of Hippolyte Delehaye. He showed that many (some would write "most") of such stories are not true, and, more importantly, that those who circulated them were offering, not scientifically verifiable fact — so far as that concept was present to mediaeval minds — but edifying and symbolizing fiction. Thanks to Delehaye and his school, we are now warned and on the watch for the circumstances which will promote such fabrications.

Delehaye cannot have been ignorant of the doctrine, which in his own lifetime became so fashionable, of the "economic interpretation of history". The money to be gained, in one place from pilgrims' offerings, or throughout the Church by the spread of a special devotion, was a powerful inducement for those who might so benefit to press claims for sanctity, to associate them with given prayers or devotional objects, to defend possession of tombs, shrines and relics. A classic example is the centuries-long warfare between the Canons Regular and the Austin Friars over Augustine's *Rule* and his remains at Pavia, which gave scandal even to the Middle Ages, hardened to such disedifying spectacles.[1]

If some organization was gaining fame or wealth through a form of prayer or veneration associated with one of its saints, rival organizations would foster competitive devotions, and claim that they had been originated by their own holy ones. Again, if some one form of vision or miracle was seen to be especially impressive on the minds of the faithful, it would soon be claimed for a wide variety of ecstatics and wonder-workers.

Standard patterns of biography evolved, strongly influenced by the Scriptures, and, in particular, by the infancy narratives concerning

1 In the first half of the fifteenth century, John Capgrave O. S. A. made several appeals to his own Order and the Canons Regular for peace and a mutual recognition that they were both Augustine's co-heirs.

Christ and John the Baptist. Parents, and especially mothers, were almost invariably pious, there were pre-natal prophecies of future holiness, and marvellous or miraculous events in such children's earliest years. Happenings which the unprejudiced might think purely natural were given supernatural explanations. Anecdotes first intended to show merely human qualities were moralized to indicate divine intervention.

Constantly, we shall find identical wonders told of quite different saints. The causes of this can be various. Identities could be transferred, so that many Christian saints were endowed with the attributes and deeds of their predecessors, often pagan, sometimes mythical. The causes of such transfer can often lie in iconography, always important in the evolution of any cult among the illiterate: thus, Perseus rescuing Andromeda may become a Christian warrior-saint, a heathen sage winging his way up to wisdom a doctor of the Church. The picture of one event, such as Christ's baptism in Jordan, may be taken to show something entirely different, such as the sacring of some holy king. Two or more saints of the same name may suffer fusion. But, most of all, we shall find that plagiarism was regarded as a work of piety — "if their saint X was fed by a raven, then our saint Y was fed by a dove".

Then, too, all the time one encounters human forgetfulness and inventiveness. Eye-witnesses give different accounts of the same event. Biographers assert that their subjects were alive when the records show that they were dead, that "the histories" tell us that a man's family was of one origin when in fact they say nothing of the sort.

Today, we know all this to be so; yet even when the practice of mediaeval hagiography was in full swing, there were some who thought it an inferior method of honouring the saints. When Leo and two other companions of Francis of Assisi in 1246 sent their Minister-General their reminiscences, for which he had asked, they said in their prologue that they had not written "in the manner of a *Legenda*", that they had not been "content simply to narrate miracles, which do not create but only demonstrate holiness", but that instead they had tried to show by Francis's own words what was his true holiness. But, as their latest editor has observed,[2] they were not wholly successful in their undertaking. Current fashion was too strong for them, and despite them, the miracles kept on intruding themselves.

But if we too seek for a mediaeval saint's true holiness as the Bollandists have taught us to do, we must beware of a too facile dismissal of all that the Middle Ages tell us about him as mere fiction. Delehaye

2 Rosalind B. Brooke, ed., *Scripta Leonis, Rufini et Angeli Sociorum S. Francisci* (Oxford 1970) 86-87, 5.

himself saw how dangerous his methods could be if unskilfully and uncritically applied. In his perceptive study of the cult of Ida of Toggenburg,[3] he warns that simply to eliminate from her legend every event which seems to a twentieth-century mind incredible is to employ a system which is arbitrary, illusory, confounding the true with the probable. He reminds us that when in 1608 the Congregation of Rites forbade the recitation of Ida's office, Bellarmine, the president, remarked: "The trouble is not so much the saint as her story"; and Delehaye goes on: "The learned cardinal then defined the rule which ought to guide the critics: do not mistake the personality of a saint for the portrait imagined by the hagiographers".[4]

Though most scholars today are content to follow Delehaye's line without observing his cautions, writing, for example, of "the human personality ... lost beneath layers of legend and rhetoric, or diluted to insipidity by imagination and error",[5] there are still those not satisfied with using "hagiography" as a merely pejorative term. A few years ago Giuseppe Agnello produced a sharp attack on the "mythological school",[6] in which he observed: "The desire to discuss the personality of a saint by contradicting everything attributed to him in legends cannot give results acceptable to critics. By using such a criterion one could reduce every saint, however authentic, to a mere figure of myth".[7]

Nothing would be easier than to set about de-mythologizing Thomas Aquinas, for, as we trace the evolution of his legend, we shall find examples of every error and fault which we have listed. There was bitter conflict for the possession of his remains, and those who wanted them to stay at Fossanova, those who organized their translation to Toulouse, glossed the accounts of his last days to suit their opposing purposes. It is difficult not to see, in the legends put about to encourage devotion to his wonder-working cincture, Dominican competition with the long-established Augustinian confraternities (whose charter, it may be added, was an equally dubious story). If we wish to demolish the account of the dying man's longing for herrings, so surprisingly gratified, we may point out that a similar story was told of Francis, decades before. As a naked infant in his bath he had produced for his nurses signs of his future sanctity; but the same, many of his biographers must have

3 "La légende de la bienheureuse Ida de Toggenburg", repr. from *Nova et Vetera* 4, 1929, in *Mélanges d'hagiographie grecque et latine* (Brussels 1966) 347-352.
4 Ibid. 352.
5 M. D. Knowles, "Great Historical Enterprises, I: The Bollandists", *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* V vol. 8 (1958) 149.
6 "Tradizioni Agiografiche e Alterazioni Leggendarie", in *Saggi e Ricerche in Memoria Ettore Li Gotti* (Palermo 1962) I 25-35.
7 Ibid. 25.

known, was told of Nicholas of Bari. Supernatural influences have been ascribed to many events of his life which can bear strictly natural interpretations, and this is especially true of his last sickness. Even today, he is the victim of "figured histories", so that his picture can be mistaken for Dominic or Vincent Ferrer, that of his sister for our Lady. The few remaining and aged witnesses at the formal interrogations who had known him in life were no more reliable than most, as we shall see from their accounts of his arrival at Fossanova. His biographers were prone to their own flights of fancy, so that the unkind nickname given him by his fellow students becomes a tribute to his mythical royal stock.

All this being so, need we trouble ourselves with his legend at all? Surely we must, and for several reasons. Though the lapse of time between his death and the collection of evidence towards his canonization is shorter by far than is usual, we can observe in those few years the growth of distortions, the intrusion of fictions and the preservation of true tradition. True tradition will tell us what Thomas did; yet even the distortions and fictions will show what his familiars thought that he was, and what was the age in which he lived, when men expected interior sanctity to be marked by external signs and wonders.

In his lifetime and immediately thereafter, Thomas was not given universal veneration. It is noteworthy that John Pecham, who as a Franciscan professor at Paris had been involved in public conflict with him, writing to the University of Oxford on 7 December 1284, calls him merely "bonae memoriae", whereas in the next month, in letters to the Roman curia, he refers to his predecessor as archbishop of Canterbury, Robert Kilwardby, as "sanctae memoriae".[8] But the University of Paris, where he had been the centre of so many storms, sent its condolences to the Order of Preachers on his death, and asked them, and also the abbot of Fossanova, for the custody of his body, sure sign that such veneration was already growing.[9] As we study the offices composed for his feasts, and his popular representations, we can see how fast the legend grew and how wide it spread. In the old Dominican church at Maastricht there are frescoes with an inscription dated 1337 (now barely discernible, but preserved in a drawing by Victor de Stuers).[10] There we see, for the edification of the Dutch faithful, the hermit "Bonus" of Roccasecca, with inscribed scroll, confronting Thomas's

8 F. Ehrle ed. F. Pelster, *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur englischen Scholastik* (Rome 1970) 67, 70.

9 P. Mandonnet, "La canonization de S. Thomas d'Aquin", *Mélanges Thomistes* (Le Saulchoir 1923) 12-13.

10 *La peinture au pays de Liège et sur les bords de la Meuse,* 2nd ed. (Liège 1903), 40-41. I owe my knowledge of this, as of many other art-objects associated with Thomas, to the valuable collections of the Index of Christian Art at Princeton, New Jersey.

mother Theodora and prophesying the unborn child's sanctity, the infant, nimbed, holding a scroll as he is bathed, his abduction by his brothers, his temptation by the courtesan and other such legendary scenes. Beyond doubt these frescoes were of Dominican commissioning, but they do show how widely and willingly the legend was accepted.

There is, however, another iconographical tradition, equally ancient, of much more sober derivation, that of the so-called "apotheosis" paintings and miniatures. Whether we find these in service-books such as MSS Milan Coll. Hoepli XXXII and XXXIII, both of the fourteenth century,[11] in details such as that from the "Last Judgment" panel in the Philip Lehmann collection in New York[12] or in such frescoes as that in St. Catherine's church in Pisa, attributed to Francis Traini[13] and that in the Spanish Chapel of Santa Maria Novella in Florence, variously attributed to Andrew of Florence, Antony di Bonaiuto and Thaddaeus Gaddi, and, according to Künstle, inspired by the anonymous painting executed at Fossanova in 1323, the year of Thomas's canonization,[14] they show regularly recurring features. He is depicted teaching, and this is usually indicated by his holding a book or books, often inscribed with quotations from his writings — at Pisa, the opening words of *Contra Gentiles*.[15] Above, he is surrounded by a great nimbus, inhabited variously by Christ in the centre, the apostles Peter and Paul, the evangelists, or Plato and Aristotle — all the sources of his wisdom. Light emanates from him, and prostrate at his feet are Sabellius, Averroes, Arius. (Nothing in this is novel. MS Bibliothèque Nationale latin 1684, of the eleventh century, shows, fol. 1, Athanasius treading down a fallen Arius; and the frontispiece of the contemporary MS B.N. latin 2079, to illustrate *Contra Faustum* shows Augustine as a bishop, with his crozier thrusting a disputing Faustus down to the ground.)

We may ask why Thomas's Order was so relatively slow in seeking through canonization for official approbation of his cult, when devotion to him, both as wonder-worker and divinely inspired teacher, was so early and prevalent. He had lived in anything but obscurity, and his death on the way to the Council of Lyons had been mourned by the whole Western Church, and even beyond its confines. Why then did almost fifty years elapse before he was raised to the altars? It has been suggested, and with great probability,[16] that the first impetus was given

11 P. Toesca, *Miniature Italiane* (Rome 1930) 48 ff.

12 R. Offner, *Florentine Painting* III 2 (Florence 1930) pt. 1, pl. XIX (2).

13 M. D. Knowles with D. Obolensky, *The Middle Ages* (London 1969) pl. C 19.

14 K. Künstle, *Ikonographie der christlichen Kunst* (2 vols., Freiburg i. B. 1926-1928) II 559.

15 For a list of such inscriptions on surviving representations, see G. Kaftal, *Iconography of the Saints in Tuscan Painting* (Florence 1952) 979.

16 To me, by my colleague Fr. James Weisheipl, O. P.

by the establishment of an independent Sicilian Dominican province, and its need — and that of the University of Naples, founded by Frederick II in 1224 — to promote the reputation of the kingdom's greatest modern saint.

To this end the Sicilian province in 1317 commissioned two of its brethren, William of Tocco and Robert of Benevento, to collect the materials necessary for a petition to the Holy See.[17] In November of that year William was in the Abruzzi, at the home of Thomas of San Severino, son of Roger and of Theodora, Thomas's youngest sister. After a journey to Salerno, William returned the next February, and this time met Catherine of Mora, daughter of William of San Severino, Roger's elder brother, and of Mary, another sister of Thomas. Catherine said that she had learned Thomas's history from his own mother, her grandmother; and in the canonization process it is recorded that she is the source of the story of his arrest and imprisonment by his family after he joined the Dominicans.

Later in 1318 William of Tocco was in Avignon, where he met Bernard Gui; and it is probable that Bernard then sketched, from William's communications, the outlines of the *Life* which he was later to publish. In 1319 evidence was heard, in Naples from 23 July until 26 November, and at Fossanova from 10 to 26 November. In 1320-1321 William completed the second, corrected draft of his *Life*, and in 1324-1326 Bernard published a revision of his work.

These were not the first or the last of such writings. The Dominican Ptolemy of Lucca, who had been personally acquainted with Thomas, in his *Annals* reported his death, his noble birth, his learning, his studies under Albert, the part he had been meant to play at Lyons in treating with the Greeks, miracles (unspecified) at Fossanova, and the first disputes over his remains[18] — a factual and dignified account. There has been much controversy, especially between Mandonnet and Prümmer, about the respective value of these sources, but most modern scholars would agree with what Pelster wrote half a century ago: "The biography of William of Tocco is, together with the data of Ptolemy of Lucca, the life-history of Thomas which is chronologically first and in content most important".[19]

The collection of the evidence had been no easy task. Bernard Gui in his *Life* complained that the Preachers through negligence had failed to

17 This chronological account of the process investigations is derived partly from K. Foster, *The Life of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Baltimore 1959), partly from Mandonnet, *La canonization.*

18 MGH Script. NS VIII (1930) 146-147, 176-177.

19 "Die älteren Biographien des hl. Thomas von Aquino", *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 44 (1920) 242-274, 366-397.

record many miracles; and during the process Bartholomew of Capua said that it was commonly and strongly asserted that the Fossanova Cistercians had concealed such miracles in their fear of losing Thomas's body. Bartholomew also stated that when Thomas's secretary and faithful companion, Reginald of Piperno (by far the most important single source of information) was dying, he had confided matters vital to Thomas's cause to John del Giudice, and that when Bartholomew met John at Anagni, he had made him bring these to the knowledge of William of Tocco, and, later, of Benedict XI, himself a Dominican. We begin to see some of the difficulties which William experienced, and of which he wrote: "A certain friar ... his mind full of anxiety, his heart full of love, was pondering how he could best construct the saint's history from all the wonderful manifestations of his sanctity and the stories in praise of him, all of them true, so that it could show what were his origins, the course of his life, his scholarly attainments and his holy end ...".[20] His problem was solved by his dream-vision of the silver net interwoven with golden chains and studded with many-coloured gems. Translated into action, this seems to have meant that he decided to exclude nothing which would serve the purposes he had here declared: he intended to make a collection of wonders to illustrate Thomas's nativity, his religious life, his theology and his saintly death. In fact, William's aim is precisely that "demonstration of holiness" which Leo and his companions had disclaimed.

Thomas's nativity had therefore to be accompanied by events which would signalize the advent of a child of extraordinary sanctity. To the canonization process, William reported that Catherine of Mora had deposed to him at Marsico that Theodora, Thomas's mother, had told her that a hermit called "Friar Bonus" (though this may mean "a hermit friar of the Order called 'Bonus'") had come to the castle of Roccasecca and had said to her: "Gaude domina quia tu es pregnans et paries filium quem vocabis Thomam ...", and that he had prophesied that the child would join the Dominicans, rather than enter Monte Cassino as his family would wish.[21] One would have thought that William's Latin here makes the Lucan allusion clear enough; but not content with this, in *Vita* 1 he adds that Theodora replied: "Non sum digna talem parere filium, faciat deus sue beneplacitum voluntatis".[22] This is the account which Bernard Gui follows, though not ad lit-

20 D. Prümmer ed., *Fontes Vitae Sancti Thomae Aquinatis* (Toulouse n.d.) 122-123. Angelico Ferrua, *S. Thomae Aquinatis Vitae Fontes Praecipuae* (Alba 1968) has also been consulted, but this does not provide the critical edition so much needed to supersede Prümmer's unreliable texts.

21 Ibid. 350.

22 Ibid. 67.

teram;[23] but Peter Calo can improve on it. According to him, what the hermit said was: "Letare vere o domina, filium enim paries qui vocabitur Thomas, in quo profecto erit abyssus sapientie plenioris".[24]

All that we can safely adduce from this is that William asserted that Catherine had told him that her grandmother had told her that a hermit had prophesied the sanctity of her yet unborn child. To drive this point home, St. Luke's Gospel, *Regina coeli*, Isidore of Seville have all been pressed into service ; and since we have no means of knowing what precisely Theodora told Catherine or Catherine told William, it would be idle to speculate how much hindsight or rationalization there may have been in the story's first form. But its essential point need not be doubted: that Thomas from his earliest days was formed in the shape of Christ.

Another infancy narrative, that of the young Thomas in his bath, is probably of different origin. Theodora, it would seem, made no mention of it to Catherine, or Catherine to William. Instead, Peter Caracciolo of Naples deposed at the process that Constance Fanisari had told him that she was present when his mother could not make the child part with the piece of paper on which was written "Ave Maria ...",[25] and which he swallowed. This last detail appears in William's *Vita*, with his gloss: "... ubi divinitus premonstrabatur in puero quam discreta ruminatio scripturarum in ipso debebat precedere ... et quantum saporem dulcedinis doctor sensurus erat ..."[26] Bernard Gui has the story without the moral;[27] but, once again, Peter Calo improves on William. According to him, the incident is "clare insinuans quod futurus erat armarium scripturarum".[28] The bathos of this needs no comment.

But there is reason for suspecting that here we may have to do with a "transferred identity". In MS Bibliothèque Nationale français 51 (John du Vignay's translation of Vincent de Beauvais's *Speculum Historiale*), fol. 117c, between the first and second chapters of the life of Nicholas of Bari, there is an illustrative miniature. Chapter 1 ends with the account of Nicholas's birth, chapter 2 begins: "Et quant il fu orphelin de pere et de mere il mectoit souvent vne euuangille deuant sez oeilz laquelle euuangille (fol. 117d) dist qui ne renonce a tout ce quil a il ne puet pas estre mon disciple ...". The miniature shows, in the foreground, the infant Nicholas naked in his bath attended by his nurses, in the

23 Ibid. 168.
24 Ibid. 18.
25 Ibid. 395.
26 Ibid. 68.
27 Ibid. 168-169.
28 Ibid. 18.

background the young man secretly bestowing gold upon three young girls and being received by the bishop. That we today know how wholly fictional is the received "Life" of Nicholas is irrelevant. We also know how universally it was accepted and represented in late mediaeval literature and plastic art. It would be of interest to know if any other such painting exists, showing the infant in his bath with a scroll, as in the Maastricht Thomas fresco, but reading "Qui ne renonce ..." Even on the evidence of MS B.N. français 51 alone, there is good reason for thinking that this Thomas anecdote may have been borrowed from a Nicholas life — whether through pious fraud or genuine error, one cannot say.

All the witnesses agree that Thomas's entry into the Dominican Order was a stormy one, marked by his abduction by his family and their attempts to lure him into unchastity. We have seen that it is stated that Catherine, his niece, was the prime source here; and there seem to be no grounds for doubting her. Though such events are still a part of the Southern Italian way of life, the story reflects no credit upon his family (even his mother, however reluctantly, had consented to the abduction), and William would hardly have risked offending them at a time when their good will was so much needed, had he not been satisfied that they knew the story to be true.

The account of his temptation by the harlot, whom he drove out with a burning brand, was given an appendix, which then became inalienable from it. William of Tocco said at the process that the previous year at Anagni he had been told by Robert of Sezze, O.P., who had been told by his uncle, Stephen, that after Thomas had thrown the woman out, he prayed that he might never again be assailed by such a temptation, and so fell asleep. In a vision two angels appeared to tell him that God had heard his prayer. They pressed upon his loins and said: "Ecce ex parte dei cingimus te cingulo castitatis quod nulla possit temptatione dissolvi". He cried aloud with the pain and awoke, but refused to say what had made him shout. "Postmodum vero hec et alia multa revelavit predicto socio suo pro eius consolatione".[29] The defective text presented here by Prümmer does not make it clear who is this "predictus socius"; in the lack of evidence we may guess that it was Reginald, and that this was part of his dying revelation. Later, William said this;[30] and Bernard[31] and Peter Calo[32] follow him.

29 Ibid. 349.
30 Ibid. 75.
31 Ibid. 175.
32 Ibid. 24.

This story regularly appears in all the popularizations of Thomas's cult. We find it in one of the matins responses for a fourteenth-century office for his feast:

Orat pressa cruce mirifica,
Renes cingit manus angelica.[33]

In MS Bibliothèque Nationale latin 9473 (French, of the fifteenth century), fol. 174v, Thomas in glory in the centre is flanked, left, by three miniatures: above, he is received as a boy by the Preachers, centre, he drives out the courtesan as his brother watches, below, he is girded by angels. All these incidents are included in a composite scene on an early fourteenth-century panel, variously attributed, in the Berlin State Museum.[34] The "cingulum castitatis" becomes one of Thomas's attributes. In the late fifteenth-century portrait by Fra Carnovale in the Poldi-Pezzoli Museum in Milan, he wears the black outdoor habit, under which a white capuche shows, and, outside, the cincture, giving him the appearance more of an Augustinian.[35]

The sources of this story are so obscure that it is useless to speculate on its authenticity; but, again, its implications were at once and universally accepted: from his youth, Thomas was of angelic purity. But the idea that veneration of a cincture would promote a like purity in the devoted is much more recent. It seems to have been originated by the Venerable Mary Villani (1584-1670), of St. John the Baptist's convent in Naples, whose Dominican biographer, Dominic Marchese, recorded that Christ and Thomas appeared to her, Thomas by Christ's command girding her with such a cincture whilst Christ promised as a further grace that the gift of chastity would be granted to anyone wearing with full faith a girdle woven by her.[36] As has been said, it is difficult not to discern in this a spirit of competition with the already established Augustinian cincture confraternities.

We have seen that in a fourteenth-century office this girding by angels with the cincture is associated with Thomas's prayer before a crucifix of miraculous properties. This collocation is, however, fortuitous, and most of the evidence suggests that this second event is to be assigned to his later days in Naples. It is, possibly, the best known and most frequently mentioned wonder of his whole life.

33 C. U. J. Chevalier, *Repertorium hymnologicum* (Louvain 1892-1912, Brussels 1920-1921) 6081; G. M. Dreves, *Analecta hymnica medii aevi* (Leipzig 1886-1922) V 321.

34 Kaftal, *Tuscan Painting* 982, where the earlier erroneous identification with Dominic is corrected.

35 Künstle II 558, ill. 265.

36 C. Pera, "De Sacro Cingulo S. Thomae Aquinatis", *Xenia Thomistica* III (1925) 486-487.

One Dominican prose alludes to it in general terms:

Crucifixus commendabat
Quod de ipso scriptitabat
  Tam venusto schemate ...[37]

Another prose quotes it more closely:

Crucifixus hunc adfatur
Et promittens consolatur
  Se doctori praemium ...;[38]

and a hymn gives the original anecdote almost verbatim:

Nam cum sacrae corpus cenae
  Descripsisset fratribus
Panis, vini substans plene
  Solis accidentibus:
De me, Thoma, scriptum bene
  Crux afflavit auribus.[39]

The story, not in the context in which it usually appears, but otherwise in its most explicit form, is found in William of Tocco's *Vita* 34. Dominic of Caserta, the sacristan at Naples, one night after matins followed Thomas into the chapel of St. Nicholas, and found him in prayer, lifted two cubits into the air. He heard a voice speaking from the crucifix: "Thoma, bene scripsisti de me, quam recipies a me pro tuo labore mercedem? Qui respondit: Domine, non nisi te". After this he wrote the third part of the *Summa,* on Christ's Passion and Resurrection, and this was almost the last that he wrote, a sign that he had already received this reward.[40]

Bartholomew of Capua in his account of how Thomas stopped writing makes no mention, as we shall see, of this locution; and we must observe that William, in *Vita* 52, has a second version, in which, when the Paris masters were publicly contradicting each other about accidents in the Blessed Sacrament, Thomas took what he had written into the chapel, laid it upon the altar, and prayed before the crucifix to be told if it were true; whereupon suddenly he saw Christ standing upon his notes, and heard him say: "Bene de hoc mei corporis sacramento scripsisti." Remaining there in prayer, he was raised a cubit into the air. Many witnessed this and related it to others.[41]

37 Chevalier 28104; Dreves XLIV 27.
38 Chevalier 28938; Dreves XXXVII 270.
39 Chevalier 31449; Dreves XLIII 294.
40 *Fontes* 108.
41 Ibid. 125-126.

Later tradition seems to have associated this miracle with Naples and not with Paris. In 1595, an account of the conflict in the Naples convent between supporters and opponents of reform concluded by saying that the victors ended the day reciting the Litanies of the Name of Jesus "in the chapel of the most holy Crucified One who spoke to St. Thomas Aquinas".[42]

We should also notice that later writers — John Michael Pio[43] and Raphael Carnavali[44] — assert that Thomas received a third "Bene scripsisti" locution at Orvieto, whilst he was composing his office of the Blessed Sacrament.[45] But older traditions seem to associate the event directly with a miraculous crucifix, and only indirectly, if at all, with the Eucharist. In MS Caius College Cambridge 148, c. 1400, the prayer often attributed to Thomas, "Concede michi queso misericors deus ..." is preceded by this rubric: "Hanc oracionem fecit sanctus thomas ... quam cotidie coram crucifixo dicere solebat. A quo idem thomas hec verba audire meruit: Bene scripsisti de me thoma ...".[46] Wilmart reserved judgment on the authenticity of "Concede michi", because he had not found it in manuscripts older than the fourteenth century; but he reports one of the fifteenth century, MS Bologna University Library 1580, with a rubric with a similar incipit: "Oratio beati thomae de aquino quam dicebat quotidie cum lacrimis coram crucifixo".[47]

In considering these accounts, we must begin by conceding that this was an age of miraculous crucifixes, and that this, beyond doubt, is to be associated with the increasingly more naturalistic representations of Christ's Passion which began about the year 1200, and reached their horrifying apex with *Christi Leiden in einer Vision geschaut* and Matthias Grünewald. It became a cliché of late mediaeval painters to indicate devotion to the Passion by showing the devotee in prayer before such a crucifix. A classic example is Francis, receiving the stigmata from one borne on seraph wings;[48] and this in its turn is transferred to Catherine of Siena — e.g. in MS Bibliothèque Nationale allemand 34, fol. 1r, the initial of a Middle High German translation of the *Dialogo*.

Corresponding stories abound. The abbot of a neighbouring monastery told how a monk known to him came upon Bernard of Clair-

42 M. Miele, *La Riforma Domenicana a Napoli ... 1583-1725* (Rome 1963) 367.

43 *Delle vite degli uomini illustri di San Domenico* (Bologna 1607-1613) 226-227.

44 *Vita di S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (Foligno 1882) 150.

45 J. V. De Groot, *Het Leven van den H. Thomas van Aquino* (Utrecht 1907) 364 n. 3.

46 A. I. Doyle, "A Prayer attributed to St. Thomas Aquinas", *Dominican Studies* I (1948) 231-232.

47 A. Wilmart, *Auteurs spirituels et textes dévots du moyen âge latin* (Paris 1932) 379 n. 1, 584.

48 E.g. MS Bibliothèque Nationale latin 1288, a fourteenth-century Franciscan breviary, fol. 521v.

vaux praying alone in the church. He was prostrate before the altar, when a crucifix appeared before him, which he reverenced and kissed. The image freed its hands from the nails, and pressed and embraced him.[49] One day as Francis prayed before the wooden crucifix in St. Damian's in Assisi, it parted its lips to say: "Go and repair my house, which is falling in ruins".[50] In MS Florence Riccardiana 1489, a partly Franciscan miscellany of the fourteenth century, on fol. 3v Francis is shown embracing the foot of the cross and gesturing towards Poverty; Christ bleeds profusely from hands and side. Sister Cecilia, of the St. Agnes convent at Bologna, described for the author of *The Nine Ways of Prayer of St. Dominic* how the saint used to pray, upright, prostrate, genuflecting or before the crucifix;[51] and one manuscript of the *Nine Ways*, Vatican Ross. 3, contains three miniatures depicting this, in all of which there pour out torrents of blood.[52]

If the ecstatic is shown in Dominican habit, identification with Thomas rather than Dominic will only be certain if the crucifix is given a "Bene scripsisti" scroll. But this sometimes is transferred, as in the Thomas apotheosis by Antonello of Messina in the National Museum at Palermo, where the words are inscribed on a book held by two angels to the right of God the Father, so robbing them of their traditional context.[53]

Thomas's age was attracted by the sensational elements of this anecdote; but these do not impair its real significance — the depth of his devotion to the Passion and the Eucharist, and the intensity of prayer and self-examination which accompanied all his work. Walz wrote: "Thomas's visions are all concerned with the manifestation of truth... These divine illuminations came to him in answer to the ardent prayers and fasts by which he implored the grace of understanding in dark and difficult matters".[54]

We may however question whether this is wholly true, when we come to consider the famous accounts of the "last vision". The immediate source is the evidence to the Naples process of the chancellor and protonotary Bartholomew of Capua, who said that this was some of the information given by the dying Reginald to John del Guidice, who

49 *Exordium Magne Cisterciense* VII vii, PL 185 419-420.

50 O. Englebert, *St. Francis of Assisi* (7th rev. English edn., Chicago 1965) 74, quoting II Celano 10 and 11.

51 F. C. Lehner, *St. Dominic: Biographical Documents* (Washington 1964) 147.

52 *Bibliotheca Sanctorum* IV 694.

53 M. Grabmann, trans. N. Ashenbrener, *The Interior Life of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee 1951) 19.

54 A. Walz, trans. S. Bullough, *St. Thomas Aquinas, a biographical Study* (Westminster, Md., 1951) 171-172.

repeated it to Bartholomew, who in his turn has made it known to William of Tocco and others. According to Bartholomew, one day after celebrating Mass in the chapel of St. Nicholas at Naples, Thomas was strangely changed. He would write or dictate nothing more, and "suspendit organa scriptionis" in the middle of III, *De Poenitentia*. Reginald asked him how he could leave unfinished anything so great, and his reply was "Raynalde, non possum". Reginald, "timens ne propter multum studium aliquam incurisset amentiam", continued to urge him, and Thomas would only say that all that he had written seemed now so much straw to him. They went to stay with his sister, the countess of San Severino, who was much perturbed by the change she saw, saying to Reginald that Thomas seemed dazed, and hardly spoke to her. Finally, imposing silence on Reginald until after his death, Thomas told him: "Omnia que scripsi videntur michi palee respectu eorum que vidi et revelata sunt michi".[55] Earlier in his evidence Bartholomew had recounted how, after this incident, on the way towards Lyons, Thomas "percussit caput in quadam arbore que ceciderat per transversum ita quod fere stupefactus quodammodo fuit circa casum".[56]

In *Vita* 67, William gives a different version, in which it is at San Severino that Thomas experienced ecstasy for an extraordinary length of time, until Reginald felt obliged to recall him to himself. He then sighed, and said: "Tibi in secreto revelo, prohibens ne in vita mea alicui audeas revelare. Venit finis scripture mee, quia talia sunt mihi revelata quod ea que scripsi et locui modica mihi videntur; et ex hoc spero in deo quod sicut doctrine mee sic cito finis erit et vite".[57] This is the version repeated by Bernard Gui;[58] but either gives us the essentials.

Of the whole legend, no other incident suggests more clearly a purely natural explanation. Several medical authorities with whom the present writer has discussed it have independently said that it presents the standard symptoms of severe brain damage through haemorrhage: impaired speech, manual dexterity and gait, expectation of further such attacks, and violent mental disturbance. Yet, on the other hand, we have, in Bartholomew's account, through, it is true, two intermediaries, Thomas's own statement that this disturbance had taken with him the form of a perception of divine truth clearer than had ever before been granted to him, and totally overwhelming. These are the facts as they are known to us; to pass further judgment on them would be temerarious.

55 *Fontes* 376-378.
56 Ibid. 375.
57 Ibid. 120.
58 Ibid. 193.

From then on, we can see, Thomas lived in daily expectation of death. Obedience made him set out for Lyons, but it is plain that he did not hope to arrive there; and when he was taken to Fossanova, saying that he wished to die in a house of religion, he uttered the famous "Hec requies mea in seculum seculi, hic habitabo quoniam elegi eam" (the Vulgate version of Psalm 131.14, the first psalm of ferial Thursday vespers in the Cursus Dominicanus).[59] The Fossanova monks gave this much prominence in their evidence to the process, since they interpreted it to mean that Thomas's body was not to be taken away; but their varying accounts of where this was said show how defective is the human memory.

Octavian of Babuco said that he, Peter of Montesangiovanni and others were present at Thomas's arrival, and that the words were spoken "ante chorum ecclesie".[60] But Peter of Montesangiovanni deposed that it was "in loco parlatori";[61] and Nicholas of Fresolino said that he had heard Peter say that it was "in ingressu dicti monasterii".[62] Still other varying accounts by such as Bartholomew of Capua and William of Tocco need not be considered, as they were not eye-witnesses.

Enough has been said to show what was the temper of Thomas's first biographers — their determination to find wonders in every possible event, their enthusiastic acceptance of stories of highly dubious authenticity, and their remorseless moralizing. His fellow students in Paris had called him "the dumb ox", in unkind allusion to his taciturnity and girth; but this is for William of Tocco a peg on which to hang the tale of how, in Cologne, he one day answered so perfectly that Albert was moved by the spirit of prophecy to exclaim: "He will low so loud when he teaches that it will sound throughout the world".[63] Later the epithet is endowed with a different significance; we are told that he was called "bos sicilie" because of his great and handsome stature, "for he, King Louis of Sicily and King Peter of Aragon were the sons of three sisters, 'ut habetur in hystoriis'".[64] The lords of Aquino, it is true, were connected by marriage with the Hohenstaufen dynasty,[65] and so with the royal houses of Sicily, Aragon, Castile and France; but that Theodora had two kings for nephews is pure fiction.

59 W. R. Banniwell, *A History of the Dominican Liturgy* (New York 1944) 136.
60 *Fontes* 286.
61 Ibid. 332.
62 Ibid. 280.
63 Ibid. 78-79.
64 "Quedam pertinentia ad translationem corporis S. Thomae de Aquino", *Analecta Bollandiana* 58 (1940) 43.
65 E. Kantorowicz, *Kaiser Friedrich der Zweite* (2 vols., Berlin 1931) indices.

The story of the "dumb ox", in its primitive form, tells us only of Thomas's recollection, patience and humility (and that he was from his youth corpulent); and so, with every other anecdote, we must search, discarding embellishments and pruning accretions, for that basic truth which in their allusive and indirect way the biographers sought to convey.

Every saint has his own distinctive emblem. Light, and the sources of light, are Thomas's. Before his body had been washed for burial, John of Ferentino, sub-prior of Fossanova, who was blind, laid himself upon it, placing his eyes over the saint's; and at once his sight was restored.[66] When John Coppa, a Naples notary, and his Dominican brother Bonfiglio visited Thomas, who was sick in his cell in the Naples convent, both saw a very bright star enter through the window and hang over the bed "for so long as one takes to say a slow 'Hail Mary'".[67] A Preacher who saw the boy in Naples and was astounded by his knowledge three times had a vision of him, his face shining like the sun and illumining everything.[68] For the three nights before his death a star like a comet was seen over Fossanova; and as he died, one of the monks who had fallen asleep praying in the church saw another star, of extraordinary brilliance, fall to the earth, where it was followed by two more, all three presently rising again to the heavens.[69] William of Tocco in *Vita* 61 repeats this and moralizes: Thomas in this life had already seen the lumen gloriae.[70]

Seven centuries have gone by, and we live in an age suspicious not only of what hagiographers such as William of Tocco were prepared to accept as evidence, but of the pieties which they sought to inspire. Yet Thomas's holiness transcends all this; nor can it be dissociated from his learning. His entire life was a singleminded and prayerful pursuit of divine truth; and his legend, in its mediaeval fashion, tells us how richly he was given what he had sought.

66 *Fontes* 335.
67 Ibid. 391-392.
68 Ibid. 70.
69 Ibid. 133.
70 Ibid. 134-135.

PAPST JOHANNES XXII. UND THOMAS VON AQUIN

ZUR GESCHICHTE DER HEILIGSPRECHUNG DES AQUINATEN

Angelus Walz O.P.

SEITDEM Gregor IX. im Jahre 1234 das Recht der Heiligsprechungen ausschliesslich dem Oberhaupt der Kirche vorbehalten hat,[1] nehmen diese unter den Amtshandlungen des Papstes einen Vorzugsplatz ein. Infolgedessen wird der Name des heiligsprechenden Papstes mit dem des Heiliggesprochenen innig verknüpft. Da Johannes XXII. die Heiligsprechung des Aquinaten vornahm, so sind die Namen dieser beiden Männer in der Geschichte der Kirche und der Kultur in besonderer Weise verbunden.

Im Folgenden kann von einer durchgehenden Neudarstellung der Geschichte der Heiligsprechung des Aquinaten aus Gründen der Raumgrenze nicht die Rede sein, es werden aber einerseits die Grundzüge des Verlaufs dieser Angelegenheit vorgeführt und andererseits Berichtigungen sowie neue Teilerkenntnisse zu früheren Darstellungen geboten.

DER AQUINATE IM RUF DER HEILIGKEIT UND DER WUNDER

Abseits von den grossen Verkehrsadern Westeuropas und fern von den belebten Mittelpunkten des Handels, der Wirtschaft und des Reichtums, des Wissens, der politischen und der Kirchenmacht hat Thomas von Aquin das Zeitliche gesegnet. Dem Ruf Gregors X. folgend, der seine Gegenwart beim 2. Konzil von Lyon gewünscht hatte, starb er auf dem Weg zur Rhônestadt in der Frühe des 7. März 1274 in der an Ausläufern der Lepinerberge gelegenen Zisterzienserabtei Fossanova.[2] Mit ihm war ein überragender Gelehrter und eine

1 J. Schlafke, *De competentia in causis Sanctorum decernendi a primis p. Ch. n. Saeculis ad a. 1234* (Rom 1961) 145. Belege für das Folgende bei A. Walz, "Historia canonizationis S. Thomae de Aquino," *Xenia thomistica,* 3 (Rom 1925) 105-172. In den folgenden Anmerkungen werden nicht alle Nachweise geboten, sondern nur neuere Quellen- und sachliche Angaben sowie Verbesserungen.

2 A. Walz, *Luoghi di San Tommaso* (Rom 1961) 112-122.

vielverehrte Persönlichkeit, ein Priester und Ordensmann von seltener Geistigkeit heimgegangen. Schon im Zeugnis, das Papst Alexander IV. am 3. März 1256 dem verhältnismässig jungen Dozenten Thomas von Aquin ausstellte als "einem Mann, der sowohl durch den Adel der Geburt als auch durch Ehrbarkeit der Sitten ausgezeichnet ist und den Schatz der schriftkundigen Wissenschaft durch die Gnade Gottes erworben hat," kommt eine übergewöhnliche Wertschätzung zum Ausdruck. Thomas wird als Gelehrter und als ethische Gestalt gerühmt. Seine Selbstbeherrschung und Vornehmheit bei der akademischen Disputation in Pariser Universitätskreisen mit dem streitbaren Johannes Peckham OFM blieb unvergessen.[3] Peckham stiess übrigens mit einem andern Thomas, dem von Cantilupe, Bischof von Hereford zusammen, den er als Erzbischof von Canterbury mit dem Kirchenbann belegte.[4]

Auffallende Gebetserhörungen und wunderwirkende Kräfte wurden dem Aquinaten schon zu Lebzeiten zugeschrieben. Nach seinem Tod betrauerte die Pariser Artistenfakultät in einem Schreiben an das in Lyon versammelte Generalkapitel der Dominikaner den Heimgang dieses so hervorragenden Meisters und Lehrers als einen Verlust für die allgemeine Kirche und eine offenkundige Verarmung der Pariser Hochschule. Aus Pariser Gelehrtenkreisen stammt das Zeugnis des Gottfried von Fontaines († nach 1306), der Thomas persönlich gekannt hatte: "Einige bekämpfen in manchen Punkten die überaus fruchtbare Lehre eines gewissen berühmten Meisters, dessen Andenken Ehre verdient; sie laufen Sturm gegen seine Aussagen, indem sie sowohl ihn persönlich herabsetzen als auch seine Lehre, allerdings mehr mit Schmähungen als mit Gründen."[5] In Neapel, wo Thomas seine letzten Jahre verbracht hatte, konnte die öffentliche Meinung über sein tugendhaftes und verdienstreiches Beispiel nicht verstummen. Die Zelle im Dominikanerkloster in Neapel galt als verehrungswürdig. Zumal Wilhelm von Tocco OP hegte grosse Andacht zum verewigten Lehrer und sprach sich darüber mit andern aus, die ihn ebenfalls gekannt hatten.[6] So mit Bartholomäus von Capua, der in jugendlichem Alter Thomas schätzen gelernt hatte, und, in Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft zu hohem Rang aufgestiegen, ihm persönliche Verehrung erwies und sich darüber mit Papst Benedikt XI. zu dessen Freude unterhielt.[7]

3 *Fontes vitae S. Thomae Aquinatis*, ed. M.-H. Laurent (Saint Maximin 1934) 374, test. Bartholomaeus de Capua. A. Walz - P. Novarina, *St. Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain-Paris 1962) 156.
4 *Lex. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 10 (1965) 138.
5 A. Walz, "Politik um Thomas von Aquin," *Religion, Wissenschaft u. Kultur*, 12 (1961) 231.
6 *Fontes vitae*, 345, 355.
7 *Lex. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 2 (1958) 11. *Fontes vitae*, 378.

Die Abtei Fossanova ehrte Thomas mit der Beisetzung vor dem Hochaltar und auch durch Übertragungen, um sich diesen Schatz zu sichern. Denn es erhoben sich Stimmen, zumal aus Dominikanerkreisen, die die sterblichen Überreste des Aquinaten für sich beanspruchten. Bei einer der Übertragungen wurde nicht die Messe de requiem, sondern die eines Bekenners gefeiert. Hilfesuchende und fromme Beter wie Bartholomäus von Capua fanden sich am Thomasgrab ein.[8]

In den Akten dominikanischer Generalkapitel wird Thomas als *venerabilis* oder *recolende memorie* und seine Lebensführung als *laudabilis* bezeichnet. Er gilt auch sonst als *sancte memorie*.[9] Mitglieder der Hierarchie wie Marinus Erzbischof von Capua, Ägidius von Rom OSA Erzbischof von Bourges, Albert der Grosse, Franziskus OFM, Bischof von Terracina-Priverno-Sezze, der Coronensis, und andere bezeugen seine Heiligkeit und Verehrung.[10] Der selige Jakob von Viterbo OSA, Erzbischof von Neapel (†1307/08) schrieb: "Das Ansehen des Bruders Thomas hat sich, obwohl seine Schriften nach seinem Tod...angegriffen wurden, nie vermindert, sondern immer mehr gefestigt und über die ganze Erde hin verbreitet zugleich mit der Verehrung und Hochschätzung für ihn." Innige Verehrung zollte Albert von Brescia OP dem Aquinaten. Über eine Vision von ihm berichtete er im Jahre 1310 zwei Studenten. Remigius Girolami OP in Florenz preist Thomas als *doctor doctorum sanctusque cacumine morum*. Dante erwähnt die höfliche Art und das glorreiche Leben des Aquinaten und das Beispiel des "buon frate Tommaso." Historiographische Zeugnisse bei Gerhard von Frachet, Thomas von Cantimpré, Tholomäus von Lucca und Bernhard Gui trugen bei, den Ruf der Heiligkeit Thomas' weithin zu tragen. Er hatte sich verbreitet im Dominikanerorden, bei Welt- und Ordensgeistlichen bis nach Zypern, ins Heilige Land und zu den "barbarischen Nationen."[11]

8 *Fontes vitae*, 380 ff.; 355.

9 *Fontes vitae*, 621 ff.; 637; 655; 656. A. Dondaine, "Venerabilis doctor," *Mélanges Et. Gilson*, (Toronto-Paris 1959) 211-225.

10 Walz, "Historia canonizationis," 110. Der Coronensis, im Prozess von Neapel (*Fontes vitae*, 403; vgl. C. Eubel, *Hierarchia catholica medii aevi*, 2 (2. Aufl. Münster 1914) xix, Carm[in]en. seu Carinen. genannt, war Dominikaner. Mit Carmicensis oder Carminensis dürfte der Bischof von Corone in Böothien gemeint sein, vgl. R. J. Loenertz, "Athènes et Néopatras," *Archiv. Fratr. Praed.* 28 (1958) 32.

11 *Fontes vitae*, 385; 586-89.

Die Thomaslehre als "Doctrina Communis"

Bei der edlen und heiligmässigen Lebensführung des Aquinaten liegt es nahe, aus seinem Beruf als Gelehrter und aus seiner wissenschaftlichen Betätigung auf eine besondere Gediegenheit seiner Geistesarbeit und seiner Doktrin zu schliessen. Das bezeugen schon das Schreiben der Artistenfakultät von 1274 und die Urteile von Gottfried von Fontaines, Jakob von Viterbo und anderen. Das bewahrheitet sich in dem Masse, dass in der Geschichte der Scholastik das 13. Jahrhundert "das Jahrhundert des hl. Thomas"[12] genannt wird. Bei dem Pluralismus der Lehrer und Geistesrichtungen darf es aber auch nicht verwundern, dass die wissenschaftliche Methode und Lehre des Aquinaten zu seinen Lebzeiten und nach seinem Tod nicht allseitig anerkannt und befolgt wurden. Eine ortskirchliche, in Stefan Tempier, Bischof von Paris, verkörperte Autorität verurteilte am 7. März 1277 40 theologische und 179 philosophische Sätze, im ganzen 219 Lehrpunkte, darunter einige, die als Ansichten des Aquinaten galten.[13] Am 18. März 1277 folgte eine ähnliche Verurteilung in Oxford durch Robert Kilwardby OP, Erzbischof von Canterbury. Kilwardbys Nachfolger auf dem Erzbischofsstuhl Johannes Peckham kam im Jahre 1284 wiederholt auf sie zurück.[14] Der Generalminister der Franziskaner verbot auf dem Generalkapitel zu Strassburg 1282 die Vervielfältigung der *Summa* des Bruders Thomas. Nur bemerkenswert intelligente Lektoren und diese bloss bei Benützung der *Declarationes* des Wilhelm de la Mare sollten davon ausgenommen sein. Mit Wilhelms Schrift begann der Korrektorienstreit, der sich durch zwei Jahrzehnte gegen und für die Thomaslehre hinzog.[15] Im Jahre 1302 übersiedelte Johannes Duns Scotus OFM nach Paris. In ihm trat ein gewichtiger Kämpe gegen das Lehrgebäude des Aquinaten auf.

Das dominikanische Generalkapitel von Mailand 1278 unter dem Vorsitz des seligen Johannes von Vercelli ordnete zwei Patres nach England ab, um über die Mitbrüder, die zum Ärgernis des Ordens über die Schriften des Aquinaten sich verächtlich ausgelassen haben, Erkundigungen einzuziehen. Das Generalkapitel von Paris 1279 verbot, unehrerbietig und unpassend über Thomas und seine Schriften zu sprechen; wer sich verfehle, soll gestraft werden. In Paris traten für Thomas unter anderen ein Wilhelm de Peyre de Godin, bekannt durch

12 F. Van Steenberghen, *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle* (Louvain-Paris 1966) 540.
13 Walz, "Politk um Thomas," 231. *Fontes vitae*, 596-614.
14 *Fontes vitae*, 615-617.
15 *Lex. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 6 (1961) 561; vgl. 10 (1965) 1138. A. Walz, "S. Tommaso d'Aquino dichiarato dottore della Chiesa nel 1567," *Angelicum*, 44 (1967) 148.

seine *Lectura thomasina* von 1300,[16] Herveus Natalis, der vielleicht angesehenste Dominikanertheologe des beginnenden 14. Jahrhunderts,[17] und Petrus de Palude, in England Thomas von Sutton und Richard Knapwell, in Italien Rambert von Primadizzi und Johannes von Neapel, im deutschen Raum Johannes Picardi von Lichtenberg, Nikolaus von Strassburg, Heinrich von Lübeck sowie Johannes und Gerhard von Sternengassen.[17a]

Dietrich von Freiberg ging eigene Wege. Johannes Quidort und zumal Johannes von Metz[18] wichen von Thomaslehren ab. Dem letzteren erwiderte (1302-1307) Herveus.[19] Grossen Anstoss erregte bei Mitbrüdern, Augustinern, Karmeliten, dem Kanzler von Oxford, und anderen der Sentenzenkommentar des Durandus. Während zehn Jahren (1307-1317) trat ihm Herveus entgegen.[20] Das Generalkapitel von Zaragoza 1309 empfahl verstärkt die Thomaslehre. Durandus, der seine Lehrtätigkeit von Paris nach Avignon verlegt hatte, wird durch die Verordnung des Generalkapitels von Metz 1313 getroffen. Man soll nicht das Gegenteil dessen vortragen, was gemeinhin als Lehre des Aquinaten gilt, auch keine Schriften ausserhalb des Ordens veröffentlichen ohne vorhergehende Prüfung durch den Ordensmeister. Die Thomaslehre gilt als "sanior et communior."[21] Der Ordensmeister Berengar von Landore übergab wohl noch 1313 die Schriften des Durandus einer zehnköpfigen Kommission. Ihr stand Herveus vor. Die Hauptbearbeiter der Zensurenliste (93 Artikel) waren Johannes von Neapel und Petrus de Palude.[22] Eine zweite Liste (235 Artikel) ist ebenfalls von ihnen verfasst worden. In der zweiten ist ein Fortschritt des Thomismus als betonterer Gegensatz zwischen Durandus und dem Aquinaten festzustellen.[23] Das Generalkapitel zu London 1314 empfiehlt das Studium moralphilosophischer und anderer Traktate des Aquinaten und bestätigt die Bestimmung von Metz. Das Generalkapitel zu Bologna 1315 schärft den Studienpräfekten die Anzeigepflicht an Obere ein, wenn Lektoren "con-

16 P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle*, I (Paris 1933), 187-188. *Lex. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 8 (1963) 363-4.

17 J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Pourçain O.P.*: Forschungen zum Streit um Thomas von Aquin zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, *Literargeschichtliche Grundlegung* (Münster i.W. 1927) I, 211.

17a Vgl. M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, III (München 1956) 352.

18 L. Ullrich, *Fragen der Schöpfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz O.P.*, Eine vergleichende Untersuchung aus der Dominikanerschule um 1300 (Leipzig 1966). B. Decker, *Die Gotteslehre des Jakob von Metz*: Untersuchungen zur Dominikanertheologie zu Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts, hg. von R. Haubst (Münster i.W. 1967).

19 Glorieux, *Répertoire*, I, 200. N. Valois, *Jacques Duèse (Pape Jean XXII)*, Histoire littéraire de la France, 34 (Paris 1914) 349.

20 Koch, *Durandus*, I, 211-391; 406-7. Glorieux, *Répertoire*, I, 201-5.

21 Koch, *Durandus*, I, 410-11. *Fontes vitae*, 655-56.

22 Koch, *Durandus*, I, 412-13; 200-203.

23 Koch, *Durandus*, I, 416; 203-8.

tra communem doctrinam Thome" oder der Kirche verstossen.[24] Gegen den Dozenten Hubert Guidi in Florenz, der sich "contra sanam et sacram doctrinam doctoris fratris Thome de Aquino" erklärt hatte, schritt das Kapitel der römischen Provinz 1315 ein.[25] Das Kapitel der Toulouser Provinz zu Orthez 1316 verfügt, dass keine der allgemeinen Lehre entgegenstehenden Ansichten vorgetragen werden. Man lese nach den Werken "der ehrwürdigen Brüder Thomas und Albert und Petrus von Tarantasia."[26] Im akademischen Jahr 1316-1317 disputierte Johannes von Neapel, ob man in Paris erlaubterweise die Thomaslehre in allen Punkten vortragen könne, d.h. ob die Verurteilung von 1277 Thomaslehren betreffe und Gültigkeit habe. Er verneinte das letztere und bejahte das erstere.[27]

Der Einfluss der Thomaslehre äusserte sich auch in der Benützung und Verbreitung der Werke. Die Pariser Artistenfakultät bemühte sich um Thomasschriften. Die dominikanischen Generalkapitel von 1278 an empfehlen ihr Studium.[28] König Karl II. von Neapel schenkte seinem Sohn Ludwig, seit 1296 Franziskaner und Erzbischof von Toulouse, für seine Studien die *Summa theologiae* des Aquinaten.[29] In der Bibliothek Bonifatius' VIII. fanden sich grössere und kleinere Thomaswerke. Der Stamser und andere Kataloge bieten Verzeichnisse von ihnen. Das Generalkapitel zu Bologna 1315 verordnet, dass Thomasschriften der Konventsbibliothek zugeführt und nicht veräussert werden, ausser sie seien doppelt vorhanden; für die Konventsbibliothek sollen sämtliche Werke des Aquinaten beschafft werden.[30]

Ein Angebot Papst Johannes' XXII.

Bei dem Ruf der Heiligkeit des Lebens und der Erhabenheit der Lehre des Aquinaten mag der eine oder andere wie Wilhelm von Tocco, Bartholomäus von Capua oder Albert von Brescia an die Möglichkeit der Heiligsprechung für Thomas gedacht haben, aber entscheidende Schritte von ihnen oder seitens des Ordens scheinen während vier Jahrzehnten nicht unternommen worden zu sein. Nach dem Tod Klemens'

24 Koch, *Durandus*, I, 413. *Fontes vitae*, 658.

25 *Acta Capitulorum Provincialium Prov. Romanae*, ed. T. Kaeppeli, (Romae 1941), MOPH, 20, 197.

26 Koch, *Durandus*, I, 414. *Fontes vitae*, 658.

27 C. Jellouschek, "Quaestio magistri Ioannis de Neapoli, O. P., "Utrum licite possit doceri Parisius doctrina fratris Thomae quantum ad omnes conclusiones eius" hic primum in lucem edita," *Xenia thomistica*, 3, 73-104. Walz, "S. Tommaso dichiarato dottore," *Angelicum* 44 (1967) 149.

28 *Fontes vitae*, 594-5; 621-2, 652-4, 663, 659, 672-3, 675-777. M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, 3. Aufl. (Münster i. W. 1949).

29 M. R. Toynbee, *S. Louis of Toulouse and the Process of Canonization in the Fourteenth Century*, (Manchester 1929) 103, 174, 236.

30 *Fontes vitae*, 652-4; 663; 659; vgl. 672-3; 675-7.

V. (†1314) ging aus einem mühevollen über zwei Jahre sich hinziehenden Konklave am 7. August 1316 Kardinal Jakob Duèse als erwählter Papst hervor: Johannes XXII.[31] Er war der Kandidat der französischen Kardinäle, des Grafen von Poitiers und des Königs Robert von Neapel. Da das Konklave im Dominikanerkloster zu Lyon stattgefunden hatte, erbot sich der neue Papst, einen Diener Gottes aus dem Dominikanerorden heiligzusprechen, den die Obrigkeiten des Ordens vorschlügen. Wann Johannes XXII. diese Absicht geäussert hat, steht nicht fest, aber offenbar zu Beginn des Pontifikates. Ordensmeister war damals Berengar von Landore. Von Johannes XXII. sehr geschätzt, wurde er zusammen mit dem Erzbischof von Bourges zur Beilegung politischer Zwiste in Frankreich, Brabant und Flandern mit einer Legation betraut.[32] An der Leitung des Generalkapitels von Pamplona 1317 verhindert, vertrat ihn als Generalvikar Petrus de Palude. Dieser unterrichtete im Auftrag des Kapitels am 29. Mai 1317 den König Jakob von Aragonien, Sardinien und Korsika vom Angebot des Papstes. Der König unternahm sofort Schritte zugunsten der Causa Raimunds von Penyafort.[33] Sie war bereits in den Jahren 1279, 1281 und 1298 erwogen worden, aber, wie die vorhergehenden Male, sollte sie auch 1317 nicht anziehen. Erst 1601 wurde Raimund von Penyafort kanonisiert.

Heiligsprechungen in voravignonischer und avignonischer Zeit

"Heiligsprechungen sind, unter Voraussetzung der nötigen sachlichen und legalen Gegebenheiten, in der sichtbaren Kirche oft ein Politikum. Der menschliche Anteil tritt in jener Zeit stark hervor. Ludwig IX. wurde am 11. August 1297 kanonisiert in einem Augenblick der Verständigung zwischen Philipp dem Schönen und Papst Bonifaz VIII." Petrus von Murrone als Papst "Cölestin V. gelangte zur Ehre der Altäre mit einer Spitze gegen das Andenken Bonifaz' VIII. Immerhin hat Klemens V. seinen mittelbaren Vorgänger nicht als Märtyrer bezeichnet, wie der französische König gewünscht hatte. Wenn das avignonische Papsttum sowieso leicht ins Politische abglitt, so verquickte es gern das Politische mit den Heiligsprechungsfeiern und umgekehrt. Mit Ausnahme des 1320 kanonisierten Thomas von Cantilupe, Bischofs von Hereford, gestorben auf einer Romfahrt 1282, erschwang sich keiner der Päpste von Avignon zu einer Kanonisation, die nicht

31 G. Mollat, *Les papes d'Avignon (1305-1378)*, 9. Aufl. (Paris 1949) 41.

32 A. Mortier, *Histoire des maîtres généraux de l'Ordre des Frères Prêcheurs*, II (Paris 1905) 516-525.

33 *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum*, 18 (1925) 406-7.

von französischen oder angionischen Kreisen vorgetragen worden wäre."[34]

Der Heiligsprechungsprozess für die Augustinerin Klara von Montefalco († 1308), wurde wenige Monate nach ihrem Tod eingeleitet, durch den Tod Johannes' XXII. unterbrochen und erst 1882 abgeschlossen. Hingegen kamen zum Zug Ludwig von Toulouse († 1297, heiliggesprochen 1317), Thomas von Aquin († 1274, heiliggesprochen 1323), Ivo Hélory von Tréguier († 1303, heiliggesprochen 1347), und Elzéar de Sabran, Graf von Ariano († 1323, heiliggesprochen 1369). Die Causa Karls von Blois, Herzogs von Bretagne († 1364) wurde unter Gregor XI. eingeleitet,[35] sein Kult 1904 bestätigt.

Was Johannes XXII. angeht, so mag er sich für die Causa eines Dieners Gottes — wie Raimunds von Penyafort — ebensowenig bewogen gefühlt haben, wie zur Ernennung eines Kardinals der spanischen Nation, um die er zu Beginn seines Pontifikates gebeten worden war. An den König von Aragonien ging ein bezeichnender Bericht: "Iste papa ut creditur communiter erit favorabilis regi Roberto et domino Philippo de Francia et eorum domibus." Friedrich Bock[36] und Giovanni Tabacco[37] haben die wohlwollenden Beziehungen Johannes' XXII. zu den Königen von Neapel und Frankreich aufgehellt. Wiederholte durch König Eduard III. von England unterstützte Bitten (1319-1331) um Heiligsprechung des Robert Winchelsea, Erzbischofs von Canterbury († 1316) liess Johannes XXII. unbeachtet.[38]

Neapolitaner für die Thomascausa

Angesichts der engen Bande, die König Robert und Papst Johannes XXII. verknüpften oder gar erst auf die Kunde vom Angebot des Papstes, einen Dominikaner heiligzusprechen, die im Sommer oder Herbst des Jahres 1316 nach Neapel gedrungen sein dürfte, traten wohl neapolitanische Kreise der Einbringung der Thomascausa näher. Im Hinblick darauf oder auf eine zu schreibende *Vita*[38a] des Aquinaten hat Wilhelm von Tocco bei Aquinern wahrscheinlich seit November 1316 abgehört, was sie von Thomas zu berichten wussten.

34 Walz, "Politik um Thomas." 232.

35 Toynbee, *S. Louis of Toulouse*, 244.

36 "Studien zum politischen Inquisitionsprozess Johanns XXII," *Quellen u. Forschungen aus italienischen Bibliotheken u. Archiven*, 26 (1935/6) 21-142; ders., "Kaisertum, Kurie u. Nationalstaat im Beginn des 14. Jahrhunderts," *Römische Quartalschrift*, 44 (1936) 122; 165; 167; 220.

37 "La politica italiana di Federico il Bello re dei Romani," *Archivio storico italiano*, 10 (1950) 3-77; ders., *La casa di Francia nell'azione politica di papa Giovanni XXII*, (Rom 1953) 22-42.

38 Toynbee, *S. Louis of Toulouse*, 153-4. Für Winchelsea vgl. Eubel. *Hierarchia*, I, 2. Aufl., 163.

38a Vgl. W. Eckert, "Stilisierung und Umdeutung der Persönlichkeit des hl. Thomas von Aquin durch die frühen Biographen," *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie*, 18 (1971) 7-28.

PAPST JOHANNES XXII. UND THOMASWERKE

Johannes XXII. war ein Freund des Studiums und der Bücher.[39] In den Rechnungsbüchern der Apostolischen Kammer stehen vom Februar bis zum November 1317 Ausgaben für auf Geheiss des Papstes erfolgte Anschaffungen von philosophischen und theologischen Werken des Aquinaten. Mit einer Ausnahme, die von Bruder Wilhelm de la Broue bezahlt wurde, wurden die anderen von Wilhelm Durandi, Lektor des Dominikanerkonventes in Bordeaux, angekauft.[40] Ob es sich bei diesen Erwerbungen um einen Nachholbedarf der päpstlichen Bibliothek oder um eine Bereitstellung für die gelehrten Anliegen jener Zeit oder um einen Zusammenhang mit der Thomascausa handelt, bleibe dahingestellt. Am 25. Oktober 1317 veröffentliche Papst Johannes XXII. die Clementinen, in deren Titulus XVI die Bulle Urbans IV. *Transiturus* über das Fronleichnamsfest steht. Von da ab wurde dieses Fest nicht in einzelnen Kirchen, sondern allgemein begangen. Seit 1317 wird als Verfasser des Fronleichnamsoffiziums der Aquinate genannt. Somit fällt diese Autorenangabe in den Pontifikat Johannes' XXII.[41]

DIE BITTSTELLER VON NEAPEL IN AVIGNON

In einem wohl im Herbst zu Gaeta abgehaltenen Kapitel der Neapolitanischen Dominikanerprovinz ordnete Robert von San Valentino, Vikar des Ordensmeisters, mit den Definitoren an, Kommissare sollten ohne Zögern dem Papst Berichte über die Thomascausa vorlegen. Als Beauftragte werden Wilhelm von Tocco und Robert von Benevent ausersehen. Im Jahre 1317 tritt ein gewichtiger Helfer für die Thomascausa in Johannes von Neapel auf, den das Generalkapitel von Pamplona (1317) von Paris nach seiner Heimat als Dozenten und Studienleiter versetzte.[42] Tocco fuhr mit seinen Umfragen über Leben und Wunder Thomas' fort. In einem Fall sagt er, der Bericht sei vor Richter, Notar und vereidigten Zeugen gegeben worden. Auch wurden Postulationsschreiben für die Thomascausa von der Königinmutter

39 Valois, *Jacques Duèse*, 163.

40 *Fontes vitae*, 664-6. Grabmann, *Die Werke*, 124.

41 Vgl. A. Walz, "La presenza di S. Tommaso a Orvieto e l'ufficiatura del 'Corpus Domini'," *Studi eucaristici* (Orvieto 1966) 337; 339; 342; 345.

42 MOPH, 4 (Rom-Stuttgart 1899) 104. Koch, *Durandus*, I, 207. M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, I (München 1926) 374. *Lex. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 5 (1960) 1064-5.

Maria, von Prinzen, Grafen, Adligen, der Stadt und der Universität Neapel an den Papst gerichtet. Mit diesen Schriftstücken versehen, schifften sich Tocco und sein Begleiter im Sommer 1318 nach Marseille ein, um von dort über Saint-Maximin nach Avignon zu reisen. Die Zeit war günstig. Das Generalkapitel war von Wien durch den Papst nach Lyon verlegt worden. Damit wurde der Provinzial der französischen Provinz Herveus Natalis Generalvikar des Ordens. Die Wähler erhoben ihn am 10. Juni zum Ordensmeister. Johannes XXII. hatte an die Kapitularen ein Schreiben gerichtet, in dem er unter anderem den Glanz der Lehre, mit dem ihr Orden inmitten der Kirche leuchte, hervorhob und versicherte, er bringe dem Orden seit langem innige Geneigheit entgegen und versuche mit Geist und Herz dessen geistlichen Fortschritt zu mehren. Die Kapitularen zusammen mit dem Ordensmeister erwiesen sich dem Papst gegenüber dankbar. Jeder Konvent soll jeden Tag eine heilige Messe für den Papst feiern.[43] Die Beziehungen des neuen Ordensmeisters zu Johannes XXII. waren die allerbesten. Herveus weilte vom Juli bis September in Avignon.[44] Er dürfte die Kommissare von Neapel gesprochen und ermuntert haben. Der Chronist Caccia meldet, Herveus habe sich um die Thomascausa verdient gemacht. Tocco und sein Begleiter trafen auch die Dominikanerkardinäle Nikolaus von Prato, Wilhelm de Peyre de Godin und Nikolaus von Fréauville, den Palastmeister Wilhelm von Laudun — sein Vorgänger Durandus war am 26. August 1317 zum Bischof von Limoux befördert worden[45] — ebenso vielleicht den Generalprokurator des Ordens Bernhard Gui, falls dieser, übrigens ein Bekannter König Roberts, von seinen kirchenpolitischen Aufträgen in Flandern und Savoyen, gelegentlich in Avignon erschien. Als Historiker hat Gui Thomas bereits in den *Flores chronicorum* und später im *Sanctorale* erwähnt. Tholomäus von Lucca, Thomasschüler und Verfasser der 1317 abgeschlossenen *Historia ecclesiastica,* unterhielt sich mit Tocco über die Thomascausa. Tholomäus weilte von 1309 bis 1319 meist in Avignon.[46] Ein dritter dominikanischer Historiker Johannes Colonna ist von 1312 bis 1332 in Avignon nachzuweisen. Tocco erwähnt in seinem Thomasleben, Johannes XXII. habe gegen den pestartigen Irrtum des Abtes Joachim eine bewundernswerte Dekretale erlassen. Er meint damit offenbar die Dekretale *Sancta romana et universalis Ecclesia* vom 30. Dezember 1317 gegen die Fratizellen. Da gewisse Ansichten der Fratizellen auf Joachim zurückgingen, konnte

43 Mortier, *Histoire*, II, 525; 533; 535.
44 A. de Guimaräes, "Hervé Noel (†1323)," *Archiv. Fratr. Praed.* 8 (1938) 70.
45 Koch, *Durandus*, I, 409; 417.
46 *Lex. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 2 (1958) 12.

man sagen, Joachim sei als geistiger Vater solcher Ansichten verurteilt worden. Toccos Nennung dieser Dekretale Johannes' XXII. ist wohl der Niederschlag von Gesprächen, die in avignonischen Kreisen gang und gäbe waren.[47]

PAPST JOHANNES XXII. BEGRÜSST DIE THOMASCAUSA

Den Beauftragten von Neapel war eine Audienz beim Papst beschieden, gewiss nicht ohne Empfehlung ihrer Person und ihres Anliegens durch bewährte Seite. Sie trugen den Grund ihres Erscheinens vor und übergaben die Bittschriften von Neapel für die Thomascausa. Sie fanden nicht nur gütige Aufnahme bei Johannes XXII., sondern grösste Geneigtheit. "Wir glauben, hörten sie vom Papst, dass Bruder Thomas glorreich im Himmel ist, denn sein Leben war heilig und seine Lehre konnte nicht ohne Wunder sein." Zu Tocco als Postulator gewandt, bedeutete der Papst: "Wir bestimmen dir das nächste Konsistorium, in dem du vor uns und unseren Brüdern dein Anliegen vorbringen kannst." Drei Tage später trug Tocco im Konsistorium sein Gesuch vor. Nach Entlassung des Postulators wandte sich der Papst an die Kardinäle: "Brüder, wir werden es uns und unserer Kirche zu grosser Ehre anrechnen, diesen Heiligen in das Verzeichnis der Heiligen eintragen zu können, wenn nur einige Wunder von ihm erwiesen werden, denn er hat die Kirche mehr erleuchtet als alle andern Lehrer; in seinen Werken lernt der Mensch in einem Jahr mehr als in den Werken anderer Lehrer während der Dauer seines Lebens."

Es wurde nun eine Kommission von drei Kardinälen gebildet zur Untersuchung des Rufes der Heiligkeit und der Wunder des Aquinaten. Nachdem sie auf Grund berufener Zeugen den erforderlichen Ruf "im allgemeinen" festgestellt und dem Papst und dem Konsistorium darüber Bericht erstattet hatten, wurde eine Kommission zur Erkundigung über Leben und Wunder des Aquinaten ernannt, bestehend aus dem Erzbischof von Neapel Humbert von Montauro, dem Bischof von Viterbo Angelus Tignosi und dem apostolischen Notar Pandulf Savelli. Ein Schreiben Johannes' XXII. vom 18. September 1318 bestimmte, dass diese drei oder wenigstens zwei von ihnen an den ihnen als geeignet erscheinenden Orten gemäss den päpstlichen, dem Schreiben beigegebenen Anweisungen die nötigen Erkundigungen "de vita et conversatione et miraculis fratris Thomae" einziehen und dem Apostolischen

47 A. Walz, "Abt Joachim und der 'neue Geist der Freiheit' in Toccos Thomasleben, c. 20," *Angelicum*, 45 (1968) 314. Vgl. Mollat, *Les papes*, 46.

Stuhl unterbreiten sollten. Damit war die Thomascausa eingeleitet. Tocco und sein Begleiter dürften auf der Rückkehr nach Neapel in Viterbo den dortigen Bischof von dem päpstlichen Auftrag unterrichtet haben. Tocco ist im Dezember 1318 im Dominikanerkonvent zu Anagni nachzuweisen, wo ihm Robert von Sezze, ein Lektor und Prediger besten Rufes, manche Einzelheiten aus dem Leben des Aquinaten mitteilte. Vom Generalkapitel des Jahres 1319, zu Carcassonne, dem Geburtsort Johannes' XXII., aus empfahl der Ordensmeister den Papst dankbarst dem Gebet der Mitbrüder: "pro sanctissimo papa nostro, et vere nostro."[48].

Die Informativprozesse in Neapel und Fossanova

Es war kein leichtes die drei Untersuchungsrichter des Informativprozesses zusammenzubringen. Der Erzbischof von Neapel konnte aus Gründen der Residenzpflicht, des Alters und eines Beinleidens die Stadt nicht verlassen. Fossanova kam deshalb als Ort der Untersuchung nicht in Frage, wie Tocco und P. Robert geplant hatten. Die beiden hielten sich in der Osterzeit 1319 dort auf, liessen sich aus dem Leben des Aquinaten berichten und waren Zeugen vieler Gebetserhörungen. Der Bischof von Viterbo traf auch in Fossanova ein und reiste am 19. Juli mit Tocco, P. Robert und mehreren Zisterziensern nach Neapel. Hier konstituierte sich das Untersuchungsgericht, bestehend aus dem Erzbischof von Neapel und dem Bischof von Viterbo. Der dritte Richter konnte fehlen und fehlte auch. Das Verfahren begann am 21. Juli 1319 in der erzbischöflichen Kurie. Tocco als Postulator der Causa überreichte den von Johannes XXII. bestimmten Richtern das päpstliche Schreiben. Es wurde verlesen. Die Richter bestellten zwei Notare für die schriftlichen Aufnahmen. Zum Anlass hatten sich hohe Geistliche aus Neapel, Rom und Viterbo sowie andere Persönlichkeiten eingefunden. Vom 23. Juli bis zum 18. September zogen sich die Verhöre hin. 43 Zeugen traten auf: 17 Zisterziensermönche und Brüder, 12 Laien, 11 Dominikaner und 3 Weltgeistliche. 5 Dominikaner, 5 Zisterzienser und 3 Laien hatten Thomas persönlich gekannt.[49] Hatten für Ludwig von Toulouse mehrere Dominikaner ausgesagt, so keine Franziskaner für Thomas.[50] Die unterfertigten und

48 MOPH, V, 224.

49 *Fontes vitae*, 265-407. K. Foster *The Life of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, Biographical Documents (London-Baltimore 1958), 82-126. W. Eckert, *Das Leben des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Düsseldorf 1965), 179-248. A. Ferrua, *S. Thomae Aquinatis vitae fontes praecipuae* [!], (Alba 1968), 197-350.

50 Toynbee, *S. Louis of Toulouse*, 165; 185.

versiegelten Zeugenaufnahmen wurden durch zwei Domherren, einen von Neapel und einen von Viterbo, nach Avignon gebracht und dort in einem Konsistorium geprüft. Tocco hat sich noch einmal nach Avignon begeben. Vielleicht traf er König Robert, der sich damals längere Zeit in Südfrankreich aufhielt.[51] Das im Jahre 1320 in Rouen abgehaltene Generalkapitel vermerkt, es bestehe gute Aussicht für die Thomascausa, und legte den Konventen entsprechende von den Provinzialen einzuziehende Kontributionen auf.

Papst Johannes XXII. schreibt in der Heiligsprechungsbulle, er habe über die Heiligkeit des Lebens und die Wirklichkeit der Wunder des in Frage stehenden Bekenners nicht nur einmal, sondern zweimal, nicht eilig, sondern reiflich Erkundigungen einziehen lassen. Mit der zweiten Untersuchung meint er den Informativprozess von Fossanova. Dort sollte noch über die auf Thomas' Fürbitte erfolgten Wunder ausgesagt werden. In einem Schreiben vom 1. Juni 1321 ernannte Johannes XXII. als Untersuchungsrichter Petrus Ferrin, Bischof von Anagni, Andreas, Bischof von Terracina, und den päpstlichen Notar Pandulf Savelli oder zwei von ihnen. Tocco überreichte am 10. November 1321 im Kapitelsaal zu Fossanova dem Bischof von Anagni und dem Magister Savelli die päpstlichen Ernennungsschreiben. Der Bischof von Terracina fehlte bei der feierlichen Eröffnung des Informativprozesses. Vom 10. bis zum 20. November wurden 99 Zeugen vernommen, zwei zu wiederholten Malen, sodass 101 Aussagen vorliegen. Die Zeugen kamen aus Fossanova, Priverno, Sonnino, Frosinone, Terracina, Sermoneta, San Lorenzo de Valle. Es waren Weltgeistliche, Zisterziensermönche, Laienbrüder oder Oblaten der Abtei, Eheleute, Jungmänner und Jungfrauen, Magister, Notare und Ärzte. Sie bezeugten Gebetserhörungen durch den seligen Thomas von Aquin oder Besuch seines Grabes, die teils vor Inangriffnahme des Heiligsprechungsverfahrens teils während dieser Zeit erfolgten.[52]

Nach dem Prozess in Fossanova hört man nichts mehr von Tocco. Er hat als Postulator und als Hagiograph die Thomasverehrung hingebend gefördert. Die Schriften des Informativprozesses von Fossanova wurden in Avignon eingehend geprüft. Die Heiligsprechungsbulle Johannes' XXII. für Thomas hebt die Genauigkeit der Untersuchungen und Prüfungen des Falles vor dem zu erwartenden päpstlichen Entscheid hervor.[53]

51 Toynbee, *S. Louis of Toulouse*, 260.
52 *Fontes vitae*, 409-510.
53 *Fontes vitae*, 529. *Xenia thomistica*, III, 187.

Die Beurteilung der Lehre des Aquinaten

Papst Johannes hat sich sowohl gegenüber den Postulatoren als auch in einem Konsistorium über die Lehre des Aquinaten rühmend ausgesprochen. Selbst Gelehrter, hat er die Bedeutung und Gediegenheit der Thomasdoktrin aus Schriften und Diskussionen beurteilen können. Von einer amtlichen Prüfung dieser Lehre berichten die Quellen nichts. Um diese Lücke auszufüllen, konnte das im Jahre 1317 oder später verfasste Werk *Concordantiae dictorum fratris Thomae* dienen, das Benedikt von Asinago zugeschrieben wird.[54]

Eine Heiligsprechungsfeier mit Bündnisschau

Nach den Informativprozessen und den kurialen Untersuchungen hätte die Heiligsprechung des Aquinaten im Jahre 1322 erfolgen können. Es waren zu einem solchen Anlass auch andere Umstände zu berücksichtigen. Mit grosser Vielseitigkeit, Willensstärke und erstaunlicher Arbeitskraft betrieb Johannes XXII. die verschiedensten Angelegenheiten.[55] 1317 hatte er die Verwaltung Roms an König Robert von Neapel als "senator et capitaneus" übertragen und dazu das Generalvikariat Italiens *vacante imperio*. Die Ghibellinen widerstanden den päpstlichen Anordnungen auf der politischen Ebene. Es wurde inquisitorisch gegen sie vorgegangen. Ein Kreuzzug gegen die Visconti in Mailand scheiterte. Mailand und Ferrara schwörten Ludwig dem Bayern Treue. Gegen ihn gedachte der Papst nun ähnliche Mittel anzuwenden wie gegen die Ghibellingen. "Als Vorspiel zu diesem Vorgehen sollten festliche Tage zu Avignon dienen. Ludwig der Bayer, infolge seines Sieges von 1322 zu Mühldorf über Friedrich den Schönen im Besitz der Krone, verlieh seinem ältesten Sohn die Mark Brandenburg und durchkreuzte dadurch die Ostpolitik des Königs Johann von Böhmen. Dieser schwenkte deshalb politisch um und so trat ein neuer Verbündeter ins päpstlich-französisch-angioinische Lager. Des Böhmenkönigs Sohn Karl empfing die Firmung vom Papst selber und wahrscheinlich anlässlich einer glänzenden Heerschau der weltlichen Gefolgschaft Johannes' XXII., zu der gerade die Heiligsprechung Thomas' von Aquin den äusseren Rahmen geliefert haben dürfte."[56]

54 Grabmann, *Die Werke*, 164; 244; 411-12. T. Käppeli, "Benedetto di Asinago da Como (+ 1339)," *Archiv. Fratr. Praed.* 11 (1941) 83-94.

55 Valois, *Jacques Duèse*, 628 ff. Mollat, *Les papes*, 57. E. Pasztor, "Una raccolta di Sermoni di Giovanni XXII," *Archivio paleografico italiano*, 2-3 (1956/57) 277.

56 Walz, "Politik um Thomas," 234-5.

Am Donnerstag, dem 14. Juli 1323, war öffentliches Konsistorium. Einen Bericht darüber gibt der Dominikaner Benzio von Alessandria. Der Papst hielt zwei Sermones, den ersten mit dem Vorspruch *Haec dies boni nuntii* (4 Kg 7, 9), um die bevorstehende Heiligsprechung anzukündigen, den zweiten mit dem Vorspruch *Scitote quoniam Dominus mirificavit sanctum suum* (Ps 4, 4) zum Preis des Predigerordens und des neuen Heiligen.[57] Dieser habe in seinem Orden ein apostolisches Leben geführt, da dieser Orden nichts in den Einzelnen, sondern nur in der Gemeinschaft etwas besitze; diese Lebensart sei die apostolische. Dieser glorreiche Lehrer habe nach den Aposteln und den alten Lehrern die Kirche mehr als andere erleuchtet. Thomas habe viele Wunder, ja überhaupt so viele Wunder gewirkt als er Artikel geschrieben habe. Die Heiligen seien die Ehre der Kirche und, wenn Ordensleute, die besondere Ehre ihrer Ordensfamilie. Mit der Armutsauffassung im apostolischen Geist wandte sich der Papst gegen die Spiritualen. Er hatte es schon 1317 getan und wird es im November 1323 nochmals tun. König Robert und Königin Sancia, die minoritische Übertreibungen begünstigten, konnten sich die päpstliche Verlautbarung zur Armutsfrage zu Herzen nehmen. Nach dem Papst trat Petrus Canteri OP als stellvertretender Postulator auf. Johannes von Neapel, der als Postulator auf Tocco gefolgt war und einen *Sermo ad postulandam canonizationem Fr. Thomae de Aquino* verfasst hatte,[58] lag krank darnieder. Der Stellvertreter trug nun im Namen des Ordensmeisters und des Predigerordens die Bitte um Heiligsprechung des hervorragenden Lehrers Thomas von Aquin vor. Weitere Bittsteller folgten. Zunächst König Robert. Bei der Heiligsprechungsfeier für seinen Bruder Ludwig von Toulouse war er abwesend. Um so mehr wurde jetzt seine Anwesenheit beachtet. Nach der Ansprache bat er kniefällig, der so grosse, in so grosser Heiligkeit lebende Lehrer Thomas möge in das Verzeichnis der Heiligen aufgenomen werden. Denselben Antrag stellten der Patriarch von Alexandrien, ein Dominikaner, und nach anderen der Bischof von Lodève, ein Franziskaner. Papst Johannes erklärte zum Schluss Thomas von Aquin der Heiligsprechung für würdig und hob die Sitzung auf.

Am Montag, dem 18. Juli,[59] fand in der Kirche Notre-Dame-des-Doms zu Avignon die Heiligsprechung des Aquinaten statt. König Robert mit Königin Sancia, eine starke Vertretung des französischen

57 Valois, *Jacques Duèse*, 536.

58 Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, I, 374.

59 St. Baluzius, *Vitae paparum Avenionensium*, I (Paris 1693) 139; 165-66; 175. Vgl. Galuanus, *Chronica*, MOPH, 2 (1897) 110: "In M. CCCXXIII beatus Thomas de Aquino canonizatur die V Marcii [!], anno a transitu suo L. inchoante."

Hofes, Kardinäle — unter ihnen de Peyre de Godin—, Prälaten und Kurialen, Graf Thomas von San Severino und wahrscheinlich Karl von Luxemburg-Böhmen, Dominikaner und Scharen von Gläubigen waren versammelt. Der Kirchenraum war mit Lichtern übersät. Der Papst eröffnete den Ritus mit einem Sermo, der unter dem Vorspruch *Magnus es tu et faciens mirabilia* (Ps 85, 10) Leben und Wunder des Aquinaten vorführte. Dann wurde das *Veni creator Spiritus* gesungen. Hierauf setzte sich der Papst, um einen zweiten Sermo zu halten. Mit dem Wort aus der Gleichnisrede bei Matthäus 18, 19 *Redde quod debes* drückte er seine Verpflichtung dem seligen Thomas gegenüber aus, da diesen Gott so glänzend im Himmel geehrt hat und die Kirche auf Erden ehren möge. Kraft apostolischer Vollmacht trug er den Namen des glorreichen Lehrers in das Verzeichnis der Heiligen ein. Es folgte das *Te Deum* und dann die Messe zu Ehren des neuen Heiligen mit eigener Oration.

Johannes von Neapel hat einen *Sermo in festo canonizationis S. Thomae de Aquino* geschrieben,[60] aber wegen Krankheit offenbar nicht gehalten. Der Ordensmeister Herveus fehlte bei der Heiligsprechung. Nach dem im Mai in Barcelona beeindigten Generalkapitel lenkte er seine Schritte nach Avignon, erkrante in Narbonne, wo er am 7. August starb. Zufriedenheit erfüllte ihn, in Thomas das Licht auf den Leuchter gestellt zu sehen, das Gott bestimmt habe, um die Menschen zu erleuchten.[61]

Die Heiligsprechungsbulle vom 18. Juli 1323

Papst Johannes XXII. zeichnet in der am Tag der Heiligsprechung erlassenen Bulle den Lebenslauf voller Tugenden des Lehrers der heiligen Theologie, der Thomas war, und führt Gebetserhörungen auf dessen Fürbitte an. Er ruft zur Freude über die Thomasehrung auf die Kirche, die Heimat, den Predigerorden, die Ordensleute, die Gelehrten und die Studierenden. Der Gang der Thomascausa wird geschildert, das Fest des neuen Heiligen am 7. März zu begehen angeordnet und ein Ablass den Besuchern des Grabes des Heiligen gewährt.[62] Grabmann und Pieper weisen darauf hin, dass bei Thomas die Kirche vor dem Entschluss stand, einen Philosophen und Theologen zu kanonisieren, weil

60 Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, I, 374.
61 Valois, *Jacques Duèse*, 313. Mortier, *Histoire*, II, 570.
62 *Fontes vitae*, 519-530. *Xenia thomistica*, III, 173-18.

er in seinem wissenschaftlichen Leben und Wirken ein Heiliger geworden war.[63]

NACH DER HEILIGSPRECHUNGSFEIER

Papst Johannes XXII. teilte die erfolgte Heiligsprechung mit an Karl von Valois, Sohn des Königs von Frankreich, an Maria, Königin von Frankreich und Navarra, an Clementine, Königinwitwe von Frankreich, an Ludwig von Frankreich und an den französischen König Karl IV. Die Dominikaner überreichten dem Papst als Zeichen der Erkenntlichkeit eine Sammlung von Thomaswerken. Sie begingen in Kirche und Konvent eine Reihe von Festanlässen. König Robert fehlte nicht dabei.

Die äussere Aufmachung der Kanonisation war eine gewaltige Demonstration um den Papst. Bock[64] meint, die prunkvolle Heiligsprechung Thomas' von Aquin sei der weithin sichtbare Hintergrund, den Johannes XXII. dem bevorstehenden Einschreiten gegen Ludwig den Bayern gab. Im Herbst darauf wurde der erste Prozess gegen diesen eröffnet. Fiel, was an der Heiligsprechungsfeier politisches Beiwerk war, bald der Vergessenheit anheim, so verblieb für alle Zeiten ihr geistiger Sinn.

VOM HEILIGEN LEHRER ZUM HEILIGEN KIRCHENLEHRER

Seit der Kanonisation wurde Thomas von Aquin in vermehrtem Masse nicht nur als grosser Gelehrter und als Haupt einer führenden geistesgeschichtlichen Schule, sondern auch als Heiliger verehrt. Waren selbst Feste eines Franziskus oder Dominikus ausserhalb der eigenen Orden nicht in allen kirchlichen Kalendarien zu finden, so noch weniger das Fest des Aquinaten.[65] Die Dominikaner verrichteten bald ein eigenes Offizium ihres neuen Heiligen.

Eine Thomaskapelle war seit 1322 in der Nähe des Savellipalastes auf dem Aventin bei Santa Sabina in Rom geplant und ist nach der Heiligsprechung errichtet worden. Der Notar Pandulf Savelli hat sie gestiftet.[66]

Die sterblichen Überreste des Heiligen wurden nach mehrmaligen Übertragungen in Fossanova durch den Grafen Honoratus von Fondi

63 "Die Kanonisation des hl. Thomas in ihrer Bedeutung für die Ausbreitung u. Verteidigung seiner Lehre im 14. Jahrhundert," *Divus Thomas* 1 (1923) 241-2. Vgl. J. Pieper, *Hinführung zu Thomas von Aquin*, (München 1958) 33.

64 Walz, "Politik um Thomas," 235.

65 Toynbee, *S. Louis of Toulouse*, 210.

66 V. J. Koudelka, "La cappella di S. Tommaso d'Aquino in Monte Savello a Roma," *Archiv. Fratr. Praed.*, 32 (1962) 126-44.

für zwei Jahre in sein Schloss und am 28. Januar 1369 auf Geheiss Urbans V. nach Toulouse überführt. Die Hagiographie, die Geschichtsschreibung und die Bibliographie sowie die christliche Kunst haben sich mit der Heiligengestalt Thomas' beschäftigt. Predigten über den hl. Thomas von Aquin sind seit Johannes von San Gimignano[67] und Heinrich Tröglein[68] überliefert. Prediger erwähnen ihn ehrenvoll, wie Tauler[69] und der selige Heinrich Seuse, der sich freut, dass "das klare Licht, der liebe Sankt Thomas, der Lehrer"[70] Verborgenes entschlüssle. Katharina von Siena preist im 158. Kapitel des Dialogs den glorreichen hl. Thomas wegen seines Erfassens und Vermittelns der Wahrheit.

Die Lehrautorität Thomas" wuchs durch die Heiligsprechung. Der Bischof von Paris Stefan de Bourret hob am 14. Februar 1325 die Verurteilung von 1277 auf. Petrus de Palude verkündete diesen oberhirtlichen Entscheid am folgenden 7. März.[71] Päpstliche Verlautbarungen gegenüber Spiritualen, Ockham, Meister Eckhart und anderen gewinnen im Licht der Lehre und Heiligsprechung des Aquinaten eigene Bedeutung. Heinrich von Lübeck OP, Dozent in Köln und später (1325-1333) Provinzial der Saxonia, spricht vom *doctor communis, doctor venerabilis* und *sanctus Thomas de Aquino, qui omnibus aliis cautius et melius scripsit.*[72]

Gleichförmigkeit mit der Thomaslehre oder in ihrer Auslegung ist aber nie allgemein erreicht worden. Bei all ihrem ausserordentlichen Gewicht erstanden ihr Gegenspieler, zumal in dem auf der *via moderna* Ockhams und Gefährten aufbauenden Nominalismus. Als *Princeps thomistarum* erscheint Johannes Capreolus. Er lehrte von 1408 bis 1424 in Paris. An Universitäten wie Köln, Löwen, Wien, Prag und Krakau folgten zumal Dominikaner der Thomaslehre. Petrus von Bergamo OP (†1482) legte seine *Tabula aurea* von Thomasstellen vor, Peter Nigri (Schwarz) OP, Rektor der Universität zu Budapest, den *Clypeus thomistarum contra modernos et scotistas* (Venedig 1481) und den *Contra omnes doctrinae doctoris angelici detractores* (Venedig 1504). Johannes Kalekas, Demetrios Kydones und Gregorios Scholarios verbreiteten die Thomaslehre im griechischen Kulturraum. In Italien stiess

67 A. Dondaine, "La vie et les œuvres de Jean de San Gimignano," *Archiv. Fratr. Praed.*, 9 (1939) 153-4.

68 *Lex. f.Theol. u. Kirche*, 5 (1960) 202.

69 G. Hofmann, *J. Tauler Predigten*, (Freiburg 1961), 157; 180; 233; 235; 247; 331; 349; 546; 552.

70 "Leben Seuses," Kap. 51, H. Seuse, *Deutsche Schriften*, hg. v. K. Bihlmeyer (Stuttgart 1907), *Nachdruck* (Frankfurt a.M. 1961) 180. *Horologium sapientiae*, l. II, c. 1, ed. C. Richstätter (Turin 1929) 178: "inter ceteros et super ceteros doctor egregius."

71 Walz, "S. Tommaso dichiarato dottore," 150. A. Maier, "Der Widerruf der 'Articuli Parisienses' (1277) im Jahre 1325," *Archiv. Fratr. Praed.*, 38 (1968) 13-19.

72 Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, I, 424.

sie mit der Renaissancebewegung zusammen. In Cajetan meldet sich ein überragender Thomaskommentator. Thomasstudium blühte in den Dominikanerschulen zu Salamanca, Sevilla, Cordoba und Lissabon. Mit Erfolg erklärten Peter Crockaert 1512 in Paris und Konrad Koellin 1512 in Köln die *Summa theologiae* und Franz Sylvester in Bologna die *Summa contra gentiles.*[73] Silvester Mazzolini, einer der ersten Gegner Luthers, wurde gerade als Thomist von diesem abgelehnt. In der Zeit des Konziliarismus und der Glaubensspaltung wird die Thomaslehre für die papal-petrozentrische Ekklesiologie verwendet.[74] Anregend wirkten Thomisten wie Franz von Victoria (†1543), Dominikus Soto (†1560), Petrus de Soto (†1563), Dominikus Bañez (†1604) und andere. Auf dem Konzil von Trient waren die Thomisten mehr an Gewicht als an Zahl vertreten. 1564 schrieb Hieronymus Vielmi OP *De Divi Thomae Aquinatis doctrina et scriptis.*[75] In der Bulle *Mirabilis Deus* vom 11. April 1567 hat Papst Pius V. den hl. Thomas zum Kirchenlehrer erhoben, nicht ohne Erwähnung von dessen Präsenz auf dem Konzil von Trient. Leo XIII. hat den Aquinaten zum Patron aller katholischen Schulen erklärt. Der *Codex iuris canonici* hat Canones zugunsten seiner Lehre. Pius XI. preist ihn als *studiorum ducem.* Das 2. Vatikanische Konzil weist an zwei Stellen auf seine Lehre hin.[76]

Der vorbildliche Lebenswandel und die Bedeutsamkeit der Lehre des Aquinaten ist von Papst Johannes XXII. klar gesehen und anerkannt worden. Die von ihm vorgenommene Heiligsprechung des grossen Lehrmeisters zählt zu den Spitzenleistungen[77] seiner an vielseitiger Betätigung reichen Persönlichkeit und Regierung, ja zu einer der denkwürdigsten in der Geschichte der Kirche.

73 Walz, "S. Tommaso dichiarato dottore," 151-2. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, I, 332-439; II (1936) 512-613; III (1956) 352-451. A. Harsanyi, *A domonkosrend magyarorszagon a reformacio elött*, (Budapest 1938), 178-225 (P. Nigri). I. W. Frank, *Hausstudium u. Universitätsstudium der Wiener Dominikaner*, (Graz-Wien-Köln 1968), 144-151. O. Kristeller, *Le thomisme et la pensée italienne de la Renaissance* (Paris 1967).

74 G. Hennig, *Cajetan u. Luther*, Ein historischer Beitrag zur Begegnung von Thomismus und der Reformation (Stuttgart 1966). A. Walz, "Von Cajetans Gedanken über Kirche und Papst," *Volk Gottes* (Freiburg 1967) 336-360.

75 A. Walz, *I domenicani al concilio di Trento*, (Rom 1961) passim, 414 Vielmi.

76 Walz, "S. Tommaso dichiarato dottore," 159-167.

77 Valois, *Jacques Duèse*, 530, die Kanonisation habe ein "retentissement immense" gehabt, vgl. 536; 628.

II

THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS

DE SUBSTANTIIS SEPARATIS: TITLE AND DATE

Francis J. Lescoe

THE *Treatise on Separate Substances* is, without doubt, one of the most important shorter works of St. Thomas Aquinas. As the eminent historian of mediaeval philosophy, Etienne Gilson, has pointed out, the *Treatise on Separate Substances* "is an incomparably rich historical work."[1] Ignatius Eschmann has called it "one of the most important metaphysical writings of Aquinas,"[2] while H.-F. Dondaine in his *Préface* to the Leonine edition of the Treatise says, "Ce n'est pas le lieu d'insister davantage sur l'importance de l'ouvrage dans l'ensemble de l'œuvre de saint Thomas; elle dépasse de loin celle d'un écrit de circonstance, celle aussi que ses dimensions modestes feraient présager."[3] Vernon Bourke calls it "a very significant metaphysical treatise"[4] and R. Henle has described the first chapter of this work, *De Opinionibus antiquorum et Platonis*, as "the most elaborate synthesis of Platonic doctrine to be found in the whole Thomistic corpus."[5]

In view of the wide agreement by Thomistic scholars on the importance of the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis*, a closer examination of the title, date, and circumstances surrounding the composition of this

1 E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York, 1956) 166. Elsewhere Gilson writes, "Comment concevoir des substances spirituelles simples qui ne soient pas des dieux? ... Le traité de saint Thomas *De substantiis separatis*, œuvre d'une richesse historique incomparable, permet de suivre en quelque sorte pas à pas l'évolution de ce problème et de dégager les enseignements qu'impliquait son histoire." E. Gilson, *Le Thomisme*, 6th ed. (Paris, 1965) 216-217.

2 I. Eschmann, *A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works* in E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* 381.

3 H.-F. Dondaine, *Préface*, Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *Opera Omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII P. M. edita. Tomus XL, pars D-E, *De substantiis separatis* (Romae, 1968) D8.

4 V. Bourke, *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom* (Milwaukee, 1965) 155.

5 R. Henle, "A Note on Certain Textual Evidence in Fabro's 'Nozione Metafisica di Partecipazione'", *Modern Schoolman* 30 (1957) 278; cf. Sancti Thomae de Aquino. *De substantiis separatis*, ed. Leonine D41-43; F. J. Lescoe, *Saint Thomas Aquinas' Treatise on Separate Substances*, English only (West Hartford, 1959) 17-23; *Saint Thomas Aquinas' Treatise on Separate Substances*, Latin-English edition, printed face to face (West Hartford, 1963) 35-42. Henceforth our references will be to the English translation contained in the Latin-English 1963 edition.

work would seem to be extremely worthwhile. Specifically, we may ask under what conditions was the *Treatise on Separate Substances* written — whether it is the work of a Novice, as in the case of the *De ente et essentia*; whether it represents a middle point in the intellectual life of the Angelic Doctor; or whether it can be considered as an example of the work of a mature and fully developed theologian.

De substantiis separatis or De angelis?

The manuscripts variously refer to the Treatise as *Tractatus, Liber de natura angelorum,*[6] *Liber, Tractatus de angelis,*[7] *De substantiis separatis,*[8] *De substantiis separatis ad fratrem Raynaldum.*[9] The two oldest manuscripts, i.e., *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale lat. 14546* and *Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale VII. B. 16*, attribute both titles (*De angelis* and *De substantiis separatis*) equally. The Paris manuscript reads, "Incipit libellus de angelis seu substantiis separatis,"[10] while the Naples work contains the following heading: "De angelis seu substantiis separatis ad fratrem Raynaldum de Piperno."[11]

As H.-F. Dondaine points out, it is not surprising that the first editors of this posthumous work which was left unfinished by its author, should hesitate in choosing definitively one or the other title. From the point of view of external criticism, both titles seem to be equally valid.[12]

It is for this reason also that almost all editors of the Treatise from the 13th century to the present have vacillated in their characterization of the work as either definitely philosophical or theological. Century after century the Treatise has been classed now as a theological and now as a philosophical work. Dondaine calls attention to this persistent hesitation over the centuries and even to our time, when he writes, "Même hésitation chez les éditeurs modernes les plus versés en la connaissance des écrits thomistes; aux XVIIe siècle, P. Pellican le classe parmi les *Opuscula theologica*, et de même au XVIIIe, B. M. de Rubeis.

6 *Lisboa, Biblioteca Nacional Illum. 95,* fol. 48vb-66vb; *Metz, Bibliothèque Municipale 1158,* fol. 12va-22va; *Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek, 581,* fol. 359ra-381rb.

7 *Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Con. Sopp. J. VII, 47,* fol. 51ra-60vb; *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 15814,* fol. 275ra-290ra; *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 15813,* fol. 180ra-191rb; *Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica, Vat. lat. 807,* fol. 112ra-138vb; *Venezia, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana, Fondo ant. lat. 128 (1518),* fol. 263vb-284rb; *Cambridge, Corpus Christi College 35,* fol. 131ra-144vb.

8 *Bordeaux, Bibliothèque Municipale, 131,* fol. 205rb-214va; *Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1655,* fol. 147ra-156va.

9 *Paris, Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, 238,* fol. 88vb-87ra.

10 *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, lat. 14546,* fol. 84rb.

11 *Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, VII. B. 16,* fol. 50ra.

12 H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, D5.

Plus près de nous, P. Mandonnet l'a au contraire rangé parmi les *philosophica*, suivi en cela par J. Perrier et R. Spiazzi."[13]

In reality, a closer reading of St. Thomas' statement in the Prologue of the work, clearly indicates, to our mind, the character of the Treatise. We read, "Intendentes igitur sanctorum angelorum excellentiam utcumque depromere, incipiendum videtur ab his quae de angelis antiquitus humana coniectura aestimavit; ut si quid invenerimus fidei consonum accipiamus, quae vero doctrinae repugnant catholicae refutemus."[14]

St. Thomas is distinctly dividing his work into two parts: first, he is going to examine "ea quae antiquitus humana coniectura aestimavit" concerning the angels — hence we have here the contribution of the unaided human intellect (therefore philosophical). Secondly, the Angelic Doctor will then study in detail the teaching of "doctrina catholica" or "christiana religio" (hence theological).

At the beginning of Chapter XVIII, Aquinas reiterates his method: "Quia igitur ostensum est quid de substantiis spiritualibus praecipui philosophi Plato et Aristoteles senserunt quantum ad earum originem, conditionem naturae, distinctionem et gubernationis ordinem; — restat ostendere quid de singulis habeat christianae religionis assertio."[15]

The second portion of the Treatise, i.e., "quid de singulis habeat christianae religionis assertio," was never completed because, after having promised to explain what Christian religion holds about the spiritual substances concerning (1) their origin (2) the condition of their nature (3) their distinction and (4) the order of government, the Treatise ends abruptly with Chapter XX, in which the third point under discussion, i.e., the distinction of spiritual substances, is left unfinished and the fourth point, viz., the order of government is completely omitted.[16]

It would seem that we have here a typically Thomistic work. First, the Angelic Doctor examines in detail all the accumulated knowledge which philosophy has acquired over the centuries concerning the subject of spiritual substances. He is especially attentive to the rich

13 *Ibid.*, D8; P. Pellican ed., *Opuscula theologica et moralia* (Paris, 1656) which in 1660 became vol. 20 of *Opera omnia* edited by the Dominicans of S. Jacques, 454 ff.; B.M. de Rubeis, ed., *Opuscula theologica*, vol. 19 of *Opera omnia* (Venice, 1754) 202 ff.; P. Mandonnet ed., *Opuscula omnia* (Paris, 1927) I, 73-144; also *Tabula generalis* at end of *Introduction*, I, liii; J. Perrier, ed. *Opuscula philosophica* (Paris, 1949) *Preface*, xviii; R. Spiazzi ed., *Opuscula philosophica* (Turin, 1954).

14 *Prologus*, ed. Leon. D41, 5-10; F. J. Lescoe, *op.cit.*, Chap. 1, 35, no. 1.

15 *Ibid.*, Chap. XVIII, ed. Leon. D71, 3-9; F. J. Lescoe, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVII, 134, no. 91.

16 *Ibid.*, Chap. XX. ed. Leon. D80; F. Lescoe, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIX, 162, no. 114. All mss. end with the following words: "Et hoc secuti esse videntur qui posuerunt daemones, quos malos angelos dicimus, ex inferiori ordine et corporeos esse."

Platonic tradition, along with its characteristic nuances and insights which the recently discovered writings of Proclus have made available. But all this philosophic knowledge — the work of the unaided intellect — has an avowedly ancillary function. It is only secondary in importance.

As H.-F. Dondaine expresses it, "En fait, on est en présence d'un des écrits les plus typiquement thomistes; attentif à tout ce que la tradition philosophique peut lui offrir, notamment la tradition platonicienne dont l'arrivée de Proclus vient de lui fournir une nouvelle approche; mais dans le but explicite d'explorer *utcumque* le mystère des anges tel que la Bible et la tradition chrétienne l'ont révélé et transmis."[17]

While it is perfectly true that within theology certain philosophical positions may be developed, nevertheless this philosophy is always regarded as a tool to be used in the service of theology. Anton Pegis has stated this relationship with his usual perspicacity when he writes, "St. Thomas was by profession a theologian and not a philosopher ... (and he) created a philosophy within theology in order to aid and indeed to make possible the human expression of revealed truth."[18] He reasons, therefore, that we have here a Christian philosophy *in the service of theology*. He says, "This philosophy is Christian, it is Christian as a philosophy, but, more than this, it is a servant of theology ... it will remain forever a Christian philosophy ministering to a theology."[19] Elsewhere Pegis again insists that "St. Thomas never approached philosophy as if he were himself a philosopher. Knowing what philosophical principles were, and how to observe as well as respect them, he nevertheless chose to use philosophy as a theologian, rather than to formulate it directly as a philosopher."[20]

We are convinced, therefore, that first and foremost the Treatise is a theological one. Aquinas is primarily interested in expounding what Sacred Scripture and Christian tradition teach about the angels ("incipiendum videtur ab his quae... humana coniectura aestimavit; ut si quid invenerimus *fidei consonum* accipiamus, quae vero doctrinae repugnant catholicae refutemus"). Catholic faith is at all times the norm and ultimate criterion in the evaluation of any philosophical speculations concerning the subject of angels or spiritual substances. The *Treatise on Separate Substances* should therefore be classed unequivocally and without any hesitation among the theological works of St. Thomas Aquinas.

17 H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, D8.
18 A. C. Pegis, *The Middle Ages and Philosophy* (Chicago, 1963) 74.
19 *Ibid.*, 74-75, 78.
20 A. C. Pegis, *In Search of St. Thomas Aquinas*, McAuley Lecture 1966 (West Hartford, 1967) 7.

Tractatus or Opusculum?

In spite of the fact that the editors of the definitive Leonine edition of the *De substantiis separatis* have not chosen to include the word *Tractatus* in the official title of the work, we shall nevertheless insist on retaining this word *Treatise*. There is more than ample justification for our insistence on retaining the word in the title, since eleven of the twenty manuscripts which list the title of the work include the word *Tractatus.*[21]

Our insistence on the use of this word is more than purely academic. We are, again, making a deliberate effort to put to rest once and for all the completely pejorative and demeaning word "opusculum" which Thomistic scholars have used for centuries and still persist in doing so even today. Witness, for example, the use of the term in the new and definitive Leonine edition (1968) of the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* on pages D5, D6, D8, D10, D12.

As Eschmann has pointed out so convincingly, "The notion of *Opusculum* i.e., minor or smaller work, in itself devoid of precise meaning, has in fact disserved the cause of Thomistic bibliography, if not even that of Thomistic studies."[22] There is a kind of demeaning and levelling anonymity which the word *opusculum* conveys, as if the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* were merely one of a large collection of miscellaneous odds and ends left us by the Angelic Doctor. The time for according this outstanding treatise its proper place among Thomistic writings is *long overdue*. We shall therefore continue to refer to this work as *Tractatus de substantiis separatis*, the Leonine editors, to the contrary, notwithstanding.

Dedication "Ad fratrem Raynaldum"

Two manuscripts and all the earliest catalogues of St. Thomas' works explicitly state that the *Treatise on Separate Substances* was destined "ad fratrem Raynaldum". The Naples manuscript (*Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale. VIII. B. 16*) reads, "De angelis seu substantiis separatis ad

21 The following mss. contain the word *Tractatus* in the title: *Bordeaux Bibliothèque Municipale, 131*, fol. 305rb; *Bologna, Biblioteca Universitaria, 1655*, fol. 147ra; *Bruxelles, Bibliothèque Royale, 2453-73 (1573)*, fol. 11r; *Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale Conv. Sopp. J. VII. 47*, fol. 51ra; *Firenze, Biblioteca Laurenziana, Fiesolano 105*, fol. 202rb; *Leipzig, Universitätsbibliothek 581*, fol. 359ra; *München, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Clm. 8005*, fol. 19ra; *Toledo, Biblioteca del Cabildo, 19-19*, fol. 59va; *Vaticano (Città del) Biblioteca Apostolica, Ottob. lat.* 198 ("... explicit tractatus fratris Thomae de angelis"), fol. 207vb; *Vaticano, (Città del) Biblioteca Apostolica, Urb. lat. 127*, fol. 55va.

22 I. Eschmann, *op. cit.*, 381; cf. F. J. Lescoe, *op. cit.*, Introduction 2.

fratrem Raynaldum," while the Sainte-Geneviève manuscript (*Paris, Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève, 238*) begins as follows: "Capitulum primum. De substantiis separatis ad fratrem Raynaldum."[23]

Frater Raynaldus or *Reginaldus* of Piperno was a life-long friend and associate of St. Thomas. The fact that Raynaldus was entrusted with the editing of all the unfinished works of Aquinas, after the latter's untimely death in 1274, attests to the intimacy which obtained between the two men.[24] (A. Dondaine estimates that on the basis of available information, Raynaldus lived at least eleven years after the death of the Angelic Doctor, but not more than twenty years.)[25]

C. Vansteenkiste seems to question, or at least leave open, the validity of the manuscript and catalogue tradition concerning the dedication to *frater Raynaldus*. He writes, "La dédicace à fr. Reginald n'empêche pas que ce soit une œuvre destinée au grand public, comme d'ailleurs le *compendium theologiae*. Les deux œuvres, parce qu'incomplètes, ont pu rester assez longtemps inédites. D'ailleurs le fait que fr. Reginald ait hérité de ces papiers a pu faire naître la dédicace."[26]

We are inclined to reject Vansteenkiste's theorizing and we tend to agree with H.-F. Dondaine who maintains that this is only a conjecture

23 Cf. *Historia eccles. nova*, lib. xxiii, cap. 12, critical edition by A. Dondaine, "Les 'opuscula fratris Thomae' chez Ptolemée de Lucques" in *Arch. Fr. Praed.* 31 (1961) 152 which reads, "Tractatus de substantiis separatis ad eundem (i.e. fratrem Raynaldum) qui sic incipit: Quia sacris angelorum solempniis"; D. Prummer, ed., *Legenda sancti Thomae de Aquino* in *Fontes vitae S. Thomae* (Toulouse, 1911) fasc. 3, cap. 54. 220 states, "Tractatus de angelis seu substantiis separatis ad fratrem Raynaldum qui incipit: Quia sacris angelorum solemniis." The listing of the Prague ms. (before the end of the 13th cent.) *Praha, Metrop. Kapit. A XVII. 2* states "De substantiis separatis ad fratrem Reynaldum", quoted in H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, D5-6.

24 On Reginald of Piperno, cf. A. Dondaine, *Secrétaires de saint Thomas* (Rome, 1956) 16-17; 198-203; P. Mandonnet, *Des écrits authentiques de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Fribourg. 1910) 2nd edit., 40-41; *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Omnia* (Paris, 1927) I, iv-v. M. Grabmann writes, "Die gegebene Persönlichkeit hierfür war ohne Zweifel Reginald von Piperno, der von 1259-1274 der unzertrennliche Begleiter des Aquinaten gewesen war, der Nachschriften *(Reportata)* mehrerer seiner Vorlesungen hergestellt hatte, dem Thomas mehrere *Opuscula* gewidmet hatte, der auch seinem heissgeliebten Lehrer und Freund auf dem Lehrstuhl and der Universität nachgefolgt war und auch das Supplementum zu der unvollendet gebliebenen *Summa theologiae* redigiert hatte." M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin* in *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, XXII, Heft 1-2 (Münster i Westf.). P. Mandonnet observes, "Raynald de Piperno avait été le compagnon, le *socius*, comme on disait dans la langue du temps, de Thomas d'Aquin, depuis le retour de ce dernier en Italie en 1259, jusqu'à sa mort." P. Mandonnet, *op. cit.*, iv. In another work, Mandonnet quotes the following notation made by a contemporary of Reginald, "Explicit postilla super partem Psalterii secundum Fratrem Thomam de Aquino ordinis Praedicatorum quia non invenitur plus in exemplari Fratri Raynaldi di Piperno qui fuit socius Fratris Thomae usque ad mortem, et habuit omnia scripta sua." P. Mandonnet, *Des écrits authentiques de S. Thomas d'Aquin*, 41.

25 A. Dondaine writes, "Dans l'état actuel de nos informations, nous devons penser que son décès fut postérieur à 1285 et presque certainement antérieur à 1295." A. Dondaine, *Les Sermons de Reginald de Piperno*, in *Mélanges Tisserant VII (Studi e Testi 236)* (Biblioteca Vaticana, 1964) 373, quoted in H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, D6 note 1.

26 C. Vansteenkiste, review in *Bulletin Thomiste* 8 (1947-1953) I, 29.

on Vansteenkiste's part — a surmise which can neither be apodictically affirmed nor rejected. The weight of evidence seems to be in favor of the ancient and time-honored tradition. Both the Naples manuscript and the Prague catalogue of St. Thomas' works belong to the last decade of the thirteenth century — a mere fifteen years after the death of the Angelic Doctor and both documents contain an explicit dedication "ad fratrem Raynaldum". It is, therefore, our conviction that the reading of the title should be as follows: *Tractatus de substantiis separatis seu de angelis ad fratrem Raynaldum de Piperno.*[27]

AUTHENTICITY

There is absolutely no question concerning the authenticity of the Tractate. It has always been characterized as "opus genuinum, absque dubio."[28] Six collections of manuscripts which date back to the thirteenth century contain the *Treatise on Separate Substances.* Each manuscript begins with the following incipit: "Quia sacris angelorum interesse solemniis non possumus...." The manuscripts are (1) *Koblenz, Stadtbibliothek, θ, 155*; (2) *Metz, Bibliothèque Municipale 1158,* (3) *Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale. VII. B. 16,* (4) *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale 14546,* (5) *Paris; Bibliothèque Nationale 15813,* (6) *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale 15814.*

Ten other manuscript collections of the fourteenth century, likewise, contain the same treatise. The *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* also appears in eleven of twelve of the ancient collections of short works which the Leonine editors used in establishing their text. All ancient catalogues similarly list this treatise. H.-F. Dondaine very appropriately summarizes the question of authenticity when he writes, "Il n'est guère d'opuscule dont l'authenticité thomiste soit mieux attestée, d'ailleurs amplement confirmé par son contenu."[29]

DATE

The exact date of the composition of the *Treatise on Separate Sub-*

27 H.-F. Dondaine writes, "Il est raisonnable de faire crédit au témoignage de la liste de Prague, comme pour les 16 autres opuscules dont elle a soin de préciser le destinataire." H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.,* D5; cf. *Le Répertoire Codices manuscripti operum Thomae de Aquino* (Romae, 1967) nn. 2631, 1925.

28 Cf. M. Grabmann, *Die echten Schriften des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Münster, 1949) 324-325; P. Mandonnet, *Des écrits authentiques de S. Thomas d'Aquin,* 104 no. 20; A. Michelitsch, *Thomasschriften. Untersuchungen über die Schriften Thomas von Aquino,* Band I (Graz und Wien, 1913) 185 no. 67; P. Synave, *Le Catalogue officiel des œuvres de S. Thomas d'Aquin, Critique-Origine-Valeur* in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,* 3 (1928) 25-103.

29 H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.,* D5.

stances in unknown. Since the Treatise is unfinished (St. Thomas promises in Chapter XVIII, 6-7 (D71) to treat of "the order of government of the spiritual substances" — which, as we have already noted is never developed), the presumption is that the work was composed just before the death of the Angelic Doctor.[30]

The early Pizzamanus incunabula of 1490, 1498 and 1508 contain the following colophon which would seem to argue for a late composition date: "Hucusque scripsit sanctus doctor de angelis sed morte praeventus, non potuit proficere hunc tractatum sicut nec plura alia quae imperfecta relinquit."[31]

In addition, Martin Grabmann reports the following notation (although in a different hand from that of the text), at the end of the treatise in the Naples manuscript (*Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale. VII. B. 16*) which reads, "Si plus vixisset, auctor hic non tacuisset."[32]

In the absence of any meaningful and substantial research which could establish a later date for the composition of the treatise, Thomistic scholars generally accepted the year 1252 as a firm date for the writing of the treatise. For example, K. Werner in *Der hl. Thomas von Aquin* (nineteenth century) and J. Zimmermann in *Über die Schrift des hl. Thomas von Aquino "De Substantiis Separatis"* (beginning of the twentieth century), placed the treatise's composition around the year 1252. A. Tauron, in *La vie de S. Thomas* in the eighteenth century suggested the same date without, however, offering any firm evidence for his particular choice.[33]

The twentieth century has seen extensive and fruitful research into the question of the date of the composition of the *Tractatus de sub-*

30 F. J. Lescoe, *op. cit*, Chap. XVII. 134 no. 91.

31 *Opuscula praeclarissima eximii ac divini doctoris sancti Thomae de Aquino ordinis fratrum praedicatorum...* emendata atque correcta, ed. Antonius Pizzamanus, Impressa Venetiis ingenio ac impensa Hermanni Liechtenstein Coloniensis, 1490. The *De Substantiis separatis* is listed as *De angelis seu de substantiis separatis. Opus 15.* It is preceded by the *De natura veri* and followed by *De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas.* No foliation.

Opuscula Sancti Thomae: quibus alias impressis nuper haec addidimus, videlicet Summam totius Logicae. Tractatum celeberrimum de usuris nusquam alias impressum, ed. Antonius Pizzamanus. Impressum Venetiis mandato et expensis nobilis viri Domini Octaviani Scoti Livi Modoetiensis. Cura et ingenio Boneti Locatelli Bergomensis, 1498. The colophon appears in this edition on fol. 83v.

Opuscula Sancti Thomae: quibus alias impressis nuper haec addidimus, videlicet Summam totius Logicae. Tractatum celeberrimum de usuris nusquam alias impressum, ed. Antonius Pizzamanus. Impressum Venetiis mandato et expensis Petri Liechtenstein Coloniensis Germani. Cura et ingenio Jacobi Pentio de Leucho, 1508. The colophon is on fol. 76r.

32 M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin* 214.

33 H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, D6 note 2; cf. K. Werner, *Der hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Regensburg 1858) i, 115; J. Zimmermann, *Uber die Schrift des hl. Thomas von Aquino 'De Substantiis Sparatis'* (Zwittau, 1901) 1; A. Touron, *La vie de S. Thomas* (Paris, 1737). Of the latter, H.-F. Dondaine cautions, "Cette date proposée par A. Touron ne repose vraiment sur aucun indice ni aucun témoignage." *Ibid.*

stantiis separatis. It shall be our purpose, therefore, in the remainder of this paper, to sketch the highlights of this research.

The first significant, it not momentous, contribution in this area of research was Martin Grabmann's discovery that the *terminus a quo* for the treatise should be advanced by sixteen years, i.e., from 1252 to 1268. The basis for Grabmann's contention was the fact that the colophon appearing in the majority of manuscripts of William of Moerbeke's translation of Proclus' *Elements of Theology* places that work as having been completed on May 18, 1268. The colophon reads as follows: "Procli Diadochi Lycii Platonici Philosophi elementatio theologica explicit. Capitula 211. Completa fuit translatio hujus operis Viterbii a fratre G. de Morbecca ordinis praedicatorum, XV Kal. Iunii anno Christo 1268, pontificatus Clementis papae IV anno 4°."[34]

St. Thomas quotes two passages, i.e. Propositions 169 and 196, from the Latin translation of the *Elementatio Theologica* in the last chapter of the *Treatise on Separate Substances.* They appear in Chapter XX, 256-259, where St. Thomas writes, "Unde Proclus dicit in Libro divinarum coelementationum 'omnis anima participabilis corpore utitur primo perpetuo et habente hypostasim ingenerabilem et incorruptibilem.'" Again, in the same chapter (XX), lines 307-309, the Angelic Doctor writes, "Unde et Proclus dicit 'quod omnis intellectus in aeternitate substantiam habet et potentiam et operationem.'"[35] It is obvious therefore that we are dealing with a work composed in 1268 or later.

The next step in advancing an even later date, i.e. 1270, for the composition of the Treatise came by way of the corroborative evidence furnished by *Book Kappa* of Aristotle's *Metaphysics.* As R.-A. Gauthier, D. Salman and F. Pelster point out, it is an established fact that *Book Kappa* was first incorporated into the Latin translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* by William of Moerbeke in 1270.[36] The obvious conclusion is that *Book Lambda* should be cited as *Book XII* in any work written after the year 1270.[37]

34 M. Grabmann, *op. cit.*, 325.

35 F. J. Lescoe, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIX, 158, 161 nos. 110, 113. Proclus. *The Elements of Theology*, ed. E. R. Dodds (Oxford, 1933) 171, 147-149; cf. C. Vansteenkiste, *Procli Elementatio translata a Guilelmo de Moerbeke* (Textus ineditus) *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 13 (1951).

36 Cf. R.-A. Gauthier, "La date du commentaire de saint Thomas sur l'Ethique à Nicomaque" in *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 13 (1951) 84-92; D. Salman, "Saint Thomas et les traductions latines des *Métaphysiques d'Aristote*" in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 7 (1932) 85-120; F. Pelster, "Die griechisch-lateinischen Metaphysikübersetzungen des Mittelalters," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, Supp. Band II (Münster, 1923) 89-119; "Die Ubersetzungen der aristotelischen Metaphysik in den Werken des hl. Thomas von Aquin", *Gregorianum* 17 (1936) 377-406 esp. 380-389.

37 Cf. H. Saffrey, *Sancti Thomae de Aquino super Librum de Causis Expositio* (Fribourg-Louvain, 1954) xxxiv.

There are three specific citations of *Book Lambda* as *Book XII* in the *Treatise on Separate Substances*. In Chapter XIV, 16 of the *Tractatus*, St. Thomas writes, "...oportet igitur quod sicut ejus (Dei) substantia est suum esse, ita etiam ejus substantia sit suum intelligere sive intelligentia, ut etiam Philosophus concludit in *XII Metaphysicae*."[38] Again, in the same chapter (XIV, 88), Aquinas cites *Book Lambda* as *Book XII*. We read, "Sed quia occasionem errandi sumpserunt ex demonstratione Aristotelis in *XII Metaphysicae*, oportet ostendere quod Philosophi intentionem non assequuntur."[39] Finally, in Chapter XX, 261, the Angelic Doctor again appeals to the authority of the Stagirite, as found in *Lambda*, which is reckoned as *XII Metaphysics*. He says, "In substantia enim incorporea et intellectuali nullus appetitus esse videtur nisi intellectivus, quid quidem est simpliciter boni, ut per Philosophum patet in XII *Metaphysicae*."[40]

One word of caution has been sounded by Ignatius Eschmann concerning the validity of the *Book XII* citations in support of the year 1270 as the composition date. He warns, "Since this work (*Treatise on Separate Substances*) is unfinished and therefore not edited by Aquinas himself, its posthumous editor may perhaps be supposed to have interfered with details of this kind."[41]

On the other side of the scale, H.-D. Saffrey has discovered a remarkably close relationship between the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* and the *Expositio super librum de causis*. He states, "De nombreux passages du *De substantiis* pourraient être mis en parallèle avec des textes du commentaire. Sans aucun doute, la parenté entre ces deux écrits est étroite."[42] He has also found that these two works are the only writings in the entire corpus of Thomas' works which cite passages from Proclus' *Elements of Theology*. As he points out, "Le seul endroit de l'œuvre de saint Thomas, en dehors du commentaire, où la traduction moerbekienne de l'*Elementatio* soit citée, est le traité *De substantiis separatis*."[43]

Saffrey has further found that the *Commentary on the Book of Causes* likewise cites *Book Lambda* as *Book XII*. There are four citations in the *Commentary*, i.e. Prop. III, p. 24, 1. 10; Prop. XII, p. 79, 1. 12; Prop. XIII, p. 83, 1. 12; and Prop. XVIII, p. 103, 1. 20.[44]

38 *Metaph.* XII, 9 (1074b 28-34); F. J. Lescoe, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIII, 111 no. 70.
39 *Metaph.* XII, 9 (1074b 15-1075a 10); F. J. Lescoe, *ibid.*, Chap. XIII, 114 no. 73.
40 *Metaph.* XII, 8 (1072b 18-19); F. J. Lescoe, *ibid.*, Chap. XIX, 159 no. 111.
41 I. Eschmann, *op. cit.*, 142.
42 H.-D. Saffrey, *op. cit.*, Introduction xxxv.
43 *Ibid.*
44 Cf. H.-D. Saffrey, *op. cit.*, (1) Prop. III, p. 24, 1. 10, "Unde et Aristoteles in XII° *Metaphysicae* signanter Deo attribuit et intelligere et vivere." (2) Prop. XII, p. 79, 1. 10 "... vivere enim viventis est ipsum esse ejus, ut dicitur in II° *De Anima* et ipsum intelligere primi intelligentis

The fact that both works contain citations from Proclus and also refer to *Book Lambda* as *Book XII* has prompted Saffrey to state that the two works are contemporaneous. He writes, "Le fait que l'*Elementatio*, dans toute l'œuvre de saint Thomas, ne soit utilisée que dans ces deux écrits, le *De substantiis separatis* et le commentaire sur le *Liber*, nous incline à croire ces deux écrits contemporains... C'est sans doute pendant qu'il etudiait l'*Elementatio* pour écrire le commentaire que saint Thomas a redigé le *De substantiis.*"[45]

In résumé, both the Treatise and the Commentary cite Proclus; hence minimally, they must be dated 1268 or later. In addition, the Commentary quotes *Book Lambda* as *Book XII.* Inasmuch as the Commentary is a finished work, there can be no question of editorial interference concerning the *Book XII* citations. The Commentary's *terminus a quo* is thus 1270. Because of the strikingly close relationship between the two works and because of Saffrey's contention that they were written contemporaneously, we maintain that though the Treatise is an unfinished work, the *Book XII* citations were made by St. Thomas himself, and not by some posthumous editor. We therefore conclude that the *terminus a quo* for the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* is the year 1270, i.e. during the second Parisian stay.

Let us now turn to further corroborative evidence in favor of the year 1270 as a point of departure in dating the composition of the *Treatise on Separate Substances.*

Some twelve years ago, while we were engaged in the preparation of a Latin text for the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* based on twelve manuscripts, we were especially struck by the wording of a passage in Chapter XIII, D64, which is entitled "De errore quorundam circa cognitionem et providentiam substantiarum spiritualium."[46]

St. Thomas begins the chapter by telling us that "not only did some thinkers err concerning the substance and order of spiritual substances, judging of them after the manner of lower beings, but some of them fell into error concerning the knowledge and the providence of these substances."[47] He then proceeds to say; "For in wanting to judge of the in-

est vita ejus et esse ipsius, ut in XII° *Metaphysicae* dicitur." (3) Prop. XIII. p. 831. 12; "Unde et Aristoteles in XII° *Metaphysicae* probat quod intelligit seipsum tantum." (4) Prop. XVIII, p. 103, 1, 20 "... unde et Aristoteles in XII° *Metaphysicae* primo principio attribuit quod sit intellectus et quod suum intelligere sit vita, et secundum hoc ab eo omnia habent esse et vivere et intelligere."

45 H.-D. Saffrey, *op.cit.*, Introd. xxxv.

46 F. J. Lescoe, *op. cit.*, Introd. 5-6; Chap. XIII, 108 no. 67.

47 "Non solum autem in substantia et ordine spiritualium substantiarum aliqui erraverunt ad modum inferiorum rerum de eis aestimantes, sed hoc etiam quibusdam accidit circa cognitionem et providentiam earundem." Chap. XIII, D64, 4-8; F. J. Lescoe, *op. cit.*, Chap. XIII, 108 no. 67.

telligence and the operation of spiritual substances after the manner of human intelligence and operation, *they held that God and the other immaterial substances did not have a knowledge of singulars, nor did they exercise a providence over any lower beings and especially human acts*."[48] The Latin of the italicized portion reads, "...posuerunt Deum et alias substantias immateriales singularium cognitionem non habere nec inferiorum et praecipue humanorum actuum providentiam gerere."[49]

Now the particular order in which Aquinas mentions the specific points and the words themselves are an almost verbatim restatement of Propositions X, XI, XII of the Condemnation of 1270 made by Bishop Etienne Tempier on December 10 against the Arts Masters of the University of Paris. The propositions read as follows: "X. Quod Deus non cognoscit singularia. XI. Quod Deus non cognoscit alia a se. XII. Quod humani actus non reguntur providentia Dei."[50]

If we bracket the phrase "et alias substantias immateriales" (which St. Thomas would naturally add in a treatise which dealt with the nature of separate substances), the similarity of the wording appears to be much more than merely coincidental.[51]

The thirteen condemned theses were most certainly the object of much discussion by the teaching masters of the various faculties. One might say that they were on the lips of the whole university community, teachers and students alike. It is not unreasonable to presume that St. Thomas, as one of the most highly respected masters on the campus, should have been asked to state his own position publicly and even to refute officially the unacceptable teachings. This particular section (Chapter XIII) of the *Treatise on Separate Substances* was Aquinas' answer. Characteristically, as a scholar who always sought to rise above personalities and partisan argumentation, St. Thomas incorporated the official wording of the condemned theses and then proceeded to a systematic and objective refutation of their positions. By suppressing the names of the proponents of these condemned theses, the Angelic Doctor was able to prescind from the atmosphere of heated controversy

48 *Ibid.*, D64, 11-15; F. J. Lescoe, *ibid.*

49 *Ibid.*

50 H. Denifle et E. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (Paris, 1889-1897) I, 487. Cf. P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'Averroïsme latin au XIIIᵉ siècle* (Louvain, 1911), 2nd ed. I, 111.

51 J. Riedl also refers to this striking similarity between the text of St. Thomas and the wording of the condemned propositions. Since Riedl was not concerned with the date of the composition of the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis*, his interest was merely one of literary dependence and hence he does not make what appears to us this valid inference. J. Riedl, *The Nature of the Angels* in R. E. Brennan ed., *Essays in Thomism* (New York, 1942) 136 and notes 86, 88. H.-F. Dondaine recognizes the point in our 1963 edition when he observes, "Autre indice pour le même *terminus a quo*: l'énoncé des erreurs combattues au chapitre 13 de l'opuscule semble faire écho aux propositions 10, 11, 12 condamnées à Paris en 1270." H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, D6.

and to evaluate the propositions with a calm and detached objectivity. There was no doubt about the identity of the opposition — their names and positions were common knowledge on the University of Paris campus. But Aquinas achieved his purpose in a masterful way.[52]

We are convinced, therefore, that while this internal evidence does not carry absolute and categorical certainty, it nevertheless is a type of corroborative testimony which cannot be ignored. Anyone who chooses to reject this evidence must assume the burden of proving apodictically that the sequence of notions, and even the order of the words themselves, is the result of pure chance. We find such an explanation extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accept. Accordingly, we maintain that an absolutely firm — if not irrefutable — *terminus a quo* for the writing of the *Treatise on Separate Substances* in December 10, 1270.

In spite of the Proclus and Lambda testimonies, C. Vansteenkiste still insists that at least the major portion of the Treatise was written much earlier, i.e. around the year 1259. Some of the reasons which he adduces for an earlier date are the following: parallelisms of style and of expressions with the *De Veritate*, the doctrine of spiritual matter, a different attitude on Aquinas' part toward the *Liber de Causis* in the *Treatise on Separate Substances* from the attitude he displayed in his *Commentary on the Book of Causes.*[53]

The Proclus citations which we found at the end of the Treatise, Vansteenkiste claims could have been used more fittingly and effectively at the beginning of the work where St. Thomas examines the opinions of the various philosophers. The fact that Proclus is completely ignored in this section is proof for Vansteenkiste that the Angelic Doctor wrote this portion of the Treatise before the translation of Proclus' *Elements* in 1268. Vansteenkiste further conjectures that St. Thomas then could have continued the Treatise after 1268, but this is not essential, since the two propositions cited by Aquinas could have been translated separately in advance of the commentaries which were not completed until 1268.[54]

52 On Latin Averroism and the Condemnation of 1270 and 1277, cf. E. Gilson, *The History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York, 1955) 387-401; A. Maurer, *Medieval Philosophy* (New York, 1962) 192-207; V. Bourke, *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom* (Milwaukee, 1965) 159 ff.; M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas,* transl. A. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago, 1964) 73-75.

53 C. Vansteenkiste writes, "... il y a une foule d'indications qui favorisent une date bien plus ancienne, les parallélismes de style et d'expressions avec le *De Veritate*, la doctrine sur la *spiritualis materia*, des expressions comme: *si quis eas (animas) ponat corporibus uniri ut formas*, l'attitude envers le *Liber de causis* qui est autre que dans son Commentaire etc." C. Vansteenkiste, *op. cit.* 29.

54 C. Vansteenkiste concludes, "Nous inclinerions pour le gros de l'œuvre à une date voisine de 1259 ou de séjour en Italie. Il est à remarquer que les citations de Proclus ne se trouvent qu'à la

It seems to us that we are facing here too many hypotheses, too much theorizing and speculation. The cumulative evidence which we have just examined forces us to reject Vansteenkiste's surmises. Accordingly, we agree with Eschmann who writes, "Vansteenkiste took issue with this chronology (i.e. May 18, 1268 as a *point de départ*) but he failed to establish a convincing case."[55]

Angelus Walz, in his volume *Saint Thomas Aquinas*, places the composition date of the *Treatise on Separate Substances* in the Italian period, i.e. 1259-1269. He says, "This opusculum (*Compendium theologiae*), which is often assigned to Aquinas' last years, is probably more correctly to be placed in this period of his sojourn in Italy (1259-1269). The same may be said of the opusculum, also dedicated to Fr. Reginald and also incomplete, entitled *De Substantiis separatis seu de angelorum natura*. These works were doubtless broken off by a change of residence on the part of the author."[56] In Chapter XIII of the same book, Walz lists all the works of the Angelic Doctor. The *Treatise on Separate Substances* appears as Item no. 15 under the heading *Opuscula*, with the following title and date: "*De substantiis separatis seu de angelorum natura ad fratrem Raynaldum socium suum carissimum* (incomplete), 1261-1269."[57]

To our mind, Walz's dating must be rejected for the following reasons: on page 112, Walz writes, "After these various apostolic labors and activities, both religious and scientific which he performed in Italy, St. Thomas was in 1268 sent by his superiors once more to Paris to take up duties as professor of theology."[58] After describing Aquinas' journey from Italy to Paris, Walz concludes, "From Milan he proceeded to Christendom's great centre of studies in the French capital, probably passing through Vercelli and Aosta and so over the Pennine Alps. He will have arrived in Paris together with his Italian companions probably in January and certainly before Easter of the year 1269."[59]

As we have already seen, the Proclus citations in the *Treatise on Separate Substances* categorically demand a 1268 *terminus a quo*. The

fin de l'œuvre et qu'il aurait pu être utilisé d'une manière fort naturelle au début, où sont exposées les opinions des philosophes. On pourrait croire que S. Thomas a continué son écrit en 1268, mais ce n'est pas absolument nécessaire. Il cite deux 'propositions' de Proclus. Or les 'propositions' n'auraient-elles pas été traduite séparément sans les 'commentaires' avant la traduction complète de 1268?" C. Vansteenkiste, *op. cit.*, 29-30.

55 I. Eschmann, *op. cit.* 412.

56 A. Walz, *Saint Thomas Aquinas, A Biographical Study*, transl. S. Bullough (Westminster, 1951) 99.

57 *Ibid.*, 184.

58 *Ibid.*, 112.

59 *Ibid.*, 114.

Lambda citations as *Book XII* almost definitively advance the *terminus a quo* to the year 1270. Walz's proposed date of 1261-1269 becomes completely untenable. Even if we were to reject the 1270 date and adopt the incontrovertible 1268 as a starting point, it is absolutely inconceivable to us that Thomas Aquinas could have written such a highly technical metaphysical treatise during the period between May 1268 and either January or Easter of 1269, while he was making the long and arduous journey from Italy to Paris. We therefore find Walz's dating of the Treatise unacceptable.

Mandonnet, on the other hand, would advance the date of composition to the period between 1272 and 1273. The reasons he adduces for this "pin-pointing" are two: (1) the work is incomplete, (2) Aquinas' stay at Naples after Easter of 1272 would have afforded him the necessary leisure which was practically impossible during the turbulent teaching days at the University of Paris.[60]

Mandonnet and Vansteenkiste further see in the Prologue of the Treatise a reference to a specific feast day and hence have attempted to indicate a definite day on which Aquinas undertook the composition of the work. In the Prologue, the Angelic Doctor writes as follows: "Quia sacris angelorum solemniis interesse non possumus, non debet nobis devotionis tempus transire in vacuum, sed quod psallendi officio subtrahitur, scribendi studio compensetur."[61]

Mandonnet sees in the "sacris angelorum solemniis" a reference to a specific feast in honor of the holy Angels and he proposes October second as the day on which Aquinas commenced writing the Treatise.[62] But H.-F. Dondaine points out that the feast of the holy Angels goes back only to the sixteenth century. The Exemplar of Dominican liturgical books, which was compiled when Humbert de Romans was Provincial during the period of 1254-1263, contains no record of a feast of the holy Angels. The second day of October is dedicated to St. Léger.[63] B.M. de Rubeis, on the other hand, conjectures that the feast might be that of St. Michael the Archangel.[64]

H.-F. Dondaine's evaluation of these conjectures seems to be to the point, "... il est probable que sous la plume de saint Thomas — et dans

60 P. Mandonnet, *Opuscula Omnia* I, liii; cf. P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe* siècle (*Etudes de philosophie médiévale*, Paris, 1933) 98.

61 *Chap.* I, D41; F. J. Lescoe, *op. cit.*, Chap. 1, 35, no. 1.

62 P. Mandonnet, "Chronologie sommaire de la vie et des écrits de saint Thomas" in *Revue des sc. phil. et théol.* 9 (1920) 151.

63 H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, D6, note 10; cf. F. M. Guerrini, *Ordinarium iuxta ritum S. Ordinis Fr. Praed.* (Romae, 1921) 264.

64 B. M. de Rubeis writes, "Festum indicare videtur sancti Michaelis archangeli." B. M. de Rubeis, *Dissertationes criticae et apologeticae XVIII* (Venetiis, 1750) 208, (Romae, 1882) ccxxxiv.

le contexte de cet ouvrage — l'expression *sacris angelorum solemniis interesse* désigne simplement l'Office choral en général. Cette formule fait réplique exacte à celle de saint Bernard parlant de la présence des anges mêlés au chœur des moines pour la *laus Dei*."[65]

Conclusion

After having reviewed the various dates offered by different Thomistic scholars for the composition of the *Treatise on Separate Substances*, we should like to conclude this short paper with the following points:

1. The May 18, 1268 *terminus a quo* (Proclus' translation) is absolutely incontestable.
2. The 1270 *point de départ*, because of the Book Lambda citations, as well as corroborating verbatim citations from the Condemnation of 1270, cannot be dismissed.
3. The period of 1270 to 1273 is, to our mind, the most logical time during which St. Thomas Aquinas wrote the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis seu de angelis ad fratrem Raynaldum de Piperno*.[66]

65 St. Bernard writes, "Doleo aliquos vestrum... nec caeli cives revereri, sed in praesentia principum tamquam mortuos apparere, cum vestra alacritate permoti *vestris interesse solemniis* delectentur." St. Bernard, *Super Cantica*. sermo 7, no. 4, PL 183, 808C, quoted in H.-F. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, D7.

66 D. Callus dates the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* as belonging to the year 1270. D. Callus, *Les sources de Saint Thomas* in *Aristote et Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain-Paris, 1956) 150. A. Dondaine cites the frequent use of the conjunction NAM in the *Tractatus de substantiis separatis* as proof that the work belongs to a later period in the writing activity of St. Thomas. The conjunction is never found in such inconstestably early works as *De ente et essentia, De principiis naturae, Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem*, or *Quodlibet VII*. On the other hand, the conjunction appears, according to Dondaine's count, 24 times in the *De substantiis separatis*. Although Dondaine does not offer any specific date for the composition of this work, he does point out that the conjunction NAM began to appear "un peu avant la fin de son enseignement magistral parisien." A. Dondaine, *op. cit.*, 218-220.

From the feast of St. Nicholas (December 6, 1273) until the time of his death, Aquinas suddenly and inexplicably ceased all literary activity. Cf. *Proc. Can. Neap.* LXXIX (Fontes IV, 376-377); V. Bourke, *op. cit.*, 192-193; A. Walz, *op. cit.*, 156-157.

LES SERMONS DE SAINT THOMAS ET LA *CATENA AUREA**

Louis-Jacques Bataillon O.P.

EN lisant les rares sermons de saint Thomas d'Aquin dont l'authenticité soit assurée,[1] ce qui frappe d'abord est leur très grande ressemblance avec la masse des prédications universitaires de son époque. Alors que le style oratoire d'un saint Bonaventure est si bien

* La plupart des sermons étudiés ici ont été édités au t.32 des *Opera omnia* (Paris 1879) par les soins de S.E. Fretté (ce tome sera cité simplement par Vivès suivi de l'indication de la page), édition reproduite dans Divi Thomae Aquinatis... *Sermones et opuscula concioniatoria*...ed. A.J.B. Raulx (Barri-Ducis, Parisiis, Friburgi Helv., 1880) t.II (cité Raulx suivi de la page). Il existe de cet ouvrage une réimpression de l'année suivante mais en deux volumes au lieu de quatre et avec une pagination différente. Quant au t.24 des *Opera omnia* imprimé à Parme en 1869, il ne contient comme sermons authentiques que *Puer Ihesus, Attendite a falsis prophetis* et *Lux orta est iusto.* Les indications concernant les sermons qui ne figurent pas dans les éditions Vivès et Raulx seront données au début de l'étude de chacun d'entre eux.

La *Catena aurea* sera citée par la référence au verset de l'Evangile commenté, suivie de l'indication de la page et de la colonne de l'édition P. Guarienti chez Marietti (Taurini-Romae 1953). Les citations sont vérifiées sur les manuscrits suivants: *Catena in Matth.*, Linz 446; Parma, Pal.1; *Catena in Lucam,* Linz 448; Laon 88: Roma, Vallicelliana B.18. J'ai aussi fait usage à l'occasion de l'édition de J. Nicolai, t.XVII (Paris 1660).

1 Il faut rejeter comme inauthentiques les deux collections imprimées dans les diverses *Opera omnia* sous le nom de *Sermones dominicales* et *Sermones festivi*; conservées dans le ms. Vat.lat.3804, elles ont été imprimées dans l'édition dite *Piana* de 1570. Dans le ms. comme dans l'édition, des renvois existent d'une collection à l'autre, mais il existe des témoins isolés de chacune d'entre elles. Seuls quelques témoins relativement anciens des *festiui* portent une attribution à saint Thomas; les exemplaires présentent de fortes divergences d'un témoin à l'autre. Dans tous une partie importante de la collection est tirée des sermons d'Aldobrandinus de Cavalcantibus, provincial de la province romaine au temps de saint Thomas; cf. Th. Kaeppeli, *Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi* (Romae 1970) 37 (N° 125). Il faut également éliminer toute une série de sermons édités par Uccelli et Ghilardi d'après le ms. Vat. lat. 812; on trouvera les références à ces éditions dans A. Pelzer, *Codices Vaticani latini*, t. II, pars prior, Codices 679-1134 (Bibl. Vaticana 1931) 153-162. Malheureusement Mgr Pelzer a été trompé par une fausse indication de Harmand, *Catalogue Général des manuscrits des Bibliothèques publiques des Départements*, t. II (Paris 1855) 342. Harmand, décrivant le ms. Troyes 823, n'a pas vu qu'il contenait en fait deux recueils distincts et a étendu aux *Sermones de tempore* du début l'attribution à Guibert de Tournai des *Sermones de sanctis* qui suivent; l'autorité de Pelzer a fait étendre cette fausse attribution à d'autres exemplaires de ce recueil *Abiciamus opera tenebrarum ... Scriptum est ad Hebreos*; en fait plusieurs manuscrits (Tarragona 1, Laon 290[3], Vat. lat. 11524), appuyés par les listes de taxation des *exemplaria* de l'Université de Paris, montrent que l'auteur en est un frère Thomas Lebreton, inconnu jusqu'ici par ailleurs. On éliminera aussi l'*introitus* biblique *Intrauit rex* attribué à saint Thomas par une lubie d'Uccelli, ainsi que le sermon édité par le P. G. Meersseman, "La prédication dominicaine dans les congrégations mariales en Italie," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 18 (1948) 131-161 (texte en 159-161); l'attribution marginale de ce sermon *Cecidit sors* porte *fratris trōphi*, que le P. Meersseman a interprété un peu trop hardiment *Thome philosophi*, alors qu'il faut plus probablement résoudre l'abréviation en *theophili* ou *theodulphi*.

caractérisé que le recours apparemment subjectif à l'*indoles bonaventuriana* n'a que rarement induit en erreur la sagacité du P. Fidelis de Fanna et des éditeurs de Quaracchi, il est très difficile de découvrir des traits spéciaux à saint Thomas prédicateur. Sans doute quelques formules reviennent volontiers dans ses sermons, et le P. Kaeppeli a noté la fréquence chez lui d'une interrogation, souvent introduite par *sed numquid*, suivie d'une réponse débutant par *certe*,[2] mais ce trait n'a rien d'exclusif. Il en irait de même pour l'emploi fréquent de *uidete, uideamus*[3] et de quelques autres locutions. Ce sont là tournures que saint Thomas affectionne mais qu'il est loin d'être seul à utiliser; elles ne peuvent fournir tout au plus que des présomptions très légères d'authenticité.

Il est un point cependant par lequel saint Thomas se distingue assez souvent de ses contemporains. La plupart des prédicateurs du milieu du XIIIe siècle ne citent guère dans leurs sermons d'autorités patristiques, à l'exception de Bernard, très souvent invoqué, Augustin et Grégoire, parfois Jérôme ou Anselme; en revanche, dans certains des sermons les mieux attestés de saint Thomas on est frappé par la relative richesse des citations et par leur variété et notamment par l'usage fréquent de Chrysostome.

Presque tous les sermons certainement authentiques appartiennent à la période du second enseignement à Paris, ainsi que le montrent et les questions qui y sont traitées et le contexte des recueils qui les contiennent en même temps que les œuvres d'autres maîtres de cette époque. Il convient donc de se demander si cette documentation patristique des sermons n'aurait pas de rapports avec le considérable dossier recueilli par saint Thomas pour la composition de la *Glossa continua super quatuor euangelia* plus connue sous le nom de *Catena aurea*. Tel sera l'objet de cette enquête.

Celle-ci ne portera que sur un nombre restreint de sermons. Afin de permettre au lecteur de se référer à un texte, les sermons encore inédits

2 Th. Käppeli, "Una raccolta di prediche attribuite a S. Tommaso d'Aquino," *Archivum fratrum praedicatorum* 13 (1943) 59-94 (article qui sera cité désormais Kaeppeli, *Raccolta*); le passage sur l'emploi de l'interrogation suivie de *certe* se trouve p. 68-70. Comme exemples de la même formule chez des prédicateurs contemporains, on peut citer, un peu au hasard, des sermons de Jean de Verdy (Paris, B.N. lat. 15952, fol. 105va), Nicolas de Nonancourt (ibid. fol. 280ra), Jean de Saint-Benoît (Paris. B.N. lat. 14923, fol. 80rb). La réponse à la question est presque aussi souvent introduite par *dico* tant par saint Thomas que par les autres prédicateurs.

3 Ces expressions se rencontrent occasionnellement dans le commentaire de saint Thomas sur les Epîtres de S. Paul (*In I Cor.*, Prol.: *Videamus ergo primo textum; In I Thes.*, Prol., etc.). Le style de ce commentaire se rapproche par plusieurs autres points de celui des sermons. Ces textes reportés nous donnent sans doute l'image la plus fidèle de ce qu'était l'enseignement oral de saint Thomas.

ne seront pas pris en considération.[4] D'autre part, trois schémas squelettiques, conservés dans le ms. Milano, Ambrosiana A. 11 sup., ne peuvent être utilisés dans ce travail, puisqu'ils ne comportent plus que l'annonce des grandes divisions accompagnées chacune d'une citation biblique. Il s'agit des sermons *Celum et terra transibunt*,[5] *Abiciamus opera tenebrarum*[6] et *Ecce ego mitto angelum meum.*[7] S'ils ont comporté des citations des Pères, il n'en reste plus trace; le traitement de condensation qu'ils ont subi a été radical, comme celui qui a affecté les sermons bonaventuriens dont le même recueil nous a gardé maint schéma.[8] D'autres sermons enfin ont pour thème des passages bibliques, tirés d'autres livres que les Evangiles et ne se prêtent guère à une comparaison; ils ne comportent de fait que peu de citations patristiques; ce sont les sermons *Germinet terra*,[9] *Lux orta est iusto*,[10] *Beata gens*,[11] *Beatus uir*,[12] *Beati qui habitant.*[13] Enfin leur genre littéraire spécial invite à ne pas considérer ici le cas des *Collationes* sur l'oraison dominicale, la salutation angélique, le symbole des Apôtres et les dix commandements.

Faute de données chronologiques suffisamment sûres pour l'ensemble des sermons, nous examinerons ceux-ci dans l'ordre de l'année liturgique.

Le premier qu'il convient d'étudier est donc le sermon pour le premier dimanche de l'Avent *Ecce rex tuus uenit.*[14] Nous n'y trouverons qu'une seule citation patristique vers la fin de la *collatio*; elle est tirée

4 Ces sermons sont ceux qui ont été découverts et étudiés par le P. Kaeppeli, *Raccolta*.

5 Vivès, 692-693; Raulx, 219-220. Un autre exemplaire de ce sermon, amputé du prothème mais conservant la troisième partie omise dans le manuscrit de Milan, se trouve dans le ms. Paris, B.N.lat.14595, fol.175r-176r.

6 Vivès, 693; Raulx, 221-223.

7 Vivès, 815; Raulx, 223-224.

8 Les exemples abondent dans le volume des *Opera omnia* de Bonaventure consacré aux sermons (t.IX, Quaracchi 1901). Ainsi le sermon I pour Noël (p.103-106) compte 366 lignes de texte alors que le schéma correspondant (p.106) n'en a que vingt.

9 Ce sermon ne figure pas dans les éditions Vivès et Raulx; il a été publié par P.A. Uccelli sous le titre "Sermone inedito di S. Tommaso sulla Natività della SS. Virgine," *I Gigli a Maria* 12 (1874) 125-143. La collation traite, non de la nativité de Marie comme le sermon du matin, mais de l'exaltation de la Croix; il y a donc toutes chances pour que cette prédication ait eu lieu le 13 septembre 1271, dimanche dans l'octave de la Nativité avec premières vêpres de la Croix.

10 Vivès, 682-687; Raulx, 380-394.

11 Vivès, 797-802; Raulx, 394-411.

12 Vivès, 802-807; Raulx, 411-423.

13 Kaeppeli, *Raccolta*, 88-94.

14 Ce sermon a été édité par Dom Jean Leclercq, "Un sermon inédit de Saint Thomas sur la royauté du Christ," *Revue thomiste* 46 (1946) 152-166 et 572. Le fait que l'allusion à saint André se trouve à la fin de la *collatio* (p.166) et non dans le sermon du matin, est plus en faveur de la date du 29 novembre 1271 (avec les premières vêpres de l'Apôtre le soir du dimanche) que de celle du 30 novembre 1270 où il y avait occurrence des deux fêtes.

des *Tractatus in Iohannem* de saint Augustin[15]; ce passage figure aussi dans la *Catena aurea*, mais cette unique coïncidence ne peut être considérée comme significative.

Il en va tout autrement avec le sermon pour le premier dimanche après l'Epiphanie *Puer Iesus proficiebat.*[16] Si le sermon du matin ne comporte qu'une référence à la lettre 36 de saint Augustin,[17] passage qui ne se trouve pas dans la *Catena*, la collation des Vêpres contient plusieurs citations. La première débute ainsi: *In expositione huius uerbi dicit quidam Grecus satis notabile uerbum*[18]; or la *Catena* sur Luc nous donne sous l'indication *Grecus*[19] un passage qui correspond presque mot pour mot:

Sermon	Catena
Considera, inquit, prudentissimam mulierum Mariam et uere sapientie matrem qualiter scolaris pueri efficitur, et iam non ut puero neque ut uiro sed ut deo ei attendit; et sicut uerbum ipsum in mente conciperat, ita omnia facta eius et uerba nunc concipit corde.	Considera prudentissimam mulierum Mariam uere sapientie matrem qualiter scolaris fit pueri; non enim ei ut puero neque ut uiro sed ut deo uacabat....Sed sicut ipsum uerbum prius in uisceribus, ita nunc eiusdem modos et dicta concipiebat et in corde suo quodam modo fouebat.

La comparaison des textes montre une telle fidélité qu'elle invite à corriger dans le sermon *mente* en *uentre* d'après le *uisceribus* de la *Catena.*

Après une citation d'Augustin qui ne se retrouve pas dans la *Catena*, en vient une de Grégoire de Nysse.[20] Ici encore il est possible de mettre les deux textes en parallèle:

Sermon	Catena
Quisquis per motionem proficit obedientiam nunquam dimittit;	...quicquid per promotionem perficitur
antequam homo ad profectum conuersationis humane perueniat,	antequam ad finem perueniat
necessarium est ipsum habere obedientiam tanquam ducentem ad bonum.	obedientiam tanquam perducentem ad bonum utiliter amplexatur.

15 PL 35, 1649; *Corpus christianorum* 36, 307. La citation se trouve dans le sermon p.166 (cf.p.572); *Catena in Ioh.* VIII, 3; t.II, p. 444b.

16 Vivès,'663-671; Raulx, 224-243. Les passages cités sont corrigés d'après l'unique témoin manuscrit: Paris, B.N.lat.15034, fol.47vb-51vb.

17 Vivès, 666b; Raulx, 242. Augustin: PL 33, 151.

18 Vivès, 669b; Raulx, 240.

19 *Catena in Lucam* II, 51; t.II, p.43a. D'après Cordier et Nicolai, l'auteur grec serait Métaphraste ou Jean le Géomètre.

20 Dans le sermon il est appelé *Gregorius* sans plus alors que la *Catena* précise.

Un peu plus loin, la *Glossa* invoquée dans le sermon n'est nullement la Glose ordinaire, mais bien un passage de *Basilius in libro religionum*, c'est-à-dire des *Constitutiones monasticae* du pseudo-Basile, utilisé par la *Catena*[21]:

Sermon	Catena
Unde super illud *Subditus erat illis*, Glossa: et quibus illis? Dicit Glossa: Homines erant iusti et honesti, pauperes tamen et penuriam necessariorum habentes, teste presepi partus uenerandi ministro per continuos labores necessaria corporis querentes et Christus cum eis laborauit.	Cum enim homines essent honesti et iusti, egeni tamen et necessariorum penuriam patientes, teste presepi partus uenerandi ministro, manifestum quod sudores corporeos continuo frequentabant, necessaria inde sibi querentes. Ihesus autem obediens illis... etiam in sustinendo labores subiectionem plenariam ostendebat.

En plus de ces citations explicites, il semble qu'il y ait dans ce sermon des réminiscences d'autres passages de Pères grecs cités dans la *Catena*; les passages ci-dessus suffisent à montrer que dans cette prédication saint Thomas s'est souvenu de la documentation de la *Glossa continua.*

Le sermon de sexagésime *Exiit qui seminat*[22] est, comme l'ont noté les P. Kaeppeli[23] et H.-F. Dondaine,[24] une des pièces importantes de la lutte *contra Geraldinos* et les points communs abondent entre ce sermon, l'opuscule *Contra retrahentes* et la question disputée *De ingressu puerorum* éditée comme *Quodlibet IV*, a.23 et 24. Les trois ouvrages comprennent beaucoup de citations communes d'*auctoritates*. Mais, si tant l'opuscule que la question disputée utilisent largement la *Catena*,[25] il n'en est pas de même du sermon: seules une citation de Grégoire[26] et deux de Chrysostome correspondent à des passages de la *Catena*,[27] mais sous une forme telle qu'il n'y a aucune nécessité de penser à un recours direct.

21 Vivès, 670b; Raulx, 242. *Catena in Lucam* II, 51; t.II, p.43b. Ps.-Basile, *Regulae monasticae* IV, 6; PG 31, 1356 D-1357 A.

22 Edition: Kaeppeli, *Raccolta* 75-88.

23 Ibid. 65-68.

24 H.-F. Dondaine, "Note sur la documentation patristique de saint Thomas à Paris en 1270," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 47 (1963) 403-406, et préface de l'édition de l'opuscule *Contra doctrinam retrahentium a religione, Opera omnia* (ed. leonina) t.XLI (Romae 1969) p. C. 7.

25 Voir pour l'opuscule l'index de l'édition précitée, p. C. 83.

26 Kaeppeli, *Raccolta*, 83. *Catena in Matth.* XX, 16; t. I, p. 294a.

27 Kaeppeli, *Raccolta*, 84. *Catena in Matth.* XXIII, 15; t. I, p. 334b-335a.

Le sermon des rogations *Petite et accipietis*[28] est encore moins riche: une seule citation commune tirée d'Augustin, que nos reportations appellent Grégoire.[29]

Nous trouvons en revanche une assez riche moisson dans le sermon *Attendite a falsis prophetis*:[30] dix-sept citations des Pères: sept d'Augustin, trois de Grégoire, six de Chrysostome, une des *Similitudes* attribuées à Anselme; or douze de ces citations coïncident avec la *Catena*. Comme il s'agit de la Glose sur Matthieu qui ne contient que des œuvres qui circulaient largement au temps de saint Thomas, on pourrait se demander s'il n'y a pas simplement rencontre fortuite. Les quatre extraits du *De sermone Domini in monte*, par exemple, ne nous apprennent rien, car la *Catena* recopie presque mot pour mot le traité d'Augustin. D'autres citations du sermon sont plus *ad sensum* qu' *ad litteram* et donc sans poids pour notre recherche. Mais un des cas est très net: il s'agit d'un passage de l'*Opus imperfectum in Matthaeum* du pseudo-Chrysostome. Le texte original porte:

> Deinde ut orans nihil nouum faciat quod aspiciant homines; nec quis uoce clamet ut audiatur ab aliis, nec expandat manus suas, ut Pharisaeus in templo, ut uideatur a multis, neque pectus suum percutiat, sed absconse, sicut publicanus in templo, neque impudenter oculos tollat ad caelum ut notabilis fiat.[31]

28 Vivès, 688-691; Raulx, 279-288, d'après le ms. Paris, B.N.lat. 14923. Une meilleure édition a été donnée par B. Hauréau, *Notices et extraits de quelques manuscrits latins de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, t. IV (Paris 1892) 81-88 (cité désormais Hauréau, *Notices*), d'après les mss Paris, B.N. lat. 14952, 14899 et 14923. Ces trois manuscrits portent une attribution explicite à saint Thomas, mais un quatrième exemplaire de ce sermon dans le ms. München, Clm 23372, donne comme auteur un Maître Guillaume Breton. Dans ce témoin le *sermo* est composé de la réunion ensemble du sermon et de la collation des manuscrits parisiens alors que la *collatio* est toute différente. Provisoirement j'inclinerais à attribuer cette collation de Munich à Guillaume Breton et à laisser à saint Thomas le sermon et la collation de Paris.

29 Vivès, 689a; Raulx, 282; Hauréau, *Notices*, 84. *Catena in Lucam* XI, 9; t. II, 162b.

30 Vivès, 673-680; Raulx, 337-354. Je corrige d'après les mss Paris, B.N. lat.15034, fol. 132ra-135rb, et Nürnberg, Stadtbibl. V.82, fol.213v-216r. Le P. Jules d'Albi, *Saint Bonaventure et les luttes doctrinales de 1266-1267* (Tamines 1922) 196-199, a prétendu que ce sermon n'était qu'un démarquage du sermon de saint Bonaventure *Medius vestrum stetit* (Sermo II in Dom.III adventus: *Opera omnia* t.IX, 59-67; *Opera theologica selecta* t.V, 279-295). Les ressemblances sont en fait très superficielles et tiennent au contexte historique commun des deux œuvres, mais le sujet traité est entièrement différent et il n'y a aucune raison sérieuse pour refuser l'attribution d'*Attendite* à saint Thomas. Dans le manuscrit de Paris, ce sermon est daté: *in tertia dominica post festum apostolorum Petri et Pauli*; l'inscription du manuscrit de Nuremberg est légèrement mutilée, mais d'après le contexte il faut sûrement lire: *VIIIa dominica post trinitatem*, ce qui correspond à la suite des péricopes évangéliques selon l'usage parisien et dominicain de l'époque; la confrontation des deux façons de dater permet d'attribuer avec sécurité ce sermon au 26 juillet 1271.

31 Hom.13; PG 56, 709.

Voici maintenant la façon dont ce texte est abrégé dans le sermon et dans la *Catena*:[32]

Sermon	Catena
Orans nichil nouum faciat ut ab hominibus uideri possit, neque clamando, neque pectus percutiendo, neque manus eleuando.	Orans, ergo nichil nouum faciat quod aspiciant homines, uel clamando, uel pectus uel manus expandendo.

La dépendance du sermon à l'égard de la *Catena* et non du texte original de l'*Opus imperfectum* semble évidente; il pourrait cependant y avoir un intermédiaire, un passage de la *IIa IIae*, q.187,a.6, ad 3m, qui cite ce passage en recopiant textuellement la *Catena* de même que certains extraits du *De sermone Domini in monte* communs à la *Catena* et au sermon.[33] Toutefois le nombre des autres coïncidences fait plutôt penser à un recours direct de saint Thomas à sa chaîne.

Une situation assez analogue se remarque dans le sermon pour le IXe dimanche après la Trinité *Homo quidam erat diues.*[34] Sur treize citations patristiques,[35] huit figurent également dans la *Catena*: une de Grégoire le Grand, trois d'Augustin, une de Théophylacte (sous le nom de Chrysostome), une autre réellement de ce dernier et deux de Basile. Si la seconde citation de Basile est seulement *ad sensum*, la première est suffisamment littérale pour montrer qu'elle ne vient pas de la traduction de Rufin mais bien de la *Catena aurea* où le passage a dû être traduit d'après la chaine grecque de Nicétas. Voici d'abord le texte tel qu'il a été traduit par Rufin:[36]

> Nunquid iniquus est Deus ut nobis non aequaliter distribuat uitae subsidia, ut tu quidem esses affluens et abundans, aliis uero deesset et egerent? An idcirco magis quia et tibi uoluit benignitatis suae documenta

32 Vivès, 677b; Raulx, 348. *Catena in Matth.* VI, 5; t.I, p.101a.

33 *IIa IIae*, q.187, a.6, arg.3 et corps (même citation q.169, a.1, corps et *IIIa P.* q.41, a.4, ad 2) = Vivès, 678a; Raulx, 349 (corriger ainsi: *Augustinus: In hoc capitulo animaduertendum non in solo corporearum rerum nitore...*). Ibid. ad 1 = Vivès, 679a; Raulx, 351. Ad 3 = Vivès 679b - 680a; Raulx, 351. Le premier et le troisième passages sont tirés du *De sermone Domini in monte* II, 12 (PL 34, 1287; *Corpus christianorum* 35, 131-132); le second de II, 24 (PL 34, 1306; C.C. 35, 179).

34 Vivès, 791-797; Raulx, 354-372. Je corrige d'après les mss Venezia, Marc. fondo antico lat. 92, fol. 257ra-261ra; Salamanca, Univ. 2187, fol. 193rb-197ra; Sevilla, Cab. 83.2.15, fol.146ra-150rb.

35 Il faut éliminer une fausse citation des éditions (Vivés, 793a; Raulx, 360): au lieu d'*Augustinus*, il faut lire *uerbi gratia.*

36 Hom.III,7; PG 31, 1752, correspondant à l'homélie grecque VI (*In illud dictum...Destruam horrea mea)*, PG 31, 276 C. Il semble que saint Thomas n'ait connu la traduction de Rufin, au moins pour cette homélie, que par l'intermédiaire du Décret qui la cite sous le nom d'Ambroise, *Ia P.* d.47, c.8 (éd. Friedberg, I, 171-172: voir notamment *IIa IIae*, q.66, a.8, corps, où est citée la fin du passage ici reproduit.

> conferre, et alium per uirtutem patientiae coronare? Tu uero susceptis Dei muneribus et in sinum tuum redactis, nihil te putas agere iniquum, si tam multorum uitae subsidia solus obtineas.... Esurientium panis est quem tu detines, nudorum uestimentum est quod tu recludis, miserorum redemptio est et absolutio pecunia quam in terra defodis. Tantorum te ergo scias inuadere bona, quantis possis praestare si uelis.

Le texte donné par la *Catena* et le sermon est tout différent:[37]

Sermon	Catena
An iniustus est Deus inequaliter nobis res dispensans?... Cur ergo tu habundas et ille mendicat nisi ut cibum dispensando uite premia consequaris et ille patientie brauiis coronetur?	An iniustus est Deus inequaliter res nobis distribuens? Cur tu habundas, ille uero mendicat nisi tu bone dispensationis merita consequaris? ille uero patientie brauiis coronetur?
At tu non depredator es, que tibi commissa sunt dispensanda appropriando?	An tu nonne spoliator es, que dispensanda suscepisti propria reputando?
Est egentium panis quem tu tenes, nudi tunica quam in conclaui conseruas, discalciati calceus qui penes te marcescit, indigentis argentum quod humi reconditum habes. Quo circa tot iniuriaris quot dare posses.	Est panis famelici quem tu tenes, nudi tunica quam in conclaui conseruas, discalceati calceus qui penes te marcescit, indigentis argentum quod possides inhumatum. Quo circa tot iniuriaris quot dare ualeres.

Ce texte est cité plusieurs fois également dans la *IIa IIae.*[38]

La citation de Théophylacte sous le nom de Chrysostome n'est pas *ad litteram.*[39] Alors que la *Catena* donne, avec la vraie attribution, le texte sous la forme suivante:

> Ille ergo dicuntur opes nequicie quascumque dominus dedit ad inpendia necessitatis fratrum ac conseruorum nostrorum, nos uero tenemus nobis,

le sermon résume ainsi:

> Crisostomus dicit quod diuicie dicuntur mammona iniquitatis quia inique eas retinuisti.

Comme il ne semble pas que Théophylacte ait pu être connu autrement que par la *Catena* au temps de saint Thomas, nous avons ici une quasi-certitude de l'utilisation de la chaine dans le sermon.

37 Vivès, 795a-796b; Raulx, 368-369. *Catena in Lucam* XII, 18; t. II, p. 181a.

38 *IIa IIae*, q.32, a.5, ad 2; q.66, a.2, ad 2; q.117, a.1, ad 1; q.118, a.4, arg. 4.

39 Théophylacte, *Enarr. in ev. Lucae*, XVI; PG 123, 926 A. *Catena in Lucam* XVI, 9; t. II, p. 224b. Sermon: Vivès, 797a; Raulx, 371.

Parmi les citations qui ne se retrouvent pas dans la *Catena*, l'une remonte presque certainement à l'une des sources principales de celle-ci, c'est-à-dire à la traduction latine de la chaine de Nicétas exécutée à la demande de saint Thomas. Il s'agit d'un passage d'une homélie sur l'économe infidèle attribuée erronément à Chrysostome.[40] Des fragments figurent dans la *Catena*, mais pas celui que transmet le sermon:[41]

> Aduena es, et transitorii et breuis usus sunt tibi iura commissa....Modo habes agrum uel fundum, considera quot dominos ante te habuit infinitos: uix habent tot glebas. Item, est de te sicut de illo qui sub umbra quiescit: recedas, et uenit alius qui quiescit ibi sicut et tu. Sic cedit tibi in mundo secundum diuinam prouidentiam, non tuam.

Or ce passage figure dans la chaine de Nicétas[42]; il y a donc toute vraisemblance pour que saint Thomas en préparant son sermon ait eu recours, non à la *Catena* elle-même, mais à la principale de ses sources.

Le dernier sermon, *Omnia parata sunt*, pour le vingtième dimanche après la Trinité, ne comporte aucune citation patristique.[43]

A la fin de cette étude, il apparait donc que saint Thomas n'avait pas une façon constante de préparer ses prédications. Dans certains cas, il n'use que peu ou point de l'autorité des Pères; dans le sermon *Exiit qui seminat* il puise sa documentation avant tout dans ses ouvrages contemporains; dans trois autres, *Puer Iesus, Attendite a falsis prophetis, Homo quidam erat dives*, il a eu recours au dossier patristique de la *Catena aurea.*[44] L'absence de rapports avec cet ouvrage ne saurait constituer une présomption suffisante pour refuser à saint Thomas la paternité de sermons que la critique externe lui attribue avec vraisemblance; par contre le recours à cette source, que frère Thomas connaissait mieux que quiconque, assure aux sermons où il est attesté une garantie supplémentaire non négligeable d'authenticité.

40 *Homelia de parabola villici,* PG 61, 785.

41 Vivès, 794a; Raulx, 363-364.

42 Ms. Vat.graec. 1611, f.214ra. B. Corderius, *Catena sexaginta quinque Graecorum Patrum in S. Lucam* (Antverpiae 1628) 395. Saint Thomas remonte également à la traduction de la chaîne grecque, au delà de la *Catena,* pour deux citations du *Contra retrahentes* (H.-F. Dondaine, article cité plus haut, note 24)

43 Edité par B. Hauréau, *Notices* 88-93.

44 Le sermon *Osanna filio Dauid,* dont seul un fragment a été édité (Kaeppeli, *Raccolta,* 72-75) comporte, outre les rapports notés par l'éditeur avec les opuscules *Contra impugnantes* et *Contra retrahentes,* quelques coïncidences avec la *Catena* et d'assez nombreux parallèles avec la *Lectura in Matthaeum.*

In the *ST*, however, directed to an audience of beginners in the study of Catholic truth, where St. Thomas had promised to set forth "briefly and clearly" the things that pertain to sacred doctrine, he introduces examples of proofs of God's existence with the flat statement that "the existence of God can be proved in five ways."[12] There is only one specific reference to a philosopher, Aristotle, and this occurs in the fourth way, which most historians ascribe rather to the Platonic tradition.

In what ways then would professors in the Parisian Faculty of Arts find use for Aquinas's theological treatment of the question of God's existence? A Christian professor, charged with guiding his students through a reading of Aristotle's *Physics*, might naturally associate a demonstration of the existence of a first unmoved mover in Book Eight with a proof for the existence of God. Even more so, a Christian commentator on Book Twelve of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* could scarcely dissociate in his own mind a proof of God's existence from a demonstration of the existence of an eternal immaterial substance, wholly in act, especially since in this book Aristotle expressly calls such a being God.[13]

In fact, similar associations had already been made, albeit in different ways, by Avicenna and Averroes. Indeed, their handling of the question of demonstrating God's existence was so different that no professor in the Arts Faculty could avoid taking sides in the controversy as to whether such a proof belongs to the science of physics or metaphysics.

Avicenna, with his recognition of a *causa agens* (the *creator mundi*) that is not merely a source of motion but a source of being (*principium essendi*), insisted that it is in the science of metaphysics that we demonstrate the existence of "the Most High God."[14] Averroes, on the contrary, denied the philosophical need for any creative causality and insisted that it is impossible to prove the existence of an immaterial being except by way of motion.[15] Thus the existence of God or the prime mover is properly and exclusively proved in the science of physics. The task of the metaphysician is to demonstrate that the prime mover, whose existence had already been proven in physics, is the principle of sensible substance in the orders of formal and final causality.[16] He

12 St. Thomas, *ST* 1, 2, 3.
13 Aristotle, *Meta*. XII, 7, 1072b 30.
14 Avicenna, *Meta*. VI, 1, fol. 91r2, and 1, 1, fol. 70r1-2.
15 Averroes, *In XII Meta*. c. 5 (Venice 1574) fol. 293 C.
16 Ibid. c. 6, fol. 294 K-L; see also *In II Meta*. c. 6, fol. 31 E.

"VERSUS" DANS LES ŒUVRES DE SAINT THOMAS

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IL n'est pas question, dans les pages qui suivent, des "poésies" de S. Thomas, authentiques ou supposées. On a parlé ainsi d'un (quelques-uns même de plusieurs) sonnet en italien.[1] On a parlé encore de l'épitaphe de S. Pierre Martyr et d'autres compositions religieuses.[2] On pensera surtout à l'office du S. Sacrement, dont l'authenticité s'affirme de plus en plus.[3] L'objet de ces modestes observations est donné par les "versus" que S. Thomas cite dans ses œuvres. (L'étude ne peut être que préliminaire, parce que nous ne disposons pas encore d'éditions critiques suffisantes, ni d'indices complets). On peut répartir ces citations en trois classes: les "versus" liturgiques, les "versus" classiques, les "versus" mnémotechniques. Ceux qui appartiennent à la liturgie (par exemple, "O Crux Ave..." dans *Summa Theologiae* III, 25, 4, s.c.) devraient être étudiés à part dans un travail sur S. Thomas et la liturgie.[4] Parmi les citations de poètes "classiques" on pourrait énumérer celles des "metra" du *De consolatione* de Boèce. Mais il serait nécessaire d'écrire une étude spéciale sur la présence de Boèce dans l'œuvre de S. Thomas, ainsi qu'on l'a fait pour d'autres auteurs (Denys, Avicenne, etc.). Nous notons ici quelques autres citations explicites (sans nous occuper des implicites) de "poètes" classiques.

Disticha Catonis[5]

1. "Legere et non intelligere negligere est, ut dicit Cato", *In IV Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ql. 2, obj. 3. Ce texte a été employé par le compilateur du Supplément à la *Somme* (q. 36, a. 2, obj. 3). Il s'agit d'un texte en prose de la *praefatio* au premier livre des *Disticha* (dans l'édition de O.

1 Qu'on lise, à ce propos, M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, 3. Auflage (Münster 1949) 413.

2 Ibid., 416.

3 Voir récemment T. Bertamini, "La Bolla 'Transiturus' di papa Urbano IV e l'Ufficio del 'Corpus Domini' secondo il codice di S. Lorenzo di Bognanco," *Aevum* 42 (1968) 29-58.

4 On sait que celle-ci était une "auctoritas" théologique pour Thomas.

5 L. Sorrento, *Medievalia. Problemi e Studi* (Brescia 1943) p. 372, dit: "le citazioni dello pseudo Catone sono 2."

Arntz, Amstelaedami 1754, p. 10). La sentence est citée comme de Caton par Humbert des Romans, *Expositio regulae Beati Augustini*, ed. J. J. Berthier (Romae 1888), p. 446, et sans nom d'auteur par Robert de Sorbon, *De conscientia (Maxima bibliotheca veterum patrum* 25, Lugduni 1677, p. 350).

2. "...secundum illud Catonis: Cole parentes", *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 81, a. 1, obj. 4. L'édition canadienne indique les *Breves Sententiae* 2, 3, et 40. La dernière (40) ne semble pas convenir, mais on aurait une fusion de 2 et 3: "Parentes (ama, cognatos) cole."

Horatius[6]

3. "Ut ait Horatius: per mare pauperiem fugiunt, per saxa, per ignes; ut Augustinus dicit in IV L. contra Iulianum", *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 23, a. 7, c. La source directe, S. Augustin, PL 44, 748; la source première: Horace, *Epist.* I, 46.

4. "Illud Horatii: brevis esse laboro, obscurus fio", *In Boethium de Trinitate,* Expositio prooemii, ed. B. Decker (Leiden 1955), p. 54. Le texte est du *De arte poetica*, 25.

5. "Illud Horatii: oderunt peccare mali formidine poenae; oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore", *De malo*, q. 1, a. 5, ad 11. La source première est *Epist.* I, 16.52. Le texte est cité encore, par exemple, dans Iohannes Viterbiensis, *Liber de regimine civitatum* (*Biblioteca iuridica medii aevi* 3, Bononiae 1901, p. 265), et par Albertano da Brescia, *Liber consolationis et consilii*, ed. T. Sundby (Havniae 1873), p. 87.

6. "Horatius: ludere qui nescit campestribus abstinet armis", *In Epist. I ad Timotheum*, cap. 3, lect. 2. Voir *De arte poetica*, 379.

Ovidius[7]

7. "Ovidius: et quacumque potes dote placere, place", *In IV Sent.* d. 49, q. 4, a. 1 (texte cité aussi par le compilateur du Supplément à la *Somme*, q. 95, a. 1). C'est un vers de l'*Ars amatoria*, I. 594.

8. "Poeta dicit: quis matrem nisi mentis inops in funere nati flere vetat", *In Iob* (ed. Léonine 1965, 2.266). C'est *Remedia amoris*, 127. Le vers est cité aussi par Albertano, op. cit. (ed. cit., p. 2), et dans le

6 L. Sorrento, op. cit., semble avoir relevé un plus grand nombre de citations, mais il ne donne pas de précisions: "*Arte poetica* (2 citazioni precise e dirette); *Odi* (1 citazione da Sant'Agostino); *Epodi* (1 citazione da Sant'Agostino); *Epistole* (1 citazione diretta)", p. 372.

7 Ici L. Sorrento est moins complet: "Ovidio Nasone, *Ars amatoria* (1 volta sola; non si può dire se diretta)", op. cit., p. 372. On pourrait renvoyer ici aux nombreuses études sur Ovide au Moyen Age (la plupart sont énumérées par S. Viarre, *La survie d'Ovide...*, Poitiers 1966).

Paedagogus Abbatum Ordinis Cistercii (ed. *Mediaeval Studies* 30, 1968, p. 309).

9. "Sicut dicit Sapiens: non minor est virtus quam quaerere parta tueri", *In Epist. ad Ephesios*, prologo. Voir: *Ars amatoria*, II.13; le vers était populaire au Moyen Age.

10. "Virtus enim laudata crescit in immensum pondus et immensum gloria calcar habet", *In Epist. ad Hebraeos*, c. 10, lect. 4. Le texte ne donne pas de nom d'auteur. Comparer: *Epist.* IV, 2.35.

Terentius[8]

11. "Terentius in Eunucho dicit quod in amore est bellum et rursus pax et indutiae", *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 54, a. 6, ad 2. Comparer: Act. I, 1.59.

12. "Terentius dicit in Eunucho...: quae res in se neque consilium neque modum ullum habet, eam consilio regere non potes", *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 153, a. 5. Voir: Act. I, 1.57.

13. "Terentius dicit in Eunucho...: haec verba una falsa lacrimula restringet", ibid. Voir: Act. I. 1.67 ss.

14. "Illud Terentii: Veritas odium parit", *De correptione fraterna*, a. 1, 19°. Voir: *Andria* I, 1.68, et Ausonius, *Ludus septem sapientium*: Bias, 3 (PL 19. 876 A).

15. "Unde Glosa: sine Cerere et Baccho friget Venus", *In Ieremiam* 5. 7. Voir: *Eunuchus* IV, 6.731, et la *Glossa interlinearis* (ed. Venetiis 1603, IV, col. 623-4).

Virgilius[9]

16. "Augustinus, XIV de Civitate Dei...inducens illud Virgilii: hinc metuunt, cupiunt, gaudentque dolentque", *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 35, a. 1, s.c. Pour Virgile, v. *Aeneis* VI. 733; pour Augustin, PL 41. 412.

17. "Augustinus, XII de Trinitate...probat per dicta Virgilii, qui proprio nomine memoriae et oblivionis usus est", *De veritate*, q. 10, a. 2, s.c. 2. Voir: *Corpus Christianorum*, SL, La 1968, p. 442.

18. "Augustinus, XIV de Civitate Dei...ex verbis Virgilii...qui...dixit: sicut homines cupiunt, metuunt gaudentesque dolentesque...", *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 5, obj. 1. Cf. la citation n. 16.

19. "Sicut quando inducunt illud Virgilii: talia pendebat memorans fixusque manebat", *In Matthaeum*, c. 1 (n. 148). Cf. *Aeneis* II. 650.

8 L. Sorrento, op. cit. dit: "*L'Eunuchus* (4 citazioni dirette et precise e 1 da S. Girolamo", p. 372.

9 Selon Sorrento "*Aeneis* (4 dirette e precise, e 1 da Sant'Agostino); *Bucolica* (1 precisa e diretta)", op. cit., p. 372.

20. "Si enim, ut dicit Augustinus: trahit sua quemque voluptas", *In Iohannem*, c. 6 (n. 935). Voir: Augustin, *In Evangelium Iohannis*, tract. 36, c. 6 (PL 35, 1608) et *Bucol.* 2.65.

Nous ajoutons ici un vers pseudo-classique: "dicitur: in vultu legitur hominis secreta voluntas", *In II Sent.* d. 8, q. 1, a.5, ad 5. On lit dans le *Miles Gloriosus* 37: "in facie legitur hominum..." (*La Comédie Latine en France au XIIe siècle*, I, Paris 1931, p. 197). On trouvera une bibliographie supplémentaire chez Walther, cité ci-après, aux nn. 11765 et 12157.

Notre énumération n'est probablement pas complète, et il nous est impossible de donner une liste des citations implicites ou allusions.

Les poètes grecs cités par S. Thomas lui sont évidemment connus par des intermédiaires, surtout par Aristote. On peut nommer Homère, Hésiode, Aratos (*Summa Theol.* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2), connu par les *Actes des Apôtres*, et Ménandre (*In I Epist. ad Corinthios*, c. 15, lect. 14) connu par S. Jérome. L. Sorrento dira donc: "Non cita che indirettamente poeti greci" (op. cit, p. 370).

Il y a enfin le troisième genre, les vers mnémotechniques, dont l'usage appartenait à la technique de l'enseignement scolastique dans toutes ses branches. L. Thorndike en a étudié l'usage dans les ouvrages de sciences naturelles.[10] H. Walther a relevé la presque totalité de ces vers.[11] Nous présentons ici ce que nous avons trouvé chez S. Thomas. Il ne sera pas nécessaire, pour notre but, de relever les nombreuses variantes (les unes purement verbales, ou même des fautes, les autres de véritables variantes d'expression). Il faudrait avoir les éditions critiques et pouvoir retracer l'histoire de ces formules.

1. "Sex in lacte dies, tres sunt in sanguine terni
bis seni carnem, ter seni membra figurant".
In III Sent. d. 3, q. 5, a. 2.

Ce texte se trouve ad litteram dans le *Regimen sanitatis* de l'école de Salerne (Salerno 1941, p. 302) et dans le *De secretis naturae* de Michel Scot (Lugduni 1598, p. 265). Comparer encore la *Glossa* d'Alexandre de Halés, III, d. 3 (Quaracchi 1954, p. 38), et IV, d. 6 (Quaracchi 1957, p. 110); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 31 (Borgnet 30.251).

2. "Rex sedet in coena — turba cinctus duodena;
se tenet in manibus — se cibat ipse cibus".
In IV Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 1; *Summa Theol.* III, q. 81, a. 1, ad 1.

10 "Unde Versus," *Traditio* 11 (1955) 162-193.
11 *Carmina medii aevi posterioris latina* (Göttingen 1959 ss.).

Voir: Walther, op. cit., n. 16778; A. Wilmart, "Poèmes de Gautier de Châtillon dans un manuscrit de Charleville," *Revue bénédictine* 49, 1937, p. 135; J. De Ghellinck, "Les notes marginales du Liber Sententiarum," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 14, 1913, p. 515). Cité encore par Gervais de Melkley, *Ars poetica* (H.-J. Gräbener, Münster 1965, p. 206); Hugues de St-Cher, *Super Lucam* 22.19 (Venetiis 1703, VI, f. 259v); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 12, a. 15 (Borgnet 29.322).

3. "Pixide servato poteris copulare dolorem
innatum, sed non illatus convenit illi".
In IV Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 4, ql. 1; *Summa Theol.* III, q. 81, a. 4.

Voir: Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d.12, a.14 (Borgnet 29. 320), *De sacramentis* (Coloniensis XXVI, p. 67); *Liber de sacramento eucharistiae*, III. 1.6 (Borgnet 38.263).

4. "Hostia dividitur in partes: tincta beatos
plene, sicca notat vivos, servata sepultos".
In IV Sent. d. 12, q. 1, a. 3, ql. 3, ad 4; *Summa Theol.* III, q. 83, a. 5, ad 8.

On retrouve ces vers chez Alexandre de Halés, *Glossa* IV, d.12 (ed. cit., p. 195); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d.13 (Borgnet 29.357); S. Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d.12, pars 1, a.3, q.3; dans les notes marginales au *Rotulus pugillaris* d'Augustin de Dacie (Walz, *Classica et Mediaevalia* 1955, p. 194). On trouve des vers semblables dans la *Summa totus homo* (H. Betti, Romae 1955, p. 62) où l'éditeur renvoie au pseudo-Hildebert (PL 171. 1280 A-B).

5. "Iussio, consilium, consensus, palpo, recursus,
Participans, mutus, non obstans, non manifestans".
In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 1, a. 5, ql. 3; *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 62, a. 7.

On retrouve ces vers chez Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 15, a. 42 (Borgnet 29.528), et Pierre de Tarantaise, *In IV Sent.* d. 15, q. 2, a. 3. Voir aussi Walther, op. cit., n. 9990.

6. "Visito, poto, cibo, redimo, tego, colligo, condo.
Consule, castiga, solare, remitte, fer, ora".
Summa Theol. II-II, q. 32, a. 2, obj. 1; le premier vers: *In IV Sent.* d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, ql. 1, et *In Matthaeum* c. 25 (n. 2098); le deuxième: *In IV Sent.* d. 15, q. 2, a. 3, ql. 2.

Pour une autre forme, voir le *Poeniteas cito* attribué à Pierre de Blois (PL 207, 1156 A).

Comparer les citations chez Alexandre de Halès, *Glossa* IV, d.15 (ed. cit., p. 232); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 15, a. 23 (Borgnet 29.505);

Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d. 14, dubium 2; Robert de Sorbon, *De conscientia* (ed. cit., p. 352; le premier vers), et *De confessione* (ibid., p. 358); Augustin de Dacie (ed. cit., p. 155). Voir aussi A. De Poorter, "Un catéchisme du XIIIe siècle," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 28, 1932, p. 72; premier vers, et Walther, op. cit., n. 3222, 3225, 3235, 20647.

7. "Praepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, studiose".
In IV Sent. d. 15, q. 3, a. 4, ql. 3, obj. 2; *In Isaiam* c. 5; *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 72, a. 9, obj. 3; II-II, q. 148, a. 4; *De malo*, q. 2, a. 6, et q. 14, a. 3, obj. 1.

L'origine première de cette codification des espèces de la *gula* sera à rechercher dans la doctrine de S. Grègoire, *Moralia* XXX.13. Le "versus" devint propriété commune. Voir, par exemple: Thomas Chobham, *Summa confessorum* (F. Broomfield, Louvain-Paris 1968, p.406); la *Summa Alexandrina* (Quaracchi 1930, III, p. 579); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 33, a. 20 (Borgnet 30.310); Guillaume Peyraut (Peraldus), *Summa virtutum ac vitiorum* (Lugduni 1668, II, p. 12); Robert de Sorbon, *De confessione* (ed. cit., p. 357).

8. "Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando".
In IV Sent. d. 16, q. 3, a. 1, ql. 2; *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 7, a. 3; *De malo*, q. 2, a. 6.

Sur l'histoire de la doctrine et de la formule, voir J. Gründel, *Die Lehre von den Umständen der menschlichen Handlung im Mittelalter* (*Beiträge* 39, 5. Münster 1963). On peut y ajouter des citations semblables chez Remi d'Auxerre, *Commentum in Martianum Capellam* (C. E. Lutz, Leiden 1962, p. 65); l'*Accessus ad auctores* (R.B.C. Huygens, Berchem-Bruxelles 1954, p. 13); Bernard d'Utrecht (cité dans Conrad de Hirsau, *Dialogus super auctores*, ed. R. B. C. Huygens, Berchem-Bruxelles 1955, p. 11); Matthieu de Vendôme, *Ars versificatoria* I.116 (in E. Faral, *Les arts poétiques du XIIe et du XIIIe siècle*, Paris 1958, p. 150); Thomas Chobham, *Summa confessorum* (ed. cit., p. 48); le *Sermo de poenitentia* de "Romanus Cardinalis" (PL 217, 689 D); Robert de Sorbon, *De conscientia* (ed. cit., p. 352); *De confessione* (ibid., p. 354); Augustin de Dacie (nota marginalis; ed. cit., p. 194). Voir aussi le Pseudo-Célestin V, *De sacramentis* (in Maxima Bibliotheca..., ed. cit., p. 828); J. De Ghellinck (art. cit., p. 713); Walther, op. cit., n. 16103.

9. "Sit simplex, humilis confessio, pura, fidelis
atque frequens, nuda, discreta, libens, verecunda
integra, secreta, lacrymabilis, accelerata,
fortis et accusans, et sit parere parata".
In IV Sent. d. 17, q. 3, a. 4, ql. 4; copié dans le Supplément à la *Somme*, q. 9, a. 4, obj. 1.

On trouve des formes identiques ou semblables dans le *Poeniteas cito* attribué à Pierre de Blois (PL 207.1153 C-D); chez Alexandre de Halés, *Glossa* IV, d.14 (ed. cit., p.216); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d.17, a.36 (Borgnet 29.707), et *De sacramentis* (ed. cit., p.99); Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d.21, pars 2, dubium 3; Hugues de Strasbourg, *Compendium theologicae veritatis*, VI.26. Voir aussi J. De Ghellinck (art. cit., p. 714) et Walther, op. cit., n.18330. Cp. le Pseudo-Célestin (ed. cit., p.828).

10. "Confessor dulcis, affabilis atque suavis,
prudens, discretus, mitis, pius atque benignus".
In IV Sent. d. 17, expositio textus.

Une formule voisine dans le *Poeniteas cito* (PL 207.1155 A). Voir aussi J. De Ghellinck (art. cit., p.714), et Walther, op. cit., n. 3067, 3135.

11. "Si pro delictis anathema quis efficiatur,
Os, orare, vale, communio, mensa negatur".
In IV Sent. d. 18, q. 2, a. 1, ql. 1; *In Epist. I ad Corinthios*, c. 5, lect. 3.

Voir Raymond de Pennafort, *Summa* (H. V. Laget, Veronae 1744, p. 398); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 18, a. 12 (Borgnet 29.793); Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d. 18, pars 2, a. 1, q. 1; le Pseudo-Célestin, *De censuris* (ed. cit., p. 820); Walther, op. cit., n. 17864.

12. "Utile, lex, humile, res ignorata, necesse".
In IV Sent. d. 18, q. 2, a. 6, ql. 1.

Voir Raymond de Pennafort, *Summa* (ed. cit., p.400); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d.18, a.21 (Borgnet 29.799); Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d. 18, pars 2, a. 1, q. 5; le Pseudo-Célestin, *De censuris* (ed. cit., p. 820); la *Glossa ad decretales* (Romae 1582, V.1886).

13. "Fratres odit, apostata fit, spernitque fateri,
poenituisse piget, pristina culpa redit".
In IV Sent. d. 22, q. 1, a. 1; *Summa Theol.* III, q. 88, a. 2, obj. 1.

Voir Alexandre de Halés, *Glossa* IV, d.22 (ed. cit., p.376); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d.22, a.1 (Borgnet 29.887), *De sacramentis* (ed. cit., p.122); Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d.22, a.1, q.1; Pierre de Tarantaise, *In IV Sent.* d.22, q.1, a.4.

14. "Collige, sustenta, stimula—vaga morbida, lenta".
In IV Sent. d. 24, q. 3, a. 3; copié dans le Supplément à la *Somme*, q. 40, a. 7.

Voir Innocent III, *De sacro altaris mysterio* (PL 217, 796 D); *Paedagogus Abbatum Ordinis Cistercii* (ed. cit., p. 279); Walther, op. cit., n. 2943, 3026, 3033.

15. "Stupri sive status verberis atque necis".
In IV Sent. d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; copié par le Supplément à la *Somme* q. 47, a. 2, ad 2.

Voir Guido de Orchellis, *Tractatus de sacramentis* (D. & O. Van den Eynde, Louvain 1953, p. 222); Raymond de Pennafort, *Summa* (ed. cit., p. 62).

16. "Ecclesiae vetitum, necnon tempus feriatum,
impediunt fieri, permittunt cuncta teneri".
In IV Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1; copié par le Supplément à la *Somme*, q. 50, a. 1.

Voir Raymond de Pennafort, *Summa* (ed. cit., p. 481); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 34, a. 2 (Borgnet 30.328); Augustin de Dacie (ed. cit., p. 189). Cp. aussi Walther, op. cit., n. 5214.

17. "Error, conditio, votum, cognatio, crimen,
cultus disparitas, vis, ordo, ligamen, honestas,
si sis affinis, si forte coire nequibus,
haec socianda vetant connubia, facta retractant".
In IV Sent. d. 34, q. 1, a. 1; copié par le Supplément à la *Somme*, q. 50, a. 1.

Voir Raymond de Pennafort, *Summa* (ed. cit., p. 481); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 34, a. 2 (Borgnet 30.327); Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d. 34, a. 1, q. 2; Hugues de Strasbourg, *Compendium* VI.38; Pierre de Tarantaise, *In IV Sent.* d. 34, a. 1; le Pseudo-Célestin, *De sacramentis* (ed. cit., p. 841); Augustin de Dacie (ed. cit., p. 185). Cp. Walther, op. cit., n. 5520, 7175 (qui cite Vincent de Beauvais).

18. "Mutat nupta genus, sed generata gradum".
In IV Sent. d. 41, q. 1, a. 1, ql. 1 et ql. 5; copié par le Supplément à la *Somme*, q. 55, a. 1 et a. 5.

Voir Raymond de Pennafort, *Summa* (ed. cit., p. 511); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 41, a. 4; Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d. 41 "praenotata" et q. 2; Pierre de Tarantaise, *In IV Sent.* d. 41, a. 1; Augustin de Dacie (ed. cit., p. 188). Cp. Walther, op. cit., n. 15806 (il cite précisément Augustin de Dacie).

19. "Quae mihi, vel cuius, mea natum fonte levavit,
haec mea commater, fieri mea non valet uxor.
Si qua meae natum non ex me fonte levavit,
hanc post fata meae non inde verebor habere".
In IV Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 3, ql. 2; copié par le Supplément à la *Somme*, q. 56, a. 4.

Voir Guido de Orchellis, *Tractatus de sacramentis* (ed. cit., p. 217); Thomas Chobham, *Summa confessorum* (ed. cit., pp. 168, 395); Raymond de Pennafort, *Summa* (ed. cit., p. 494); Albert le Grand, *In IV*

Sent. d. 42, a. 6 (Borgnet 30.478); Bonaventure, *In IV Sent.* d. 42, a. 1, q. 3. Cp. *Glossa ad decretales* (ed. cit., IV.1495).

20. "Unus semper eris compatrum spiritualis
alter carnalis, nec fallit regula talis".
In IV Sent. d. 42, q. 1, a. 3, ql. 2; copié par le Supplément à la *Somme*, q. 56, a. 4, ad 2.

Voir Raymond de Pennafort, *Summa* (ed. cit., p. 492); Albert le Grand, *In IV Sent.* d. 42, a. 4 (Borgnet 30.473); Augustin de Dacie (ed. cit., p. 187). Cp. Walther, op. cit., n. 19687.

Nous ajoutons encore trois "versus" qui se trouvent dans les éditions courantes des œuvres bibliques de S. Thomas.

1. "Simile, prostituens, vis, mors et credita forma,
Si convertatur, post novit, mittere nequit".
Super Evangelium Matthaei, c.V (n. 522).

2. "Expedit infirmis, licet absque dolo, sine lite,
praelatisque licet, non expedit anachoritae,
non licet ut per eum sint res in iure petitae".
Super Evangelium Matthaei, c.V (n. 544).

3. "Est sine matre Deus, est sine patre caro".
In Epist. ad Hebraeos, c.VII, lect. 1.

Nous ne prétendons pas que la liste des "versus" donnée dans ces pages soit complète, et encore moins que la documentation sur leur origine et leur usage soit exhaustive. Il nous suffit d'avoir attiré l'attention sur cet aspect (accidentel) de la méthode de S. Thomas, qui en ceci encore a suivi les usages de son temps.

LA LETTRE DE SAINT THOMAS A L'ABBÉ DU MONTCASSIN

Antoine Dondaine O.P.

LA lettre de saint Thomas à Bernard Ayglier, abbé du Montcassin, demeura longtemps ignorée: elle ne fut découverte, dans les marges d'un manuscrit des Morales de saint Grégoire des Archives du monastère, qu'en 1874, il y a juste un siècle. L'auteur de la découverte, Dom Louis Tosti, lui-même abbé du Montcassin, ébloui par sa trouvaille, avança tout de suite l'hypothèse d'une pièce authentique, mieux encore, celle d'un document écrit par la main de son illustre auteur. Présentant le volume où se lit la lettre, il écrivait:

> Il faut marquer d'un caillou blanc le jour de la fête de saint Grégoire le Grand 1874, au cours duquel ce manuscrit me passa entre les mains, dans le moment où l'Italie célébrait le sixième centenaire du décès de saint Thomas d'Aquin et honorait sa mémoire par de solennelles fonctions. En effet, tandis que je scrutais avec soin les feuillets du volume, arrivé aux pages 320-322, à l'improviste je découvris un commentaire dans leurs marges, celles-ci partout ailleurs libres. Les yeux et l'esprit avidement concentrés, il n'est pas possible d'exprimer la joie qui m'envahit lorsque j'identifiai en ce commentaire non pas seulement une lettre jusqu'alors inconnue de saint Thomas d'Aquin adressée à Bernard abbé du Montcassin, mais une lettre écrite de sa propre main. Ce manuscrit que saint Thomas a tenu entre les mains et qu'il a enrichi d'un nouveau témoignage de sa pensée, devrait être précieusement recouvert en bois de cèdre.[1]

Avant de publier sa découverte Tosti avait pressenti l'avis autorisé d'un spécialiste des autographes de saint Thomas, l'abbé Pierre Antoine Uccelli. Celui-ci appuya sans réserve l'hypothèse avancée: des planches photographiques lui avaient été communiqués; leur confrontation avec l'écriture de saint Thomas lui révélait une parenté suffisante des formes pour conclure à une même origine.[2] Ainsi confirmé dans sa conviction,

1 L. Tosti, *Bibliotheca Casinensis II* (Montis Casini 1875) 302.

2 Dom Tosti publia trois lettres de P.A. Uccelli en rapport avec sa découverte, dans les prolégomènes de *S. Thomae Aquinatis propria manu scripta epistola ad Bernardum abbatem*

Tosti proposa l'explication d'une telle origine. En ce temps là un doute doctrinal troublait la communauté du Montcassin. Apprenant le passage à Aquino de saint Thomas en route pour le concile de Lyon, l'abbé Bernard lui adressa un message le priant de venir au monastère; son autorité apaiserait le trouble de ses religieux. Le doute en question était né d'un passage des Morales de saint Grégoire; l'abbé joignit un manuscrit de cet ouvrage à son propre message: saint Thomas, ne pouvant monter au Montcassin, inscrivit sa réponse dans les marges du précieux volume.

L'accueil fait à cette explication et au texte de la lettre publiée dans le Florilegium Casinense fut d'abord très favorable,[3] mais avec le temps

Casinensem...in lucem prolata opera et studio Monachorum O.S.B. (entendez L. Tosti), Bibliotheca Casinensis II, Florilegium Casinense 199-220 (lettres d'Uccelli 210-213; dans le tiré-à-part, mêmes lieu et date, XIV-XVII). Dans la troisième de ces lettres Uccelli écrivait: "Mi affretto a ringraziarlo infinitamente per le due fotografie che si è compiaciuto inviarmi. In esse io non esito a riconoscervi la mano di S. Thomaso e le trovo assai somiglianti all'autografo di Napoli, e più ancora a quello di Bergamo" (Florilegium..., 212; tiré-à-part XVI). — Avant de connaître les reproductions photographiques, Uccelli avait soulevé l'hypothèse d'une transcription: "Una lettera sul margine di un manoscritto! Due supposizioni sole mi sembrano a farsi. Una che l'Ab. Bernardo abbia inviato il Codice di S. Gregorio a S. Tomaso per sentirne il parere intorno al passo indicato, e S. Tomaso vi avesse scritto sopra ad dirittura la riposta, facendo economia di carta, come era solito; l'altra che qualche monacho avesse sul codice gregoriano trascritta la lettera di S. Tomaso come un commentario di una dichiarazione...", ibid.211 (XV).

3 Voir par exemple le compte rendu, sommaire mais précis, de *La Civilta Cattolica*, Ser. IX, vol. IX, fasc. 615 (1876) 336. Nous n'avons pu atteindre G. de Luca, "San Tommaso d'Aquino mirabilmente compendia la tradizione sulla infallibile prescienzia di Dio e l'umana libertà, *La scienza e la fede* 101 (1876) 177-191, 486-491, signalé par M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Münster Westfalen 1949) 377 n. 195 et 441 n. 364, et par R. A. Verardo, *S. Thomae Aquinatis, Opuscula theologica* I (Torino 1954) 247. De même nous ont échappé V. Ingletti, *Lettera autografa di S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, Napoli 1876, extrait de *L'Illustratore Cattolico di Milano*, 10 Marzo 1876, a. I n. 7, mentionné par Dom Leccisotti, "S. Tommaso d'Aquino e Montecassino," *Miscellanea Cassinese* 32 (Montecassino 1965) 59, et Ianotta, *Per il gran dottore S. Tommaso...* (Sora 1903)—auquel fait allusion F. Scandone, "La vita, la famiglia e la patria di S. Tommaso de Aquino," dans *S. Tommaso d'Aquino O.P., Miscellanea storica-artistica* (Roma 1924) 31 n. 4—. Editions postérieures: 2) G. Deho, *Lettera di San Tommaso d'Aquino novamente publicata a cura del Sac. Gaetano Deho...* (Modena 1880), opuscule de 8 pages extrait de *Opuscoli Religiosi, Letterarj e Morali*, Ser. IV, t. VII, fasc. 19 (1880). M. Grabmann, l.c., et R. A. Verardo, l.c., signalent une édition donnée par le même Deho (Casini 1875); cette information nous paraît erronée.—3) Edition Vivès, *S. Thomae... Opera omnia*, t. 32 (Paris 1889) 834-835.—4) L. Tosti, *Scritti varii*, t. 2 (Romae 1890), même texte que celui de la première édition moins les planches: prolégomènes 19-42, texte 42-45.—5) A. M. Caplet, *Regesti Bernardi I Abbatis Casinensis Fragmenta ex Archivio Casinensi* (Romae 1890), Prolegomena XCIX-CI n. 92: édition nouvelle avec de nombreuses notes critiques.—6) I. Monterisi, *Lettera doctrinale di S. Tommaso d'Aquino all'abbate cassinese Bernardo Ayglerio sull'accordo tra la prescienza divina e la libertà umana* (Montecassino 1896), opuscule de 22 pages insérant le texte de la lettre dans un commentaire de vulgarisation (texte de Tosti, sans les parenthèses distinguant les compléments ajoutés par l'éditeur).—7) P. Mandonnet, *S. Thomae Aquinatis opuscula omnia* III (Paris 1927) 249-251: *texte de Tosti à travers l'édition Vivès mais entaché de plusieurs fautes et mutilé de la finale (57 mots manquent)*.—8) D. A. Saba, "Bernardo I Ayglerio, Abbate di Montecassino," *Miscellanea Cassinese* 8 (Montecassino 1931) 78-80 en note 5: texte de Caplet, troublé de quelques infidélités.—9) R. A. Verardo, l.c., 249-250: texte repris de l'édition 7 avec ses défauts (cependant l'éditeur repêche la finale "Valeat...vobis" dans Grabmann, *Die Werke...*, 378).—10) T. Leccisotti,

des doutes furent soulevés soit sur les circonstances, soit sur la qualité autographe, soit même sur l'authenticité du document. Contre ces doutes, des savants comme Mandonnet, Inguanez soutinrent que la lettre était autographe; Grabmann, tout en refusant une telle qualité, en admettait l'authenticité.[4] Qui avait raison? Pour décourvir la vérité et atteindre une conviction ferme, nous nous proposons de reprendre l'enquête à partir du manuscrit du Montcassin et d'examiner les difficultés soulevées par le contenu de la lettre.

LA LETTRE N'EST PAS UN AUTOGRAPHE DE SAINT THOMAS

L'hypothèse d'une lettre autographe dans les marges du manuscrit du Montcassin heurte le bon sens. Est-il vraisemblable que l'abbé Bernard ait fait porter loin de son dépôt ce respectable volume infolio (360x260 mm.) de 384 pages, alors qu'il suffisait de quelques minutes pour transcrire sur un simple feuillet le passage de saint Grégoire objet de la lettre? Et moins concevable encore que saint Thomas ait pris sur lui d'écrire sa réponse sur ce précieux manuscrit dès ce moment plus que trois fois centenaire: la graphie malhabile, encombrée de ratures, est un outrage à la belle bénéventine du X-XI[e] s. des Morales.

Uccelli attribuait deux écritures à saint Thomas, l'une calligraphique l'autre tachygraphique — celle que nous appelons la *littera illegibilis*. C'était manifestement dans les fragments de la *Summa contra gentiles* en écriture calligraphique mêlés à l'*illegibilis* qu'il découvrait quelque ressemblance avec l'écriture de la lettre à l'abbé Bernard. Il y a un siècle le jugement d'Uccelli pouvait faire autorité et emporter l'assentiment de Dom Tosti; il n'en est plus de même aujourd'hui. Nous ne pouvons attribuer avec certitude qu'une seule écriture à saint Thomas, la *littera illegibilis*; s'il a pratiqué également une écriture calligraphique, chose fort peu vraisemblable, nous ne la connaissons

S. Tommaso d'Aquino e Montecassino (l.c.), Documenta, tavole V-VII, texte revu sur le manuscrit; c'est la meilleure édition parue jusqu'à ce jour.—Traductions italiennes: 1) V. Ingletti, l.c.—2) R. Bonanni, *Uomini illustri di Aquino e Diocesi...* (Alatri 1923) 47-50, traduction par A. D'Amico.

4 Doutes divers: J. Didiot, *Le docteur angélique S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Tournai 1894) 88-91. Il date la lettre de 1269, d'ailleurs sans aucune justification. Il envisage la possibilité d'une copie dans le manuscrit à partir de l'original, mais s'en rapporte au jugement d'Uccelli pour admettre qu'il s'agit d'un autographe (p. 91 n. 1).—J. A. Endres, *Thomas von Aquin* (Mainz 1910) 105 n. 5, déclare qu'il tentera de démontrer ailleurs l'inauthenticité de la lettre: "Was den Brief des hl. Thomas an Abt Bernhard Ayglerius von Montecassino betrifft, so werde ich an anderer Stelle den Nachweis versuchen, dass er auf Echtheit keinen Anspruch erheben kann."—F. Scandone, "La vita..." (cf. n. 3) 31-32 et notes afférentes. Pour cet auteur, la lettre doit être traitée comme une fausse perle.—Nous verrons dans un instant la pensée du P. Mandonnet.—M. Inguanez, *Codicum Casinensium Manuscriptorum Catalogus* I, pars 1 (Montis Casini 1915) 86. Décrivant le codex 82 contenant les livres XI-XVI des Morales de saint Grégoire, Inguanez écrivait: "In marginibus pag. 320-322 legitur *Epistola* S. Thomae Aquinatis propria manu scripta ad Bernardum abbatem Casinensem."—M. Grabmann, l.c., 441-443.

pas. Les fragments calligraphiés dans l'autographe de la *Summa contra gentiles* sont de la main de Réginald de Piperno.[5]

La conviction du Père Mandonnet n'était pas motivée par une comparaison avec un étalon illusoire et, loin de s'atténuer avec le temps, elle s'est affermie de plus en plus; elle demande à être pesée avec attention.

En 1910, dans un ouvrage justement célèbre, après avoir reconnu qu'une comparaison avec l'écriture de saint Thomas était difficile, Mandonnet écrivait:

> Je suis porté à croire cependant que la lettre à l'abbé Bernard est de la main de saint Thomas. Si un scribe avait transporté sur les marges des *Morales* de saint Grégoire une copie de la lettre de saint Thomas d'Aquin, il l'eut fait avec plus de soin. Il semble bien que nous sommes ici en présence d'une écriture d'auteur. Les passages soulignés de traits irréguliers et peu sûrs, ceux dont l'encre a blanchi parce que l'écrivain n'a pas pris garde que sa plume n'avait pas assez d'encre, et quelques autres particularités indiquent une écriture d'autographe.[6]

Plus tard, après avoir vu de ses propres yeux le manuscrit au Mont-cassin (en revenant de Naples, en 1914), le P. Mandonnet corrigea sur un exemplaire personnel de son ouvrage les expressions dubitatives du passage qu'on vient de lire:

> Il n'y a pas de doute cependant que la lettre à l'abbé Bernard soit de la main de saint Thomas. Si un scribe avait transporté sur les marges des *Morales* de saint Grégoire une copie de la lettre de saint Thomas d'Aquin, il l'eut fait avec plus de soin. Nous sommes bien ici en présence d'une écriture d'auteur. Les passages soulignés de traits irréguliers et peu sûrs, ceux dont l'encre a blanchi parce que l'écrivain n'a pas pris garde que sa plume n'avait pas assez d'encre, et surtout le fait que bon nombre de mots ont été grattés et la place recouverte par la même écriture, ainsi que je l'ai constaté moi-même sur le manuscrit, et que l'a noté très en détail Caplet en rééditant cette lettre, indiquent une écriture autographe.

Cette conviction, le P. Mandonnet l'a affirmée encore en 1929, dans une note sur les autographes de saint Thomas:

> Quelques jours après avoir consulté le ms. de Naples j'examinai aussi au Mont-Cassin le volume des Morales de saint Grégoire qui porte en marge

5 L'identification de la main de Réginald de Piperno a été faite par M. G. Ouy, "Compte-rendu de 'Secrétaires de Saint Thomas', Addendum," *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes* 116 (1958) 248-249. Sur l'activité de Réginald comme secrétaire de saint Thomas, nous renvoyons le lecteur à notre étude: "Sermons de Réginald de Piperno," *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant* VI (Biblioteca Vaticana 1964) 363-368.

6 P. Mandonnet, *Des écrits authentiques de saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 2e éd. (Fribourg 1910) 120-121; 1re éd. Extrait de la *Revue Thomiste* 1909-1910 (Fribourg 1910) 107. Nous citerons la 2e éd., revue et corrigée.

> la lettre de saint Thomas d'Aquin à l'abbé Bernard Ayglier et qui fut jadis éditée par Dom Tosti comme autographe. Je n'avais pas émis de doute à cet égard; mais je suis encore plus rassuré aujourd'hui. Les conditions de l'écriture de la lettre me paraissent exclure toute autre main que celle de son auteur. Nous n'avons pas affaire à une écriture de scribe, c'est-à-dire de copiste. Les surcharges et les ratures de mots ne peuvent être que l'œuvre de saint Thomas, et Dom Caplet les a très soigneusement notées.[7]

Les motifs allégués en ces déclarations à l'appui d'un autographe d'auteur sont beaucoup plus pressants entendus d'une copie. Si l'auteur de la transcription a eu sous les yeux un modèle pour lui difficile à lire, il aura plus sûrement maculé son ouvrage de tous les incidents qu'il présente que ne l'aurait fait, même hésitant sur sa rédaction, l'auteur du texte. Les traits irréguliers et peu sûrs dont il est parlé devaient souligner des citations du texte de saint Grégoire incluses dans la lettre; qu'un copiste se soit trompé et sur leur étendue et sur leur place exacte est des plus vraisemblable; l'erreur le serait moins de la part de l'auteur du texte.[8] Le défaut d'encre sur la plume s'explique fort bien d'un scribe aux prises avec les difficultés de son modèle; de même les ratures, reprises et surcharges: c'est beaucoup trop dire qu'elles "ne peuvent être que l'œuvre de saint Thomas".

Pour refuser de voir dans la lettre un autographe, Grabmann alléguait en premier lieu la différence de l'écriture avec celle des autographes de saint Thomas que nous connaissons: c'est là un argument solide. En second lieu il mettait en avant la présence de l'avertissement précédant la lettre: "quod est extra non scribatis". Cette mise en garde, à l'adresse d'un copiste qui devait transcrire les Morales en prenant le manuscrit pour modèle, n'est pas absolument contemporaine de l'inscription de la

7 P. Mandonnet, "A propos des Autographes de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Bulletin Thomiste* VI (1929) 523. Dans l'édition 7, publiée sous le nom du P. Mandonnet, le texte de la lettre est précédé d'une introduction (p. 249 n. 1) tirée à la lettre (il y a une omission) de l'éd. 3, p. 834 note a, où l'auteur (Fretté?) met en doute la qualité autographe du texte inscrit dans les marges du manuscrit du Montcassin. Telle quelle dans l'édition 7, cette introduction a fait hésiter Grabmann sur la pensée de Mandonnet (*Die Werke*..., 442 n. 368); elle a trompé R. A. Verardo (éd. 9, pp. 245-246) qui la croit expression d'une étape intermédiaire dans cette même pensée: l'examen du manuscrit aurait finalement convaincu Mandonnet et ramené à sa première position. Il aurait suffi de comparer les dates et de l'examen en question (en 1914) et de l'édition 7 (1927) pour mettre en garde sur l'interprétation proposée.

8 Un cas particulier mérite d'être relevé. Le texte controversé de saint Grégoire (*Morales* XVI) est cité deux fois, d'abord intégralement (lignes 23-26), puis en partie et par fragments séparés et soulignés d'un trait de plume. Or le premier de ces fragments fut d'abord souligné non pas en son lieu (28-29) mais dans l'énoncé intégral (24-25). Une telle erreur n'est pas imputable à l'auteur de la lettre qui ne peut hésiter sur sa composition, mais bien à un copiste trop peu attentif au sens de ce qu'il transcrit. Par la suite ce copiste — ou bien quelqu'un d'autre — répara la faute en effaçant au grattoir le trait inscrit sous le premier énoncé. Cette nouvelle intervention abîma plusieurs lettres, notamment les hastes basses de p et q; les réparations postérieures sont dénoncées par le fait que ces hastes sont sur le grattage.

lettre; elle ne prouve donc rien contre la qualité autographe de celle-ci. Enfin Grabmann appuyait son refus sur la différence de la couleur de l'encre de certains mots; ceux que Mandonnet attribuait au défaut d'encre sur la plume, il les dits inscrits en second temps. Le copiste, ne sachant d'abord les lire, aurait laissé des espaces vides sur le parchemin; par la suite, après une étude plus attentive du modèle, lui-même — ou quelqu'un d'autre — les aurait déchiffrés et transcrits en leur lieu avec cette encre plus pâle. Ces mots, dit Grabmann, sont écrits d'une manière plus large, pour bien remplir un espace d'abord laissé vide, et il cite en exemple quelques cas particuliers: *officii, vita, ge* dans *gestum.*[9] Cette argumentation, croyons-nous, se fonde davantage sur l'examen des planches photographiques de l'édition de 1875 que sur une étude immédiate du manuscrit 82. Ces planches étaient remarquables à bien des égards; elles trahissent toutefois l'original sous le rapport des couleurs. Il nous paraît certain que les fragments et mots isolés à l'encre pâle appartiennent eux-aussi au premier temps de l'inscription; l'examen attentif du manuscrit ne prête guère à une erreur sur ce point. L'explication par le défaut d'encre sur la plume est vraisemblable. Quant à l'observation que les mots en question seraient écrits de manière à remplir un espace vide, c'est là une illusion sans fondement dans la réalité; elle ne mérite pas que l'on s'y attarde.

Il y avait mieux que ces faits fragiles pour écarter l'hypothèse d'un autographe de saint Thomas, et nous sommes surpris que les deux grands spécialistes qu'étaient le P. Mandonnet et Mgr. Grabmann n'y aient pas prêté attention. L'un et l'autre ont observé le document de l'extérieur, sans l'explorer en lui-même. Il suffira de produire trois arguments pour procurer une conviction de caractère critique.

Le premier sera pris d'une forme orthographique particulière. La consonne *s* redoublée est plusieurs fois remplacée par la lettre *x*.

necessitati[28]	*est écrit*	necx̄itati
expresse[28]	... .	expx̄e
necessitate[30]	... .	nex̄itate
potuisse[35]	... .	potuixe
successive[40]	... .	succexiue
successionem[42]	... .	succexionē

9 M. Grabmann, *Die Werke...*, 442-443. Les trois exemples cités sont sur les lignes 9, 26 et 14 selon le manuscrit (éd. ci-après pp. 102-103). Par la suite toutes nos références au texte de la lettre renverront à ces lignes.

Un cas unique d'une telle substitution a pu être repéré dans la totalité des textes écrits de la main de saint Thomas parvenus jusqu'à nous; la fréquence d'une telle forme ici interdit de voir dans la lettre un autographe du même auteur.

Voici maintenant une anomalie. Dans le cours de la lettre nous lisons:

> Vt autem dubitantibus plenius satisfiat, inserenda sunt presentibus uerba beati gregorii que ignorantibus dubitationem ingerunt et errorem (19-23),

après quoi suit tout le passage intéressé (23-26). Si le document est un autographe, il faudrait justifier comment l'insertion du texte des Morales dans la marge du manuscrit pouvait en procurer une meilleure intelligence, et apaiser les religieux troublés davantage que celui inscrit tout à côté, en sa place normale, dans les colonnes 320b et 321a, en grands et beaux caractères. Pourquoi le répéter? Par contre, si la réponse était originairement un document isolé, individuel (cf. presentibus 21) et sans relation au manuscrit 82 plutôt qu'à un autre, il était naturel, disons même exigé, que saint Thomas y insère le fragment d'autorité divisant la communauté du Montcassin; le commentaire qu'il allait en proposer appelait cette présence.

Troisième argument. Le texte des Morales cité par saint Thomas n'est pas le même que celui du manuscrit 82 et appartient à une autre tradition; par conséquent il dépend d'une autre source que celle-là. Au cours de la lettre le passage disputé de saint Grégoire est cité à deux reprises, une première fois intégralement — lignes 23-26 "Sciendum...subtraxit" —, la seconde fois en partie seulement et en trois fragments séparés, selon la trame du commentaire — lignes 28-29 "quia accepta...amictunt", 33-34 "quamvis...quo moritur", 36-37 "Nam... merebatur". La recension des Morales supposée par l'explication qu'en donne saint Thomas est bien assurée par ces répétitions.

Recueillons d'abord la leçon du manuscrit 82, témoin d'un texte du xe-xie siècles:

> Sciendum tamen quia benignitas dei est peccatoribus spacium poenitencie largiri, sed quia accepta tempora non ad fructum poenitencie sed ad usum iniquitatis vertunt quod a diuina misericordia mereri potuerunt amittunt. Quamuis omnipotens deus illud tempus unius cuiusque ad mortem presciat quo eius uita terminatur. nec alio in tempore quisquam mori potuit nisi ipso quo moritur. Nam si ezechie anni additi ad uitam quindecim memorantur. tempus quidem uite creuit ab illo termino quo mori ipse merebatur. Nam diuina dispositio ex tempore illum mori presciuit quo hunc post modum ex presenti uita subtraxit (320b-321a).

D'autres témoins manuscrits confirment cette recension; par exemple Montecassino, codex 72, du XVe siècle, p. 290a; cod. 74, XIe s., p. 159b; cod. 79, XIe s., p. 194a.[10]

Parmi les variantes par rapport aux leçons de cette famille, les doubles citations de saint Thomas — nommons *Th* la citation intégrale, *Th'* les citations partielles — cinq sont garanties par *Th* et *Th'*; une sixième de *Th*, en un lieu où *Th'* fait défaut, est confirmée par les éditions imprimées des Morales. Il suffira de noter ici la première et la dernière de ces variantes:

2-3 sed ad usum *cod.* 82] ad usum uero Th 24 Th' 29
8 ex tempore illum mori *cod.* 82 eius tempus tunc Th 26 (*PL* 75, 1127).

Ces deux leçons elles aussi sont anciennes; nous pouvons les appuyer par les manuscrits Montecassino 86, XIe s., p. 280b, et 87, XIe s., p. 313a.[11] Le témoignage est suffisant pour prouver que saint Thomas n'avait pas sous les yeux le texte du manuscrit 82 dans le temps où il rédigeait sa réponse à l'abbé Bernard; par conséquent la lettre dans les marges du volume ne peut pas être un autographe.

Authenticité de la Lettre

Les médiévistes de notre temps qui se sont penchés sur la lettre à l'abbé Bernard Ayglier sont généralement d'accord pour en reconnaître l'authenticité.[12] Le refus d'Endres, il y a plus d'un demi siècle, n'a pas été justifié, du moins à notre connaissance; seul celui de Scandone, catégorique, fut appuyé de quelques motifs, d'ailleurs sommairement formulés:

> Le document présente un saint Thomas moine bénédictin du Montcassin et non un frère prêcheur.
>
> Dans le temps auquel il faut rattacher la lettre, Thomas n'était plus capable d'en être l'auteur; depuis deux mois il n'avait plus écrit ni dicté.
>
> A supposer qu'il se soit arrêté un moment pour prendre quelque nourriture et se reposer sur le parcours Teano-Maenza, comment les moines du Montcassin auraient-ils connu son passage?

10 Ces volumes sont décrits par M. Inguanez, *Codicum Casinensium... Catalogus* I, 1: MS 72, p. 82; MS 74, p. 83; MS 79, p. 85.

11 M. Inguanez, loc. cit., MS 86, p. 88; MS 87, p. 89. Dans ce dernier témoin le texte primitif 'ad usum uero' fut corrigé plus tard en 'sed ad usum'.

12 Cependant le P. A. Walz hésite à se prononcer, *San Tommaso d'Aquino* (Roma 1945) 183 — Adaptation française par P. Novarina, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Philosophes médiévaux V (Louvain-Paris 1962) 194-195: "La lettre que nous possédons est peut-être authentique, mais non autographe."

Si le maître s'était senti la force d'écrire, aurait-il accusé la longueur de l'office divin et la durée du jeûne — lui, un saint! — et non son propre épuisement?

La comparaison du document avec les autographes manifestera sa fausseté de manière irréfragable.[13]

Ce dernier motif doit être récusé sans plus; s'il vaut pour nier la qualité autographe de la lettre, il est absolument inefficace au regard de l'authenticité. Le premier n'a guère plus de valeur: ces expressions de révérence et de soumission n'ont nullement la signification que leur attribue Scandone; elles étaient requises de la part du dominicain s'adressant au grand dignitaire ecclésiastique qu'était l'abbé du Montcassin. Saint Thomas ne pouvait avoir oublié sa première formation bénédictine; les formules de respect qu'il avait apprises jeune oblat lui étaient familières; elles traduisent ses sentiments de religieuse déférence, rien de plus. D'ailleurs, il pourrait se faire qu'il se soit introduit dans la copie des expressions plus accentuées que dans l'original. Le scribe qui a inscrit le texte dans les marges du manuscrit était sans doute moine du Montcassin; il a pu sans y prendre garde modifier les formules dans un sens qui lui était plus coutumier, comme Tosti a suppléé un (*nostri*) entre *Patris* et *Benedicti* alors qu'une correction sur le parchemin interdit un tel supplément.[14]

L'affirmation que saint Thomas n'était plus capable d'écrire au temps de la lettre dépasse, estimons-nous, le donné de la source qu'elle sup-

13 F. Scandone, *La vita...*, écrivait: "E facile, intanto, giudicare se, in quelle condizioni di mente e di salute, il santo dottore, proprio durante il viaggio, passando per Aquino (nessuna testimonianza, proprio nessuna, attesta ch'egli vi si sia mai fermato) avesse pensato ad inviare una lettera, autografa per giunta, all'abbate di Montecassino, Bernardo Ayglerio. La critica storica impone dei penosi doveri. Debbo additare come una perla falsa questo documento cassinese: sceverandolo dai veri, questi avranno maggior valore. Avrebbe potuto scrivere lui, che da due mesi non aveva scritto più nulla, e nemmeno dettato? E, nella brevissima sosta — (in cui avrebbe potuto prendere un po'di cibo e di riposo, mentre percorreva la via da Teano a Magenza) — in qual modo i frati avrebbero saputo del suo passaggio? E se anche il dottore si fosse sentita la forza di scrivere, perchè avrebbe accennato alla "prolixitas divini officii" (lui, un santo!), e alla "ieiunii prolungatio" (ma, non si trattava di digiuno meritorio, se dipendeva dalla malattia!), e non alla sua stremata salute? E una fortuna che i falsari non si diano la cura di ricercare minutamente il vero, cosa troppo lontana dalle loro mire, come dalle loro abitudini. L'esame comparativo degli autografi proverà l'assunto in modo irrefragabile" (pp. 31-32). — Et en note (32 n. 1), citant le début de la lettre, Scandone ajoutait: "Riferiamo le prime parole della lettera, che ci vorrebbe presentare un s. Tommaso, non già domenicano, ma benedettino, e cassinese. Ne giudichi il lettore: "Rev. do in Christo patri d. Bernardo, dei gratia ven. Abb. Casinensi, Frater Thomas de Aquino suus devotus filius [dunque, cassinese, non già "Ordinis praedicatorum"] se semper et ubique ad obedientiam promptum. [Ed eccone la conferma. "Pronto alla ubbidienza!". Ma se era il superiore di un Ordine, diverso dal suo!].

14 Texte de la lettre ligne 16. Avec raison Dom Leccisotti a éliminé cette addition non justifiée; il estime qu'elle avait dû être écrite primitivement, puis annulée par rasure du parchemin. Le fait même d'une telle annulation ancienne interdirait sa restitution.

pose, à savoir la déposition de Barthélemy de Capoue au Procès de Naples. Quand le Logothète — informé par les confidences de Réginald de Piperno parvenues jusqu'à lui — déclare que frère Thomas, à la suite d'une sorte d'extase mystique, s'était dit incapable de poursuivre ses travaux, et que de fait il avait cessé d'écrire ou de dicter, le témoignage concerne l'activité professorale et magistrale du saint, ses grandes œuvres, telles la *Somme théologique* interrompue au cours de la IIIa *Pars*, l'explication des Psaumes, les commentaires philosophiques (*De generatione*), il ne se rapporte pas, cela paraît évident, à des écrits mineurs comme une lettre privée. Le saint avait été éclairé par une lumière surnaturelle sur la fragilité de la spéculation humaine; tous ses grands ouvrages lui paraissent maintenant sans plus de valeur que la paille auprès de ce qu'il a compris, et il en demeure totalement absorbé, envahi par le souvenir de sa vision. Il ne s'agit pas d'une diminution de ses aptitudes, d'aliénation mentale comme ose l'écrire Scandone — "Sembrava un intontimento, da far pensare ad una alienazione mentale" (*La vita...*, 30) — mais d'une concentration intérieure qui le rend comme étranger aux choses sensibles. Si dès ce moment il avait été aussi gravement atteint qu'on le suppose, au point qu'il n'ait pu remplir ce léger devoir que la déférence et l'amitié lui imposaient envers l'abbé du Montcassin, se serait-il mis en route pour le long et rude voyage qui devait le conduire à Lyon? C'est seulement au château de Maenza, chez sa nièce, qu'il tombera malade,[15] et cette maladie elle-même ne paraît pas avoir atteint chez lui les facultés intellectuelles; sur son lit de mort,

15 Ce fait est bien attesté par le *Procès de Naples*. L'abbé de Fossanova, Nicolas, dépose devant les enquêteurs que "...dum dictus frater Thomas...infirmatus fuit in castro Magentie..., et cum infirmitate ipsa gravaretur, dixit..."Si Dominus voluerit me visitare, melius est quod reperiar in domo religiosorum quam in domibus secularium'. Et ex tunc...", *Fontes vitae sancti Thomae Aquinatis*...éd. D. Prümmer-H. M. Laurent (Toulouse 1911-ss) 276-277; éd. A. Ferrua, *S. Thomae Aquinatis vitae fontes praecipuae* (Alba 1968) 213. — Dans les citations suivantes nous référerons à ces deux éditions sous l'intitulé sommaire *Fontes vitae* et la désignation des pages, premier chiffre pour l'édition Prümmer - Laurent, chiffre entre ( ) pour l'édition Ferrua.— Fr. Octavien *de Babuco*, religieux de Fossanova, "dixit etiam quod ipse vidit ipsum fratrem Thomam venientem de castro Magentie in quo fuerat infirmatus...", *Fontes vitae* 286 (233). — Fr. Pierre de Mont Saint Jean, du même monastère, "Dixit etiam quod dum dictus frater Thomas iret ad concilium Lugduni...et faceret transitum per castrum Magentie, Terracinensis diocesis, et ibi per aliquos dies moram traheret pro eo quod erat aliquantulum discrasiatus...ivit ad visitandum dictum fratrem Thomam ad dictum castrum Magentie". — "...dictus frater Thomas dum viveret et esset in dicto castro Magentie et cepisset aliquantulum infirmari...", Ibid. 330-331 (272); 333 (274). — Barthélemy de Capoue, après avoir dit que saint Thomas se mit en route pour le concile, poursuit: "Et in itinere invasit ipsum infirmitas in castro Magentie de Campania, de qua postmodum decessit". — "Item dixit dictus testis quod quando idem frater Thomas incepit gravari infirmitate in eodem castro Magentie, petiit cum multa devotione quod portaretur ad monasterium sancte Marie de Fossanova, sicque factum est", Ibid. 377-378 (320). — Enfin témoignage de Ptolémée de Lucques: "...frater Thomas de Aquino...cum iter arripiens de Neapoli venisset apud Cicanum in Campania, ibi egritudo graviter ipsum arripuit." *Annales Lucennes*, anno 1274. — Cf. *Fontes vitae* (372).

à Fossanova, il expliquera encore le Cantique des Cantiques aux moines avides de l'entendre.[16]

Le refus de Scandone qu'un saint ait pu formuler les motifs d'excuse que l'auteur de la lettre allègue pour ne pas monter à l'abbaye — la prolixité de l'office divin et le jeûne, — prouve simplement que son auteur estimait fort mal le poids réel de cet office dans les monastères médiévaux, et de même celui du jeûne, lequel ne pouvait être rompu avant 15 heures. A monter au Montcassin, saint Thomas s'exposait à ne pas trouver libre pour l'entendre la communauté des religieux, et dans ce cas il aurait dû prolonger son arrêt, contrairement aux obligations de son voyage.

Reste l'impossibilité que le Montcassin ait été informé d'un arrêt momentané de saint Thomas au cours du trajet Teano-Maenza. Si en effet les voyageurs suivaient la voie maritime (Via Appia), celle-ci les aurait entraînés fort loin du monastère, lequel est situé à l'Est de la vallée du Liri; si au contraire ils faisaient route par la Campanie (Via Latina), leur passage au pied du Montcassin ne pouvait passer inaperçu et la démarche de l'abbé Bernard devient fort vraisemblable: son message aura atteint saint Thomas deux lieues plus loin, à Aquino. La difficulté soulevée par Scandone suppose le premier itinéraire; l'hypothèse est-elle fondée?

L'un des meilleurs connaisseurs actuels de la vie de saint Thomas, le P. A. Walz, le pense, parce que la bulle de canonisation dit expressément: Thomas "...de Neapoli veniens, ubi tunc temporis more solito famose legebat ut doctor, et *per maritimam transiens*, cum ad monasterium Fossenove...pervenisset...".[17] C'est accorder trop à un tel document de le citer à la barre pour attester un fait comme celui qui nous intéresse. La bulle appartient à un genre littéraire particulier qui n'exige pas une parfaite précision en ce domaine. Aussi bien son rédacteur ne fait aucune allusion à la halte de saint Thomas à Maenza, chez sa nièce la comtesse de Ceccano; il prépare simplement la citation du psaume 131 que le malade prononça lors de son arrivée à l'abbaye de Fossanova "Haec requies mea in saeculum saeculi...". Prenant le saint à Naples, il le conduit au terme de son voyage par la route commune, sans ce soucier du détail des faits. La contradiction qui existe ici entre ce document et d'autres témoignages contemporains doit être résolue dans le sens de ceux-ci, précisément parce qu'ils déposent sur des faits

16 Guillelmus de Tocco, *Historia beati Thomae de Aquino* cp. 57, *Fontes vitae* 131 (107).

17 A. Walz, *San Tommaso...* (Adaptation Novarina) 194: "... la bulle de canonisation indique formellement la route du littoral". Bulle, *Fontes vitae* 522. Cf. A. Walz, *Bulla canonisationis S. Thomae Aquinatis...*, Xenia thomistica (Romae 1925) 179. C'est nous qui soulignons en texte *per maritimam transiens*.

particuliers, tandis que l'auteur de la bulle brosse l'histoire à grands traits, pour l'édification.

Sur le triple témoignage de Tosti, Uccelli et Inguanez proclamant la lettre autographe dans le manuscrit du Montcassin, A. Toso admet que saint Thomas se soit rendu à Aquino — on ne précise pas le moment; sans doute au temps de son séjour chez sa nièce —; il tient toutefois pour plus assuré le voyage par la route maritime et le littoral du Lazio qui était moins longue entre Teano et Maenza que celle par la Campanie.[18] Une telle raison étonne, parce que les deux voies étaient sensiblement égales, avec même un avantage non négligeable par la vallée du Liri. Certes les routes modernes peuvent abréger quelque peu, mais nous avons le témoignage de Barthélemy de Capoue qu'au moyen âge celle par la Campanie était la plus directe. Quand il se rendait à la Curie romaine pour traiter des affaires royales, il faisait le détour par Fossanova, par dévotion pour la tombe de frère Thomas, et "dimissa via Campanie breviori, ibat ad maritimam et hospitabatur in eodem monasterio".[19]

Il existe des témoignages formels que saint Thomas suivit la route de Campanie. Voici celui de Nicolas, abbé de Fossanova, déposant sous serment au Procès de Naples: "...dum dictus frater Thomas vocatus iret ad concilium Lugdunense et transitum faceret per Campaniam, infirmatus fuit in castro Magentie...".[20] Barthélemy de Capoue, lié par le même serment, précise incidemment la route suivie par saint Thomas: "Et dum ipse frater Thomas esset in via eundi ad concilium Lugduni..., descendens de civitate Theani per viam Burgi Novi percussit caput in quadam arbore que ceciderat per transversum...".[21] Une telle information suffirait à nous éclairer. Si les voyageurs ont laissé Teano en se dirigeant vers Borgo Nuovo, ils tournaient le dos à Minturno et la voie maritime; par conséquent ils s'engageaient sur la route de la vallée du Liri et Aquino.[22] Un tel itinéraire est confirmé par Guillaume de

18 A. Toso, *Tommaso d'Aquino e il suo tempo* (Roma 1941) 124-125, 171: "...perchè, se fosse passato da Aquino per andare poi a Maenza, avrebbe allungato notevolmente il suo cammino già cosi gravoso a dorso di mulo" (124). "Dopo Teano proseguendo per la *Marittima*, cioè la regione litoranea del Lazio, si fermo a Maenza presso sua nipote Francesca" (170).

19 *Fontes vitae* 379-380 (321-322).

20 Ibid. 276-277 (213).

21 Ibid. 375 (317).

22 Cette donnée précise paraît avoir échappé à Toso, *Tommaso d'Aquino...*, 170. — A. Walz, *San Tommaso...* (Adaptation Novarina) 192, ne l'ignore pas mais ne l'utilise pas comme élément déterminant de la question. — Scandone, lorqu'il écrivait "movendo da Teano verso il Lazio" (*La vita...*, l. c. 31 et n. 2) l'interprétait à rebours. Malgré les grands mérites de cette fort belle étude qu'est *La vita, la famiglia...di S. Tommaso De Aquino*, il faut la lire la plume à la main pour annoter ses erreurs. Citons un exemple: saint Thomas passa les fêtes de Noël 1272 à Molaria, chez son ami le cardinal de Saint Ange, Richard *degli Annibaldeschi*, — *Fontes vitae, Historia...* 96 (65). — Scandone, *La vita* 27 et n. 3, dit qu'en retournant à Naples, le saint s'arrêta à Fossanova

Tocco dans l'*Historia beati Thomae*: "Post hec cum predictus doctor iret ad concilium Lugduni celebrandum..., contingit autem ipsum transire per Campaniam et ad castrum Magentie quod erat domine Francisce neptis sue, debilem declinare...".[23]

Si la santé de saint Thomas était déjà ébranlée, au coeur de l'hiver, — on était à la fin de janvier ou dans les premiers jours de février — cette route de Campanie lui offrait l'avantage d'être moins exposée et moins insalubre que la voie par les marais Pontins. Et s'il avait le pressentiment de sa fin prochaine, nous consentirons sans peine au motif plusieurs fois mis en avant par ses historiens, qu'il voulut revoir les siens, le lieu de sa naissance et de ses premières années.[24]

Nous nous faisons trop souvent l'image d'un maître Thomas isolé dans un monde supérieur, tout absorbé par sa vie spéculative et contemplative, ses luttes scolaires; le portrait n'est pas complet. Le saint savait se dépenser activement, payer de sa personne pour ses amis et ses proches. Citons quelques faits des dernières années de sa vie.

Quittant Rome pour Naples vers la fin de l'été de 1272, il visite son ami le cardinal de Saint Ange, Richard *degli Annibaldeschi,* au château de Molaria, non loin de Rome. Réginald de Piperno qui l'accompagne, tombe gravement malade; il est guéri par l'imposition d'une relique de sainte Agnès que Thomas porte sur lui. En mémoire de cet événement, le saint fera une fondation au couvent de Naples pour procurer une réfection annuelle aux membres de la communauté.[25] Roger d'Aquila, comte de Traiecto et Fondi, époux d'Adelesia sœur du saint, était décédé le 26 août; Thomas fut nommé exécuteur testamentaire. Le 20 septembre, il est au château du défunt à Traiecto (Minturno); le 27, il est à Capoue, pour traiter avec les fonctionnaires de la curie royale, en faveur de son neveu, fils de Roger et nouveau comte de Fondi.[26] A

pour s'y reposer: "Ritornando, si trattenne, per riposarsi, nel monastero di Fossanova. Cf. Da Tocco, § 31, p. 670, e si aggiunge 'lectiones ubi dimiserat, cum esset Lector Neapoli, resumpsit'..." Or ce dernier texte ne concerne pas saint Thomas mais bien Réginald, lequel, après les obsèques du saint à Fossanova rentra à Naples et y reprit ses leçons: "Quod ex ore predicti fratris Raynaldi socii eius est habitum, qui, quod de ipso viderat, servavit in dicti doctoris vita secretum. Retulit autem predictus socius post prefati magistri obitum, quod cum de monasterio Fossenove redisset, et lectiones, ubi dimiserat, cum esset lector Neapoli, resumpsisset, cum ingenti fletu dixit: "Fratres, ego fui a magistro meo in vita sua prohibitus, ne miranda, que de ipso videram revelarem...", G. de Tocco, *Historia...*, *Fontes vitae* 104-105 (75).

23 *Fontes vitae, Historia...*, 129 (104). Ptolémée de Lucques doit évidemment être entendu dans le même sens lorqu'il écrit: "(Thomas de Aquino)...cum iter arripiens de Neapoli venisset apud Cicanum in Campania, ibi egritudo graviter ipsum arripuit" (cf. supra, n. 15). Ceccano évoque la via Latina et non la via Appia.

24 Cf. A. Toso, *Tommaso d'Aquino...*, 125.

25 *Fontes vitae, Historia...*, 123-124 (98); *Procès de Naples*, ibid. 348 (290); Ptolémée de Lucques, *Historia ecclesiastica nova* XXIII, c. 10; *Fontes vitae* (363).

26 Cf. Scandone. *La vita...*, 22-26; *Fontes vitae* 374 (316).

Noël, il est de nouveau à Molaria, invité par le cardinal pour disputer avec deux juifs de ses amis; ceux-ci convaincus par le saint se font baptiser.[27] Il visite plusieurs fois sa nièce Francesca comtesse de Ceccano, au château de Maenza, où il tombera malade[28]; Pierre de Mont-Saint-Jean, ancien abbé de Fossanova, l'a vu à Marisco — à 150 kilomètres de Naples — chez sa sœur Theodora, comtesse de Marisco, auprès de laquelle Réginald le conduit encore en décembre 1273, cette fois au château de San Severino.[29]

Il est bien naturel que ce vrai Thomas d'Aquin ait suivi la route de Campanie pour se rendre une fois encore à Maenza. Ceci étant, les informations contenue dans la lettre à l'abbé Bernard ne soulèvent pas de difficulté particulière. Les circonstances de son voyage ne lui permettant pas un arrêt prolongé, le saint donna par écrit les éclaircissements souhaités. Le fit-il d'Aquino où l'atteignit le messager venu de Montcassin, de Roccasecca, ou bien même de Maenza où il demeura au moins une semaine? Nous ne savons. Mais une telle incertitude importe peu; la cohérence du document avec la pensée du docteur angélique comme ses leçons propres du texte de saint Grégoire, non présentes dans le manuscrit supposé le modèle, sont le gage de son authenticité; un faussaire se serait gardé de cette dernière maladresse.

Le Texte de la Lettre

Le texte de la lettre est abîmé dans l'unique manuscrit par lequel il est parvenu jusqu'à nous. Cet état est dû en partie à l'inhabileté du scribe mais aussi aux pertes que les marges ont subies au moment d'une reliure du volume; quarante sept lignes sur soixante trois ont été mutilées à leur début par le tranchet du relieur. Des conjectures sont nécessaires pour suppléer autant que possible à ces pertes et restaurer un sens vraisemblable au document.

Son premier éditeur, Dom Louis Tosti, s'est ingénié avec un rare bonheur à ce travail de restitution; il sera difficile de faire mieux. Plusieurs fois cependant nous proposerons des leçons différentes, notamment là où l'espace mutilé invitera à une conjecture plus longue ou plus brève[30]; ailleurs ce sera le sens général de la phrase, une in-

27 *Fontes vitae, Historia...*, 96 (65); *Procès de Naples,* ibid. 389-391 (331-332).

28 Octavien *de Babuco,* moine de Fossanova, dépose au Procès de Naples qu'il conversa avec frère Thomas "in castro Magentie, ad quod castrum plerumque veniebat ad visitandum quandam dominam consanguineam suam." *Fontes vitae* 286 (223).

29 Ibid. 330 (271); 377 (319).

30 L'étendue de la perte pour chacun des cas est en quelque manière dénoncée par les conjectures nécessaires au début des lignes voisines; d'une ligne à l'autre, les suppléances doivent être, plus au moins, de même longueur, compte tenu des abbréviations communes de l'écriture médiévale. Voici un exemple: ligne 4 Dom Tosti a restitué *semper et,* et ligne 6 *fratribus,* mais il ne supplée rien au début de la ligne 5. N'est-il pas des plus vraisemblables que celle-ci a perdu quelque chose de son texte, comme les lignes voisines; elle appelle donc elle aussi un complément.

correction du style, une faute grammaticale qui suggérera une autre intervention. Il est clair que nos options seront présentées à titre de suggestions et l'apparat mettra sous les yeux du lecteur les suppléances de Tosti et de Dom Leccisotti que nous laisserons de côté.

De manière assez générale le déchiffrage du texte est ardu, parce que celui-ci est encombré d'incidents divers qui en troublent la trame. Les abréviations sont inaccoutumées et plus souvent encore les signes complémentaires qui doivent les expliciter sont instables; des mots sont coupés, estropiés — in iquitatis 25,[31] ...octaueram 5, tumor 41 — certaines lettres sont déformées de telle sorte qu'elles en suggérent d'autres — ici un d voulait d'abord être lu b — abditi pour additi 25 —, là q est écrit comme un p — pre pour que 57 —; des corrections maladroites, des surcharges, des rasures du parchemin, des espaces vides augmentent la confusion. Dom A. M. Caplet a noté en détail un grand nombre de ces incidents; sans être complet, l'apparat de son édition contient quarante notes critiques dénonçant des accidents variés.

Malgré ses mérites, ce relevé est difficilement exploitable sans le manuscrit devant les yeux; il peut même induire en erreur, car il n'est pas certain, il s'en faut, que toutes les rasures signalées aient fait disparaître de premières inscriptions. Quelques cas pourtant sont indubitables mais comme tels ils sont rares; un seul d'entre eux dénonce clairement un texte effacé[32] et toujours nous ignorons s'il s'agit de réels changements de rédaction ou d'accidents de copie. Le grand nombre de mots omis au cours de la transcription et inscrits dans les interlignes, les fautes élémentaires dénoncent les maladresses et l'impéritie d'un copiste aux prises avec un modèle trop difficile pour lui et réparées tant bien que mal à seconde lecture.

Pour proposer une édition valable du document, nous procéderons comme Tosti; d'abord une image aussi proche que possible de l'état du texte dans sa source; en second lieu un texte normalisé.

La première édition respectera les lignes du manuscrit. Cette disposition permettra de distinguer les suppléances nécessaires au début des lignes mutilées où elles seront imprimées en caractères italiques. Les mots inscrits dans les interlignes seront ici inclus entre crochets

31 Ici la leçon vraie est d'autant plus blessée que la haste de la lettre q a été effacée par un grattage faisant disparaitre un trait de plume qui soulignait à tort le texte de saint Grégoire (cf. ci-dessus, n. 8); la graphie actuelle suggère 'in iatatis'.

32 Nous avons noté comme à peu près certains: satisfiat 20, accepta tempora 24, tunc 26, determinat 27, nulla (*de* nullatenus) 28, necessitatem incurrunt non *en partie* 31, q *et* uis *de* quamvis, o *de* omnipotens 33, dei scientia falleretur. <secundum> 35, est: 37, assunt sicut ipse moysi fa 44, cas non signalé par Caplet et peut-être le plus assuré, parce que des traces d'une inscription précédente demeurent visibles.

aigus < >, sans notations particulières dans l'apparat critique—sauf exceptions justifiées par un autre motif. Les traits inclinés ///// signaleront les rasures du parchemin sans inscription postérieure au grattage; les espaces limités par les traits / / signifieront les lacunes dans les lignes. L'apparat critique appellera l'attention sur les faits non dénoncés par ces artifices et dignes de notation. Il affirmera également les fautes du copiste conservées ici—à ne pas confondre avec des erreurs de typographie. Les témoins cités dans cet apparat seront: le manuscrit Montecassino 82= M (pM et sM premier état et second état), édition 1 (Tosti) = T, éd. 5 (Caplet) = C, éd. 10 (Leccisotti) = L.

TEXTE DU MANUSCRIT

*Reve*rendo in Christo patri domino Bernardo dei gratia
*ven*erabili abbati casinensi frater Thomas
*de a*quino suus deuotus filius se
fatetur ubique ad obedientiam promtum
*Pre*octaueram pater Venerande quod conuocatis
fratribus qui ex uerbis Illustris doctoris
*Gre*gorii scandalum patiuntur satis-
*fa*cerem viva uoce Set hoc proli-
*xi*tas diuini officii et jeiunii
*obli*gatio impediuit. et forte fructuo-
sum erit ut quod scripture mandatur non
*sol*um presentibus prodesse ualeat set
*et pos*teris. nec absque diuina dispen-
*sati*one hoc gestum credo ut me pro-
*ficis*centem in galliam vestre littere comprehen-
*deren*t
*a*quino ubi sanctissimi patris /----/////////
*be*nedictini beatus Maurus eius discipulus
ab eo transmissus in galliam recipere meruit
*li*cteras et sacra exenia tanti patris. Vt
autem dubitantibus plenius satisfiat
inserenda sunt presentibus uerba beati
gregorii que ingnorantibus dubitationem

1 Christo] x° M
4 *fatetur*] *def.* M semper et T C L
promptum M C | *fortasse e* promtus pM dicit *add.* L
5 *Pre*octaueram | |octaueram M octaveram C L optaveram T
10 *obli*gatio] |gatio M prolongatio T C L
13 *et pos*teris] |teris M futuris T C
15 comprehenderent | *pars ultima* (*deren*t) *in spatio interlineari, supra* aquino M
16 patris | *sequitur lacuna trium vel quatuor litterarum, deinde rasura* M nostri *add.* T C
19 exenia sM | exenia pM
20 satisfiat | *pars ultima, scil.* tisfiat *sup. ras.* M
22 ingnorantibus M

*in*gerunt et errorem. Sciendum inquid "quod
*be*nignitas dei peccatoribus spatium penitentis largitur set quia accepta tempora non ad fructum penitetie ad usum <uero> iniquitatis conuertunt quod ad diuina misericordia.
25 mereri poterant amictunt quamuis omnipotens deus illud tempus uniuscuiusque ad mortem presciat quo uita eius terminatur nec <alio> in tempore quisquam mori potuit nisi quo <moritur> nam si ezechie anni additi
26 *ad* uitam quindecim memorantur tempus uite creuit /////// illo tepere quo mori ipse merebatur. nam diuina dispositio eius tempus tunc presciuit quo hunc postmodum ex presenti uita subtraxit". In quibus
27 *ver*bis satis lucide doctor lucifluus duplicem uniuscuiusque hominis considerationem habendam determinat. unam quidem secundum se. aliam uero secundum quod ad diuinam prescientiam comparatur. secundum se quidem
28 *homo* consideratus in his scilicet que circa eum accidunt necx̄itati non subiacet set possibile est aliqua circa ipsum contigere que nullatenus sortiuntur effectum quod exp̄xe premictit de peccatoribus dicens "quia accepta
29 *te*mpora non ad fructum penitentie ad usum uero iniquitatis ///// conuertunt quod a diuina misericordia mereri poterant amictunt". Si ergo mereri
30 *p*oterant non ex nex̄itate amittunt. Vnde ea que contra hominem accidunt

24-41 *longis lineis*
24 penitentis M
24-25 quia...omnipotens: *sub his verbis Gregorii lineam ducit* pM *quam postea erasit* sM
quia accepta *sup. ras.* M
penitetie M
iniquitatis *scrips.*] in iquitatis pM in iatatis (*e ras. hastae litt.* q—*cf. nota ad* 24-25 quia) sM
ad[3] M
25 amictunt sM] ammictunt pM
<moritur> *hic scrips.*] *om.* pM *sup. lin. ante* ezechie sM
additi sm] abditi pM
26 creuit: *sequitur rasura vacua septem vel octo litterarum* M
tepere (*pro* tempore) M
tunc *sup. ras.* M
27 lucifluus: *syllaba* ci *sup. ras.* M
determinat *sup. ras.* M
secundum[2] *sup. ras.* M
28 in his scilicet *sup. ras.* M
necx̄itati M
subiacet sM] subiaceant pM
contigere M
nullatenus] nulla *deinde brevis ras.* tenus M
effectum] *pars ult.* um *sup. ras.* M
exp̄xe M
28-29 quia accepta...amictunt: *sub his verbis Gregorii linea est ducta* M
29 iniquitatis: *sequitur ras. vacua sex vel septem litterarum* M
a sM] ad (*cf. lin.* 24) pM
amictunt sM] ammictunt (*cf. lin.* 25) pM
30 non ex nex̄itate amittunt *sup. ras.* M
enim diuine] ...im diuine *sup. ras.* M

non ex ne<cessi>tate eueniunt, eadem enim ratio est de morte <et> de quibuscumque aliis que homo agit aut patitur. omnia enim diuine
31 *pro*uidentie supponuntur. Si uero consideretur homo diuine prescientie comparatus ea que agit uel patitur quandam nece <ssitatem> incurrunt. <non> quidem absolutam ut omnino secundum se considerata non possint ut dictum est aliter euenire. <set> conditionalem (p. 321)
32 quia scilicet hec condicionalis est necessaria. si deus aliquid prescit hoc erit. Non enim possunt ista duo simul stare aliquid esse a deo prescitum <et> illud non esse quia sic dei prescientia falleretur. est autem omnino
33 impossibile ut falsitatem veritas patiatur. et hoc signant uerba sequentia beati gregorii cum subdit "quamuis omnipotens deus illud tempus unuscuiusque ad mortem presciat quo uita eius terminatur nec alio <in> tempore
34 quisquam mori poterat nisi ipso quo moritur". scilicet quo a deo prescitus est mori. non enim possunt ista duo simul esse quod <deus> presciat aliquem mori quodam tempore et ipse alio tempore
35 moriatur. alioquin dei scientia falleretur. <Secundum> se autem consideratus homo potuit alio tempore mori. quid enim dubitat eum potuixe prius trasfigi gladio
36 igne comburi aut precipicio aut laqueo vitam finire. Hanc et distinccionem sapiunt eius uerba sequentia subdit enim "Nam si ezechie
37 anni additi ad vitam XV^{cim} memorantur tempus vite creuit ab illo <tempore> quo mori ipse merebatur" stultum autem est dicere quod aliquis mereatur id quod impossibile est euenire. ipse ergo
38 secundum se consideratus poterat tempore illo <mori> set diuine scientie comparatus non poterant hec simul esse ut ipse uno tempore moreretur et alio tempore deus eum presciret moriturum
39 .... (*linea recisa*) (p. 322)

31 *prouidentie*] ...uitentie *potius* M
quandam... <non>] quandam nece *sup. ras.* <ssitatem> *sup. lin.* currunt *sup. ras.* <non> *sup. lin.* M
32 a deo] adeo M
<et> *sup. lin.* sM | *valde confuse* pM
non^{2} *ex emendatione* sM | *fort.* uero pM
quia *legi.* | *confuse* M
33 impossibile *legi.* | im^{le} (le *sup. ras.*) M
33-34 quamuis...moritur: *sub his verbis Gregorii linea est ducta* M
quamuis omnipotens] uis o *sup. ras.* M
33 unuscuiusque M
34 poterat] potuit *Gregorius* T
a deo] adeo M
simul] *in forma compendiata et* imul *sup. ras.* M
35 dei...falleretur *sup. ras.* M
potuixe M
trasfigi M
36-37 Nam...merebatur: *sub his verbis Gregorii linea est ducta* M
37 <tempore> *sup. lin.* sM | illo pM
est^{2} *sup. ras.* M
38 moriturum] et *add.* T C L *ante trans. ad pag.*
39 *linea recisa*

doctoris exprimiunt quasi oculata fide dubitantium animis ingeramus. considerare oportet differentiam diuine cognitionis et humane <quia> enim homo subiacet mutationi et tempori in quo prius et posterius locum habent succexiue cognoscit res quedam prius et quedam posterius et inde est quod preterita memoramur. videmus presentia et prenosticamur futura. Set deus sicut liber est ab omni motu secundum illud malachie "Ego dominus et non tumor". ita omnem temporis succexionē excedit nec in eo inuenitur preteritum *nec* futurum set presentialiter omnia futura et *pre*terita ei assunt sicut ipse moysi famulo *suo* dicit "ego sum qui sum". Eo ergo modo ab eterno presciuit hunc tali tempore moriturum *si* modo nostro loquimur cum tamen eius modo dicendum *esse*t videt eum mori quomodo ego *vi*deo petrum sedere cum sedet. Manifestum est autem quod ex hoc quod video aliquem *sedere* nullam ingeritur ei necessitas sessionis *I*mpossibile est hec duo simul esse vera. quod *ego* uideam aliquem sedentem et ipse non *sede*at. et similiter non est possibile quod deus presciat *ali*quid esse futurum et illud non sit *nec tam*en propter hoc futura ex necessitate *eve*niunt. Hec sunt pater karissime pre vestre *petiti*oni obediens ad errantium reductionem scripsi. que si eis non sufficiunt *i*sta rescribere uobis obediens non *des*inam Valeat paternitas *vestra* diu. Frater Raynaldus *com*mendat se uobis.

40 exprimiunt M
differentiam | bifferentiam *potius* (*cf. nota ad* additi 25) M
<quia> | quod *ut videtur* pM
41 quedam...quedam (*scil. neutr. plural., saepe apud Thomam*) M
illud sM | id pM
tumor M
42 inuenitur *scrips. cum* L | T ūetē M inveniuntur T C
43 *nec* | *def.* M et T C L
present aliter M
44 assunt...famulo | assunt...fam *sup. ras.* sM *illegibilis* pM
47 *si* | *def.* M ut T L ... C
cum tamen: *conf.* (*potius* tum tum) M
dicendum | dicen dum M
48 *esset* | |t M ...t C
49 cum sM | dum pM T C L
51 nullam M | nullum *cum nota* C
53 *ego* | *def.* M *om.* T C L (*cf. lin.* 48 *in fine et princ. lin.* 52 *et* 54)
56 *nec tamen* | |en M Non tamen T L ...en C
57 karissime M | Reverendissime C
pre M et (*cum nota*) C | que *cett.*
58 *petiti*oni | |oni M iussioni T C L
60 *i*sta | |ta M dicta T L ita C

Texte Normalisé

L'apparat de ce texte aura pour fonction d'informer le lecteur sur la valeur respective des éditions antérieures. Toutefois, pour ne pas l'encombrer sans profit, nous ne nommerons que les éditions principales et les plus courantes: à savoir 1 Tosti = T, 3 Vivès (Fretté) = F, 7 Mandonnet = Ma, 9 Verardo = V, 10 Leccisotti = L. S'il y a lieu, la leçon de la source sera mise en parallèle = M et en exposant, le numéro de la ligne du manuscrit.

Reverendo in Christo patri domino Bernardo, Dei gratia venerabili abbati Casinensi, frater Thomas de Aquino suus devotus filius se fatetur ubique ad oboedientiam promptum. Praeoptaveram, pater venerande, quod convocatis fratribus qui ex verbis illustris doctoris Gregorii scandalum patiuntur satisfacerem viva voce, sed hoc prolixitas divini officii et ieiunii obligatio impedivit; et forte fructuosum erit, ut quod scripturae mandatur non solum praesentibus prodesse valeat sed et posteris. Nec absque divina dispensatione hoc gestum credo, ut me proficiscentem in Galliam, vestrae litterae comprehenderent Aquino, ubi sanctissimi patris Benedicti beatus Maurus eius discipulus ab eo transmissus in Galliam recipere meruit litteras et sacra exenia tanti patris.

Ut autem dubitantibus plenius satisfiat, inserenda sunt praesentibus verba beati Gregorii, quae ignorantibus dubitationem ingerunt et errorem. "Sciendum, inquit, quod benignitas Dei peccatoribus spatium paenitentiae largitur; sed quia accepta tempora non ad fructum paenitentiae, ad usum vero iniquitatis convertunt, quod a divina misericordia mereri poterant, amittunt; quamvis omnipotens Deus illud tempus uniuscuiusque ad mortem praesciat quo vita eius terminatur, nec alio in tempore quisquam mori potuit nisi ipso quo moritur. Nam si Ezechiae anni additi ad vitam quindecim memorantur, tempus vitae crevit ab illo tempore quo mori ipse merebatur: nam divina dispositio eius tempus tunc praescivit quod hunc postmodum ex praesenti vita subtraxit."

In quibus verbis satis lucide doctor lucifluus duplicem uniuscuiusque

2 fatetur] *def.* M^{4} semper et T F Ma V L
3 promptum] promtum M^{4} dicit *add.* L
Praeoptaveram] |octaueram M^{5} optaveram T F Ma V octaveram L
5 satis facerem Ma
6 obligatio] |gatio M^{10} prolongatio T F Ma V L
7 et posteris L] |eris M^{13} futuris T F Ma V
9 comprehenderent] comprehendereant Ma V
Aquino] Aquini T F Ma V
patris] *sequuntur lacuna et rasura* M^{16} nostri *add.* T F Ma V
14-15 paenitentiae] penitentis M^{24} L poenitentis F
15 paenitentiae] penitetie M^{24}
16 a] ad M^{24} C L
18 ad mortem *om.* F Ma V
20 <ab> *suppl.*] *rasura* M^{26} ab *editiones*
tempore] tepere M^{26}

hominis considerationem habendam determinat: unam quidem secundum se, aliam vero secundum quod ad divinam praescientiam comparatur. Secundum se quidem homo consideratus, in his scilicet quae circa eum accidunt necessitati non subiacet, sed possibile est aliqua circa ipsum contingere quae nullatenus sortiuntur effectum; quod expresse praemittit de peccatoribus dicens "quia accepta tempora non ad fructum paenitentiae, ad usum vero iniquitatis convertunt, quod a divina misericordia mereri poterant, amittunt." Si ergo mereri poterant, non ex necessitate amittunt; unde ea quae contra hominem accidunt, non ex necessitate eveniunt. Eadem enim ratio est de morte et de quibuscumque aliis quae homo agit aut patitur, omnia enim divinae providentiae supponuntur. Si vero consideretur homo divinae praescientiae comparatus, ea quae agit vel patitur quandam necessitatem incurrunt, non quidem absolutam ut omnino secundum se considerata non possint, ut dictum est, aliter evenire, sed conditionalem, quia scilicet haec conditionalis est necessaria, "Si Deus aliquid praescit hoc erit." Non enim possunt ista duo simul stare, aliquid esse a Deo praescitum et illud non esse, quia sic Dei praescientia falleretur: est autem omnino impossibile ut falsitatem veritas patiatur. Et hoc significant verba sequentia beati Gregorii cum subdit "Quamvis omnipotens Deus illud tempus uniuscuiusque ad mortem praesciat quo vita eius terminatur, nec alio in tempore quisquam mori poterat nisi ipso quo moritur," scilicet quo a Deo praescitus est mori. Non enim possunt ista duo simul esse, quod Deus praesciat aliquem mori quodam tempore et ipse alio tempore moriatur, alioquin Dei scientia falleretur. Secundum se autem consideratus homo potuit alio tempore mori: quis enim dubitat eum potuisse prius transfigi gladio, igne comburi aut praecipitio aut laqueo vitam finire? Hanc et distinctionem sapiunt eius verba sequentia, subdit enim "Nam si Ezechiae anni additi ad vitam quindecim memorantur, tempus vitae crevit ab illo tempore quo mori ipse merebatur." Stultum autem est dicere quod aliquis mereatur id quod impossibile est evenire. Ipse ergo secundum se consideratus, poterat tempore illo mori, sed divinae scientiae comparatus, non poterant haec simul esse, ut ipse uno tempore moreretur et alio tempore

27 necessitati] necxitati M[26]
27-28 contingere] contigere M[28]
28 expresse] expxe M[28]
31 amittunt[1]...poterant *hom. om.* Ma V
necessitate] nexitate M[30]
35 praescientiae] providentiae V
38 conditionalem/ p. 321 M/ quia
41 significant] signant M[33]
42 cum] quum T F Ma V
43 uniuscuiusque] unuscuiusque M[33]
44 poterat] *emendatur in* M[34] potuit T F Ma V
48 potuisse] potuixe M[35]
48-49 transfigi] trasfigi M[35]
49 praecipitio] precipio L
51 additi *om.* F Ma V
55 moreretur] moretur L

Deus eum praesciret moriturum... (*defectus lineae* 39)... doctoris exprimunt, quasi oculata fide dubitantium animis ingeramus, considerare oportet differentiam divinae cognitionis et humanae.

Quia enim homo subiacet mutationi et tempori, in quo prius et posterius locum habent, successive cognoscit res, quaedam prius et quaedam posterius; et inde est quod praeterita memoramur, videmus praesentia et praenosticamur futura. Sed Deus, sicut liber est ab omni motu secundum illud Malachiae "Ego Dominus et non mutor," ita omnem temporis successionem excedit, nec in eo invenitur praeteritum nec futurum, sed praesentialiter omnia futura et praeterita ei adsunt; sicut ipse Moysi famulo suo dicit "Ego sum qui sum." Eo ergo modo ab aeterno praescivit hunc tali tempore moriturum, si modo nostro loquimur cum tamen eius modo dicendum esset 'videt eum mori quomodo ego video Petrum sedere cum sedet' Manifestum est autem quod ex hoc quod video aliquem sedere nulla ingeritur ei necessitas sessionis. Impossibile est haec duo simul esse vera, quod ego videam aliquem sedentem et ipse non sedeat; et similiter non est possibile quod Deus praesciat aliquid esse futurum et illud non sit, nec tamen propter hoc futura ex necessitate eveniunt.

Haec sunt, pater carissime, quae vestrae petitioni oboediens ad errantium reductionem scripsi. Quae si eis non sufficiunt ista, rescribere vobis oboediens non desinam. Valeat paternitas vestra diu.

Frater Raynaldus commendat se vobis.

56 eum *om.* F Ma V
moriturum] et *add.* T F Ma V L
doctoris: *antea* M *transit ad p.* 322
56-57 exprimunt] exprimiunt M[40]
60 successive] succexive M[40]
quaedam...quaedam] quedam...quedam M[41] quasdam...quasdam T F Ma V L
62 Praenosticamur] prognosticamur T F Ma V
63 mutor *scrips. cum* Malachia 3[6]] tumor M[41] *cum nota* L
64 invenitur *scrips. cum* L] inventem *potius* M[42] inveniuntur T F Ma V
nec[2]] *def.* M[43] et T F Ma V L
65 adsunt] assunt M[44]
66 "Ego...sum": Exodi 3[14]
67 si] *def.* M[47] ut T F Ma V quo L
70 nulla] nullam M[51]
71 ego] *def.* M[53] *om.* T F Ma V L
71-77 non sedeat...se vobis *om.* Ma
71-76 non sedeat...desinam *om.* V
74 carissime] karissime M[57] L charissime T F *def.* Ma V
quae] pre M[57]
petitioni] |oni M[58] iussioni F T L *def.* Ma V
75 ista] |ta M[60] dicta T F L *def.* Ma V
76 desinam] |nam M[61] *def.* Ma V

III

EXEGETICAL STUDIES

QUASI DEFINITIO SUBSTANTIAE

Etienne Gilson

THE origin of this essay is the surprise I felt, some twenty years ago, when I stumbled upon a rather abrupt statement in the disputed question *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 3, ad 4: "Ens per se non est definitio substantiae, ut Avicenna dicit..." At that time, although well advanced in years, I must confess that, asked for a definition of substance, my answer would probably have been that substance is *ens per se*, and that accident is *ens per aliud* or *in alio.* A second cause of surprise was that, finding in my edition of the *De potentia* a reference to Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, book 3, I failed to find there the text under discussion. Unless I am mistaken, the reference is not correct; but the main reason for my failure to find the words "Ens per se non est definitio substantiae" was that, as a matter of fact, Avicenna probably never wrote them.

Having been imbued during my school years with respect for exact quotations, I persisted for a long time in my efforts to find these exact words somewhere in Avicenna. My repeated failures made me imagine that perhaps I had misunderstood the obvious meaning of the sentence. Perhaps "Ens per se non est definitio substantiae, ut Avicenna dicit" meant something like: "as Avicenna says it is." But I could hardly believe this, for Thomas probably would have expressed this with a *quamvis* rather than an *ut*, and, above all, I could not find in Avicenna the enunciation at stake whether as the object of an affirmation or a negation.

Hope revived in my heart when I became aware of the existence of the invaluable memoir of C. Vansteenkiste on the quotations of Avicenna in the writings of Thomas Aquinas.[1] I hastened at once to look for the reference to *De potentia*, 7, 3, ad 4, and, of course, the text

1 "Avicenna-Citaten bij S. Thomas," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie*, 15 (1953), 457-507. Same author, "Autori Arabi e Giudei nell'opera di San Tommaso," *Angelicum* 37 (1960), 336-401. I take pleasure in recalling the pioneer work of Aimé Forest, *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1931); see "Table des citations d'Avicenne dans l'œuvre de saint Thomas," in the second edition, 1956. pp. 331-360.

was there, duly listed in its proper place on p. 488, n. 299; but I realized at once that the author had not committed himself to giving references to the corresponding passages in the writings of Avicenna. Slightly disappointed, I simply concluded that to identify the precise Avicennian source of the 426 references listed by him in his memoir had seemed to C. Vansteenkiste a thankless task; and after all, having done so much for us, he was fully justified in leaving it to us to do the rest. So I accepted my lot: never to know exactly where Avicenna had said "Ens per se non est definitio substantiae."

In 1966, as I was preparing a memoir for the Rome-Florence congress on the influence of Islamic culture on the Latin Middle Ages,[2] I found myself confronted with the problem of the overall influence of Avicenna. It became necessary for me to identify at least some of Thomas' Avicennian quotations, and only then did I realize that Thomas' idea of a quotation was very different from our own. By the same token, the discretion shown by C. Vansteenkiste appeared wholly justified in my own sight. Of course, it has long been known that Thomas was very free in his quotations, but he could be strictly correct when correctness was required. In the case of Avicenna's Latin translation, he was at grips with a particular sort of Latin, so obscure that the average reader would have been puzzled by it. For that reason, it is seldom possible to find in Thomas Aquinas a literal quotation of Avicenna. The text usually is quoted *ad sensum*. Still, the original is always recognizable and it can be found, provided one accepts in its place what its involved syntax has become under the clear and pithy pen of Thomas Aquinas.

Since all our own references will be to the text of Avicenna that we think Thomas had in mind, it seems advisable to begin by reproducing it in full. Already in Avicenna, as will still be the case with several texts of Thomas Aquinas, the problem of how correctly to define substance is introduced by a more strictly theological problem: Does the name "substance" correctly apply to God? In other words, is it right to say that God is a substance? After answering the question in the negative, Avicenna goes on to say:

> Potest autem aliquis dicere, quod licet refugiamus dicere de Primo nomen substantiae, non tamen possumus refugere quin dicamus de eo intentionem substantiae, quoniam est ens [ed. et] non in subjecto, quae est intentio substantiae quam posuimus genus.

2 "Avicenne en occident au moyen âge," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 36 (1969), 89-121.

Contra quod dico quod haec non est intentio substantiae quam posuimus genus. Imo intentio ejus est, quod est res habens quidditatem stabilem, cujus esse est esse quod non est in subjecto corpore vel anima.
Cujus rei probatio haec est, quoniam nisi hoc fuerit intellectum de substantia, ipsa erit genus nullo modo. Quod enim significatur per hoc nomen ens, non judicatur esse genus. Negatio vero quae sequitur non addit ei aliquid super esse nisi occasionem discretionis. Hac vero intentione non affirmatur aliquid quod jam sit acquisitum in esse. Nec est intentio alicujus rei per se, sed est in respectu tantum. Esse igitur non in subjecto non est intentio affirmativa, nisi quod essentiae ejus hoc potest esse, ut sit ens, et deinde ipsum ens sit aliquid negative et relative, quod est extra idemptitatem quae est rei. Haec igitur intentio si accipitur hoc modo, non erit genus.
Tu autem jam plene nosti hoc in logica, et nosti etiam in logica, quod cum dicimus omnis aitas[3] non est, intelligimus omne [ed. esse] appropriatum quia non habet certitudinem aliam nisi aitatem. Tunc de hoc quod dicimus de diffinitione substantiae, quia ipsa est ens non in subjecto, intentio est quod est res de qua dicitur quod est non in subjecto, ita ut "ens non in subjecto" praedicetur de ea et habeat in seipsa quidditatem sicut homo, lapis et arbor.
Sic igitur oportet imaginare substantiam ad hoc ut sit genus. Probatio autem quod inter haec duo sit differentia et quod unum eorum sit genus et non alterum est haec, scilicet quod de individuo alicujus hominis cujus esse ignoratur, potest dici quod ipsum sine dubio modo non est in sub-

3 The ancient editions sometimes give *unitas*, sometimes *anitas*. The first reading is not satisfactory, but it must have been invented as an at least possible substitute for the impossible *anitas*. The sentence "anitas non est" is self-contradictory. Having consulted Mlle M.-T. d'Alverny on the possibility of reading "aitas" ("the property of being A"), I received from that charitable Guide of the Perplexed the following communication which I am reproducing in full.

"'Tu autem nosti hoc in Logica. Et nosti etiam in Logica quod cum dicimus omnis a<n>itas <non est> intelligimus omne appropriatum, quia non habet certitudinem aliam nisi a<n>itatem.'

Texte arabe, éd. Le Caire, 1960, t. II,p. 248: 'Tu as appris également en Logique, que si nous disons, par exemple: 'tout A', nous entendons: toute chose qualifiée en tant que A, même si <cette chose> avait une réalité autre que son aïté.'

La lecture 'anitas', pour 'aitas' qui a dû être forgé par le traducteur pour traduire 'alifiyya' (dérivé de alif = A) doit être une erreur des scribes, qui n'ont pas compris le terme et lui ont substitué 'anitas' qui se trouvait dans le même chapitre.

Mais il y a des différences entre le texte arabe et la traduction. D'abord, le fait que la traduction porte: 'omnis a<n>itas *non est*, paraît indiquer que le manuscrit utilisé avait une négation, ce qui n'a pas de sens. Ensuite, la substitution de 'aitas' à 'A' dans le premier membre de la phrase, s'explique difficilement. Enfin, les traducteurs n'ont pas compris la copule signifiante 'même si', et ont écrit à tort 'quia'; il faudrait 'etsi'.

Certitudo traduit *haqqiqa*, qui signifie vérité, et réalité."

This communication helps us to realize why Thomas Aquinas could not very well have quoted Avicenna *verbatim*, even if he had wanted to. Of course, he probably could have had recourse to the competence of scholars who knew Arabic and, perhaps, had a copy of the original at hand, but we do not know if such was the case. He probably was obliged to rely on his own insight most of the time and to guess the meaning of the sentences such as he found them in his own copies of the Latin Avicenna.

jecto, sed videtur sufficere quod assignavimus de hoc cum loquebamur de logica.[4]

As can be seen at once, if there is a text in which "Avicenna says" in so many words that "being through itself (*esse per se*) is not the definition of substance," it is not this one. At the same time, it cannot be denied that, in this text, Avicenna is painstakingly explaining that "ens non in subjecto... non est intentio substantiae." If "not to be in a subject" (or rather,"to be not in a subject") is taken as an equivalent for "to be through itself," the import of the two passages is the same couched in different words.

This particular text sets up a pattern that Thomas Aquinas will follow through the various passages in which the same theme is taken up, in relation to different problems, but always with reference to the teaching of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*. Thomas could not have been unaware that Avicenna had dealt with the same notion in his logic: Avicenna himself says as much in the text of the *Metaphysics* we have just cited. But Thomas would follow Averroes rather than Avicenna in matters of logic, and without precluding the possibility of an influence of certain texts of Avicenna's *Logic* on the Thomistic definition of substance, we shall leave to others the task of establishing it.

Since, however, the notion of substance is one of the Aristotelian categories, it is impossible to discuss it, even from the point of view of the metaphysician, without bearing in mind what logic says about it. Far from being indifferent to actual reality, the logic of Aristotle starts from the primary substance, which is the only actually existing reality. Its characteristic is "that it is never present in a subject" (*Cat.* V). Because substance signifies that which is individual, it is a self-subsisting unit and, by the same token, what the Scholastics will call an *ens non in alio*. As compared with it, species and genera were called by Aristotle "secondary substances." Socrates is a primary substance, his species "man" and his genus "animal" are secondary substances. They are not present in Socrates (manhood is not present in Socrates, nor in animality), but they are predicated of him. It is by stating species and genus that we correctly define individual substances, but they themselves are not substance in the full meaning of the term, they only are substances to the extent that they are predicable of it.

In the order of predication every genus, except substance, is a species with respect to a higher one, every species is a genus with respect to a lower one, but because in actual reality the concrete substance is that of

4 Avicenna, *Opera philosophica* (Venice 1508), *Metaphysica*, tract. VIII, cap. 4, fol. 99rC.

which all the rest can be predicated (including both species and genera), in the order of logical predication, the notion of substance is the supreme term and, as such, escapes all definition. Substance is the species of nothing, and since all definition is by genus and specific difference, the absolutely universal substance cannot be defined. As Avicenna says in his *Logic*: "substantia est genus generalissimum"; it is eminently genus because there is above it no higher genus of which it can be made the species: "ideo est genus quoniam impossibile est fieri speciem, quoniam supra illud non est aliud communius genus." In short, "substantia etenim non habet genus supra se."[5] There is no higher term in conjunction with which, as its difference, it can possibly be defined. Incidentally, this accounts for the fact that in a consistently idealistic view of the world, such as that of Spinoza, substance is at once posited as identical with God.

The special status of substance, as transcending all its differences and transcended by none, suggests at once that it is not susceptible of a definition properly so called. Hence the cautious words of Thomas Aquinas: "Sed si substantia possit habere definitionem non obstante quod est genus generalissimum...."[6] And the curious expressions he uses in connection with the would be definitions of the notion. Speaking of "per se existere," he once called it a "circumlocutio verae descriptionis,"[7] and another time, speaking of the correct description itself, he called it a "definitio, vel quasi definitio substantiae."[8] That was as much as saying: "substantia definitionem habere non potest."

I do not remember meeting the problem in the early works *De ente et essentia* and *In Boethium de Trinitate*. Thomas was already familiar with Avicenna when he wrote these two treatises. One sentence in the second work shows him already possessed of the Avicennian principle that would have enabled him to solve it: "Deus in nullo genere est, cum non habeat quod quid est aliud a suo esse, quod requiritur in omnibus generibus, ut Avicenna dicit."[9] With the commentary on Peter Lombard, however, the picture becomes different. Thomas obviously seeks every opportunity to stress the importance of the problem and to give it a technically justified answer.

5 Avicenna, *Logica*, pars prima; ed. cit. fol. 8r.
6 *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 3, ad 4; see Selected Texts I, 5.
7 *Quodl.* IX, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2.
8 *In IV Sent.* d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ql. 3, ad 2; Vivès (Paris 1873) 10, pp. 293-294.
9 *In Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 3, Resp.; ed. B. Decker (Leiden 1955), p. 222; with reference to Avicenna, *Metaphysica*, tr. VIII, c. 4, ed. cit. fol. 99rA-C, obviously the standard Avicennian text on the question.

1. Is God a Substance?

Since, according to Saint Anselm, God is all that which it is better to be than not to be, God has, and is, all the perfection of substantial being, but the question is to know whether the name "substance" is fittingly said of God.

A first passage of the commentary on the *Sentences* goes straight to the core of the difficulty. (See Text I). The affirmative is argued from a commonly accepted definition of substance, as being "that which is not in a subject, but is a being through itself." In view of what is to follow in the discussion of other texts, let us note at once that, in the terminology of Thomas, "non esse in subjecto," or "esse non in subjecto," and "ens per se" are equivalent expressions. Since, therefore, it eminently befits God not to be in a subject, and to be through himself, he seems to belong in the genus substance.

Thomas answers that this is not so because, according to Avicenna, the words "that which is not in a subject" are not the definition of substance. Assuming the equivalence of "not to be in a subject" and to be an "ens per se," Avicenna and Thomas observe that "being is no genus." Their reason for saying so reaches the deepest layers of Avicenna's ontology, to wit: his very notion of being. As it is implicit in the argument of Thomas, we must first consider it in itself. According to the two philosophers (or to the philosopher and the theologian), being (*ens*) is that which first occurs to the human mind.[10] Thomas has often quoted Avicenna to that effect, but the problem is far from simple, for it already implies the way Thomas usually quotes Avicenna.

First, as a quotation, the sentence is incomplete, and it is noteworthy that this consistently is the case, a consistency suggestive of some intention on the part of Thomas. The complete Avicennian formula says: "Dicemus igitur quod *ens*, et *res* et *necesse* talia sunt quae statim imprimuntur in anima prima impressione, quae non acquiritur ex aliis notioribus se..."[11] Of these three terms, Thomas habitually leaves out the third, namely *necesse*. To find an explanation for this apparently systematic omission is easy, but to find the good one is not. One feels tempted to think that there is in *necesse* a touch of Moslem fatalism,

10 *In Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 3; ed. cit. p. 69. The reply *ad 3m* will not question the truth of the principle; it will simply deny that God is what first occurs to the human mind. If, as is more and more commonly admitted, the exposition on Boethius' *De Trinitate* is one of the earliest works of Thomas, the quotation suggests that his attention was detained very early by the ontology of the Moslem philosopher.

11 Avicenna, *Metaphysica*, lib. II, tr. I, cap. 1 (in the 1495 ed.). In the 1508 ed., tr. I, c. 6, fol. 72rA.

but that would be to indulge in literary commentaries, for indeed being as such is no less necessary in itself to Thomas Aquinas than it is to Avicenna. Yet, for Avicenna, the proper qualification of the Prime Being is *necesse esse.* The God of Thomas Aquinas too is Necessary Being, but he is necessary because he is pure *Esse,* not conversely. So let us simply note the fact that the usual formula employed by Thomas Aquinas is a simplified one: "Ens est illud quod primo cadit in cognitione humana, ut Avicenna dicit...; Primum cadens in apprehensione intellectus est ens, ut Avicenna dicit...; Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio *Metaphysicae* suae."[12]

We should not look for secret intentions beneath all the variations of a language as free as that of Thomas Aquinas, but it may be significant that his first quotation of the Avicennian formula is also the closest to the authentic thought of his predecessor: "ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo in intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in *Metaphysica.*"[13] The insertion of *essentia* is meaningful and, this time, a precise passage of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* helps us to give it its precise meaning.

> Dico ergo quod intentio *entis* et intentio *rei* imaginantur in animabus duae intentiones. *Ens* vero et *aliquid* sunt nomina multivoca unius intentionis. Nec dubitabis quoniam intentio istorum non sit jam impressa in anima legentis hunc librum. Sed res et quicquid aequipollet ei, significat etiam aliquid aliud in omnibus linguis. Unaquaeque enim res habet certitudinem qua est id quod est, sicut triangulus habet certitudinem qua est triangulus, et albedo habet certitudinem qua est albedo; et hoc est quod fortasse appellamus esse proprium, nec intendimus per illud nisi intentionem esse affirmativi, quia verbum ens signat etiam multas intentiones, ex quibus est certitudo qua est unaquaeque res, et est sicut esse proprium rei.[14]

This very important passage is not immediately clear; its meaning appears quite simple, however, if one admits that it might be the source of another Avicenna "quotation" by Thomas Aquinas: "Nomen entis imponitur ab esse et nomen rei a quidditate, ut dicit Avicenna."[15] In the

12 *In Boethium de Trinitate,* q. 1, a. 3, obj. 3; ed. cit. p. 69; *In I Sent.,* d. 1, q. 38, a. 1, obj. 4; *De veritate,* I, 1, Resp. and 21, 1, Resp. For a typical quotation, see *In I Metaph.* lect. 2: "primo in intellectu cadit ens, ut Avicenna dicit...."

13 *De ente et essentia,* prooemium.

14 Avicenna, *Metaphysica,* tract. I, c. 6; ed. cit. fol. 72vC.

15 *In I Sent.,* d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, obj. 2 and Sol. Cf. *In II Sent.,* d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, Sol., and *De veritate,* q. 1, a. 1, Resp. Cf. *In II Sent.* d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, Sol.: "... ut dicit Avicenna distinguens entis et rei significationem."

same passage of his commentary on the *Sentences*, Thomas explains himself, and Avicenna, more at length, but what was rather obscure in the Latin Avicenna becomes both precise and clear in the school Latin of Thomas Aquinas. At the same time, the ultimate metaphysical import of what first looked like a mere question of vocabulary, appears in full:

> According to Avicenna, as has been said above, the name "being" and the name "thing" differ, inasmuch as two points must be considered in "thing," namely its quiddity and notion, and its *esse*; and it is from the quiddity that the name "thing" is taken. And because the quiddity can have *esse* in both the singular outside the soul and in the soul, inasmuch as it is apprehended by the intellect, the name "thing" applies to both: to that which is in the soul, inasmuch as *res* is derived from *reor reris*, and to that which is outside the soul, inasmuch as "thing" is said of what is confirmed and firm in nature. But the name "being" is taken from the fact that the thing is.[16]

From this text one should remember the first sentence, on which all the rest depends: "secundum Avicennam... hoc nomen ens et res differunt secundum quod est duo considerare in re, scilicet quidditatem et rationem ejus, et esse ipsius..." These words refer us to the first sentence of Avicenna in the above-quoted text: "intentio entis et intentio rei imaginantur... duae intentiones." Thus far the phrase "secundum Avicennam" is fully justified. It is less immediately evident that it also covers the ensuing development: "Et a quidditate sumitur hoc nomen res... Sed nomen entis sumitur ab esse rei." Yet, on closer inspection, such seems to be the meaning of the later part of the text. For it says that being (*ens*) and something (*aliquid*) are two different names for one single object. But thing (*res*) or any equivalent term, signifies something else in all languages, for every thing has an essence in virtue of which it is that which it is. The Latin Avicenna calls it the *certitudo* of the thing, a word that in his translator's vocabulary is synonymous with quiddity. Summing up his development, Avicenna himself will say: "Redeamus igitur et dicamus... quod unaquaeque res habet certitudinem propriam quae est ejus quidditas, et notum est quod certitudo cujusque rei quae est propria ei, est praeter esse quod multivocum est cum aliquid." So Thomas does not betray Avicenna in making him say that *ens* points out the *esse* of the thing while *res* points out its quiddity. Having thus cleared up the intention of Avicenna, Thomas will never hesitate to attribute to him the words which sum up the doctrine such as he himself correctly understood it.

16 *In I Sent.*, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4.

In such statements, however, Thomas freely used the various synonyms according to his own needs of the moment. For instance:

> Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi *essentia* ejus, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur nomen *res*, quod in hoc differt ab *ente*, secundum Avicennam in principio *Metaphysicae*, quod *ens* sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen *rei* exprimit quidditatem sive essentiam entis.[17]

The key to the problem of the true definition of substance and of its applicability to God, therefore, is the celebrated distinction of essence and *esse* in finite beings, each and every one of them definable as an essence that has an *esse*. It is well known that the doctrine is common to Avicenna and to Thomas, though a deep difference distinguishes their respective conceptions of *esse* and of its relation to essence.[18] But that difference does not affect their agreement on the notion of substance, which is our present concern.

From the first part of his *Logic*, Avicenna stresses the distinction between the quiddity of a thing and its actual being: a corresponding modification of the notion of substance necessarily follows from that innovation. To define it as an *ens per se* is to posit *ens* as the genus of the definition and *per se* as the difference. But this is impossible. *Ens* is not a genus. Either it is God, in which case it is above being, since it is pure absolute *esse*; or else it is *a* being, in which case it is an essence endowed with its own *esse*. To add that the particular being at stake is through itself, does not specify it as any definite being, since it only adds to it the merely negative condition of "not being in a subject." To define substance as "a being that is not in a subject" is accordingly to say nothing.

Such is the argument of Avicenna, as reported by Thomas in Text I. *Ens non in subjecto* cannot be the definition of substance because, since being is no genus, that would be a definition without a genus, which is impossible. Now, "in every genus one must signify a certain quiddity," more precisely, a quiddity which, unlike that of God, does not include *esse*.[19] As "being does not signify quiddity, but only the act of being

17 *De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, Resp.

18 Because, for Avicenna, the necessity of the essence is the very core of being, actual existence (*esse*) is added to essence by the creative power of God as a sort of accident. Thomas was fully aware of what separated his own notion of being from that of Avicenna. Cf. *In XII Metaph.* lect. 3: "Avicenna posuit quod unum et ens sunt praedicata accidentalia, et quod significant naturam additam supra ea de quibus dicuntur."

19 The conclusion that God is no substance can be directly reached from the principle that he has no essence other than his *esse*. Cf. "Aliquis enim est, sicut Deus, cujus essentia est ipsummet suum esse; et ideo inveniuntur aliqui philosophi dicentes quod Deus non habet quidditatem vel essentiam, quia essentia sua non est aliud quam esse suum. Et ex hoc sequitur quod ipse non sit in

(*sed solum actum essendi*),"the argument does not follow:"*x* is not in a subject, hence it is in the genus substance." A correct argument would be: "*x* has a quiddity from which it follows that it is not in a subject." Now this cannot be said of God, whose quiddity is identical with his *esse*. So God is no substance: in him there is no essence, or quiddity, to stand under (*sub-stare, sub-stantia*) his *esse*. The name "substance" does not befit the pure actuality of God.

The whole point is perfectly summed up by Thomas in two lines of his commentary on the *Sentences*: "...non esse in subjecto non est definitio substantiae..., sed habere quidditatem cui tale esse competat."[20]

Thomas has several times restated his position on the problem at stake. A particularly interesting case is *Contra Gentiles*, I, 25, § 9-10, because the text of Thomas closely recalls the movement of the corresponding passage in Avicenna. After establishing that, although we may refuse to call the Primary Being a substance, he adds that we cannot refuse to attribute to him substantiality, because he is a being not in a subject, which is the meaning of substance posited as a genus. To the "Potest autem aliquis dicere quod licet refugiamus..."of Avicenna, echoes the "Potest autem alicui videri quod..." of Thomas Aquinas. It is the same movement of style and the content of the developments is the same.

Let us briefly recall the reasoning of Thomas Aquinas: 1) being is not a genus, 2) to be a being through itself is a pure negation, 3) for substance to be a genus it must be "a thing to which it belongs to be not in a subject," 4) the name "thing" is derived from the quiddity, as the name "being" is derived from "to be", 5) so substance should be defined as a quiddity to which it belongs to be not in another, 6) in no way then

genere, quia omne quod est in genere oportet quod habeat quidditatem praeter esse suum...." *De ente et essentia*, V; ed. Roland-Gosselin (Paris 1948), p. 37. Cf. "Quidam enim dicunt, ut Avicenna, lib. *De Intelligentiis*, cap. 1, et Rabbi Moyses, lib. I, cap. 57 et 58, quod res illa quae Deus est, est quoddam esse subsistens, nec aliquid aliud nisi esse, in Deo est: unde dicunt quod est esse sine essentia." *In I Sent.*, d. 2, q. 1, Sol. Vivès (Paris 1873) 7, p. 37. On the apocryphal *De Intelligentiis*, cf. Reginald de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin* (Paris 1934). Rabbi Moses and Thomas Aquinas followed Avicenna on that precise point, with only verbal differences: "Dico enim quod Necesse Esse non potest habere quidditatem quam comitetur necessitas essendi...." Avicenna, *Metaphysica*, tract. VIII, c. 4 (Venice 1508), fol. 99A. "...igitur necesse esse non habet quidditatem nisi quod est necesse esse, et haec est anitas." Ibid. AB. The principle is: "...quicquid habet quidditatem praeter anitatem causatum est." Since the Primary Being is uncaused, he can have no quiddity (other than his *Esse*), so: "...omne habens quidditatem causatum est"; "ibid. B. Hence it follows: "Primus etiam non habet genus; primus enim non habet quidditatem, sed quod non habet quidditatem non habet genus." Ibid. B. Since *ens* is no genus it cannot define substance, which is always some actually existing essence or quiddity. The two propositions are inseparable in the mind of Avicenna: "Primus enim non habet quidditatem," and "quod non habet quidditatem non habet genus,"

20 See Selected Texts, II, 1.

is God in the genus of substance, since he has no quiddity save his being.

Everything in this development is Avicennian in origin. One cannot find in it one expression to which Avicenna could not subscribe, for the simple reason that everything in it comes from him. And yet the two doctrines belong to different intelligible worlds, because *Necesse Esse* and *I Am* are not identical. *Necesse Esse* can say *I Am* and *I Am* is Necessary Being, but these dialectical equivalences hide from sight a deep metaphysical difference, which history as such is perhaps competent, if not to perceive, at least to convey.

Among the other passages of Thomas dealing with the same problem, there is perhaps not one that does not offer some noteworthy detail, but the position remains unchanged to the end. The text of the *Summa theologiae* is perfect in its concision.[21] The words *non solum* usefully remind the reader that what Thomas denies is not that substance is through itself; his precise point is that to be through itself is not the definition of substance, unless, as he says elsewhere, these words be used as an abridged formula and for the sake of brevity.

Almost equally concise and more technically complete is the passage of the disputed question *De potentia*, q. 7, a. 3, ad 4, which first called our attention to the problem.

> To be through itself is not the definition of substance, as Avicenna says. For indeed, being cannot be the genus of a thing, as Aristotle proves, because nothing can be added to being that does not participate in it, while the difference must not participate in the genus. But if substance is susceptible of definition, despite its being the *genus generalissimum*, that definition should run as follows: Substance is a thing to the quiddity of which it is due to be not in something. And thus the definition of substance will not befit God, who has no quiddity besides his *esse*. God, therefore, is not in the genus of substance, but is above all substance.[22]

2. Transsubstantiation and Accident

There is no treatise of Thomas Aquinas on substance. Being a theologian, he dealt with the notion when a theological problem made it necessary for him to do so. To decide whether the name "substance" correctly applies to God was such an occasion; another was the necessity to define the ontological status of the eucharistic species. Hence the second series of texts in which the correct definition of substance is reasserted by the theologian.

21 Selected Texts, I, 4.
22 Selected Texts, I, 5.

The difficulty to overcome was plainly visible. Among the many difficulties arising from the possibility of transsubstantiation, a particularly striking one was the fact that, after the consecration, all the "accidents" of bread and wine remain unchanged. All their qualities: color, taste, odor, figure, quantity, and weight are perceived by the senses just as they were before the consecration. It is hard to believe, therefore, that the substance of the body of Christ is there, under those accidents foreign to its nature, and that the substances of bread and wine themselves have ceased to be present.

This provides the theologian with an opportunity to approach the problem of the definition of substance from the point of view of the definition of accident. Of course, the theologian does not intend to make his reader *understand* such a miracle. Nor is it his task to make it appear like a natural possibility, but he has to answer objections taken from the very philosophical definition of accidents conceived in their relationship to substance. Now, just as the definition of substance is wrongly supposed to be "a being that is through itself," so that of accident is wrongly supposed to be "a being that is through another one." As Aristotle has said: "... for an accident to be is *to be in*."[23] To suppose that after the consecration of bread and wine, which converts their substance, their accidents still subsist, is to admit that accidents can subsist as though they themselves had become substances. But, in Thomas' own words: "Nec possunt per se subsistere, cum accidentis esse sit inesse."[24] For that and many other reasons, the teaching of Christ and the Church concerning that sacrament appears hard to accept.

Thomas has defined his own position on the problem as early as his lectures on the fourth book of the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.[25] There again his starting point is the Avicennian definition of substance as different from the usual one. "As Avicenna proves in his *Metaphysics*," he writes, "to subsist through itself is not the definition of substance." We know the reason: that alleged definition does not point out the quiddity of the thing, but its *esse* which, in finite beings, is not their quiddity. Now, where there is no quiddity, there is no thing that subsists, no substance. Substance, then, let it be said again, is a thing having a quiddity to which it is due to be in itself and not in something else.

This time, however, the nature of the problem prompts Thomas to extend the consequence from the definition of substance to that of accident. So he goes on to say: "And, in like fashion, *to be in something*

23 *Metaph.* V, 7, 1077a19.

24 *Contra Gentiles*, IV, 62, § 12.

25 Selected Texts, II, 1.

else is not the definition of accident, but, on the contrary, the definition is, *a thing to which it is due to be in something else.*"

How does this help to remove the difficulty? For this reason, that since such is its definition (*res cui debetur esse in alio*) an accident cannot possibly become something else, namely a substance. It cannot be separated from its definition, as would be the case if its definition were "to be in something else," for indeed, in that case, subsisting in themselves after the consecration, the former accidents of bread and wine would become many substances, which is contradictory and therefore impossible.

On the contrary, it is neither contradictory nor impossible that something to which to be in something else is due by reason of its quiddity, or essence, be caused by the divine power to subsist without any substance. A subsisting accident is something miraculous, which only God can cause to happen, but it is not a self-contradiction as would be an accident-become-substance. As St. Thomas writes, "To cause an accident to be without substance is not to separate the definition from the defined." And this is precisely what can happen, supposing the allpowerfullness of God, if the definition of accident is not "to be in a subject" but, rather, "to be something to which it is natural to subsist in a subject." The power of God is free with respect to nature, but it cannot achieve self-contradiction which, of itself, is nothingness.

Theology need not go farther than to demonstrate the intrinsic non-impossibility of miracles, especially in the case of the Eucharist, which is the greatest of all.

The very name "transsubstantiation" shows how great a miracle it is. It is not merely the passing of some accidents into others within one substance. It even is more than the annihilation of a substance and its replacement by another. Transsubstantiation is the passing over of a subject into another subject, what is called a *substantial conversion.* In such conversions, the substance of the first subject does not persist. The substance of the bread does not subsist after the consecration; the matter of that substance likewise ceases to exist. Since, however, something persists, this can only be the accidents of bread and wine. The substance of the bread then becomes the substance of the body of Christ under the accidents of the bread. In Thomas' own words, "the body of Christ in some way acquires the place of the bread, with the measurements of the bread, nonetheless, mediating."[26]

26 *Contra Gentiles*, IV, 63, § 12; transl. C. J. O'Neill, *On the Truth of the Catholic Faith* (New York 1957), p. 260. For a detailed justification of the non-impossibility of such a miracle from the point of view of the conservation of things (which is the same as that of their creation), see op. cit., IV, 65, § 3. Perhaps through my own fault, I have not been able to find in this chapter, which

A short passage of the *Summa theologiae* attests that Thomas had not altered his position at the time he was writing it. Speaking of the sacrament of the Eucharist, the theologian reaches the question: Whether in that sacrament the accidents persist without a subject. The answer is in the affirmative despite the straight philosophical objection that "the definition of a thing cannot be separated from that thing, even miraculously."[27] The second objection says that it is contradictory that a thing be separated from its definition or, (which comes to the same thing), that the definition of one thing should apply to another. For instance, even God cannot effect that a man, while remaining a man, be an irrational animal. That would be for contradictories to subsist together at one and the same time, since the definition of a thing is what the thing is. Now, it is of the definition of accident that it be in a subject, just as it is of the definition of substance that it subsist by itself, not in a subject. It cannot miraculously happen, then, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, that accidents be without a subject.

To this objection, Thomas makes his own usual answer, that since being is no genus, *esse* cannot be the essence of either substance or accident. So *ens in subjecto* is not the definition of accident: "but just as it is of the quiddity or essence of substance to have being not in a subject, so also is it of the quiddity or essence of accident to have being in a subject." Now, in the sacrament of the Eucharist, it is not given to the accidents to be not in a subject in virtue of their own essence (which would be contradictory), but to be not in a subject owing to the divine power that sustains them. "And so they do not cease to be accidents, because the definition of accident is not separated from them and the definition of substance does not apply to them." So they do not become substances; they subsist without ceasing to be accidents.

A last text worth mentioning is found in a *Quaestio quodlibetalis*[28] which proves at least that the question was of general theological interest around the middle of the thirteenth contury: Whether, in the sacrament of the altar, there are accidents without a subject.

The second objection for the negative side and its reply bring into play the same set of arguments, and, naturally, the answer begins by appealing to the principle laid down by Avicenna, that *esse* cannot enter the definition of any genus or species. This time, however, Thomas justifies the rule by stressing, in more forcible terms perhaps than usual,

deals with the "objections regarding accidents," the argument drawn from the correct definition of accident. If it really is not there, nor anywhere else in the *Contra Gentiles*, I do not know the reason for its omission, especially in a work written specifically in view of the philosophers.

27 *Summa theologiae*, III, 77, 1, obj. 2. See Selected Texts, II, 2.

28 *Quaestiones quodlibetales, Quodl.* IX, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2. See Selected Texts, II, 3.

the metaphysical notion that underlies the doctrine. It also happens to be one of the most frequently neglected points of Thomism in its commonly taught school version.

Esse, Avicenna and Thomas say, cannot enter the definition of any genus or species, because all the individuals included in a genus or species are united by their sharing in their definitions, whereas genus and species are not found with one and the same *esse* in the individuals they contain. In other words, the species is the same for all the individuals contained in it, whereas the *esse* of each individual is proper to it. That uniqueness of individual *esse*, which makes a being to be an individual, is therefore required for the constitution of every substance, but because finite *esse* necessarily is the *esse* of something, the notion of the quiddity or essence that receives it is likewise required for a correct definition, description or quasi description of both substance and accident. Substances and accidents are beings only because they are things that are. Thomas repeatedly says of them that they are *res*, that is to say essences actualized, according to two different modalities, by their respective acts of being.

A few texts scattered through the complete works of Thomas Aquinas constitute all the information we have on what would have been a most important and fundamental chapter of his philosophy, had he written one. This accounts for the fact that so many "Thomists" substitute an incomplete, and to that extent incorrect, definition of substance for the authentic definition of it given by Thomas and his predecessor, the Moslem Avicenna.

Those who say that we have the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas in his early *De ente et essentia*, should specify that, although all the elements of the Thomistic definition of substance are found in that work, the definition itself of that fundamental notion is not there.

Those who maintain that the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas is contained in his commentaries on Aristotle, and even that, such as it is interpreted by him in those commentaries, the philosophy of Aristotle is his own philosophy, should account for the fact that, such as Thomas himself understands them, the fundamental philosophical notions of being, thing, substance, and accident are regularly related by him to the metaphysics of Avicenna, never to that of Aristotle. Inversely, of the 426 quotations of Avicenna in the complete works of Thomas Aquinas listed by C. Vansteenkiste, only twenty-five are found in the commentaries on Aristotle, eleven of which are in the commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Between the metaphysics of Aristotle and that of Thomas Aquinas, the metaphysics of Avicenna acts as a kind of filter. The ontology of Aristotle reaches Thomas Aquinas Avicenna

polarized. And, of course, Averroes knew full well the reason why the metaphysics of Avicenna could serve the purpose of a theologian better than that of Aristotle. Avicenna was always to be found half way between philosophy and theology. Since Thomas Aquinas, and before him Avicenna, had read the Old Testament, they have in common the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

A last remark should perhaps be made, being well understood that there is nothing personal in it.

The narrow scope of the preceding observations does not authorize general conclusions concerning the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas, except perhaps this one, that it is pure intellectual dishonesty to present under the patronage of Thomas Aquinas some philosophy and theology using his vocabulary without keeping faith with the authentic meaning of his words. Thomism is an exceptional example of both liberty and precision in philosophical language. We cannot disregard one of its fundamental notions without wrecking the whole structure. Those who want to claim his authority in favor of their own philosophical and theological positions have to take his doctrine such as it is, or leave it.

To those who think that to take the doctrine as it is will impair their liberty of mind, I beg to offer two answers.

The first will be in the form of a question. Do you really know Thomism? Are you speaking of it on hearsay only? Or after a more or less rapid survey of the doctrine? Or after living with it for many years and progressively achieving a realization of the meaning of its principles? Let everyone answer for himself; personal experience cannot be communicated.

The second answer necessarily escapes the grasp of all those to whom Thomas Aquinas is but the name of, at best, an unknown theologian and, at worst, of a hopelessly outdated philosopher. For those, on the contrary, who have lived with him and in close familiarity with his thought, it will become increasingly evident that his guidance does not lead us to something that would be his own personal metaphysics and theology but, rather, to the very substance of metaphysical reality in philosophy as well as to that of the Christian faith in theology. The result of a close adherence to the authentic thought of Thomas Aquinas is completely to liberate the mind from every particular system and to leave him alone, a dangerously but a really free man, in exactly the situation in which Thomas himself was: at grips with the mysterious nature of ultimate reality. To follow him faithfully is the only safe way to go at least as far as he himself has gone. To go farther than he did is certainly not a forbidden ambition, but one first must join him where he is before undertaking to go beyond him.

SELECTED TEXTS

I. God and Substance

1. 2. Praeterea, substantia est quae non est in subjecto, sed est ens per se. Cum igitur Deo hoc maxime conveniat, videtur quod ipse sit in genere substantiae.

Ad secundum dicendum quod ista definitio secundum Avicennam (*Metaphy.*, tract. II, c. 1, et tract. III, c. 8) non potest esse substantiae: substantia est quae non est in subjecto. Ens enim non est genus. Haec autem negatio "non in subjecto" nihil ponit; unde hoc quod dico, ens non est in subjecto, non dicit aliquod genus, quia in quolibet genere oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de cujus intellectu non est esse. Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum; et ideo non sequitur: est non in subjecto, ergo est in genere substantiae; ... sed hoc dictum Deo non convenit, ut dictum est. *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2; ed. Vivès (Paris 1873) 7, pp. 117-118.

2. Ut Avicenna dicit in sua *Metaphysica* (tract. II, c. 1, et tract. VI, c. 5), ad hoc quod aliquid sit proprie in genere substantiae requiritur quod sit res quidditatem habens, cui debeatur esse absolutum, ut per se esse dicatur vel subsistens. Et ideo duobus modis potest contingere quod aliquid ad substantiae genus pertinens, non sit in genere substantiae sicut species: vel quia res illa non habet quidditatem aliam nisi suum esse; et propter hoc Deus non est in genere substantiae sicut species, ut ipse Avicenna dicit. *In II Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, solutio; ed. Vivès (Paris 1873) 8, p. 55.

3. Potest autem alicui videri quod, quamvis nomen substantiae Deo proprie convenire non possit, quia Deus non substat accidentibus, res tamen significata per nomen ei conveniat, et ita sit in genere substantiae; nam substantia est ens per se, quod Deo constat convenire, ex quo probatum est ipsum non esse accidens.

Sed ad hoc dicendum est ex dictis, quod in definitione substantiae non est ens per se. Ex hoc enim quod dicitur ens, non posset esse genus, quia jam probatum est quod ens non habet rationem generis. Similiter nec ex hoc quod dicitur per se, quia hoc non videtur importare nisi negationem tantum: dicitur enim ens per se, ex hoc quod non est in alio, quod est negatio pura, quae non potest naturam vel rationem generis constituere, quia sic genus non diceret quid est res, sed quid non est. Oportet igitur quod ratio substantiae intelligatur hoc modo, quod substantia sit res cui conveniat esse non in subjecto, nomen autem rei a quidditate imponitur, sicut nomen entis ab esse; et sic in ratione substantiae intelligatur quod habeat quidditatem cui conveniat esse non in alio. Hoc autem Deo non convenit, nam non habet quidditatem nisi suum esse. Unde relinquitur quod nullo modo est in genere substantiae, et sic nec in aliquo genere, cum ostensum sit ipsum non esse in genere accidentis. *Contra Gentiles*, I, 25, §9-10; ed. Vivès (Paris 1874) 12, p. 33.

4. ... substantiae nomen non significat hoc solum quod est per se esse; quia hoc quod est esse non potest esse genus, ut ostensum est, sed significat essentiam, cui competit sic esse, id est, per se esse; quod tamen esse non sit ipsa

ejus essentia. Et sic patet quod Deus non est in genere substantiae. *Summa theologiae*, I, 3, 5, ad 1; ed. Vivès (Paris 1871) 1, p.26.

5. 4. Praeterea, cuicumque convenit ratio generis substantiae, est in genere. Sed ratio substantiae est per se existere, quod maxime convenit Deo. Ergo Deus est in genere substantiae. ...

Ens per se non est definitio substantiae, ut Avicenna dicit (*Metaphy.* tract. III, c. 8). Ens enim non potest esse alicujus genus, ut probat Philosophus, III *Metaphy.*, com. 10, cum nihil possit addi ad ens quod non participat ipsum; differentia vero non debet participare genus. Sed si substantia possit habere definitionem, non obstante quod est genus generalissimum, erit ejus definitio, quod substantia est res cujus quidditati debetur esse non in aliquo. Et sic non conveniet definitio substantiae Deo, qui non habet quidditatem suam praeter suum esse. Unde Deus non est in genere substantiae, sed est supra omnem substantiam. *Q. D. De potentia*, q. 7, a. 3, ad 4; ed. Vivès (Paris 1875) 13, pp. 220-221.

II. Transsubstantiation

1. Sicut probat Avicenna in sua *Metaphysica*, per se existere non est definitio substantiae: quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas ejus, sed ejus esse; et sua quidditas non est suum esse; alias non posset esse genus: quia esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contenta in genere differant secundum esse. Sed definitio, vel quasi definitio substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse, vel debetur, ut non <sit> in alio. Et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio. Et hoc nunquam separatur ab aliquo accidente, nec separari potest; quia illi rei quae est accidens, secundum rationem suae quidditatis semper debetur esse in alio. Sed potest esse quod illud quod debetur alicui secundum rationem suae quidditatis, ei virtute divina agente non conveniat. Et sic patet quod facere accidens esse sine substantia, non est separare definitionem a definito. Et si aliquando hoc dicatur definitio accidentis, praedicto modo intelligenda est definitio dicta, quia aliquando ab auctoribus definitiones ponuntur causa brevitatis non secundum debitum ordinem, sed tanguntur illa ex quibus potest accipi definitio. *In IV Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ql. 3, ad 2; ed. Vivès (Paris 1873) 10, pp. 293-294. Cf ... non esse in subjecto non est definitio substantiae, ut dictum est; sed habere quidditatem cui tale esse competat ..." Loc. cit., ad 3; ed. cit., p. 294.

2. 2. Praeterea, fieri non potest etiam miraculose quod definitio rei ab ea separetur, vel quod uni rei conveniat definitio alterius, puta quod homo manens homo sit animal irrationale. Ad hoc enim sequeretur contradictoria esse simul; *hoc* enim *quod significat nomen rei est definitio*, ut dicitur in IV *Metaph.* (text 28 [*lect. 16*]). Sed ad definitionem accidentis pertinet quod sit in subjecto, ad definitionem vero substantiae quod per se subsistat, non in subjecto. Non ergo potest miraculose fieri quod in hoc sacramento sint accidentia sine subjecto ....

Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum ens non sit genus, hoc ipsum quod est esse, non potest esse essentia substantiae vel accidentis. Non est ergo definitio

substantiae, *ens per se sine subjecto*, nec definitio accidentis, *ens in subjecto*; sed quidditati seu essentiae substantiae competit habere esse non in subjecto; quidditati autem, sive essentiae accidentis competit habere esse in subjecto. In hoc autem sacramento non datur accidentibus quod ex vi suae essentiae non sint in subjecto, sed ex divina virtute sustentante. Et ideo non desinunt esse accidentia, quia nec separatur ab eis definitio accidentis, nec competit eis definitio substantiae. *Summa theologiae*, III, 77, 1; ed. Vivès (Paris 1872) 5, pp. 456-457.

3. 2. Praeterea, de eodem praedicatur definitio et definitum; sed *ens per se* est definitio vel descriptio substantiae; si ergo in sacramento altaris accidentia sunt per se non in subjecto, sequitur quod sint substantiae, quod est absurdum ....

Ad secundum dicendum, quod secundum Avicennam in sua *Metaphysica*, esse non potest poni in definitione alicujus generis et speciei, quia omnia particularia uniuntur in definitione generis vel speciei, cum tamen genus vel species non sit secundum unum esse in omnibus, et ideo haec non est vera definitio substantiae: substantia est quod per se est, vel, accidens est quod est in alio, sed est circumlocutio verae descriptionis, quae talis intelligitur: substantia est res cujus naturae debetur esse non in alio, accidens vero est res cujus naturae debetur esse in alio. Unde patet quod quamvis accidens miraculose non sit in subjecto, non tamen pertinet ad definitionem substantiae; non enim per hoc ejus natura debetur esse non in alio; nec egreditur definitionem accidentis, quia adhuc natura ejus manet talis ut ei debeatur esse in alio. *Quaest. Quodlibetales*, IX, q. 3, a. 5, ad 2.

THE SEPARATED SOUL AND ITS NATURE IN ST. THOMAS

Anton C. Pegis

I

The Problem

THIS essay has grown out of an effort to understand the doctrine in *Summa Contra Gentiles* II, c. 81, especially paragraphs 5-7, dealing with the knowledge of the separated soul.[1] When compared with *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 89, a. 1, the *SCG* text shows marked differences in development as well as content: in doctrinal formation it is similar to *De Veritate,* q. 19, a. 1, as well as to *In III Sent.,* d. 31, q. 2, a. 4 and *In IV Sent.,* d. 50, q. 1, a. 3. On the other hand, *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 is noticeably similar in its teaching to *Quaestiones de Anima,* q. 15.

The difference of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 from *SCG* II, c. 81 has three aspects, namely, a change in doctrine, a change in St. Thomas' view of the state of the question before him, and the entry of the Aristotelian notion of *nature* into the discussion of the knowledge of the separated soul. If these differences can be proved from the texts, then it is also permissible to think that *SCG* II, c. 81 belongs to an earlier stage in St. Thomas' views on the separated soul. And if, finally, it is correct to argue that as a *summa* the *SCG* had for its immediate purpose the assimilation of Aristotelianism, then it is plausible to believe that St. Thomas' use of Aristotelian teaching was not uniform or complete at the time of the *SCG*: it was absent, for example, from the problem of the knowledge of the separated soul, as compared with the fuller and even more radical application of Aristotelian notions in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 and *Quaestiones de Anima,* q. 15.

1 Abbreviations used: *SCG* = *Summa Contra Gentiles; ST* = *Summa Theologiae.* On the purpose of the *SCG* referred to in the next paragraph, see A. C. Pegis, "Qu'est-ce que la Summa Contra Gentiles?" (in *L'homme devant dieu. Mélanges offerts au Père Henri de Lubac* [3 vols., Paris 1964], vol. II, pp. 169-182); *Saint Thomas Aquinas: On the Truth of the Catholic Faith: Summa Contra Gentiles, Book One: God* (New York 1955), pp. 19-44.

This conclusion does not directly argue for any precise chronology. But the recognition that *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 contains a new perspective and a new doctrine on the separated soul throws serious doubt on the late dating recently proposed for the *SCG*, as well as on the accepted dating of *Quodlibet* III as being Easter, 1270.[2] *SCG* II, c. 81 and *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 were both written not only before 1269 at the latest, when St. Thomas held the *Quaestiones de Anima* in Paris, but also at an even earlier date (i.e. before 1265) if the *prima pars* of the *ST* was written in 1265-1268).[3] The main point is that *SCG* II, c. 81 and *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 belong in the intellectual climate of the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate*, not in the later and more developed Aristotelian climate of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1.

II

a. *SCG II, c. 81, §§ 5-7*

Before the chapter that concerns us, *SCG* II, c. 80 had recorded five arguments proving that the soul would not survive the body. Of these the fifth held that there was no substance without its operation and that, since the soul had no operation surviving its separation from the body, it would not itself survive the body. The core of the argument is the Aristotelian view of the human intellect. Though its own operation takes place without an organ, its objects of knowledge are phantasms, so that it cannot understand without phantasms. In addition, the soul needs other internal sensible powers to prepare the phantasms, namely, the cogitative power and the memory. Now, since all these powers die with the body, the intellect will not be able to understand without the body and will therefore not survive it.[4]

In reply, St. Thomas declares the argument false on the ground that operations not exercised through the body will survive its death. These are *intelligere* and *velle*.[5] But in view of the Aristotelian doctrine that

2 For these dates, see below, notes 35 and 39.

3 For the dating of the *Quaestiones de Anima* (January to June, 1269), see P. Glorieux, "Les questions disputées de saint Thomas et leur suite chronologique" (*Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 4, 1933, pp. 5-33), pp. 22, 26-27; also J. H. Robb, St. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones de Anima* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), pp. 27-37. On the title "Quaestiones de Anima," see J. H. Robb, *ibid.*, pp. 26-27. — For the dating of *ST* I (1265-1268), see the summary in I. T. Eschmann, "A Catalogue of St. Thomas' Works" (in E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. L. K. Shook [New York 1956], pp. 381-439), p. 387.

4 *SCG* II, c. 80, § 5. The Aristotelian basis of the argument is clear in the text. See *De Anima* I, 4, 408b24-25; III, 5, 430a23-24, 24-25; III, 7, 431a16-17.

5 *SCG* II, c. 81, § 5.

intelligere has phantasms for its objects, St. Thomas must explain how understanding takes place in the separated soul. He argues that the separated soul understands in a different way from the united or embodied soul because it exists in a different way. Everything *acts* according as it *is*. The being (*esse*) of the united human soul, though free and independent of the body, nevertheless has the body as its underlying subject. That is why the soul's act of understanding, though exercised without an organ, has a bodily object, phantasms. It is therefore true that *quamdiu anima est in corpore, non potest intelligere sine phantasmate.* It is also true that this kind of *intelligere* will perish with the death of the body.[6]

But the separated soul will have a being (*esse*) that belongs to it alone without the body. Its *intelligere* will consequently take place without reference to bodily objects or phantasms. The separated soul "will understand through itself, in the manner of the substances that are in their being completely separate from bodies." It will also receive their influence more richly for more perfect understanding. There are signs of this future perfection even now. The virtue of temperance, by restraining the soul from bodily pleasures, makes men more fit for understanding. Men asleep perceive the future under the influence of higher substances, and so, even more, do ecstatics. St. Thomas' point (which he has already proved) is that since the soul lives on the confines of two worlds, that of material and immaterial substances, or of time and eternity, on leaving the lowest level it approaches the highest.[7]

6 Ibid., § 6.

7 Ibid. See *SCG* II, c. 68, §§ 3-6. The notion of the soul as established on the horizon of two worlds came to St. Thomas from the *Liber de Causis*, § 2, lines 7-9 (ed. O. Bardenhewer, *Die pseudo-aristotelische Schrift Ueber das reine Gute, bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Causis* [Freibourg-im-Br. 1882], p. 165).

It is to be noted that St. Thomas uses the doctrine of the horizon in more than one direction, depending on his immediate problem. For example, in *SCG* II, c. 68, § 6, St. Thomas' purpose is to emphasize that the soul is an incorporeal form of matter and to bring together two aspects of the soul, namely, its immateriality and its embodiment. Hence, the soul is called *horizon* and *confinium* because, *inquantum est substantia incorporea*, it is yet *corporis forma.* (This interpretation of *horizon* is likewise adopted in *Quaestiones de Anima*, q. 1, ed. J. H. Robb, p. 60). But in *SCG* II, c. 81, § 6 (as well as in *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1), the point that St. Thomas wishes to make, in using the notion of *horizon*, is that, when it is free of the body, the soul reaches up to what is highest: *recedens ab infimo appropinquat ad summum.* There now follows St. Thomas' own position, namely, that the separated soul *perfecte assimilabitur substantiis separatis quantum ad modum intelligendi.* —In *SCG* III, c. 61, § 5 St. Thomas uses the notion of *horizon* simply to argue that the substance of an intellectual form of matter, being above matter, has an action above it. St. Thomas then adapts this use to his own point: the opening that the soul has toward eternity shows that in the vision of God the intellectual soul will share in eternal life. — Finally, in *SCG* IV, c. 55, § 5, where St. Thomas is concerned to show how it was fitting that Christ should be joined to *man* in the Incarnation, the notion of *confinium* is applied to man himself: he unites the whole universe by his spiritual and corporeal nature. Note: "homo... quasi quoddam confinium tenens utriusque naturae..." (*ibid.*).

These texts clearly suggest that at the time of writing them St. Thomas was not aware that in

Hence, pursues St. Thomas, when the soul "will be wholly separated from the body, it will be perfectly likened to separate substances in the mode of understanding, and receive their influence in abundance: *perfecte assimilabitur substantiis separatis quantum ad modum intelligendi, et abunde influentiam earum recipiet.*" St. Thomas therefore concludes that, though the mode of understanding of the present life will be corrupted when the body is corrupted, it will be followed by another and higher, mode of understanding: *sic igitur, etsi intelligere nostrum secundum modum praesentis vitae corrupto corpore corrumpatur, succedet tamen alius modus intelligendi altior.*[8]

St. Thomas does not say what this other mode of understanding will be, but he does argue that the separated mode of being will give to the soul a separated mode of understanding. What he does not in the least consider here is the nature itself of the human soul. If the separated soul will not have another *nature,* how can its separation from the body make its mode of operation to be like that of separate substances? This question of the nature of the human soul, however, dominates the discussion in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1.

b. *ST I, q. 89, a. 1*

The question asked is whether the separated soul understands anything, and St. Thomas begins his discussion with the sore point involved, namely, that a soul united to the body understands only by turn-

Prop. 2 the *Liber de Causis* was referring, not to the human soul, but to a divine soul. But in his own commentary on the *Liber de Causis,* which with the *De Substantiis Separatis* very likely belongs to the year 1272, St. Thomas pointed out that for the *Liber de Causis* the soul that was said to be on the horizon of eternity and time was a divine and heavenly soul. See St. Thomas *Super Librum de Causis Expositio,* Prop. 2 (ed. H. D. Saffrey, Fribourg-Louvain 1954, p. 16). The *Elementatio Theologica* of Proclus, which was translated from Greek into Latin by William of Moerbeke in May, 1268, was the new source of St. Thomas' appreciation that the *Liber de Causis* was speaking of an *anima divina,* and not the human soul. It is possible that St. Thomas did not study the text of Proclus seriously until 1272, when he made his own meticulous exegesis of the *Liber de Causis* and showed that it was *excerptus,* as he said in his introductory comments (*ed. cit.,* p. 3), from the *Elementatio* of Proclus. In any case, the influence of Proclus can be found in the *De Substantiis Separatis,* especially in the general exposition of Platonism in c. 1 as well as in two specific citations in c. 19 (see *De Substantiis Separatis,* cc. 1 and 19 [ed. F. J. Lescoe, West Hartford 1962], pp. 38-42, 158, 161, 165, 178). *Anima divina* appears as a Platonic doctrine in St. Thomas' late Commentary on the *De Caelo,* but without mention of Proclus (*In Ar. Libros de Caelo et Mundo* [ed. R. M. Spiazzi, Turin-Rome, 1952], Lib. II, lect. 4, § 334, p. 163). For the doctrine of divine souls as the first of three classes of souls, see Proclus, *Elements of Theology,* Prop. 184, 185, 201, 203 [ed. E. R. Dodds, 2nd ed., Oxford 1963], pp. 160, 162, 176, 178).

8 *SCG* II, c. 81, §§ 6-7. — The Leonine editors read *eorum* with the manuscripts in § 6, and St. Thomas may have written *eorum,* in which case the editors had no option; but the sense requires *earum,* which modern translators follow even when they print *eorum.* (For the reading *eorum* see *SCG* II, c. 81, § 6, in *S. Thomas Aquinatis Opera Omnia,* ed. Leonina, vol. 13 [Rome 1918], p. 506).

ing to phantasms. This turning is the crux of the matter because the turning to phantasms is *ex natura animae*: it follows from the nature of the soul. Were this not the case, and the turning were instead an accidental circumstance resulting from embodiment, as the Platonists held, then the answer would be an easy one. If the soul were by nature a separate substance and embodiment were for it an impediment, then on separation the soul would return to its nature and understand as a separate substance. In that case, however, union with the body would be a detriment for the soul, not a benefit, though it would be a benefit for the body. But this is not a reasonable position because matter exists for the sake of form, not contrariwise. Hence, we must face the main difficulty. If we hold that *its nature* requires the soul to understand by turning to phantasms, then "since the nature of the soul after death will not be changed, it seems that the soul is [then] naturally able to understand nothing since phantasms, to which it might turn, are not present to it: *cum natura animae post mortem corporis non mutetur, videtur quod anima naturaliter nihil possit intelligere, cum non sint ei praesto phantasmata ad quae convertatur.*"[9]

Nature and the *natural union* between soul and body have now entered the discussion with decisive effect on the problem of the knowledge of the separated soul. *Si autem ponamus quod anima ex natura sua habeat ut intelligat convertendo se ad phantasmata...* So St. Thomas writes, and the first effect of dealing with the soul *ex natura sua* is to confront what seemed like a principle in *SCG* II, c. 81. Nothing acts, St. Thomas recognizes, except so far as it is in act, and therefore a thing's mode of operation follows its mode of being. The soul, as united to the body and as separated from it, has indeed different modes of being. But there is more to be said: across these two modes of being the nature of the soul remains the same: *manente tamen eadem animae natura.* We are here beyond the position of the *SCG*, and St. Thomas drives the point home by emphasizing that the two modes of being (embodied and separate) are both controlled by the nature of the soul. The soul is joined to the body, not accidentally, but by the structure and character of its nature: *per rationem suae naturae corpori unitur.* This is why the soul understands by turning to phantasms. The point, then, is that the embodied mode of being and acting is natural to the soul, and St. Thomas goes on to draw the consequences for the separated soul. He does so in a surprising way. To understand by turning to phantasms is natural to the soul, and to be separated from the body and understand without phantasms (by turning to pure in-

9 *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1.

telligibles, as separate substances do) is beyond the nature of the soul (*praeter naturam*). This is indeed why the soul is joined to the body, namely, "to be and to act according to its nature: *ut sit et operetur secundum naturam suam*." Again, the nature of the soul is occupying St. Thomas' mind, and he admits, not without humor, that since the higher is always the better, perhaps God should have so established the nature of the soul that it would turn by nature to intelligibles above it and not need the body for this purpose.[10]

We are now at an impasse rather than an answer, caused entirely by the conclusion that the embodied mode of being and acting is what is natural to the soul. There is no doubt, St. Thomas proceeds, that to understand by turning to higher intelligibles is nobler than to understand by turning to phantasms. But, in fact, the higher mode of understanding would have been the more imperfect one for the soul. The power to understand comes to intellectual substances from the divine light, which, one and simple in God Himself, becomes divided and diversified as intellectual creatures are more and more distant from God. Angels have a higher intellectual power, and need fewer but more powerful universals for understanding; on the other hand, lower intellectual substances have more multiplied, less universal and less powerful forms by which to know.[11] Human souls are such lower intellectual substances, which means that, had they been established by God to know in the manner proper to separate substances, their knowledge would have been incomplete and confused or indeterminate. Hence the problem and its answer: "For souls to have a complete and proper knowledge about things, they are naturally established in such a way as to be joined to bodies, and to receive a proper knowledge of sensible things from sensible things themselves — much as uncultivated men cannot be led to knowledge except through sensible examples." Here, then, is where we are: it is for the soul's better good that it is joined to a body and knows by conversion to phantasms. Nevertheless, the soul can be separated and it can have another mode of understanding.[12] And this is the end of the article!

ST I, q. 89, a. 1 is surely a remarkable, not to say astonishing, text. Exactly how has St. Thomas answered his own question, namely, whether the separated soul knows anything? Down to the last sentence of the *Respondeo* he has systematically proved that to be embodied and to know in an embodied way are natural to the soul; and he has em-

10 *Ibid.*
11 *Ibid.*
12 *Ibid.*

phasized that the specific intellectual nature of the soul cuts across and governs its embodied and separated modes of being; so much so, that, seen in the light of the soul's nature, a separated mode of being and acting is for the soul *praeter naturam*. St. Thomas does answer, in the very last sentence, that the soul can be separated and have another mode of understanding. But, to say the least, this is a very modest answer to the question formally raised by *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1. This is so true that we can only wonder whether St. Thomas' purpose in the whole article was not to show that embodiment was more than a question of a state of existence; it was expressive of a nature, so that, just as the embodied state was natural, so the separated state was beyond the conditions of the soul's nature.

The emphasis on the role of nature in characterizing the embodied and separated states of the soul is a new — and Aristotelian — development in the teaching of St. Thomas. It is new, specifically, when compared with the teaching in *SCG* II, c. 81. Moreover, it is new when compared with the teaching in the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate*. On the other hand, the same notion of the nature of the soul is at work in the *Quaestiones de Anima*. Let us here limit our remarks to the two texts that we have examined. In *SCG* II, c. 81 St. Thomas held, without qualification, that the separated soul, existing through itself, *intelliget per seipsam ad modum substantiarum quae sunt totaliter secundum esse a corporibus separatae*; and he had not hesitated to add that, *quando totaliter erit* (scil. *anima*) *a corpore separata, perfecte assimilabitur substantiis separatis quantum ad modum intelligendi et abunde influentiam earum recipiet*. On the most generous interpretation, these remarks are rather surprising. They say that the separated soul, on the basis of its separated *esse*, will function perfectly as a separate substance. The soul will respond to its separated state by knowing as a separate substance. This is surely the view that St. Thomas denies in the *ST*, where his very way of stating the difficulty already transcends the perspective of *SCG* II, c. 81.

As St. Thomas sees the difficulty posed by the separated soul in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, it is both caused and dominated by the *nature* of the soul. The difficulty is that if the embodied way of knowing is natural to the soul, because union with the body is for the good of the soul, then, as a consequence, it would seem that the separated soul *naturaliter nihil possit intelligere*. The controlling word in this difficulty is *naturaliter*. The state of separation from the body is *praeter naturam*, since the soul does not have the intellectual power to function properly as a separate substance. Thus, whereas in *SCG* II, c. 81 the separated state of the soul was accepted as the basis for saying that it will have a separated mode

of knowing, in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 such an answer is impossible; not indeed because the separated soul cannot understand, but because its *natural* understanding is defective by as much as separation, both as a mode of being and as a mode of knowing, is *praeter naturam*.

III

The introduction of the intellectual nature of the soul as the essential factor in dealing with the way in which the soul knows is a decisive change in St. Thomas' attitude toward the separated soul. From this moment on he saw the separated soul in the light of the embodied soul considered as the model of what is natural to the soul both in its mode of being and in its mode of operation. There is therefore a before and after *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 in the sense that St. Thomas thought of the knowledge of the separated soul without, and then with, the intervention of the identity of nature in the embodied and the separated soul. The nature of the soul intervened with decisive force in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, and that intervention can be felt not only throughout q. 89, but also in the *Quaestiones de Anima*. But when he was thinking about the soul without such an intervention, St. Thomas could, and did, visualize it as having two modes of existence, embodied and separate, as well as two modes of knowing, namely, by conversion to phantasms and as a separate substance. This position we have seen in *SCG* II, c. 81, but it is already to be found in the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate*.

a. *The Commentary on the* Sentences

In the Commentary on the third book of the *Sentences*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 4, the question is asked whether the scientific knowledge (*scientia*) that man has in the present life will be taken away in the next. The answer is interesting because it shows that, however much St. Thomas believed and said at this time that soul and body were parts within the unity of human nature,[13] he had not yet related the nature of the human intellect and the soul's union with the body as aspects of one and the same doctrine. In our present scientific knowledge, he writes, there are three things to consider: habit, act, and mode of acting. The mode of acting is by conversion to phantasms. In this life, the soul can neither acquire nor use already acquired knowledge without phantasms, since phantasms are related to the intellect as sensibles are related to the sense. The act of scientific knowing consists in grasping conclusions by

13 St. Thomas, *In III Sent.*, d. 5, q. 3, a. 2 (ed. M. F. Moos [Paris 1933], pp. 206-207).

bringing them back to self-evident first principles, while the habit is the quality that enables a man to accomplish such an act. What is the cause of the soul's mode of acting, that is, its need to turn to phantasms?

There are two causes, says St. Thomas. First, the human soul is by nature the lowest of intellects, and its possible intellect is related to all intelligibles as prime matter is related to all sensibles: it understands them only by receiving their forms via the senses and the imagination. There is a second cause, namely, the fact that the soul is the form of the body. The soul therefore acts as part of the whole man, so that the body acts as presenting the object for the intellect to know; which is also why, without a phantasm, the soul cannot understand (i.e. actually reconsider) what it already knows. The consequences for the separated soul are as follows.

The nature of the soul will remain in the separated soul, but its actual union with the body will not. This means more than a state of fact. Since indeed the nature of the soul remains after the union with the body is dissolved, the question is to know what can be said of it on this precise basis. St. Thomas thinks that the separated soul is able to consider what it previously knew without resorting to phantasms, though it faces the need of phantasms with respect to new knowledge. As is clear from the sequel, St. Thomas is not saying exactly what he means to say. The separated soul will not need phantasms to use old knowledge (in fact, none are present); it will rely on the habit of scientific knowledge as a substitute. As for new knowledge, this it can acquire either from what it previously knew or by divine infusion. What St. Thomas does not wish to admit is that "on the basis of what the soul now contains in its nature, it cannot understand without the body in any way." This view is for him rather close to those who say that the soul will die with the body, for, given that a natural operation accompanies a nature, then, if none of the soul's present operations can exist without the body, neither can the soul itself exist without the body. We can admit that inquiry and discursiveness will pass away from scientific knowlege, but the certitude to which they lead will remain. We must therefore conclude that separated souls will have another mode of understanding, one without phantasms. After the resurrection St. Thomas will admit the use of phantasms, but then the body will be entirely under the rule of the soul.[14]

The St. Thomas who wrote the present text did not like to think that to know by turning to phantasms was more than a matter of the soul's embodied state. The fifth objector, construing the dependence of the

14 *In III Sent.*, d. 31, q. 2, a. 4; *ed. cit.*, pp. 996-997.

soul on phantasms strictly, not to say rigidly, is told that the phantasm is not the proximate and proper object of the intellect, since it is only a potential intelligible: the *species intellecta* (the form in its state of abstracted intelligibility) is the *per se* object. St. Thomas clearly wishes to cut the intellect from its dependence on phantasms — except in terms of its *status* as in the body. So, too, St. Thomas wishes to discard from *scientia* the view that to know through phantasms belongs to its nature, and to argue that this belongs to it from the condition of its subject, that is, its embodiment.[15] The embodied way of knowing does not, in these comments, represent the nature of the human intellect. What is worrying St. Thomas is not difficult to fathom: *dicere enim quod secundum id quod modo anima habet in natura sua non possit intelligere sine corpore aliquo modo, est valde familiare illis qui ponunt animam cum corpore deficere.*[16] Clearly, to say that embodiment means for the soul that it cannot in any way understand when it is separated from the body is to render the separated soul operationless and to threaten it with nonexistence. For, according to the teaching of *De Anima* I, 1. 403a10-11, if none of the soul's present operations can be without the body, then neither can the soul itself be without the body: *quia, ut dicitur I De Anima t. 13, si nulla operationum quas habet* (scil. *anima*) *potest esse sine corpore, nec ipsa sine corpore esse possit.*[17] At this moment, at least, St. Thomas is not able to say that the separated condition of the soul is *praeter naturam*. He therefore isolates the nature of the intellectual soul from the fact of knowing with phantasms, and, having done so, he is free to agree with those who say that *in patria, quantum ad animas separatas, erit alius modus intelligendi, quia sine phantasmate considerabunt.*[18] The difficult point in this position is not the *alius modus intelligendi,* it is the grounding that this other mode has in the nature of the soul.

At the end of the Commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences,* d. 50, q. 1, a. 3, St. Thomas asks whether the separated soul knows singulars. The issues involved are the same as those we have just left. Five objectors pose in different ways the fundamental problem to be met, namely, that only the sense powers grasp singulars directly. How, then, can the disembodied soul know singulars? St. Thomas' answer depends on distinguishing between the creative knowledge of God, which is prior to things and their cause, and the knowledge that comes

15 *Ibid.,* ad 5; *ed. cit.,* p. 998.
16 *Ibid., Solutio; ed. cit.,* p. 997.
17 *Ibid.* See *De Anima* I, 1. 403a5-16.
18 *In III Sent., ibid.*

from things and is caused by them. In the latter kind of knowledge, the universals, being abstracted from matter and individuation by matter, are unable to give a knowledge of singulars. That is why the soul, while joined to the body, knows singulars directly only through the sense powers; the intellect knows singulars indirectly, by returning to phantasms. When the soul is separated from the body, it will have both kinds of knowledge. It will receive the forms of things from above, and since these likenesses, being derived from the divine ideas, represent individuals, the soul will thereby know individuals. But the forms received from things will not enable it to know singulars directly.[19] St. Thomas offers no further clarification, and he sees no difficulty in replying to an objector that the form by which the separated soul knows, being received from higher substances, is of another nature and power than abstracted universals.[20] There is no questioning in the text of the natural fitness of the soul for such a means of knowing, or of its consequences — which are precisely the questions St. Thomas raises in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1.

b. *De Veritate, q. 19*

Can the separated soul understand? Can it understand singulars? These two questions are not new. What is new in the *De Veritate* is the striking confrontation between the nature of the soul (the position set forth in many ways by the objectors) and the separated mode of existence belonging to the soul after the death of the body (the position maintained by St. Thomas himself in the *Respondeo*). The objectors are bent on emphasizing the need of the intellect to function within the embodied state of the soul, and to argue that this need is a matter of nature. Stressing the nature of the soul to be embodied and the need of the intellect to depend on the sense powers and the body for its objects, the objectors conclude that the separated soul cannot understand. That St. Thomas should oppose this radical conclusion is scarcely surprising; what is surprising is the manner in which he answers the strongly Aristotelian arguments uniting the objectors in their common conclusion. As we shall see, *De Veritate,* q. 19 is not governed by that persistent principle that will dominate *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, namely, the identity of nature in the embodied and separated soul and the decisive role played by this identity.

19 *In IV Sent.*, d. 50, q. 1, a. 3 (*S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia,* ed. S. E. Fretté, vol. 11 [Paris 1874], pp. 559-560).
20 *Ibid.*, ad 5; *ed. cit.*, p. 560.

The teaching of Aristotle appears as a difficult enemy in the objections of *De Veritate,* q. 19, a. 1. The soul is tied to the body for its activity, even in its highest reaches. Its understanding cannot, therefore, survive the body (obj. 1-2). Phantasms are necessary to the intellect for its objects; after the death of the body there will be no phantasms and no understanding (obj. 4). Nor is this dependence of the soul on the body a matter of its present status; for *objectum potentiae determinatur secundum naturam ipsius potentiae,* and *eadem est natura animae intellectivae ante mortem et post.* If the soul is ordered to phantasms before death, therefore, the same is true of it after death (obj. 5). The argument is a strong one, and St. Thomas must make his way through it.

In his own answer, St. Thomas begins by locating the problem before him. The soul cannot survive the death of the body unless it has an activity of its own. Therefore, just as, according to the Catholic Faith, we hold firmly that the soul survives the body, so we must hold that it can understand without the body. *How* is, precisely, the difficulty. The mode of understanding involved is difficult to grasp because the absence of phantasms means that the separated soul will have a mode of understanding that is different from its present one. St. Thomas rehearses no less than five opinions before reaching his own view of the matter.[21]

The principle governing the answer states that each thing receives the causal influence of what is above it in accord with its own mode of being: *per modum sui esse.* The human soul stands between separate forms and material forms in the reception of its own *esse* from God. The *esse* of the angels is not received in matter, nor dependent on matter; the *esse* of material forms is received in matter and is dependent on matter. The human soul, as form of the body, receives its *esse* in matter and is joined to the body in its *esse*; but, unlike a material form, the soul does not depend on the body because the *esse* of the soul can be conserved without the body. This intermediate position of the soul has consequences. The intellectual light received by the soul is such that its intellectual knowledge is related to the body, as depending on bodily powers for the origin and the actual use of its knowledge. At the same time, the soul's intellectual light is free, as not itself functioning through a bodily organ. This last point on the freedom of the soul's light means to St. Thomas that "when the soul is separated from the body, just as it will have its being (*esse*) independent of the body and not existing in the body, so accordingly will it receive the light of its intellectual

21 *De Veritate,* a. 19, a. 1.

knowledge: it will be neither bound to the body as exercised through the body, nor have any order to the body whatever: *nec omnino aliquem ordinem ad corpus habeat.*"

We have our answer, but St. Thomas wishes to add a comparison between the two modes of knowing, the embodied and the separate. On being created in the body, the soul acquires an intellectual way of knowing that depends on the body, that is, it knows by abstraction from phantasms and knows only what can be known in this way (e.g. it does not thereby have a knowledge of separate substances). But when the soul is separated from the body, the situation will change radically. It will then receive the light of intellectual knowledge as do the angels, without a body. It will receive the forms of things from God, without needing to resort to phantasms for actual understanding. It will moreover be able to see separate substances themselves by a natural knowledge, though not God Himself, which no creature can do without grace:

> Sed quando habebit esse a corpore absolutum, tunc recipiet influentiam intellectualis cognitionis hoc modo quo angeli recipiunt sine aliquo ordine ad corpus, ut scilicet species rerum ab ipso Deo recipiat, ne oporteat ad intelligendum in actu per has species, vel per eas quas prius acquisivit, ad aliqua phantasmata converti. Poterit nihilominus ipsas substantias separatas, scilicet angelos vel daemones, naturali cognitione videre, quamvis non Deum, quod ulli creaturae non conceditur sine gratia.[22]

St. Thomas concludes. The separated soul will know in three ways: by the species it received in its embodied state, by infused species, and by seeing separate substances (though this last is at their discretion).

In the name of its *esse*, therefore, the soul, on separation from the body, will act as a separate substance. St. Thomas sees no problem arising from the nature itself of the soul. It is only in its embodied state that the soul knows through the body, St. Thomas tells the first two objectors. He gives the same reply to the fourth objector. To the fifth St. Thomas admits that the specific nature of the soul is the same before and after death; but, he adds, the mode of being is not the same, and therefore neither is the mode of acting: *tamen non est idem modus essendi, et per consequens nec idem modus operandi.* In the same spirit St. Thomas argues (ad 6, 8) that, while the separated soul will have the same intellectual powers that it now has, these will not be ordered to the body. The reply to objector 13 makes more precise the meaning of the infusion of species that St. Thomas had said would take place on the separation of the soul from the body. This objector had argued that God

22 *Ibid.*

would not infuse any gifts into the souls in hell, which means that they would not have understanding. In reply, St. Thomas points out that the infusion he has in mind is a matter of nature, and therefore will be received by the souls of the damned as well: *Praedicta autem specierum infusio, quae fit in separatione animae a corpore, pertinet ad conditionem naturae animae separatae; et ideo huiusmodi infusione nec animae damnatorum privantur* (ad 13).

The view that St. Thomas has here set down in *De Veritate,* q. 19, a. 1 carries over into the problem of the knowledge of singulars by the separated soul (a. 2). It will know in two ways: by species infused on separation, and by species acquired in the body. On infused species, St. Thomas says that *attribuenda est animae separatae cognitio similis angelicae cognitioni*: on separation, the soul will know (by nature) *as* a separate substance. It will know by means of forms which, derived from the divine ideas, are both universal and the likenesses of singulars. As for universals acquired in this life, in the state of separation the soul will not know singulars through them, though it will be able to use them in relation to singulars that it otherwise will know.

It should be clear that in *De Veritate,* q. 19 St. Thomas endows the human soul with two modes of being and two modes of natural operation, the embodied and the separate. He finds no difficulty in saying that the separated soul will be equipped with infused species enabling it to know in a new way as a separate substance. St. Thomas all but endows the separated soul with a new nature; or rather, he sees no problem in holding that the separated soul, while having the same nature and the same powers as the embodied soul, will yet be able on separation to function properly as a separate substance. But this is precisely the point that he will deny in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, where, as we have seen, he writes that the sort of intellectual nature possessed by human souls means that, had they been established by God as separate substances, *non haberent cognitionem perfectam, sed confusam in communi.* In other words, the angelic mode of knowing does not suit the *nature* of the soul. In the *De Veritate,* however, it does in the sense that the nature itself of the soul plays no role in determining the mode of knowing that is natural to it in the state of separation.

IV

Quaestiones de Anima, qq. 15-20

After proving the immortality of the soul in q. 14, St. Thomas approaches the knowledge of the separated soul by placing his finger on the source of the problem, namely, the need that the soul has in this life of sense powers and sense knowledge as the basis for intellectual understanding. As in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, the union of soul and body, expressive of the intellectual nature of the soul itself, commands St. Thomas' decisions about the separated soul. Moreover, in considering the life and activity of the separated soul, St. Thomas points out repeatedly and specifies that the whole issue at stake concerns the *natural* knowledge of the separated soul. The knowledge that the souls of the blessed will have through grace is not what is in question: on the basis of this supernatural knowledge, they will be equal to the angels, since they will see everything in the divine Word.[23] St. Thomas' precise concern in qq. 15-20 is the *naturalis influxus* of God, and the *naturalis cognitio* and the *capacitas naturalis* of the soul.[24]

Refusing to follow the belief of Plato and Avicenna that the senses contribute only extrinsically to the existence of intellectual knowledge in man, St. Thomas believes that the only tenable explanation of the natural union of soul and body is to hold that *potentiae sensitivae sunt necessariae animae ad intelligendum, non per accidens tamquam excitantes ut Plato posuit, neque ut disponentes tantum sicut posuit Avicenna, sed ut repraesentantes animae intellectivae proprium objectum.*[25] Phantasms are therefore intrinsically necessary to the intellectual activity of the soul. This poses the question: does the separated soul understand? Given that the soul is the least of intellectual creatures, can it function as a separate substance? It can do so only to the extent of its intellectual power. Hence, were it to receive forms for knowledge of the kind that the angels receive, the separated soul would know indeterminately and confusedly. The only forms that it can know properly are those in matter. Not that the separated soul will not understand and know. But since it cannot naturally function as a separate substance, if we limit ourselves to the *naturalis influxus* of forms from above we must say that the resulting knowledge of the

23 *Quaestiones de Anima*, a. 18 (ed. J. H. Robb, p. 240). Page references to the text are to this edition (on which see note 3).
24 *Ibid.*, q. 15, p. 214; q. 17, p. 230; q. 18, pp. 239, 240.
25 *Ibid.*, q. 15, p. 213.

separated soul will not be as complete and determinate in its grasp of singulars as the soul now has through the sense.[26] The separated soul will not have to bear the burden that the body is, but its natural knowledge will remain indeterminate in the absence of the senses and the body.

Similarly, after proving at length that the embodied soul can know only that separate substances exist and what they are not,[27] St. Thomas allows that the separated soul, as a result of influence from above, will know itself directly; but, in view of its lowly intellectuality, it will not (that is, by a natural knowledge) know separate substances as perfectly as they know themselves.[28] In the same way, the question whether the separated soul knows all natural things gives St. Thomas the opportunity to emphasize (a) that, as the lowest among intellectual substances, the soul has the *naturalis capacitas* to receive forms of the kind found in material things, and (b) that the separated soul has no greater intellectual power than is in keeping with such material forms: *nec est ei major virtus naturalis ad intelligendum quam ut secundum hujusmodi formas sic determinatas in cognitione intelligibili perficiatur.*[29] This, clearly, decides the matter. The separated soul receives forms in a less universal way than do the separate substances, but, then, it has a lesser intellectual power; as a result its knowledge (that is, its natural knowledge) is such that the separated soul knows things universally and without determination.[30] And this is our conclusion. "By means of a natural knowledge, separated souls know all natural things in a universal way; but they do not know each thing in a particular way." Of course, the souls of the saints have through grace a knowledge equal to that of the angels.[31]

The separated soul's knowledge of singulars likewise involves the principles that we have just seen. Where angels have the power to know singulars by participation in the creative ideas of God, the intellectual power of the separated soul is not equal to such infused universals which nevertheless contain a proper representation of singulars — except where, for some special reason, traces of the relations to particular singulars survive.[32] But the principle remains intact. The natural power of the separated soul, proportioned to knowing only material singulars,

26 *Ibid.*, p. 214.
27 *Ibid.*, q. 16, pp. 220-225.
28 *Ibid.*, q. 17, pp. 229-230.
29 *Ibid.*, q. 18, pp. 239-240.
30 *Ibid.*, p. 240.
31 *Ibid.*
32 *Ibid.*, q. 20, pp. 258-260.

and knowing intellectually only what is universal in them, knows singulars in its state of separation only in an indeterminate way.[33]

V

FROM *SCG II, c. 81 to ST I, q. 89, a. 1*

We can now see in some detail the change in teaching that *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 represents. In the *Sentences,* the *De Veritate* and the *SCG,* St. Thomas had thought that the separated soul could know as a separate substance, and he had thought so because the intellectual nature of the soul played no limiting role in the teaching of these texts. Nor is there any visible influence in these same texts of the notions that will impress St. Thomas in the *ST* and the *Quaestiones de Anima,* namely, the identity of nature in the embodied and separated soul and, more particularly, the identity of intellectual power and capacity. The natural knowledge of the separated soul was not a problem for St. Thomas when he wrote the *Sentences,* the *De Veritate* and the *SCG.* However strange it may seem, the intellectual nature of the soul, on the one hand, and its relations to the body, on the other, were not seen in the *Sentences* as expressive of one and the same fact about man.[34] Hence, in the *De Veritate* and in the *SCG* St. Thomas based his conception of the knowledge of the separated soul, not on any consideration of its specific intellectual power, but on its separated mode of being: having such a mode of being, the separated soul could know as a separate substance.

This position did not say merely that the separated soul could in fact understand and know. It said that it had a separate mode of being and a separate mode of knowing. Admittedly, if this was true, it was an answer to those who argued that, since the proportioned and hence appropriate way for the soul to know was through the body, the separated soul could not have any understanding. But to make the separated soul into a separate substance in order to free it from total dependence on the body was too much of an answer. Yet it was the answer of *SCG* II, c. 81: *quando totaliter erit* (scil. *anima*) *a corpore separata, perfecte assimilabitur substantiis separatis quantum ad modum intelligendi, et abunde influentiam earum recipiet.* It is here — in the astonishing notion of "perfecte assimilabitur" — that St. Thomas had further thoughts in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1.

33 *ST* I, q. 89, aa. 2-4.
34 See above, pp. 139-140.

To go as far as the *SCG* had gone was, however unintentionally, to create a new difficulty in the process of answering an old one. For if the soul could thus be perfectly like separate substances in its own state of separation, then, what was its nature and what was the point of its union with the body? St. Thomas had finally to come to terms with this question and to see that the nature of the soul as a lesser intellectual substance was properly expressed only in its state of embodiment, so that separation from the body was *praeter naturam*. The nature of the soul was such that, by constitution and power, it could be no more than an inadequate separate substance. The *natural* knowledge of the separated soul was imperfect by as much as there were no sense powers and organs to complete it. Seen in the light of what St. Thomas had written in the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate*, the text of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 can be read as a deliberate reassessment of his position. The separated mode of being and knowing in the soul is controlled by its intellectual nature and that nature is adequately realized only in its condition of embodiment. What God does for the soul through grace is not in question. The question concerns the nature of the soul to be embodied in the name of its own intellectuality.

The distance from *SCG* II, c. 81 to *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 is remarkable. *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, followed by *Quaestiones de Anima*, qq. 15-20, opens up a new outlook in the thought of St. Thomas. The outlook is new both as a development and as a correction of the earlier doctrine of St. Thomas. The correction involves the realization that it is not possible to infer an adequate mode of knowing for the separated soul on the basis of its survival as a separated form. St. Thomas' emphasis on the conditions of the natural knowledge of the separated soul, on its natural capacity and power, and on the natural imperfections that attend its ways of knowing in the state of separation from the body, is certainly a correction of his earlier doctrine. That same emphasis is also a development of his view of the unity of the human person, and especially the unity of intellectual nature in the composite of soul and body. Composition is to be understood as an expression of the soul's intellectual nature and therefore as a permanent need in the soul itself. Composition governs the nature of the separated soul, therefore, with all the consequences affecting its natural power and capacity that we have seen.

Some chronological comments can be added to these doctrinal results. Belonging in its teaching with the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate*, *SCG* II, c. 81 is to be located chronologically with them in the sense that it was written before *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1. It seems absurd to believe that, having corrected himself in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, St. Thomas reverted, after the correction, to his earlier opinion. This would be the

effect of thinking that the *SCG* was written after the *ST*, that is, that the *SCG* was completed in 1273.[35] Some intellectual changes are not reversible, if only because they involve the clarification and maturing of ideas in a person's mind. Given the doctrinal substance of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, it seems more than implausible that *SCG* II, c. 81 was written after such a correction. *SCG* II, c. 81 could certainly have been drafted while St. Thomas was disputing *De Veritate,* q. 19; it could not have been written while St. Thomas was composing *ST* I, that is, during 1265-1268 in Italy. As far as a general chronology is concerned, therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that *SCG* II, c. 81 is to be associated in its teaching with *De Veritate,* q. 19. Since, moreover, in the second book of the *SCG*, St. Thomas makes use of William of Moerbeke's new Greek-Latin translation of Aristotle's writings on animals, done in 1260, this book was written in 1261 or 1262.[36] The old date of Tolomeo of Lucca, locating the *SCG* during the pontificate of Urban IV (1261-1264), fits the teaching of *SCG* II, c. 81.[37] That chapter was written very early in the 1260's, when St. Thomas was framing his Aristotelian principles but when he had still to apply them extensively in his theology. Taken together, *SCG* II, c. 68 and c. 81 make decisively clear that St. Thomas knew man in his existential unity before he meditated, with Aristotelian tools, on the unity of his intellectual nature.[38] This second knowledge belongs to the transition from *SCG* II, c. 81 to *ST* I, a. 89, a. 1.

35 I am referring to: *S. Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris Angelici Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Errores Infidelium qui dicitur Summa Contra Gentiles, Introductio* (Marietti-Lethielleux 1967). This voluminous *Introduction* is by P. Marc, C. Pera and P. Caramello, and the general result of their work can be seen in the proposed new (and revolutionary) chronology of the writings of St. Thomas on pp. 406-424. The authors see no difficulty in loading the bulk of St. Thomas' theological writings and his Aristotelian commentaries into the last four years of his life. As for the *SCG,* which is the central concern of the *Introduction,* the conclusion is that St. Thomas began it late in 1269 and finished it in Naples in 1273 (p. 374). I find this view untenable, but it would require a long analysis to deal with the question adequately.

36 On the Arabic-Latin and Greek-Latin translations of Aristotle's works on animals, see G. Lacombe, *Aristoteles Latinus,* Pars Prior (Roma 1939), pp. 80-85. For St. Thomas' use of William of Moerbeke's Greek-Latin translations, see A. Gauthier's introduction to *Saint Thomas d'Aquin, Contra Gentiles,* Livre Premier (Paris 1961), pp. 41-47.

37 See Tolomeo's catalogue in P. Mandonnet, *Des écrits authentiques de s. Thomas d'Aquin* (2nd ed., Fribourg 1910), p. 60.

38 *SCG* II, c. 83 is an interesting witness on this point. It is directed against the Platonic doctrine of the eternity of souls and even more against its Christian adaptation by Origen and his followers. In this view, souls were created by God before the visible universe and then infused into bodies. Arguing against this position in the name of the unity of human nature, St. Thomas emphasizes from many points of view that the soul cannot be created before the body. The union of soul and body is natural, not violent or voluntary; the soul as form is completed in the matter in which it belongs; the soul naturally needs senses and organs for knowledge (including the knowledge of principles); etc. The intended point of these and similar arguments is that the soul was not created before the body. Yet the arguments also tell against the position that St. Thomas had just adopted in *SCG* II, c. 81, §§ 5-7. Clearly, if to be embodied is of the very nature of the soul, then separation must be in some sense *praeter naturam.* If *SCG* II, cc. 81 and 83 hang together, it can be only because the notion of *praeter naturam* is not here present to St. Thomas' mind.

VI

The Problem of *Quodlibet III, q. 9, a. 1*

Once it has been established that *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 represents a new doctrine in the teaching of St. Thomas on the separated soul, two sorts of consequences follow. First, on this problem at least, there are doctrinal periods in St. Thomas' life: the teaching of *SCG* II, c. 81, §§ 5-7, is not compatible with that of the *ST* and with *Quaestiones de Anima,* qq. 15-20: the nature of the soul controls what St. Thomas says about the knowledge of the separated soul in the latter texts, while that same nature, though recognized, plays no part in determining how the separated soul knows in the *SCG*, the *De Veritate* and the Commentary on the *Sentences.* St. Thomas corrected himself in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 by recognizing that the separated state of the soul was *praeter naturam*, and its natural power inadequate to the state of separation. This correction, moreover, was the result of a development in doctrine, namely, the fuller application to the separated soul of the notion that to be joined to a body was of the very essence of the soul's intellectual nature. In this sense, there is a limited Aristotelianism in *SCG* II, concentrating its attention on the existential unity of the human person; in this same sense, the Aristotelianism of *ST* I is more extensive in influence: the nature of the separated soul is explicitly treated as still the nature proper to an embodied form.

The second consequence of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, as we have seen, is chronological. Clearly, St. Thomas could not have written the *SCG* (and specifically II, c. 81) in 1265-1269 when he was writing the *Prima Pars* and the *Quaestiones de Anima.* He could have written the *SCG* before 1265 or after 1269. Belonging doctrinally with the Commentary on the *Sentences* and the *De Veritate,* the *SCG* could have been written in 1261-1264. I have argued that it was, and I have done so, not by translating a clear doctrinal affinity into a chronological fact, but by emphasizing that the development of St. Thomas' Aristotelianism in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 makes the return to the teaching of *SCG* II, c. 81 an untenable hypothesis. No one, of course, can prove that, having written *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 and *Quaestiones de Anima,* qq. 15-20, St. Thomas could not have gone on to write *SCG* II, c. 81, §§ 5-7. Anyone who allows such a possibility will not be impressed by doctrinal evidence. And yet that is the question. Is it conceivable that, once achieved, the development of the doctrine of the *nature* of the soul during 1265-1269 was thereafter reversed? To the present writer, at least, such a reversal does not seem possible. For this reason the *SCG* could not have been

written after the *ST*; it was written early in the 1260's, as has traditionally been believed.

This conclusion brings us to *Quodlibet* III, q. 9, a. 1, which is dated Easter, 1270.[39] If we accept as correct the view that the *Quaestiones de Anima* were held in Paris in the first half of 1269,[40] then we are faced by a new and more aggravated form of the difficulty posed by dating the *SCG* after 1269. In doctrine, *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 is like the *De Veritate* and the *SCG*. Hence, if St. Thomas held the third *Quodlibet* at Easter, 1270, we must believe that he reversed the position of the *Quaestiones de Anima* a scant year after developing it. Were the change effected by *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, a purely technical point or a relatively unimportant one, it is conceivable that St. Thomas held one view in the early 1260's, changed his opinion in 1265-1269, and then returned to his earlier opinion in 1270. But we are dealing with a major change in a major question. We are dealing with the knowledge of the separated soul, a natural part of the human person, and we are doing so at a moment when the notion of "part" is subject to its maximum stress, namely, the separation of the soul from the body. Is the separated soul, as separated, still *by nature* (that is, in its intellectuality) a part of the human composite? That it is, is what St. Thomas finally affirmed in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1. He affirmed it, and he then elaborated it into a doctrine of the natural power and capacity of the separated soul that we have seen in *Quaestiones de Anima,* qq. 15-20. The question is: did St. Thomas then cancel this development less than one year after effecting it?

There is no doubt about the teaching of *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1. The question asked is whether one separated soul knows another separated

39 See J. Destrez, "Les disputes quodlibétiques de saint Thomas d'après la tradition manuscrite" (*Mélanges Thomistes* [Le Saulchoir 1923]), pp. 73, 90, 94, 97; F. Pelster, "Literarhistorische Probleme der Quodlibeta des hl. Thomas von Aquin II" (*Gregorianum*, 29, 1948), pp. 63-69.

In view of the scribal evidence it may seem more than surprising to question the dating of the third *Quodlibet*. But if it is true that *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 contains a new doctrine on the knowledge of the separated soul, then the question must be asked. There are three possible answers in the situation. (a) My interpretation of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, as compared with *SCG* II, c. 81, §§ 5-7, is not correct and therefore no problem, chronological or doctrinal, exists. But, *salvo meliori judicio*, the *ST* does contain a new doctrine on the *natural* knowledge of the separated soul, visibly expanded in the *Quaestiones de Anima*, qq. 15-20. If the *Summa* and the *Quaestiones* are dated 1265-1269, the change took place during this period. (b) If my interpretation of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 is correct, then a second possibility offers itself. *Quodl.* III is dated at Easter 1270 and St. Thomas simply changed his mind and returned to his earlier position. This is possible, but also so unlikely as not to be worth serious consideration. St. Thomas expanded his knowledge, and especially his use, of Aristotelianism in the transition from the *SCG* to the *ST*. How could he have reversed that process? (c) There remains a third — and difficult— alternative: *Quodl.* III does not belong to Easter 1270. This is not a proof but a question, arising from the evidence of the *ST* and the *Quaestiones de Anima*.

40 See above, note 3.

soul, but, though St. Thomas finally answers this question, the purpose of his *Respondeo* is to explain how the separated soul knows. The soul survives the death of the body, and since no substance is deprived of its own operation, St. Thomas must defend the view that the separated soul understands in some way. One of three possible ways of understanding can be attributed to the separated soul. It will understand (a) either by abstracting species from things, as it now does in its embodied state; (b) or by species acquired in the body and conserved after death; (c) or even by species that are concreated with the soul or in some way derived from above.

Some accept the first alternative, but St. Thomas does not. Abstraction needs sensible powers and the separated soul will not have corporeal organs for the exercise of such powers. There are those who not only deny the first alternative but also say that the separated soul will not understand by species acquired from sensible things in its embodied state. Following Avicenna,[41] these thinkers hold that species are not in any way conserved in the possible intellect; there are particular species in the imagination and the memory and when the possible intellect turns to them it then receives intelligible species from the agent intellect. But since the imagination and the memory will be corrupted with the death of the body, the separated soul will not understand by species received from the body: none are conserved in the intellect. How, then? The proposed answer is that separated souls understand through concreated species, as do the angels.

St. Thomas finds this second position irrational. He thinks, against Avicenna, that intelligible species are conserved in the intellect, where they are received with the immobility of the being of the intellect and share in that same immobility. He also thinks that the Avicennian view is contrary to the teaching of Aristotle, who held that intelligible species were present in the intellect not only in actually used knowledge but also in habitually possessed knowledge.[42] Nor is concreation a tenable answer, as St. Thomas shows. If we say that the embodied soul has and can use such concreated species, then we must hold that man can understand without sense experience. This would mean that a blind person will understand colors, which is false. If we say that union with the body will prevent the soul from knowing through its supposed con-

41 Avicenna's doctrine of intelligible species can be found in his *De Anima* (*VI Naturalium*), Part V, c. 6 (*Avicennae... Opera,* Venice 1508), fol. 26rb-va (C-D). St. Thomas has examined the doctrine in *SCG* II, c. 74; *ST* I, a. 84, a. 4; also, but under a different aspect, in *De Veritate,* q. 10, aa. 2 and 6 and q. 11, a. 1.

42 Aristotle, *De Anima* III, 4. 429b5; see St. Thomas' use of this text in *ST* I, q. 79, a. 6.

created species, then we are holding that the union of the soul and the body is not a natural one.

There remains the third alternative, which St. Thomas accepts. The separated soul will understand some things through species abstracted in the embodied state. But this is not a sufficient answer. Separated souls will know many things that we do not know in this life. There is the further difficulty that if abstracted species are the only source of knowledge for the separated soul, those who die before birth and perhaps have made no use of their intellects and acquired no intelligible species, will understand nothing after death. In addition to abstracted species, therefore, St. Thomas posits that, on separation from the body, the soul will receive intelligible species from God. The principle behind this view is what St. Thomas calls the natural order of the soul, which we ourselves experience in this life. According to this natural order, the more we free ourselves from the senses of the body, the more the soul can share in a higher light. We can see this in people who are asleep or who are in some state of alienation and who have even been known to foretell future events.

This conclusion enables St. Thomas to argue, by way of answer to the original question proposed, that one separated soul will be able to know another both by a knowledge it acquired in this life and by likenesses it will receive from God. That this is a natural knowledge is clear: *sive per aliquam similitudinem influxam a deo naturali influxu.*

In the main, *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 is a condensed version of *De Veritate*, q. 19, a. 1. The immediate questions raised are different and the diagnosis of various views on the way in which the separated soul knows is more elaborate and detailed in the latter text. But *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 follows the same development as *De Veritate,* q. 19, a. 1 and comes to the same conclusion: the separated soul will know by species abstracted in the embodied state and by infused species (this infusion is a matter of natural knowledge, not of supernatural grace). There is one difference between the *Quodlibet* and the *De Veritate.* In the manner of *SCG* II, c. 81, § 6, *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 argues that, on separation, the soul will be free to receive infused species. The principle of this freedom is that separation from the body will enable the soul to approach the higher world of intellectual light more perfectly. The natural order (*secundum naturalem ordinem*) of which the *Quodlibet* speaks is the doctrine of the soul as located on the horizon of eternity and time, understood both here and in *SCG* II, c. 81, § 6 as meaning that when the soul is free of the body it will also be free to live and act as a separate substance.[43]

43 See above, note 7.

Doctrinally, therefore, *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 belongs with the Commentary on the *Sentences*, the *De Veritate* and the *SCG*; it does not belong with the *ST* and the *Quaestiones de Anima.* After *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, the *nature* of the soul assumes a controlling role in what St. Thomas says about the knowledge — and, specifically, the natural knowledge — of the separated soul. The new doctrine, far from seeing in separation a freedom for the soul, sees a condition that is *praeter naturam*: the proper mode of being for the soul is in the body. St. Thomas emphasizes this point more than once in the *Quaestiones de Anima,* qq. 15-20, where he also makes clear that the problem at issue concerns the natural capacity and power of the separated soul for knowledge. If (to repeat) the *Quaestiones de Anima* were held in Paris between January and June 1269, then, in the light of the change that took place between 1265 and 1269, we are faced by the following question: could *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1, belonging in the doctrinal family of the *De Veritate* and the *SCG,* have been held at Easter, 1270?

Many things are possible, and there is no absolute proof that early in 1270 St. Thomas could not have repudiated what he had developed in 1265 to 1269. It is possible, but it is also incredible. Wishing to endow the separated soul with some intellectual knowledge, St. Thomas did not say until the *ST* that the natural knowledge of the separated soul was confused and indeterminate and that the separated soul was naturally inadequate to being — and acting as — a separate substance. In *SCG* II, c. 68, that marvelous text on the existential unity of soul and body in man, St. Thomas had said that *ipsum intelligere animae humanae indiget potentiis quae per quaedam organa corporalia operantur,* and from this he had inferred that the human soul *naturaliter unitur corpori ad complendam speciem humanam* (§ 12). Even so, this position had not prevented St. Thomas from holding, only a few chapters later, the doctrine that we have seen, namely, that *quando totaliter erit* (scil. *anima*) *a corpore separata, perfecte assimilabitur substantiis separatis quantum ad modum intelligendi, et abunde influentiam earum recipiet* (c. 81, § 6). This *modus intelligendi* remains as unconnected here with embodiment as it did in the Commentary on the *Sentences* (III, d. 31, q. 2, a. 4). But with *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, the intellect of the separated soul reveals how much it needs embodiment and how much separation impedes its natural operation.

The question is: is it credible that St. Thomas reversed the *ST* and the *Quaestiones de Anima* in writing *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 and returned to the position and the perspective of the *De Veritate* and the *SCG*? The question is really a twofold one, since, as with the *SCG*, it concerns not only the position taken by St. Thomas but also his view of the problem

to be solved. To repeat, St. Thomas had two such views, belonging doctrinally and chronologically to different periods in his life. One is *De Veritate,* q. 19, a. 1, the other is *Quaestiones de Anima,* q. 15. These texts represent two views of the same problem, namely, whether the separated soul can understand; and the views are different both in the answer proposed and in the way in which St. Thomas analyzed (both historically and doctrinally) the state of the question before him. It seems as untenable that in *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 (as well as in *SCG* II, c. 81, §§ 5-7) St. Thomas should have returned to the position of *De Veritate*, q. 19, a. 1 as that he should have returned to its perspective. The text of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 had eliminated the perspective of the *De Veritate,* and the *Quaestiones de Anima* had established a new one; the two texts together had defined what was and what was not natural to the soul. Having worked out a new perspective on the knowledge of the separated soul in 1269, could St. Thomas have silently ignored that perspective early in 1270 and as silently returned to the *De Veritate*? This is so unlikely both as procedure and as doctrine that it is much more reasonable to question the dating of *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1.

VII

Conclusion

Given the nature and the dimensions of the doctrinal change effected in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, it seems impossible not to think of *SCG* II, c. 81 and *Quodl.* III, q. 9, a. 1 as early texts: they belong in the world defined by *De Veritate,* q. 19, a. 1. In comparison, the world of the *ST* is new in the sense that it achieved a purer and more authentic expression of the naturalism that is the distinctive mark of the Thomistic theology. If there is a doctrinal argument for the view advanced in the present essay, namely, that St. Thomas did not undo the teaching of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, it lies at this point. Embodiment is of the essence of the human soul, deriving from its intellectual nature; so much so, that, under the pressure of his own teaching, St. Thomas came to see (and even to underscore, in the *Quaestiones de Anima*) that the separated state of the soul was, in terms of its constitution as a nature, *praeter naturam.* When St. Thomas reached this point he added to his theology a remarkable precision on the doctrine of the immortality of the soul.

To say that embodiment is of the essence of the soul is to question not only the natural condition of the separated soul but also the separation itself. Up to and including *SCG* II, c. 81, §§ 5-7, St. Thomas was in some danger of endowing the separated soul with an intellectual power

and mode of acting that could not be verified in the nature of the embodied soul. This danger the *ST* eliminated. As seen in I, q. 89, a. 1, separation was not a fulfillment for the soul according to its nature, it was a defect and a suffering caused by the fact of death. Death has never been an easy reality for philosophers to manage, even though Plato began his long career by thinking, in memory of Socrates, that philosophy was a meditation on death. But, then, such a Platonic meditation presupposed that the soul was a person in its own right, which was exactly the notion that St. Thomas worked to eliminate from Christian teaching. The soul was a part of man, man himself was the person, and, not the soul alone, but man the composite of soul and body was destined for immortal life.

We have only to see death and the separation of the soul from the body with the eyes of St. Thomas the theologian to realize that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul must not be identified with the fact of the separation of the soul from the body. The human soul is incorruptible and immortal, and it does survive the body; but, as we know from *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, the condition of the separated soul, when seen in terms of its constitution, is *praeter naturam.*[44] Are we to say, then, that

44 The opinions of St. Thomas' sixteenth- and seventeenth-century commentators on the knowledge of the separated soul are outside the scope of the present essay. Yet Cajetan's reflections on *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 are, in purely textual terms, a surprising phenomenon. See his commentary in *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia,* ed. Leonina, vol. 5 (Rome 1889), pp. 371-374. (a) Translating St. Thomas' *praeter naturam* into his own *praeternaturale,* and (b) interpreting *praeternaturale* as wider or more common than *contra naturam* (so that it includes under it *contra, supra* and *extra naturam*), Cajetan argues that in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 St. Thomas is taking *praeternaturale* in the sense of *supra naturam propriam ipsius animae* (§§ XI and XIII, p. 373). There is nothing in the text of St. Thomas to justify the decision, but, having made it, Cajetan separates himself even more from his master. The intellectual soul, he writes, *secundum propriam naturam* has *esse in corpore et intelligere per conversionem ad phantasmata*; but in the peak of its intellectuality, the soul *participat aliquid de natura substantiarum separatarum...* and *habet quod sit extra corpus, ut illae sunt, et intelligat per conversionem ad intelligibilia simpliciter, ut illae intelligunt* (§ XIII, p. 373).

This conclusion effectively destroys the unity of nature in the embodied and separated soul. Except for the knowledge of principles, there is no such intellectual peak in the soul for St. Thomas as Cajetan supposes. See *ST* I, q. 79, a. 8. Nor does St. Thomas' *praeter naturam* bear the interpretation that Cajetan has given it. It is remarkable that in the very text in which St. Thomas emphasizes at length the dependence *by nature* of the soul on the body for its intellectual operation, Cajetan has managed to make the soul into a separate substance. *Praeter naturam* is for St. Thomas, not a perfection, but a loss; that is why the *natural* knowledge of the separated soul has all the limitations that qq. 15-20 of the *Quaestiones de Anima* have systematically pointed out. In spite of Cajetan, the St. Thomas who could say in *SCG* IV, c. 79, § 10 that *est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse* saw something of that *contra naturam* (to say the least) in the *praeter naturam* of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1.

The terminology *praeter naturam* in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 and *contra naturam* in *SCG* IV, c. 79, § 10 should be distinguished from the same terminology used in another context, e.g. in *SCG* III, c. 100, § 1 where St Thomas writes: "... licet Deus interdum praeter ordinem rebus inditum aliquid operetur, nihil tamen facit contra naturam." For, St. Thomas continues, all nature is as a *quoddam artificiatum* of the divine art, so that "non est autem contra rationem artificii si artifex aliter aliquid operetur in suo artificio" (ibid., § 6). The *praeter naturam* and *contra naturam* that we

its own immortality confronts the soul with natural defects that the death of the body causes? Is not immortality, seen simply as the survival of the separated soul, the burden of living *praeter naturam*? This is certainly not what St. Thomas thought. On the contrary, we can see his position as a theologian in the fourth book of the *SCG* (c. 79) where he is face to face with the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. What has the human soul itself to say on this point?

It is appropriate that St. Thomas should first think of the teaching of St. Paul on the resurrection of the body. Death came into the world through the sin of Adam, but the resurrection of Christ has freed man from the consequences of sin just as at the end of time it will free man from death in the resurrection of his own body (§§ 2-8). This is a fulfillment of the faith of Job that after death he would rise from the earth and see his divine defender in the flesh (§ 9; *Job* 19.25-26). But St. Thomas does not stop with purely scriptural proofs of the resurrection. There is also *evidens ratio* in support of it, such as St. Thomas himself had set forth in *SCG* II. He looks back to that argumentation now, noting his overall conclusion that *anima corpori naturaliter unitur* and his sustained proof (cc. 56-68) of the philosophical formula of this conclusion, namely, that *est enim* (scil. *anima*) *secundum essentiam suam corporis forma*. This estimate in *SCG* IV, c. 79 of what he had proved with philosophical tools in *SCG* II is St. Thomas' prepared ground for saying, as he does say, that *est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse*. The theologian who wrote these words was surely free of what he had written in *SCG* II, c. 81. But there is more. For, since nothing against nature can be everlasting (so Aristotle had taught St. Thomas to think[45]), and since the soul itself is everlasting, it follows that the soul "must again be joined to the body: *oportet eam corpori*

have seen concern the *internal* order of a created nature, namely, man, and it was St. Thomas' point that to be and to act in the state of separation from the body was for the soul to be *praeter naturam* in the Aristotelian sense in which a body is outside its natural place; similarly, given what St. Thomas proved in *SCG* II, cc. 56-68 on the natural union of soul and body, it can be said in *SCG* IV, c. 79, § 10 that "est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse." The *constitutional* use of *praeter* and *contra naturam* is not to be confused with their *institutional* use within the perspective of the divine government: the first concerns the created nature, the second concerns the action of God in the created nature.

In his recent study of the action of God *praeter ordinem naturae*, Vladimiro Boublik ignored, even for terminological purposes, *praeter naturam* in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 and *contra naturam* in *SCG* IV, c. 79, § 10. (See V. Boublik, *L'Azione Divina "Praeter Ordinem Naturae" secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* [Rome 1968]). That such texts do not belong directly in the study of the divine action is perfectly clear; but it is just as clear that such texts exist, containing a terminology and a doctrine that are part of the Aristotelian naturalism that St. Thomas introduced into theology. Cajetan, for example, missed that naturalism in his astonishing interpretation of *praeter naturam* in *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1, although the Aristotelian doctrine of natural places was used by St. Thomas in the same text to explain the meaning of saying that the condition of the separated soul was *praeter rationem suae naturae* and *praeter naturam*.

45 See *De Caelo* II, 3. 286a17-18.

iterato coniungi." This is for the body to rise again. Hence: "The immortality of souls, therefore, seems to require the future resurrection of their bodies: *immortalitas igitur animarum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum futuram*" (§ 10).

As a theologian St. Thomas is here giving full verification to a notion that is a distinctive part of his theology, namely, the notion that embodiment is by nature the permanently proper condition of the soul. God had even proportioned an otherwise mortal body, beyond the power of matter, to the immortality of the soul: He had endowed it, through the soul, with freedom from death. But death entered the life of man with the sin of Adam, and the innocence of paradise was succeeded by labor and death. Only, considering how God had established Adam, and how He had freed the body from its mortality in order to match the immortality of the soul, let us notice what death is. "Considering how human nature was established, death is therefore something befalling man as a sort of accident through sin: *est igitur mors quasi per accidens superveniens homini per peccatum, considerata institutione humanae naturae.*" Moreover, this accident was taken away by Christ: *hoc autem accidens sublatum est per Christum.*[46]

As seen in *SCG* IV, cc. 79-81, the resurrection of the body is a religious truth that, beyond its scriptural foundation, finds support in the *evidens ratio* of *SCG* II, c. 68 that the intellectual soul is the form of the body. But if the soul is in its essence the form of the body, then for the soul to be without the body is *contra naturam*. Only, let us notice, this outcome contains more than the reinforcement of a religious truth by a rational argument; it also contains the shaping of a rational or philosophical truth by a religious truth. The future resurrection of the body will remove the *contra naturam* of the separated soul. The human soul is incorruptible, but it survives the body with the nature that it had as part of man. Immortality, therefore, cannot be centered in separation. Even if it cannot say more, philosophy can say this such; at least, the philosophy serving the theology of St. Thomas can say it: it can defend (or, at least, learn to defend) the unity of man within the immortality of the soul and thereby open that immortality to the natural need that the soul has of the body. The teaching of *ST* I, q. 89, a. 1 is a decisive moment in the development of that teaching.

46 *SCG* IV, c. 81, §§ 3-4. For philosophical arguments, based on the nature of the soul, leading to the doctrine of the Incarnation, see the justly famous text of *SCG* IV, c. 54. It is to be noted that the arguments for the Incarnation based on beatitude are set forth first and at some length (§§ 2-8) before the question of original sin is raised (§ 9). No doubt, this procedure is part of the apologetic structure and purpose of the *SCG* as a theological *summa*. — On how, as between the worlds of nature and grace, to read the *indicia* of the Incarnation, see *SCG* IV, c. 55, § 11. On the related question whether death and other evils are natural, see *ibid.* IV, c. 52, §§ 1-5.

"ECCLESIA" ET "POPULUS (FIDELIS)" DANS L'ECCLÉSIOLOGIE DE S. THOMAS

Yves Congar O.P.

DANS le cadre d'un bref traité des sacrements, plus particulièrement du Sacrement de l'Ordre, S. Thomas, en *Contra Gentiles*, livre IV, chapitre 76, parle "de episcopali potestate et quod in ea unus sit summus". Voici le texte du deuxième paragraphe de ce chapitre:

> Manifestum est autem quod quamvis populi distinguantur per diversas dioeceses et civitates, tamen, sicut est una Ecclesia, ita oportet esse unum populum Christianum. Sicut igitur in uno speciali populo unius ecclesiae requiritur unus episcopus, qui sit totius populi caput: ita in toto populo Christiano requiritur quod unus sit totius Ecclesiae caput.

L'argument repose sur le passage de l'idée d'*ecclesia* à celle de *populus*, plus exactement de l'idée d'*una ecclesia* à celle d'*unus populus*, puis sur un retour de l'idée de *populus* à celle d'*ecclesia*, mais d'une idée de *populus* enrichie ou précisée par cette donnée, prise comme évidente, qu'il ne peut y avoir de *populus* sans *caput*.

Ailleurs et antérieurement, Thomas avait exposé la même thèse, mais sans distinguer les concepts de *populus* et d'*ecclesia*: dans *In IV Sent.* d.24, q.3, a.2 sol. 3, il traitait les Eglises particulières et l'Eglise universelle de façon très sociologique, comme des corps sociaux poursuivant, celles-là, un bien commun "spécial", objet d'un "regimen particulare", celle-ci un bien commun "plus divin", objet d'un "regimen universale".[1] La théologie de l'Eglise particulière redécouverte depuis une quinzaine d'années serait peu satisfaite par cette considération sociologique: elle part, en effet, de l'idée que tout le mystère de l'Eglise est réalisé dans

1 "Ubicumque sunt multa regimina ordinata in unum, oportet esse aliquod universale regimen supra particularia regimina: quia in omnibus virtutibus et artibus, ut dicitur in 1 Ethic. (c. 1), est ordo secundum ordinem finium. Bonum autem commune divinius est quam bonum speciale; et ideo super potestatem regitivam quae conjectat bonum speciale, oportet esse potestatem regitivam universalem respectu boni communis, alias non posset esse colligatio ad unum. Et ideo cum tota Ecclesia sit unum corpus, oportet, si ista unitas debet conservari, quod sit aliqua potestas regitiva respectu totius Ecclesiae supra potestatem episcopalem, qua unaquaeque specialis Ecclesia regitur: et haec est potestas Papae; et ideo qui hanc potestatem negant, schismatici dicuntur, quasi divisores ecclesiasticae unitatis..."

l'Eglise particulière, surtout en raison du fait que l'Eucharistie y est célébrée et qu'avec elle tout le bien commun spirituel de l'Eglise est là.[2] Ainsi le texte dont nous partons, et dont nous espérons qu'il nous introduira en une meilleure connaissance de la pensée de S. Thomas sur l'Eglise, suppose-t-il, entre les concepts d'*ecclesia* et de *populus*, à la fois une différence et une certaine identité. Nous examinerons d'abord l'identité, puis la différence.

A. Le thème d'identité

"Ipse populus Ecclesia dicitur".[3] L'Eglise n'est pas autre chose que le peuple de Dieu en sa condition chrétienne. C'est là un thème fondé dans l'Ecriture et familier à la Tradition. Il s'est développé selon deux lignes qui se sont souvent rapprochées, parfois mêlées, la ligne dogmatique et la ligne historique de Chrétienté.

1. *Dans la ligne dogmatique*

Sous une forme ou sous une autre — "populus Dei", "populus Christi", "Ecclesiae populus", "populus credentium" — la désignation de l'Eglise comme peuple fidèle est fréquente chez les Pères de l'époque anténicéenne.[4] Même chose chez les Pères de la fin du IVe siècle: Lucifer de Cagliari,[5] Ambroise,[6] Optat de Milev,[7] Jérôme.[8] Chez S. Augustin, les textes abondent. En voici quelques uns, sans recherche d'une succession chronologique rigoureuse qui, dans le cas, ne s'impose pas:

> Ecclesia id est populus Dei per omnes gentes, quod est corpus ejus (*De catech. rud.* 3, 6: PL 40, 313).
> Nunc quippe populus Dei censentur omnes qui portant sacramenta ejus...(*En. in Ps.* 47, 8: PL 36, 538).
> Societatem christiani populi (*De vera relig.* 17, 33: PL 34, 136).

2 Voir infra n. 71. Le décret Presbyterorum Ordinis, 5, cite en note les textes de *Sum. theol.*, III, q. 65, a. 3, ad 1 (et q. 79, a. 1 c et ad 1), où on lit: "Bonum commune spirituale totius Ecclesiae continetur substantialiter in ipso Eucharistiae sacramento."

3 S. Thomas, *In IV Sent.* d. 20, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1, cité et commenté infra. Cf. n. 26.

4 Voir Vincenzo Loi, "Populus Dei-Plebs Dei. Studio storico-linguistico sulle denominazioni del 'Popolo di Dio' nel latino paleo-cristiano", *Salesianum* 27 (1966) 606-628.

5 Cf. *Pro Athanasio* II, 3 (PL 13, 885; CSEL 14, 150); *De non parcendo in Deum delinquentibus* 17 (PL 13, 969 C; CSEL 14, 244).

6 Cf. *In Ev. Luc.* III, 38 (PL 15, 1605 B; CSEL 32/3, 126): "Cui (Christo) nupsit Ecclesia, quae Verbi semine et Spiritu Dei plena, Christi corpus effudit, populum scilicet Christianum."

7 Cf. III, 1; VI, 1 (CSEL 26, 67, 10; 144, 10).

8 Cf. *Orig. Hom. in Ez.* X, 1 (PL 25, 761 D) avec, peut-être, une nuance: "Infamia est a populo Dei et ecclesia separari."

... Nullus seditiosus, nullus dividens populum Dei, nullus fatigans Ecclesiam in ministerio diaboli (*En. in Ps.* 84, 10: PL 37, 1076).
Ecclesia vero, quod est populus Dei...(*De baptismo* I, 15, 24: PL 43, 122).
In Spiritu enim Sancto, quo in unum Dei populus congregatur... (*Sermo* 71, 19: PL 38, 455).

On comprend que le Catéchisme de Trente dise, mais en ne donnant pas une référence exacte, "Ecclesia, ut ait Augustinus, est populus fidelis per universum orbem dispersus".[9] Du reste, nous retrouverons encore S. Augustin plus loin, à propos de la définition qu'il a donnée à l'idée de "peuple". La liturgie romaine emploie très fréquemment et comme des synonymes les expressions "populum tuum" et "ecclesiam tuam".[10] Celui qui fut en quelque sorte le précepteur du haut moyen âge, S. Isidore de Séville, définit l'Eglise comme peuple de Dieu d'une façon précise et intéressante.[11] Il exprime bien le sentiment traditionnel: l'Eglise est faite d'une multitude d'hommes et de peuples rassemblés par la même foi et la soumission au même règne. Mais le règne est ici celui de Dieu et du Christ, sans mention de la soumission au *regimen* d'un unique *caput* ecclésiastique.

On ne s'étonnera pas que, durant le haut moyen âge, principalement à l'époque carolingienne, l'Eglise ait été définie comme peuple de Dieu, même à un plan purement théologique. Nous verrons plus loin que cela était lié avec la réalité de la *société* chrétienne, mais sans s'identifier totalement avec elle.[12] Que l'Eglise se définit comme étant le peuple chrétien, qu'il y eût passage d'une expression à l'autre, nous avons de nombreux témoignages que c'était là une idée commune. Richard Wethershet, Chancelier de Lincoln au milieu du XIIe siècle, écrit:

9 Pars I, c. 10, q. 2. La monographie de J. Ratzinger (*Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche*. München 1954) contient de fines remarques mais n'épuise pas la matière qu'annonce son titre.

10 Dans le Missel Romain d'avant Vatican II, 90 fois "populus", 80 fois "ecclesia", 12 fois "familia": A. Schaut, "Die Kirche als Volk Gottes. Selbstaussagen der Kirche im römischen Messbuch", *Benediktinische Monatschrift* 25 (1949) 187-196.

11 *De fide cathol.* II, 1 (De gentium vocatione): "3. Quam pluralitatem gentium ita declamat adunari ad unius Dei cultum: *In conveniendo,* inquit, *populos in unum, et regna, ut serviant Domino* (Ps 101, 23). In unum utique, id est in unum regem, ut qui diversorum ritu simulacrorum regna multa et populi multi dicebantur, in unam conveniendo fidem unus Dei populus unumque regnum vocetur. — 4. Hujus populi congregatio ex gentibus ipsa est Ecclesia..." (PL 83, 499-500).

12 Quelques textes: Alcuin, *Epist.* 23 et 129 (MGH Epp. IV, pp. 61 et 191); *Disputatio puerorum,* "ecclesia, populus et domus est Dei" (PL 101, 1142 A); concile d'Aix de 836, c. III can. 25: "Quia enim ecclesia in una adque indiscreta Christi fide ac dilectione concorditer ad coelestia tendens populus dicitur..."(MGH *Concilia* II/2, p.723); Hincmar de Reims, *De coercendo et exstirpendo raptu viduarum*, c. 1: l'*ecclesia* est "una gens sancta, unus populus acquisitionis (...) Cum ergo omnis populus Dei ... una grex sit sub uno pastore..." (PL 125, 1017-1018): il s'agit du Christ, non du pape; Hincmar exprime sa conviction que ce peuple de Dieu qu'est l'Eglise garde son unité sous et malgré la division des royaumes.

"Credo populum christianum esse sanctam Ecclesiam".[13] S. Bonaventure, dont nous célébrons le centenaire en même temps que celui de S. Thomas, a bien la même conviction.[14] Avant de revenir à S. Thomas lui-même, citons encore ce texte de Grégoire IX qui nous rapproche de celui du *Contra Gentiles*. Il s'agit d'une lettre adressée le 13 janvier 1240 à la reine Rusude de Géorgie et à son fils David pour les amener à reconnaître la juridiction du Pontife romain: il n'existe qu'*une* Eglise, donc un seul *caput* (les évêques sont appelés "in partem sollicitudinis, vices Dei et Apostolicae Sedis"...):

> Licet enim plures populi in cultum sint catholicae fidei congregati, omnes tamen una censentur ecclesia, dum uni capiti, Christi vicario et beati Petri successori, cervice reverentiam exhibent inclinata.[15]

Chez S. Thomas, les textes identifiant Eglise et peuple fidèle se distribuent sur trois thèmes dans chacun desquels se mêlent des éléments d'analyse sociologique et une vision dogmatique:

a) Contexte sacramentel. Thomas dit souvent que l'Eglise est construite, fondée, consacrée par la foi et les sacrements de la foi.[16] Il dit la même chose du peuple chrétien: "populus christianus per fidem et sacramenta Christi sanctificatus est, secundum illud (cit. de *1 Cor.* 6, 11 et *1 Petr.* 2, 9)".[17] La foi est absolument fondamentale. Dès la plus haute antiquité, avec de simples variations dans les expressions, on avait défini l'Eglise comme l'assemblée des croyants ou des fidèles. Sur la base d'une documentation que nous espérons pouvoir mettre en œuvre un jour, nous avons acquis la conviction que S. Thomas *a voulu* définir l'Eglise "congregatio (coetus, societas, collegium, communio) fidelium". Mais il n'y a pas de société sans que son unité soit exprimée et assurée par certains signes.[18] C'était le cas du peuple de Dieu sous

13 *Speculum Ecclesiae*, cité par W. Ullmann, *The Growth of Papal Government in the Middle Ages* (London 1955) 438 n. 2.

14 Dans le *De perfectione evangelica* q. 2, a. 2 n° IV (*Opera*, ed. Quaracchi, t. V p. 153a) il dit que critiquer la règle des Prêcheurs ou des Mineurs revient à prétendre que "Ecclesiam universalem errasse...quod Deus permitteret sic errare universaliter populum sanctum suum"; dans l'*Expos. super regulam Fratrum Minorum*, c. III n° 4 (VIII, p. 408a), il parle des douze patriarches "per quos multiplicatus est populus credentium carnaliter, duodecim etiam Apostoli per quos in novo testamento multiplicatus est populus credentium spiritualiter."

15 Potthast n° 10841. Texte dans Baronius-Raynaldus, *Annales ecclesiastici*, éd. A. Theiner, t. XXI (Bar-le-Duc 1870) p. 226: cette partie est omise dans *Registres de Grégoire IX*, éd. L. Auvray: t. III (Paris 1910) n° 5022, pp. 162-163.

16 "Ecclesia constituitur, fabricatur (*In IV Sent.* d. 18, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1; III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3) fundatur (*In IV Sent.* d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, sol. 5), instituitur (I, q. 92, a. 3), consecratur (*In Ioan.* c. 19, lect. 5, n. 4) per fidem et fidei sacramenta."

17 II-II, q. 99, a. 1, ad 2.

18 "Cum ecclesia sit sicut civitas (...) In qualibet autem civitate, ad hoc ut sit una, quatuor debent esse communia, scilicet unus gubernator, una lex, eadem insignia et idem finis (...) Tertio eadem sunt insignia ecclesiae scilicet sacramenta Christi, inter quae primum baptisma, quod est janua omnium aliorum." S. Thomas, *In Ephes.*, c. 4, lect. 2.

l'ancienne alliance auquel le signe de la circoncision a été donné avant la Loi.[19] Sous l'alliance spirituelle de grâce, qui fait le "populus spiritualis",[20] c'est le baptême qui, par le signe spirituel indélébile du caractère, discerne les membres du peuple de Dieu parmi les autres hommes.[21] C'est la marque commune des fidèles, qui les situe à la base, par laquelle "non adipiscitur aliquis nisi infimum gradum in populo christiano".[22] Elle distingue les fidèles des autres et les habilite à participer aux sacrements; un autre caractère, celui de l'Ordre, discerne, dans le peuple de Dieu, les ministres des simples fidèles.[23]

Le sacrement à la participation duquel le peuple chrétien est suprêmement habilité est évidemment l'Eucharistie. Qu'à tel endroit le fait que S. Thomas s'exprime à son sujet en termes de "populus christianus" s'explique par le texte du pape Jules Ier qu'il vient de citer d'après Gratien,[24] n'empêche pas S. Thomas de parler de la même façon ailleurs, là où il n'est pas conditionné par une citation.[25]

b) S. Thomas identifie encore le peuple chrétien et l'Eglise dans les textes où il parle de celle-ci comme d'une cité, d'une *polis*, en distinguant cette forme de "vie ensemble" de celle de la famille. Il met en œuvre ici la distinction formulée par Aristote, dont l'*Ethique à Nicomaque* exerça sur les esprits, sur celui de Thomas en particulier, un

19 "Populus fidelium congregandus erat aliquo signo sensibili quod est necessarium ad hoc quod homines in quadam religione adunentur, sicut Augustinus dicit, *Contra Faustum*, lib. XIX, c. XI (PL 42, 355)." III, q. 70, a. 2, ad 2.

20 III, q. 74, a. 3, ad 1.

21 Cf. *In IV Sent.* d. 18, q. 2, a. 3, qa 3, ad 1: "Apostolus loquitur de paganis et aliis infidelibus qui non habent characterem per quem annumerati sint in populo Dei. Sed quia character baptismalis quo quis populo Dei annumeratur est indelebilis..."

22 III, q. 67, a. 2, ad 2.

23 *In IV Sent.* d. 4, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 3: "Sicut in naturalibus...ita etiam in spiritualibus est potentia spiritualis quasi passiva per quam homo efficitur susceptivus spiritualium actionum, et talis spiritualis potentia confertur in baptismo, quia non baptizatus effectum aliorum sacramentorum suscipere non posset, unde et per consequens nec aliis tradere, et haec est prima distinctio qua communiter totus populus fidelis, cujus est sacramentorum participem esse, ab aliis distinguitur. Alia potentia est activa spiritualis ordinata ad sacramentorum dispensationem et aliarum sacrarum hierarchicarum actionum exercitium... Et quia in ecclesiastica hierarchia non omnes sunt agentes...ideo isti duo characteres non distinguunt populum Dei universaliter ab aliis, sed quosdam de populo ab aliis."

24 "...effectum hujus sacramenti, qui est unio populi christiani ad Christum": III, q. 74, a. 6 c., après une citation du pape Jules ("cum in calice aqua vino miscetur, Christo populus adunatur") tirée de Gratien, *De cons.* d. 2, c. 1 (Friedberg, col. 1314). Comparer q. 76, a. 7 c., "per aquam mixtam vino significatur populus adunatus Christo."

25 Ainsi III, q. 82, a. 3, ad 1; II-II, q. 187, a. 4 ("sacrificium altaris ubicumque agatur, commune est toti populo fidelium"); *In IV Sent.* d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qa 3, ad 2, à propos du rite du Vendredi saint: "Ecclesia volens populum christianum circa ipsam dominicam passionem prout in capite nostro fuit, mente occupari statuit ut illa die non consecraretur corpus Christi. Ne tamen ecclesia omnino sine corpore Christi esset, corpus Christi, praecedenti die consecratum et reservatum sumitur." Dans ce texte, le mot *ecclesia* revêt deux sens: la première fois, celui de l'autorité qui détermine ou consacre rites et discipline, sens fréquent chez S. Thomas à propos des sacrements, la seconde fois, celui de la communauté chrétienne.

attrait d'une extraordinaire puissance. Le thème de la *civitas* comporte d'autres aspects encore chez S. Thomas: on pourrait suivre, par exemple, le destin qu'a eu chez lui l'idée augustinienne de "Civitas Dei", à laquelle il a gardé son statut théologal, en évitant de la sociologiser. Quelques textes vont nous guider ici:

> Sed cum Ecclesia sit congregatio fidelium, congregatio autem hominum sit duplex, scilicet oeconomica, ut illi qui sunt de una familia, et politica, sicut illi qui sunt de uno populo, Ecclesia similatur congregationi politicae, *quia ipse populus Ecclesia dicitur*, sed conventus diversi vel parochiae in una dioecesi similantur congregationi in diversis familiis vel in diversis officiis.[26]

La portée de ces quelques mots, apparemment banals et que nous avons soulignés, "quia ipse populus Ecclesia dicitur", s'éclaire à la lumière d'autres textes au terme desquels le *populus* apparaît comme exerçant la plénitude des actes les plus élevés de la cité:

> Collegium fidelium quandoque in scripturis vocatur domus, secundum illud 1 Tim. 3: *Ut scias quomodo in domo Dei oporteat te conversari, quae est Dei ecclesia*. Quandoque autem vocatur civitas, secundum illud Ps. CXXI: *Jerusalem quae aedificatur ut civitas*. Civitas enim habet collegium politicum: domus autem oeconomicum, inter quae quidem duplex differentia invenitur. Nam qui sunt de collegio domus communicant sibi in actibus privatis: qui vero sunt de collegio civitatis, communicant sibi in actibus publicis. Item qui sunt in collegio domus, reguntur ab uno qui vocatur paterfamilias; sed qui sunt in collegio civitatis reguntur a rege. Ita enim est paterfamilias in domo, sicut rex in regno. Sic igitur collegium fidelium aliquid habet de civitate, et aliquid de domo. Sed si consideretur rector collegii, pater est (*Pater noster, qui es in coelis*, etc. [Matth. 6], *Patrem vocabis me, et post me ingredi non cessabis* [Jerem. 3]); et sic collegium est domus, si vero ipsos subditos consideres, sic civitas est, quia communicant sibi in actibus praecipuis, sc. fidei, spei et charitatis. Et hoc modo si fideles considerentur in se, est collegium civitatis; si vero rector collegii attendatur, est collegium domus.[27]

> Haec civitas est Ecclesia. Psal. 86: "Gloriosa dicta sunt de te, civitas Dei" etc. Tria sunt in ista civitate, quae sunt de ejus ratione. Primum est, quod sit ibi multitudo liberorum quia si est ibi unus vel pauci, non est civitas; et similiter si sunt servi. Et hoc maxime invenitur in Ecclesia. Gal. 4: non sumus ancillae filii, sed liberae." Secundum est quod habeat sufficientiam per se. In vico enim non inveniuntur omnia necessaria vitae humanae sanis et infirmis; sed in civitate oportet invenire omnia

26 *In IV Sent.* d. 20, q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1. Nous avons naguère utilisé ces thèmes pour une théologie de la paroisse sous l'angle sociologique: "Mission de la paroisse", in *Structures sociales et Pastorale paroissiale* (Paris 1948) pp. 48-68 (reproduit in *Sacerdoce et Laïcat...* [Paris 1962] pp. 175-205).

27 *In Ephes.*, c. 2, lect. 2.

> necessaria ad vitam. Et haec sufficientia est in Ecclesia: quia quicquid necessarium est ad vitam spiritualem, invenitur in ea. Psal. 64: "Replebimur in bonis domus tuae." Tertium est unitas civium: quia ab hoc, scilicet ab unitate civium, civitas nominatur, quia civitas quasi civium unitas. Et haec est in Ecclesia. Joan. 17: "Ut sint unum in nobis, sicut et nos unum sumus." Haec ergo civitas laetificatur per gratiam Spiritus sancti in eam descendentem.[28]

S. Thomas caractérise l'Eglise comme cité et son régime propre par le fait que 1°) le communautaire, en elle, n'empêche pas l'intimité que ses enfants peuvent avoir avec leur père dans le rapport interpersonnel le plus direct et le plus étroit; 2°) cependant, on trouve dans l'Eglise la plénitude des biens spirituels, et c'est en cela qu'elle est *cité*; 3°) *tous* y participent; tous font ensemble les actes les plus élevés de cette cité, qui consistent dans "les trois théologales", par lesquelles nous entrons immédiatement en rapport de communion avec Dieu lui-même. Tous font évidemment aussi ensemble les actes de la prière.[29]

Pour saisir la force de cette affirmation il est bon de se rappeler que, dans la cité médiévale, il existait un "peuple d'en haut", qui seul exerçait vraiment les actes de la citoyenneté, et un "peuple d'en bas", que désignent souvent les expressions *vulgus, plebs* ou *popularis, populares*, et qui ne les exerçait pas.[30] Saint Isidore distinguait le *vulgus* ou la *plebs* du *populus*, lequel formait la *civitas*.[31] Mais Jean le Teutonique dans sa *Compilatio IV*, vers 1216, écrivait: "nomine populi comprehenduntur patricii et senatores".[32] Vers la même époque, un commentateur du *Décret* écrivait: "Nota quod ea[dem] differentia est inter populum et plebem, que est inter animalem et hominem, inter genus et speciem. Nobiles enim, et in nobiles simul collectum, sunt

28 *In Ps.* XLV, n. 3 (éd. Parme XIV, 327).

29 Dans un texte comme celui-ci "ecclesiae in quibus populus christianus ad laudem Dei congregatur" (I-II, q. 102, a. 4, ad 3), il n'y a pas de distinction entre fidèles et ministres.

30 D'une assez abondante documentation, extrayons seulement quelques références sur ce sens de *populares* à l'époque de S. Thomas: Thomas lui-même, I-II, q. 100, a. 11 c.; q. 102, a. 6, ad 8 fin; q. 105, a. 1; III, q. 47, a. 5 c ("minores id est populares"); S. Bonaventure, *Apologia pauperum* c. 9, n. 9 (Quaracchi VIII, p. 297 — les gens du peuple, distingués des rois, princes et chevaliers); Henri de Gand, Sermon d'ouverture du concile parisien de 1289, dans K. Schleyer, *Anfänge des Gallikanismus im 13. Jahrhundert* ...(Berlin 1935) p. 172 (les gens du peuple, par distinction des *magnates*).

31 *De fide cathol.* II, 1, 6: "Populus ergo tota civitas, vulgus vero plebs est. Plebs autem dicta a pluralitate, major est enim numerus minorum quam seniorum (...) Vulgus est passim inhabitans multitudo, quasi quisque quo vult" (PL 83, 500).

32 In *Antonii Augustini Opera omnia,* t. IV (Lucca 1769) 626: cité par J. Sydow, "Elemente von Einheit und Vielfalt in der mittelalterlichen Stadt (im Lichte kirchenrechtlicher Quellen)", in *Universalismus und Partikularismus im Mittelalter*, hrsg. v. P. Wilpert (Berlin 1968) 186-197: cf. pp. 191-192, qui renvoie aussi, pour ce régime hiérarchisé de la cité médiévale, à *Patriziat und andere Führungsschichten in der südwestdeutschen Städten* (Tübingen 1965).

populus. Ple[b]s est ubi non sunt senatores et viri consulares..."[33] Tout le monde n'avait pas le plein exercice des droits de citoyen dans la cité hiérarchisée du moyen âge. Dans l'Eglise, dit S. Thomas, tous participent aux activités les plus hautes: "ipse populus Ecclesia dicitur".

c) Un troisième aspect sous lequel S. Thomas identifie *ecclesia* et *populus fidelium* est celui des "mores populi christiani".[34] Il s'agit, par exemple, du remplacement du sabbat mosaïque par le dimanche: cela est venu "non ex vi praecepti legis, sed ex constitutione Ecclesiae et consuetudine populi christiani".[35] Ou bien il s'agit de jeûnes imposés "sub praecepto"; cela n'est-il pas contraire au statut de liberté qui caractérise le peuple de Dieu sous le régime de la grâce?[36] Non, répond Thomas avec un large optimisme: "Nec sunt contra libertatem populi fidelis, sed magis sunt utilia ad impediendam servitutem peccati quae repugnat libertati spirituali". Le tout est de savoir de quelle liberté il s'agit!

2. *Dans la ligne historique de Chrétienté*

Le fait est bien connu: l'expression *populus fidelis* (ou *christianus*), le mot même d'*ecclesia*, durant le moyen âge, mais surtout le haut moyen âge, désignent de façon indistincte ce que nous appelons Eglise et la société, car celle-ci était faite de baptisés: c'était la société chrétienne.[37] Le *populus christianus* était, d'une certaine façon, identique à l'*ecclesia*, au point que Charlemagne pouvait être appelé "rector ecclesiae".[38] L'expression, cependant, était ambivalente, car elle désignait aussi bien le peuple constituant l'Eglise sous l'autorité du Sacerdoce et l'ensemble des chrétiens qui, sous le gouvernement des princes, continuaient la *christianitas.*[39] Le thème s'annonce à partir de S. Grégoire le Grand, chez lequel "populus christianus" comporte une nuance de société soumise à la fois au Sacerdoce et aux rois.[40] Dans plusieurs textes de l'époque carolingienne, "populus Dei", "ecclesia" et "respublica"

33 Summa "Antiquitate et tempore", Dist. 2, c. Lex est: MS, Vat. Palat. lat., fol. 37v, cité par G. Post, *Studies in Medieval Legal Thought, Public Law and the State 1100-1322* (Princeton 1964) p. 374, n. 16.

34 Expression de I-II, q. 102, a. 2.

35 II-II, q. 122, a. 4, ad 4.

36 I-II, q. 147, a. 3, où l'objection 3 était: "sed non minus videtur libertas populi christiani impediri per multitudinem observantiarum quam per multitudinem sacramentorum."

37 Nombreuses études classiques. Nous-même avons publié *L'Ecclésiologie du Haut Moyen Age* (Paris 1968).

38 Alcuin disait aussi bien "Rector populi christiani". Voir textes et références dans notre ouvrage cité n. précédente, pp. 267, 277 s. M. Hoechstetter, *Karl der Grosse, König, Patritius und Kaiser als Rector ecclesiae* (Diss. Augsburg 1934).

39 Cf. F. Kempf, "Das Problem der Christianitas im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert", *Historisches Jahrbuch* 79 (1961) 104-123; J. Rupp, *L'idée de Chrétienté dans la pensée pontificale des Origines à Innocent III* (Paris 1939).

40 Cf. J. Rupp, op. cit., pp. 28 s.

désignent la même réalité concrète.[41] Il y a cependant une nuance qui s'annonce dans certains textes d'Alcuin[42] et qui s'explicite chez le pape Jean VIII (872-882), avec l'emploi du mot *christianitas* comme équivalent de *populus christianus* pour désigner, l'un comme l'autre, l'ensemble des chrétiens en tant que, sous le gouvernement des princes fidèles, ils avaient des intérêts religieux temporels communs, tandis que *ecclesia* désignait les chrétiens soumis à l'action du Sacerdoce.[43] On ne s'étonne pas, dès lors, de trouver "christianus populus" dans un contexte de croisade, par exemple chez Urbain II ou S. Berbard.[44] Il est normal qu'Innocent III (1198-1216) ait fait un grand usage des termes *christianitas* et *populus christianus*, puisque sa conception de sa charge pontificale, aussi cohérente qu'explicite, fait de lui le chef, non seulement de l'*ecclesia*, mais du peuple chrétien: car le pape est vicaire du Christ, prêtre et roi selon l'ordre de Melchisédech.[45] Il serait trop long de citer ici tous les textes. Nous ne nous étonnerons évidemment pas, connaissant son idéologie du pouvoir pontifical, que Boniface VIII ait qualifié Rome de "communis omnium Christiani populi nationum curia"[46]: où l'on perçoit bien l'implication temporelle de l'expression "peuple chrétien".

Chez Innocent III et Boniface VIII, cette compréhension du terme "populus Christianus (Dei)" s'inscrivait au bénéfice de l'autorité pontificale, mais elle pouvait aussi bien servir les prétentions des rois et, à la faveur de l'identité entre *populus fidelis* et *ecclesia*, appuyer leur revendication d'un droit de régir l'Eglise. Tel avait été l'enjeu du conflit entre Grégoire VII et l'empereur Henri IV. Grégoire avait voulu sortir, en quelque sorte, de l'indivision et de l'indistinction des juridictions.[47]

41 Nous avons déjà cité supra n. 12, le texte du concile d'Aix de 836. Voir encore, par exemple, Paschase Radbert, *Vita Walae*, lib. II, c. 17 (PL 120, 1639 C).

42 Ainsi MGH *Epp.* IV, p. 148, "Christo Deo propitiante in omni proficias bonitate ad consolationem sanctae Dei aecclesiae et gaudium populi christiani"; p. 289, "plena tibi scientia data est a Deo ut per te sancta Dei aecclesia in populo christiano regatur, exaltetur et conservetur."

43 Cf. J. Rupp, op. cit., pp. 36, 48; notre *Ecclésiologie du Haut Moyen Age*, pp. 239 s.

44 Urbain II, *Epist.* 5, "divina populum suum respiciente Clementia", à propos de la Reconquista (PL 151, 288); S. Bernard, contre ceux "qui repositas in Ierosolymis christiani populi inaestimabiles divitias tollere gestiunt" (*Ad milites Templi*, c. 3, n. 5: PL 182, 925); voir aussi la lettre adressée en 1146 à Conrad III pour l'inviter à mater la révolte des Romains qui ont forcé le pape à quitter Rome: *Epist.* 244 (PL 182, 400 D - 442 C): il parle en termes de *populus christianus*, non d'*ecclesia*.

45 Voir notre *L'Eglise de S. Augustin à l'époque moderne* (Paris 1970) 192-197. Pour l'usage de *populus christianus* et *christianitas*, parfois distingués par une nuance d'*ecclesia*, chez Innocent III, voir J. Rupp, op. cit., pp. 99-123; F. Kempf, *Papsttum und Kaisertum bei Innozenz III...* (Rome 1954) 301 s.

46 Extrav. Comm. lib. II, tit. III, c. unic. (Friedberg, col. 1256).

47 Voir G. B. Ladner, "The Concepts of 'Ecclesia' and 'christianitas' and their relation to the idea of papal 'plenitudo potestatis' from Gregory VII to Boniface VIII", *Sacerdozio e Regno da Gregorio VII a Bonifacio VIII...* (*Miscell. Hist. Pontif.*, XVIII), (Rome 1954) pp. 42-77; notre *Eglise de S. Augustin à l'époque moderne*, pp. 102-107 (Grégoire VII), 113 (les impériaux), 116-118 (l'Anonyme Normand).

On comprend la gravité de cet enjeu quand on voit l'usage du terme *populus christianus* fait par le fameux Anonyme Normand, vers l'an 1100, en faveur du droit des rois à régir l'Eglise.[48]

Christianitas n'est pas du vocabulaire de S. Thomas.[49] Il connaît, par contre, l'emploi de "populus christianus" en situation de Chrétienté: et comment eût-il pu l'ignorer, puisque le terme et la chose étaient inscrits dans les textes et dans les faits de son époque? De fait, Thomas utilise l'expression dans certains contextes guerriers de Chrétienté.[50] Il connaît la situation où les lois d'Eglise sont en même temps lois de la cité, voire où certaines prescriptions en matière de pratique religieuse sont portées également par les "principes christiani populi".[51] Mais dans le texte même où il dit cela, Thomas distingue les deux autorités et, ailleurs, deux domaines.[52] Au-delà d'une "mentalité" conditionnée par son milieu historique, c'est dans ce sens qu'allait son "esprit", pour reprendre une heureuse distinction élaborée par M. Jean Guitton.

B. Le thème de distinction

Si S. Thomas est passé d'un terme à un autre, même pour arguer de l'identité des réalités qu'ils recouvrent, il doit bien y avoir une raison. Ce ne serait pas le seul cas où deux termes désignent (comme matériellement) la même réalité, mais sous des aspects comportant chacun leur nuance propre: ainsi Eglise et Corps mystique, voire même, chez S. Augustin, Eglise et Cité de Dieu.

Or une logique assez évidente, qu'illustrent de très nombreux témoignages, montre que *populus* connote l'idée de soumission à un gouvernement et à des lois. C'est normal puisque, comme l'écrit S. Thomas, "populus est multitudo hominum sub aliquo ordine comprehensorum".[53] Déterminer l'ordre en question est l'objet de la loi

48 Voir *Die Texte des Normannischen Anonymus*... hrsg. von K. Pellens (Wiesbaden 1966): pp. 149, 157, 168, 198, 199, 200-201, 222-223.

49 C'est ce que remarque I. Th. Eschmann, "St. Thomas and the two Powers", *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958) 177-205: p. 191 n. 44.

50 Cf. II-II, q. 40, a. 2, ad 3, "bella carnalia in populo fideli"; q. 99, a. 1, ad 2, le peuple chrétien est sanctifié, "et ita id quod fit in injuriam populi christiani secundum quod infideles ei praeficiantur, pertinet ad irreverentiam sacrae rei": q. 188, a. 4 c. "corporalibus armis populum fidelium tueri."

51 Cf. *Quodl.* IV, 13, "praelatis Ecclesiae et principibus populi christiani determinanda"; comparer, en plus général, I-II, q. 108, a. 1, c. et II-II, q. 147, a. 3.

52 Cf. *In IV Sent.* d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, qa 3, ad 2. L'objection partait précisément de la situation de Chrétienté, où les rois, étant oints comme les prêtres "etiam potestatem in populum fidelem divinitus habent". La réponse distingue les pouvoirs "in temporalibus" et "in spiritualibus", et ajoute "sed excellentia potestatis ipsorum a Christo descendere significatur, ut et ipsi sub Christo in populo christiano regnent." Dans l'excercice de ce gouvernement, ils sont subordonnés aux prêtres et surtout au pape "cui omnes reges populi christiani oportet esse subditos" (*De regimine principum*, I, 14, si cette partie est encore de S. Thomas).

53 I, q. 31, a. 1, ad 2; comparer I-II, q. 17, a. 4 c.; III, q. 8, a. 1, ad 2.

Aussi "ad rationem populi pertinet ut communicatio hominum ad invicem justis praeceptis legis ordinetur".[54]

S. Thomas, comme beaucoup d'autres avant lui (Isidore, par exemple), à son époque et après lui, a plusieurs fois cité la définition du *populus* que S. Augustin avait empruntée à une traité de Cicéron: "Populus est coetus multitudinis juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus".[55] Si donc on passe de *populus* à *ecclesia* — et S. Thomas fait expressément l'application de cette définition au "populus Dei" — , ce sera sous l'angle où l'Eglise comporte une organisation juridique par des lois: la loi de Dieu d'abord, les lois humaines ensuite.

L'autorité publique gouverne selon les lois. La notion de *populus* implique celle de gouvernement. Depuis des siècles, le Vendredi saint, l'Eglise priait Dieu de garder le pape "incolumen ecclesiae tuae, ad regendum populum sanctum Dei".[56] Dans maints textes anciens le mot *populus (Dei)* attire la détermination: *gubernare* ou *regere*.[57] Tel est le cas aussi chez S. Thomas.[58] Il partage l'antique conviction formulée ainsi par les *Proverbes* (11, 14): "Ubi non est gubernator, populus corruet".[59]

Nous ne nous étonnerons pas que, chez S. Thomas comme très fréquemment dans les textes ecclésiastiques et jusque dans la Constitution de Vatican II sur la liturgie, *populus*, avec ou sans précision, désigne l'ensemble des fidèles en tant que distingués des ministres qui les gouvernent et qui, aussi, les président et les représentent, au sens que S. Thomas donne à ce mot "représenter", qui signifie plutôt "personnaliser".[60]

54 I-II, q. 105, a. 2. Comparer "omnis lex alicui populo datur": I-II, q. 90, a. 2; a. 3; q. 96, a. 1; q. 101, a. 3; III, q. 70, a. 2, ad 2.

55 Augustin, *De civitate Dei* II, 21et XIX, 21 et 24 (PL 41, 67 et 648) = Cicéron, *De Republica* I, 25. Cité par S. Thomas I-II, q. 105, a. 2; II-II, q. 42, a. 2; *In Hebr.* c. 8, lect. 3, avec application formelle au "populus Dei". Cf. Isidore, *Etymol.* IX, 4; Vincent de Beauvais, *Speculum doctrinale* VII, 7 (éd. Douai, 1624, p. 561); un peu plus tard, Alvarez Pelayo, avec application à l'Eglise (*De planctu Ecclesiae*, c. 63, in Rocaberti, *Bibl. Max. Pontif.* III, p. 208).

56 Au Gélasien, éd. Wilson, p. 75.

57 Exemples dans mon *Ecclésiologie du haut moyen âge* (Paris 1968) p. 64, n. 15. Usages fréquents chez les canonistes, par exemple Deusdedit, "sacerdotes et levite summi pontificis cardinales... populum Dei regant" (éd. W. von Glanvell. Paderborn 1905, pp. 267-268); Gratien, "potestas gubernandi populum" (C. 16, q. 2, dict. post c. 7), etc.; S. Bernard, *Epist.* 188, "stat zelus auctoritas Romanae ecclesiae super populum Dei" (PL 182, 353 A).

58 Exemples: "Christus constitutus est rex a Deo ad populum regendum" (*In Ps* 2, n. 7: éd. Parme XIV, 154); "regimen populi" (I-II, q. 105, a. 1, c. et ad 1); "Sacerdotes et principes Iudaeorum erant illud populi seniores" (III, q. 42, a. 2, obj. 3). Voir aussi II-II, q. 87, a. 1 à propos des dîmes; q. 147, a. 3 à propos des jeûnes; *In 2 Cor.*, prol., "ministri gubernant populum Dei".

59 Cf. III, q. 65, a. 4.

60 Ainsi plusieurs fois dans *C. Gent.* IV, 75; I-II, q. 102, a. 4 et 5; III, q. 80, a. 12. Voir également I-II, q. 95, a. 4 ("sacerdotes pro populo Deum orantes"); II-II, q. 83, a. 12 ("Communis oratio est quae per ministros ecclesiae in persona totius fidelis populi Deo offertur, et ideo oportet

Si *populus* connote l'idée de gouvernement, *ecclesia* se situe de soi, à un plan de grâce et de vie théologale: là réside, à notre avis, la différence qui fonde l'emploi de deux termes dans le texte même où S. Thomas passe de l'un à l'autre en les faisant désigner la même réalité. C'était peut-être aussi le motif pour lequel, en plein régime de Chrétienté caractérisé par la symbiose de la société politique et de la communauté ecclésiale, certains textes dédoublaient les vocables, marquant ainsi une certaine distance entre eux (voir supra nn. 42 s.). S. Thomas savait bien que, sous la grâce, les fidèles ne sont plus soumis à un régime théocratique et hiérocratique comme l'était le peuple juif.[61] Il n'a pas écrit de traité de l'Eglise, mais sa pensée ecclésiologique peut, croyons-nous, être dégagée avec assez de certitude. Du moins permettra-t-on à un homme qui l'a longuement étudiée, de dire comment il la comprend.[62] La question nous semble liée au plan de la Somme sur lequel j'ai aussi publié quelques études.[63]

D'une façon générale, S. Thomas a bien distingué le moment nécessaire, essentiel, et le moment contingent, historique, du mystère surnaturel.[64] C'est ce qui explique le fait, de prime abord étonnant et presque scandaleux, qu'il ait traité de la grâce avant de parler du Christ. C'est qu'il s'agit, pour S. Thomas, d'être en communion avec le *Dieu-Triade*, ce que réalisent la grâce et les vertus théologales, et ce pour quoi le Christ, en tant que Verbe incarné (n') est (qu') un *moyen* historique, et donc accidentel par rapport à l'essentiel qui est, dans toute la vérité de l'expression, une *déification*.[65] C'est pourquoi, là où il s'est expliqué le plus formellement et le plus librement sur l'Eglise, à savoir dans son commentaire du Symbole, il en définit l'être et l'unité par les vertus théologales et par l'habitation du Saint-Esprit. C'est pourquoi, dans notre étude de 1939 (cf. supra n. 62), nous avions rat-

quod talis oratio innotescat toti populo, pro quo profertur"); q. 86, a. 2 ("sacerdos quodammodo constituitur sequester et medius inter populum et Deum"); q. 87, a. 1 et q. 108, a. 2 (il est convenable que les ministres soient sustentés par le *populus*); III, q. 65, a. 1 ("sacerdotes hostias offerunt non solum pro se, sed etiam pro populo"); q. 80, a. 12.

61 Voir I-II, q. 105, a. 1, ad 1.

62 Voir déjà "L'idée thomiste de l'Eglise", paru en anglais in *The Thomist*, oct. 1939, pp. 331-359, en français dans *Rev. Sciences philos. théol.* 29 (1940) 31-58 et dans *Esquisses du mystère de l'Eglise* (Paris 1941) 59-91, puis notre *Eglise de S. Augustin à l'époque moderne* (Paris 1970) 232-241. De la bibliographie citée là, retenons ici surtout M. Useros Carretero, *"Statuta Ecclesiae" y "Sacramenta Ecclesiae" en la eclesiologia di S. Tomas* (Rome 1962).

63 En particulier "Le moment 'économique' et le moment 'ontologique' dans la Sacra doctrina (Révélation, Théologie, Somme théologique)", *Mélanges offerts à M.-D. Chenu (Bibl. Thomiste, XXXVII).* (Paris 1967) 135-187 (bibliographie).

64 Voir en ce sens les remarques du P. A. Patfoort, "L'unité de la Ia pars et le mouvement interne de la Somme théologique de S. Thomas d'Aquin", *Rev. Sciences philos. théol.* 47 (1963) 513-544.

65 Voir à ce sujet L.-B. Gillon, "L'imitation du Christ et la morale de S. Thomas", *Angelicum* 36 (1959) 263-286.

taché d'abord la vue ecclésiologique de S. Thomas à la IIeme pars et à son thème du *reditus*. C'est pourquoi aussi, même après avoir parlé du Christ et de sa "grâce capitale", S. Thomas présente l'Eglise ou le Corps mystique comme étant le domaine de la grâce, "effectus gratiae", au risque d'attirer les critiques d'un A. Mitterer qui veut le mettre en contradiction avec l'encyclique *Mystici Corporis* de Pie XII, et de pouvoir effectivement prêter à une mauvaise interprétation dans le sens d'une Eglise invisible.[66] S. Thomas n'a-t-il pas admis le thème augustinien et grégorien de l'"ecclesia ab Abel"?[67] N'a-t-il pas écrit que les anges en font partie tout comme nous?[68] Il n'aurait certainement pas appelé le pape "chef du Corps mystique": la primauté du pontife romain, que S. Thomas n'a certes pas diminuée (Harnack l'accusait d'être responsable de son élévation au plan d'un dogme!), est rattachée strictement à la juridiction.

Cela semble supposer qu'il existe deux concepts de l'Eglise: l'un répondant à la Cité de Dieu augustinienne ou à la communion des saints, l'autre à l'organisme historique, visible et juridique, dont S. Thomas a du reste abondamment et remarquablement parlé (cf. M. Useros Carretero). Par le côté essentiel des vertus théologales, de la grâce et de l'habitation du Saint-Esprit, l'Eglise est absolument une; elle n'est multiple que par le côté où elle se réalise dans un peuple de Dieu divisé en divers royaumes, provinces et cités.[69] Mais cela signifie que l'aspect d'organisation juridique, de lois et de gouvernement, celui qui est attaché au terme de *populus*, est accidentel et matériel, non essentiel ni formel pour qu'on puisse théologiquement parler d'*ecclesia*. Bien sûr, si l'on entend par Eglise celle qui existe concrètement de par la réalisation du plan de salut de Dieu par le Christ, elle englobe les deux aspects, l'essentiel-théologal et l'historique sacramentel, social et juridique!

On nous permettra de rapprocher de ce que nous croyons être la vue ecclésiologique profonde de S. Thomas, deux données ecclésiologiques récentes :

1. La lettre que la Congrégation romaine du Saint-Office adressa le 8 août 1949 à Mgr Cushing, archevêque de Boston, au sujet des errements

66 A. Mitterer, *Geheimnisvoller Leib Christi nach St. Thomas von Aquin und nach Papst Pius XII.* (Wien 1950). Voir notre article "Lumen Gentium n° 7, L'Eglise Corps mystique du Christ, vu au terme de huit siècles d'histoire de la théologie du Corps mystique", *Au service de la Parole de Dieu. Mélanges offerts à Mgr A.-M. Charue* (Gembloux 1969) 179-202.

67 Ainsi dans le commentaire du Symbole, art. 9. Et voir Y. Congar, "Ecclesia ab Abel", *Abhandlungen über Theologie und Kirche. Festschrift für Karl Adam* (Dusseldorf 1952) 79-108; *L'Eglise de S. Augustin à l'époque moderne*, p. 234 n. 5.

68 Voir par exemple *In III Sent.* d. 13, q. 2, a. 2, qa 2, ad 3; *In Ephes.* c. 1, lect. 8.

69 Cf. notre texte initial du *C. Gent.* IV, 76. On peut voir utilement A. Darquennes, *De juridische Structuur van de Kerk volgens Sint Thomas van Aquino*, (Leuven 1949).

théologiques du P. Léonard Feeney sur le sens de la formule "Hors de l'Eglise, pas de salut", exprime une doctrine qui repose sur une distinction entre ce qui est nécessaire par nature, c'est-à-dire essentiellement, pour entrer en communion avec Dieu et être sauvé, — c'est la foi et la charité — et ce qui est nécessaire seulement par une institution divine positive: l'Eglise, le baptême d'eau.[70] Cette distinction correspond bien à la vision thomiste des choses. Le seul point de différence est que le document romain n'aurait certainement pas donné le nom d'*ecclesia* à la pure communion spirituelle opérée sur la base de la foi et de la charité seulement. La note de visibilité rentre dans la définition de l'Eglise (cf. notre étude citée supra n. 66).

2. Le concile de Vatican II a formulé une idée de l'Eglise particulière. Si on accepte de l'identifier au diocèse, il en donne une définition digne du plus grand intérêt. Nous avons déjà évoqué ce texte (n.2): "Dioecesis est Populi Dei portio, quae Episcopo cum cooperatione presbyterii pascenda concreditur, ita ut, pastori suo adhaerens ab eoque per Evangelium et Eucharistiam in Spiritu Sancto congregata, Ecclesiam particularem constituat, in qua vere inest et operatur Una Sancta Catholica et Apostolica Christi Ecclesia."[71] L'Eglise est une. Si l'on parle en vérité d'"Eglises particulières", c'est parce qu'elles réalisent la réalité ou le mystère de l'Eglise pure et simple, que nous confessons être une, sainte, catholique et apostolique. Si on l'envisage sous l'angle de la multiplicité et même d'une certaine division, on parle de "portion du peuple de Dieu". On rejoint le vocabulaire du *C. Gentiles* IV, 76.

Nous avons commencé en citant ce texte. Pris globalement, et aussi dans le contexte de tout le chapitre, il est caractéristique de la contribution que S. Thomas, avec bien d'autres théologiens et hommes d'Eglise de son temps, a apportée à l'évolution des idées vers une ecclésiologie de l'Eglise universelle sous la primauté du Pontife romain.[72] Ce développement ecclésiologique peut être suivi dans diver-

70 Texte de cette lettre publiée en 1952, in *The American Ecclesiastical Rev.* 127 (1952) 307-311; en français in *Document. Cathol.* 2 nov. 1952, col. 1395-98 et notre *Sainte Eglise* (Paris 1963) pp. 427 s. et 432.

71 Décret *Christus Dominus* du 28.X.1965, n° 11. Comparer Constitution dogmatique *Lumen gentium* du 2.XI.1964, n° 23, § 2.

72 Voir nos études "Aspects ecclésiologiques de la querelle entre Mendiants et Séculiers dans la seconde moitié du XIIIe siècle et le début du XIVe", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 28 (1961), 35-152; "De la communion des Eglises à une ecclésiologie de l'Eglise universelle", *L'épiscopat et l'Eglise universelle* (Paris 1962) 227-260; *L'Eglise de S. Augustin à l'époque moderne*, pp. 248-252.

ses questions, par exemple dans la théologie du schisme, que S. Thomas considère au plan de l'Eglise universelle et à l'égard de l'autorité du Pape, non dans le cadre de l'Eglise locale.[73] S'agissant du texte du *C. Gentiles* avons-nous forcé son sens? Y avons-nous introduit des subtilités arbitraires? Nous ne le croyons pas. Nous pensons avoir montré que S. Thomas a eu conscience qu'on ne peut passer d'emblée de *una ecclesia* à l'affirmation d'un *unum caput*, le pape, qui ait autorité sur toute l'Eglise: une telle démarche appelait l'usage d'un moyen terme, celui de peuple fidèle ou universalité des chrétiens et l'affirmation, difficilement contestable, de l'identité entre *Populus Dei* et *Ecclesia*. Nous trompons-nous? Il nous semble que cette démarche n'est pas sans intérêt pour comprendre la vision que Thomas a eue de l'Eglise.

73 Cf. II-II, q. 39, a. 1 et comp. le texte de *In IV Sent.* cité supra n. 1; cf. aussi notre article "Schisme", *Dict. de Théol. Cath.* 14, 1286-1312 (1939).

LES IDÉES DIVINES DANS L'ŒUVRE DE S. THOMAS

L. B. Geiger O.P.

MON intention n'est pas de traiter l'ensemble des problèmes historiques et systématiques qu'on peut soulever à propos du thème des idées divines dans l'œuvre de S. Thomas, quelque intérêt qu'offrirait un tel propos. Je voudrais seulement préciser certaines perspectives qui permettront de faire voir, je l'espère, quelle place il convient d'attribuer, dans la philosophie et la théologie de S. Thomas, aux idées en tant qu'objets de la connaissance divine.

Rappelons d'abord un point, qui ne fait d'ailleurs difficulté pour personne, à savoir la diversité des fonctions que le thème des Idées en général et celui des idées divines en particulier a été appelé à remplir au cours de l'histoire.[1] Chez Platon, les Idées sont les essences parfaites et immuables des réalités imparfaites et changeantes de notre univers, exigées par le savoir véritable dont elles sont l'objet et auquel elles fournissent les normes absolues du bien et du beau.[2] Elles n'interviennent cependant pas directement dans la formation de notre univers. Du moins Platon n'a-t-il jamais précisé, en dehors de leur statut de modèle pour le démiurge, leur rôle actif dans la participation. C'est Plotin qui les a dotées d'une énergie par laquelle elles peuvent communiquer la participation de leur similitude, leur donnant ainsi d'être à la fois objet de contemplation et cause exemplaire.[3]

Une fois qu'elles auront été placées dans un intellect divin, elles pourront assurer plus facilement cette double fonction.[4] Mais on sait que la nécessité d'admettre en Dieu la connaissance de l'univers à produire ou à gouverner s'est imposée en dehors de toute référence à la

1 Voir, par exemple, l'article "Idée" dans Eisler, *Wörterbuch*, 4[e] éd., ou celui, plus récent, d'A. Carlini, dans l'*Enciclopedia filosofica* s.v. "Idée", avec la bibliographie. Voir aussi l'exposé historique de H. Rüssimann, *Zur Ideenlehre der Hochscholastik* (Freiburg-im-Brisgau 1938).

2 Voir D. Ross, *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford 1951; réimpr. 1961).

3 Voir E. R. Dodds, *Proclus, The Elements of Theology* (Oxford 1933), pp. 215; 264 (prop. 121).

4 Pour l'histoire de ce passage des Idées dans l'intelligence divine, voir Dodds, op. cit., p. 206 (prop. 20); C. J. De Vogel, *Philosophia*, I (Assen 1970), ch. 15, spécialement, pp. 363s, 372ss.

noétique platonicienne, soit dans la révélation judéo-chrétienne par exemple, soit dans certaines écoles philosophiques, comme le stoïcisme,[5] encore que, très tôt, le dialogue se soit établi entre ces courants et la tradition platonicienne des Idées.[6] Admettre la connaissance, par Dieu, de l'univers à produire ou à gouverner, ce n'est donc pas nécessairement admettre la conception platonicienne des Idées.[7] Aussi bien n'y-a-t-il aucune difficulté à comprendre que S. Thomas ait toujours rejeté la noétique platonicienne ou augustinienne des Idées, règles et normes de notre connaisssance, et retenu tout au long de son enseignement le thème des idées divines. Il suffit que celles-ci constituent les raisons éternelles de l'intelligence divine, raisons qui sont comme le modèle dont s'inspire l'artisan dans son travail, sans qu'elles soient appelées à illuminer notre connaissance intellectuelle pour lui fournir, à défaut de l'abstraction, les principes de ses jugements.

Mais, si un mot ne recouvre plus la réalité précise qui lui donnait sa signification spécifique, pourquoi le conserver? Certes on peut appeler, et on appelle en effet *idée* le modèle intérieur d'après lequel l'artisan est censé produire son œuvre. On se trouve alors dans un domaine totalement étranger à l'univers des Idées platoniciennes voire augustiniennes. On s'expose donc à des malentendus. C'est un inconvénient certain. Mais le Moyen Age était coutumier d'une certaine indifférence à l'égard des mots, pourvu que le sens, visé en chaque cas, fût suffisamment certain.

Il y a plus. Certains interprètes de sa pensée estiment que S. Thomas aurait éliminé de sa théologie les développements qu'il consacre aux idées divines s'il avait suivi la seule logique de ses positions personnelles. Ce serait "le langage platonicien en usage dans son milieu," ou "la reconnaissance de l'autorité théologique de S. Augustin" qui expliqueraient le maintien d'un mot et d'un ensemble de propositions que rien, du point de vue systématique, n'invitait à conserver, que tout devait amener, au contraire, à écarter. Leur suppression n'entraînerait aucun changement dans l'équilibre de la doctrine. Tout à l'inverse, la netteté de ses lignes caractéristiques n'en sortirait que plus clairement.

5 Voir M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen 1948), I, pp. 93-101.

6 Philon, par exemple. Voir H. A. Wolfson, *Philo* (Cambridge, Mass. 1948), I, ch. 3 et 4; C. J. De Vogel, *Greek Philosophy*, 2nd ed. (Leiden 1964), III, n. 1294. Sur le monde intelligible, voir ibid., n. 1293.

7 Pour la notion de la providence chrétienne et ses rapports avec la doctrine des idées divines, voir E. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, 2ᵉ éd. (Paris 1948), ch. 8. Pour ce qui est du Nouveau Testament, G. Kittel fait remarquer que le sens platonicien de *eidos* ne s'y rencontre jamais: *Theol. Wörterbuch zum N.T.*, s.v. "eidos", p. 373, 30ss.

Avec le P. Sertillanges, par exemple,[8] on peut se montrer sensible aux simplismes qu'on risque d'introduire dans la théologie de S. Thomas en traitant des idées divines, expression authentiquement thomiste, il est vrai, sans tenir compte des thèses telles que l'unité et la simplicité de Dieu, qui permettent de les comprendre correctement. Avec les idées, en effet, n'est-ce pas comme un univers intelligible, plus ou moins distinct de Dieu, qu'on introduit dans l'intelligence divine, cet univers des possibles, objet et source de tant de spéculations fallacieuses, et dont Bergson avait dénoncé le caractère illusoire, en démontant les mécanismes qui concourent à le former? N'est-ce pas aussi réduire notre univers à n'être que la reproduction d'un modèle tout fait, donc en exclure toute possibilité de nouveauté et d'invention?

D'après S. Thomas:

> L'Idée, en Dieu, s'identifie à l'essence divine considérée comme source une et simple de toute intelligibilité comme de tout être. Les idées, dans leur diversité, ne se définissent que par un rapport des réalités mêmes — j'entends des réalités concrètes, et par suite, individuelles — à cette unique Source. C'est pourquoi je dis qu'en dehors de l'exemplarité ... la doctrine des Idées est chez Saint Thomas un encombrement, non une lumière, un nid à équivoques où beaucoup de disciples ont pris occasion d'erreur. Laissé à lui-même notre auteur eût préféré sans doute suivre Aristote[9] à qui il prête, plus ou moins valablement d'ailleurs, une doctrine d'exemplarité sans Idées obsédantes. Le langage platonicien en usage dans son milieu ne le lui permit pas.[10]

On peut aussi montrer, avec M. Gilson,[11] que la thèse la plus personnelle de S. Thomas, relative à l'Etre de Dieu, *Ipsum esse subsistens,* conduit logiquement et aurait dû conduire S. Thomas à se passer de la doctrine des idées divines. Dans la perspective de l'*Esse*, en effet, le problème de la possibilité de l'univers consiste à se demander

> comment les essences peuvent émaner de l'être en qui nulle essence distinctive ne s'ajoute à l'*esse* pour composer avec lui....Sous quelque aspect qu'on envisage le problème, il semble impossible d'éviter la conclusion que l'essence est un amoindrissement, une distension et comme

8 A. D. Sertillanges, *Le christianisme et les philosophes* (Paris 1939), I, pp. 273-276. Voir aussi, à propos de la *Somme théologique*, I, 15, dans la traduction française de l'Edition de la Revue des Jeunes, Dieu II, les *renseignements techniques*, pp. 403-405.

9 Pour S. Thomas, on le sait, Aristote à la différence de Platon et de ses Idées subsistantes en elles-mêmes, aurait admis l'existence d'idées dans l'intellect divin. Voir par exemple *In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1. Ce n'est donc pas Aristote qui aurait pu le persuader d'abandonner les idées divines.

10 A. D. Sertillanges, ibid. I, p. 276.

11 E. Gilson, *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne* (Paris 1960), pp. 173-183. Dans *Le Thomisme*, 6e éd. (Paris 1965), pp. 146-148, la doctrine de la *Somme théologique*, I, 15, est reproduite sans discussion.

> un éparpillement de l'être...Le difficile, qui n'est peut-être qu'imparfaitement possible, est de discerner la nature de l'opération prise en quelque sorte à la source, au moment où la première essence se divise d'avec sa cause, qui est l'acte pur d'*esse*.[12]

C'est ici qu'interviennent les Idées:

> La réponse à la question se tire généralement de la notion d'intellect divin, lieu des Idées qui sont elles-mêmes les archétypes des essences. Réponse correcte sans aucun doute et qui peut s'autoriser de ce que Saint Thomas lui-même, à la suite de Saint Augustin, a expressément enseigné, sur la nature des Idées divines. Pourtant, il est à peine exagéré de dire qu'au fond, tout ce que S. Thomas a dit des Idées était dans son esprit une concession de plus faite au langage d'une philosophie qui n'était pas vraiment la sienne. C'était aussi, n'en doutons pas, la reconnaissance de l'autorité théologique de Saint Augustin.[13]

La preuve en est que

> l'exposé du problème et sa discussion dans le *Contra Gentiles* (I, 44-71) relègue à l'arrière plan la notion d'idée divine. Celle-ci fait de brèves apparitions aux chapitres 51 et 54, où il est question de la manière dont une pluralité d'objets connus peut être dans l'intellect divin sans en rompre l'unité, mais Saint Thomas n'en fait mention que comme d'un artifice employé par Saint Augustin pour sauver dans une certaine mesure l'opinion de Platon...La solution platonicienne du problème est donc inopérante; la *Somme contre les Gentils* ne semble pas avoir jugé nécessaire de mettre en œuvre la notion platonicienne d'Idée, entendue de quelque manière que ce soit.[14]

C'est la simplicité divine, c'est à dire la simplicité de l'*esse* divin, tel que le conçoit S. Thomas, qui rend superflu le recours aux Idées.

> Intelliger est à l'intellect ce qu'être est à l'essence; mais c'est l'être qui est l'essence de Dieu; l'intellect est donc son essence, qui est son être...: *Quicquid enim est in Deo, est divina essentia, et divinum esse, et ipse Deus. Nam Deus est sua essentia et suum esse.* (CG. I, 45, § 2).[15]

On peut donc se demander à bon droit ce

> qu'ont à faire les Idées dans une pareille doctrine....En effet, pourquoi poserait-on des Idées en Dieu? Pour expliquer comment, par elles, il connaît les créatures? Mais Dieu connaît par son intellect, qui est son essence, qui est son *esse*. Comme le dit Saint Thomas avec force, si l'on veut que toute connaissance se fasse par une espèce intelligible, alors, c'est l'essence de Dieu qui est en lui l'espèce intelligible.[16]

12 E. Gilson, *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne*, pp. 170-173.
13 Ibid., pp. 173-174.
14 Ibid., pp. 174-175.
15 Ibid., p. 175.
16 Ibid., pp. 175-176.

Pris en somme entre ses conceptions les plus personnelles et le langage théologique de son temps avec les représentations qu'il véhiculait, S. Thomas aurait conservé les idées divines par nécessité (Sertillanges), ou par respect à l'égard de l'autorité de S. Augustin (Gilson), sans qu'on puisse leur trouver une nécessité intelligible dans sa synthèse théologique. Dépouillées de leur fonction noétique par l'abstraction aristotélicienne, difficilement conciliables avec les exigences et la simplicité de l'*Esse* divin, elles errent, telles des ombres, dans un univers qui n'est pas fait pour elles.

Personne ne contestera l'influence subie par S. Thomas, comme d'ailleurs par n'importe quel philosophe ou théologien, de la part de son milieu intellectuel et culturel, ni la déférence qu'il n'a cessé de marquer pour l'autorité de S. Augustin. On accordera aussi que les arguments fondés sur l'opposition entre la simplicité de l'*Esse* divin et le thème des idées divines ne manquent pas de valeur. On peut toutefois se demander si la conclusion s'impose. Je ne le pense pas, et j'essaierai de montrer que, si S. Thomas a conservé les idées divines tout au long de son enseignement, c'est justement pour éviter la contradiction entre la thèse de la simplicité divine et la nécessité d'affirmer la connaissance distincte, par Dieu, d'une multiplicité d'*objets* de sa connaissance.

L'idée certes, n'a plus chez lui la fonction d'objet de notre savoir théorétique ou de norme de nos jugements de valeur, comme chez Platon. Elle n'est plus liée à l'illumination divine, même si l'on consent à appeler illumination, avec S. Thomas lui-même, le don, fait par Dieu à chaque homme, de son pouvoir de connaître, participation à la lumière de Dieu. Les idées ne forment pas en Dieu un univers d'intelligibles, le monde des possibles que Dieu contemplerait et dont notre univers serait comme une reproduction. Elles ne sont pas cependant un ornement inutile, la répétition pure et simple, en d'autres mots, de ce qui a été déjà dit et bien dit. S. Thomas a en effet distingué, de plus en plus fermement, la forme qui est principe de l'acte de connaissance, en le spécifiant et en l'actualisant, et la forme qui est terme de la connaissance, parce qu'elle a été elle-même formée par l'intelligence. Les idées sont les participations de l'essence divine, connues, en tant qu'elles sont exprimées par Dieu, non pas l'essence divine en tant qu'elle est quasi forme actualisante de l'intellect de Dieu. C'est en tant que terme formé par le connaissant qu'elles permettent d'assurer la multiplicité des objets connus, donc une multiplicité d'idées, sans contredire la simplicité de l'essence divine.

Si donc l'idée, telle que S. Thomas la conçoit, ne répond ni au contenu ni aux fonctions qu'on leur attribue, en songeant à telle ou telle autre philosophie, on peut certes conclure logiquement que ce contenu

ne s'y trouve pas, qu'il n'est donc pas nécessaire non plus d'en conserver le mot, dans la mesure exacte où il désigne le contenu et la fonction ainsi entendus. Mais on ne peut conclure d'une manière générale, qu'elle n'a aucun contenu utile, ni aucune nécessité, qu'elle ne représente que la fidélité à un vocabulaire et à une tradition. Si S. Thomas a donné au mot *idée* un sens qui lui est propre, il a pu en maintenir la présence pour des raisons positives et systématiques. C'est ce que nous nous proposons de montrer.

LE PROBLÈME

Que la raison d'être des idées en Dieu soit bien celle du terme formé et exprimé par le connaissant, il suffit, pour s'en convaincre, de réfléchir au prologue de *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 14, qui donne le plan du traité consacré à "l'opération" de Dieu. L'intellection est l'une des opérations immanentes. On en traitera à la question 14. Et "puisque tout objet connu est dans le connaissant, que les raisons des choses, en tant qu'elles sont en Dieu connaissant, sont appelées idées, il faudra joindre, à la considération de la science de Dieu, celle des idées."[17] Le problème des idées concerne donc "les raisons des choses" en tant qu'elles sont *en Dieu comme connaissant.*

Or la question 14 traite des problèmes de la connaissance divine en montrant que Dieu n'a besoin que de l'identité de son intelligence avec sa propre essence pour posséder toutes les connaissances qu'on doit lui attribuer. Dans notre expérience, l'intellection, opération immanente, ne peut se produire sans l'intervention d'une forme, principe d'actuation d'ordre accidentel, qui fait passer le pouvoir de l'état de puissance à l'état actuel. En Dieu, la question 14 le montre en détail, l'unique *Esse* de Dieu, plénitude de tous les modes possibles de l'être, remplit éminemment toutes les fonctions que nous attribuons à la forme actualisante. Par son *Esse*, Dieu est en acte de tous les objets possibles de la connaissance, par l'identité entre son *Esse*, son intelligence et son acte d'intellection. Toutes les conditions sont donc remplies pour fonder la connaissance divine à l'égard de Dieu lui-même et de toutes les participations possibles de la plénitude de son être.

Tout semble donc dit au sujet de la connaissance divine. Aussi bien,

17 "Post considerationem eorum quae ad divinam substantiam pertinent restat considerandum de his quae pertinent ad operationem ipsius. Et quia operatio quaedam est quae manet in operante...primo agemus de scientia et voluntate (nam intelligere in intelligente est, et velle in voluntate).... Rursum, quia omne cognitum in cognoscente est, rationes autem rerum, secundum quod sunt in Deo cognoscente, ideae vocantur, cum consideratione scientiae erit etiam adjungenda consideratio de ideis." *Sum. theol.* I, 14, prol. (Ed. léonine).

quand au début de la question 15, S. Thomas déclare qu'il reste à traiter des idées, on peut se demander avec M. Gilson, pourquoi? "Ayant déjà fondé la connaissance divine du singulier sur ce qui, de toute manière, doit être l'ultime fondement — *ipsum Esse* — pourquoi ajouter à la doctrine cette sorte d'enclave consacrée aux Idées: y-a-t-il des Idées? Y en a-t-il plusieurs? Y en a-t-il de tout ce que Dieu connaît?"[18]

Dans une noétique strictement aristotélicienne, la présence de la forme intelligible suffit à faire connaître l'objet, de même que la présence de la forme sensible suffit à la connaissance sensible portant sur les êtres réels. En d'autres mots, dans la noétique aristotélicienne, il y a des formes intelligibles ou sensibles; mais elles se trouvent dans le pouvoir connaissant pour le mettre en acte, à titre de principe formel de son opération. Il y a des objets connus, mais ce ne sont pas des Idées. Ce sont les réalités elles-mêmes, sensibles ou intelligibles, ces dernières actualisées par le pouvoir appelé intellect-actif, auquel Aristote assigne une fonction analogue à celle de la lumière pour la sensation visuelle. Dans le cas de notre connaissance humaine, les pouvoirs sont d'abord réceptifs ou passifs. En tant qu'ils sont réceptifs ils ne produisent rien, si ce n'est l'acte lui-même, une fois que la forme de l'objet l'aura spécifié et, par là, actualisé.

Appliquée à Dieu, une telle noétique fonde la connaissance divine sur l'essence de Dieu, identique à son intelligence et à son acte d'intellection, et, tout ensemble, similitude éminente de toutes les participations possibles. S. Thomas ne dit-il pas, ici même (I, 14, 2, c): "Nous connaissons en acte quelque objet par nos sens ou notre intelligence du fait que notre intelligence ou notre sens sont actuellement informés par l'espèce sensible ou intelligible." La présence de la similitude de l'objet au principe de l'acte de connaissance suffit donc, semble-t-il, à assurer la connaissance de cet objet. S. Thomas conclut, d'ailleurs, immédiatement de la présence en Dieu de la quasi-forme intelligible, à la connaissance actuelle de Dieu par lui-même: *Ipsa species intelligibilis est ipse intellectus divinus et sic seipsum intelligit.* (Ibid.).

Si donc l'idée n'apportait aucune présence nouvelle de l'objet connu au sujet connaissant, aucune forme de présence surtout, qui s'impose avec quelque nécessité systématique, on ne voit pas pour quelle raison on en annonce une étude spéciale pour assurer la présence de l'objet dans le sujet connaissant (q. 14, prol.). N'aurions-nous pas affaire, très exactement, avec une de ces questions inutiles, occasionnées par les hasards de la routine scolaire, dont l'auteur de la *Somme* s'est proposé

18 E. Gilson, *Introduction à la philosophie chrétienne*, p. 180.

de débarrasser l'exposé ordonné de la théologie? [19] Aurait-il été si difficile de déclarer qu'on ne traitera pas des idées divines, puisque, sous ce mot, on ne ferait que redire ce qui avait été exposé suffisamment, en étudiant la connaissance divine et ses objets? Si S. Thomas ne l'a pas fait, c'est croyons-nous parce que l'idée assure en effet une mode de présence de l'objet connu dans le sujet connaissant, qui doit compléter celui qui est assuré par la forme, principe de l'intellection. L'intellection se complète par la *dictio*, dont on ne trouve point de trace dans la noétique de la connaissance spéculative d'Aristote. C'est finalement, en tant que forme formée ou exprimée, non prévue par le Stagirite, que l'idée permet de résoudre un problème qu'Aristote n'a pas posé, et que sa noétique de la forme actualisante, transposée dans un domaine pour lequel elle n'était pas faite, laissait sans réponse satisfaisante, face à l'objection tirée de la multiplicité des objets à connaître par l'intellect de Dieu.

Les rapports de notre problème des idées divines avec la pensée d'Aristote sont en effet les suivants: d'une part, le Dieu d'Aristote, si l'on veut appeler ainsi l'Intellect suprême, ne pose aucune difficulté au sujet des idées, puisqu'il ne s'occupe pas de l'univers, ni pour le concevoir, ni pour le produire, ni pour le gouverner. Eternellement en acte, il ne doit connaître que lui-même, l'intelligible le plus parfait, pour jouir de ce fait d'une éternelle et parfaite béatitude.[20]

D'autre part, la théorie des formes, chargées de rendre présente aux différents pouvoirs la forme de l'objet connu, était liée étroitement, chez le Stagirite, au problème du passage de la puissance à l'acte: ou bien le pouvoir est en acte par la forme reçue, et il peut connaître l'objet dont il possède la similitude; ou bien il ne l'est pas, et la connaissance ne peut pas se produire. La forme une fois reçue assure donc à un acte immanent du pouvoir la connaissance d'objets qui en sont *réellement distincts*, et qui, inférieurs dans certains cas au pouvoir, dans l'ordre ontologique, possèdent la priorité d'être en acte dans l'ordre de la forme et de l'essence. La connaissance comporte donc l'assimilation du pouvoir et de la réalité à connaître, permettant au premier de se rapporter à la seconde, qui en est indépendante dans son être. La réalité se fait connaître en déléguant dans le pouvoir la similitude d'elle-même sous les espèces de la forme actualisante.[21]

19 "Consideravimus...huius doctrinae novitios...plurimum impediri partim quidem propter multiplicationem inutilium quaestionum, articulorum et argumentorum. Haec igitur et alia huiusmodi evitare studentes, tentabimus...ea quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinent, breviter ac dilucide prosequi." *Sum. theol.*, prol.

20 Sur ce point, voir les remarques de E. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philos. médiév.*, p. 159, n. 2.

21 Voir, p.e.: *In I Sent.* d.35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3 et 4; ed. Mandonnet (Paris 1929), I, pp. 812-813.

Un Dieu créateur, au contraire, qui produit l'univers en fonction d'une conception qu'il s'en fait, dans son ensemble comme dans le détail, et qui le produit librement, doit posséder en lui-même les formes des êtres qu'il crée, s'il est vrai que l'intellect ne connaît que les objets dont il possède la similitude. Mais il doit les posséder sans les recevoir de cet univers, qui ne peut rien lui donner, puisqu'il reçoit tout de lui, son être et son intelligibilité; et il doit les posséder de toute éternité, puisqu'il n'y a pas en lui passage de puissance à acte. Enfin, et surtout, il doit connaître l'univers en lui-même, comme *terme de connaissance*, à la manière dont l'artisan connaît le modèle, inventé ou appris, qui guide son activité, par laquelle il produira ce qui n'existe pas encore et l'amènera à sa perfection. Dieu, en effet, crée l'univers d'après un dessein de son intelligence et le gouverne par sa providence, qui prend soin, non seulement des hommes, mais encore des oiseaux du ciel et des lys des champs.

C'est dire que le rapport entre l'intelligence créatrice et son œuvre est inintelligible si, d'une manière ou d'une autre, on ne fait appel à la présence d'un terme intérieur au connaissant, forme formée librement et exprimée dans le connaissant comme terme de son acte de connaissance. Aristote, non plus que Platon d'ailleurs, n'a distingué, pour la connaissance spéculative au moins, deux formes intelligibles: l'une qui est principe, l'autre qui est terme de l'acte de connaissance. Pour Aristote, nous l'avons dit, le terme de l'acte c'est ou bien la réalité sensible, ou bien l'intelligible en puissance dans la réalité, où il est saisi, une fois actué par l'intervention de l'intellect actif.

Ne peut-on penser d'ailleurs que cette absence d'un terme produit par le connaissant tient à la conception qu'on se faisait de la connaissance spéculative? Spéculer, ce n'est pas construire a priori comme on le pensera dans la philosophie et la théologie après Kant. Spéculer, c'est regarder, contempler. Quand nous regardons, nous n'avons pas conscience d'autre chose que de la présence de notre regard à l'objet contemplé. La dignité de la connaissance spéculative tenait, non pas à la nécessité logique qui lie entre elles les moments d'un raisonnement ou les termes d'une proposition, mais à la nécessité de l'objet lui-même, éternel, immuable, manifesté à une vue, qui est justement la *saisie* intelligible. Une connaissance spéculative n'est-elle pas précisément celle qui a pour objet des réalités que nous saisissons, mais ne produisons pas? N'est-elle pas d'autant plus purement elle-même que le sujet se montre plus exclusivement réceptif, présent à un être qui se donne au connaissant, mais n'est d'aucune manière produit par lui?

La connaissance pratique comporte la production ou la conception d'un modèle que l'artisan s'applique ensuite à réaliser par son travail.

Mais on sait en quelle médiocre estime les philosophes grecs ont tenu ce genre d'activité. Il ne peut donner lieu à aucun savoir proprement dit. N'est-il pas, d'ailleurs, lié au *besoin*, à l'utile, donc aux *moyens*, destinés à accroître notre bien être, non pas notre connaissance de *ce qui est*? Il concerne le domaine des *factibilia*, dont aucun savoir théorétique ne peut consentir à s'occuper. Connaître pour connaître, et connaître ce qui vraiment est, voilà la dignité de l'homme et du philosophe. C'est aussi celle de l'Intellect suprême d'après Aristote.

Il n'est pas difficile, dès lors, de comprendre à quelles difficultés se heurteront les théologiens quand ils tenteront de traduire le mystère de la création et de la providence à l'aide de concepts philosophiques issus de Platon et d'Aristote. La métaphore de l'artisan, suggérée par l'Ecriture, s'offrait tout naturellement. Elle avait d'ailleurs l'avantage de ne faire appel à aucune théorie particulière au sujet de la nature de la connaissance. Tout le monde admet facilement que l'artisan dirige son activité d'après un modèle ou une idée qu'il porte en lui-même, qu'il connaît, comme le potier, dont les doigts semblent suivre les contours d'une image intérieure, visible pour lui seul.

Mais attribuer à Dieu la connaissance pratique, c'est à dire une connaissance faite pour diriger la production d'une œuvre, n'est-ce pas le rabaisser? Certes on souligne ainsi son pouvoir absolu sur la création tout entière, la liberté du dessein créateur. Mais du même coup, n'est-ce pas la nécessité de tout l'édifice du savoir relatif à l'essence des êtres qui se trouve compromise? Concevoir un projet ou un modèle, l'exécuter ou le réaliser en inspirant chacun des gestes par ses exigences, c'est assurément une perfection qui élève l'homme au dessus des forces aveugles de la nature, et le rend indépendant, en partie du moins, de leur empire. Mais le savoir théoretique, le savoir véritable ne tient-il pas sa dignité du caractère nécessaire, éternel et immuable de son objet?

Si au contraire on tient à sauvegarder la dignité du savoir spéculatif en reconnaissant la perfection, l'éternité et l'immutabilité de son objet, ne sera-t-on pas conduit à imposer à Dieu lui-même quelque forme de nécessité: un univers de Formes qu'il contemplerait, ou qu'il formerait en lui-même par quelque processus nécessaire à partir d'un point de départ qu'il serait lui-même?

C'est donc tout le problème des rapports entre la sagesse grecque et le savoir spéculatif, d'une part, et la révélation d'une création libre, d'autre part, qu'on pourrait évoquer ici: défiance à l'égard d'Aristote, aussi longtemps du moins que sa pensée se présentait sans les changements et compléments, étrangers à son contenu originel; attrait, au contraire, exercé par les différentes philosophies d'inspiration néo-

platonicienne, avec le danger de céder à quelque forme d'émanatisme voire de panthéisme.[22]

Dans le problème des idées divines et leur rôle dans la création et la providence, tel que le discute S. Thomas, ces perspectives ne sont pas complètement absentes. On pourrait les évoquer facilement à la faveur de telle ou telle citation. Une étude complète se devrait de les envisager explicitement. Nous nous contenterons ici d'observer les péripéties de la rencontre entre les exigences de la connaissance du monde qui doit être celle d'un Dieu créateur et provident, et une noétique qui ne fait pas sa place à la forme formée ou exprimée par l'intelligence, en suivant, dans leur ordre chronologique, les textes majeurs qui en traitent.

Le *Commentaire sur les Sentences*

C'est au *Commentaire* sur le premier livre des *Sentences* que nous lisons le premier exposé explicite consacré au problème des idées divines. Or, remarquons le, dans le texte, le maître lui-même ne fait allusion ni aux idées, ni d'ailleurs à aucune théorie de la connaissance particulière. A la distinction 35, il précise le sens d'un certain nombre d'expressions relatives à la connaissance divine, telles que: science, préscience, providence, disposition et prédestination. Il conclut son exposé en montrant que, si des mots comme préscience, disposition, prédestination ou providence se rapportent aux réalités temporelles et seulement à elles, les mots de science ou de sagesse ont rapport non seulement aux choses temporelles mais aussi aux éternelles. "Toute la raison de la sagesse suprême et éternelle se trouve en Dieu....Son immense sagesse comprend en effet toute sagesse et toute science."[23]

22 Il faut donc distinguer les tentatives pour a) dire la formation de l'univers intelligible, en soi ou dans un intellect divin; b) construire l'univers réel à partir de quelques données simples, comme le fera Descartes, par exemple; c) manifester les moments par lesquels, dans les différentes philosophies émanatistes, le multiple procède d'un principe premier; d) mettre en lumière l'intelligibilité de l'univers en tenant compte explicitement de la liberté divine dans la conception et la production de la création, comme Saint Thomas le fait dans le beau chapître, *3 CG*, 97, qui a pour titre: "Quomodo dispositio providentiae habeat rationem." Pour la cause de la multiplicité et de l'inégalité des êtres, voir, p.ex. *Sum. theol.*, Ia, q. 47, a. 1 et 2. La raison de la création est la volonté de Dieu de se communiquer et de communiquer sa bonté, autant qu'il est possible, non point quelque nécessité naturelle d'émanation. La création comporte nécessairement déficience par rapport à la perfection de la bonté divine, mais elle est un don.

23 *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum, studio et cura PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae in lucem editi.* 2a ed. (Quaracchi, 1916), I, n. 322. J'ai traduit le texte du Lombard d'après l'éd. Mandonnet, I, 805. Il s'agit d'une citation de Saint Ambroise. Elle doit se lire ainsi: "Omnis enim ratio supernae et terrenae sapientiae, ut ait Ambrosius, in eo est, quia omnem sapientiam et essentiam capit sua immensa scientia." Ed. citée, n. 322.

"Aussi, dit-on, que toutes choses sont en Dieu et y ont été de toute éternité,"[24] comme S. Augustin l'expose dans son Commentaire sur la Genèse. Et le Lombard commente a son tour: "Par ce texte nous comprenons que ces choses visibles, avant d'exister, étaient dans la science de Dieu. C'est en ce sens qu'on dit que toutes choses sont en Dieu, et que tout ce qui a été fait est vie en lui: non point parce que la créature serait le Créateur, ou que ces réalités temporelles seraient essentiellement en Dieu, mais parce qu'elles sont toujours dans la science de Dieu, qui est vie."[25]

La distinction 36 aborde un problème, dont l'auteur nous dit qu' "on a l'habitude de la soulever ici."[26] Si en effet la connaissance ou la prescience sont en Dieu identiques à son essence, ne doit-on pas conclure que toutes les choses présentes dans la connaissance de Dieu sont présentes aussi dans son essence ou sont en Dieu par essence? L'inférence semble valide. Mais on aboutirait à cette conclusion que toutes choses sont identiques à l'essence divine, puisque être en Dieu par essence ne convient qu'à l'essence divine qui est Dieu même.

Le Lombard évite la conclusion, comme dans d'autres cas, par la simple distinction entre la présence comme objet de connaissance et présence dans la nature. La connaissance ou la prescience de Dieu sont identiques à sa nature. Il n'en suit pas qu'être présent à sa connaissance soit identiquement être présent à sa nature, comme le montre d'ailleurs un texte de S. Augustin.[27] La suite de la distinction traite spécialement de la présence du mal à la connaissance divine. On montre ensuite comment on doit entendre l'expression: toutes choses sont de Dieu, par Dieu et en Dieu. On veut dire par là, notamment, que toutes choses sont en Dieu, parce qu'il les connaît et qu'il en est l'auteur. Il faut user de distinctions analogues pour d'autres expressions qui sont examinées dans la dernière partie du texte.[28] Aucune justification, ni métaphysique, ni noétique, ne vient éclairer le débat. La discussion se tient au niveau du sens commun. Il n'est question ni d'idées, ni d'aucune donnée relevant d'un système philosophique déterminé.

24 Ibid., n. 323.

25 "Ecce hic habes, quia visibilia haec antequam fierent, in Dei scientia erant. Ex hoc igitur sensu omnia dicuntur esse in Deo, et omne quod *factum est* dicitur esse *vita in ipso*; non ideo, quod creatura sit Creator, vel quod ista temporalia essentialiter sint in Deo, sed quia in eius scientia semper sunt, quae vita est." Ibid., n.323 fin-324.

26 "Solet hic quaeri..." Ibid., n. 326.

27 Ibid., n. 326.

28 Ibid., n. 329-332. Présence à la connaissance divine seulement, comme objet; présence dans l'essence, cause exemplaire; présence dans l'essence et dans la connaissance sont les différentes possibilités, parmi lesquelles le Lombard aurait pu instituer une discussion. Il se contente de faire son choix parmi les deux premières, en s'appuyant sur l'autorité de Saint Augustin.

C'est dans ce contexte que, à la distinction 36, S. Thomas traite des idées. Il le fait, conformément à une tradition scolaire relativement récente.[29] A propos de cette distinction 36, S. Thomas pose deux questions. La première complète celle qui avait été développée en cinq articles, à la distinction 35. Sous le titre: *De his quae a Deo cognoscuntur*, elle traite de la connaissance des singuliers et du mal par Dieu, et de la manière dont on doit dire que se trouvent en Dieu les objets qu'il connaît. La question suivante, consacrée aux idées, ne concerne plus les objets connus par Dieu, mais ce par quoi les choses sont connues: *per quas res cognoscit.*[30]

Les idées, en effet, sont comme des "formes opératives," c'est-à-dire qu'elles sont, dans la connaissance divine, l'équivalent des modèles qui, présents dans son esprit, guident le travail de l'artisan. Les formes des objets qui sont produits par l'art ou la technique ont, en effet, "un *esse* double. D'une part elles existent en acte dans la matière; d'autre part elles existent en puissance, mais en puissance active, dans l'esprit de l'artisan....Or c'est une affirmation commune à tous les philosophes que toutes choses sont dans l'esprit de Dieu comme les produits de l'art dans l'esprit de l'artisan. Nous appelons donc idées les formes des choses existant en Dieu, qui sont comme des formes opératives." Et, après celle du Commentateur, S. Thomas fait appel à l'autorité de Denys. Il précise cependant que, le mot *idea* venant de *eidos*, il signifie la forme. Le mot *idée* peut donc s'appliquer également, en vertu de son sens propre, à la connaissance spéculative et à la connaissance pratique. Dans les deux cas, elle joue le rôle de principe de la connaissance. Dans les deux cas, elle est un objet connu.[31]

Cependant, dès le *Commentaire sur les Sentences*, S. Thomas identifie ces formes opératives avec les exemplaires, et ceux-ci avec l'essence divine en tant qu'elle est imitable par les créatures.[32] A la différence du Lombard, qui nous l'avons vu, ne veut admettre, pour les choses distinctes de Dieu, qu'une présence dans la connaissance divine, S. Thomas tient que "le mot *idée* designe l'essence divine en tant qu'elle

29 Le problème des idées divines, de leur nature et de leur multiplicité en Dieu, se trouve déjà dans les *Gloses* d'Alexandre de Halès sur les *Sentences*, à la distinction 36. Voir: *Alexandri de Hales, Glossa super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi* (Quaracchi 1951), I, pp. 357-358. Mais la discussion autour de ce problème est évidemment plus ancienne que son évocation à propos du texte du Lombard.

30 *In I Sent.*, ed. Mandonnet, I, p. 829.

31 Ibid., d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, sol.; p. 839.

32 A propos de la connaissance divine des singuliers, Saint Thomas rejette d'abord diverses théories. Puis il propose la solution qu'il va adopter: "Unde procedendum est per viam quam docet Dionysius...Dicit enim, quod cum Deus cognoscit res per essentiam suam quae est causa rerum..." Ibid., dist 36, q. 1, a. 1, sol.: pp. 831-832. Cf. qu. 2, a. 2, sol.; p. 841.

est l'exemplaire imité par la créature."[33] Les créatures sont donc présentes, de quelque manière, dans l'essence divine en tant qu'elle est imitable par elles, donc présentes aussi dans son intelligence, identique à son essence: "Cum hoc nomen 'idea' nominet essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar imitatum a creatura, divina essentia erit propria idea istius rei secundum determinatum imitationis modum."[34]

Pour éviter de porter atteinte à la simplicité et à l'unité de Dieu, il faut donc distinguer les raisons de l'imitation en tant qu'elles sont fondées dans la plénitude de l'essence divine, et en tant qu'elles sont objets de connaissance. Le mot *idée* est réservé pour exprimer la seconde signification: "...ex hoc sunt plures rationes ideales, secundum quod Deus intelligit essentiam suam ut imitabilem per hunc vel per illum modum. Ipsae enim rationes imitationis intellectae, seu modi, sunt ideae; idea enim, ut ex dictis patet, nominat formam ut intellectam, et non prout est in natura intelligentis."[35] C'est cette distinction, entre l'essence divine imitable et l'essence divine connue comme imitable, qui est appelée, et appelée seule, à résoudre le problème de l'antinomie entre l'unité de l'intellect divin et la pluralité des idées; antinomie qui, répétons le, ne se pose pas pour le Lombard, puisqu'il ne reconnaît qu'une seule présence en Dieu, celle des objets de sa connaissance en tant qu'objets, qui semble bien exclure une présence "in natura intelligentis."

Le Lombard, en somme, suit un itinéraire inverse de celui de S. Thomas. Il développe une théologie de la science divine qui n'utilise que de données propres au domaine de la connaissance. Il évoque ensuite une présence dans l'essence divine, mais c'est pour la rejeter. S. Thomas, au contraire, a adopté d'emblée une présence dans l'essence divine comme plénitude imitable, fondement de la perfection de son intellection. Dieu connaît tout, toutes choses distinctes de lui, et il connaît tout jusque dans le détail individuel, sans recevoir sa connaissance des êtres distincts de lui, puisque tout ce qui est est imitation de la plénitude de sa perfection. La distinction 35 a développé ce point. Elle a montré notamment que la connaissance d'objets multiples ne contredisait point la simplicité de Dieu. Il suffit pour cela de distinguer l'essence comme essence et l'essence comme imitable. La perfection de la connaissance suit la perfection de l'essence et la plénitude de son imitabilité. La présence dans la connaissance est la conséquence logique de la présence dans l'essence à titre d'imitabilité de sa

33 "Hoc nomen 'idea' nominat essentiam divinam secundum quod est exemplar imitatum a creatura." Ibid., d. 36, q. 2, a. 2, sol.; p. 842.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

plénitude. Il suffit de distinguer entre un *intellectum primum* et un *intellectum secundum* pour pouvoir conclure: "Si ergo consideretur intellectum primum, nihil aliud intelligit Deus nisi se; qui non recipit species rerum, per quas cognoscat; sed per essentiam suam cognoscit, quae est similitudo omnium rerum; sed si accipiatur intellectum secundum, sic non tantum se intelligit, sed etiam alia."[36]

A cette doctrine relative à la connaissance divine, la question des idées n'ajoute rien, si ce n'est un rapport à la production des êtres, *formae operativae*, et un certaine rôle de medium de connaissance joué par ces formes à l'égard de la réalité des créatures: *per quas cognoscit.*[37] On dirait que, attentif à la *présence* des intelligibles dans la connaissance divine, S. Thomas s'est moins inquiété du problème de la *forme actualisante*. Le traité de la connaissance et celui des idées n'envisagent explicitement que la présence à titre d'objet, soit comme terme connu seulement, soit comme terme connu et medium ou quasi medium de la connaissance des êtres produits par Dieu.

C'est le rôle de forme actualisante, attribué à l'essence divine, qui va faire apparaître sous un jour nouveau l'antinomie entre la simplicité de l'essence divine et la multiplicité des objets connus.[38] Ceux-ci, en effet, ne doivent-ils pas aussi actuer en quelque sorte l'intellect divin pour être connus, comme l'exige, en principe, l'espèce intelligible selon Aristote? Si l'on veut éviter une conclusion, ruineuse pour la simplicité divine, il faudra compléter la noétique de l'espèce intelligible par une donnée nouvelle, celle de l'expression ou de la formation d'un terme connu par le connaissant. C'est ce que S. Thomas va faire quand il reprendra la discussion des idées divines et surtout le problème de leur multiplicité. L'idée, imitation de l'essence divine, identique à son essence, ne sera plus alors un objet connu seulement, présent dans son intelligence par la forme actualisante, mais aussi objet formé par le connaissant. C'est à ce titre qu'elle constituera un élément nécessaire de la synthèse théologique relative à la connaissance divine.

36 Ibid., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, sol.; p. 815. Pour le vocabulaire ici employé, voir infra pp. 194-197. Sur ce point de l'essence comme similitude éminente du multiple, Dodds a cru pouvoir montrer des liens entre le néo-platonisme et la théologie chrétienne des attributs divins. Ce serait plutôt celle des idées divines qu'il faudrait évoquer, me semble-t-il. Voir, Proclus, *The Elements of Theology*, éd. citée, pp. 270-271 (prop. 112), pp. 278-279 (prop. 151-159).

37 Ce n'est pas rien. Mais c'est assurément, à propos de notre exposé du *Comm. sur les Sent.*, qu'il est légitime d'affirmer que ce sont des causes accidentelles qui expliquent la présence d'une question consacrée aux idées divines. Et l'on pourrait estimer que, sauf le rapport à la créature, considérée dans sa réalité, tout a été dit à la dist. 35 et à la qu. 1 de la dist. 36.

38 Dans notre texte, cette antinomie est envisagée à propos de la connaissance divine; d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 3; a. 2, obj. 1 et 3. Voir les réponses, et infra p. 195 s. Pour la qu. des idées, voir a. 1, obj. 2, 3, et 4. Mais il s'agit plutôt de la distinction réelle de l'intelligence et des idées et de leur fonction d'objets.

De Veritate, qu. 3

Nous retrouvons le problème des idées divines dans la 3e question du *De Veritate*. Comme dans le *Commentaire sur les Sentences*, elle fait suite à la discussion de la science divine. Aucun lien cependant ne la rattache à la question précédente, ce qui est normal pour le genre littéraire des questions disputées. Le premier article, comme dans le *Commentaire sur les Sentences*, établit la nécessité d'admettre l'existence d'idées en Dieu. Dix arguments, dont cinq sont empruntés à S. Augustin, préparent la démonstration proposée dans le corps de l'article. Celle-ci est organisée autour de la notion de *forme*, le mot *idée* pouvant être rendu en latin par *forma* ou *species*, au dire de S. Augustin. Le mot *forme* comporte des sens différents. Pour définir le sens du mot *idée*, il faut retenir celui de "forme imitée par une chose par l'intention de l'agent qui se propose une certaine fin."[39] Cette forme n'est rien d'autre que la forme exemplaire ou idée. C'est elle qui sert de fin à l'artisan, c'est d'elle aussi qu'il reçoit la forme selon laquelle il agit, si l'exemplaire est distinct de lui. Or Dieu n'agit point pour une fin distincte de lui-même. Il ne reçoit pas d'ailleurs la forme qui lui permet d'agir. Il n'y a donc pas d'idées en dehors de Dieu, mais seulement dans l'esprit divin.[40]

La perspective est donc la même que dans le *Commentaire sur les Sentences*. L'idée est le modèle d'après lequel Dieu crée, puisque la création n'est ni l'œuvre du hasard, ni l'effet d'une nécessité naturelle.

C'est à l'article 2 que nous trouvons un nouveau développement, à propos de la multiplicité des idées. Le problème est mis en rapport, explicitement, avec les doctrines qui voulaient limiter la connaissance divine à une seule idée, commune à toute la création, afin de sauvegarder l'unité de Dieu. S. Thomas tient au contraire qu'"il est nécessaire de dire que toute la distinction des choses est prédéfinie par Dieu. Il est donc nécessaire de placer en Dieu les raisons propres de toutes choses. Voilà pourquoi il est nécessaire de placer en Dieu plusieurs idées."[41] Il

39 "Haec ergo videtur esse ratio ideae, quod idea sit forma quam aliquid imitatur ex intentione agentis qui praedeterminat sibi finem." Q. 3, a. 1; éd. léon., p. 100, ll. 221-223.

40 "Forma exemplaris vel idea habet quodam modo rationem finis et ab ea accipit artifex formam qua agit si sit extra ipsum, non est autem conveniens ponere Deum agere propter finem alium a se et accipere aliunde unde sit sufficiens ad agendum, ideo non possumus ponere ideas esse extra Deum sed in mente divina tantum." Q. 3, a. 1; éd. léon, p. 100, ll. 254-251.

41 "Unde necesse est dicere quod tota distinctio rerum sit praediffinita ab ipso, et ideo necesse est in Deo ponere singulorum proprias rationes, et propter hoc necesse est ponere in eo plures ideas." Q. 3, a. 2; éd. léon., p. 104, ll. 153-157.

faut donc montrer que cette multiplicité ne contredit pas l'unité divine.[42]

C'est ici que S. Thomas introduit une donnée dont il n'avait pas fait usage dans son exposé du *Commentaire sur les Sentences*. On a dit que l'idée était une forme, et, plus précisément "la forme exemplaire, à l'imitation de laquelle quelque chose est constitué,"[43] ou "la forme que quelque autre chose imite,"[44] qu'elle soit dans l'agent ou en dehors de lui.[45] Il suffit qu'elle soit "une forme que quelque chose imite, par l'intention d'un agent qui se propose une fin déterminée."[46]

Or

> ...une forme peut se trouver dans l'intellect de deux manières. D'une première manière elle y est en tant que principe de l'acte d'intellection, comme la forme qui appartient au connaissant en tant que connaissant; c'est la similitude, en lui, de l'objet connu. D'une autre manière, elle y est comme terme de l'acte d'intellection, quand l'artisan, par exemple, invente (*excogitat*), en connaissant, la forme de la maison. Puisque cette forme est inventée par l'acte d'intellection et, en quelque sorte, produite par lui, elle ne peut être le principe de l'acte d'intellection, constituant le premier *quo* par lequel s'effectue l'acte d'intellection. Elle est plutôt un objet connu, d'après lequel le connaissant produit quelque chose. Néanmoins cette forme est un deuxième *quo* par lequel le connaissant connaît, parce que, par la forme inventée, l'artisan connaît ce qu'il faut produire. Nous voyons de même, pour l'intellect spéculatif, que l'espèce, par laquelle l'intellect est informé pour connaître en acte, est le premier *quo*

42 Notons qu'au *Commentaire sur les Sentences*, Saint Thomas a marqué quelque réserve au sujet de l'expression "plures ideae." L'idée occupe comme une position intermédiaire entre l'essence, qui est une, et les "raisons," qu'on peut dire "plures." "Idea autem quasi medio modo se habet; quia essentiam et rationem imitationis, quae est secundum respectum, importat; et ideo, etsi inveniatur in nomine ideae consignificata pluralitas, ut cum pluraliter profertur, raro tamen aut nunquam invenitur significata per additionem termini numeralis, ut sic dicantur plures ideae; pluralitas enim exprimitur magis significando quam consignificando." *In I Sent.*, d. 2., ad 4; éd. Mandonnet, I, p. 843. Comparer avec le texte suivant d'Alexandre de Halès: "Idea media est secundum rationem intelligentiae inter essentiam divinam et creaturam quam facit; nihil autem est medium secundum rem. Et quia per modum medii est secundum intelligentiam, idea habet aliquem modum ex parte una, et aliquem ex parte altera. Ex parte creaturarum habet quod sit 'multa'; ex parte autem Dei, quod sit 'una'. Unde notandum quod non proprie dicitur 'multae', ut multitudo quae est in illis exprimatur per dictionem significantem multitudinem. Hoc patet ex verbis Augustini: singulorum enim rationibus est plena ars illa. Et haec est ratio: quia ex parte Dei idea propinquius se tenet, unde magis ei convenit unitas quam pluralitas; unde, si proprie exprimatur illa pluralitas, debet exprimi per multitudinem 'consignificatam' et non 'significatam'. Unde haec est propria 'ideae'; haec autem minus propria, 'multae ideae'." *Magistri Alexandri de Hales, Quaestiones disputatae "antequam esset frater"* (Quaracchi, 1960), II, pp. 799-800.

43 *De ver.*, q. 3, a. 1, c., éd. léon., p. 99, ll. 179-180.

44 Ibid l. 182.

45 "Solum hoc (ideam) dicimus quando agens propter finem determinat sibi finem, sive illa forma sit in agente sive extra agentem: dicimus enim formam artis in artifice esse exemplar vel ideam artificiati, et similiter etiam formam quae est extra artificem ad cuius imitationem artifex aliquid facit." Ibid., p. 100, ll. 214-220.

46 Ibid. ll. 220-223.

par lequel on connaît. Mais une fois en acte par une telle forme, l'intellect peut agir en formant la quiddité des choses et des jugements affirmatifs ou négatifs. La quiddité formée dans l'intellect, ou bien la proposition affirmative ou négative est donc quelque chose qui a été produit par l'intellect, mais par quoi, néanmoins, il connaît la chose extérieure, et qui constitue donc comme un deuxième *quo* de l'acte de connaissance.[47]

S. Thomas distingue donc les deux formes, qu'on appellera plus tard: espèce impresse et espèce expresse. L'artisan ou l'intellect spéculatif, qui possèdent une première forme, principe de l'acte d'intellection, peuvent en former une seconde, qui joue le rôle de terme de l'acte. On s'attend à voir cette distinction appliquée au problème des idées divines. En fait, le développement s'oriente différemment. La distinction entre la forme reçue et la forme produite, l'une et l'autre étant cependant ce par quoi (*quo*) l'intellect connaît, passe au second plan. On revient au cas de Dieu, en supposant "l'intelligence d'un artisan qui produirait une œuvre à la ressemblance de lui-même. Dans ce cas, l'intellect de l'artisan serait l'idée, non en tant qu'intellect, mais en tant que connu (*intellectum*)."[48] La conclusion sous-entendue, c'est que, dans le cas de Dieu, c'est l'intelligence, donc l'essence de Dieu, qui est l'idée, à la ressemblance de laquelle l'œuvre de la création est produite. On ne dit pas explicitement qu'une forme est conçue dans l'intellect divin, ou que nous pouvons parler d'une telle forme, par analogie avec les modèles conçus par l'artisan.

L'existence d'un modèle conçu est cependant utilisée implicitement dans la suite du texte, pour faire comprendre la possibilité d'admettre la multiplicité des idées dans l'intellect divin.

Il arrive, en effet, quand une chose est produite à l'imitation d'une autre, que l'imitation soit parfaite. Dans ce cas, l'intellect opératif, qui *conçoit d'avance* la forme de l'œuvre, a comme idée la forme même de la chose

47 "Forma enim in intellectu dupliciter esse potest. Uno modo ita quod sit principium actus intelligendi, sicut forma quae est intelligentis inquantum est intelligens, et haec est similitudo intellecti in ipso; alio modo ita quod sit terminus actus intelligendi, sicut artifex intelligendo excogitat formam domus, et cum illa forma sit excogitata per actum intelligendi et quasi per actum effecta, non potest esse principium actus intelligendi ut sit primum quo intelligatur, sed magis se habet ut intellectum quo intelligens aliquid operatur, nihilominus tamen est forma praedicta secundum quo intelligitur quia per formam excogitatam artifex intelligit quid operandum sit; sicut etiam in intellectu speculativo videmus quod species qua intellectus informatur ut intelligat actu est primum quo intelligitur, ex hoc autem quod est effectus in actu per talem formam operari iam potest formando quiditates rerum et componendo et dividendo, unde ipsa quiditas formata in intellectu vel etiam compositio et divisio est quoddam operatum ipsius, per quod tamen intellectus venit in cognitionem rei exterioris et sic est quasi secundum quo intelligitur." Q. 3. a. 2, c.; éd. léon., p. 104, ll. 159-183.

48 Ibid., p. 104. ll. 183-188.

imitée, telle qu'elle est dans la chose imitée. Il arrive aussi que l'œuvre produite à l'imitation d'autre chose n'en soit pas une imitation parfaite; en ce cas, l'intellect opératif se servirait de la forme de la chose imitée comme idée ou exemplaire de l'œuvre à produire, non pas absolument, mais dans la proportion déterminée d'après laquelle la reproduction demeure en deçа de l'exemplaire principal ou l'imite.[49]

Dans le cas de la création de l'univers par Dieu, c'est la seconde hypothèse qui se vérifie. Les créatures n'imitent la perfection divine que d'une manière déficiente. L'essence divine n'est donc pas l'idée en tant qu'essence, mais, d'une part, en tant qu'elle est connue, et, d'autre part, dans la proportion qui définit le degré selon lequel la créature imite l'essence divine ou demeure en deçа:

Je dis donc que Dieu, agissant par son intelligence, produit toutes choses à la similitude de son essence. Son essence est donc l'idée des choses, non en tant qu'essence, mais en tant qu'elle est connue. Or les choses créées n'imitent pas parfaitement l'essence divine. L'essence est donc prise par l'intellect divin comme idée, non pas absolument, mais selon la proportion de la créature à produire et de l'essence divine elle-même, selon qu'elle reste en deçа ou l'imite. Or les choses diverses imitent l'essence diversement, et chacune selon son mode propre, puisque chacune a un *esse* distinct de celui des autres. Il s'ensuit que l'essence divine elle-même, en y comprenant comme objets connus en même temps (*cointellectis*) les diverses proportions des choses à son égard, est l'idée de chaque chose. Et puisque les proportions des choses sont diverses, il est nécessaire qu'il y ait plusieurs idées, et qu'il n'y en ait qu'une de la part de l'essence, tandis que la pluralité se prend des diverses proportions des créatures par rapport à elle.[50]

49 "In his autem quae ad imitationem alterius producuntur, quandoque quidem id quod alterum imitatur perfecte imitatur ipsum, et tunc intellectus operativus praeconcipiens formam operati habet ut ideam ipsam formam rei imitatae prout est illius rei imitatae; quandoque vero quod est ad imitationem alterius non perfecte imitatur illud, et tunc intellectus operativus non acciperet formam rei absolute ut ideam vel exemplar rei operandae sed cum proportione determinata secundum quam exemplatum a principali exemplari deficeret vel imitaretur." Ibid., p. 104, ll. 187-200. Il est évident qu'il ne s'agit pas d'une inégalité qui serait l'effet de causes indépendantes de l'artisan. C'est l'artisan lui-même qui délibérément produit une œuvre dont il sait qu'elle ne représente qu'une imitation imparfaite de "l'exemplaire principal." Il doit donc connaître l'exemplaire principal, plus les diverses imitations possibles. L'œuvre à produire est donc conçue nécessairement comme un certain mode d'imitation d'un modèle qui la dépasse, c'est-à-dire que l'idée de l'œuvre à produire est elle-même relative à l'exemplaire principal, c'est-à-dire, dans le cas de la création, à l'essence divine.

50 "Dico ergo quod Deus per intellectum omnia operans omnia ad simititudinem essentiae suae producit, unde essentia sua est idea rerum non quidem ut est essentia sed ut est intellecta. Res autem creatae non perfecte imitantur divinam essentiam, unde essentia non accipitur absolute ab intellectu divino ut idea rerum sed cum proportione creaturae fiendae ad ipsam divinam essentiam secundum quod deficit ab ea vel imitatur ipsam; diversae autem res diversimode ipsam imitantur et unaquaeque secundum proprium modum suum cum unicuique sit esse distinctum ab altera. Et ideo ipsa divina essentia, cointellectis diversis proportionibus rerum ad ipsam, est idea uniuscuiusque rei: unde cum sint diversae rerum proportiones, necesse est plures esse ideas, et est quidem una ex parte essentiae sed pluralitas invenitur ex parte diversarum proportionum creaturarum ad ipsam." Ibid., p. 104, l. 200, p. 105, l. 219.

La solution, on le voit, ne reprend pas la distinction entre une forme principe de l'acte et une forme formée par l'acte. Cette distinction ne semble être intervenue que pour faire voir la possibilité d'utiliser un modèle, qui, en fait, est un objet produit par le connaissant, soit absolument, soit dans diverses proportions seulement. C'est, en tout cas, le seul aspect de la comparaison qui soit explicitement utilisé.

La forme produite par le connaissant n'intervient non plus pour résoudre la difficulté posée par la multiplicité des idées, si celles-ci sont considérées comme ce *par quoi* Dieu connaît, c'est à dire, si elles sont considérées à la fois comme une multitude d'objets connus et une multiplicité de formes actualisant l'intellect. En effet "un intellect qui connaît par plusieurs formes est un intellect composé, et il passe d'un objet à un autre, ce qui est étranger à l'intellect divin; puisque donc les idées sont des raisons des choses, par lesquelles Dieu connaît, il semble qu'il n'y ait pas plusieurs idées en Dieu."[51] S. Thomas répond:

> L'idée n'a pas raison de ce par quoi premièrement quelque chose est connu; elle a raison d'un objet existant dans l'intellect. Or l'uniformité de l'intellect suit l'unité de ce par quoi premièrement quelque chose est connu, tout de même que l'unité de l'action suit à l'unité de la forme de l'agent qui en est le principe. Bien que les rapports connus par Dieu, soient donc multiples, en quoi consiste la multiplicité des idées, son intellect n'est pas multiple, mais un, puisqu'il connaît tous ces rapports par son essence qui est une.[52]

Rien, on le voit, au sujet d'une forme-formée.

S. Thomas utilise ici, à propos du problème de la multiplicité des idées, une distinction différente de celle dont il s'était servi aux *Sentences* à propos de la multiplicité des *objets connus* par Dieu, c'est à dire à la distinction 35, non pas à la distinction 36, qu. 2, consacrée aux idées. Il ne s'agit pas formellement de l'opposition entre la multiplicité des objets et l'unité de l'intellect divin, mais plutôt de la possibilité, pour Dieu, de connaître en lui-même, et par son unique essence, les êtres *distincts* de lui, qu'il crée. Problème du même et de l'autre,

51 Ibid., obj. 9.

52 "Idea non habet rationem eius quo primo aliquid intelligitur, sed habet rationem intellecti in intellectu existentis; uniformitas autem intellectus sequitur unitatem eius quo primo aliquid intelligitur, sicut unitas actionis sequitur unitatem formae agentis quae est principium ipsius; unde quamvis respectus intellecti a Deo sint multi in quibus pluralitas idearum consistit, quia tamen illos omnes per unam suam essentiam intelligit, intellectus eius non est multiplex sed unus." Ibid., ad 9; éd. léon., p. 106, ll. 302-313. Saint Thomas refuse donc seulement de voir dans les idées des formes analogues à l'espèce intelligible. Il n'oppose pas un *quo primo* à un *quo secundo* mais le rôle de principe d'actuation (*quo*) à celui d'objet connu. Les idées ne sont que des objets connus, comme on l'a déjà dit dès le *Comm. sur les Sent.*; plus exactement, elles sont connues avec l'essence elle-même (*cointellecta*), comme les modes divers selon lesquels sa perfection peut être imitée.

pourrait-on dire, plutôt que problème de l'un et du multiple, bien que ce dernier entre nécessairement aussi en ligne de compte. Dieu doit connaître, en effet, les êtres qu'il crée et qu'il gouverne, qui sont donc distincts de lui (*alia a se*).

> Mais il faut savoir que l'expression *objet connu par l'intelligence*, de même que celle d'*objet vu*, s'entendent en deux sens. Il y a en effet un premier objet vu, qui est la *species* elle-même de l'objet visible, existant dans la pupille, perfection, aussi de celui qui voit, principe de vision et medium à l'égard de la chose visible; et il y a un deuxième objet vu qui est la chose elle-même en dehors de l'âme. De même le premier objet connu est la similitude de la chose qui se trouve dans l'intellect; et il y a un deuxième objet connu qui est la chose elle-même connue par cette similitude.[53]

En appliquant cette distinction à Dieu, on obtient ceci:

> Si l'on parle du premier objet connu, Dieu ne connaît que soi-même, puisqu'il ne reçoit pas les espèces des choses par lesquelles il connaîtrait, mais il connaît par son essence, qui est similitude de toutes choses. Si au contraire on parle du deuxième objet connu, Dieu ne connaît pas seulement lui-même, mais aussi les réalités distinctes de lui.[54]

C'est en pensant au premier objet connu qu'Aristote a pu dire que Dieu ne se connaît que lui-même. Et d'ailleurs, c'est le premier objet seul qui est perfection du connaissant, non le deuxième. "Ce n'est pas la pierre qui est en dehors de l'âme qui est perfection de l'intellect, mais la similitude de la pierre qui est dans l'âme."[55]

La distinction entre un *primum intellectum* et un *secundum intellectum* est donc appelée à fonder la connaissance, par Dieu, des êtres distincts de Dieu. Ceux-ci sont présents dans l'intellect divin comme objets connus, parce qu'ils ne sont rien que l'essence divine elle-même en tant qu'imitable et participable. Ils sont donc envisagés comme objets connus (*quod*), non comme principe par lequel l'intellect est en acte (*quo*). Ce dernier rôle revient à l'essence, formellement comme essence,

53 "Sciendum tamen est quod intellectum dupliciter dicitur, sicut visum etiam. Est enim primum visum quod est ipsa species rei visibilis in pupilla existens, quae est etiam perfectio videntis, et principium visionis, et medium nomen (sic: respectu?) rei visibilis: et est visum secundum, quod est ipsa res extra animam. Similiter intellectum primum est ipsa rei similitudo, quae est in intellectu; et est intellectum secundum ipsa res, quae per similitudinem illam intelligitur." *In I Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, sol.; éd. Mandonnet, I. pp. 814-815.

54 "Si ergo consideretur intellectum primum, nihil aliud intelligit Deus nisi se; quia non recipit species rerum, per quas congnoscat; sed per essentiam suam cognoscit, quae est similitudo omnium rerum. Sed si accipiatur intellectum secundum, sic non tantum se intelligit, sed etiam alia. Et secundum primum modum dicit Philosophus... quod Deus intelligit tantum se." Ibid., p. 815.

55 "Quod enim objicitur primo, quod intellectus est perfectio intelligentis, verum est de intellecto primo, et non de intellecto secundo. Non enim lapis, qui est extra animam, est perfectio intellectus; sed similitudo lapidis, quae est in anima." Ibid., p. 815.

"medium unique, parfaitement simple," par lequel Dieu connaît tout ce qu'il connaît, et qui est aussi le *primum intellectum.*[56]

Il n'est pas facile, assurément, de bien entendre ce vocabulaire. L'espèce de la pierre, qui est dans la pupille, n'a jamais été considerée par S. Thomas, dans ses écrits postérieurs, comme un objet vu, ni d'ailleurs l'espèce intelligible comme un objet connu par l'intelligence, si ce n'est par un acte de réflexion. Et celle-ci, justement, fait défaut aux pouvoirs sensibles. La comparaison avec le cas de Dieu suppose cependant que l'espèce, aussi bien que la réalité, soient des objets connus. L'essence divine, en effet, ne peut faire connaître les êtres distincts d'elle, comme S. Thomas veut le faire comprendre, si elle n'est pas objet connu, en tant qu'essence aussi bien qu'en tant qu'essence imitable. Il semble certain, néanmoins que par les expressions: *primum visum* et *primum intellectum*, S. Thomas désigne les espèces sensibles et intelligibles formellement comme principes d'actuation et de spécification, non comme objets connus,[57] même si, pour l'intelligence, l'espèce peut devenir un *intellectum*, au sens d'objet connu, pour l'acte de réflexion.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la difficulté est résolue uniquement par la distinction de deux "objets connus," et leur identité avec l'essence divine. Aucune mention, pour aucune forme, de sa production par l'acte d'intellection pour en être le terme. Quand, à la distinction 36, c'est non

56 "Scientia Dei est una numero omnium rerum, quia per unum medium simplicissimum, quod est sua essentia, omnia cognoscit." Ibid., ad 4, p. 815. Il semble donc qu'il faille comprendre ainsi l'ensemble des données; l'essence assure l'*unité* de la connaissance divine à l'égard des choses distinctes de Dieu (*alia*) en tant qu'elle contient leurs essences comme imitation (notes 54 et 55); elle est *intellectum primum*, comme essence, en tant que l'essence joue le rôle d'espèce ou de forme actualisante (note 54); elle est *intellectum secundum*, objet connu à la fois comme essence et comme similitude de toutes choses (note 54); les créatures sont seulement *intellectum secundum* nullement ce par quoi Dieu connaît (notes 54, 55); elles sont plutôt comme la pierre réelle, vue par l'œil.

57 Voici un texte, qui montre clairement que c'est bien l'espèce intelligible, en tant qu'elle actue le pouvoir, qui est *intellecta*: "Intellectus enim humanus, qui aliquando est in potentia, et aliquando in actu, quando est in potentia intelligens non est idem cum intelligibili in potentia, quod est aliqua res existens extra animam; sed ad hoc quod sit intelligens in actu oportet quod intelligibile in potentia fiat intelligibile in actu per hoc quod species ejus denudatur ab omnibus appenditiis materiae per virtutem intellectus agentis; et oportet quod haec species, quae est *intellecta in actu*, perficiat intellectum in potentia: ex quorum conjunctione efficitur unum perfectum, quod est intellectus in actu, sicut ex anima et corpore efficitur unum, quod est homo habens operationes humanas." Appliquées à Dieu, ces considérations donnent les précisions suivantes: "prout consideratur essentia ejus ut immunis a materia, sic est intelligens... sed prout consideratur essentia sua secundum quod intellectus accipit eam sine materia, sic *est intellectum*; sed prout consideratur ipsum intellectum prout non deest sibi intelligenti, sed est in seipso quodammodo, sic est intelligentia vel scientia: quia scientia nihil aliud est quam impressio vel conjunctio sciti ad scientem." Ibid., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; éd Mandonnet, I, p. 812. Si le texte de nos éditions est correct, Saint Thomas désigne donc par le participe *intellectum* ou *visum* à la fois ce qui fait connaître et ce qui est connu. Voir aussi les notes 55, 56, et 59.

plus l'altérité des objets connus, mais leur multiplicité qui est en cause, et leur multiplicité comme idées (*per quas intelligit*), c'est encore par l'unité de l'essence et la multiplicité de ses participations ou imitations possibles, envisagées comme objets connus, que le problème est résolu: "Ipsae enim rationes imitationis ut intellectae, seu modi, sunt ideae; idea enim...nominat formam ut intellectam, et non prout est in natura intelligentis."[58]

En résumé, nous pouvons dire que le texte du *De Veritate* développe, à propos des idées et de leur multiplicité en Dieu, la distinction entre forme principe de l'acte et forme formée par l'acte de connaissance. Les deux peuvent jouer le rôle de ce par quoi (*quo*) la réalité est connue en dehors du connaissant: l'œuvre, par exemple, connue par le modèle d'après lequel elle a été produite.[59] Mais on ne dit pas explicitement comme on pourrait s'y attendre, qu'en Dieu l'idée est comme un terme produit par le connaissant, dans lequel et par lequel la créature est connue. C'est dans la *Somme contre les Gentils* que S. Thomas va faire de l'idée en Dieu, explicitement, un terme produit par le connaissant. C'est dans cette identification de l'idée avec un terme formé qu'il voit alors la possibilité d'éviter la contradiction entre l'unité de l'intellect divin et la multiplicité des idées, contradiction à laquelle on aboutit nécessairement quand on s'en tient strictement à la notion de l'espèce intelligible, telle qu'elle est utilisée par Aristote.

LA *SOMME CONTRE LES GENTILS*

On a voulu voir, dans les chapitres 53 et 54 du premier livre de la *Somme contre les Gentils*, la preuve particulièrement nette que S. Thomas n'avait nul besoin de parler des idées pour traiter la question

58 Supra note 35.

59 Du point de vue du vocabulaire, il faut donc distinguer: a) *quo primo*, qui désigne le principe d'actualisation du connaissant comme tel, et s'oppose à *intellectum*, l'objet connu (note 52); b) *intellectum* (note 57), qui se divise en: *intellectum primum*, la forme comme forme, donc identique au *quo primo* précédent, et *intellectum secundum*, l'objet connu, qu'il soit dans le connaissant ou en dehors de lui; c) *primum quo* et *secundum quo* (note 47), le premier étant l'espèce en tant qu'elle fait connaître à titre de medium, non pas formellement en tant qu'elle actue le pouvoir; le second étant une forme produite, considérée comme objet de connaissance et medium par rapport à la réalité dont elle est la similitude.

Le texte suivant montre bien les différents aspects du problème dont les multiples distinctions essaient de tenir compte: "Si ratio cognitionis accipiatur ex parte cognoscentis, Deus eadem ratione se cognoscit et alia quia et idem cognoscens et idem cognitionis actus et idem medium est cognoscendi; si autem accipiatur ratio ex parte rei cognitae sic non eadem ratione se cognoscit et alia quia non est eadem habitudo sui et aliorum ad medium quo cognoscit, quia ipse illi medio est idem per essentiam res autem aliae per assimilationem tantum, et ideo se ipsum cognoscit per essentiam alia vero per similitudinem; idem tamen est quod est eius essentia et aliorum similitudo." *De ver.*, 2, 3, ad 6; éd. léon., p. 53.

de la connaissance divine. De fait, l'ensemble des chapitres 44 à 70, si l'on excepte les chapitres 60-62, consacrés à la vérité en Dieu, forme un tout où l'on retrouve la matière traitée, dans la *Somme théologique* comme dans les *Sentences* et le *De Veritate*, sous le titre de la connaissance divine. Aucun chapitre, traitant des idées divines, ne vient le compléter. Cependant il n'est pas difficile de voir que les chapitres 51-54 forment un bloc qui interrompt l'exposé. S. Thomas vient de montrer que Dieu connaît les réalités distinctes de lui (*alia a se*) (chap. 49), et qu'il en a une connaissance propre (chap. 50). Dans la *Somme théologique*, les mêmes sujets sont traités aux articles 5 et 6 de la question 14. Ils sont suivis par des articles dont le sujet correspond, avec quelques inversions, aux chapitres 55 et suivants de la *Somme contre les Gentils*.

Les chapitres 51 et 52 introduisent, dans la séries des chapitres traitant de la connaissance divine, une discussion des doctrines selon lesquelles les multiples objets connus par Dieu, ou bien ont un *esse* distinct en Dieu, ou bien subsistent en dehors de Dieu, ou bien se trouveraient dans des intellects distincts de Dieu. Aucune n'est acceptable. D'une manière ou d'une autre. elles ruinent des thèses établies précédemment, spécialement la simplicité divine, sans parler des autres raisons qui les condamnent. Le chapitre 51 annonce qu'on va "examiner la manière dont les objets connus (*intellecta*) sont multiples," afin d'éviter de laisser s'introduire la composition dans l'intellect divin, du fait de la multitude des objets connus."[60] Le chapitre 53 se rattache à ce propos, par dessus l'exposé et la discussion des doctrines, qui occupent les chapitres 51 et 52. Or, ces doctrines, on l'a vu, sont censées transformer les intelligibles connus par Dieu en entités indépendantes de l'intellect divin, peu importe qu'elles se trouvent dans l'intellect divin lui-même ou en dehors de lui. Platon, en particulier, est longuement discuté (chap. 51).

La composition entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible peut concerner, en effet, soit l'espèce intelligible qui est principe de l'acte, soit son objet. L'espèce intelligible donne à l'intelligence d'être en acte, en lui donnant, du même coup, d'être en possession de la similitude de l'objet à connaître. Les Idées platoniciennes, au contraire, assurent la présence à titre d'objets, sans jouer le rôle d'une similitude reçue dans le pouvoir. On aurait une multitude d'objets, sans espèce intelligible correspondante dans l'intellect. S. Thomas rappelle justement, contre la con-

60 "Sed ne multitudo intellectorum in intellectum divinum compositionem inducat, investigandus est modus quo ista intellecta sunt multa." I *CG*, 51, init.,; éd. léon. man., pp. 48-49.

ception platonicienne, la nécessité d'une présence dans l'intellect lui-même: "Intellectum oportet esse in intelligente. Non igitur sufficit ponere formas rerum per se existentes extra intellectum divinum ad hoc quod Deus multitudinem rerum intelligat, sed oportet quod sint in ipso intellectu divino" (chap. 51 fin).

Cependant, S. Thomas a déjà montré que "l'intellect divin ne connaît par aucune autre espèce intelligible que son essence. L'espèce intelligible en effet est le principe formel de l'opération intellectuelle, tout de même que la forme de l'agent est le principe de son opération propre."[61] Il a montré que "Dieu connaît premièrement et par soi uniquement lui-même. Est en effet connue premièrement et par soi par un intellect uniquement la chose par l'espèce de laquelle il connaît. Or ce par quoi Dieu connaît n'est rien d'autre que son essence. L'objet connu par lui premièrement et par soi n'est donc que lui-même."[62] Il a montré enfin que "par le fait même que Dieu se connaît, il est nécessaire d'admettre qu'il connaît en lui-même les choses distinctes de lui."[63] Et il conclut: "En tenant ensemble ces deux conclusions (i.e. chap. 48 et 49), on voit clairement que Dieu se connaît lui-même premièrement et par soi, en quelque sorte, les autres choses comme vues dans son essence."[64] Le chapitre 50 montre ensuite longuement que Dieu doit avoir de toutes choses une connaissance propre, c'est à dire pour autant qu'elles sont distinctes les unes des autres. L'avant dernier argument est fondé sur le rapport d'imitation entre l'essence divine et les diverses formes: "Dieu connaît...selon combien de modes quelque chose peut être semblable à son essence. Or la diversité des formes tient au fait que les choses imitent diversement l'essence divine. Aussi le Philosophe appelle-t-il la forme naturelle quelque chose de divin. Dieu connaît donc les choses selon leurs formes propres."[65]

61 "...apparet quod intellectus divinus nulla alia specie intelligibili intelligat quam sua essentia. Species enim intelligibilis principium formale est intellectualis operationis; sicut forma cuiuslibet agentis principium est propriae operationis." Ibid., c. 46; pp. 44-45.

62 "...apparet quod Deus primo et per se solum seipsum cognoscit. Illa enim solum res est primo et per se ab intellectu cognita cuius specie intelligit: operatio enim formae quae est operationis principium proportionatur. Sed id quo Deus intelligit nihil est aliud quam sua essentia....Igitur intellectum ab ipso primo et per se nihil aliud est quam ipsemet." Ibid., c. 48, init, p. 46.

63 "Ex hoc autem quod seipsum cognoscit primo et per se, quod alia a se in seipso cognoscat ponere oportet." Ibid., c. 49, init., p. 47.

64 "Colligentes igitur has duas conclusiones (cf. cap. praec.), apparet Deum cognoscere seipsum quasi primo et per se notum, alia vero sicut in essentia sua visa." Ibid., c. 49, fin.

65 "Divina...natura communicabilis est per similitudinem. Scit ergo Deus quot modis eius essentiae aliquid simile esse potest. Sed ex hoc sunt diversitates formarum quod divinam essentiam res diversimode imitantur; unde Philosophus formam naturalem *divinum quoddam* nominat.... Deus igitur de rebus habet cognitionem secundum proprias formas." Ibid., c. 50, fin., p. 48.

Tout semble donc dit au sujet de la connaissance divine et de ses objets. La composition que "la multitude des objets connus" risque d'introduire dans l'intellect divin ne se comprend donc pleinement que si les objets connus, en tant que tels, tenus par certains pour des intelligibles autonomes, c'est à dire des idées, entraînaient aussi une multiplicité ou une composition du côté du pouvoir et de ses actes, c'est à dire, si la multiplicité des objets connus exigeait une multiplicité identique du côté de l'espèce intelligible en tant que principe d'actuation.

Nous avons vu S. Thomas évoquer ce parallélisme, notamment à propos des idées et de leur multiplicité.[66] Ici, il ne se contente pas de distinguer entre l'espèce en tant que forme actualisante et en tant qu'elle est objet. Pour faire voir "comment les choses connues sont dans l'intellect,"[67] il développe, avec une ampleur remarquable, l'existence, en plus de l'espèce intelligible, d'une *intentio*,[68] formée par l'intellect lui-même. Il montre que cette formation est nécessaire, chez nous, même pour la connaissance spéculative, parce que nous connaissons les choses aussi bien présentes qu'absentes, et surtout parce que notre intelligence "connaît la chose comme séparée des conditions matérielles sans lesquelles elle n'existe pas dans la réalité. Ceci serait impossible si l'intellect ne formait pas pour lui-même l'*intentio* dont on vient de parler. Mais puisque cette *intentio*, qui est objet de connaissance, est en quelque manière le terme de l'opération intellectuelle, elle est différente de l'espèce intelligible qui donne à l'intellect d'être en acte, et qu'il faut considérer comme le principe de l'opération intelligible, encore que les deux soient similitude de la chose connue."[69]

66 Voir supra, pp. 188 et n. 35; 189 et n. 36; 194 et n. 52.

67 "...ne multitudo intellectorum in intellectum divinum compositionem inducat." Voir supra, note 60. Il s'agit donc bien de la multitude des objets, formellement comme objets connus. Or les idées divines ne sont rien si ce n'est exactement cette multitude d'objets connus, nécessaire pour dire le rapport de l'intelligence divine à la création. Mais au lieu de distinguer seulement l'essence divine comme principe formel de connaissance et comme objet connu, Saint Thomas va placer les *intellecta* dans le verbe produit par l'acte d'intellection. Il semble difficile de ne pas reconnaître ce que Saint Thomas discute ailleurs sous le nom d'idées.

68 "Dico autem *intentionem intellectam* id quod intellectus in seipso concipit de re intellecta." IV *CG*, c. 11; éd. cit., p. 445. Il faudrait citer le chapitre presqu'en entier. Sur bien des points, il donne des définitions et des développements qui éclairent le présent chapître 53, dont on pourrait dire, sans exagération, qu'il semble les supposer.

69 "Ulterius autem considerandum est quod intellectus, per speciem rei formatus, intelligendo format in seipso quandam intentionem rei intellectae, quae est ratio ipsius, quam significat definitio. Et hoc quidem necessarium est: eo quod intellectus intelligit indifferenter rem absentem et praesentem, in quo cum intellectu imaginatio convenit; sed intellectus hoc amplius habet, quod etiam intelligit rem ut separatam a conditionibus materialibus, sine quibus in rerum natura non existit; et hoc non potest esse nisi intellectus sibi intentionem praedictam formaret.

Haec autem intentio intellecta, cum sit quasi terminus intelligibilis operationis, est aliud a

En appliquant ces discernements au cas de la connaissance divine, on doit dire ceci:

> L'intellect divin ne connaît par aucune autre espèce que son essence, comme on l'a montré plus haut (chap. 46). Cependant son essence est la similitude de toutes choses (chap. 29). Il s'ensuit que la conception de l'intellect divin, en tant qu'il se connaît lui-même, conception qui est son verbe, est la similitude non seulement de Dieu lui-même, objet connu, mais encore de tout ce dont l'essence divine est la similitude. Par conséquent, par une seule espèce intelligible, qui est l'essence divine, et par une seule *intentio* connue, qui est le verbe divin, une multitude d'objets peut être connue par Dieu.[70]

La composition se trouve donc éliminée. Du côté de l'espèce intelligible, comme pour la forme formée par l'intellect, c'est toujours l'unique essence divine qui est en cause. Celle-ci peut assurer la connaissance de Dieu lui-même et de toutes choses, puisque l'essence, dans sa plénitude, contient tous les modes possibles selon lesquels les êtres peuvent l'imiter. S. Thomas ne précise pas ici, comme il le fait ailleurs,[71] que la présence du verbe en Dieu n'introduit pas une composition dans l'intellect divin, comme c'est le cas pour le verbe chez nous. Il est attentif surtout à montrer, semble-t-il, que si l'on distingue l'espèce intelligible et le verbe produit, une multitude d'objets connus n'entraîne plus, logiquement, une composition dans l'intellect divin.

Il reste à faire voir explicitement, comme dans les exposés précédents, que la multiplicité peut être connue dans l'unité, puisque toute la multitude des formes ou des essences est fondée dans l'unité de la plénitude divine. Elle n'est donc pas saisie dans une sorte de vue panoramique, mais comprise dans son principe et en lui:

> L'essence divine comprend en elle les noblesses de tous les êtres, non point par mode de composition, mais par mode de perfection, comme on l'a montré plus haut (chap. 31). Or, toute forme, propre aussi bien que commune, est une certaine perfection, en tant qu'elle pose quelque chose; elle n'inclut l'imperfection que pour autant qu'elle comporte défaut par

specie intelligibili quae facit intellectum in actu, quam oportet considerari ut intelligibilis operationis principium; licet utrumque sit rei similitudo." I *CG*, c. 53. Comparer avec le texte cité à la note 47, et avec la première rédaction de ce chapître, étudiée et reproduite dans notre article, cité infra note 75.

70 "Intellectus autem divinus nulla alia specie intelligit quam essentia sua, ut supra (cap. 46) ostensum est. Sed tamen essentia sua est similitudo omnium rerum (cap. 29). Per hoc ergo sequitur quod conceptio intellectus divini, prout seipsum intelligit, quae est verbum ipsius, non solum sit similitudo ipsius Dei intellecti, sed etiam omnium quorum est divina essentia similitudo. Sic ergo per unam speciem intelligibilem, quae est divina essentia, et per unam intentionem intellectam, quae est verbum divinum, multa possunt a Deo intelligi." Ibid.

71 IV *CG*, c. 11, p. 446, par exemple.

rapport à l'*esse* véritable. L'intellect divin peut donc comprendre, dans son essence, ce qui est propre à chaque être, en connaissant ce en quoi il imite son essence, et en quoi il demeure en deçà de sa perfection... Dieu peut donc avoir, par son essence, une connaissance propre de toutes choses.

Puisque d'autre part, la raison propre d'une chose se distingue de la raison propre d'une autre, et que la distinction est le principe de la pluralité, il faut admettre dans l'intellect divin une certaine distinction et une pluralité de raisons connues, pour autant que ce qui est dans l'intellect divin est la raison propre de choses diverses. Or puisque (ce qui est dans l'intellect divin) est ce par quoi Dieu connaît le rapport propre d'assimilation qui unit à lui chaque créature, il s'ensuit que les raisons des choses dans l'intellect divin ne sont plusieurs ou distinctes que dans la mesure où Dieu connaît que les choses peuvent lui être semblables selon des modes multiples et divers.[72]

C'est sur la base de cette pluralité dans l'unité, que S. Thomas accepte de dire, avec S. Augustin, que Dieu crée l'homme selon une *raison* et le cheval selon une autre, et qu'il consent à sa manière de parler des raisons des choses en Dieu selon un mode de pluralité. Il reconnaît de même la part de vérité, contenue dans l'opinion de Platon, relative à l'existence d'Idées, d'après lesquelles est formé tout ce qui existe dans les choses matérielles.[73]

Si l'on met ensemble le contenu des chapitres 53 et 54, il apparaît clairement, me semble-t-il, que S. Thomas voit, dans la formation du verbe par l'intellect, le moyen de donner une solution plus nette au problème de la multiplicité des objets connus par Dieu. Cette multiplicité soulève en effet deux difficultés: celle de la possibilité de connaître une multitude d'objets par un seul principe d'intellection; celle de la possibilité d'admettre une multitude d'objets connus, sans

72 "Divina autem essentia in se nobilitatem omnium entium comprehendit, non quidem per modum compositionis, sed per modum perfectionis, ut supra (cap. 31) ostensum est. Forma autem omnis, tam propria quam communis, secundum id quod aliquid ponit, est perfectio quaedam: non autem imperfectionem includit nisi secundum quod deficit a vero esse. Intellectus igitur divinus id quod est proprium unicuique in essentia sua comprehendere potest, intelligendo in quo eius essentiam imitetur, et in quo ab eius perfectione deficit unumquodque... Sic igitur patet quod essentia divina, inquantum est absolute perfecta, potest accipi ut propria ratio singulorum. Unde per eam Deus propriam cognitionem de omnibus habere potest.

Quia vero propria ratio unius distinguitur a propria ratione alterius; distinctio autem est pluralitatis principium: oportet in intellectu divino distinctionem quandam et pluralitatem rationum intellectarum considerare, secundum quod id quod est in intellectu est propria ratio diversorum. Unde, cum hoc sit secundum quod Deus intelligit proprium respectum assimilationis quam habet unaquaeque creatura ad ipsum, relinquitur quod rationes rerum in intellectu divino non sunt plures vel distinctae nisi secundum quod Deus cognoscit res pluribus et diversis modis esse assimilabiles sibi." I *CG*, c. 53. On notera que dans la *Somme théol.*, au prologue de la qu. 14, Saint Thomas écrit: "Quia...rationes rerum secundum quod sunt in Deo cognoscente ideae vocantur."

73 ibid.

multiplier du même coup les principes d'actualisation. Dès son premier enseignement, S. Thomas a vu, dans la distinction entre l'essence comme quasi forme actualisante et l'essence comme connue, le moyen de résoudre la seconde difficulté, et dans la thèse de la plénitude de l'essence divine imitable par les créatures, celle de résoudre la première. Sur ce dernier point ses exposés ne changent pas. Nous le voyons, au contraire, préciser la distinction entre l'espèce intelligible comme principe d'actualisation et comme objet connu, par la distinction de deux formes. Le chapitre 53 introduit l'expression du *verbe*, qui ne laisse plus subsister aucune équivoque.[74]

J'ai montré ailleurs[75] que la mention du verbe, et la justification de sa nécessité dans la connaissance spéculative que nous lisons actuellement dans le texte du chapitre 53, figurent seulement dans une troisième rédaction, écrite dans la marge inférieure, lors de la révision du manuscrit. Les deux premières rédactions, écrites coup sur coup, et supprimées lors de la révision, ne sont pas des ébauches, mais des exposés complets. Signalons simplement ici les analogies frappantes de la première rédaction avec *De Veritate* 3, 2, et le fait que la deuxième, plus simple, omet la mention de la forme formée par l'intellect. Le vocabulaire de la dernière rédaction offre, par contre, des ressemblances étroites avec la *Somme contre les Gentils* 4, 11, qui donne la définition des termes employés ici, au chapitre 53. Il y aurait lieu aussi d'étudier un long passage de l'autographe du chapitre 54, dont voici le début: "Ex his ulterius videri potest...(qualiter) in divina mente omnium formae vel rationes, quae ideae dicuntur, in mente divina esse possint absque aliqua intellectus divini compositione. Sunt enim in eo ut intellecta in intelligente." Aucune mention du verbe, mais seulement celle de la forme inventée par l'artisan et qui joue premièrement le rôle de *quod* et deuxièmement le rôle de *quo* dans l'acte de connaissance.[76]

Il est donc permis de conclure que, si les idées ne sont nommées qu'incidemment dans notre chapitre 53, c'est bien du problème posé par elles qu'il s'agit et de la réponse que S. Thomas a élaborée pour le résoudre. Il faut admettre une multitude d'objets connus par Dieu, si sa connaissance doit atteindre les créatures jusque dans leur diversité spécifique et même individuelle. Pour la penser, sans contradiction, il

74 Que le verbe dont il s'agit dans notre chapître est bien identique aux idées, il suffit, pour s'en convaincre, de comparer avec le chapître 13 du 4e livre, où l'on retrouve, à propos du Verbe de Dieu, "omnium, quae facta sunt, ratio perfecta," la métaphore de l'artisan et du modèle, "ratio domus quam habet in mente." Ed. cit., p. 451, " Quicumque autem..." Toute la seconde partie de ce chapître serait à citer pour compléter la doctrine de nos chap. 53 et 54.

75 "Les rédactions successives de *Contra Gentiles*, I, 53 d'après l'autographe." *S. Thomas d'Aquin aujourd'hui* (Bruges 1963) 221-240.

76 Ed. léon., XIII, 21*b, ll. 10-71.

ne suffit pas d'utiliser la notion aristotélicienne de l'espèce intelligible. Une distinction est nécessaire au moins entre le rôle de l'espèce comme forme actualisante et celui d'objet connu. Dans le texte que nous venons d'étudier, S. Thomas ajoute, de la manière la plus expresse, la distinction entre l'espèce intelligible et le verbe. La multiplicité des essences est fondée dans l'essence divine en tant que telle, donc aussi en tant qu'elle est identique à l'intellect divin et forme de son opération. Mais il ne faut parler de la pluralité des objets connus par Dieu, qui sont les raisons des êtres créés ou créables, qu'en rapport avec l'essence en tant que connue, voire en tant que verbe exprimé par le connaissant.[77]

La *Somme Théologique*

L'étude que nous venons de faire nous autorise à affirmer que, si S. Thomas a conservé, dans la *Somme Théologique*, une question consacrée aux idées divines, ce n'est pas sans quelque raison systématique. Certes les idées ne jouent pas le même rôle que chez Platon ou S. Augustin. Mais la question 15 ne répète pas simplement la question 14. De l'une à l'autre il y a la différence entre le rôle de l'espèce intelligible et de l'objet connu. Et la question que l'on peut se poser est plutôt pourquoi on ne retrouve pas dans la *Somme Théologique* le vocabulaire si net de la *Somme contre les Gentils*, et la distinction entre *intelligere* et *dicere*. La *Somme Théologique* pourrait-elle être postérieure à la dernière rédaction du chapitre 53? La chronologie actuellement admise communément ne permet pas de le penser.

Quoi qu'il en soit, la question 14 traite formellement de l'intellection divine, donc de l'essence en tant qu'elle rend possible l'acte d'intellection, face à ses différents objets. La question 15 se limite explicitement à l'étude des *rationes rerum* appelées "idées" en tant qu'elles sont en Dieu connaissant (Qu. 14, prol.). C'est en effet la présence de ces objets là qui fait difficulté quand on admet leur multiplicité. Or il faut admettre une multiplicité d'objets connus. Il faut

77 Si les idées divines sont, en effet, les "rationes rerum" non seulement connues par Dieu, mais exprimées dans le Verbe ("importatur in Verbo ratio factiva eorum quae Deus facit" I, q. 34, a. 3, c.), on ne peut pas dire que "l'expressionisme bonaventurien ajoute à la doctrine thomiste des idées une sorte de génération interne de la notion des êtres réalisables. Alors qu'il suffit à Dieu de se connaître en tant que participable pour avoir, chez Saint Thomas, les idées de toutes choses, il faut encore que Dieu profère en soi, par son Verbe éternel, les notions de ces participations possibles à son essence," E. Gilson, *L'esprit de la philosophie médiévale*, 2e éd. (Paris 1948), p. 167. N'est-ce pas plutôt sur l'exemplarisme que porte la différence, comme le montre le même auteur. *La philosophie de Saint Bonaventure* 3e éd. (Paris 1953) pp. 132-134, et sans doute plus précisément encore, sur la notion de "participation possible à l'essence divine"?

donc montrer comment la concevoir sans contradiction, "ce qu'il est facile de voir, si l'on considère la manière dont l'idée de l'œuvre produite se trouve dans l'esprit de celui qui la produit. Elle y est en effet comme ce qui est connu, non pas comme l'espèce par laquelle on connaît, et qui est la forme par laquelle l'intellect est en acte."[78]

Or, "connaître une multitude d'objets, cela n'est pas contraire à la simplicité de l'intellect divin, comme serait contraire à cette même simplicité le fait pour l'intellect d'être formé (c'est-à-dire, actué) par plusieurs espèces. Il y a donc dans l'esprit divin une pluralité d'idées comme objets connus par lui.[79] L'absence de composition ainsi établie, S. Thomas passe, comme dans les autres exposés, à la démonstration de l'absence de multiplicité, en développant une fois de plus les considérations sur l'essence divine, similitude propre de chaque créature.

La présence dans le connaissant, exigée par les raisons ou idées, est donc différente de celle qui est assurée par l'espèce intelligible. Dans la réponse à la 2e objection, S. Thomas la compare à la conscience qu'aurait l'artisan de connaître, par le modèle, la maison réelle qu'il a construite.

> Les mots "sagesse" et "art" signifient ce par quoi Dieu connaît, mais l'"idée" signifie ce que Dieu connaît. Or par un seul (principe de connaissance) Dieu connaît un grand nombre de choses, non seulement en elles-mêmes, mais en tant qu'elles sont connues, ce qui revient à connaître plusieurs raisons des choses. Ainsi quand l'artisan connaît la maison (réalisée) dans la matière, on dit qu'il connaît la maison. Mais lorsqu'il connaît la forme de la maison comme contemplée par lui, du fait qu'il connaît qu'il la connaît, il connaît l'idée ou la raison de la maison. Or Dieu non seulement connaît beaucoup de choses par son essence, mais il sait aussi qu'il connaît beaucoup de choses par son essence; ce qui revient à dire que Dieu connaît plusieurs raisons des choses, ou que plusieurs idées sont dans son intelligence comme objets connus.[80]

78 "Ratio autem alicuius totius haberi non potest, nisi habeantur propriae rationes eorum ex quibus totum constituitur; sicut aedificator speciem domus concipere non posset, nisi apud ipsum esset propria ratio cuiuslibet partium eius. Sic igitur oportet quod in mente divina sint propriae rationes omnium rerum... Unde sequitur quod in mente divina sint plures ideae. Hoc autem quomodo divinae simplicitati non repugnet, facile est videre, si quis consideret ideam operati esse in mente operantis, sicut quod intelligitur, non autem sicut species qua intelligitur, quae est forma faciens intellectum in actu. Forma enim domus in mente aedificatoris est aliquid ab eo intellectum ad cuius similitudinem domum in materia format." *Ia*, q. 15, a. 2, c. Il s'agit donc bien d'une forme conçue par l'intelligence.

79 "Non est autem contra simplicitatem divini intellectus quod multa intelligat, sed contra simplicitatem eius esset, si per plures species eius intellectus formaretur." Ibid.

80 "Sapientia et ars significantur ut quo Deus intelligit, sed idea ut quod intelligit. Deus autem uno intellectu intelligit multa: et non solum secundum quod in seipsis sunt, sed etiam secundum quod intellecta sunt: quod est intelligere plures rationes rerum. Sicut artifex, dum intelligit formam domus in materia, dicitur intelligere domum; dum autem intelligit formam domus ut a se speculatam, ex quo intelligit se intelligere eam, intelligit ideam vel rationem domus. Deus autem

Si le mode propre de cette présence est nécessaire pour formuler correctement tous les aspects de la connaissance divine, la présence des idées est nécessaire au même titre pour l'équilibre de la synthèse doctrinale.[81]

CONCLUSION

Si nos précédentes analyses sont exactes, nous devons comprendre de la manière suivante les données historiques et systématiques du problème des idées divines dans l'œuvre de S. Thomas. Pierre Lombard, traitant de la connaissance divine, se demande si la présence des créatures dans la connaissance divine ne doit pas comporter aussi une présence dans l'essence. Il répond négativement, en s'appuyant sur S. Augustin, sans d'ailleurs faire allusion aux idées. S. Thomas, dès la distinction 35, a adopté la thèse de Denys, relative à la plénitude éminente de l'essence divine, qui contient dans son unité, toutes les perfections reçues par les créatures.[82] Il trouve, d'autre part, une question relative aux idées divines, rattachée au texte du Lombard par ses commentateurs. La thèse de Denys permet de faire comprendre que Dieu, en se connaissant lui-même, peut connaître toutes choses, si l'on fait jouer à l'essence le rôle de l'espèce intelligible, donc de la similitude, qui permet à l'acte de connaissance de se produire. Le thème des idées met en relief, non seulement la production des créatures (*formae operativae*), mais la distinction des objets connus. S. Augustin, d'ailleurs, insiste sur cette distinction: *alia ratione....* Sans elle, la connaissance distincte de l'univers par Dieu est impossible. Or il faut la maintenir, contre les doctrines qui consentent à limiter la perfection de la connaissance divine, afin d'en sauvegarder l'unité.

non solum intelligit multas res per essentiam suam, sed etiam intelligit se intelligere multa per essentiam. Sed hoc est inteligere plures rationes rerum; vel plures ideas esse in intellectu eius ut intellectas." Ibid., ad 2.

81 Très précisément, Saint Thomas a besoin, pour la précision de la doctrine, d'une distinction ferme entre l'essence dans sa fonction de forme de l'intelligence, et l'essence assurant la connaissance des raisons des choses comme *objets* connus, soit à titre de forme opérative ou modèle de la création, soit à titre de medium à l'égard des créatures considérées comme distinctes de Dieu. Les idées, c'est à dire ce que Saint Thomas met sous ce mot, assurent cette distinction, que la noétique de la seule espèce intelligible, sans production d'un terme par le connaissant, n'assure qu'imparfaitement, comme le montre le premier exposé de la question des idées divines, dans le *Comm. sur les Sentences.* Pour l'histoire du verbe en Saint Thomas, voir H. Paissac, O. P., *Théologie du verbe, Saint Augustin et Saint Thomas* (Paris 1951).

82 Voir supra note 32. Les objets connus par Dieu sont donc, en tant que participations, présentes dans l'essence, en ce sens du moins que Saint Thomas y voit plus qu'une présence dans la connaissance, à titre d'objets connus, plus aussi qu'une présence dans la cause, envisagée uniquement comme cause.

Dès les *Sentences*, la difficulté apparaît de bien comprendre cette multitude d'objets distincts, si tout objet connu doit être présent au principe de l'acte pour le spécifier:

> Les objets connus sont, par rapport à l'intellect, comme le dessin par rapport à une tablette; aussi le Philosophe...compare-t-il l'intellect possible, avant qu'il ne connaisse, à une tablette sur laquelle rien n'est écrit. Or il est impossible pour un même corps d'avoir en même temps et quant à la même partie diverses figures. Il est donc impossible que le même intellect puisse connaître en même temps plusieurs objets. Si donc l'intellect divin se connaît lui-même et beaucoup d'autres objets, il y aura nécessairement succession dans son intellect, et, par là, lassitude, du fait qu'il n'a pas en acte ce qu'il cherche. Et cela ne se peut.[83]

S. Thomas se contente de répondre que l'argument vaut pour tout intellect qui connaît des objets divers par des espèces diverses, ce qui n'est pas le cas de Dieu: en connaissant son essence, il connaît les autres choses.[84]

Mais dès les *Sentences* aussi, à propos de la multiplicité des idées, S. Thomas introduit la distinction entre l'essence comme essence et comme objet connu. La multiplicité des idées doit se placer du côté de l'essence en tant qu'elle est connue. Cette solution cependant ne le satisfait pas. Tout se passe comme s'il avait jugé nécessaire de distinguer non seulement l'essence en tant qu'elle assure la *présence* de l'objet, d'une part, et l'essence comme *objet connu,* mais encore l'essence comme assurant la présence de l'objet et la *manière* dont elle joue ce rôle, c'est à dire comme *forme actualisante.* La distinction entre deux formes, l'une principe, l'autre terme et produit de l'acte, va être introduite à partir du *De Veritate.* Limitée d'abord à certains actes et à certaines formes "inventées" par le connaissant, la distinction est généralisée et approfondie dans la *Somme contre les Gentils*, toujours à propos de la multiplicité des raisons que Dieu doit connaître. Elle distingue les questions 14 et 15 de la *Somme Théologique,* et on la retrouve clairement, dans la même *Ia Pars*, qu. 34, a. 3, c., ou l'on montre que le nom de Verbe, en Dieu, comporte un rapport à la créature:

> Dieu, en effet, par un acte unique, se connaît lui-même et toutes choses. Aussi son Verbe unique exprime-t-il non seulement le Père, mais aussi les créatures. Et de même que la science de Dieu est à l'égard de Dieu purement connaissante, à l'égard des créatures par contre connaissante et productrice à la fois, ainsi le Verbe de Dieu est seulement expression de

83 *In I Sent.*, d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 3; éd. Mandonnet, I, pp. 813-814.
84 Ibid., ad 3, p. 815.

> ce qui est dans Dieu le Père, pour les créatures, par contre, il est à la fois expressif et opératif.

Mais

> le mot "idée" signifie principalement le rapport à la créature, et c'est pourquoi on l'emploie au pluriel en Dieu et il n'est pas personnel. Le mot "Verbe", par contre, signifie principalement le rapport à celui qui le prononce, et par voie de conséquence seulement, le rapport aux créatures, pour autant que Dieu, se connaissant lui-même, connaît toute créature. Aussi n'y a-t-il en Dieu qu'un unique Verbe et le mot désigne une personne. (Ibid. ad 4).

Je dirais donc volontiers pour conclure que poser la question de la place des idées divines dans sa théologie, c'est demander si S. Thomas aurait pu se passer des raisons multiples des choses, par lesquelles Dieu connaît en lui-même les êtres qu'il crée et gouverne. Si la réponse est négative, il faut se demander ultérieurement si, ayant fondé la multitude de ces objets connus, et leur présence dans l'intellect divin, sur la plénitude de l'essence divine, et donc ultérieurement sur son rôle d'espèce intelligible, il aurait pu aboutir à une présentation équilibrée de la doctrine, en se contentant de la seule espèce intelligible, donc en supprimant la question des idées.

S. Thomas semble avoir pensé que non. Sa conception des idées divines, en tout cas, loin de se présenter comme le résultat de causes fortuites ou extrinsèques au problème, constitue le résultat d'un effort pour trouver la synthèse entre des données, dont on peut montrer, sans doute, qu'elles viennent ou de Denys, ou d'Aristote ou de S. Augustin, mais qui apparemment, étaient pour lui les exigences objectives du problème lui-même.

EPILOGUE

La conclusion qui précède ne concerne directement que le problème de la connaissance divine et les textes que nous avons étudiés. Il faudrait la comparer avec les résultats d'une étude semblable d'un certain nombre de thèmes connexes, tels que: la providence, l'expression des créatures dans le Verbe, la causalité exemplaire et ses rapports avec le thème des idées, ou la création par intermédiaires.

Il y aurait lieu surtout de confronter ensuite cet ensemble avec un autre, qui, historiquement, en est largement indépendant, qui, doctrinalement, pose un problème exactement contraire, à savoir le problème des idées dans leur rapport avec la vision de l'essence divine par les esprits créés: le Christ en tant qu'homme, les anges, les bienheureux; à quoi il y aurait lieu d'ajouter certains aspects de la con-

naissance prophétique. Quand il s'agit de la connaissance que Dieu a du monde, la théologie chrétienne ne pouvait aller que dans le sens de la plus grande perfection possible: Dieu connaît distinctement tout objet possible de connaissance: l'ensemble et les détails, l'universel et le singulier, le passé, le présent et l'avenir, le substantiel et l'accidentel, ce que nous appelons le nécessaire et ce que nous appelons le hasard, le réel et le possible, le bien et le mal. Quand il est question, au contraire, de la vision de l'essence divine par des esprits créés, clairement affirmée par la foi, le problème se pose de maintenir une différence entre la connaissance accordée par la vision béatifique et la connaissance divine. N'y a-t-il pas danger de voir des esprits finis égaler le savoir infini de Dieu?

La difficulté devient particulièrement aigüe quand on fait intervenir les idées divines. "Le Verbe incréé en effet est un miroir qui fait connaître toutes les créatures, parce que, par lui, le Père se dit lui-même et toutes choses. En lui se trouvent donc les similitudes de toutes les choses."[85] Ces similitudes que sont elles, sinon les idées divines? Or, quiconque voit un miroir voit nécessairement tous les objets qui s'y réfléchissent. Comment dès lors ne pas conclure que la vision de l'essence divine donne en même temps la vision de tout ce que Dieu connaît? Et si l'on veut éviter la conclusion, pour assurer à Dieu un domaine privé et exclusif, en dépit de la vision de l'essence et des idées qui y sont contenues, comment y réussir sinon en estompant la netteté des idées, de certaines au moins, pour empêcher une trop grande curiosité de surprendre tout le contenu de la connaissance divine? Enfantillages, dira-t-on, matérialisations maladroites. Ce sont cependant ces difficultés qu'on trouve discutées sérieusement, à partir du moment où le thème des idées divines a été introduit dans les questions posées à propos du texte du Lombard, qui lui, ne les mentionne pas plus qu'il ne l'a fait pour la connaissance divine.

C'est dans ce contexte qu'on voit figurer notamment la distinction entre les idées divines précises et confuses,[86] distinction que S. Thomas abandonnera, avec tout le matériel des métaphores du miroir, pour montrer que les idées ne sont pas dans l'intellect comme des choses ou des images, que n'importe qui peut aller voir. Mais l'histoire de ce problème exigerait des développements qui dépassent le cadre de ce travail.

85 *De ver.*, q. 3, a. 1, obj. 8.

86 *In III Sent.*, d. 14, a. 2, qua 2, sol.; éd. Mandonnet, III, pp. 447-448. Comparer avec *Somme théol.*, IIIa pars, q. 10, a. 2.

IV

ST. THOMAS AND HIS PREDECESSORS

AQUINAS AS ARISTOTELIAN COMMENTATOR

Joseph Owens C.Ss.R.

I

THE role of St. Thomas Aquinas as an Aristotelian commentator still proves puzzling. Certainly his work in this respect is not the detached and theologically neutral undertaking that is found in moderns such as Bonitz, J. A. Stewart, or Sir David Ross. No matter how closely his attitude is concerned with explaining the Aristotelian text just as the text stands, it is consistently sensitive to any deviations of the teaching from the integrity of Christian faith and of orthodox theology. In fact, it does not at all give the impression that it is going out of its normal way when it corrects the Aristotelian tenets in the light of revealed doctrine. Rather, it proceeds as though correction of this type is a legitimate and integral part of its overall method.[1]

Does not this savor strongly of an out and out theological method? Should it not mean that the Aristotelian commentaries of Aquinas are to be classed as works of sacred theology rather than of philosophy? Is not the procedure in them theological through and through, in contrast to a genuinely philosophical treatment of the Aristotelian text? Does not this mean theology only?

However, hesitation arises at once in confrontation with this apparently extreme stand. The overwhelming predominance of the

1 E.g., *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, Cathala-Spiazzi nos. 2496-2499; *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 2, Angeli-Pirotta nos. 2041-2044; *In I Eth.*, lect. 9, Spiazzi no. 113; *In I Periherm.*, lect. 14, Spiazzi nos. 195-197; *In III de An.*, lect. 9, Pirotta no. 726; *In I de Cael. et Mund.*, lect. 6, Spiazzi nos. 64-66. Cf.: "Sehr beachtenswert ist die Art und Weise, wie Thomas oft ganz unauffällig an der nikomachischen Ethik Korrekturen vornimmt und auf die Ideen und Ideale des christlichen Ethos hinweist. ... Es liessen sich diese Belege von Korrekturen, die Thomas oft ganz unauffällig an Aristoteles vornimmt, noch bedeutend vermehren." Martin Grabmann, "Die Aristoteleskommentare des heiligen Thomas von Aquin," in *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben* (Munich 1926), pp. 305-306. "In the present case where the reader is the theologian Saint Thomas, the Stagirite's works are read through Christian eyes." M.-D. Chenu, *Towards Understanding Saint Thomas*, tr. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago 1964), p. 209. However, Grabmann (p. 282) can maintain that Aquinas was striving to present an "objective picture" of the Aristotelian doctrine. On the way a medieval commentator may claim to be giving an entirely objective interpretation, and yet not "remain within the bounds of what he had intended in principle," see Chenu, pp. 206-207, n. 9, in reference to Albert the Great.

discussion in the commentaries deals with the Aristotelian thought and not with professedly theological issues. Moreover, on the supposition of outside interference the theological interest is not the only observable intrusion into the commentaries. A partly new conception of the sciences seems to dominate the whole discussion.[2] Metaphysics seems placed in an Avicennian framework, ethics and politics in traditional Christian grooves, and logic in the setting of the three Scholastically accepted intellectual activities. Would not this new philosophical coloring have to be regarded as changing the character of the commentaries just as much as the theological concern? Or is it to be viewed as in some way connected with, and subsumed under, the theological orientation?

The above observations suggest at least that in these writings of Aquinas the task of a commentator was not understood to be a disinterested and historically exact explanation of the Aristotelian views. It was not a function to be detached from concern for revealed Christian truth. There can be little doubt that St. Thomas grasped in large part the true import and thrust of the Stagirite's tenets. He did not hesitate for a moment to acknowledge that Aristotle accepted the eternity of the world and the actuation of the heavenly bodies by spiritual souls in the sense that these tenets were strictly essential to the Aristotelian metaphysics.[3] He was continually aware that Aristotle in the *Ethics* was concerned only with this-worldly contentment. Yet he undertakes to show how the Aristotelian teachings blossom out into thoroughly Christian flora. Does not this procedure mean much more than that in the commentaries "theological considerations color his interpretations"?[4] Will it anywhere allow one to view the Aristotelian commentaries as articulating "positions which are rejected in his basically theological writings"?[5]

One may sharpen the question still further. Can the procedure in the Aristotelian commentaries be regarded as in *any* way basically philosophical, in contrast to that of the "basically theological writings"? Are the theological coloring and additions and reservations merely intruded from outside as occasion demands, in order to make the

2 E.g., *In Metaph.* Proem; *In I Eth.*, nos. 2-7; *In Periherm.*, Proem, no. 1; *In de Gen. et Cor.*, Proem, Spiazzi no. 2.

3 *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 5, no. 2496; cf. lect. 10, no. 2598. *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 2, no. 2043. *In I de Cael. et Mund.*, lect. 6, no. 64. On the requirement of souls for the Aristotelian heavenly bodies, see *In II de Cael. et Mund.*, lect. 13, nos. 415-419; cf. *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 21, no. 2479, and *In XII Metaph.*, lect. 4. nos. 2476 and 2536. For the *Ethics*, see infra, n. 43.

4 Victor Preller, *Divine Science and the Science of God* (Princeton 1967), p. 22.

5 Preller, *ibid.* The "articulating" of the positions rejected does not necessarily mean their acceptance by Aquinas in the commentaries. Preller's attitude is: "The closest that Aquinas comes to manifesting a purely philosophical intention is in his commentaries on Aristotle." *Ibid.*

Stagirite's doctrine palatable in a Christian milieu and safeguard it from censure-prone ecclesiastical authority? Or must these commentaries be classed as authentically theological documents? In a word, is Aquinas as an Aristotelian commentator writing as a philosopher or as a theologian?

The tendency to view the Aristotelian commentaries as basically philosophical writings is of course deep-seated. Allegedly according to the mind of St. Thomas they fill the role of a *Summa Philosophica* for beginners,[6] providing students with a complete and suitable course of philosophy,[7] presenting Thomistic philosophy in words of the Angelic Doctor himself.[8] The hermeneutical principle would be: "For Thomas interpreted Aristotle's thought not only in the light of its inner consistency, but also by taking into account the results of subsequent philosophical research."[9] Seen from this standpoint, the work is properly philosophical.

There is obviously a problem, then, in regard to the nature of the Thomistic commentaries on Aristotle. In its broadest framework, the issue is whether these commentaries are essentially philosophical or theological documents. Within the procedure proper to the one or the other discipline, as the case may be, the question has to be faced how Aquinas can so patently understand the real meaning of the Aristotelian text and yet explain it in a way that is not Aristotle's, or even opposed to Aristotle's conception of its implications. Comparatively little work has as yet been devoted to this problem. At a Scholastic congress in 1950 it was noted that the number of studies published on these commentaries was minimal, totaling less than fifty, and almost exclusively mere articles.[10] The situation has not improved notably in the intervening years. The topic is still wide open for investigation.

The meaning of the word "commentary" is practically of no help in regard to the issue. It is wide enough to cover explanation of the basic document, notes on it, reflections on it, development of questions

6 J. Isaac, "Saint Thomas interprète des œuvres d'Aristote," *Acta Congressus Scholastici Internationalis Romae 1950* (Rome 1951), p. 356. This would extend to present-day beginners in philosophy.

7 "... procurer à la jeunesse estudiantine un cours complet de philosophie adapté à ses besoins." Isaac, *ibid.* Against these views, see Chenu, p. 214.

8 Isaac, p. 355.

9 E. Cantore, "Critical Study: The Italian Philosophical Encyclopedia," *The Review of Metaphysics*, XXIV (1971), 515.

10 See Isaac, p. 355. Some interesting possibilities for exploration in regard to the "management" of the Aristotelian philosophy in the commentaries are suggested by A. C. Pegis, "St. Thomas and the Nicomachean Ethics," *Mediaeval Studies*, 25 (1963), 1-25.

arising from it. In the last sense it became regularly applied to works on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, in which the basic text served merely as a springboard for wide-ranging articles on subjects of current interest. But the word did not enter into the titles of these writings of Aquinas in their original form. Rather, they were called *Expositiones*. They were presented as explanations of the Aristotelian works. This throws the problem back to the kind of explanation found in the Thomistic undertaking. Is it philosophical or theological in character? Does it respect the original meaning scrupulously, or merely use that meaning as a springboard for its own new interests? Basically, is it explaining Aristotle or is it doing something else? Or is it in some way an amorphous combination of these possibilities?

The last suggestion does not seem to be at all acceptable, for the inspiration of the Thomistic commentaries on Aristotle seems to be unitary throughout. They do not give the impression of an amalgam of disparate elements. Rather, their procedure appears to be a self-consistent enterprise, constituting an authentic literary genre. No impression of anything amorphous or fragmentary is given in the course of these writings. The command of the situation seems firm from start to finish. The attitude shown in them is that of a man engaged in a thoroughly coherent task. He is apparently doing his work in a manner recognized and accepted in his milieu. He may embody in his technique of literal commentary a distinct improvement over his predecessors in handling the Aristotelian doctrine, but in his use of pagan thought in a Christian atmosphere he appears to be carrying on a unity of method that had been achieved through a long history of intelligent effort. The procedure has the marks of something undertaken with a well thought out and consciously adopted purpose. Prima facie, accordingly, it has every right to be approached with this assumption. It is not to be dismissed lightly on the strength of present-day formal and stereotyped norms. Rather, grass roots investigation in the commentaries themselves is indicated in order to see whether or not the above assumption will be borne out.

A close scrutiny of the commentaries, then, is the way to obtain correct answers about their nature. The Aristotelian commentaries of Aquinas are twelve in number. The earliest chronological indication for any of them is the reign of Pope Urban IV (1261-1264). This is for the commentary on the *Metaphysics*, a commentary that was not finished before 1272. The other Aristotelian commentaries are dated variously between 1266 and 1273.[11] The commentary on the *Metaphysics*, con-

11 See Angelus Walz, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, adaptation française par Paul Novarina (Louvain & Paris 1962), pp. 165-166; 221-222. Chenu, pp. 223-224.

sequently, would seem to stretch in one way or another through the whole chronological period in which Aquinas was engaged in producing these writings on Aristotle. It may therefore quite safely be approached as the proper commentary in which to begin an investigation of the procedure of Aquinas. Later the results can be tested in briefer fashion against the method shown in the other Aristotelian commentaries.

II

The commentary of Aquinas on the *Metaphysics* covers the first twelve of the fourteen books traditionally grouped under the title.[12] A short Proem introduces the study that is to be dealt with, locating it in the science that naturally dominates all the others. The Proem uses as its springboard some observations from Aristotle's *Politics*, with two explicit references. It also draws upon, but without express references, a number of characteristic Aristotelian teachings from the *De Anima*, the *Analytics*, and the *Metaphysics* itself. These various tenets are brought to bear upon the one notion "intellectual in the highest degree" (*maxime intellectualis*)[13] as the distinguishing feature of the science that is being introduced. The assembling of so many roving tenets under the one unifying principle shows a thorough mastery of the philosophical materials, and an innate ability to organize them successfully from a new and personal viewpoint. It marks Aquinas himself as the "author" of the work about to be undertaken, in the medieval sense of the *auctor*. He is the one who will be doing the thinking and passing the judgments and presenting the work as his own, no matter how liberally he is drawing upon someone else for material, help, and inspiration. Such at least is the function of the commenting writer as suggested by this Proem.

Further, there is divergence in some details from the strict Aristotelian description of the philosophical notions involved. Actuality and potentiality, for instance, are presented as consequent upon being, just as are unity and multiplicity — "ea quae consequuntur ens, ut unum

12 For a short survey of the general procedure in the commentary of Aquinas on the *Metaphysics*, see John P. Rowan, *St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, 2 v. (Chicago 1961), I, viii-xxiii. The commentary will be referred to according to the numbers in the edition of M.-R. Cathala, revised by R. M. Spiazzi, *S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Duodecem Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Expositio* (Turin & Rome 1964). These numbers are likewise used in Rowan's English translation of the commentary.

13 "... scientia debet esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix, quae maxime intellectualis est. ... causarum cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur... Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis, quae circa principia maxime universalia versatur. ... Unde scientia, quae de istis rebus considerat, maxime videtur esse intellectualis, ..." *In Metaph.*, Proem.

et multa, potentia et actus" (*In Metaph.*, Proem.). In this regard Aristotle himself gives details about the way the most general "forms" follow upon being.[14] He regards unity and multiplicity as basic, but does not mention actuality and potentiality. Rather, actuality and potentiality name original instances of being, not subsequent properties.[15]

Somewhat similarly the formal substances that in Aristotle were described as "absolutely separate" (*Metaph.*, H 1, 1042a29-31) are designated in this Proem as separate "secundum esse," in contrast to the mathematicals, which are separate "secundum rationem." This places the division in an obviously remodeled cast, for in Aristotle the mathematicals were described as things not separate, though taken in abstraction and separated by thought from movement.[16] Against an Arabian background the things that are separate "secundum esse" are distinguished as "Deus et intelligentiae," quite apparently understood in the biblical sense of God and angels. Together these separate substances are looked upon as the common and universal causes of common being — "ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae" (*In Metaph.*, Proem).

What has happened here? There is an unmistakable effort to keep God and the angels from playing the role of subject to the science of metaphysics. Sacred theology had already appropriated God as its specifying subject.[17] This subject accordingly had to be different from the subject of any of the other sciences. The Avicennian framework was at hand to exclude God and the highest causes from the subject of metaphysics, and substitute instead the common aspect of being.[18] It

14 *Metaph.*, Γ 2, 1003b28-1004a20. Actuality and potentiality had been described as attributes following upon being by Albert, *Metaph.*, I, tr. 1, c. 2; ed. Borgnet, VI, 5b. Cf. also Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, 1D, (Venice 1508) fol. 70r2.

15 *Metaph.*, Δ 7, 1017b1-9; E 2, 1026b1-2.

16 Cf. *Ph.*, II 2, 193b33-34, and *Metaph.*, E 1, 1026a9-15; K 7, 1064a32-33. The status of the mathematicals had been handed down as that of things dealt with in a science that is *sine motu inabstracta*, things that cannot be separated (*separari non possunt*) from matter and motion. Boethius, *De Trin.*, c. II; ed. Stewart and Rand (London & New York 1926), p. 8.11-14.

17 See Aquinas, *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 4, Resp.; ed. Bruno Decker (Leiden 1955), pp. 194.14-195.27. At p. 195.15 "God and angels" (cf. p. 165.27) is used in the context in which "God and the intelligences" occurs in the Proem to the commentary on the *Metaphysics*. In *In I Sent.*, d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, Solut. (ed. Mandonnet, I, 839) the separate movents of the spheres in Averroes seem to be entirely absorbed into the Christian notion of God. Apparently Aquinas experienced little difficulty in seeing the Aristotelian separate substances coalesce in the one Christian God, or on the contrary in regarding them as God and angels together, or in speaking of them as God and the intelligences according to the Neoplatonic tradition as found in the Arabians: "... Platonici ponebant... ordinem superiorum intellectuum separatorum, qui apud nos consueverunt *intelligentiae* vocari." *In II de Cael. et Mund.*, lect. 4, Spiazzi no. 334.

18 See Avicenna, *Metaph.*, I, 1 (Venice 1508), fol. 70r1-v1. St. Thomas seems well enough aware that the Avicennian framework has to be used as an alternate to saying that the primary philosophy treats of the separate substances and then having to add "non tamen solum ea; sed etiam de sensibilibus, inquantum sunt entia, philosophus perscrutatur. Nisi forte dicamus, ut

safeguarded the distinction between metaphysics and sacred theology. But why did not only God but also the "intellectual substances" (*Deus et intellectuales substantiae*) have to be left outside the subject of metaphysics? Surely the exclusion of God alone would have been enough to provide for the specification of sacred theology. Why, moreover, the interest in showing that in this context metaphysics bears entirely upon things separate from matter "secundum esse et rationem," not only things that can never be in matter, but also aspects that are able to be found without matter, such as common being?[19]

These preoccupations suppose a conception of metaphysics in which separate substances, apart from distinction into God and angels, functioned as the subject of metaphysics. This conception was well enough known at the time through the position of Averroes.[20] But there was enough in the Aristotelian text to substantiate it in the description of metaphysics as "theological science."[21] The title "theology" had to be accorded it, and was allowed it by Aquinas on the ground that it dealt with the separate substances in the way already explained, namely as the causes of common being.[22] The alternate Aristotelian title "first

Avicenna dicit, quod huiusmodi communia de quibus haec scientia perscrutatur, dicuntur separata secundum esse,..." *In Metaph.*, lect. 1, no. 1165. At *In I Sent.*, Prol. q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3, Solut. 1 (v. I, p. 12), metaphysics was regarded as divine from the viewpoint of subject in contrast to source of illumination: "Metaphysica autem considerat causas altissimas per rationes ex creaturis assumptas. Unde ista doctrina magis etiam divina dicenda est quam metaphysica: quia est divina quantum ad subjectum et quantum ad modum accipiendi; metaphysica autem quantum ad subjectum tantum." Here the highest causes and the divine are regarded as subject in the wide sense that they are things treated of by metaphysics, even though its source of inspiration is not divine. There is no occasion here for contrasting the subject of the science with the causes and principles of the science from the viewpoint of the science's specification, with reference to Aristotle's philosophical theology.

19 From the viewpoint of inclusion under common being, the angels as creatures have to be regarded as part of the subject of metaphysics, along with spiritual souls. This allows common aspects such as being, unity and plurality, actuality and potentiality, to be found sometimes in matter, sometimes apart from matter. When the separate intelligences are contrasted with common being as its cause or principle, then, they are viewed as coalescing in nature with the Christian God (see supra, n. 17). In the Aristotelian tradition they were called divine, and from this viewpoint would for a Christian have to coincide with the one supreme God. When on the other hand they are regarded as angels and accordingly as creatures, they are all composed of actuality and potentiality, and in this way exhibit unity and multiplicity. For Aquinas, in consequence, both actuality and potentiality are said to follow upon common being, as though by way of a property without which common being cannot be found.

20 "Et qui dicit quod prima Philosophia nititur declarare entia separabilia esse, peccat. Haec enim entia sunt subjecta primae Philosophiae." Averroes, *In I Phys.*, comm. 83G (Venice 1562), fol. 47vl. "Thus, Averroes is the permanent substrate of his commentary on the *Metaphysics*" — Chenu, p. 215. Cf. supra, n. 18.

21 Aristotle, *Metaph.*, E 1, 1026a19; K 7, 1064b3.

22 "Dicitur enim scientia divina sive *theologia*, inquantum praedictas substantias considerat." *In Metaph.*, Proem. Cf. "Sic ergo theologia sive scientia divina est duplex. Una, in qua considerantur res divinae non tamquam subiectum scientiae, sed tamquam principia subiecti, et talis est theologia, quam philosophi prosequuntur, quae alio nomine metaphysica dicitur." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 4, Resp.; ed. Decker, p. 195.6-9. Cf. V, 1, Resp.; p. 166.1-6.

philosophy" was similarly admitted for the same reason, namely that it treated of these first causes of things.[23] Both these ways of expressing the nature of the science had accordingly to be accepted and the infection localized. The new standpoint would leave the divine as the specifying subject of only sacred theology, and yet acknowledge that it was studied, though in a different way, by the philosophical pursuit. This made the traditional title "metaphysics" free to designate the science from the viewpoint of its specification by its own subject, common being, which is "transphysical" insofar as it is common to material and immaterial things alike: "*Metaphysica,* inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia" (Proem). The term "metaphysics," consequently, can still imply a science of what is separate from matter, though at the cost of introducing a technical notion of "separate" that is not to be found in the Aristotelian treatises. How could any common notions be regarded in the Aristotelian context as "separata a materia secundum esse"? To be separate in the sense contrasted with "separate in notion," they would have to be substances, and for Aristotle nothing common or universal can be a substance in the setting of the *Metaphysics* (*Z* 13, 1038b8-35).

What is the significance of this change in location for the subject of metaphysics? If for Aristotle primary philosophy or theological science dealt with the separate substances in the sense of the divine beings, and with all other things on account of their reference to this primary instance of being, does not the change become a complete reversal in perspective?[24] For Aquinas common being, from which the divine is excluded, becomes the subject of metaphysics. The divine is treated of by the science only because of the reference it has to common being, namely in its role of the cause of common being. Yet the one formula "separata a materia secundum esse et rationem" serves for Aquinas as the means of expressing his own conception of the subject of metaphysics in words that would apply equally well to the subject of the Aristotelian theological science.

How has this change come about? In his commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate,* Aquinas had occasion to deal with the notion of theology against both the Aristotelian and the Christian backgrounds. Boethius,

23 "Dicitur autem *prima philosophia,* inquantum primas rerum causas considerat." *In Metaph.,* Proem.

24 The two opposed interpretations of the *Metaphysics,* labeled the "ontological" versus the "theological" interpretation, persist through medieval into modern times. A discussion of the problem may be found in my study *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian* Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Toronto 1963), pp. 25-26; 35-67.

following Aristotle, had written that while natural philosophy and mathematics are types of non-abstract science (*inabstracta*), theology is in contrast to them abstract and separable (*abstracta atque separabilis*), since there is no matter nor movement in the substance of God.[25] In Aristotelian fashion Aquinas takes up the consideration of this subject in the plural as *res divinae* — divine things (V, 4, resp. 3; p. 194.14). The use of the plural, though taken from Aristotle, is supported by the Scriptural way of referring to the "invisible things of God" (*ibid.*, line 22 — from *Rom.*, I, 20) and "the things that are of God" (p. 195.1 — from *I Cor.*, II, 11). In this way the Aristotelian plural in referring to the divine is made to bear upon the unique Christian God.

So understood these divine things can be considered in two ways, as far as the specification of theology for Aquinas is concerned. They can be considered in their role of the common principles of all things. In this way alone can they be treated of by the philosophers, in the science that has as its subject being *qua* being and which is called by them the divine science. In the second way the divine things are considered insofar as they are things that subsist in themselves, and not as manifested through effects. Procedure in the first of these two ways gives rise to philosophical theology or metaphysics. Procedure in the second way is that of the theology of sacred scripture. Both deal with things separate from matter *secundum esse,* though separate respectively in two different ways, namely as things that can never be in matter, such as God and the angels, or as things that can be without matter though sometimes found in matter. Objects separate in the first way constitute the subject of sacred theology, while they function only as the principles of the subject of philosophical theology (pp. 194.14-195.27).

This conception of the science of metaphysics is merely repeated in the Proem to the commentary on the *Metaphysics,* without any significant addition or change. But the chronologically prior development of the doctrine, in the course of the commentary on Boethius, shows clearly enough the issue that is at stake. If God as he exists in himself is allowed to function as the subject of metaphysics, no room will be left for a further science about God arising from divine revelation.[26] The preoccupation is to make the intellectual world safe for sacred theology. The concern of the Christian theologian is crystal clear. It is allayed by making a new type of separate objects specify

25 Boethius, *De Trin.*, c. II.

26 See Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 1: ed. Mandonnet, I, 6-8, especially "quamvis philosophia determinet de existentibus secundum rationes a creaturis sumptas, oportet tamen esse aliam quae existentia consideret secundum rationes ex inspiratione divini luminis acceptas". *Ibid.*, ad lm; p. 8.

metaphysics, while the divine is left free to specify sacred theology.

The task was rendered comparatively easy and the results readily acceptable in the framework already established by Avicenna. But is the key feature in the new notion of separate object, namely separate in being (*secundum esse*), characteristically Avicennian? It is hardly Aristotelian. In the "Proem" to the commentary on the *Metaphysics* the topic is introduced through contrast with the separation of the mathematicals: "Et non solum secundum rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et intelligentiae." In this contrast, *esse* can scarcely mean anything other than existence. If it had the formal sense that it would have in its regular Aristotelian use in a setting like this, it would not set up a contrast. In the Aristotelian use of the infinitive of the verb "to be" in similar contexts, the formal aspects of a thing were signified. For instance, the dividing and uniting by a point or instant are the same thing but differ in *εἶναι* (*Ph.*, IV 13, 222a16-20). Here and elsewhere in Aristotle[27] the infinitive is used synonymously with *logos*, in the sense of a formal aspect. Used with "separate," it would accordingly mean separate in notion, and not separate *secundum esse* in the additional meaning desired here by Aquinas. *Esse* would have to retain the Boethian meaning of *definition.*[28] The force of the *secundum esse* in its present use by St. Thomas calls for considerably more, then, than the formal Aristotelian meaning. Nor can the Boethian text that provides the take-off point for the discussion be expected to furnish the metaphysical basis for the new concept of separation *secundum esse et rationem.*

What new factor, then, is at work in the development of the formula "separata a materia secundum esse et rationem" (*In Metaph.*, Proem.) to describe the subject of metaphysics? The context strongly suggests the meaning of existence: "... non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam illa quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune." The prima facie meaning suggested by these words is that objects like God and the intellectual substances can never *exist* in matter, and that an object like common being is able to occur without matter. The reference seems clearly enough to bear on existential status, rather than on anything pertaining to the notions themselves. The verb is accordingly translated as "exist" without any hesitation in the English renditions "those things which can never exist in matter" and "those things which can exist without matter" (tr. Rowan). In the pertinent passages in the com-

27 See Bonitz, *Ind. Arist.*, 221a34-61.
28 *In Isog. Porphyr.*, editio secunda, IV, 14; ed. Brandt (CSEL, vol. 48), p. 273.13-15.

mentary on Boethius the existential bearing had been expressed so strongly as to leave it beyond doubt.[29]

In the Boethian commentary the meaning of *esse* had even in the article on the specification of divine science been clearly given its sharp Thomistic force as the actuality of essence.[30] Is this notion brought into the commentary on the *Metaphysics*? Does it bear upon the presentation of the subject of the science as common being distinct from divine being, in the recognizable Avicennian framework? If so, does it mean that the notion of separation *secundum esse* gives the subject of metaphysics a status that it could not possibly have had in Avicenna?

The rejection of the Avicennian notion of being, regarded as adding something by way of accident to the essence, is explicit in the commentary on the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*. In explaining the Aristotelian tenet that the substance of a thing is unitary and existent in virtue of its own self and not in virtue of something added, Aquinas takes the occasion to note that Avicenna's view is different. But Avicenna is wrong, for the being of a thing though other than its essence is not to be understood as something superadded in the fashion of an accident. Rather, it is as it were constituted by the principles of the essence.[31]

The characteristically Thomistic view of being pervades this passage. It means that the being of a finite thing is other than the thing itself, yet is caused by the very essence of the thing, so that nothing is more essential to a thing than its being. Not other by way of subsequent accident,

29 Cf.: "Quaedam vero sunt, quae quamvis dependeant a materia secundum esse, non tamen secundum intellectum, quia in eorum diffinitionibus non ponitur materia sensibilis, sicut linea et numerus. Et de his est mathematica. Quaedam vero speculabilia sunt, quae non dependent a materia secundum esse, quia sine materia esse possunt, sive numquam sint in materia, sicut deus et angelus, sive in quibusdam sint in materia et in quibusdam non, ..." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 1, Resp.; p. 165.21-27. Here the *esse* is contrasted with the definitions, and means existing in contradistinction to essence. Translation by the English term "existence" is accordingly justified: "Now there are some objects of speculation which depend on matter with respect to their existence, for they can exist only in matter ... There are some objects of speculation, however, which although depending on matter with respect to existence, do not depend on it with respect to their concept, because sensible matter is not included in their definitions." *The Division and Methods of the Sciences*, tr. Armand Maurer, 2nd ed. (Toronto 1958), pp. 7-8.

See also: "Non enim intelligit lineam esse sine materia sensibili, sed considerat lineam et eius passiones sine consideratione materiae sensibilis, ..." V, 3, ad 1m; p. 186.26-28. Cf.: V, 4, Resp.; p. 195.11-12. *Ibid.*, ad 7m; p. 199.14-21.

30 "Sed quia non habet esse a seipso angelus, ideo se habet in potentia ad esse quod accipit a deo, et sic esse a deo acceptum comparatur ad essentiam eius simplicem ut actus ad potentiam. Et hoc est quod dicitur quod sunt compositi ex 'quod est' et 'quo est,' ut ipsum esse intelligatur 'quo est,'" —*In Boeth. de Trin.*, V, 4, ad 4m; p. 198.16-20. This is exactly the same doctrine of existence as is found in *De Ente et Essentia*, c. IV (ed. Roland-Gosselin, pp. 34.4-36.3), and in *In I Sent.*, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2, Solut. (ed. Mandonnet, I, 229-230).

31 "Esse enim rei quamvis sit aliud ab eius essentia, non tamen est intelligendum quod sit aliquod superadditum ad modum accidentis, sed quasi constituitur per principia essentiae." *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, no. 558. Cf.: "... cum nihil sit essentialius rei quam suum esse." *In I Sent.*, d. 8, expositio lae partis; I, 209.

the being can be other only by way of a prior actuality.[32] The disturbing feature is that this uniquely Thomistic doctrine is being used as a norm for judging in the course of a commentary on Aristotle. It is used ostensibly to defend Aristotle's tenet that the substance of a thing is existent in virtue of its own self. At the same time the tenet of the Aristotelian passage that "an existent man" (*ens homo*) is a merely verbal reduplication of what is contained in "a man" (*homo — In IV Metaph.*, lect. 2, no. 550) is waved aside by the blunt assertion that the being of a thing is other than its essence (no. 558). The assertion is made with all the assurance that it need not be defended here, and that it is accepted by the readers without argument.

This shows that the notion of being by which both Aristotle and Avicenna are being judged in the commentary is the notion developed in Aquinas' own thinking. According to that notion the nature of being is found only in a unique primary instance. It is not a nature that could be shared either univocally or in analogically ranged degrees.[33] As a nature it cannot be common. Wherever it is found outside its primary instance it is other than the nature it actuates. In consequence the nature of being cannot function as common being nor be ranged as an instance under the notion of common being. Rather, as the cause of all the things that exhibit common being it is to be regarded in this respect as the cause of common being. With the subject of metaphysics in the wake of Avicenna distinguished from God and the highest causes, and now with Aquinas designated as common being, the kind of metaphysics introduced in the Proem to the Aristotelian commentary of Aquinas becomes clear. The notion of metaphysics presented as the entry into the Aristotelian thought is that of Aquinas himself. In its light, then, one need not be surprised to find judgment passed on Aristotle and Avicenna, as well as on Averroes and any other thinker.

The frequently made assertion that Aquinas was interested only in truth and not in the author making the statements now comes into focus as regards the Aristotelian *Metaphysics*. For St. Thomas human truth consisted in the correspondence of intellect with things,[34] and his own metaphysics was the way in which his own thinking corresponded to things on the metaphysical level. It was accordingly the one truth in which he could present metaphysical tenets, no matter whose words he was using.

32 A discussion of this topic may be found in my article. "The Causal Proposition — Principle or Conclusion?" *The Modern Schoolman*, 32 (1955), 323-327.

33 See *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2m; I, 10.

34 E.g.: "... quae quidem correspondentia, adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum supra ens, scilicet conformitatem, sive adaequationem rei et intellectus." *De Ver.*, I, 1c.

Viewed in this light, then, the kind of philosophical truth being propounded in the commentary on the *Metaphysics* should be the truth developed and expressed in the metaphysical thinking of Aquinas himself, to the extent the text of the *Metaphysics* gives occasion to do so. The care to safeguard the interests of sacred theology in the delineation of the subject of metaphysics has already shown the dominant thinking of the Christian theologian. The particular metaphysical cast into which the Proem throws the discussion that is to ensue, now indicates further the intention to present the meaning of the Aristotelian treatises in a general framework that cannot be that of Aristotle himself. How this complicated orientation works out in practice may best be seen from a study of the details that emerge as the commentary pursues its course.

The opening paragraphs (nos. 1-4) add to the thought three well-developed philosophical reasons, not found in the present passage but taken from authentic Aristotelian reasoning in other works. They substantiate the opening sentence of the *Metaphysics,* which Aristotle himself presents merely as a readily acceptable observation. This procedure does not differ in any essential way from a modern commentator's use of Aristotelian tenets from other treatises or from fragments to explain a doctrine stated succinctly in a particular sentence. In the paragraphs that follow, other Aristotelian works such as *De Anima* and the *Ethics* continue to be drawn upon to explain tenets of the present treatise, and an outside author, Cicero (no. 11) is called upon for help. All this is still standard practice among commentators today. By and large the commentary continues this presentation of the meaning found in the text, adding information judged relevant such as the names of the seven sages of ancient Greece, and representing Thales as "committing his 'disputationes' to writing" (no. 77) quite as any eminent medieval Master would do. So far things proceed as in the usual understanding of a commentary, with the virtues and the faults of its epoch.

Only at rare intervals does the alien framework imposed by the Proem make itself apparent. In this, Aquinas seems to feel himself fully in accord with Aristotle, who could make what was obscure in a preceding philosopher appear as something admirable. That was achieved by articulating "distinctly and manifestly" what the earlier philosopher wanted to say, that is, "what his intellect was tending towards, but which he was unable to express" (no. 196). In corresponding fashion Aquinas, as has just been seen (supra, nn. 31-34), explains the Aristotelian identity of being and thing in the light of his own tenet that a thing is other than its being, even though being is essential to the thing. In a severe criticism of Averroes he seems nevertheless to acquiesce in the position that knowledge of the separate substances

(plural) is the goal of human intellection,[35] and in the context of the distinction of the primary philosophy from both mathematics and the philosophy of nature he continues to speak of these substances in the plural (nos. 1163-1164; 2263-2267), although apparently equating them with God as the subject matter of theological science.[36] In this setting he feels obliged to go out of the text's way to note that the primary philosophy is not concerned with separate things only, but also with sensible things. Then comes the revealing concession: "unless perhaps we may say, as Avicenna says, that these common objects of which this science treats, are called separate *secundum esse* ... because they do not of necessity have their existence in matter, as do the mathematicals."[37]

This last text can leave little doubt that Aquinas is well aware of the plain meaning of the Aristotelian passages. Separate substances, namely divine things, are the subject treated of by the primary philosophy, which is on that account theological science. One has therefore to add sensible substances, *unless* one wishes to use the Avicennian framework in which notions like common being are called separate *secundum esse*.

This conclusion is confirmed by the reference to the beginning of Book *Γ* for the way in which the science of the primary being is the science of common being.[38] The Aristotelian framework is clearly recognized. In it the nature of the primary instance specifies the science. The secondary instances are treated of by the science in virtue of their reference to the primary instance. In the Avicennian framework, on the contrary, the common aspect specifies the science,

35 "Et ratio sua, quam inducit, est valde derisibilis... Deficit enim haec ratio. *Primo* quidem in hoc, quod cognitio intellectus nostri non est finis substantiarum separatarum, sed magis e converso." *In II Metaph.*, lect. 1, no. 286.

36 "Unde sunt causa entium secundum quod sunt entia, quae inquiruntur in prima philosophia, ut in primo proposuit. Ex hoc autem apparet manifeste falsitas opinionis illorum, qui posuerunt Aristotelem sensisse, quod Deus non sit causa substantiae caeli, sed solum motus eius." *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 1, no. 1164. Cf. no. 1168, and *In XI Metaph.*, lect. 7, nos. 2264-2265.

While there need not be any doubt that for Aristotle the separate substances are the cause of being for the sublunar world, the Aristotelian text explains this in the order of final causality. Yet Aquinas, showing clear understanding of the way the influence of the separate substances reaches the sublunar world through moving the heavenly bodies, speaks in a way that would strongly suggest the exercise of efficient causality by the separate substances: "Sic enim a substantiis separatis immobilibus ponit Aristoteles procedere et fieri et esse inferiorum, inquantum illae substantiae sunt motivae caelestium corporum, quibus mediantibus causatur generatio et corruptio in istis inferioribus." *In I Metaph.*, lect. 15, no. 237.

37 *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 1, no. 1165, my translation. Text supra, n. 18.

38 "... eadem enim est scientia primi entis et entis communis, ut in principio quarti habitum est." *In VI Metaph.*, lect. 1, no. 1170. Cf. "Eadem enim est scientia quae est de primis entibus, et quae est universalis. Nam prima entia sunt principia aliorum." *In XI Metaph.*, lect. 11, no. 2267. "Et quia ad illam scientiam pertinet consideratio entis communis, ad quam pertinet consideratio entis primi, ideo ad aliam scientiam quam ad naturalem pertinet consideratio entis communis; et eius etiam erit considerare huiusmodi principia communia." *In IV Metaph.*, lect. 5, no. 593.

and the divine is treated of in the science only because of reference to the common aspect, namely as its cause.

The Thomistic metaphysics of existence, however, requires that the reference to common being be explained in terms of efficient causality. The differences of the Thomistic commentary from the original Aristotelian meaning become especially apparent when details of this reference are under consideration. Aquinas acknowledges without hesitation that in Aristotle's view the first principles in the genus of substances, the heavenly bodies, are besouled (nos. 2476 and 2536), and that the eternity of motion and time is essential in Aristotle's own procedure regarding the immaterial substances (no. 2496). These two tenets he himself rejects. Aristotle's reasons accordingly are not regarded as cogent for establishing his conclusions. Nevertheless the conclusions themselves follow with necessity when the bringing of the world into existence is the operative factor in the reasoning (no. 2499). What can this mean if not that the Aristotelian conclusions, in order to be cogent, have to be based upon the existential actuality uppermost in Aquinas' own metaphysical thinking? The shying away from the Aristotelian eternity of the world, a possible philosophical alternative, indicates also the dominance of theological motivation in this problem.

Correspondingly the *necessary* perpetuity of cosmic motion, based by Aristotle on final causality, is explained as depending in its totality upon the *will* of God. The illustration used is that artifacts are assimilated to the artisan insofar as in them the artisan's will is fulfilled.[39] The nature of the Aristotelian reference to the first causes by way of assimilation seems clearly enough recognized, but it is explained in terms of efficient causality originating from will. Further, an Avicennian and ultimately Neoplatonic consideration that a unique first principle can cause only a unitary effect is dealt with in terms of existence as an acquired actuality. It is set aside on the ground that the one efficient cause can understand a multiplicity of things and cause them accordingly (no. 2559). In the same setting the Aristotelian doctrine that a separate substance has only itself as its intelligible object, is explained as meaning that God "by understanding himself understands all other things" (no. 2614) and "by knowing himself knows all things" (no. 2615). The reason given is that as first principle he contains all things in his power. Further, the order of the universe is a working out of what is in

39 *In XII Metaph.,* lect. 7, no. 2535. The metaphor of "assimilation" seems to have a Neoplatonic background. On the notion of necessity dependent upon the will of the maker, see my article "'Cause of Necessity' in Aquinas' *Teria Via,*" *Mediaeval Studies,* 33 (1971), 22-23; 33-39; 44-45.

the intellect and the will of the primary movent (no. 2631), and all natural things obtain their inclinations towards their goal from the primary intelligent being (no. 2634). Against this clearly etched background of Thomistic metaphysics the explicit assertions about divine providence made in the course of the commentary (nos. 1215-1222) fall into place. The overall theological interest also comes to the fore in this regard with the statement that on account of the philosophical conclusions all things may be said according to the Catholic faith to be subject to divine providence.[40]

With the foregoing data from the survey of the commentary on the *Metaphysics,* one is in a position to formulate the questions about the kind of procedure the work involves. Quantitatively, the overwhelming percentage of the book confines itself to explanation of the Aristotelian text just as the text stands, with recourse to other Aristotelian treatises and to other writers for elucidation as the occasion demands. Taken apart as just in itself, this almost total extent of the commentary does not prima facie differ in spirit from what is understood today as a philosophical commentary or interpretation. It can accordingly be cited and used to advantage by modern commentaries on Aristotle as though it were exactly of the same literary genre as they. Any noticeable divergences can be accounted for in terms of the different literary style and approach and background of the two epochs, medieval and modern. The treatment in the Aristotelian text would from this perspective be thoroughly philosophical in character.

Even within the strictly philosophical explanation, however, at times the judgments are made and the decisions are given on the strength of the Thomistic metaphysics of existence. These occasions are few, comparatively, but they are concerned with philosophically important issues. They are not marked off by any indications that they are intrusions from the outside. Rather, they seem part of the normal flow of thought. Do they show that the whole thrust of the commentary is to propound Thomistic thought, into which the great body of Aristotelian philosophy is skilfully absorbed? Is this the bearing given it by the Proem in making common being rather than separate substance the subject of the metaphysics about to be explained?

Further, does the theological concern that is implicit in the Proem affect the general character of the treatment throughout the commentary?

40 "Et propter hoc secundum fidem catholicam dicitur, quod nihil fit temere sive fortuito in mundo, et quod omnia subduntur divinae providentiae." *In VI Metaph.,* lect. 3, no. 1216. This means clearly enough that on account of the reasons set forth in Aristotle one is able to apply the vocabulary of the Catholic faith to the situation that is being considered.

Does it effectively alter the rank of the Aristotelian primary philosophy as supreme among the sciences? Is it the source of the assertions about the negotiable status of the Aristotelian reasons for the eternity of the world and the besouled nature of the heavenly bodies, and of those positive claims about divine providence? Is it all-pervasive enough to change the totality of the *philosophy* in the commentary, both Aristotelian and Thomistic, into the wine of theology? Or may it be dismissed as an over-scrupulous and unjustifiable propensity of a Christian theologian to go out of his way in order to insert corrections of doctrinal error and unorthodox tendencies piecemeal wherever he finds these aberrations, no matter what happens to be the real nature of the materials with which he is dealing?

With the questions already formulated, a brief glance at the other Aristotelian commentaries of Aquinas is now in order before attempting the answers.

III

In the commentary on the *Ethics*, the subject of moral philosophy is discussed not in a Proem but at the beginning of the commentary proper. It is located in human activity directed towards a purpose. On the basis of man acting first as an individual, secondly as a member of a family or household, and thirdly as a citizen, it allows moral philosophy to be divided into three parts (no. 6). The first part is treated of in the *Ethics* (no. 7). Aristotle's concern with political philosophy in the ethical treatises in explained away by stating that "the doctrine of this book contains the first elements of political science" (no. 31), and "the reflections of the present science pertain to political science, because in this science the principles of political science are given" (no. 225). The philosophy in the Aristotelian *Ethics* is accordingly regarded as a science in some way different from the Aristotelian political science. It is placed in a framework in which a general moral science is divided into three parts, of which the first is concerned with the activities of the individual man, and the third with those of civil society. The second is left for economics, understood as the science of running a household or estate.

Can any preoccupation be recognized behind this refusal to accept Aristotle's political science as the *whole* of moral philosophy?[41] The

41 When the three Aristotelian *Ethics* are read strictly against their original Greek pagan background, there can be little if any doubt that they make moral and political philosophy coincide. Political science is the discipline that envisages the supreme good of man and directs to it all other human activities (*E N*, I 2, 1094a27-b7), the good of the individual and the political society

threefold division of moral philosophy has a deep background in Christian tradition, through Albert the Great and Hugh of St. Victor to Cassiodorus and Boethius.[42] In spite of the very notion of "moral," implying as it does the basis of *mores*, i.e. customs developed in a common culture, this division allows a morality to a man just as an individual. With Aquinas, moreover, care is taken to restrict the absolute dominance of political science as described in Aristotle. Political science is dominant "not absolutely, but in the order of active sciences that are concerned with things human" (no. 31). Above them all is the divine science, which envisages the ultimate end of the whole universe. The Aristotelian *Ethics*, on the other hand, deals only with the imperfect happiness attainable in the present life on earth.[43]

The preoccupation, accordingly, seems to be to safeguard the supernatural happiness of the beatific vision as the ultimate end of man. This supreme goal is something to be attained by each man as an individual. Hence there can be a morality that applies to each man as an individual, and not just as a member of political society. The Aristotelian *Ethics*, in finding that human happiness consisted essentially in in-

is one and the same (2, 1094b7-10), and moral philosophy is a political study (b10-11; *M M* I 1, 1181b28-1182a1). The *Politics* is regarded as continuing the same discipline pursued in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (X 9, 1180b28-1181b24). However, for the view that Aristotle himself broke with "cette confusion platonicienne de la morale et de la politique," see R. A. Gauthier and J. Y. Jolif, *L'Ethique à Nicomaque* (Louvain & Paris 1958-1959), II, 2.

42 See Joseph Mariétan, *Problème de la classification des sciences d'Aristote à St. Thomas* (Paris 1901), pp. 67 (on Boethius); 80-81 (Cassiodorus); 137 (Hugh of St. Victor); 172-173 (Albert the Great). With Albert the vocabulary is exactly the same as that used by Aquinas. In Hugh of St. Victor the term *solitaria* occurs instead of *monastica*, and is used as an alternate for *ethica* and *moralis* in designating the science — see *Disdasc.*, II, 19, (ed. Buttimer) pp. 37.22-38.9; VI, 14, p. 131.15-17. The focus is on the exercise of the virtues, these being regarded as the acts of individuals. Boethius, though still under the influence of Aristotle in giving political science the leading rank among the branches that deal with groups, had given the branch that deals with virtues the first place in introducing the threefold division. See texts and comment in Mariétan, pp. 66-67, nn. 3-4 and 1-2. "Virtues" and the "care of the republic" are accordingly regarded as two different objects for the specification of sciences.

43 *In I Eth.*, lect. 2, no. 31; lect. 9, n. 113; lect. 10, no. 129; lect. 15, no. 180; lect. 16, no. 202; lect. 17, no. 212; *In III Eth.*, lect. 18, no. 590; *In IX Eth.*, lect. 11, no. 1912; *In X Eth.*, lect. 12, no. 2115; lect. 13, no. 2136. The *scientia divina* at no. 31 is quite clearly meant in reference to Aristotle's assertion of the supremacy of metaphysics at *Metaph.*, A 2, 982a16-19 and b4-7, yet the wording remains open to the still higher role of sacred theology in this regard. More surprising, however, is the way Aristotle's secondary happiness, the life of the active virtues, is at no. 2115 located as happiness in this life in contrast to "separate" happiness in the only too obvious sense of happiness after death: "Et per consequens felicitas, quae in hac vita consistit, est humana. Sed vita et felicitas speculativa, quae est propria intellectus, est separata et divina." In the commentary on the *Sentences*, however, the Aristotelian happiness in this life was ranged under contemplation: "Contemplatio autem Dei est duplex. Una per creaturas, quae imperfecta est, ratione jam dicta, in qua contemplatione Philosophus, *X Ethic.*, ... felicitatem contemplativam posuit, quae tamen est felicitas viae; et ad hanc ordinatur tota cognitio philosophica, quae ex rationibus creaturarum procedit." *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 7-8. The same is suggested at *In X Eth.*, lect. 11, no. 2110.

tellectual activity, offered a welcome means to express the theological doctrine of the beatific vision. But what was said in the *Ethics* about the requirements for the contemplative happiness, namely, friends, good looks, affluence, full life span on earth, and so on, did not apply in any obvious sense to the Christian ultimate end. The whole of the Aristotelian happiness had therefore to be located in the imperfect happiness of the present life, subordinated entirely to a higher happiness even in its role of end for human activity. With this framework of Christian tradition made manifest, the commentary of Aquinas on the *Ethics* is able to proceed in the same way as the one on the *Metaphysics*. It occupies itself with explaining the text just as the text stands, with only the occasional indication in passing that it is placing the whole consideration in a Christian setting.[44]

The commentary on the *Physics* experiences no special difficulty in accepting mobile being as the subject for natural philosophy. It places the topic, however, in the framework of abstraction from matter, contrasting definition with existence: "... there are some things whose being depends on matter, and that cannot be defined without matter."[45] In that framework a creationist metaphysics is presupposed and freely used (nos. 2001-2008). The first cause is the efficient cause of the whole being, both matter and form.[46] Movement can accordingly be regarded as beginning in an indivisible moment, not requiring any prior movement (no. 2054).

The problem in which the creationist metaphysics surfaces so clearly is admittedly theological. It is the frankly acknowledged (nos. 2041, 2043) conflict of the Aristotelian eternal world with the Christian belief that the world began in time. The Aristotelian reasons are recognized as valid where movement has to originate through another movement, but not where things begin to exist through the production of their whole being by the first cause of being (nos. 2044-2045). The truth here held on faith cannot in consequence be efficaciously attacked by the Aristotelian arguments (no. 2044). Averroes is blamed for making oc-

44 E.g., the reference to the supreme God as the giver of happiness at *In I Eth.*, lect. 14, no. 167. Cf. no. 169, lect. 10, no. 120, and lect. 18, no. 223. See also the example of St. Lawrence at *In III Eth.*, lect. 2, no. 395.

45 *In I Phys.*, lect. 1, no. 3. Cf. nos. 1-6. The framework is dependence or lack of dependence on matter *secundum esse, secundum rationem. Ibid.*, no. 3.

46 "Ex hoc ergo quod omne particulare agens presupponit materiam quam non agit, non oportet opinari quod Primum Agens Universale, quod est activum *totius entis*, aliquid praesupponit quasi non creatum ab ipso." *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 2, no. 2000. This is considered to be in accord with the meaning (*intentio* — no. 2001) of Aristotle and with his knowledge of the principle of all being (*totius esse* — no. 2007). The efflux is not movement or change, but emanation from an agent who is acting voluntarily (nos. 2046-2047).

casion of these arguments to attack the faith (no. 1996), and the reader's confidence in him is softened by showing how the Arabian commentator's understanding of Aristotle's method is "ridiculous" (no. 1970). It makes everything appear confused and without order, and his basic reason is "entirely frivolous" (no. 1972).

The genre of theological polemic is unmistakable in this manner of handling the problem of the world's eternity. Nevertheless, just as in the commentaries on the *Metaphysics* and on the *Ethics*, the manifestations of sacred theology and existential metaphysics are very rare.[47] The procedure in its near entirety consists in explanation of the text just as the text stands, quite in accord with the procedure in the other two commentaries. Yet it can bring in the theological and existential considerations without any indications or feeling of an alleged change to a different type of treatment. They all seem to be integral parts of the enterprise, rather than intrusions from outside.

The Proem to the commentary on *Perihermeneias* (*De Interpretatione*) divides the science of logic according to the three activities of the intellect, namely simple apprehension, enunciation ("judgment" — nos. 31-32), and reasoning. The first two of these activities are expressly taken from an Aristotelian division, and the third is regarded as added (no. 1). Logic is without hesitation projected as a science.[48] Mention of essence or quiddity as understood "absolutely" through simple apprehension seems to presuppose the metaphysical doctrine of existence as grasped through judgment. Existence as the specifying object of judgment seems likewise understood in the explanation of truth (no. 31). Existence is explicitly presented as the actuality of every form, either substantial or accidental (nos. 71-73). Likewise unmistakable is the existential dependence of all effects on the divine will, in the explanation of God's knowledge of future contingents (nos. 195-197), and the theological motif of safeguarding the Christian notion of providence.

In the commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*[49] the theological concern does not appear, but the existential metaphysics seems back of the

47 E.g., the truth that God made other things on account of himself, yet without need of them for his happiness, *In VIII Phys.*, lect. 2, no. 2051; and the assertion that he can have eternal understanding of non-eternal things, no. 2047. Also the difference of the faith from the position of Anaxagoras, at lect. 3, no. 2067.

48 "Cum autem Logica dicatur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis." *In I Periherm.*, Proem., Spiazzi no. 2. On the problem of logic and the Aristotelian division of the sciences, see Mariétan, pp. 20-25; 179-181.

49 On the bearing of the term "Analytics" for Aquinas, in the sense of bringing a judgment back to the first principles upon which its certainty rests, see *In I Post. Anal.*, Proem, Spiazzi no. 6.

contrast of definition with being (nos. 15-16) and of the distinction between being and substance in all things except in God (nos. 462-463), as well as of the requirement of a cause for the existence of all necessary beings except the one first principle (no. 480). Undoubtedly a theological interest can be detected behind this last requirement, but the language remains strictly philosophical and does not allow any theological motif to appear openly. Logic is presented as a science in the Proem (no. 2), and the Aristotelian treatises on it are located in the framework of the three activities of the human intellect (nos. 4-6).

The commentary on the *De Anima* locates its study in the framework of the sciences in which first philosophy deals with things that either are or can be without matter.[50] The existential setting is still clearer in the explanation of cognition through spiritual existence in contrast to natural existence (nos. 43, 159, 282-284, 553), and in the twofold existence to which the common nature is in this way open (nos. 378-380). Theological interests are evident in the distinction of God from the other separate substances, from the viewpoint of intellection (no. 726), and in the explanation of the two intellects as powers of the soul (734-745). On the other hand, no existential stress is here laid on the Aristotelian dictum that for living things to live is to be.[51]

The commentary on *De Sensu et Sensato* likewise uses the framework of separation *secundum esse et rationem* (no. 1), and of the twofold existence of the natures of things (nos. 213, 291). The commentaries on *De Memoria et Reminiscentia* and *Meteorologica* seem occupied solely with the explanation of the Aristotelian text. That on *De Caelo et de Mundo* invokes the Catholic faith for the creation of the world in time (nos. 64-66, 287), and in these passages and elsewhere (no. 91) repeats that God causes the heavens as an intelligent agent. The reasons given by Aristotle hold only against an original production of things by way of motion, and in no way militate against the teaching of the Catholic faith. The supreme God is distinguished from the other separate substances (nos. 295, 334), and is viewed as conserving a nature (no. 295), and as the cause that imparts existence and motion (nos. 291, 295, 299,

50 *In I de An.*, lect. 2, Pirotta no. 28. Though the commentary on Book I of the *De Anima* is the report of a *lectio* of Aquinas, it is accepted as authentic Thomistic doctrine; see preface in Pirotta edition (Turin 1925), pp. xi-xii.

51 *In II de An.*, lect. 7, no. 319. In the commentary on the *Sentences* a strongly existential explanation of the text had been given: "Alio modo dicitur esse ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus." *In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1m; ed. Mandonnet, I, 766. Similarly at *In II de Cael. et Mund.*, lect. 4, no. 334, *vivere* is explained as having two meanings, namely existence (*esse*) and operation. A discussion of the different instances of the use of this Aristotelian passage by Aquinas may be found in A. E. Wingell, "*Vivere Viventibus Est Esse* in Aristotle and St. Thomas," *The Modern Schoolman*, 38 (1961), 85-120.

334). Aristotle is asserted to have regarded God as the maker, and not only the final cause of the heavenly bodies (no. 91). The commentary on *De Generatione et Corruptione* (Proem, no. 2) uses the framework in which as in metaphysics the common genus considered by a science is contradistinguished from the cause of that genus. In the commentary on the *Politics* (Proem, no. 6) the subject matter is regarded as contained under that of the moral sciences in general, and as the culminating point of the philosophy that is concerned with things human (no. 7). The doctrine, including the discussion on slavery (nos. 47-96), is explained just as it stands in the text. The error of the Gentiles in anthropomorphizing the separate substances created by the one supreme God (no. 30; cf. no. 154) and similarly in calling great rulers gods (no. 84), is noted. The same overwhelming quantitative predominance of explanation of the text as it stands, with occasional appearance of the already noted theological and existential considerations, is accordingly observable in these commentaries.[52]

On the whole, then, one may say that the other commentaries continue to manifest the pattern shown in the commentary on the *Metaphysics*. The sciences are made to fit into the framework in which metaphysics deals with common being as subject and separate substance as cause of the subject. The recognition of a moral science for individual actions, distinct from political philosophy, is added. The theological interests of creation, of the supremacy of God over the other separate substances, and of universal divine providence, are safeguarded wherever occasion demands. Polytheism is branded an error. Finally, the Thomistic metaphysics of existence, in the relation of existence to common nature and in the understanding of efficient causality as the bestowal of existence, seems taken for granted throughout.

IV

The above survey makes it clear that, except for quantitatively minimal proportions, the Aristotelian commentaries of Aquinas are made up of explanations of the text just as it stands, with discussions of its background and of the various opinions of others about it. In all this the Aquinas commentaries do not range outside the limits of the modern notion about what a commentary should be. But in two thirds of these commentaries on Aristotle there are passages that show an

52 The commentaries in this paragraph have been cited according to the numbers used in the Marietti editions.

overriding theological concern. In two thirds of them there are likewise passages that reveal a definitely existential metaphysics, something not found in the Aristotelian texts. Finally, three quarters of the commentaries have passages that locate their subject matter in a framework of the sciences rather different from that of Aristotle.

How is this situation to be assessed? May one close one's eyes to the comparatively small number of passages that introduce theological and existential considerations, as well within the percentage limit to be expected in any commentator with strong religious convictions and definite metaphysical tendencies of his own? May one regard the passages that locate the Aristotelian treatises within the then contemporary classification of the sciences as a quite normal failure to see outside the perspective of the times, much as a modern commentator is hardly blamed for putting Aristotle into frameworks like those of ontology, psychology, or philosophy of science? May all these passages as it were be mentally excised and the other ten commentaries be allowed to join the two in which no indication of theological or existential interest appears, and in which no attempt is made at science classification? In this case the Aristotelian commentaries of Aquinas would be straight philosophical explanations of the text, with all the restrictions and merits and faults of their times.

Can one, though, legitimately make this mental excision of the passages that jar with the interpretation? Do not these passages, relatively few in number as they are, set rather the whole tone of the commentaries? Certainly in their own settings they show no signs of being intrusions into the general procedure of the thought. They read as though they belong to the same original inspiration, and unable to be regarded as alien incursions except on norms that were not those of the writer. They flow forcefully from what seems to be a unitary source.

If so, what is that source? It could hardly be the metaphysical or epistemological interest. These could not be for Aquinas the inspiration of the overriding theological concern. Sacred theology, on the contrary, could be and normally would be the source of existential and epistemological inquiries for him. His most penetrating metaphysical thought is found in the commentary on the *Sentences* and other professedly theological works. His most extensive study of the classification of the sciences is in his commentary on Boethius' *De Trinitate*. For him sacred theology, as the absolutely highest wisdom, has the office of judging and orienting the results of all the other sciences.[53] It has every right, accordingly, to survey their results as occasion

53 *ST*, I, 1, 6c. Cf.: "Ita, cum finis totius philosophiae sit infra finem theologiae, et ordinatus

demands. Exactly that, it seems, has been done in the Aquinas commentaries on Aristotle. In these commentaries, then, may one say that Aquinas continues his dedication to the work of theological wisdom,[54] and that in them he continues to change what was water in the other sciences into the wine of theology?[55] The use of a new existential metaphysics may be taken as established. But that is still on the philosophical level. It does not just in itself prove theological motivation. Its structure is thoroughly philosophical. May the philosophical structure be regarded as remaining intact while its content functions as a part, in fact by far the greatest part quantitatively, of a colloidal theological enterprise?

The colloidal nature of wine allows the water to be extracted from it and replaced without too much difficulty. The overwhelmingly preponderant part of the commentaries may be extracted in similar fashion from the theological setting given it by the comparatively few theological passages. Extraction of philosophical statements from professed theological works such as the *Summa Theologiae* and the commentary on the *Sentences* has been standard practice for centuries. Likewise the four Aristotelian commentaries in which no theological assertions occur may be viewed in isolation from the whole work of Aquinas and be regarded as merely philosophical commentaries. But in doing so is one encountering the real St. Thomas? Is one understanding what he is doing? Is one at all in tune with the spirit of faith endeavoring to understand all the things with which it comes in contact?

A more vivid objection arises from the quantitative proportions of the theological and philosophical passages. Can a few drops of wine be expected to change into itself a chain of rather large lakes? Here the metaphor seems to break down. The biological simile of a few clusters of living cells affecting the whole medium would be more in order. At any rate, the medieval mind experienced no difficulty in seeing an author express as his own the material taken nearly one hundred per cent from other writers. Peter Lombard, for instance, could be regarded as the author of everything in his four books of *Sentences*, even though

ad ipsum, theologia debet omnibus aliis scientiis imperare et uti his quae in eis traduntur." *In I Sent.*, Prol., q. 1, a. 1, Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 8.

54 Cf. expression of this dedication in the *Contra Gentiles*: "Assumpta igitur ex divina pietate fiducia sapientis officium prosequendi, ... propositum nostrae intentionis est veritatem quam fides Catholica profitetur, pro nostro modulo manifestare... et quomodo demonstrativa veritas fidei Christianae religionis concordet". *CG*, I, 2, Assumpta.

55 "Unde illi, qui utuntur philosophicis documentis in sacra doctrina redigendo in obsequium fidei, non miscent aquam vino, sed aquam convertunt in vinum." *In Boeth. de Trin.*, II, 3, ad 5m; ed. Decker, p. 96.18-20. On the topic, see A. C. Pegis, "*Sub Ratione Dei*: A Reply to Professor Anderson," *The New Scholasticism*, 39 (1965), 141-157.

practically all the material was taken from others.[56] As long as the writer was asserting mastery over material used and was organizing and directing it towards his own purpose, he was expressing it as his own. There is accordingly not too much difficulty in regarding St. Thomas, in taking on the duties of the wise man (*CG*, I, 2), as considering himself to be pursuing the work of sacred theology throughout the whole course of his commentaries on the Aristotelian text.

It is, of course, much easier to apply this conception of philosophy changed into theology to a work like the *Contra Gentiles*,[57] than to writings that are professedly commentaries on a pagan philosopher. Yet is the difference that crucial? The theologian is writing in the service of faith (supra, n. 55). He sees a wealth of rationally developed truth in the pagan source. What better way to bring it into the service of faith than by exploring it painstakingly word for word, presenting it as a whole, and allowing it thereby to further the understanding of the Christian conception of things? Does not this accomplish the purpose much better than a piecemeal citation of convenient passages? And will not this perspective allow the four commentaries in which there is no express mention of theological interests to be viewed as an integral part of the whole enterprise? Will they be any less theological in character than the long passages within the other commentaries in which no explicit mention of theological concern is found?

But may not the Thomistic commentaries on Aristotle be regarded as Christian philosophy, genuinely philosophical in character yet brought under Christian goals? The notion of Christian philosophy is a difficult one. It has received many interpretations in recent years.[58] If it is to be kept strictly on the philosophical level, however, it cannot use revealed truths as principles for its reasoning.[59] It cannot give them a probative function. Yet the Thomistic commentaries on Aristotle are dominated

56 So, for St. Bonaventure, *In I Sent.*, Proem, q. 4, the writer of the *Sentences* was exercising the function not of a scribe or of a compiler or of a commentator, but of an author: "Talis fuit Magister, qui sententias suas ponit et Patrum sententiis confirmat. Unde vere debet dici auctor huius libri". *Ibid.* Resp. This theme in Bonaventure is discussed in John Quinn, *The Historical Constitution of St. Bonaventure's Philosophy* (Toronto 1973).

57 See Pegis, art. cit., pp. 143-146.

58 See Maurice Nédoncelle, *Is There a Christian Philosophy*? tr. Illtyd Trethowan (New York 1960), pp. 85-114.

59 Aquinas states clearly the difference between the two procedures, philosophical and theological: "Vel procedunt ex principiis fidei, ... Ex his autem principiis ita probatur aliquid apud fideles sicut etiam ex principiis naturaliter notis probatur aliquid apud omnes. Unde etiam theologia scientia est". *ST*, II-II, 1, 5, ad 2m.

The work of James C. Doig, *Aquinas on Metaphysics* (The Hague 1972), appeared after this paper had been completed. Its study of the nature of Aquinas' commentary on the *Metaphysics* bears out the views of the present article, though it does not trace the reasons for the unity of Aquinas' treatment to his theological activities.

by this properly theological direction. The creation of the world in time is taught as the way the case actually is. The besouled nature of the heavenly bodies is rejected. Perfect human happiness, the first principle of ethics, is located definitely in the beatific vision. Divine providence is a "must". These considerations dominate the Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle in the commentaries. They seem to generate theology, not philosophy. The purpose is to defend revealed truth, not just Christian philosophical truth.

The distinction between "personal" works of Aquinas and commentaries is obvious and has to remain. In the "personal" works he sets his own order of discussion. In the commentaries he is bound by the order in the text before him. Correspondingly, the theological character of the works will vary. A commentary on a philosophical study will not be theological in the same way and to the same extent that the *Summae* and the *Quaestiones Disputatae* are theological. The material that is brought into theological service will manifest at far greater length its philosophical structure. The question therefore is not "theology *or* philosophy?" It concerns theology *and* philosophy found together. The question is whether the theology or the philosophy gives the work as a whole its characteristic specification. Here, just as in a colloidal solution, the issue of degrees enters. The *Summa Theologiae* is more manifestly theological than the *Summa contra Gentiles*, and both are more so than the Aristotelian commentaries. But the best philosophy in Aquinas is to be found in the most theological of his writings. Its cogency and its worth as philosophy are not at all diminished. Yet the anvil on which it was hammered into shape was theology.

This limited and selective participation in philosophy by the theologian is still a problem today. Aquinas at the height of his theological career devoted a decade to the interpretation of Aristotle. There is no indication that this was a side interest or a hobby. Rather, the theologian seemed to feel the need of philosophical guidance from Aristotle for his own theological work. Was this guidance, with all its prudential selection and its specially directed development, not incorporated into the theological enterprise? And may it not remain genuinely philosophy as material used by a theologian, while functioning on the theological level as the most apt medium for developing and expressing an overall theological conception of things?

THE *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS* AND THOMAS AQUINAS

Vernon J. Bourke

WITH the publication of the critical edition of St. Thomas' commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* the time has come for an examination of what we know and what we do not know about this Thomistic work.[1] The long Latin "Preface" to the Leonine text was written by R. A. Gauthier, O.P. In spite of its thoroughness, this introduction raises many new problems and its answers to some of the old ones may not be entirely satisfactory.[2] The text of the new edition differs considerably from the vulgarized text in earlier printings of the *Commentary*. Comparison of readings in a key section, such as the explanation of prudence in Book VI, 4, reveals more than a dozen significant changes in the text, several consisting of whole clauses or phrases that are lacking in older editions.[3] This means that future studies of this commentary must be based on the Leonine text; it is probably the best edited work of St. Thomas in the Leonine edition.[4]

In what follows, we propose to examine some of the problems associated with Aquinas' exposition of the NE: the question of the Latin version used by Thomas, his utilization of preceding commentaries, the time and place of composition of his commentary, and the value of the commentary in modern Thomistic and Aristotelian studies.

1 Sancti Thomae de Aquino, *Opera Omnia*, iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita, tomus XLVII: *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*, cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum, vol. 1, Praefatio, Libri I-III; vol. 2, Libri IV-X, Indices (Romae: Ad Sancta Sabinae 1969) pp. 275*, 193, 201-683.

A note at the bottom of p. 268* tells us what Dominican scholars worked on this edition: L. J. Bataillon, B. Guyot and M. Perrier transliterated the codices; R. A. Gauthier and M. Gils collated the MSS; Gauthier investigated the sources of the commentary (assisted by R. Gallet, A. M. Kenzeler and J. Peters) and he also "adapted" the Latin text of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (hereafter NE) to the commentary.

2 Because of its cost ($ 76 U.S.), Leonine tome XLVII will be available in only a few special libraries and there will be few reviews. The notice by B. Quelquejeu in *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 53 (1969) 400, is a non-critical description.

3 Compare *In VI Ethicorum*, ed. R. M. Spiazzi (Turin 1964) pp. 386-389, with *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* (ed. Leon.) pp. 344-347. The Leonine editors have changed the usual title of the commentary and have deleted the paragraph nos. that were inserted in the Marietti printings.

4 Unfortunately the English translation (*Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. by C. I. Litzinger, 2 vols. [Chicago 1964]) was done before the Leonine text was printed. If a revised printing of the English is ever brought out, it should have a new introduction and its readings should be corrected throughout the commentary.

VERSIONS OF THE NE AVAILABLE TO AQUINAS

Concerning the Latin text of the *Ethics* that Aquinas used, some writers say that he commented on a translation made, or revised, by William of Moerbeke.[5] Other respectable scholars even claim that this Moerbeke version is found in extant manuscripts.[6] However, in 1946, Martin Grabmann reviewed the whole problem of the extent of William of Moerbeke's translations of Aristotle and showed that there is little evidence for accepting the existence of a Moerbeke text of the NE.[7] Even earlier, A. Pelzer had concluded that Moerbeke never did produce a version of Aristotle's *Ethics.*[8] Of course, Ezio Franceschini did claim that William had made a revision of Grosseteste's translation of NE but this contention was subjected to severe criticism by scholars like Leo Keeler and Antoine Dondaine.[9] The fact remains, however, that some sort of revision of the Grosseteste version was made by someone working early in the second half of the thirteenth century, and a copy of this revision was the base for Thomas Aquinas' exposition.[10]

A complete Latin translation of the NE may have been made by some unknown scholar in the twelfth century.[11] We have no evidence

5 Thus Litzinger ("Introduction," I, xii) speaks rather confidently of the version "generally attributed to William of Moerbeke, as found in the Cathala-Spiazzi edition." He adds that, "it was the basis for the Commentary, although St. Thomas at times varies from this rendition."

6 "As regards the exegesis of the *Ethics*, we are now in a position to discern the role played by the Moerbeke revision done upon the previous version of Grosseteste. In fact, as we have seen, a manuscript tradition of the Moerbeke Greco-Latin version is clearly discernible." M. D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, trans. A. M. Landry and Dominic Hughes (Chicago 1964) p. 217. Cf. I. T. Eschmann, "Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works" in E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York 1956) p. 404.

7 *Guglielmo di Moerbeke, O.P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele* (Roma 1946) pp. 103-111.

8 "Les versions latines des ouvrages de morale conservés sous le nom d'Aristote," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 23 (1921) 316-341; 378-412.

9 For Franceschini's main argument see "La revisione Moerbekiana della 'Translatio Lincolniensis' dell'Etica Nicomachea," *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* 30 (1938) 150-162. Leo Keeler argued ("The Alleged Revision of R. Grosseteste's Translation of the Ethics," *Gregorianum* 18 [1937] 410-425) that the textual variants used by Franceschini were really derived from the *Notule* in Grosseteste's translation. See also A. Dondaine, in *Bulletin thomiste* 6 (1940-42) 90-94.

10 Gauthier, *Praefatio* in *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* (ed. Leon. XLVII, 1, hereafter cited as *Praefatio*) p. 232*, insists that this revision of Grosseteste was not made by Moerbeke: "nec ulla est causa cur virum doctum qui post Robertum Grosseteste *Librum Ethicorum* iterum recognovit Guillelmum de Moerbeke fuisse suspicemur." Cf. Gauthier, "Introduction," to Aristotle, *L'Ethique à Nicomaque*, 2me éd. (Louvain-Paris 1970) pp. 125-126. Hereafter cited as *Introduction E N.*

11 L. Minio-Paluello, "Iacobus Veneticus Grecus: Canonist and Translator of Aristotle," *Traditio* 8 (1952) 279. There is one MS (Cambridge, Mass., Library of Harvard University, olim Library of Philip Hofer, Typ. 233 H, f. 17ra-58ra, XIII s.) which seems to contain parts of this twelfth-century version. Cf. Gauthier, *Praefatio*, p. 204*.

that this twelfth-century version was available as a complete text at any point in the thirteenth century. Certain parts of the NE were read in Latin in the early decades of the century of St. Thomas. These may have been excerpts from the twelfth-century version, or they may have been fragmentary translations from the early thirteenth century. In any case, Books II and III (the *Ethica vetus*), plus Book I (the *Ethica nova*), plus portions of Books VII and VIII (the *Ethica Borghesiana*) were in Latin before Robert Grosseteste began to translate the NE.[12] These fragmentary translations are not unimportant. Both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas used them — even after they could have consulted the newer and more complete text provided by Grosseteste. It is even possible that Hermannus Alemannus translated some parts of the NE which were read in the thirteenth century.[13]

However, it is now generally accepted that the only complete thirteenth-century translation of the NE was made by Robert Grosseteste about the years 1246-1247.[14] At the time that Albert was commenting on Peter Lombard's *Sentences* (before 1245) he did not know the whole text of the NE; but in the period 1248-1252, when he was lecturing on the NE, he of course had the full text in the version of Robert Grosseteste.[15] This translation was made from the Greek and was accompanied by passages translated from Greek commentators (such as Aspasius and Eustratius) plus certain annotations (*notule*) written by Grosseteste himself.[16] It was probably in the next decade (1250-1260) that Grosseteste's translation was copied, without the comments from the Greeks and without his own *Notule*, and this constituted an *editio minor* of the *translatio Lincolniensis.*[17]

This smaller edition of Grosseteste's work was revised at some time after mid-century by a scholar who knew Greek. Many histories and reference works continue to attribute this revision to William of Moerbeke. But, as we have seen, this is probably incorrect. Gauthier lists

12 For further data consult the forthcoming vol. XXVI of *Aristoteles Latinus*; it is devoted to the mediaeval Latin translations of the NE.

13 Cf. Gauthier, *Introduction EN*, pp. 114-115.

14 D. A. Callus, "The Date of Grosseteste's Translations and Commentaries on the Ps. Dionysius and the Nicomachean Ethics," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 4 (1947) 201. See also O. Lottin, "Saint Albert le Grand et l'Ethique à Nicomaque," *BGPM*, Suppl. III, 1 (Münster 1935) 611-626.

15 Jean Dunbabin, "The Two Commentaries of Albertus Magnus on the Nicomachean Ethics," *RTAM* 30 (1963) 232.

16 S. H. Thomson, "The 'Notule' of Grosseteste on the *Nicomachean Ethics,*" *Proceedings of the British Academy* 19 (1933) 195-218.

17 Gauthier, *Praefatio*, p. 206*, where three MSS (plus the Harvard MS mentioned above, note 11, which appears to have some parts of the Grosseteste version in contaminated form) are listed as representing the tradition of the *editio minor.*

about ten manuscripts containing this revision which are either Parisian or copied from Paris manuscripts.[18] Although the research on the catchwords and manuscript traditions conducted by Gauthier and his associates, in connection with the making of the Leonine edition, indicates that it was this revision of the Grosseteste version that was used by Thomas Aquinas,[19] it is also clear that Aquinas was acquainted with the *Ethica vetus* and *nova*, with some of the texts of the Greek commentators, and of course with the material in Albert's *Lectures* on the NE, as we shall see.

Gauthier contends that St. Thomas derived his various readings of the NE from the one manuscript prepared by the anonymous revisor mentioned above.[20] Indeed, Thomas' use of a single manuscript of the Grosseteste revision is associated by the Leonine editor with the conclusion that Aquinas was ignorant of what even mediaeval scholars knew about textual criticism.[21]

However this may be, it has not been possible to identify the manuscript that was actually used by Thomas Aquinas. In fact, there is still some doubt that it is clearly established that there was but this one manuscript at Thomas' disposal. This is the reason why the Latin text of the NE, printed in tome XLVII of the Leonine edition, is admitted to be "adapted" by R. A. Gauthier.[22] We are not yet finished with the investigation of the text and sources used by Aquinas, as a commentator on the NE. The continuing uncertainty is closely connected with the related problems of where and when he produced his commentary.[23]

18 Gauthier, *Praefatio,* pp. 206*-208*; this close identification of the text tradition of the revision with Paris would certainly cast doubt on its association with Moerbeke.

19 Ibid., p. 231*.

20 Ibid., p. 234*.

21 "Quin contra, si candide confitemur Thomam artis criticae, ut illis temporibus solebat, fere expertem unum solum codicem et hunc corruptum et contaminatum ad explicandam *Libri Ethicorum* sententiam adhibuisse, inanes glorias ei sane denegabimus, solidior tamen ei manebit gloria sapientis . . ." Ibid.

22 "Praefationem conscripsit P. R. A. Gauthier, qui etiam Aristotelis textum Thomae Sententiae aptavit." *Praefatio*, p. 268*.

23 G. Meersemann ("Les Manuscrits du cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur la Morale à Nicomaque, recueilli et rédigé par saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 38 [1935] 82) was overconfident in suggesting that the Grosseteste version of the N E is what is in the Marietti printings. This vulgarized text is apparently a combination of several versions.

Commentaries Prior to St. Thomas

Among the influences on St. Thomas' commentary are three types of earlier expositions of Aristotle's *Ethics*. These were commentaries in Greek, in Arabic, and in Latin. The ancient Greek commentaries included an explanation of Books I-IV, VII (in part) and VIII by the second-century A.D. scholar named Aspasius. There is also an anonymous Greek commentary on Books II-IV, dating from about the sixth century A.D. Later, Christian Greek scholarship added a commentary on Books V and IX-X, by Michael Ephesius (11th c.), a commentary on Books I and VI by Eustratius (11th c.) and an anonymous commentary on Book VII, from the twelfth or thirteenth century.

Aquinas has echoes of the views of Aspasius throughout his commentary on the eighth book.[24] The Leonine *Index Auctorum*[25] and the footnotes to Thomas' exposition of Book VIII show this dependence on Aspasius. However, Gauthier doubts that Thomas read Aspasius directly, or even in the passages included with Grosseteste's first version of the NE. Instead, Gauthier is convinced that Aquinas was indebted to Albert's *Lectura* for what is found from the Greek commentators in the Thomistic *Commentary.*[26] However it is derived, Thomas' exposition of Books I and VI shows that he knew something of Eustratius' views.[27] On the other hand, there is less evidence for a positive influence from Michael Ephesius or the anonymous Greek commentaries.[28]

In the world of mediaeval Arabic scholarship one finds paraphrases, summaries and commentaries of Aristotle's *Ethics* from the tenth century onward. Alfarabi (10th c.) commented on portions of the N E and a Latin version of his work was probably known to Albert at the time of his first *Lectura.*[29] The Tahdhib al-Akhlaq of Ibn Miskawaihi (11th c.) was the outstanding Mohammedan adaptation of Aristotelian ethics but its influence on Aquinas is not established. Such an influence would, in any case, be indirect, via twelfth-century compilations.[30] No com-

24 "S. Thomas a fait usage, et même de façon assez suivie, de l'œuvre d'Aspasius. La similitude frappante de plusieurs passages ne saurait trouver d'autre explication." W. Stinissen, "De commentaar van Thomas op Boek VIII en IX van de Nicomachische Ethiek. Zijn verhouding tot de Griekse commentaren," *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie* 20 (1958) p. 748 in the French Summary.

25 *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*, ed. Leon. XLVII, 2, p. 625.

26 Thus Gauthier writes: "suspectum ergo Eustratium habuit Thomas, quia Albertum, non autem Eustratium, legit." *Praefatio*, p. 247*.

27 However derived, the influence of Eustratius on Books I and VI of Thomas' *Commentary* is somewhat evident. See the footnotes of these books in the Leonine edition.

28 Cf. Stinissen, art. cit., p. 748.

29 Gauthier, *Introduction E N*, p. 109.

30 See V. J. Bourke, *History of Ethics* (New York 1968) pp. 76-77.

mentary on the NE is now attributed to Avicenna but the impact of his development of Aristotelian psychology is evident in Thomas Aquinas' ethics commentary.[31] It was Averroes' *Middle Commentary* on the *Ethics* that was well known to Aquinas. There are more than thirty passages in the Thomistic commentary which show some relation to the thought of Averroes.[32] Of course, it is well known that the style of Aquinas' *Commentary on the Ethics* is similar to that of the Averroistic middle commentaries. In the final analysis, the most important lesson that Thomas may have learned from the Arabs as commentators is that Aristotelian ethics is not entirely incompatible with a strong theistic position.

Several commentaries on the NE are found in Latin before St. Thomas' time. At least six courses on the *Ethica vetus* and *nova*, given by Masters in the Arts faculty at Paris, have now been identified in manuscripts. Both Albert and Thomas knew some of these partial commentaries and used various formulae from them.[33] However, it is now difficult to determine whether Thomas had direct access to such records of Arts courses, at the time that he was working on his own exposition.

Another pre-thomistic Latin compilation was precisely Grosseteste's translation of the complete text of the NE, with his own *Notule* and the selected passages from the Greek commentators. This collection was available in Latin before mid-century and, in fact, was used in Albert's first course on the *Ethics*.[34] We have already discussed the possibility of Thomas using the Greek commentaries (and it would have been through the Grosseteste version, if the influence was direct) but the "Notes" composed by Robert Grosseteste pose still another problem. Gauthier has printed many of these *Notule* in the footnotes to the Leonine edition of Thomas' *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*. They run throughout the critical apparatus. Yet Thomas' own text does not show that he was reading the Grosseteste "Notes" at the time that the Thomistic exposition was made. One must admit that, in some cases, Thomas uses readings and gives explanations that would probably have been corrected, if he had had the Grosseteste "Notes" before him. It is, then, the opinion of the Leonine editor that Thomas commented on a manuscript

31 The Leonine *Index* (vol. 2, 626) records more than ten resemblances to Avicenna's *De anima (Liber VI Naturalium)*.

32 Leonine *Index*, s.v. Averroes (vol. 2, 626).

33 Gauthier, *Praefatio*, pp. 236*-246*.

34 The first two books of Grosseteste's version, plus his translation of Eustratius and the anonymous commentary on Book II, have been critically edited by H. P. F. Mercken under the title: *Aristoteles over de menselijke Volkomenheid* (Brussels 1964). In the same series of the Flemish Academy of Science, Letters and Fine Arts, W. Stinissen has edited Books VIII-IX of Grosseteste's version, under the title: *Aristoteles over de Vriendschap* (Brussels 1963).

that contained the Grosseteste version of the NE but lacked both the *Notule* and the materials from the Greek commentators.

Since the pioneering study of A. Pelzer in the early 1920's, we have known that Albert the Great lectured on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, when Aquinas was his student, and that several manuscripts of this course are extant, deriving from a *reportatio* made by Thomas Aquinas.[35] In fact, Albert produced two explanations of the NE, the first of which is closely connected with the Thomistic *Commentary*, and a second *Commentarium* which may not have been known to Aquinas.[36]

Before the mid-1240's Albert knew and cited some parts of the *Nicomachean Ethics.*[37] His early *Tractatus de natura boni* has two quotations from the NE. His *Summa de creaturis* gives evidence that Albert now knew more than the *Ethica vetus* and *nova* but his treatment of justice, at this time, depends on the first Book (rather than the more developed Book V) of the NE. The third Book of Albert's *Commentary on the Sentences* (after 1247) shows that his knowledge of the NE is growing more extensive: he now knows the treatment of liberality in NE IV and of justice in the fifth Book. When we look at Albert's comments on the fourth Book of the *Sentences*, we see that he has the full text of Grosseteste's translation of the *Ethics* in his hands.[38]

It was in the years between 1248 and 1252 that Albert headed the Dominican *studium generale* and gave the lectures that were written up by Thomas Aquinas. Albert's *Lectura in Libros Ethicorum* exists now in at least five manuscripts and a printed edition has been started.[39] Besides the analysis of the text and the commentary, this *Lectura* contains 502 Questions. It is a longer work and, in some ways, more thorough than St. Thomas' *Commentary.*[40] Comparison of Albert's work on the NE with that of Thomas Aquinas is not easy, however. For

35 A. Pelzer, "Le cours inédit d'Albert le Grand sur la Morale à Nicomaque recueilli et rédigé par S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 24 (1922) 333-361, 479-520; reprinted in *Etudes d'histoire littéraire sur la scolastique médiévale* (Louvain 1964) pp. 272-335.

36 C. H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors A-F," *Traditio* 23 (1967) 344. But see Gauthier, *Introduction E N*, p. 130, where he suggests that *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* I, 1 (ed. Leon. p. 5, lines 142-155) may refer to Albert's *Commentarium*.

37 For details of these findings, see O. Lottin, "Saint Albert le Grand et l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*," *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters*, Beiträge Supplement, III (Münster 1935) 611-621.

38 Lottin's research is confirmed by D. A. Callus, "The Date of Grosseteste's Translations," *RTAM* 14 (1947) 205.

39 The two best MSS are Vat. lat. 722, and Cambridge, Gonville and Caius 510 (388). See Dunbabin, art. cit., p. 233; and Meersemann, art. cit., pp. 70-83. For the critical edition: Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica, Commentum et Questiones, tres libros priores*, ed. Wilhelmus Kübel (*Opera Omnia*, vol. XIV, 1, 1; Köln 1968).

40 In ed. Leon. Thomas' *Commentary* runs to about 600 pages, including Aristotle's text; less than one third of Albert's *Lectura* in the Kübel ed. takes up 220 pages.

one thing, we do not know how much of the *Lectura* is due to Albert and how much to his young reporter, Thomas. Pelzer thought that Thomas reworked and completed the oral materials copied from Albert's classes.[41] Some of the *Quaestiones* in the *Lectura* have the clarity and profundity of questions in the *Secunda Pars* of St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae.*[42] No other commentary now attributable to Albert has the complicated style or thoroughness of the *Lectura.* On the other hand, the exposition of the text and the use of added questions in the *Lectura* are reminiscent of Aquinas' *Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate.*

No doubt the Albertine *Lectura* is an outstanding mediaeval exposition of the NE.[43] In his edition of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* Gauthier is almost effusive in his praise of Albert's *Lectura.*[44] Now, in the "Preface" to the Leonine edition of Thomas' *Commentary,* more than twenty pages are devoted to the *Lectura.*[45] Climaxing this lengthy study is Gauthier's claim that Albert's *Lectures on the Ethics* is the main source of Thomas Aquinas' *Commentary.* This dependence is said to extend to both style and content. As far as Gauthier is concerned Aquinas used Albert as a source for the Greek commentaries, for the Latin text of the NE, and for many of the phrases (e.g. *sapientis est ordinare*) commonly considered distinctive of Thomistic terminology. We must await the printing of the complete text of Albert's *Lectura* before attempting further appraisal of these sweeping claims.

Some twenty years after giving his Cologne course on the NE, Albert returned to the text and wrote his second "commentary," a treatise of quite different character.[46] This is the *Commentarium in X Libros Ethicorum* long known in the collected works of St. Albert.[47] This work from the late 1260's is not really a commentary in the usual sense of the term. It does not contain the Latin text of the NE; nor does it include an analysis of the Aristotelian text. Divided into books, tractates and chapters, Albert's *Commentarium* is his own paraphrase of much of the thought content of the NE. The work is a semi-personal course on

41 "D'autre part, saint Thomas ne s'est pas contenté de mettre par écrit séance tenante, les leçons qu'il entendait chez Albert: il les a ensuite, je crois, remaniées et complétées ça et là sans recourir toutefois, lui-même, à la version de Robert Grosseteste avec son triple contenu." Pelzer, art. cit. (1922) p. 358.

42 Cf. Pelzer, art. cit. (1922) p. 348.

43 Dunbabin, art. cit. pp. 232 and 250.

44 Gauthier, *Introduction E N,* pp. 123-124.

45 *Praefatio,* pp. 235*-257*: "De Alberti Lectura."

46 Dunbabin, art. cit., p. 245, dates the second commentary in 1267-1268. It was certainly produced after Albert had resigned from the episcopate of Ratisbon (A.D. 1262).

47 *Opera Omnia,* ed. P. Jammy (Lugduni 1681) IV, 1-364; ed. A. Borgnet (Paris 1890-1899) VII, 1-611.

philosophical ethics which follows the topical order of Aristotle's ten books but does not deal with the original text, phrase by phrase. Although it uses many Greek words, the Albertine *Commentarium* contains no catch-word references.

Whether Thomas ever saw Albert's second commentary is not clear but, in any case, it played little or no part in the background of the Thomistic *Commentary*. One reason for this lack of influence may be chronological: it is quite possible that Albert's *Commentarium* post-dated Thomas' *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*. This brings us to the problem of the dating of this work of St. Thomas.

Date and Place of Composition of Thomas' Commentary

Thomas Aquinas seems to have known the NE throughout most of his scholarly career. Of course, we do not know that he had read any part of it during his Arts course at the University of Naples. It is probable that he studied some of Aristotle's logical and biologico-psychological writings at that time, under Masters Martin and Peter.[48] When, between 1248 and 1252, Thomas attended Albert's Cologne lectures, he must have made a thorough study of Aristotle's ethical thought. In his own lectures on the *Sentences* (A.D. 1252-1256) Thomas shows a complete mastery of the text of the NE. His *distinctio* 33, in the third book of Thomas' *Commentary on the Sentences*, is very significant on this score. Commenting on a two-page section in Peter Lombard, Aquinas now treats forty-one questions in moral theology. For the same text of Peter Lombard, Odon Rigaud used five questions, Albert four, and Bonaventure six.[49] My rapid check of this *distinctio* 33 shows Thomas making 121 explicit citations of the NE, using every book except the tenth in his commentary on this short passage. Book X of the NE is cited at the beginning of Distinction 34. There is no doubt at all, then, that as a Bachelor in Theology Aquinas was thoroughly familiar with the entire NE.

When Thomas left Paris in 1259 to spend almost a decade at various Dominican monasteries in the Papal States, he was severing his

48 For recent views on this early period, see Bourke, *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom* (Milwaukee 1965) pp. 20-32.

49 "Ce bachelier de 30 ans a créé ainsi 'le premier traité de théologie morale', esquisse de la seconde partie de sa Somme théologique. L'*Ethique* d'Aristote y pénètre d'une manière saisissante: alors qu'Albert, dans les mêmes circonstances, l'avait citée une douzaine de fois, Bonaventure trois fois, Thomas s'y réfère 125 fois." A. Walz, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, adaptation française par Paul Novarina (Louvain-Paris 1962, hereafter cited as *Walz-Novarina)* p. 86. Cf. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, p. 217.

associations with university teaching. Apparently he served as Lector in Dominican houses at Anagni, Orvieto, Rome and Viterbo.[50] We know little about his actual teaching in these places but it is possible that he now devoted some time to the study of the major works of Aristotle. Indeed, as we shall see, I think he commented on the *Nicomachean Ethics* early in the 1260's. Certainly Aristotle's *Ethics* was very much in Thomas' mind at this time. If we look at the *Summa contra Gentiles* Book III, chapters 48 to 160 (a section which Aquinas wrote in Italy before 1264) we find explicit references to every book of the NE. These citations occur in every second or third chapter of this Book III.

At the University of Paris in his second professorate, from 1269 to 1272, Thomas was very busy teaching, engaging in several controversies, advising various ecclesiastical dignitaries, and writing several major works. It is the contention of R. A. Gauthier that Thomas also wrote his *Commentary on the Ethics* in Paris at this time.[51] Of course, we must admit that Thomas was making extensive use of the NE in the works written during this second Paris professorate. The second part of the *Summa of Theology* and the *Disputed Questions on Evil* show this beyond any doubt. The difficulty lies in interpreting what we know of his activities in the years 1269-1272.

Let us now turn more precisely to the problem of the time and place at which Thomas produced his ethics *Commentary*. I say "produced," because we do not really know whether it stemmed from oral lectures on the text, or was written outside the classroom in Thomas' own hand, or was dictated to secretaries. Until recently, this commentary by Aquinas was dated in the early or mid-1260's and was thought to have been done in the Papal States. The fourteenth-century historian Tolomeo of Lucca had left this account:

> isto autem tempore Thomas tenens studium Romae, quasi totam philosophiam sive moralem sive naturalem exposuit, et in scriptum seu commentum redegit; sed praecipue Ethicam et Metaphysicam, quodam singulari et novo modo tradendi.[52]

The period mentioned is the pontificate of Urban IV, from August 29, 1261 to October 2, 1264. In essence the passage says that Thomas

50 I have tried to summarize what can be discovered about this period, in *Aquinas' Search for Wisdom*, pp. 107-122.

51 Speaking of the origin of the archetype of the Italian MSS of Thomas' *Commentary* as stemming from this time, Gauthier concludes that it was written, "in conventum fratrum Praedicatorum parisiaco sancti Iacobi, in quo Thomas *Sententiam Libri Ethicorum* circa annos 1271-1272 scripserat..." *Praefatio*, p. 178*; see also p. 201*.

52 *Historia Ecclesiastica* XXIII, cap. 24; in L. A. Muratori, *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores* XI, col. 1162.

Aquinas commented on the *Ethics* and *Metaphysics* of Aristotle at this time. Martin Grabmann, Odon Lottin, Gérard Verbeke and others, agree that Tolomeo's report is substantially correct.[53]

On the other hand, R. A. Gauthier, A. Mansion and I. T. Eschmann have more recently suggested that Thomas' *Commentary on the Ethics* must be dated at Paris, 1271-1272.[54] The reasons proposed by Gauthier for this late date are four. First, Thomas' treatment of the virtue of magnanimity is said to show a progressive evolution from the *Commentary on the Sentences*, through the *Quaestiones de Malo*, to the *Commentary on the Ethics* and the *Summa Theologiae*, IIa-IIae.[55] Hence, the ethics commentary would appear to be contemporaneous with the writing of the second part of the *Summa of Theology*, i.e. after 1271. Second, Gauthier thinks that the *Metaphysics Lambda* test establishes that Thomas was writing his comments on the first book of the NE at the time that the Latin translation of Book *Kappa* became available: this would be in 1270-1271.[56] Third, citations of the *Περὶ παθῶν* of Pseudo-Andronicus are anonymous in Thomas' *Summa of Theology* up to II-II, qq. 48-49. At q. 80 this Greek writer is cited as "Andronicus Peripateticus." However, he is called Andronicus Peripateticus in the beginning of Thomas' *Commentary on the Ethics*.[57] From this Gauthier concludes that Thomas was writing his commentary at about the same time as this section of the IIa-IIae. Fourth, Gauthier suggests that the thought of Aquinas evolves on the question of the subject-powers of continence and perseverance. Early works put these virtues in the "reason," while later texts situate them in the "will."[58] The doctrine of *S.T.* II-II, qq. 143 and 155 is similar on this point to that of the *Commentary*, Book VII, 10.[59]

May I say immediately, by way of comment on these arguments, that all students of these problems are indebted to R. A. Gauthier and his

53 M. Grabmann, "Les Commentaires de s. Thomas sur les ouvrages d'Aristote," *Annales de l'Institut supérieur de Philosophie* (Louvain) 3 (1914) 240; *Guglielmo di Moerbeke* (1946) pp. 62-70; G. Verbeke, "La date du commentaire de s. Thomas sur l'Ethique à Nicomaque," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 48 (1949) 207, 220; O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, tome IV (Gembloux 1954) pp. 521-548.

54 Gauthier, "La Date du Commentaire de s. Thomas sur l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*," *RTAM* 18 (1951) 66-105; *Praefatio* (written in 1964) p. 178*; *Introduction E N*, (1970) pp. 128-129, 275; A. Mansion, "Autour de la date du commentaire de s. Thomas sur *l'Ethique à Nicomaque*," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 50 (1952) 460-471; Eschmann, "Catalogue," p. 405.

55 Gauthier, "La Date du Commentaire," p. 76.

56 Art. cit. pp. 84-92.

57 *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* I, 6 (ed. Leon. p. 22, lines 66-67).

58 "La Date du Commentaire," pp. 102-103.

59 Gauthier (ibid. p. 103) ties in this alleged evolution of Aquinas' views with a mitigation in the later works of Thomas' "excessive intellectualism."

associates for the information on the manuscripts and sources of Thomas' *Commentary*, now found in the long "Preface" to the Leonine edition. Most of the factual data that can be uncovered are contained in this *Praefatio*. These details, particularly the tables showing the relation of the Italian manuscript tradition to that of Paris, cannot be summarized. Suffice it to say this: I think it has been established that the six or so Italian manuscripts are more or less dependent on the Paris tradition. This, in effect, is the strongest argument for the contention that Thomas commented on the NE at Paris in the early 1270's.

However, the matter is not that simple. It seems to me that we ought to distinguish between the time and place of Aquinas' initial explanation of the *Ethics* and the date of the editing, dictation or transcription of the full text of the *Commentary*, so as to provide booksellers' copies for the learned world. I think that Thomas Aquinas first commented on the *Ethics* in the early 1260's in the vicinity of Rome, quite possibly as a lecture course for young students in the Roman Province of the Order of Preachers. These young men would not do university-type studies. Some record of this course on the NE (either in Thomas' own hand, or in a *reportatio*) was then brought to Paris at the beginning of 1269 and, after some possible revision which would explain the intrusion of passages postdating the original lectures, the exposition was put into fair copies. Doubtless several of Thomas' other works were similarly handled. This interpretation of the available data means that the *composition* of the Thomistic commentary would be dated in the Papal States, 1261-1264, while the *editing* and *final copying* would occur at Paris in 1270-1272.

The first reason for this suggestion is very simple: too many of Thomas' writings are now assigned to the period 1269-1272. It would not have been humanly possible for one man to have composed all these works in three years. Remember that Thomas Aquinas was a priest who said his own Mass daily and daily served the Mass of his clerical secretary; he was engaged in giving lectures in theology at the University of Paris; he conducted academic disputations, apparently at least once a week; he was active in three time-consuming controversies; he was still consulted on numerous philosophical and theological problems by important officials in the hierarchy of the Church and of his Order; and he served on various commissions and attended regular meetings of the Order of Preachers.

To indicate what we are asked to believe about Thomas' literary production in these busy three years, I have gone to the work of Walz-Novarina which summarizes recent views, particularly of Dominican

scholars.[60] Their tables assign the following works to the second Paris period:

Bible commentary:
- *In Job expositio* (1269-72)
- *In evangelium Matthaei lectura* (1271-72)
- *In evangelium Joannis expositio* (cap. I-V) *et lectura* (VI seq.) (1269-72)

Disputed Questions:
- *De anima* (1269)
- *De malo* (1269-72)
- *De pueris* (in *Quodl.* VII, art. 14-16) (1271)
- *De unione Verbi Incarnati* (1272-73)
- *De virtutibus* (1269-72)

Quodlibetal Questions:
- *Quodlibeta* I-VI (1269-72)
- *Quodlibetum* XII (1270)

Major theological writing:
- *Summa theologiae, Prima Secundae et Secunda Secundae* (1269-72)

Miscellaneous writings:
- *Contra pestiferam doctrinam* (1270)
- *De aeternitate mundi* (1271)
- *De forma absolutionis* (1270)
- *De judiciis astrorum* (1269-72)
- *De occultis operibus naturae* (1269-72)
- *De perfectione vitae spiritualis* (1269)
- *De secreto* (1269)
- *De sortibus* (1269-72)
- *De unitate intellectus* (1270)
- *Responsio de articulis XLII* (1271)
- *Responsio de articulis VI* (1271)
- *Responsio de articulis XXXVI* (1271)

Philosophical commentary:
- *In librum De Causis expositio* (1271-72)

Aristotle commentaries:
- *In libros posteriorum Analyticorum* (1269-72)
- *In libros de Anima* (lib. II et III) (1269)
- *In libros de Caelo et Mundo* (1272)
- *In decem libros Ethicorum* (1270-72)
- *In libros peri Hermeneias* (1269-72)
- *In librum de Memoria et Reminiscentia* (1271-1272)
- *In XII libros Metaphysicorum* (1268-72)

60 *Walz-Novarina*, pp. 221-226.

In IV libros Meteorologicorum (1269-72)
In VIII libros Physicorum (after 1268)
In libros Politicorum (1269-72)
In librum de Sensu et Sensato (1266-72)

Now, it is my contention that Thomas Aquinas could not have composed all these writings in this triennium. Given the fact that he was assisted by several scribe-secretaries, granting his scholarly dedication and genius, it was still impossible, I think, for one man to originate all this literary output in this short period. As Gauthier admits: "one may be astonished at the multitude of works that Thomas composed in this short time . . . when he was writing the Second Part of the *Summa of Theology* and other works."[61] Not only would such an output be astonishing: to my mind it would be incredible. Gauthier's position would require us to accept that about one half of all Thomas Aquinas' writings resulted from these three years! Moreover, this approach to Thomistic bibliography further demands that we accept the corollary that Aquinas produced practically no writings (apart from finishing the *Summa contra Gentiles* and doing a few miscellaneous writings) during his whole decade in the Papal States.

In place of this odd contention which rests on very indirect evidence, what I am proposing is that we accept the view that the scribes and secretaries were kept very busy at Paris in the early 1270's making clear copies of the accumulation of notes, lecture records and almost illegible personal manuscripts brought to Paris by St. Thomas in the winter of 1269. This would explain why so many manuscripts of Thomistic writings go back to copies made at this time in Paris.

A second argument for the Italian composition of Thomas' ethics *Commentary* rests on the character of the work itself. Of all his expositions of the writings of Aristotle, that on the *Ethics* is one of the simplest and least pretentious. It has comparatively few references to other authors.[62] It is stylistically the least complicated of Thomas' commentaries.[63] Because of this comparative simplicity, Grabmann and several other scholars regard the commentary on the NE as the earliest

61 "admirari enim solet de multitudine operum quae Thomas in parvo tempore confecit, praesertim cum *Sententiam Libri Ethicorum* Lutetiae Parisiorum circa annos 1271-1272 scripserit dum secundam partem Summae theologiae aliaque opera scribebat." *Praefatio,* p. 201*.

62 On this lack of documentation, Gauthier makes this odd comment: "Saint Thomas, au contraire de saint Albert, n'a pas eu recours de façon suivie aux multiples instruments de travail dont disposait à son époque l'exégète de l'*Ethique*: son commentaire présente tous les caractères d'une œuvre rapide, faite, si j'ose dire, 'de chic'." *Introduction EN*, p. 130.

63 Speaking of the Thomistic *Commentary on the Ethics,* Roger Guindon notes: "Comme, par ailleurs, ce commentaire est sans doute le moins développé de tous ceux que notre auteur a consacrés aux ouvrages du Stagirite." *Béatitude et théologie morale chez saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Ottawa 1956) p. 156.

of Thomas' expositions of Aristotle.[64] Remarking on this undeveloped character of the ethics commentary, Gauthier notes the view (without accepting it) that it could have been a course of lectures for young beginners in the Dominican Order. He even admits that it is not absolutely impossible that Thomas taught the NE to youthful students *at Paris* who had no previous Arts studies.[65] However, Gauthier remains convinced that it would have been out of keeping with the dignity of a Master of Theology, as Thomas was, to lecture on a philosophical text, such as the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Here again, Gauthier's view is open to criticism; he must admit that Albert, when a Master in Theology, lectured at Cologne on the NE. Indeed, whenever he did them, all of Thomas Aquinas' commentaries on Aristotle were produced after he became a Master in Theology — and portions of them (notably the first book *de Anima*) are obviously *reportationes* made from oral lectures.

In point of fact, one should ask: "Under what conditions might Thomas Aquinas have composed a commentary such as this brief exposition of the *Ethics*? Would it be at a large university center such as Paris, where books would be easily available and audiences comparatively sophisticated, or would it more likely be at some country town in Italy, where young monks would need some elementary introduction to *the* Philosopher, and where the Lector would have little more to document his course than the manuscripts that he had brought with him?" As far as I can see, the second suggestion is much preferable. One could accept the suggestion that Thomas composed this elementary exposition in the vicinity of Rome but it is difficult to think that he did it at Paris, when he was busy with the composition of the detailed moral theology of the *Pars Secunda*.

We may further ask for whom St. Thomas wrote this explanation of the NE. Gauthier seems to think it was for his own benefit, as a tool to help him with the problems that he was treating in the *Summa of Theology*.

> Saint Thomas n'a été, et n'a voulu être, qu'un théologien. Si, au moment même où il exposait dans la *IIa Pars* de la *Somme de théologie* sa théologie morale, il a commenté l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*, c'était uniquement

64 Grabmann speaks of "il Commento all'Etica, che io ritengo il primo commento aristotelico fatto da S. Tommaso d'Aquino." *Guglielmo di Moerbeke*, p. 64.

65 "il est possible, — mais nous n'avons aucune raison de l'affirmer, et nous en avons par contre de bonnes d'en douter, — que le commentaire de saint Thomas soit un cours, et que ce cours ait été destiné à de tout jeunes débutants, ce qui expliquerait son parti-pris de simplification et de clarté . . ." *Introduction E N*, pp. 130-131. In a footnote to this (p. 131, note 138) Gauthier adds: "il n'est pas absolument impossible que saint Thomas l'ait expliquée aux jeunes frères qui étaient entrés en religion sans avoir suivi les cours de la faculté des arts, mais c'eût été là une dérogation aux usages, le rôle du maître en théologie étant d'expliquer la Sainte Ecriture." By way of comment, it seems that only a small part of Thomas' time as a professor of theology was spent in Scripture classes!

> parce qu'il voyait dans la philosophie morale d'Aristote l'instrument rationnel qui lui permettrait de rendre compte de ce que la foi nous enseigne sur le sens de la vie humaine.[66]

But surely it would not have been necessary or advisable for Thomas to compose a phrase-by-phrase exposition for this purpose. At Paris in the 1270's he would have had access to existing expositions of the NE, notably to Grosseteste's *Notes* and Albert's *Lectura*. Nor would this suggestion of Gauthier explain why Aquinas might have undertaken to comment on all the other works of Aristotle at this late date. Did Thomas think, for instance, that a commentary on the four books of the *Meteorologica*, or on the eight books of the *Physics*, would help him with problems in moral theology? It is much more likely that Thomas composed his Aristotle commentaries at a time and place at which his listeners or readers needed them. For most of these expositions, this would be in Italy in the early 1260's—not in Paris in the 1270's.

A third reason for questioning the late dating of the *Commentary on the Ethics* has to do with the alleged evolution of Thomas' thought on key points. As we have seen, Gauthier thinks that the teaching on the seat of continence and perseverance changed from the early works to the later views of the *Commentary on the Ethics* and the *Secunda Pars*.[67] Similarly, A. Mansion has argued for dating the ethics commentary after 1270, because Book I, *lectio* 17, refers to a more complete explanation elsewhere of the state of the human soul after death. Mansion took it that this places the *Commentary* after *S.T.* I, q. 89.[68] Contrariwise, Roger Guindon argues from a study of Thomas' treatment of final beatitude in the ethics commentary that it is an early work, having much the same doctrinal development as the commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences*![69]

To my mind, arguments from doctrinal developments and comparisons are among the weakest and most deceptive devices for determining literary dates. If one looks at the whole theory that runs through

66 *Introduction EN*, p. 275.

67 See supra, note 58.

68 Mansion, "Autour de la date du commentaire," *RPL* 50 (1952) 460-471. At the end of *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* I, 17 (ed. Leon. p. 63), Thomas refuses to discuss whether the soul in a future life knows what is going on here below and is affected by such knowledge, because Aristotle did not treat of happiness in a future life. Thomas adds: "Alibi autem haec plenius disseruimus." The "elsewhere" at which Thomas treated such matters could refer to several theological writings from the *Commentary on the Sentences* and the *Summa contra Gentiles* (IV, cap. 85-95) onward.

69 Guindon (*Béatitude et théologie morale*, pp. 149-156) ranks as similar in their views of ultimate felicity the expositions of Sacred Scripture, the *Commentary on the Sentences*, and the *Commentary on the Ethics*. I am not impressed by his findings but cite the study as an example of how misleading doctrinal comparisons for the sake of dating writings can be. For a different interpretation of Thomas' teaching on felicity in the ethics *Commentary*, see W. Kluxen, *Philosophische Ethik bei Thomas von Aquin* (Mainz 1964) pp. 166-184.

Thomas' explanation of the *Ethics*, one does not get the impression that it is a well developed and mature piece of work.

Nor is the *Lambda* test of much value in this case. Book *Kappa* of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle became available to Aquinas in 1270-1271; before that he cited the following book (*Lambda*) as XI, after that time *Lambda* becomes XII. At the beginning of the *Commentary on the Ethics, Lambda* is cited internally and explicitly as XI. Five *lectiones* later in the same Book I the same passage (1075a13-15) is cited internally as Book XII![70] Now Gauthier takes this to mean that Thomas was in the course of explaining the first book of the NE, when he received Moerbeke's translation of *Metaphysics Kappa.*[71] On the other hand, A. Mansion interprets this as a case of editorial correction in the second passage.[72] However, this incompatibility of references to the *Metaphysics* can be explained in several other ways, the simplest being an original error in writing or copying a Roman numeral. What is really astonishing is the fact that neither Thomas nor his secretaries detected this obvious incompatibility, or error, when the *Commentary* was being revised or copied. Even if the *Commentary* were composed in the Paris period, why would Thomas have failed to remember that he had cited *Lambda* as XI just a sheet or two earlier in the manuscript?

As for the citation of Andronicus by name in the first book of the *Commentary*,[73] his treatise *Περὶ παθῶν* was translated by Robert Grosseteste and could have been known by Thomas Aquinas under the name of Andronicus, from his first Paris professorate onward. It is correct that this little treatise is not attributed to Andronicus in the *Summa of Theology* until q. 80 of the II^{a}-II^{ae} but this does not seem to me to preclude a prior reference to Andronicus in a work from the 1260's. In any case, an editorial correction at the time of the Paris copying of the *Commentary* would have been quite possible.

My conclusion as to the place and date of composition of this commentary, then, is that it was done at Orvieto in the years 1261-1264. The testimony of Tolomeo of Lucca is roughly correct and should not be rejected on the basis of indirect and doubtful arguments. There is no convincing argument for delaying the initial composition of this *Commentary on the Ethics* to the second Paris period.

70 *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* I, 1 (ed. Leon. p. 4, line 12): "ut Philosophus dicit in XI Metaphysicae, ordo partium exercitus ad invicem est propter ordinem totius exercitus ad ducem." Ibid. I, 6 (ed. Leon. p. 22, line 90): "nam et ipse Aristoteles in XII Metaphysicae ponit quoddam bonum separatum a toto universo, ad quod totum universum ordinatur sicut exercitus ad bonum ducis . . ."

71 Gauthier, "La Date du Commentaire," pp. 84-88. On p. 91, he shows that 21 MSS give these readings.

72 Cf. ibid. p. 84; and Mansion, "La version médiévale de l'*Ethique à Nicomaque,*" *Revue néoscolastique de philosophie* 41 (1938) 401-427.

73 *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* I, 6 (ed. Leon. p. 22, line 67).

VALUE OF THOMAS' COMMENTARY

Surprisingly, the chief editor of the Leonine text of Aquinas' *Commentary* on the NE takes a rather dim view of its value. Father Gauthier has maintained for many years that the best mediaeval commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics* is the *Lectura* of Albert the Great.[74] On the other hand, he faults Thomas Aquinas for not using the best available texts and sources for his exposition and insists that, as far as Aristotelian interpretation is concerned, the Thomistic commentary on the NE is of no help at all.[75] In fact, Gauthier finds that Thomas brought nothing new or distinctive to the mediaeval art of interpreting Aristotle.[76]

Contrasting with this severe judgment is much that has previously been written about Thomas' *Commentary.* Paul Shorey's contrary opinion has frequently been quoted:

> If I had the choice of putting into the hands of a student of Aristotle the commentary of Thomas or the book of some recent interpreter of Aristotle, I would choose the medieval schoolman as more educative in sensible methods and less likely to mislead and confuse the student.[77]

In like vein, the only complete monograph on Thomas' *Commentary on the Ethics* depicts this work as the best explanation of Aristotle's NE that we have. Professor Jaffa writes:

> Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to assume that the Aristotelian teaching is more accessible in the pages of Thomas than in the original. Certainly no one in modern times, perhaps no one since Thomas, has possessed his mastery of the Aristotelian corpus, and his marvelous capacity for relating each point in that massive edifice to every other point.[78]

74 Most recently (*Introduction E N*, p. 123) Gauthier has pointed to the literal exposition, plus the addition of questions, plus the utilization of the best versions and commentaries available and concluded: "Tout cela fait du premier cours d'Albert le Grand sur l'*Ethique* le meilleur, et de beaucoup, des innombrables commentaires sur l'*Ethique* que nous a légués le moyen âge." In a footnote (p. 123, note 122) Gauthier severely criticizes the manner in which the first volume of the critical edition of Albert's *Lectura* is edited.

75 "le commentaire de saint Thomas sur l'*Ethique,* envisagé du point de vue de l'exégèse aristotélicienne est une œuvre manquée et de nul secours. . ." *Introduction E N*, pp. 130-131.

76 "tempus est ut candide fateamur in interpretandis libris nil singulare, nil novum Thomam invenisse, sed contra totam interpretandi artem iam vetustate comprobatam a magistris artium Albertoque accepisse." *Praefatio,* p. 246*.

77 Shorey, *Platonism Ancient and Modern* (Berkeley, Cal. 1938) p. 90; the comment is quoted in Litzinger's "Introduction," p. XI, to *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.*

78 Harry V. Jaffa, *Thomism and Aristotelianism. A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics* (Chicago 1952) p. 6. At the time this book was published, Jaffa was a professor of political science at Ohio State University.

Such diversity of scholarly opinion calls for a brief, but more detailed, appraisal of the present value of Thomas' ethics commentary.

While Jaffa and others do offer some very favorable remarks on Thomas as an interpreter of the *Ethics*, they are quick to point out areas in which Aristotle is not followed, or is distorted, by Aquinas. The following six points are said to be falsely attributed to Aristotle by Thomas:

1. Belief in divine particular providence.
2. Belief that perfect happiness is impossible in this life.
3. Belief in the necessity of personal immortality to complete the happiness intended, evidently, by nature.
4. Belief in personal immortality.
5. Belief in the special creation of individual souls.
6. Belief in a divinely implanted, 'natural' habit of the moral principles.[79]

Indeed, these beliefs are characteristic of Thomas' own outlook but he is usually rather careful to avoid saying that Aristotle so believed. Typical is his comment on a passage in the fourth book, where Aristotle gives as an example of munificence (μεγαλοπρέπεια) expenditure for worship of the gods: "the Philosopher speaks here according to a Gentile custom which is now revoked by the obvious truth, for if anyone were to spend anything now on the worship of demons he would be sacrilegious, not munificent."[80]

We have another example of this sort of thing — where Thomas states what he considers to be the truth, not the view of Aristotle — in a remark that occurs in the last book. He has been summarizing Aristotle's conclusion that the happy man is he who is best able to contemplate truth and God (1179a30), and Thomas adds: "Supposing, as the truth of the matter has it, that God exercises care and providence over human affairs, it is reasonable for Him to take pleasure in what is best in men and most closely related and similar to God, namely understanding."[81] Here, Thomas does not assert that Aristotle believed in

79 This is Jaffa's list, *op. cit.* p. 187. He is somewhat indebted to a similar itemization of differences found in F. Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. II: *Mediaeval Philosophy: Augustine to Scotus* (Westminster, Md. 1950) chapter 39. Wolfgang Kluxen, op. cit. pp. 104-106, criticizes both Jaffa and Copleston for misunderstanding the relation of faith to reason in Thomas' thought.

80 "et loquitur hic philosophus secundum consuetudinem Gentilium, quae nunc manifestata veritate est abrogata, unde, si aliquis nunc circa cultum daemonum aliquid expenderet, non esset magnificus, sed sacrilegus." *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* IV, 7 (ed. Leon. p. 222, lines 28-32).

81 "Supposito enim, sicut rei veritas habet, quod Deus habeat curam et providentiam de rebus humanis, rationabile est quod delectetur circa homines de eo quod est optimum in eis et quod est cognatissimum, id est simillimum, Deo, quod quidem est intellectus..." *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* X, 13 (ed. Leon. p. 595, lines 116-121).

divine providence but he does say that it is true that God looks after human affairs.

Of course there are a few passages in the Thomistic *Commentary* where obviously Christian elements intrude. At one point Thomas introduces the well-known maxim of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite to the effect that good stems from a cause that is one and whole, whereas evil comes from a defect in any feature of an action.[82] Again, in the third book, Thomas uses the example of the martyrdom of St. Lawrence to illustrate Aristotle's claim that it is preferable to die rather than do certain very evil deeds.[83] For a Christian audience, such as St. Thomas', this would have more meaning than an illustration from Greek mythology. It does not suggest at all that Aristotle taught anything about Christian martyrdom. Another instance of this sort of intrusion is found in the fifth book, where Thomas cites Isidore of Seville's statement that right (*ius*) means the just thing (*iustum*).[84] Apart from these few cases, there is little else in Thomas' comment on the *Ethics* to show that he is a Christian theologian; nothing other than a general attitude suggesting that he is more confident of a future life, the freedom of the human will and the presence of God to man, than is Aristotle. On the whole, Thomas as commentator is very faithful to his author and tries to get at the exact meaning of the text itself.[85]

This is not to claim that Thomas' *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* is necessarily the best mediaeval commentary on the NE. Even in the field of expositions by Christian scholars more manuscripts are coming to be known. It is possible that complete publication of Albert's *Lectura* will alter the situation. Since Thomas as "editor" may have contributed a good deal to the *Lectura*, such a finding need not diminish his reputation in the field of Aristotelian scholarship.[86]

Nor is it correct to suggest that the Thomistic *Commentary* is superior to any comparable modern work. The truth of the matter is

82 "Dionysius dicit in libro De divinis nominibus, quod bonum contingit ex una et integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus defectibus." *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* II, 7 (ed. Leon. p. 98, lines 10-12).

83 *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* III, 2 (ed. Leon. p. 122, line 52).

84 "nam et Ysidorus dicit in libro Ethimologiarum quod ius dicitur quasi iustum." *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* V, 12 (ed. Leon. p. 304, lines 16-17). Cf. *Libri Etymologiarum* V, 3 (PL 82, 199).

85 Thus J. Isaac suggests that Albert in his commentaries tries to philosophize himself and to use Aristotle to back up Albert's own views, whereas: "Il n'en va pas de même pour saint Thomas: il entend manifestement mettre les étudiants pour lesquels il écrit en contact direct avec Aristote et s'effacer le plus possible devant le Philosophe. Ses commentaries sont en réalité des explications de textes basées sur la critique la plus exigeante qui soit." See "Saint Thomas interprète des œuvres d'Aristote," in *Scholastica ratione historico-critica instauranda* (Roma 1951) pp. 360-361.

86 Cf. Georges Kalinowski, *Le Problème de la vérité en morale et en droit,* (Lyon 1967) pp. 129-140.

that many of the standard commentaries on the NE, done in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are of little value. This is especially so of those in English, for they were done by men who were not primarily philosophers, or by men who had little knowledge of the speculative parts of Aristotle's philosophy. But, except in humility, the French commentary by Gauthier and Jolif certainly excells the work of Thomas Aquinas on the *Ethics*.[87] Aquinas had no acquaintance with the Greek text of the NE; for most of the work he was dependent on one Latin version by Grosseteste; his awareness of previous commentaries may have been indirect (via Albert's *Lectura*) and he may have had to depend on memory of these commentaries, if he lectured on the text in the Papal States; Thomas' notion of the unity and rational structure of the NE is simplistic, when viewed in the light of the twentieth-century research on the text. There was no way in which Thomas Aquinas could have challenged the exegesis of a good modern interpreter.

When all of this has been admitted, one must add that St. Thomas still looms at the greatest ethical thinker that we can find between Aristotle and Kant.[88] The suggestion that Albert the Great is entitled to this honor is not without recent supporters.[89] No one, however, suggests that Albert's second *Commentary on the Ethics* (with which Thomas had nothing to do) is comparable in value with Thomas' work. In fact, Albert's *Commentarium* (as it appears in the printed editions) is a very inferior paraphrase of Aristotle's ethics.

It is true that a good deal of Aquinas' moral wisdom is not found in his *Commentary* but in his theological writing.[90] The problem of the relation between Thomas' moral theology and his moral philosophy is beyond the scope of this study. Perhaps it is enough to say that St. Thomas' *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* is neither as valueless to Aristotelian scholarship as R. A. Gauthier implies, nor as priceless as Paul Shorey suggested.

87 Aristote, *L'Ethique à Nicomaque*, Introduction, traduction et commentaire, par R. A. Gauthier et J. Y. Jolif, 3 vol., (Louvain-Paris 1958-1959; 2me éd. 1970).

88 Cf. Kluxen, op. cit. p. 244: "es haben zwischen Aristoteles und Kant keinen gewichtigeren Beitrag zur praktischen Philosophie gegeben als den des Thomas von Aquin."

89 See Dunbabin, art. cit. p. 232.

90 D. J. O'Connor, for instance, remarks that, "the commentaries on Aristotle contain a higher proportion of pure philosophical discussion but are, perhaps for that reason, less important and characteristic." *Aquinas and Natural Law* (New York 1968) p. 3. He cites the *Commentary on the Ethics* only four times in his book.

ST. THOMAS AND ULPIAN'S NATURAL LAW

Michael Bertram Crowe

ANY study of the concept of the natural law, above all any historical study, must take account of the definition attributed to the Roman jurist Domitius Ulpianus (c. 170-228 A.D.): *jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit.* In the history of the natural law, notably in the Middle Ages, this definition has shown a remarkable vitality not entirely accounted for by its conspicuous adoption in that authority *par excellence*, the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* of Justinian. And while many authors expend much ingenuity in making the definition plausible, explaining it and explaining it away, St. Thomas Aquinas shows a remarkable preference for Ulpian. In this he departed from the views of his predecessors; and he found few followers. Attention has long ago been drawn to this surprising predilection — amongst others by Dom Odon Lottin over forty years ago.[1] It may be enlightening to look at it once again.

I. Ulpian and his Formulary

Ulpian's is one of the great names in Roman jurisprudence and one of those to whom the codification of the Roman law by Justinian in the sixth century was most indebted.[2] The definition of the natural law as

1 O. Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs* (Bruges 1931), pp. 61-67: "Saint Thomas et les définitions antérieures" — "par-dessus tout il affectionne (la définition) du juriste Ulpianus (*Commentary on the Sentences*)... nouvelle faveur accordée au droit romain...saint Thomas remet décidémment à l'honneur cet élément du droit romain qu'on avait trop délaissé avant lui (*Commentary on the Ethics*)...nous trouvons ici exprimé une nouvelle fois le sens strict que saint Thomas attribue au *jus naturae...quod natura omnia animalia docuit* (*Prima-Secundae*)...le fond de la pensée de saint Thomas, je veux dire ses sympathies sécrètes pour les formules du droit romain (*Prima-Secundae*)...preuve nouvelle de la sympathie de saint Thomas pour les formules du droit romain (*Secunda-Secundae*)."

2 By quantity Ulpian contributed more than any other jurist to the *Digest*, about one third of the whole. Many of the tags and aphorisms of the Roman law in the Middle Ages were attributed, not always correctly, to him; for example the definition of jurisprudence as the *ars equi et boni* and the description of justice as *constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi*; the law's precepts as *honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere*; also the maxims *quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem* and *princeps legibus solutus*. Cf. *Dig.*, I,1,1; I,1,10; I,3,31; I,4,1, etc.

"what nature has taught all animals" was only part, but an influential part, of that debt owed by Justinian's compilers to Ulpian and to his second and third century predecessors and contemporaries. The effect of appearing in the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* was to enhance and confirm Ulpian's authority for centuries of legislators, jurists and philosophers. A definition that figured prominently in both the *Institutes* and the *Digest* (or *Pandects*) of Justinian could not fail to enjoy enormous authority.[3]

How did Ulpian arrive at his definition of the natural law — if, indeed, the definition is genuinely his? To this question there is no easy answer. But it is, in fact, a question of secondary importance; for the influence of Ulpian on the natural law thought of the Middle Ages depends neither upon the sources nor upon the genuineness of his definition. It was enough that it was adopted into the *Corpus Iuris.*[4] The context of the definition is, however, relevant. In Roman law the natural law and the *jus gentium* were not, at first, sharply distinguished. Cicero tends to identify them, particularly in passages where he appeals to universal consent; and the practice of the first century lawyers seems hardly different.[5] In the last quarter of the following century the position was unchanged. Gaius, writing about 180 A.D., distinguishes only two kinds of law, the *jus civile* and the *jus gentium*, the latter being the work of natural reason and getting its name from the fact that all peoples observed it.[6] Paulus, writing slightly later, similarly recognises no opposition between the *jus naturale* and the *jus gentium.*[7] At the end of the century, however, there is a change; for, in the writings of the jurisconsults Tryphoninus, Florentinus and, above all, Ulpian, the natural law and the *jus gentium* are clearly distinguished.[8]

3 *Inst.*, I,1; *Dig.*, I,1,3 (Ulpianus *Liber I Institutionum*).

4 Cf. W. Onclin, "Le droit naturel selon les romanistes des XIIe et XIIIe siècles," *Miscellanea Moralia A. Janssen* (Louvain 1948).

5 *Tusculan Disputations*, I,13,30: "Omni autem in re consensio omnium gentium lex naturae est"; I,15,35; "omnium consensus naturae vox est"; cf. F. Senn, *De la justice et du droit* (Paris 1927), Appendix, "De la distinction du jus naturale et du jus gentium," p. 77; M. Villey, *Leçons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit* (Paris, 1957), pp. 121-123.

6 *Dig.*, I,1,9: "quod quisque populus ipse sibi jus constituit id ipsius proprium civitatis est; vocaturque jus civile quasi jus proprium ipsius civitatis. Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeque custoditur; vocaturque jus gentium, quasi quo jure omnes gentes utuntur."

7 *Dig.*, I,7,11: "Jus pluribus modis dicitur, uno modo cum id quod semper aequum et bonum est jus dicitur, ut est jus naturale..."

8 Tryphoninus and Florentinus make the distinction when they refer to slavery. *Dig.* 12,6,64 (Tryphoninus): "Ut enim libertas naturali jure continetur et dominatio ex jure gentium introducta est"; *Dig.*, 1,5,4 (Florentinus): "Servitus est constitutio juris gentium, qua quis dominio alieno contra naturam subjicitur." Cf. R. Voggensperger, *Der Begriff des "jus naturale" im Römischen Recht* (Basel 1952), pp. 17-24, 112-113.

It was Ulpian who formalised the distinction in the tripartite division of law into natural law, *jus gentium* and civil law:

> Jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam istud jus non humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium quae in terra, quae in mari nascuntur, avium quoque commune est. Hinc descendit maris atque feminae conjunctio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus; hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio; videmus enim coetera quoque animalia, feras etiam, istius juris peritia censeri. Jus gentium est quo gentes humanae utuntur; quod a naturali recedere facile intelligere licet, quia illud omnibus animalibus, hoc solis hominibus inter se commune sit..."[9]

So in the *Digest*. In the *Institutes* of Justinian the same tripartite division is retained but, while Ulpian's definition of the natural law is retained, his definition of the *jus gentium* is discarded for that of Gaius. This might seem to bring the natural law and the *jus gentium* closer together, for Gaius did not distinguish clearly between them. On the contrary, the outline given in the *Institutes* of the field of the *jus gentium* (taken this time from Hermogenianus), the consequences of war, contracts etc., brings it closer to positive law.[10] One could be critical of Justinian's compilers here; for one of the main rules laid down for them was that they were to prune the law of discrepancies and contradictions. Ulpian's division had the merit of being clean-cut; and this virtue was to stand it in good stead in later controversies about the definition of the natural law, offsetting the difficulty and implausibility of a natural law common to animals. Justinian's compilers, by their eclecticism in admitting into the *Institutes* texts which tended to assimilate the natural law and the *jus gentium*[11] forwent, doubtless unconsciously, this advantage. The result was to isolate Ulpian's definition of the natural law as what nature has taught all animals by depriving it of the support of the complementary definition of the *jus gentium* as the natural law proper to mankind.

Ulpian's definition may be an eccentric and isolated conceit in the Roman law. Whatever may be said about its sources, its genuineness or

9 *Dig.*, 1,1,1,3.

10 *Inst.* 1,2,2: "Jus gentium humano generi commune est. Nam usu exigente et humanis necessitatibus, gentes humanae quaedam sibi constituerunt; bella enim orta sunt et captivitates secutae et servitutes quae sunt naturali juri contrariae. Jure enim naturali omnes homines ab initio liberi nascebantur. Et ex hoc jure gentium omnes pene contractus introducti sunt ut emptio, venditio, locatio, conductio, societas, depositum et alii innumerabiles." The text of Hermogenianus is in *Dig.* 1,1,1,5.

11 Cf. *Inst.* 2,1,1: "Naturali jure communis sunt omnium haec, aer, aqua, profluens et mare et per hoc littora maris. Nemo igitur ad littus maris accedere prohibetur, dum tamen a villis et monumentis abstineat; quia non sunt juris gentium, sicut est mare" (Marcianus); also texts from Gaius in *Inst.* 2,1,11 and 2,1,41.

possible interpolation or about possible parallels in Pythagorean or Stoic philosophy, the principal fact is that it appears at the head of both the *Digest* and the *Institutes* of Justinian. To this fact rather than to any intrinsic worth must be attributed the authority it carried for so many centuries.

II. From Ulpian to St. Thomas

In the Middle Ages Ulpian's definition of the natural law was commonly described as the "jurists' definition" or the "definition of the law." Occasionally, however, it is attributed to Isidore of Seville. This is ironical; for while Isidore (c. 560-636) occupies a position of great importance in the transmission of the concepts of the Roman law — together with a vast accumulation of other miscellaneous learning — to the Middle Ages, he did not, in fact, transmit Ulpian's definition. His *Liber Etymologiarum*, upon which he worked during the last decade of his life, is a vast and rather uncritical encyclopaedia whose real merit is that it preserved so much of antiquity. Isidore was not always consistent in his choice of texts to preserve, and the etymologies he offers are frequently fantastic[12]; but he does deserve his place in history as one of the important educators of the Middle Ages.[13]

In Book V of the *Book of Etymologies* legal terms find their place. The trichotomy of Ulpian — natural law, *jus gentium*, civil law — appears, taken by Isidore probably from either the *Digest* or the *Institutes* of Justinian. This, indeed, is one of the indications that Isidore knew Justinian's *Corpus Iuris Civilis.*[14] But in accepting the division Isidore effectively changed the terms. He abandoned entirely Ulpian's natural law common to all animals and returned to something not unlike the law, independent of human conventions, described by Aristotle as "natural":[15]

> Jus naturale est commune omnium nationum, et quod ubique instinctu naturae, non constitutione aliqua habeatur, ut viri et feminae conjunctio,

12 P. Sejourné, *Le dernier Père de l'Eglise, saint Isidore de Seville* (Paris 1929), p. 62: "On a pu se demander si ce n'est pas dans les livres des juristes romains, surtout les juristes stoiciens, que notre encyclopédiste a été chercher l'idée de son ouvrage; car nulle part ailleurs on ne trouve d'aussi fréquentes et artificielles étymologies"; T. Gilby, *Law and Political Theory: Summa Theologiae 1-2ae, 90-97* (London-New York 1966), p. 110, note: "St. Isidore, a collector rather than a systematizer, salvaged what he could of the past without caring whether some of the texts he transmitted were inconsistent..."

13 Dante places him in the fourth heaven, that of the sun or light, in the excellent company of St Thomas, St Albert the Great, Gratian, Peter Lombard, Dionysius the Areopagite, Boethius and others. Cf. *Par.* X, 131.

14 P. Sejourné, op. cit., p. 65.

15 Cf. A. F. Utz, *Recht und Gerechtigkeit, Kommentar in 2-2ae, 57-79* (Deutsche Thomas-Ausgabe, Band 18), (Heidelberg 1953), p. 448.

> liberorum susceptio et educatio, communis omnium possessio et omnium una libertas, acquisitio eorum quae coelo, terra, marique capiuntur. Item depositio rei vel commodatae restitutio...[16]

Another key-figure in the transmission of legal ideas and formulae to the Middle Ages was the twelfth-century canonist Gratian. Here, too, as far as Ulpian's definition is concerned, it is a matter of indirect influence. Gratian did not record Ulpian's definition but himself formulated an equally troublesome one.

The *Decretum Gratiani* (or, to give its proper title, the *Concordia discordantium canonum*) saw the light about 1140. Despite the fact that it was a "private" text, never receiving official recognition as a source of canon law, it is arguably the most important single document in the history of canon law. Gratian faced a situation in canon law not unlike that found by Justinian in the civil law six centuries before — the legislation had become a thicket through which it was next to impossible to find one's way. Gratian systematized the canons, the ecclesiastical traditions, decisions of Popes and Councils, the arguments of the Fathers and the other sources of canonical legislation. And although he never had Justinian's power to give juridical effect to his compilation, his logical categories were invaluable. It was not surprising that the *Decretum*, like the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* should attract its commentators. What Gratian says of the natural law is clearly of the greatest importance for medieval theology.[17]

Gratian relies upon Isidore for his definitions and divisions concerning the nature and varieties of law. But the issue was confused for him by the necessity of reconciling Isidore's bipartite division of law (into human and divine) with Ulpian's Roman law tripartite division of law (into natural law, *jus gentium* and civil law). Gratian's solution was unfortunate, for it confused the natural law with the divine law revealed in the Scriptures:

> Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali videlicet jure et moribus. Jus naturae est quod in lege et Evangelio continetur quo quisque jubetur alii facere quod sibi vult fieri et prohibetur alii inferre quod sibi nolit fieri.[18]

16 *Etym.* V, 4 (PL 82, 199). Isidore similarly alters Ulpian's *jus gentium* and makes it embrace mainly war and its consequences. This may not be unconnected with the fact that Ulpian placed the *jus militare* next to the *jus gentium*. *Etym.* V, 6 (PL 82, 200): "Jus gentium est sedium occupatio, aedificatio, munitio, bella captivitatem, servitutes...et inde jus gentium quod eo jure omnes fere gentes utuntur."

17 Cf. B. C. Kuhlmann, *Der Gesetzbegriff beim hl. Thomas von Aquin in Licht der Rechtsstudiums seiner Zeit* (Freiburg-Bonn 1921), pp. 14-18; E. E. Hölscher, *Von römischen zum Christlichen Naturrecht* (Augsburg 1931), pp. 51-52, 63.

18 *Decretum Magistri Gratiani*, editio Lipsiensis secunda, ed. A. Friedberg (Leipzig 1879), (reprint Graz, 1959), col I (PL 187, 29, has the reading "jus naturale").

The confusion has exercised commentators from the very beginning.[19] And from the beginning Ulpian's natural law appears in the writings of the decretists who tend, as is the way of commentators, to list more or less systematically the possible meanings of the terms in their text. It was scarcely to be expected that there would be unanimity among them in their handling of Ulpian's definition. The decretists of the half century following Gratian's work present a wide variety of approach to Ulpian's definition, ranging from an unequivocal rejection, through a more or less reluctant acceptance of it as a concession to usage, to its adoption into the list of possible meanings of natural law.[20] The preference of many of the decretists was for an association of the natural law with reason. Rufinus, one of the earliest and greatest of them, speaks of it thus: *Est itaque naturale jus vis quaedam humanae creaturae a natura insita ad faciendum bonum cavendumque contrarium*,[21] a phrase that recalls Cicero.

In the last decade of the twelfth century and the first of the thirteenth there seems to have been a pause in the production of commentaries on the *Decretum Gratiani*.[22] The authoritative *Glossa ordinaria*, the work of Johannes Teutonicus (John Zimeke) about 1216-1217 and accepted as the standard commentary by subsequent students of Gratian, may be regarded as a mosaic of the current views of the canonists about the natural law. The meanings are arranged in hierarchical order. There is a natural law which is concerned with all beings, one which is limited in its application to animals, and one which takes cognisance of rational beings only. In addition, and somewhat outside the classification, there

19 O. Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs* (Bruges 1931), p. 11 stigmatised Gratian's definition as "une fâcheuse confusion entre le droit naturel et le droit divin." Some see the influence of St Augustine in the definition, e.g. F. Arnold, "Die Rechtslehre des Magister Gratianus," *Studia Gratiana*, 1 (1953-1954), pp. 369-370. H. E. Feine, *Kirkliche Rechtsgeschichte* (Köln-Graz, 4. Aufl., 1964), pp. 331-332, suggests that the explanation of Gratian's definition may lie partly in the distinction he makes between the natural law (i.e. the moral precepts of the Old Testament and the divinely revealed law of the New Testament) which alone binds the Holy See and other laws which do not: "Sacrosancta Romana ecclesia ius et auctoritatem sacris canonibus impertit, sed non eis alligatur." Another suggestion is that the "law" in Gratian's definition is the Roman law. Cf. C. Leitmaier, "Das Privateigentum im Gratianischen Dekret," *Studia Gratiana*, 2 (1954), pp. 369-370.

20 Rufinus (1157-1159) and Simon of Bisignano (1177-1179) wholly reject Ulpian's definition; the authors of the *Summa Monacensis* and of the *Summa Lipsiensis* (c. 1186) and Huguccio of Ferrara (c. 1188) tolerate the usage; Stephen of Tournai (c. 1160), the author of the *Summa Coloniensis* (1169-1170), Sicard of Cremona (after 1179) accept the definition each in his own way. Cf. O. Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs* (Bruges 1931) pp. 13-23 and Appendices I-V; Id., *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, t. II (Louvain-Gembloux), 1948, pp. 73-75.

21 H. Singer (ed.), *Die Summa Decretorum des Magister Rufinus* (Paderborn 1902), p. 6.

22 Cf. S. Kuttner, "Bernardus Compostellanus Antiquus, A. Study in the Glossators of the Canon Law," *Traditio* 1 (1943), pp. 277-340, at pp. 279-292.

is said to be a natural law which is the equivalent of the Decalogue. This kind of hierarchical classification will be a commonplace of the theologians who, from about the time of the *Glossa ordinaria*, were beginning to write their systematic treatises on the natural law.[23]

III. St. Thomas's Immediate Sources

First of the immediate sources from which St. Thomas could have taken Ulpian's definition is, of course, the Roman law itself. Most of the glossators and post-glossators of the *Corpus Iuris Civilis* accept the definition, although some qualify it as an improper sense of the term "natural law." The first of the great medieval glossators, Irnerius (c. 1035-1125), who taught at Bologna in the last decades of the eleventh century, has no express reference to Ulpian; nor does there appear to have been much interest in the subject evinced in his twelfth century successors.[24] The thirteenth century civilians, however, following in the footsteps of Azo (who commented upon the Code of Justinian about 1210) and Accursius, the author of the *Great Gloss*, did face the question. They arrive at a list of meanings of "natural law" not unlike that of the decretists. The meanings are basically four.[25] There is, first of all, a generic natural law based upon the natural inclinations common to all animals. Azo defines it, *motus quidem instinctu naturae proveniens quo singula animalia ad aliquid faciendum inducuntur.* This, Ulpian's definition, is accepted by most of the commentators, although with qualifications by some. In the discussions some of the more paradoxical consequences are explored — the difficulty for instance, that, if Ulpian's definition is to be taken at its face value, the distinction between fornication and marriage becomes uneasy. To say that marriage is based upon contract or consent is to stress its rational character and, it seems, to remove it from the natural law conceived strictly in Ulpian's terms.[26] It is a problem that will continue to be discussed in the thirteenth century and later, and one to which there may be no answer short of the abandonment of Ulpian.

23 Cf. O. Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs* (Bruges 1931), p. 23; M. Grabmann, "Das Naturrecht der Scholastik von Gratian bis Thomas von Aquin," *Mittelalterliche Geistesleben*, I (München 1926), p. 68.

24 Cf. H. Kantorowicz, *Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law* (Cambridge 1938), pp. 35-37, 146-148. One twelfth century civilian, Roger, wrote a treatise *De iure naturali, gentium et civili* in which he recorded Ulpian's definition almost without comment: "Dicitur ius naturale quasi a natura animali, quod omnium animalium sit commune." H. Kantorowicz, op. cit., p. 275.

25 W. Onclin, "Le droit naturel selon les Romanistes des XIIe et XIIIe siècles; *Miscellanea Moralia A. Janssen* (Louvain 1948), II, pp. 329-338.

26 W. Onclin, art. cit.

Of the other definitions retained by the civilians the most important is the specifically human natural law, sometimes called *jus gentium* by Accursius and Azo. This, and Ulpian's definition, persist with the civil lawyers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in an uneasy relationship. Their reconciliation is described in a text of Cinus of Pistoia (1270-1336), Dante's friend and a poet of the *dolce stil nuovo* as well as a great lawyer.[27] Of the two the definition of Ulpian is the one officially adopted by the *legistica traditio* — which is hardly surprising, given the prominence enjoyed by it in the *Corpus Iuris Civilis*.[28] When a theologian like St. Thomas opts for it he is, then, not making an arbitrary choice among the available juristic definitions but rather taking the jurists' own choice.

Side by side with the lawyers, the theologians must be counted among St. Thomas's immediate sources in the matter of Ulpian's definition. Early medieval theology, as represented by the school of Anselm of Laon († 1117), developed a characteristically theological teaching about the natural law and left little room for Ulpian. The natural law is a product of natural reason and, because men neglected it, is supplemented by the Mosaic law. This view helped to point the way to Gratian's definition of the natural law as *quod in lege et Evangelio continetur*.[29] Hugh of St. Victor holds a similar view.[30] Peter Abelard, in his *Commentary on Romans*, speaks of the natural law as preceding the Mosaic law; and in the *Dialogus* he adopts the Ciceronian distinction between the *jus naturale*, prescribed by natural reason, and the *jus positivum*, set up by men.[31] There is no room for Ulpian here either.

When, just after the mid-twelfth century, Peter Lombard wrote his *Book of Sentences*, which was to have such a formative influence upon medieval theology, he was reticent about the natural law. He refers to it only in passing and in a context entirely in keeping with the views of the school of Anselm of Laon; the natural law is summarised in the prohibition of doing to others what a man would not have done to him-

27 *De justitia et jure*, i,10,3 cited by W. Onclin, art. cit. "Homo est creatus in duabus materiis, una scilicet quam communem habet cum ceteris animalibus...et secundum hanc naturam describitur jus naturale in legibus; altera vero quam communem habet cum angelis, scilicet rationabilitatem, secundum quam jus definitur in canone."

28 Cf. the Gloss of Faventinus, cited in W. Ullman, *Medieval Papalism* (London 1949), p. 40: "Hoc autem jus legistica traditio generalissime definit dicens: jus naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit"; J. M. Aubert, *Le droit romain dans l'œuvre de saint Thomas* (Paris 1955), p. 95.

29 F. Bliemitzrieder, *Anselms von Laon Systematische Sentenzen* (Münster 1919), pp. 35-36; "Contra originale peccatum sunt inventa remedia et in naturali et in scripta lege et in tempore gratiae. Naturalem autem legem naturalis ratio tenere persuadet ut quod homo non occidatur; hanc enim sua naturalis ratio unumquemque docet."

30 *De sacramentis legis naturalis et scriptae*, (PL 176, 39).

31 *Expositio in Epistolam Pauli ad Romanos*, (PL 178, 814-862); *Dialogus*, (PL 178, 1656).

self, and this *praeceptum juris naturalis* had to be reiterated in the Decalogue because of man's negligence of it.[32]

Peter Lombard's commentators and successors in the following century did not share his reticence about the natural law; before the middle of the thirteenth century the *Tractatus de legibus* had become an integral part of theology. And in this theological elaboration the natural law looms large and Ulpian has his say. The general development of the treatise on law in the theology of the thirteenth century has frequently been studied. Here it is necessary only to mention some of the important predecessors of St. Thomas and their attitude towards Ulpian's definition.

As with the decretists and the civilians, so with the theologians there is a tendency to list and to systematize the meanings of the natural law. Thus in the *Summa aurea* of William of Auxerre, in the first important integration of the natural law into theology, Ulpian's definition appears, described as natural law in the wide sense, as opposed to the strict sense which connects natural law with reason.[33] This general classification recurs in later writers; *ius naturale quoddam est speciale, quoddam universalius, quoddam universalissimum.* Roland of Cremona, teaching at Paris about 1229-1230, speaks of the inclination towards good in all creatures as a generic natural law under which are the more specific laws related to vegetative, animal and human nature. The *ius specialius in animalibus* he attributes to Boethius.[34]

The same ideas are also found in the important Franciscan tradition in the law-tract of the thirteenth century. The *Summa fratris Alexandri* (Book III, containing the law treatise, being the work of Alexander's collaborator, John of La Rochelle) set the tradition.[35] Here there are said to be several kinds of natural law, each derived in its own way from

32 Petrus Lombardus, *Liber Sententiarum*, III, D. 37 (PL 192, 832). O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe* siècles, II (Louvain-Gembloux 1948), p. 73: "nulle part il ne parle du droit naturel", appears to have overlooked this reference; in *Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs* (Bruges 1931), p. 28, he had said more exactly: "nulle part il ne relève la moindre définition du *jus naturae.*" Lombard also refers to the natural law in *Collectanea in Epistolas Divi Pauli* (PL 191, 1345).

33 Cf. O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles*, II (Louvain-Gembloux 1948), pp. 75-76.

34 O. Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédecesseurs* (Bruges 1931), Appendix VII, p. 115: "Est aliud ius speciale magis in animalibus quod unumquodque animal coniungitur ad sibi simile, sicut dicit Boethius..."

35 V. Doucet, *Prolegomena in librum III necnon in libros I et II in Summa fratris Alexandri* (Quaracchi 1948), IV, pp. CCCLXIX, CCCVII: cf. I. Brady, "Law in the Summa fratris Alexandri," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 24 (1950), pp. 133-136; F. Henquinet, "Ist der Traktat de legibus et praeceptis in der Summa Alexanders von Hales von Johannes von Rupella?", *Franciskanische Studien*, 26 (1930), pp. 1-22, 234-258.

the eternal law.[36] Amongst them is the natural law common to man and animal — which the *Summa fratris Alexandri* wrongly attributes to Isidore.

This is the tradition in which one would expect to find Bonaventure although, in fact, he has no special treatise on laws. A good deal can be pieced together from his various references, for example in the *Breviloquium*, to establish his views on the eternal law and the natural law.[37] But it is in his *Commentary on the Sentences* that he cites and eulogizes Ulpian's definition. He records three definitions, all of which he attributes to Isidore:

> Dicendum quod jus naturale tripliciter sumitur, scilicet communiter, proprie et magis proprie et secundum hoc tripliciter definitur...Uno modo sic: Jus naturale est quod in Lege et Evangelio continetur...Secundo modo dicitur proprie et sic definitur...jus naturale est quod est commune omnium nationum et hoc jus est quod dictat ratio recta...Tertio modo dicitur jus naturale propriissime quod natura docuit omnia animalia.[38]

Bonaventure does not give his reason for preferring Ulpian's definition. Nor is there much enlightenment to be found in his application of these notions. Fornication, he says, is against the natural law in the first sense, since it is forbidden in the Law and the Gospel; it is also against the natural law of the second definition, as being against right reason; but the natural law in Ulpian's sense neither approves nor condemns, for animals propagate in different ways.[39] Nor does Bonaventure appeal to Ulpian's definition as a way around the difficulty of the polygamy of the Old Testament Patriarchs. He might have suggested that nature has taught many animals to take a plurality of mates; instead he says that polygamy is against the animal nature of man, which inclines him towards exclusiveness in marriage, and he concedes that God could and did dispense the patriarchs from this obligation.[40]

36 III, pars 2, Inquis. 1, c. 7, a. 4 (Quaracchi, t. IV, n. 223, pp. 328-329): "Dicendum quod omnis lex naturalis est a lege aeterna, tamen secundum propinquius et remotius, secundum quod naturae, in quibus est, se habent secundum propinquius et remotius ad Deum."

37 *Breviloquium* I,9 (*Opera Omnia*, Quaracchi, 1889, t. V, p. 2176); cf. L. Baur, *Die lehre vom Naturrecht bei Bonaventura* (Münster 1913), p. 223 et passim.

38 *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 1 (*Opera Omnia*, Quaracchi, t. IV, pp. 747-748).

39 Centuries later supporters of Ulpian's definition still had not found a satisfactory reason for asserting that it excluded fornication. Cf. F. Suarez, *De legibus* (*Opera Omnia*, ed. Berton, Paris, 1856, t. V), II, c. 17.

40 *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, a. 1, q. 2 (*Opera Omnia*, Quaracchi, 1889, t. IV, pp. 749-750): "Si dicatur jus naturale quod natura impressit animalibus, sic dicendum quod non omnibus, sed aliquibus animalibus brutis impressit; sed tamen in natura est aliquorum animalium, et in nostra hoc natura plantavit."

Albert the Great's approach to the definition of Ulpian is in lively contrast with Bonaventure's. Albert (1206-1280) deals expressly with the natural law several times in his long career. In the *Summa de bono* (part three of his *Summa de creaturis*) and in his *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics* his treatment is much the same; and it includes a clear rejection of Ulpian. In the *Summa de bono* he begins with Cicero's description of the natural law as implanted by an innate force — *quod non opinio genuit sed quaedam innata vis inseruit.* In enlarging upon this *innata vis* he goes out of his way to disagree with the understanding of the natural law that would make it common to us and to animals.[41] In the following article he is even more forthright in rejecting the natural law common to animate creatures that he found in the decretists. He has little patience with the ingenuity of the doctors who made distinctions to accommodate Ulpian, forgetting that there can be a natural law in the proper sense only for man.[42] Earlier in the *Summa de creaturis*, where he is discussing the polygamy of the Old Testament patriarchs, Albert distinguishes between the nature man has in common with animals (and needs only the difference between male and female for propagation) and the nature (or *ratio*) proper to man, which demands that the act of propagation be reasonably accomplished.[43]

Some years later, when between 1248 and 1252 Albert commented at Cologne on the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle, his views had scarcely changed. He insists once again that natural law (and the natural justice of Aristotle's distinction between natural and legal justice) belongs to the specific nature of man, namely reason, and not to any nature man may share with other creatures.[44]

Finally, there is Albert's *Ethica*, composed probably later than 1260.[45] Here Albert devotes his efforts to reconciling Aristotle's and Cicero's approaches to the natural law. He does not discuss Ulpian or the jurists directly; but when he comes to the *innata vis*, the innate

41 *Summa de bono*, Tractatus V De justitia, q.1, a.1, ed. W. Kubel - F. Heyer (*Opera Omnia*, XXVIII, Münster 1951, pp. 265-266): "Non enim consentimus in distinctionem quam quidem posuerunt, scilicet quod ius naturale multis modis dicatur, et uno modo sit commune nobis cum brutis."

42 Id., q.1, a.2 (pp. 268-269): "Non erit jus naturale nisi solius hominis...Haec distinctio nec artem nec rationem habet sicut mos est decretistarum ponere distinctiones..."

43 *Summa de bono*, De Sacramentis, Tractatus IX De Matrimonio, ed. A. Ohlmeyer (*Opera Omnia*, Münster 1958, p. 165). The same teaching is found in Albert's *Commentary on the Sentences*, *In IV Sent.*, d. 33A, aa. 1-3 (*Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, Paris 1890-1898, t. XXX, pp. 289-296).

44 Cf. G. Fasso, *La legge della ragione* (Bologna 1964), Appendix 19-20, pp. 268-269; G. Meersseman, "Le droit naturel chez s. Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs," *Angelicum*, 9 (1932), pp. 63-76.

45 *Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet, t. VII.

natural force, of Cicero's conception of the natural law, he takes good care to point out that the nature in question cannot be the animal nature of man, but rather must be his rational nature. This precludes any real acceptance of Ulpian's definition and shows that Albert never wavered in his insistence upon the essentially rational character of the natural law and in his radical rejection of Ulpian. This makes it all the more curious that St. Thomas, in so many matters the faithful follower of Albert, should in this matter opt for the view of Bonaventure who, it will be recalled, adopted Ulpian's definition.

IV. St. Thomas and Ulpian

The development of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas on the natural law presents a familiar picture. There are a number of relatively isolated discussions in the early works giving way to the systematic treatment in the *Summa theologiae* at the end of his career. In the early discussions, notably in the *Commentary on the Sentences*, a number of conceptions of the natural law appear to compete for his assent, amongst them Ulpian's. Indeed, in the most extended treatment of the natural law in the *Sentences* St. Thomas begins by making a place for Ulpian:

> Lex ergo naturalis nihil est aliud quam conceptio homini naturaliter indita qua dirigitur ad convenienter agendum in actionibus propriis, sive competant ei ex natura generis ut generare, comedere et hujusmodi, sive ex natura speciei ut ratiocinari et similia.[46]

As the discussion proceeds it becomes clear that the rational nature of man is much more important than the generic (or animal) nature. One would, therefore, expect that the emphasis upon Ulpian's definition would be correspondingly muted.[47] In the *Summa theologiae* natural law is firmly situated in the treatise on law and linked with the notion of law in general (*ordinatio rationis*) and with the eternal law of which it is said to be the rational creature's participation.[48]

This broad outline, however, calls for qualification. One of the details that does not fit is, precisely, Ulpian's definition. While it agrees somewhat uneasily with some of Aquinas's early formulations, it is certainly difficult to reconcile with his mature thought on the essence of

46 *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1.

47 The cognate discussions of synderesis and conscience in the *Commentary on the Sentences* confirm the importance of rational nature as the basis of natural law. Cf. *In II Sent.*, d. 24, q. 2, a. 3; Id., d. 39, q. 3, a. 1; *De veritate*, q. 16.

48 1-2ae, q. 90; q. 94.

the natural law. Yet Ulpian's definition remains in honour throughout. This is the matter that demands closer scrutiny.

St. Thomas's first major confrontation with the natural law comes in his discussion of the polygamy of the Old Testament patriarchs: Is it or is it not against the natural law to have more than one wife? The question, as has been noted, has a peculiar acuteness for the theologian aware both of the sacramental character of marriage and of the practices, in the fields of polygamy and divorce, condoned if not actually approved in the Old Testament. St. Thomas's conclusion is that polygamy — that is to say a plurality of wives or polygyny — is against the secondary but not against the primary precepts of the natural law. But nature has clearly not taught all animals to avoid a plurality of mates. Consequently, if Ulpian's definition is to be accepted, there would seem to be no grounds for saying that polygamy is against the natural law.

St. Thomas replies to this objection[49] by distinguishing, as so many of his predecessors had done, between the senses of "natural law." Natural law, firstly, is so called because "its principle is nature"; it proceeds from or is impressed by nature. This meaning of the term is associated with Cicero's definition: *jus naturale est quod non opinio genuit sed quaedam innata vis inseruit.* Natural law, in a second sense, "proceeds from an extrinsic principle which is above nature." In this sense the "divine law" might be said to be natural because coming from God, who is above nature. Here St. Thomas accommodates Gratian's definition (which he ascribes to Isidore): *jus naturale est quod in Lege et Evangelio continetur.* The third sense is the one upon which the objection depends:

> Dicitur jus naturale non solum a principio sed a natura quia de naturalibus est.[50]

Now since nature is contrasted with reason, man's distinguishing mark, it follows that the law proper to man, even though it be dictated by natural reason, is not the natural law in the strictest meaning of the term. That strictest meaning must be reserved for the dictates of natural reason in the matters which are common to man and animals alike. Hence Ulpian's definition.

This does, perhaps, give as acceptable a sense to Ulpian's definition as is possible. But it is difficult to escape the impression that St.

49 *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 4.

50 Ibid. J. M. Aubert, *Le droit romain dans l'œuvre de saint Thomas* (Paris 1955), p. 98, labels these definitions respectively "définition suprême extrinsèque, définition par l'essence, le contenu exprimé."

Thomas is straining, as his predecessors had done, to provide a suitable context for a definition that came to him with the weight of the Roman law behind it. In such circumstances one looks to see if the sense of such a definition, verbally adopted, has not been effectively changed. And in the passage it cannot be said that the thought of St. Thomas is unambiguous.

The objection he is answering, it will be recalled, is that a natural law common to man and animals does not exclude polygamy. The difficulty was how to accept the definition — because of its authority — without accepting this consequence. In a similar context Albert the Great (who, of course, rejected Ulpian) had pointed out that nature teaches animals differently, each according to its species, inclining some to monogamous unions, others to polygamy.[51] St. Thomas himself, elsewhere in the *Sentences*, makes the same point in practically the same terms. When speaking of the natural law status of the marriage impediment of consanguinity he says: *conjunctio maris et feminae dicitur esse de jure naturali quia natura hoc omnia animalia docuit; sed hanc conjunctionem diversa animalia diversimode docuit secundum diversas eorum conditiones.*[52] The point is more fully developed in a discussion about the naturalness of marriage:

> Natura hominis ad aliquid inclinat dupliciter. Uno modo quia est conveniens naturae generis; et hoc est commune omnibus animalibus; alio modo quia est conveniens naturae differentiae qua species humana abundat a genere, inquantum est rationalis, sicut actus prudentiae et temperantiae. Et sicut natura generis, quamvis sit una in omnibus animalibus, non tamen est eodem modo in omnibus; ita etiam non inclinat eodem modo in omnibus, sed secundum quod unicuique competit.[53]

One wonders why some consideration of this kind was not invoked in order to suggest that the natural law, even in Ulpian's sense, forbids polygamy to man, the human species demanding monogamy as a pattern of marriage. But then one has departed from the literal sense of Ulpian's definition; for monogamy is decidedly *not* what nature has taught all animals. The dilemma seems inescapable.[54] One thing is clear

51 *In IV Sent.*, d. 33A, a. 1 ad 4 (*Opera Omnia*, ed. Borgnet, Paris 1890-1898, t. XXX, p. 290): "Natura omnia animalia hoc docet, sed diversimode secundum diversitatem specierum."

52 *In IV Sent.*, d. 40, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3.

53 *In IV Sent.*, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1.

54 J. M. Aubert, *Le droit romain dans l'œuvre de saint Thomas* (Paris 1955), pp. 98-99, offers a benign interpretation: "Le développement de l'article insère cette...définition dans le même contexte idéologique que précédemment; la nature de l'homme est double; générique, elle s'exprime dans la fin primaire du mariage; spécifique, dans la fin secondaire. La bigamie ne s'opposant pas à la réalisation de la première, n'est pas contraire au droit naturel entendu au sens d'Ulpien; ce droit, tout en portant sur des inclinations communes à tout le règne animal, n'en est pas moins réglée par la raison; et sous cet aspect il est alors synonyme de loi naturelle dont il exprime un des principes premiers."

— that St. Thomas does not use St. Albert's escape: outright rejection of Ulpian's definition. Was it diffidence in the face of a formidable tradition or a recognition of a genuine insight on the part of Ulpian?[55]

Certainly the tradition was a formidable one and it made its impact even upon the mature thought of St. Thomas, which might have been expected to show a departure from Ulpian's conception of the natural law. The contexts in which Ulpian's definition reappears are well-known and have been much studied. In the *Summa theologiae* Ulpian makes his appearance, both in the Prima-Secundae and in the Secunda-Secundae, although with considerably less prominence than he was accorded in the *Commentary on the Sentences.*

One does not have to rehearse the mature thought of St. Thomas in any detail in order to see that Ulpian's definition of the natural law must present a difficulty. The article on the existence of the natural law, leading up to the classical definition of the natural law as the rational creature's participation in the eternal law, says as much.[56] The third objection is a rather captious one, turning upon the proposition that the freer a thing is the less it is under law. Man, being a self-determining creature, is freer than animals, which are determined; consequently man should be less under law. This implication constitutes an objection to the conclusion of the article only on the assumption that animals do not come under the natural law; and in his explanation St. Thomas concedes the point. It seems decisive against Ulpian:

> Etiam animalia irrationalia participant rationem aeternam suo modo, sicut et rationalis creatura. Sed quia rationalis creatura participat eam intellectualiter et rationaliter, ideo participatio legis aeternae in creatura rationali proprie lex vocatur: nam lex est aliquid rationis...In creatura autem irrationali non participatur rationaliter: unde non potest dici lex nisi per similitudinem.[57]

The same point is made in a later article, where it is stated that man cannot impose a law upon irrational creatures, no matter how subject they are to him:

> Ideo rebus irrationabilibus homo legem imponere non potest quantumcumque ei subiiciantur. Rebus autem rationabilibus sibi subjectis

55 The point that St Thomas's fascination for Ulpian did not blind him to the essential rationality of law is made by G. Fassò, *La legge della ragione* (Bologna 1964), p. 80: "Qualche passo di opere minori o giovanili potrebbe far pensare che l'Aquinate, per verità, si sia lasciato suggestionato dalla definizione di Ulpiano. Però anche in esse la fondamentale distinzione tra esseri razionali ed esseri irrazionali — come destinatari della legge naturale — non manca mai." Cf. S. Cotta, *Il concetto della legge nella Summa Theologiae di San Tommaso d'Aquino* (Torino 1955), pp. 60-61.

56 I-2ae, q. 91, a. 2.

57 Id., ad 3.

> potest imponere legem, inquantum suo praecepto vel denuntiatione quacumque imprimit menti earum quandam regulam quae est principium agendi...Alio modo creaturae irrationales subduntur legi aeternae, inquantum moventur a divina providentia, non autem per intellectum divini praecepti sicut creaturae rationales.[58]

The case against Ulpian's definition must seem to be closed; and if St. Thomas were entirely consistent, doubtless it would be. That the definition is not far from his mind emerges from a reading of the key discussion of the natural law. The question is whether the natural law contains several precepts or one only.[59] It begins with an exploration of what self-evidence may mean in relation to moral imperatives, continues with an appeal to the parallel between the procedures of the speculative and the practical intellect, and ends with an articulation of the precepts of the natural law according to the different levels of natural tendency found in man. Man's nature, considered as substance, has a tendency to persevere in being; considered as animal, it has a tendency towards the coupling of male and female and the rearing of offspring; and, as rational, it has a tendency to avoid ignorance, to cooperate with fellow-men and so on. This classification has obvious affinities with the hierarchical ordering of the senses of the natural law in St. Thomas's predecessors; it recalls, for example, the triple acceptation of the *jus naturae* in the *Glossa ordinaria* of Johannes Teutonicus. In the circumstances one would have expected a mention of Ulpian in the case of the tendencies related to the animal nature of man. Ulpian, however, is not mentioned. But, lest this be taken as an argument from silence and an indication of Aquinas's rejection of the Roman law definition, Ulpian makes an unmistakable return in the next question. The logic of Isidore's division of human law is at issue, in particular his putting of the *jus gentium* as a kind of human law "used by nearly all peoples." It might well be thought that any effort to introduce logical consistency into Isidore's divisions is an effort misplaced. And, to further complicate the matter, the particular division of human laws into *jus gentium* and *jus civile*, attributed by St. Thomas to Isidore, is not found formally in Isidore. It seems to be a conflation of two separate divisions, the division of laws into divine and human and the classical trichotomy *jus naturale, jus gentium, jus civile*. Further, there is another dictum of Isidore's that divine laws belonged to nature, human laws to custom — *divinae (leges) naturae, humanae moribus constant.*[60]

58 I-2ae, q. 93, a. 5.
59 I-2ae, q. 94, a. 2.
60 I-2ae, q. 95, a. 4 ad 1; *Etym*, V, 2-4 (PL 82, 198-199).

What is easier, then, than to assimilate *jus naturale* to divine law and *jus gentium* (together with *jus civile*) to human law? And when it is objected that the *jus gentium*, on Isidore's own showing — *quia eo omnes fere gentes utuntur* —, is more natural law than human law, Ulpian comes to the rescue:

> Jus gentium est quidem aliquo modo naturale homini, secundum quod est rationalis, inquantum derivatur a lege naturali per modum conclusionis, quae non est multum remota a principiis. Unde de facili in hujusmodi homines consenserunt. Distinguitur tamen a lege naturali, maxime ab eo quod est omnibus animalibus commune.[61]

This answer, while it meets the current difficulty, has the disadvantage of creating another; for it appears to go against what St. Thomas had said, in a previous article of the same question, about conclusions from the natural law having the force of natural law.[62]

Similar problems arise when we turn to the Secunda-Secundae. Here the topic is *jus*, the *objectum justitiae*, and the viewpoint is, as might have been expected, somewhat different from that of the law-tract in the Prima-Secundae. In concerning himself with the virtue of justice St. Thomas asks whether the division of *jus* into *jus naturale* and *jus positivum* is exhaustive, and whether *jus gentium* and *jus naturale* are distinct or identical.[63] The questions are connected; and the affirmative answer to the first leads on to the latter. And it is here that Ulpian's definition comes once more into play.

Is the *jus gentium* better assimilated to natural law or to positive law? St. Thomas, in order to answer this question, examines the element of equivalence in *jus*, the object of justice. The equivalence may be in the very nature of a given relationship — male is related to female for the purposes of generation or parent to child for the purposes of education. In such cases we have *jus naturale* absolutely speaking. But it may be that a relationship, of itself, does not give us enough information. Private property is an example; a field is no more mine than yours apart from outside considerations about efficient cultivation, peaceful possession, etc. Here we have *jus naturale*, but with a qualification. And the two kinds are reconciled for St. Thomas by the Jurisconsults — he cites Ulpian for natural law in the absolute sense and Gaius for natural law in the qualified sense:

61 1-2ae, q. 95, a. 4 ad 1.

62 1-2ae, q. 95, a. 2: "Derivantur ergo quaedam a principiis communibus legis naturae per modum conclusionum...quaedam vero per modum determinationis...utraque igitur inveniuntur in lege humana. Sed ea quae sunt primi modi continentur in lege humana non tamquam sint solum lege posita, sed habent etiam aliquid vigoris ex lege naturali..." Cf. L. Clément, "Le *jus gentium*", *Révue de l'Université d'Ottawa*, Section spéciale, 9-10 (1940), pp. 188-191.

63 2-2ae, q. 57, aa. 2,3.

> Absolute autem apprehendere aliquid non solum convenit homini, sed etiam aliis animalibus. Et ideo jus quod dicitur naturale secundum primum modum, commune est nobis et aliis animalibus. A jure autem naturali sic dicto recedit ius gentium, ut Iurisconsultus dicit, quia illud omnibus animalibus, hoc solum hominibus inter se commune est.[64]

Ulpian is not named explicitly, although Gaius is. But Ulpian's definition plays a critical rôle in solving the present difficulty. Whether the solution, making the *jus gentium* a natural law peculiar to man, is consistent with the suggestion noticed in the Prima-Secundae that *jus gentium* belongs more to positive law, is another matter.[65]

It may be thought that too much stress is here being laid upon what are, after all, passing references to Ulpian in the *Summa theologiae.*[66] Indeed, as has already been seen, the general view of the natural law in the *Summa* is hardly reconcilable with Ulpian's definition. Yet Aquinas does appear to feel a need, not altogether explained by his habit of deference to authorities, to make provision for Ulpian. There are two considerations that should prevent too easy an acceptance of the view that the references to a law of nature common to man and animals are merely incidental in the *Summa.* One is that St. Thomas's *Commentary on the Ethics* of Aristotle, written later even than the parts of the *Summa* with which we have been concerned, is far from rejecting Ulpian. The other — which cannot here be pursued — is that for centuries after St. Thomas sporadic efforts continued to be made by disciples and followers of his to accommodate Ulpian's natural law.[67]

It is now generally accepted that St. Thomas wrote his *Commentary on the Ethics* of Aristotle very late in his career, in 1271-1272. The

64 2-2ae, q. 57, a. 3.

65 Further discussion of this problem would involve an examination of St. Thomas's handling of the two classical dispositions of the *jus gentium*, slavery and private property, dispositions that had already exercised the Roman jurists. Cf. R. Voggensperger, *Der Begriff des "ius naturale" im Römischen Recht* (Basel 1952), pp. 17-24, 36-39.

66 Cf. S. Cotta, *Il concetto della legge nella Summa theologiae di S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (Torino 1955), p. 64: "...gli occasionali riferimenti alla formula del *Digesto* contenuti nella *Summa* mi sembra che debbono o esser considerati elementi eterogenei, quasi meccanicamente ripetuti, o vadano meglio intesi nel quadro generale del pensiero tomista..."

67 So, for example, Peter of Tarentaise, *In IV Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 and other works cited in O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles* (Louvain 1948),II,pp.92-93; Giles of Rome, *De regimine principum*, III, pars ii, c. 25. In the "Silver Age" of scholasticism some writers continued to show a qualified acceptance of Ulpian. Domingo Bañez, for example, spoke of *jus naturale nobis et brutis commune* — cf. M. Van Overbeke, "S. Thomas et le droit," *Revue thomiste*, 55 (1955), p. 552. The more usual view was that of Francisco Suarez, who rejected Ulpian's definition as *metaphorica et valde analoga*. Cf. *De legibus*, II, c. 3, n. 9 (*Opera Omnia*, ed. Berton, Paris, 1856, t. 5). There is a useful collection of texts on this question in S. Ramirez, *El derecho de gentes* (Madrid 1955).

point is of considerable importance for studies of the development of his thought; and it is relevant to the present discussion.[68]

Aristotle's notice of "natural justice" provides St. Thomas, as it has done (and to this day still does) other commentators on the *Ethics*, with an occasion of discussing the natural law.

> Of political justice part is natural, part legal, — natural that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that; legal that which is originally indifferent but when it has been laid down is not indifferent...[69]

The text used by St. Thomas[70] rendered Aristotle's *δίκαιον φυσικόν justum naturale.* Aristotle had divided the *justum politicum* into *justum naturale* and *justum legale*, a division that, St. Thomas suggests, is the same as the jurists' division of *jus naturale* and *jus positivum*. The reconciliation if effected by explaining the ambiguity of *justum politicum*; for Aristotle it is the general term, sub-divided into *justum naturale* and *justum legale*, whereas for the jurists the *justum politicum* is divided against the *naturale.*[71]

It is when Aquinas comes to consider the *justum naturale* at close quarters that he makes appeal to Ulpian, although without naming him explicitly. Having identified the natural law with a series of rational principles — the principles that can be related in a reasoning process as premiss and conclusion, as, for instance, the prohibition of stealing follows as a conclusion from the prohibition of injuring others,[72] he goes on to consider how such natural law judgments follow upon the inclinations of nature:

> Est autem considerandum quod iustum naturale est ad quod hominem natura inclinat. Attenditur autem in homine duplex natura: una quidem secundum quod est animal, quae est sibi aliisque animalibus communis; alia autem est natura hominis quae est propria sibi in quantum est homo, prout scilicet secundum rationem discernit turpe et honestum. Iuristae autem illud tantum dicunt ius naturale quod consequitur inclinationem

68 R. A. Gauthier, "La date du Commentaire de saint Thomas sur l'Ethique à Nicomaque," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 18 (1951), pp. 66-105; *Sententia Libri Ethicorum (Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia*, t. XLVII, Romae, 1969) Praefatio, p. 201: "... admirari enim solet de multitudine operum quae Thomas in parvo tempore confecit, praesertim cum *Sententiam Libri Ethicorum* Lutetiae Parisiorum circa annos 1271-1272 scripserit dum secundam partem *Summae theologiae* aliaque opera scribebat." Cotta's argument — supra note (66) — is in part based upon a mistaken chronology of St. Thomas's writings.

69 *Nic. Eth.*, V, 7, 1134b18-21.

70 Cf. R. A. Gauthier, *Sententia Libri Ethicorum*, Praefatio, III, 1, "De libri Ethicorum codice a Thoma usurpato" (*Opera Omnia*, t. XLVII, Romae, 1969), pp. 203* - 231*.

71 *In V Eth.*, lectio 12 (*Opera Omnia*, t. XLVII, Romae 1969), p. 304, 12-33.

72 Ibid., p. 305, 49-57.

naturae communis homini et aliis animalibus, sicut coniunctio maris et feminae, educatio natorum et alia huiusmodi; illud autem ius quod consequitur propriam inclinationem naturae humanae, in quantum scilicet homo est rationale animal, vocant ius gentium. quia eo omnes gentes utuntur, sicut quod pacta sint servanda, quod legati etiam apud hostes sint tuti, at alia huiusmodi. Utrumque autem horum comprehenditur sub iusto naturali, prout hic a Philosopho accipitur.[73]

This is not an enthusiastic adoption of Ulpian's definition — St. Thomas recognises it as a restrictive sense of natural law. But it is not a rejection of Ulpian; and, even when it is borne in mind that St. Thomas's preoccupation in commenting is to uncover the *sensus Aristotelis*, this fact is significant. He does make use of Ulpian's definition despite its incongruity with his general view.[74]

To this consideration of St. Thomas's later thought on Ulpian's definition of the natural law one might add one or two vague passages in the *Commentary on the Politics* of Aristotle.[75] There are no direct references to Ulpian's natural law. There is, however, the passage, apropos of Aristotle's saying that man is a political animal, in which St. Thomas enlarges upon the distinction between man and animals. Man's social or political nature is contrasted with the gregariousness of certain animals or with the organising capacity of bees. What really distinguishes man from the animals is his power of speech — the expression of thought; the voice of animals is sound without meaning. As an example of the knowledge that man expresses in his speech St. Thomas adduces the distinction between good and evil, between just and unjust. This would seem to rule out any real acceptance of Ulpian's definition.[76]

The same conclusion may be drawn perhaps more vaguely, from

73 Ibid., p. 305, 57-75.

74 S. Cotta, *Il concetto di legge nella Summa theologiae di S. Tommaso* (Torino 1955), pp. 61-62: "Dunque i sudetti testi, lunghi dall' offrirci una univoca interpretazione naturalistica dello *ius naturale*, ci indicano invece come essa appaia insufficiente a S. Tommaso. Tuttavia non si può negare ch'egli sia pure in parte, la mantenga e l'accetti, e quindi il problema, per quanto ridotto a proporzioni minori, rimane." Passages in the *Sententia Libri Ethicorum* confining law to rational beings and implying, therefore, a rejection of Ulpian, are plentiful. Cf. *In V Eth.*, lectio 16 (*Opera Omnia*, t. XLVII, p. 323, 103-104: "Talia sunt facta humana, de quibus dantur leges"; *In X Eth.*, lectio 12 (Ibid., p. 592, 161-168), etc.

75 The Thomistic text ends at *In III Pol.*, lectio 6, the completion being the work of Peter of Auvergne. The date has not yet been satisfactorily established, but there is fairly general agreement that St. Thomas began his commentary during his second Paris period, 1269-1272. On these matters cf. H. F. Dondaine, L. J. Bataillon, Préface, *Sententia Libri Politicorum (Opera Omnia*, t. XLVIII, Romae, 1971, pp. A5-A8).

76 *In I Pol.*, lectio 1 (*Sententia Libri Politicorum*, Lib. I, c. 1/b, 142-146, *Opera Omnia*, t. XLVIII, Romae, 1971, p. A79): "... locutio est propria hominibus, quia hoc est proprium eis in comparatione ad alia animalia, quod habeant cognitionem boni et mali, iusti et iniusti, et aliorum huiusmodi que sermone significari possunt."

those passages further on in the *Commentary on the Politics* in which St. Thomas puts as good a face as he can on Aristotle's doctrine of the natural slavery of some men. Speaking of the varieties of domination, he remarks that, despite their common nature, man is naturally master of the other animals. Domesticated animals are *digniora* than wild animals precisely because they participate in the rule of reason.[77] There is nothing here about a common law, based upon the common nature of man and animals; if anything the stress upon the rule of reason excludes it. Again, one might look to the following *lectio*, in which the issue of slavery is joined expressly in terms of natural and human law. In what reads like a piece of special pleading Aquinas concedes that slavery by conquest may be injust (for the less wise may enslave their betters) and yet may be provided for in human law, on the ground that it places a premium upon valour, which is not without its use for the common good.[78] This recalls a controversy that was found already in the Roman law about the status of slavery and in which Ulpian's dictum that all men are by nature equal carried the implication that slavery must have been introduced by the *jus gentium*.[79] But St. Thomas has nothing here to say about Ulpian's natural law.

Conclusion

The conclusion to be drawn is hardly startling. It is simply that St. Thomas's complacency towards what he calls the Jurists' definition of the natural law — in fact, Ulpian's natural law common to man and animals — remains somewhat surprising, particularly in the later works. This has nothing to do with the original and highly conjectural origins of the definition. On the other hand, it does not seem to be altogether explained by the adventitious authority conferred upon the definition by its adoption in the authoritative *Corpus Iuris Civilis*; for other medieval writers, no readier than Aquinas to dispute the authority of Justinian and the Roman law, were able to relegate Ulpian's natural law to a relatively obscure rôle. Not many, admittedly, went as far as Albert the Great and rejected Ulpian out of hand, although a precedent

77 *In I Pol.*, lectio 3 (*Sententia Libri Politicorum*, Lib. I, c. 3, 178-185): "... similiter se habet in homine et aliis animalibus quod naturale et expediens est ut homo aliis dominetur; videmus enim quod animalia mansueta quibus homo dominatur, digniora sunt secundum naturam siluestribus in quantum participant aliqualiter regimine rationis..."

78 *In I Pol.*, lectio 4 (*Sententia Libri Politicorum*, Lib I, c. 4, 101-112).

79 Cf. R. Voggensperger, *Der Begriff des "ius naturale" im Römischen Recht* (Basel 1952), pp. 17-24.

might have been found in the Roman law, and even in Ulpian, for the denial of a law common to man and animals.[80] Most, with that penchant for lists and classifications that characterised theologians and lawyers — both civil and canon — easily enough accommodated Ulpian without having to take his definition more seriously than they took, for example, the "cosmic justice" backed by the authority of Plato in the *Timaeus*.

The trend, undoubtedly, was to develop more and more the rational aspect of the natural law and to be correspondingly less conciliatory towards Ulpian. Aquinas (and Bonaventure) go against the trend. St. Thomas's early going out of his way to approve of Ulpian's definition and his retention of it almost to the end of his career remains, in the last resort, slightly puzzling.

80 The consensus of Stoic philosophy, which formed such an important part of the background to the Roman law, was against a law common to man and animals. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, *Vit. Philos*, VII, 129: "Placet item illis nulla non lege naturae teneri adversus reliqua animalia ob naturae dissimilitudinem, ut Chrysippus in primo de iustitia et Poseidonius in primo de officiis tradunt." Cf. Seneca, *Ep. ad Lucil.*, 121, 124; *De ira*, ii, 26, 4; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa* (Göttingen, 2. Aufl. 1959), pp. 137, 228; M. Villey, *Leçons d'histoire de la philosophie du droit* (Paris 1957), pp. 144-145. In this connection Ulpian's statement that an animal cannot suffer injury *quod sensu caret* (*Liber ad Edictum* partially reproduced in *Inst.*, IV, 9) is worth recording. Perhaps the last word may be left with P. M. Van Overbeke, "S. Thomas et le droit," *Revue thomiste*, 55 (1955), p. 545: "dans une définition du droit naturel ces "animalia" ne manquent pas de rester passablement gênants."

FATALISM AND FREEDOM ACCORDING TO NEMESIUS AND THOMAS AQUINAS

Gérard Verbeke

DURING the first centuries of the Christian era, as well as in classical antiquity, the question of fatalism and freedom was controversial. In some currents of contemporary philosophy, the liberty of human behaviour and the consistency of our existence are excessively emphasized; this is one of the main reasons why some thinkers of our time profess atheism, because the existence of God is supposed to be incompatible with the density and full value of human life. In this respect ancient thinking and contemporary philosophy are clearly opposed: awareness of human freedom evolved rather slowly from antiquity to the present time. Apparently ordinary people in Greece had a keen sense of their dependence upon the world and upon some higher, very powerful beings, who constantly interfered with the events of human life and the course of history.[1] This topic is one of the most recurrent themes in Greek tragedy. Human existence is described as dominated by higher powers; it cannot escape the grip of blind fate, as is illustrated by the history of some famous families.[2] The original meaning of *εὐδαιμονία* derives from that ancient belief: happiness is not effected through personal activity and moral behaviour; there is an element of chance about it, a good luck bestowed on us by the favour of divine

1 In a poem of Pindar (*Pyth.* 8) man is called "the dream of a shadow" (*σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος*), he is *ἐπάμερος*, which means according to H. Fränkel the uncertainty of human existence: "Denn es ist nicht gemeint dass unsere Lage fortgesetzt wechselt, sondern vielmehr dass sie sich von einem Tag zum andern radikal ändern kann. Je länger sich unser Leben ausdehnt, desto wahrscheinlicher wird es dass wir einen Tag des Umsturzes erleben." H. Fränkel, *Wege und frühgriechischen Denkens* (Munich 1960), p. 27.

2 Speaking about Homer, H. Fränkel points to the fact that the intervention of the gods in the Trojan war is not very evident; after all the old city is not destroyed by a heavenly fire. The intervention of the gods is for the most part integrated in the normal course of events in such a way that the initiative of man is not entirely excluded. H. Fränkel, *Dichtung und Philosophie des frühen Griechentums* (Munich 1962), p. 79. Still it remains true that those divine beings interfere on the level of human events and favour some individuals rather than others. In the light of this primitive belief the opposition of some philosophers to the notion of divine providence becomes quite understandable.

beings. It was quite a reversal when Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle "interiorized" the notion of happiness: according to them, it does not depend on the arbitrary favour of divine powers but is brought about by individual behaviour. Every man is the author of his own life and the architect of his own felicity.[3] If man did not become aware of his freedom very quickly, this is explicable by the fact that he only becomes conscious of his capacities insofar as they are embodied in concrete achievements. One could hardly feel "free" unless he were able to carry out what he wants to do; the praise of man in Sophocles' *Antigone* is a marvellous piece of poetry, and yet the achievements mentioned there are hardly comparable with the discoveries and technical progress of our time. A Greek could not appreciate the capacities man bears within himself as long as they remained on the level of mere possibilities.[4]

Early Christian writers had to cope with the same situation; they also went on asking the same question, whether man may be considered the principle of his own deeds. Is man able to take free initiative, is he a being responsible for his behaviour, or is human life subject to higher powers? When the Christian message entered into history, Stoic philosophy was still widespread over the civilized world and generally accepted by intellectuals. According to philosophers of that school, human behaviour is free as far as the inner attitude is concerned; as to the course of events, man may possibly oppose it, but he is not able to change it in any way.[5] The main duty of man is to accept the events of his own life as well as the history of the world, for both are thoroughly rational. Yet, if human freedom is always stressed by Stoic philosophers, the notion of freedom they proposed is rather narrow, because it does not extend to man's creative activity in the world, but is

3 In this respect a sentence of Democritus should be quoted (*Vors.* 68, B 170): *εὐδαιμονίη ψυχῆς καὶ κακοδαιμονίη*. What does it mean that happiness, as well as its opposite, belongs to the realm of the soul? Obviously this sentence is to be understood against the background of a common belief which is discarded; happiness results from human activity and behaviour.

4 Needless to say, fatalism was accepted, even by philosophers: according to Heraclitus, whatever happens is regulated by destiny (*Vors.* 22, A 1,7: *πάντα δὲ γίνεσθαι καθ' εἱμαρμένην*). Similarly, the notion of Necessity plays an important role in the philosophy of Parmenides and Empedocles. As for the Stoics, their doctrine on *εἱμαρμένη* is quite basic in their explanation of the world: instead of denying and opposing destiny, they transformed it radically by identifying it with the divine Reason, the immanent principle of the cosmos. Consequently history in their opinion is completely "rational"; each period of the world is a masterpiece caused irresistibly by the divine Logos.

5 One of the most concise expressions of this Stoic doctrine is to be found in a prayer of Cleanthes, reported by Epictetus (*Man.*, c. 53) and Seneca (*Epist.*, 107, 10; SVF I 527). The author wants to accept willingly and without hesitation the law of destiny; otherwise, opposing the divine Reason, he will have to accept it unwillingly: "Fac nolle, comitabor gemens, malusque patiar, quod pati licuit bono. Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt."

limited to his behaviour towards the emotions.[6] Stoic philosophers acknowledged the possibility of divination: emphasizing both the unity of the world and the coherence of history, they maintained that it is possible to predict the future because everything in the world is linked with everything else.

As far as astrology is concerned, it is unnecessary to recall that it was largely recognized and practized in the ancient world. On the other hand, Christianity too, at first glance, seemed to substantiate fatalism, because it strongly emphasizes the weakness of man without the help of God. Do we not read in the Gospel that nothing is put within the control of man? Moreover, according to Christian doctrine, God is omniscient: he knows everything, not only past and present events, but also the future. His foreknowledge extends to all future events, both contingent and necessary. Does this doctrine not entail the suppression of human freedom?[7] In any case, Celsus, as reported by Origen, advocated this doctrine against the Christians.[8] Without entering into details, we might recall that Origen firmly countered all those criticisms; he does not hesitate to acknowledge the freedom of human behaviour. His standpoint may be summarized as follows: human conduct is not regulated by the heavenly bodies, as the astrologists assume; however, the course of the heavenly bodies may be a token of some activities of man. Nor is human conduct determined by influences from outside; man may become conscious of his autonomy within the world by retiring within himself, by drawing his attention to his true self.[9]

6 According to Epictetus (*Diss.* I, 1) a wise man is able to draw a distinction between matters depending on himself and those which are independent of his individual attitude. Because he is endowed with reason, man is aware of himself, his dignity and his capacities. His behaviour is not merely the outcome of the empirical data he receives from the world, he is able to use his representations in one way or another: *ἡ χρηστικὴ δύναμις ταῖς φαντασίαις*. The Stoic sage accepts the divine law, because it is both rational and irresistible.

7 *De principiis*, III, 124: "Haec quidem dicunt hi qui volunt ex auctoritate divinae Scripturae disserere nihil esse positum in nostra potestate." If certain biblical texts are taken literally (v. gr. "et velle et perficere ex Deo est"), one cannot avoid the conclusion that nothing is placed within the power of man ("quod si est, liberi arbitrii non sumus"). Origen to a certain extent agrees with this doctrine: the capacity of accomplishing voluntary acts springs from God. However, it depends upon each individual to direct this power towards right or wrong deeds ("nostrum vero est motus istos quibus moveri ex Deo habemus vel ad bona vel ad mala convertere"). Cf. Hal Koch, ***Pronoia und Paideusis*** (Berlin-Leipzig 1932), p. 281 sqq.; E. de Faye, *Origène, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée*, 3 vols. (Paris 1923-28), III, pp. 179-198.

8 *Contra Celsum*, II, 17 sqq.; the same objection is to be found in *De oratione*, V, 6. According to Origen the divine foreknowledge does not cause the event; on the contrary this foreknowledge is made possible by the future event. In this context he mentions the sophism of the sick man who believes it to be useless to call a physician: everything being settled by fate, he will die or recover whatever he does. Origen replies that destiny may have settled that somebody will beget children or not; he however, will not manage to beget them without sexual intercourse.

9 According to Origen man is always able to judge whatever influence he undergoes; without his agreement, no act will be performed: *εἰ μὴ εὐδόκησις καὶ συγκατάθεσις καὶ ῥοπὴ τοῦ*

Finally, human acts are not the result of a mere corporeal situation; in other words, they do not simply spring out of the particular equipment of the body. Of course, Origen does not deny the importance of all these influences, but for him they do not bring about human action as a necessary consequence.[10]

Gregory of Nyssa was obliged to handle the same problem: in a public debate at Constantinople he discussed with a pagan philosopher the question of fatalism. As far as we are informed by the text of Gregory, the philosopher ascribed everything that happens to a necessity of fate; in other words, there are no free decisions. As to the notion of fate, it is conceived as an infrangible concatenation of all events according to the conjunction of the heavenly bodies. Quite in agreement with Stoicism the philosopher professes the unity of the world, comparable to the unity of a living organism; a universal sympathy links together all parts of the cosmos.[11] In his reply Gregory especially stresses the inequality of men born at about the same time; he points to the case of two men, one born shortly before the other, whereas the destiny of both is quite different. One attains the *summum* of happiness, whereas the other endures a miserable condition.[12] Gregory asks whether any reason might account plausibly for the poor and unfortunate life of this man. In Gregory's view fate is to be identified with the free choice of each man; in other words, fate is not a power compelling us from outside: it coincides with our autonomous decision.[13]

In his treatise *De migratione Abrahami*, Philo had already opposed the astrology of the Chaldeans, who also acknowledged the universal sympathy of all parts of the world. According to them the visible cosmos is the only reality; it must be identified with God, unless the soul of the world is God.[14] As one might expect, Philo discards the

ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τόδε τι (*De principiis*, III, 110). As a matter of fact, it does not depend on the individual to receive some representations, but he is able to judge them by his reason: *τὸ δὲ κρῖναι οὑτωσὶ χρήσασθαι τῷ γινομένῳ ἢ ἑτέρως, οὐκ ἄλλου τινος ἔργον ἢ τοῦ ἡμῖν λόγου ἐστίν* (*De principiis*, III, 1, 3).

10 *De principiis*, III, 110-111.

11 *Contra fatum*, PG 45, 152 c: *ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ μία τίς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι συμπάθεια, καὶ συνεχές ἐστι τὸ πᾶν ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ παντὶ θεωρούμενα οἷον ἐπὶ σώματος ἑνὸς ἐν μιᾷ συμπνοίᾳ καταλαμβάνεται. πάντων πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν μερῶν συννευόντων, τούτου χάριν ἀρχηγικωτέρας οὔσης τῆς ἄνω λήξεως, τὰ περίγεια πάντα τῷ προηγουμένῳ συνδιατίθεται.*

12 *Contra fatum*, PG 45, 157.

13 *Contra fatum*, PG 45, 169: *δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ ἀκολούθου, ὅτι μοῖρα καὶ εἱμαρμένη ἡ ἑκάστου προαίρεσις γίνεται, τὸ δοκοῦν κατ' ἐξουσίαν προαιρουμένη.*

14 *De migratione Abrahami*, 178. Speaking of the Chaldeans, Philo writes: *τὴν ἐμμελεστάτην συμφωνίαν τοῦ παντὸς ἐπιδεικνύμενοι τῇ τῶν μερῶν πρὸς ἄλληλα κοινωνίᾳ καὶ συμπαθείᾳ.*

notion of God as it was professed by the Chaldeans: God is transcendent, he is not a merely immanent principle like the soul of the world. As far as the heavenly bodies are concerned, they are not the ultimate causes of the events occurring in human life; a prior cause has to be acknowledged, prior to all kinds of becoming and distinct from it. This cause is God, whose power pervades the whole cosmos and is the principle of its cohesion.[15]

Eusebius of Caesarea in his *Praeparatio evangelica* deals with the same question.[16] His criticism is not original: he merely borrows the arguments against Stoic determinism from the *De fato* of Alexander of Aphrodisias. According to D. Amand, these arguments have not been invented by Alexander; they stem from a source that is much earlier, namely Carneades, who initiated the debate against fatalism and whose arguments have been used by many later writers.[17] The particular kind of determinism Carneades intended to counter seems to be the extreme fatalism defended by Chrysippus.[18]

In the view of St. Augustine human freedom is an undeniably important topic, closely connected with his reflection on the problem of evil. One of his works, *De libero arbitrio*, is formally devoted to that question. Augustine endeavours to discover the origin of evil in the world. In his opinion there is no need for seeking any further cause than human freedom:[19] as our mind knows everything else and also itself, in the same way our will disposes of everything else and of itself. Hence man is able to perform right actions, but also to behave wrongly.[20] This does not, however, entail the position that the will is bad. Since it is capable of both wisdom and insanity, the human will occupies an intermediate stage between right and wrong; it belongs to the class of the "media bona."[21] In regard to divine providence, the foreknowledge of God does not suppress the liberty of our actions. That God knows beforehand the wrong actions we will perform does not imply that we

15 *De migratione Abrahami*, 181.

16 *Praeparatio evangelica*, VI, 6, 4-21.

17 *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'Antiquité grecque* (Louvain 1945).

18 D. Amand, op. cit., p. 367.

19 *De libero arbitrio*, III, 22, 63: quae peccata, ut jam diu disseruimus, nonnisi propriae voluntati earum tribuenda sunt, nec ulla ulterior peccatorum causa quaerenda. — III, 17, 48: ergo improba voluntas malorum omnium causa est.

20 *De libero arbitrio*, II, 19, 51: ut quodammodo se ipsa utatur voluntas quae utitur caeteris, sicut seipsam cognoscit ratio, quae cognoscit et caetera. According to Augustine, the same prevails in the memory: ipsa se memoria quodammodo tenet in nobis, quae non solum aliorum, sed etiam sui meminit.-I, 12, 25: quid enim tam in voluntate quam ipsa voluntas sita est?

21 *De libero arbitrio*, II, 19, 50; III, 5, 15: the capacity of free choice is always valuable even in the case of moral decay: ita est excellentior creatura quae libera voluntate peccat, quam quae propterea non peccat, quia non habet liberam voluntatem.

are necessitated to do them.[22] Augustine comes back to the same question in his *De civitate Dei*, book V (especially chapter 10), and argues that instead of talking about fate, we should rather speak of divine providence.

In order to present a general survey of Nemesius's background, I should not disregard Proclus and Boethius, both of whom face the question of fatalism and human behaviour in a neoplatonic perspective. In his treatise *De providentia et fato* Proclus does not really dismiss the doctrine of fate, he only attempts to discover its exact meaning.[23] According to him fate is to be identified with nature, whose domination extends to the whole field of corporeal beings movable by something else.[24] Consequently fate is something divine, though it does not coincide with God; it depends on divine providence and may be called its image.[25] On the other hand, Proclus opposes the doctrine of the Peripatetics and the Stoics, who claim that divine foreknowledge involves the necessity of all events.[26] In his mind the nature of knowledge does not depend upon the object but upon the knowing subject.[27] As for the freedom of human actions, it is to be located in the field of our inner choices and decisions; in other words, it does not belong to anything outside the soul.[28]

The opinion of Boethius shows at least two features akin to the doc-

22 *De libero arbitrio*, III, 3, 7: quamobrem, quamvis praesciat Deus nostras voluntates futuras, non ex eo tamen conficitur ut non voluntate aliquid velimis. — III, 3, 8: Non igitur per ejus praescientiam mihi potestas adimitur, quae propterea mihi certior aderit, quia ille cujus praescientia non fallitur, adfuturum mihi esse praescivit.

23 *Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula* (De Providentia, Libertate, Malo), ed. H. Boese (Berlin 1960).

24 *De Providentia*, 10: Palam utique quod que a fato reguntur et connectuntur ab altero mobilia sunt et corporalia omnino. Si autem hoc demonstratum est, manifestum quod causam connexionis fatum ponentes ipsum presidem ab altero mobilium et corporalium esse ponemus.

25 *De Providentia*, 14: Sic igitur providentia quidem deus per se, fatum autem divina aliqua res et non deus: dependet enim a providentia et velut ymago est illius.

26 *De Providentia*, 63: Alii autem determinatam cognitionem attribuentes deo, admiserunt necessitatem in omnibus quae fiunt: Peripateticorum et Stoicorum heresum sunt haec dogmata. The reference to the peripatetics is rather astonishing. One of the criticisms often put forward in the doxographies against Aristotle concerns his negative attitude towards the doctrine on divine providence. Still, Alexander of Aphrodisias in his *De Fato* (c. 30, p. 201, 26 sqq.) wonders whether God has a determinate knowledge of the future. According to him it is questionable whether such knowledge is possible; and even if it is possible, it remains questionable whether it is to be attributed to God.

27 *De Providentia*, 65: Quare et cognoscunt dii divine et intemporaliter que in nobis et nos operamur ut apti nati sumus.

28 *De Providentia*, 35: Ubi igitur hic *le in nobis* quando quod fit connectitur cum periodo mundi, et rursum quando ex illa solummodo efficitur? Ubi autem alibi dicemus quam in nostris interius electionibus et impetibus? — Proclus asks the question whether the human soul is subject to destiny. His answer quite corresponds to the neoplatonic idea of the soul. According to its substance, the human soul ranks above fate. In its behaviour, however, it may become subject to destiny (*De Providentia*, 20).

trine of Proclus. Like him, Boethius subordinates fate to divine providence.[29] The necessity of fate is used by God to eliminate all kinds of evil from the world. For Boethius, no evil is to be found in the world itself.[30] Obviously fate does not extend to the decisions of man: these are free because man is endowed with reason.[31] In his treatment of divine foreknowledge he also criticizes the Stoics. He professes the same principle as Proclus: knowledge is not determined by the nature of the object but by the very essence of the knowing subject.[32] God knows the future because he is eternal. This knowledge, however, does not introduce any necessity into the events that follow one another in time.[33]

At the end of the fourth century, when Nemesius wrote his treatise *De natura hominis*, the question of fatalism and freedom had already been treated many times by outstanding pagan and Christian writers, apparently without arriving at a definitive answer. Was it worthwhile to face it again? Was it not a waste of time to make a new inquiry into a question on which opinions were thoroughly divided and opposed? Nemesius was convinced that the question was important, especially for the religious and moral education of the Christian community. In a different historical context we can note that the cultural climate at the University of Paris in the second half of the thirteenth century was hardly comparable to the religious condition of the Christian community in Syria at the end of the fourth century. And yet Thomas Aquinas had to cope with the same problem, especially in his struggle against Averroism. In his day Aquinas turns for his source to the authority of the bishop of Emesa, or rather to that of Gregory of Nyssa, at that time commonly supposed to be the author of the *De natura hominis*.[34] The question of fatalism and freedom is obviously one of those archetypal philosophical problems that endlessly intrude upon our attention, presenting such varied aspects that they require renewed investigation in every age.

29 *Philosophiae Consolatio*, IV, 6, 12-13: fatum vero eorum quae divina simplicitas gerenda disposuit mobilem nexum atque ordinem temporalem.

30 *Philosophiae Consolatio*, IV, 6, 55.

31 *Philosophiae Consolatio*, V, 2, 3: neque enim fuerit ulla rationalis natura quin eidem libertas adsit arbitrii.

32 *Philosophiae Consolatio*, V, 4, 24: Cujus erroris causa est quod omnia quae quisque novit ex ipsorum tantum vi atque natura cognosci aestimat quae sciuntur.

33 *Philosophiae Consolatio*, V, 6, 15.

34 In 1270 thirteen propositions were censured by Etienne Tempier, bishop of Paris. Four of them are related to the freedom of human behaviour and to the question of divine providence: (3) Quod voluntas hominis ex necessitate vult vel eligit; (4) Quod omnia que hic in inferioribus aguntur, subsunt necessitati corporum celestium; (9) Quod liberum arbitrium est potentia passiva, non activa, et quod necessitate movetur ab appetibili; (12) Quod humani actus non reguntur providentia Dei.

In the framework of the relation between Nemesius and Thomas Aquinas, we intend to investigate more closely three fundamental topics: the notion of fate or destiny, the doctrine of divine providence, and the question of human freedom.

1. Fate or Destiny

Concerning the notion of fate, five different opinions are taken into consideration by Nemesius. The most extreme fatalism maintains that whatever happens in the world is necessitated by the movements of the heavenly bodies.[35] Nemesius dismisses this view because it is not in keeping with common opinions (*κοιναῖς ἐννοίαις*).[36] Moreover, if it is true political organisation becomes quite useless. Blame and praise will also be meaningless. It would make no sense to pray. Divine providence and religion would have to be denied, as well as all contingency and liberty. Finally, who will be guilty of wrong deeds, such as injustice, adultery and murder? They would have to be attributed to the heavenly bodies and ultimately to God himself. Granted this opinion, how could one escape from charging God with the most execrable crimes?[37] These arguments against extreme fatalism clearly belong to the tradition originated by Carneades. They can be traced back to their origin because they occur in nearly the same fashion in the works of several pagan and Christian writers. As D. Amand has shown, they became the common way in which fatalism was attacked and discarded.[38] Even Thomas Aquinas, in his inquiry into human freedom, briefly refers to the same arguments.[39]

The names of the Stoic philosophers Chrysippus and Philopator are

35 *De natura hominis*, ed. C. F. Matthaei (Halle 1801), c. 34, p. 289. The correspondence of this doctrine to the fourth proposition censured by the bishop of Paris in 1270 is clear.

36 According to the Stoics, common opinions (*κοιναὶ ἔννοιαι*) cannot be erroneous; since they are accepted by all people, they certainly stem from nature, i.e. from the divine Reason (Alex. Aphrod., *De mixtione*, p. 216, 14 ed. Bruns; SVF II, 473). If the Logos is the immanent principle of the world, there cannot be a real agreement or a true consensus on an erroneous proposition: that would be incompatible with the rational conception of the cosmos as it was professed by the Stoics.

37 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 289-290.

38 *Fatalisme et liberté dans l'Antiquité grecque*, p. 41-68. D. Amand distinguishes between two categories of arguments developed by Carneades against astrology: "Les *τόποι* de la seconde catégorie visent spécialement le fatalisme absolu professé par les "Chaldéens" et défendu par Chrysippe. Cette doctrine de l'*εἱμαρμένη* astrologique conduit nécessairement à la négation de notre liberté, à l'inaction et à l'indifférence radicale, à la suppression du mérite, à l'abrogation de la législation et des institutions judiciaires, enfin à la ruine de la morale. C'est l'argumentation "éthique" antifataliste, qui a été adoptée et répétée par quelques moralistes de l'antiquité et surtout par les théologiens chrétiens" (p. 49).

39 *S.T.*, I, q. 83, a. 1.

mentioned by Nemesius as representatives of the second group, professing a less radical form of fatalism.[40] According to these philosophers, fate must be compatible with human freedom. Every being bears within itself some particular characteristics that originate from fate, as for instance the fact that water is cold, plants yield their fruit, stones fall, and flames rise. Similarly, a living being assents to the objects it perceives and moves itself thanks to its own structure. Such a being will in fact tend to certain objects provided that it is not impeded from without and that another fate is not an obstacle.[41]

In the opinion of Nemesius this theory of fate may be reduced to the first described above. Everything is necessitated by fate. The very impulse to act springs from fate and the actual attaining of the goal may be impeded by fate. Hence freedom of action is entirely suppressed. That impulse appears to be necessitated, for the same causes always produce the same results. There is no difference whatsoever between the behaviour of men and that of animals; just as all animal activity flows necessarily from destiny, so if all the elements in human decision, including judgment and assent, are necessitated by fate, no room is left for free action.[42] Thomas Aquinas mentions Nemesius's definition of Stoic fatalism: an unchangeable concatenation of causes. In his view, as in that of Nemesius, this Stoic theory is incompatible with human freedom.[43]

The third conception of fatalism is attributed by Nemesius to certain Egyptian sages. According to them everything that happens in the world is regulated by the movements of the heavenly bodies. Yet the events are not quite immutable; some changes may be introduced through prayers and sacrifices. These may be addressed to the stars themselves or to some higher divine powers in order to propitiate them. Thus religious cult is quite justified and efficacious.[44]

40 About Philopator we only have limited information. He probably lived in the 2nd century A.D., wrote a treatise *On Fate* (*Περὶ εἱμαρμένης*) in which he tried to corroborate the point of view of Chrysippus and to save human freedom without discarding the notion of destiny. See M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, I (Göttingen 1948), p. 354; II (Göttingen 1949), p. 147. One of his pupils was the teacher of Galen (Galenus, *De cogn. an. morb.* 8, V, 41 Kühn). According to Nemesius this theory which professes the compatibility of destiny and human freedom was held not only by Chrysippus and Philopator, but also by many other outstanding thinkers (*καὶ ἄλλοι πολλοὶ καὶ λαμπροί*).

41 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 291.

42 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 291-293.

43 *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, c. 73: Per haec autem excluditur opinio Stoicorum, qui secundum ordinem quendam causarum intransgressibilem, quem Graeci ymarmenen vocabant, omnia ex necesssitate dicebant provenire.

44 *De natura hominis*, c. 35, p. 294.

Several objections against this doctrine are raised by Nemesius. First of all, in the view of the Egyptian sages the notion of fate receives a rather unusual meaning. It no longer relates to necessary events but to contingent, undetermined and unknowable facts.[45] Indeed, whatever is determined by destiny may eventually be changed through someone's prayer. Moreover, divination, and particularly astrology as it was accepted and practised, would no longer be possible. This is of course an argument *ad hominem*, since the Egyptian sages gave much value to nativity-casting.[46] As for the influence of religious cult upon the course of events, Nemesius rightly asks why prayer alone depends on human initiative. If acts of religion depend upon our free decision, why could not some other acts enjoy the same privilege?[47] On the other hand, if everybody is able to change the course of events regulated by fate, one might be able equally to transform the whole sequence of history. If only some privileged individuals are capable of doing this, how are they chosen? Was the selection also made by fate? If so, the efficacy of prayer would ultimately depend on destiny.[48] Yet even this solution is necessarily wrong; if everything depended on destiny, nobody could be righteous or unrighteous. Why do some people rule over destiny whereas others are subject to it? The selection could not be made as a reward for special merits since everything is necessitated by destiny.[49]

It is noteworthy that Nemesius examines this point of view rather carefully, presumably because it comes closer to the Christian doctrine of providence. Thomas Aquinas in turn raises a similar question: whether destiny is changeable or unchangeable? In his reply the Angelic Doctor mentions the Egyptian sages and refers to Nemesius's treatise.[50] However, he does not pay much attention to this opinion

45 *De natura hominis*, c. 35, p. 295: *ἐροῦμεν ὅτι τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ οὐχὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ποιοῦσι τὴν εἱμαρμένην · τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον, ἀόριστον· τὸ δὲ ἀόριστον, ἄγνωστον.* According to Nemesius the contingent future, being undetermined, is quite unknowable. This standpoint corresponds to the doctrine of Aristotle: a proposition about the contingent future is neither true nor false (*Peri Hermeneias*, c. 9, 19a7-19b4).

46 *De natura hominis*, c. 35, p. 295.

47 *De natura hominis*, c. 35, p. 295-296.

48 *De natura hominis*, c. 35, p. 296. If some people are able to change the course of events regulated by fate, they escape from the power of destiny. Accordingly, the life of some people will be regulated by fate, whereas some privileged individuals will stay outside its realm (*καὶ εὑρεθήσεται, τισὶ μὲν ἀνθρώποις πάντα καθ' εἱμαρμένην, τισὶ δὲ οὐδὲν καθ' εἱμαρμένην*, p. 297). Why are some people subject to fate whereas other people avoid it? In the opinion of Nemesius, there is no reply to that question.

49 *De natura hominis*, c. 35, p. 298.

50 *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, c. 96, n. 2717: Quidam vero e contrario divinam dispositionem orationibus vertibilem esse dicebant; sicut et Aegyptii dicebant quod fatum orationibus et quibusdam imaginibus, subfumigationibus, sive incantationibus, vertebatur.- *S. T.*, I, q. 23, a. 8 co.; q. 116, a. 3 co.

because it does not accept the immutability of divine providence. According to Thomas Aquinas destiny may have two different meanings. Insofar as it designates the orderly connection of secondary causes, destiny is changeable. On the contrary, when destiny means divine providence it is hypothetically unchangeable. If God foresees some future event, it certainly will happen.[51] Thomas Aquinas opposes the doctrine of the Egyptian sages because of its notion of destiny. For him, destiny cannot be considered completely mutable; in a way it is also immutable.

The fourth doctrine of destiny mentioned by Nemesius is professed by "the wisest of the Greeks,"[52] who apparently are the Stoics again. In the mind of these philosophers, choice itself depends upon free initiative, whereas the outcome of a man's activity is regulated by destiny. This theory indeed corresponds to the Stoic mentality: the Stoics do not consider the range of free initiative to extend to outer events, to the transformation of the external world, but confine it to inner decision, to the attitude man adopts towards the happy and unhappy events of his life. One may accept or oppose the course of history; he will never be able to change it in the slightest way because it depends on divine reason.

Nemesius to a certain extent agrees with this perspective, insofar as it acknowledges the freedom of human activity. He also accepts the conclusion that the outcome of a man's decisions is not entirely determined by the man himself.[53] Yet he disagrees with the Stoics' position that the outcome of our activity is caused by destiny. For him, it is rather entirely dependent upon divine providence.[54] In Nemesius's opinion there is an enormous difference between destiny and providence. The former is an unchangeable sequence of causes, whereas providence bestows on everybody what is really profitable for him.[55] Holding to the Stoic

51 *S.T.*, I, q. 116, a. 3: Et ideo dicendum est quod fatum, secundum considerationem secundarum causarum, mobile est; sed secundum quod subest divinae providentiae, immobilitatem sortitur, non quidem absolutae necessitatis, sed conditionatae; secundum quod dicimus hanc conditionem esse veram vel necessariam, *Si Deus praescivit hoc futurum, erit.* — According to Thomas the connection between secondary causes and effects is not infrangible; but whatever is foreknown by God will certainly happen, without however being necessitated by this foreknowledge.

52 *De natura hominis*, c. 36, p. 299: *εἰσὶ δὲ τῶν ἑλλήνων οἱ σοφώτατοι.*

53 *De natura hominis*, c. 36, p. 299: *τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τιθέναι τὰς αἱρέσεις τῶν πρακτῶν, μὴ πάντως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἀποβάσεις, ὀρθότατα λέγουσι.*

54 Nemesius argues against this Stoic theory which implies that fate is imperfect because the decision remains outside the realm of destiny. In a way fate is even subordinate to man because man is able to influence it through his decision (*De natura hominis*, c. 36, p. 300).

55 Nemesius refers to the Stoic definition of destiny; *εἰ δὲ ἡ εἱμαρμένη εἱρμός τις οὖσα αἰτιῶν ἀπαράβατος, οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν οἱ στωϊκοὶ ὁρίζονται, τούτεστι τάξις καὶ ἐπισύνδεσις ἀπαράλλακτος* (*De natura hominis*, c. 36, p. 301). As far as the sequence of outer events is concerned,

theory, one could not justify the fact that some people suffer from mental diseases and are thereby unable to make any free decisions. Since their disease is also caused by destiny, obviously nobody is the principle of his own decisions, because even the capacity of choosing is to be traced back to destiny.[56] Consequently this theory merges with the universal determinism it claims to avoid.

Later on, John Damascene accepted the doctrine of Nemesius on this point, although his way of formulating it is more accurate. According to Damascene, God knows our free decisions beforehand but without predetermining them.[57] According to Nemesius, however, divine providence should not be concerned with man's free choices. On this point Thomas Aquinas introduces an important improvement: our autonomous initiatives are not necessitated by divine providence, and yet they do not escape the universal ruling of God.[58]

Finally, Nemesius takes up the fifth theory, that of Plato, which was very influential in the further evolution of Christian theology. According to Plato, the notion of destiny has two different meanings. As a substance, it designates the world soul; as an activity, it refers to the unalterable divine law springing from an ineluctable cause.[59] This law has been given to the world soul by the supreme god with a view to the creation and the government of the cosmos. As such, destiny rules over everything but is also involved in divine providence as a part of it. Whatever happens according to destiny belongs to divine providence. Yet the inverse is not true: what happens according to divine providence does not always belong to the field of destiny.[60] How must we conceive the ruling function of the divine law? The answer depends on the nature of the objects concerned. Some of them are immediately related to the divine law, for instance our assents, judgments, and im-

everything is linked with its cause as an unavoidable result. There is no contingency. The present situation of the world is the necessary effect of the past, there is only one way which the divine Reason fashions the history of the world.

56 *De natura hominis*, c. 36, p. 301-302.

57 Joannes Damascenus, *De Fide orthodoxa*, ed. Buytaert, c. 44, p. 161: Oportet noscere quod omnia quidem praenoscit Deus, non omnia autem praedeterminat. Praenoscit enim et quae in nobis, non praedeterminat autem ea. Non enim vult malitiam fieri, neque compellit virtutem.

58 Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 349: *ἡ δὲ πρόνοια τῶν οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.* — Cf. ibidem, c. 44, p. 366. — Joannes Damascenus, *De Fide orthodoxa*, c. 43, p. 157: Omnia autem dico quae non in nobis: quae enim in nobis, non providentiae sunt, sed nostri liberi arbitrii. — Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, 90, n. 2660: Et similiter quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, in libro quem *de Homine* fecit, *Providentia est eorum quae non sunt in nobis, non autem eorum quae sunt in nobis*; et Damascenus eum sequens, dicit in secundo libro, quod *ea quae sunt in nobis Deus praenoscit, sed non praedeterminat*, exponenda sunt ut intelligantur ea quae sunt in nobis divinae providentiae determinationi non esse subiecta *quasi ab ea necessitatem accipientia.*

59 *De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 303.

60 *De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 304.

pulses. These are the starting point or basis (*καθ' ὑποθέσιν*) of further events, which necessarily flow from our activity (*ἐξ ὑποθέσεως*).[61] Consequently the choice itself of our acts depends on our free initiative, whereas the consequences belong to the field of destiny, which partly coincides with providence. God is in no way mixed up in the wrong we eventually do, whereas moral behaviour remains free and the possibility of divination is warranted.[62]

Only on one particular does Nemesius advance an argument against Plato. According to the latter the outcome of our decisions could not belong to the field of necessity. The outcome is not necessary but contingent, for it depends on the ruling of divine providence.[63] A result of the Platonic theory is that prayer loses most of its relevance. It is limited to choice alone, whereas everything else is necessitated.[64] How could God be subject to such necessity? As a proof Nemesius mentions some special divine interventions taken from Scripture which show that God is not bound by any necessary law. The orbits of the stars have been fixed by God. Nevertheless he proved that he is not bound by his own law by making a special day and stopping the course of the sun. The same is true in the case of Enoch and Elias.[65] In this context Nemesius refers to the doctrine of *ἀποκατάστασις* held by the Stoics and also by Origen.[66] According to this view the history of the world would be periodical, each stage being constituted by exactly the same events. History would be the endless repeating of the same play without a definitive issue. In other words, there would be no true eschatology. Since the content of each period would be the same, the gods would be able to "predict" the future because they had witnessed the events of the past beforehand.[67] Here again God would be subject to necessity. Nemesius especially attacks the opinion of those who identify the

61 *De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 304. According to Nemesius, divine providence is directly concerned with the constituents of our free choice, namely *συγκαταθέσεις καὶ κρίσεις καὶ ὁρμαί*. This conception of human decision corresponds to the doctrine of Alexander Aphrodisiensis, as it is explained in his *De Fato*. Cf. G. Verbeke, "Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme dans le *De Fato* d'Alexandre d'Aphrodisias," *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 50 (1968), p. 88. It is not merely borrowed from the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle; some Aristotelian and Stoic elements have been combined.

62 In the opinion of Plato what happens according to fate has not been regulated eternally; it depends upon our decision and is related to them: *μὴ γὰρ ἐξ ἀϊδίου ὡρίσθαι τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην, ἀλλ' ἐπισυμβαίνειν, προηγησαμένοις τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν* (*De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 305). If man is truly the author of the acts he accomplishes, God does not bear any responsibility for our wrong deeds. He may not be called guilty in any way: *θεὸς ἀναίτιος* (op. cit., p. 306).

63 *De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 306.

64 *De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 306-307.

65 God is not bound by any necessary law. Related to him, even the necessary becomes contingent: *πάντα δέ ἐστιν αὐτῷ ἐνδεχόμενα καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα* (*De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 308).

66 Origenes, *Contra Celsum*, IV, 69; VI, 20, 25, 26. *De Principiis*, I, 6, 2; II, 6, 1, 3,; III, 6, 1.

67 *De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 310.

Christian doctrine of resurrection and the Stoic theory of cosmic rebirth. For him there is an essential difference between the two because the resurrection occurred only once, being a definitive issue of world history, whereas the Stoic "apocatastasis" is an endless process.[68]

It is noteworthy in this connection that one of the most profound metaphysical doctrines of Thomas Aquinas is his view that God could not be subject to necessity. In this he agrees with Nemesius. As to the question whether God is a necessary being, Aquinas's reply is negative: God transcends both categories of necessity and contingency because they belong to the world of becoming. Expressing the relation of finite beings within our evolving world, they could not be used to formulate the unique relation between the infinite and the finite. Consequently God cannot be called *Ens necessarium*. He is neither necessary nor contingent.[69]

As a whole, the teaching of Nemesius on destiny is a truly positive contribution to the interpretation of Christianity, insofar as it stresses the freedom of human behaviour as well as the liberty of God. One of the main themes of his exposition emphasizes that God cannot be subject to necessity. Nevertheless we have already pointed to a lacuna in the theory of Nemesius, filled by Thomas Aquinas. In the opinion of the bishop of Emesa divine providence is concerned only with things not dependent upon our free initiative. Thomas Aquinas places even our free behaviour under divine providence.

2. Divine Providence

The second problem we have to consider in the *De natura hominis* concerns the notion of providence. This notion is treated after the discussion on human freedom for the reason already mentioned: providence deals with events that are not dependent upon our choice.[70] According to Nemesius it would not be necessary to prove divine

68 *De natura hominis*, c. 37, p. 311: *καὶ διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν, φασί τινες, τοὺς Χριστιανοὺς τὴν ἀνάστασιν φαντάζεσθαι.* — Many Greek philosophers professed a cyclical conception of time: when a period comes to an end, another starts immediately with the same beings and the same events. There is no progress from one period to another. The trial of Socrates will take place in each period of history and the sentence will be the same. History never comes to a definitive end. Hence the question whether this endless repetition of the same events is meaningful. Even Aristotle, in his theory of time, takes up a rather pessimistic point of view: being linked with change, time is something *ἐκστατικόν*, pushing things out of their former condition: "In time all things come into being and pass away; for which reason some called it the wisest of all things, but the Pythagorean Paron called it the most stupid, because in it we also forget; and his was the truer view. It is clear then that it must be in itself, as we said before, the condition of destruction rather than of coming into being" (*Phys.* IV, 13, 222b16-21; transl. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye).

69 Thomas Aquinas, *Comm. in Peri Hermeneias*, I, lectio 14, n. 197: Et secundum harum conditionem causarum, effectus dicuntur vel necessarii vel contingentes, quamvis omnes dependeant a voluntate divina, sicut a prima causa, quae transcendit ordinem necessitatis et contingentiae.

70 *De natura hominis*, c. 42, p. 332: *ἀκόλουθος τοῖς ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ περὶ τῆς προνοίας λόγος.*

providence for a Jewish or Christian reader, but it would be meaningful for a Greek.[71] However, there is no special argument in Nemesius's treatise for providence as such; the proofs of the existence of God cover this ground as well. Some of these arguments receive but slight development. The author stresses the continued existence of the universe; the lasting and orderly arrangement of the world, especially the regular movements of the stars, the sequence of day and night, as well as the succession of the different seasons in a year.[72]

One topic is developed further as a particular argument in favour of providence: the disclosure and punishment even of hidden trespasses. In this connection Nemesius mentions the famous trial of Susanna and the murder of the poet Ibycus, which, according to the legend, was discovered by the help of cranes.[73] As an irrefutable sign of providence, Nemesius also points to the harmonious structure of living organisms and to the variety of colours that may be observed in animals according to their species.[74] In the same context the author refers to the common conviction of all people about the need for prayer and religious cult, as well as the common practice of beneficence and charity towards others. Furthermore, if providence is denied, prophecy and foreknowledge are ruled out.[75] Nemesius also points to the fact that each individual has his own distinguishing characteristics: an important gift of providence, for they enable him to be recognized by his friends and family. Even animals can recognize other individuals by their distinctive features.[76] Finally, speaking to the Greeks, Nemesius mentions the importance of tokens, oracles, presages, omens, all of which would be meaningless in a world without providence.[77]

It is not easy to draw a comparison between Nemesius and Thomas Aquinas on the question of providence. Nemesius's approach is rather empirical. It starts from the orderly structure of the world and from a kind of universal belief which is at least implicitly involved in human

71 In his account of providence, Nemesius will also start from what Greeks believe to be true so that he might be understood not only by Christians and Jews, but also by pagan readers (*De natura hominis*, c. 42, p. 332).

72 *De natura hominis*, c. 42, p. 334.

73 *De natura hominis*, c. 42, p. 334-335.

74 *De natura hominis* c. 42, p. 336.

75 *De natura hominis*, c. 42, p. 336: *καὶ τὸ κοινῇ δὲ παρὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁμολογού μενον, τὸ δεῖν εὔχεσθαι καὶ θεραπεύειν τὸ θεῖον ἀναθήμασί τε καὶ περιβόλοις, προνοίας ἐστὶ δηλωτικόν.* Nemesius appeals again to the consensus of all men about the necessity of prayer; this argument often used by the Stoics could be easily accepted by a Christian, insofar as a universal mistake of all men would be incompatible with divine providence. Of course when the argument is used in order to prove divine providence, it is to be understood in its immediate significance: if everybody agrees on a particular proposition, it must be true, in other words it has been checked so many times that there cannot be a mistake.

76 *De natura hominis*, c. 42, p. 339-342.

77 *De natura hominis*, c. 42, p. 342-343.

behaviour. Thomas Aquinas takes a decidedly metaphysical standpoint. Whatever good may be found in the world, in his view, stems from God, the almighty creator of the universe. Looking at creatures, one has to distinguish between the substance of beings and their direction towards their end, especially towards their ultimate end. Whereas the substance of beings depends upon the creative causality, the orientation of beings towards their end belongs to the providence of God, who directs each creature according to a preexisting plan or *ratio* in the divine mind. Properly speaking providence means the divine idea according to which everything is related to its end.[78] In this connection Thomas mentions an objection of John Damascene, which is a quotation from Nemesius: it seems that providence, being concerned with things existing in time, would be incompatible with the eternity of God.[79] The reply of Thomas is rather summary: a distinction has to be drawn between the divine providence and its execution. The project is eternal, the carrying into effect is temporal. Thus providence is not merely temporal.[80]

In order to make his notion of providence more exact Nemesius emphasizes the distinction between the creation of things and their government after they have been brought into existence. In his opinion both are not necessarily realized by the same being. Carpenters, copyists, and modellers of clay work out projects, but they themselves do not always take care of the work they have completed. On the other hand, there are some persons (for instance herdsmen or sheperds) who perform tasks without planning them.[81] Accordingly providence may be defined as the care God takes of the beings he has created. In other words, providence is the divine project according to which all beings receive the most favourable mode of existence.[82] This leads Nemesius to a very optimistic view of the world; a more perfect arrangement of the universe would be quite impossible.[83] On the other hand, it belongs to

78 *S.T.*, I, q. 22, a. 1 co.: Ratio autem ordinandorum in finem, proprie providentia est.

79 *S.T.*, I, q. 22, a. 1, obj. 2: Praeterea quidquid est in Deo, est aeternum. Sed providentia non est aliquid aeternum: est enim *circa existentia*, quae non sunt aeterna, secundum Damascenum. Ergo providentia non est in Deo. — Cf. Joannes Damascenus, *De Fide orthodoxa*, c. 43, p. 155: Providentia igitur est quae ex Deo ad existentia fit cura. — Nemesius, *De natura hominis*, c. 43, p. 343: *πρόνοια τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐκ θεοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα γινομένη ἐπιμέλεια.* According to the translation of Burgundio: Providentia igitur est ea quae a Deo ad ea quae sunt, fiens procuratio. — It might be noticed that the translations of this sentence, both made by Burgundio, nevertheless are different. According to E. M. Buytaert the translation of *De Fide orthodoxa* was made in 1153-54. The version of *De natura hominis* dates back to 1165. This later translation sticks more closely to the Greek text.

80 *S.T.*, I, q. 22, a. 1, ad 2.

81 *De natura hominis*, c. 42, p. 338-339.

82 *De natura hominis*, c. 43, p. 343: *πρόνοιά ἐστι βούλησις θεοῦ δι' ἣν πάντα τὰ ὄντα τὸν πρόσφορον διεξαγωγὴν λαμβάνει.*

83 *De natura hominis*, c. 43, p. 344: ... *ὡς τὴν κρείττω τάξιν μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι.* The world could not be more perfect than it is. Thus Nemesius takes up the radical optimism of the Stoics.

the creator of the world and not to any other being to take care of it. If the care of creatures were not assumed by the creator himself, it would mean that he lacked power. Hence the creator must be a God of providence, and this providence is ultimately the divine purpose or project.[84] On this topic there is a fundamental agreement between Nemesius, John Damascene (who in his chapter on providence quotes many texts from the *De natura hominis*), and Thomas Aquinas. It is worthy of note that Thomas Aquinas refers to Nemesius's definition in order to show that divine providence is not incompatible with human freedom.[85] According to him the end of each creature is to become as similar to God as possible. In the case of man this likeness involves free behaviour, because liberty also belongs to God's nature. If providence coincides with the divine project which imparts to each being the best mode of existence, man could not be deprived of his highest dignity, his capacity for free choice.[86]

One of the most important problems Nemesius deals with is whether providence is concerned only with the general ruling of the world or also with individual beings. According to Plato providence takes care of each individual but not in the same way. Three levels have to be distinguished. First, the providence of the highest god, who rules primarily over the ideas and the world as a whole, namely the heavens, the heavenly bodies, universals, such as the different kinds of things (substance, quantity, quality, and other general categories) and their subordinate forms.[87] On a lower level secondary gods are to be located; they take care of the generation of ordinary animals, plants, and all corruptible things. This providence is ascribed by Aristotle to the sun

However, the realm of providence does not extend to the free initiatives of man: these initiatives may be wrong. According to our author the world is as perfect as possible in so far as the ruling of divine providence is concerned.

84 *De natura hominis*, c. 43, p. 344.

85 *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, 73, n. 2490: unde et de providentia divina Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod est voluntas Dei per quam omnia quae sunt convenientem deductionem accipiunt. — Apparently Thomas reproduces rather faithfully the translation of Burgundio: Providentia est voluntas Dei propter quam omnia quae sunt competentem deductionem suscipiunt.

86 *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, 73, n. 2490.

87 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 345. The interpretation of Plato's doctrine on providence corresponds to the account we find in the *Περὶ εἱμαρμένης*, c. 9, falsely attributed to Plutarch. According to Philip H. de Lacy and B. Einarson the work was written by an unknown Platonist at the beginning of the second century A.D. The following passage should be quoted: "The highest and primary providence is the intellection or will, beneficent to all things, of the primary God: and in conformity with it all things divine are primordially arranged throughout, each as is best and most excellent. Secondary providence belongs to the secondary gods, who move in heaven, and in conformity with it all mortal things come into being in orderly fashion, together with all that is requisite to the survival and preservation of the several genera. The providence and forethought which belongs to the daemons stationed in the terrestrial regions as watchers and overseers of the actions of man would reasonably be called tertiary." (transl. de Lacy and Einarson). Cf. Calcidius, *In Timaeum commentarius*, ed. J. H. Waszink (London-Leiden 1962), 144-145, p. 182-183.

and the zodiac.[88] The third level of providence is concerned with human behaviour and some matters of lower degree, such as natural, material or instrumental things. This task is assumed by spiritual beings who are stationed around the earth as the guardians of human conduct.[89] In the opinion of Plato the second and third levels of providence are subordinate to the primary god, who rules over all the agents governing the world. Nemesius agrees with Plato insofar as the lower levels of providence are ultimately reduced to the ruling power of God, but he argues against the theory of the second level of providence being effected by the movements of heavenly bodies. In his view, such ruling cannot be called providence but destiny and necessity.[90]

Taking his information from Nemesius, Thomas Aquinas also mentions the theory of Plato and criticizes it like the bishop of Emesa.[91] As we already indicated, a distinction must be introduced between the divine plan and its exercise. The project or idea existing in the divine mind not only concerns the general government of the world but of each individual. Whatever exists and acts, God provides with the power of producing a given effect. As a result, whatever happens in the world springs from a divine project. Does this mean that the divine govern-

88 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 345.

89 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 346.

90 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 347: οὐ γὰρ πρόνοια τὸ γινόμενον, ἀλλ' εἱμαρμένη καὶ ἀνάγκη.

91 *Summa contra Gentiles*, III, 76, n. 2517. Thomas's report of the theory of Plato relies on the translation of Burgundio, without being a literal quotation:

Posuit enim Plato, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit triplicem providentiam:	Igitur Plato quidem et universalia et singularia providentiam disponere vult dividens providentiae sermonem in tria:
Quarum prima est summi Dei qui primo et principaliter providet propriis, idest omnibus spiritualibus et intellectualibus; consequenter vero toti mundo quantum ad genera et species, et universales causas, quae sunt corpora caelestia.	Nam primam quidem esse eam quae est primi dei; providere hunc antecendenter quidem propriis, deinde vero omni universali mundo, puta caelis et astris et omnibus universalibus, hoc est generibus et substantiae et quantitati et qualitati et aliis talibus et his quae his subiectae sunt speciebus.
Secunda vero est qua providetur singularibus animalium et platarum et aliorum generabilium et corruptibilium, quantum ad eorum generationem et corruptionem et alias mutationes. Quam quidem providentiam Plato attribuit diis qui caelum circueunt, Aristoteles vero horum causalitatem attribuit obliquo circulo.	Generationi vero individuorum et animalium et plantarum et omnium quae in generatione et corruptione sunt, secundos deos providere qui caelum circueunt. Aristoteles vero horum generationem imponit soli et zodiaco circulo.
Tertiam vero providentiam ponit rerum quae ad humanam vitam pertinent. Quam quidem attribuit quibusdam daemonibus circa terram existentibus qui sunt, secundum ipsum, humanarum actionum custodes.	Deductionis vero et finis gestibilium et ordinis eorum, quae et secundum hanc vitam sunt et naturalium et materialium et organicorum vocatorum bonorum et eorum quae his sunt opposita, tertiam esse providentiam Plato enuntiat. Sed et praesistere huic quosdam ordinatos daemones custodes humanarum gestionum.

Cf. *S.T.*, I, q. 22, a. 3 co. — *S.T.*, I, q. 103 a. 6 arg. 1.

ment is exercized without intermediaries? Certainly not. God always governs lower beings by means of higher, not because he needs help but because he wants to impart his causality to his creatures. Consequently in the opinion of Thomas Aquinas providence is at once mediate and immediate. Insofar as the divine planning is concerned, it is immediate; but in the actual exercise of the divine plan lower beings are introduced and participate in the causality of God.[92]

At this point Nemesius once again mentions the Stoic theory which tried to combine human freedom and destiny. Actually this theory leaves no room for providence and suppresses liberty of choice.[93] This objection to Stoicism is rather astonishing because in the ancient doxography the Stoics are generally contrasted with Aristotle and the Epicureans on the very issue of providence. In his list of philosophers who deny general as well as individual providence Nemesius cites the names of Democritus, Heraclitus, and Epicurus. As far as Aristotle is concerned, the author refers to the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where according to the Stagirite everything is ruled by nature and there is no individual providence.[94] Apparently the information of Nemesius on this issue is rather poor. No connection is made with the Aristotelian doctrine of divine knowledge in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*. Insofar as Aristotle's metaphysical thinking is concerned, he quite obviously denies providence because it is incompatible with the purely actual character of divine knowledge. On the other hand, he does not categorically deny certain common opinions in favour of providence.

The main problem Nemesius has to face in his defense of providence is undoubtedly the existence of evil. If each particular being is ruled by divine providence, what is the source of the terrible injustices inflicted upon good people, their humiliations, and every kind of evil? Why are the wicked and violent blessed with power, wealth, and many other

92 *S.T.*, I, q. 22, a. 3 co.

93 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 347.

94 Nemesius probably refers to *Eth. Nic.* VI, 13, 1144b4-17. In his doctrine of human freedom our author was certainly influenced by the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. In the third book of this treatise can be found one of the most remarkable analyses of free choice and personal responsibility handed down to us from antiquity. The knowledge Nemesius had of the work of Aristotle is probably limited to the *Nic. Eth.*. In a work on the nature of man one could expect him to mention the *Περὶ ψυχῆς* of the Stagirite. Obviously Nemesius has some information about the psychological doctrine of Aristotle; however a direct knowledge of the *De Anima* is rather questionable. Eusebius in his *Praeparatio evangelica* (XV, 4, 9, ed. Mras, II, 352) also refers to the ethical treatises of Aristotle. What he writes about them could hardly depend on a direct contact with the work of the Stagirite. In his opinion the moral doctrine of Aristotle has little value, and may be profitable only for uneducated people, children, and women. About Aristotle's teaching on providence, Eusebius contrasts Plato with the Stagirite. According to the latter's view divine providence would extend only to the moon, not to the sublunary world. (*Praep. evang.* XV, 5, 1, ed. Mras, II, 355). Against Aristotle, Nemesius argues that nature does not coincide with divine providence, but is only a part of it (*De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 350).

goods?[95] Nemesius asks whether the injustice in the world is compatible with the notion of providence extending to every particular being and event. In his reply he first draws attention to the immortality of the human soul. It would be wrong to evaluate human life taking into account only our present existence.[96] Besides, if the soul is held to be superior to the body, the good of the soul will be much more valuable than whatever promotes the well-being of the body.[97] In the mind of our author real happiness may include some bodily or material elements, but these play a very secondary role: they do not belong to the strict notion of happiness (*κατὰ περιγεαφήν*).[98] Obviously Nemesius's view on this matter is less Aristotelian than Stoic: virtue is said to be the only true and sufficient condition of happiness. Finally, Nemesius maintains that it is very difficult, if not impossible, to give a well-founded judgment of a human life: ignorant of the future, one can only take into account the present condition. From this limited viewpoint, how can a man judge whether poverty, the death of his children, or the flight of his slaves, is a good? Divine knowledge is not limited to the present situation; it also embraces the future. What seems to be an evil from our standpoint may truly be a good if human life were seen as a whole.

Some philosophers, while admitting a general providence, refuse to acknowledge any providence for particular things and events. Nemesius gives three possible arguments. supporting their opinion. One could imagine a god who is unaware that he has to take care of everything. But this supposed ignorance is quite incompatible with the divine perfection. Besides, how could general providence itself be actually realized without taking care of individual beings? Indeed, if all individuals perish, nothing remains as the object of general providence.[99] Nemesius then asks whether God may eventually decline to take care of individuals. Of course, he could not refuse to do so through indolence owing to fear or desire for pleasure. The only plausible reason, at least at first glance, could be a certain unfittingness connected with the divine perfection. One may wonder indeed whether it is fitting for God to be involved in all material concerns and foolish decisions.[100] Ac-

95 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 351.

96 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 351: *μάλιστα δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἀθάνατον*.This passage must be associated with the doctrine explained in chapter 2. Does Nemesius agree with Iamblichus on the theory of metempsychosis? Addressing his work not only to Christians but also to Greeks, our author does not discard categorically metempsychosis among human beings. On the other hand, he could hardly accept it, because he clearly envisages another life different from our existence on earth (op. cit., c. 44, pp. 359-360).

97 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 352.

98 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 352.

99 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 355.

100 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 356.

cording to Nemesius this argument does not stand up, because in this supposition we attribute to God a contempt for human affairs, as well as the danger of being defiled, both of which are incompatible with the divine nature. God does not scorn the details of human life, and his perfection cannot be sullied. Can the sun be defiled when her rays shine on mire and mud?[101]

A final question concerns God's ability to take care of all individual things. Is this not contrary to his nature? Our author draws a comparison between divine providence and political government. Those responsible for the latter take care not only of the society as a whole but also of individuals.[102] An important argument against the objection mentioned above is the spontaneous attitude of people who are in need. They immediately call in the aid of prayers and turn to divine providence. Nemesius stresses the fact that this is spontaneous and natural, and, being instilled by nature, it cannot be meaningless.[103]

Where do the objections against particular providence come from? According to our author they mainly spring from two sources. People who oppose particular providence are persuaded that the human soul is mortal, with the result that the sins committed during this life will never be punished. This is obviously contrary to the common belief not only of the Greeks but also of other people.[104] The second major reason for denying providence is our inability fully to grasp the divine ruling power: man with his finite mind cannot grasp the divine government of the world.[105] This is true, Nemesius replies, but our lack of understanding is no ground for dismissing this government. We have to accept many things beyond our grasp.[106] If providence is the project in the divine mind according to which God provides everybody with the optimum mode of existence, then it seems necessary to take into ac-

101 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 357.

102 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 358-359.

103 ***De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 359:** *ὡς ἂν τῆς φύσεως ἀγούσης ἡμᾶς ἀδιδάκτως ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ βοήθειαν. οὐκ ἂν δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀδιδάκτως ἦγεν ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ φύσιν ἔχον γίνεσθαι.* This argument may be associated with the Aristotelian teleology: the work of nature is always purposive, a natural tendency could not be ineffectual.

104 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 360: In this context Nemesius again mentions metempsychosis, yet not as his own conviction, but as a doctrine professed by outstanding Greek philosophers. In connection with this opinion he refers to the theory concerning the places where the souls stay after death, each soul getting the place it deserves with respect to its moral behaviour. This point of view corresponds to the theory of Plato about the life of the soul after death; especially in the *Gorgias* (523a sqq.) where the author emphasizes the justice of God who bestows on each soul the life it deserves. Some souls are severely punished, whereas others are admitted to perpetual happiness.

105 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 360: *εἰ δὲ ἀκατάληπτος ἡμῖν ἐστιν τῆς τῶν κατὰ μέρος προνοίας ὁ λόγος.* It is noticeable that the term *ἀκατάληπτος* used by Nemesius in this context stems from the Stoics: it means a true knowledge grasping the object which is intended. It is to be located between opinion (*δόξα*) and science (*ἐπιστήμη*) and is defined as the assent (*συγκατάθεσις*) to a true representation, in other words, the assent to a representation capable of grasping the object (Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. Math.* VII, 151; SVF II, 90).

106 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 360.

count individual differences between men and also various conditions within the evolution of human life. As a matter of fact, particular providence does not mean that God causes without qualification everything that happens in the world. We must realize that many events are only permitted by divine providence.[107] Of course there may be a hidden reason for some things that we do not immediately grasp. People suffer and die, and we ask why. It might be a punishment for secret sins; it might be better for them to die; the sufferings of a martyr might be the source of salvation of others. Many explanations might be given. Whatever may be the case, we should not judge according to outer appearances; we ought to be convinced that everything is as it must be. Whatever springs from divine providence is perfect; we should admire everything.[108] The only real evils in the world are the wrong deeds coming from man's free decisions.

Thomas Aquinas in his turn was obliged to handle the same problem. Referring to Nemesius and John Damascene, he wondered whether a created free will could always do right and never wrong. Are there not some creatures which are incorruptible whereas others are corruptible? The human soul and the heavenly bodies are naturally incorruptible. Why then could not a spiritual creature be naturally impeccable?[109] The reply of Thomas Aquinas refers again to the teaching of Nemesius and John Damascene. Having been created *ex nihilo*, man inevitably has a changeable (and therefore peccable) nature. As long as he lives, he cannot definitively adhere to the right. It is true that a created being can be incorruptible. But this comparison does not justify the inference deduced from it. Man is able to come close to the absolute Good through his free acts. Hence, to suppress the changeable character of human nature would entail the denial of freedom and man's ability freely to approach the absolute Good.[110]

As far as the doctrine of providence is concerned, there is an unquestionable connection between Nemesius, John Damascene, and Thomas Aquinas. Some passages from Nemesius and John Damascene

107 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 362: *φαμὲν γοῦν τινὰ γίνεσθαι κατὰ συγχώρησιν τοῦ θεοῦ.*

108 *De natura hominis*, c. 44, p. 366.

109 *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 7, obj. 5: Praeterea Gregorius Nyssenus et Damascenus hanc rationem assignant quare creatura sit mutabilis secundum liberum arbitrium quia est ex nihilo. Sed propinquius consequitur creaturam ex hoc quod est ex nihilo posse in nihilum cedere, quam posse malum facere. Sed invenitur aliqua creatura quae naturaliter est incorruptibilis, sicut anima et corpora caelestia. Ergo multo fortius potest inveniri aliqua creatura spiritualis quae naturaliter est impeccabilis. — Cf. *De natura hominis*, c. 41, p. 324: Burgundio translates as follows: Inquimus igitur confestim rationali subintrare liberum arbitrium et generatis aptam natam esse transmutationem et versionem maxime his quae ex subjecta materia fiunt. — Joannes Damascenus, *De Fide orthodoxa*, c.41: Inquimus igitur rationali confestim cointrari liberum arbitrium. Omne enim generabile et vertibile est.

110 *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 7 co. et ad 5. Cf. ibid. q. 24, a. 1, ad 16.

are quoted by Thomas, and there is a general agreement concerning the doctrine itself. Still, the philosophical approach to the problem is different. The starting point of the inquiry in Thomas Aquinas is a metaphysical understanding of the nature of God, whereas Nemesius appeals to common opinions and empirical data.

3. HUMAN FREEDOM

Nemesius's treatment of the question of freedom is one of the most important handed down to us from that early period. We do not intend to examine the sources of the *De natura hominis*; this has already been done to a large extent. Occasionally we shall refer to thinkers who undoubtedly influenced the doctrine of Nemesius, for instance Aristotle, Carneades, Alexander, Epictetus, and Origen. Here again our main concern is the relation between Nemesius and Thomas Aquinas. It is not necessary to recall that many quotations from Nemesius have been taken over by John Damascene in his *De fide orthodoxa*.

Nemesius starts his inquiry into human freedom with an investigation concerning voluntary and involuntary acts.[111] A clear distinction must be drawn between them. Whereas involuntary acts are caused either by violence or by ignorance, voluntary deeds spring from the agent himself. The agent is truly the source of what he is doing without necessitation by outer or inner influence. He is aware of the particular circumstances of his act.[112] The question arises whether the work of nature (for instance the process of growing or digestion) is to be called voluntary or involuntary. According to our author neither of these terms applies to a natural process: it is neither voluntary nor involuntary. In other words, a natural process does not belong to the category of things depending on our initiative.[113] On the contrary, what is done under the impulse of our emotions (for example anger or lust) is to be accounted voluntary: these acts are commonly praised or blamed, their performance is accompanied by pleasure or grief, and their source resides within the agent.[114] Man is not necessarily determined by his emotions; the behaviour of each individual depends on his moral education.[115] Finally, Nemesius proceeds to the problem whether animals and children are able to perform voluntary acts. His reply is af-

111 *De natura hominis*, c. 29, p. 263 — c. 32, p. 277.
112 *De natura hominis*, c. 32, p. 275: *συνθέντες οὖν ἑκάτερον ὁριζόμεθα τὸ ἑκούσιον οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ, εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις.*
113 *De natura hominis*, c. 32, p. 275.
114 *De natura hominis*, c. 32, p. 275.
115 *De natura hominis*, c. 32, p. 276.

firmative. He bases his answer on the fact that animals and children search for food without being impelled from outside, knowing what they are doing, and carrying it out with pleasure or grief according to the circumstances. The behaviour of animals and children, then, is used to prove that acts performed under the impulse of emotions do not cease to be voluntary.[116]

In his inquiry into the notion of the voluntary act, Thomas Aquinas refers to the doctrine of Nemesius. If an act may only be termed voluntary if its source lies within the agent, the question arises whether any human action is voluntary. Is it not always caused from outside, by the desirable object?[117] According to Thomas, human activity is voluntary in the highest degree. It not only originates from the agent himself but it is purposive. In other words, man is not only aware of what he is doing, but he consciously aims at a goal he is pursuing.[118] As to the question whether animals are able to carry out voluntary acts, Thomas refers to the treatise of Nemesius, whose doctrine he tries to improve.[119] An activity is to be called voluntary insofar as the agent knows the goal that is intended. Such knowledge must take place on two levels: the mere knowledge of the object that is aimed at, or the understanding of the notion of goal. In the latter case, the agent grasps the very notion of an aim and the relation he has towards it. Hence he is able to turn it over in his mind and to deliberate about his behaviour. One could not attribute this complete awareness of the goal to animals; they possess only an imperfect knowledge of the object they pursue.[120]

Do choice and voluntary act coincide? In the mind of Nemesius the notion of voluntary is broader: a voluntary deed is not always an act of choice.[121] In order to define more accurately the notion of choice, our author compares it to other kinds of human activity. Choosing is not the

116 *De natura hominis*, c. 32, p. 276. In his *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle asks whether children or animals are able to perform a πρᾶξις; in other words does the term πράττειν apply to the activity of children or animals? His reply is negative: the term πρᾶξις refers to the behaviour of a man who is able to deliberate about what he intends to do (*Eth. Eud.*, II, 6, 1222b18; II, 8, 1224a28). With respect to this question Aristotle also asserts that an animal is not capable of "eudemony" or happiness; a horse, a bird or a fish could not be called happy (*Eth. Eud.*, II, 7, 1217a26).

117 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 6, a. 1, obj. 1.

118 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 6, a. 1 co: Et ideo cum utrumque sit ab intrinseco principio, scilicet quod agunt et quod propter finem agunt, horum motus et actus dicuntur voluntarii: hoc enim importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria inclinatione. Et inde est quod voluntarium dicitur esse secundum definitionem Aristotelis et Gregorii Nysseni et Damasceni, non solum cujus principium est intra, sed cum additione scientiae. Unde cum homo maxime cognoscit finem sui operis et movet seipsum, in ejus actibus maxime voluntarium invenitur.

119 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 6, a. 2, sed contra.

120 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 6, a. 2 co: Unde soli rationali naturae competit voluntarium secundum rationem perfectam; sed secundum rationem imperfectam competit etiam brutis animalibus.

121 *De natura hominis*, c. 33, p. 277.

same as desiring.[122] Nemesius especially emphasizes the difference between choosing and wishing: whereas choice is always concerned with things depending on us, wishing may aim at something impossible.[123] Moreover, wishing is directed towards an end, whereas choice is also linked to the means leading to the end.[124] Neither is choice the same as opinion: opinion may refer to something eternal, it may be true or false, and it is related to a universal object — none of which applies to choice.[125] Finally, choice differs from deliberation; it is rather the outcome of deliberation.[126] According to Nemesius choice is a combination of three constituent elements: deliberation, judgment, and desire.[127] This corresponds to the doctrine of Alexander rather than to that of Aspasius, as E. Dobler suggests.[128]

In his study of choice Thomas Aquinas again mentions the theory of Nemesius. He agrees that choice is a combination of elements. Referring to the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he distinguishes two components, understanding and desire, which are related to each other as the formal and material aspects of choice. In this respect he freely quotes a passage of Nemesius stating that the combination of the constituents of choice may be compared to the composition of body and soul in man.[129] Obviously the theory of Nemesius has been somewhat distorted. First of all the combination as it is described by Nemesius embraces three elements, not just two. Besides, the relation of body and soul is not conceived by him according to the pattern of matter and form. On the other hand Thomas Aquinas agrees with Nemesius on the question whether animals are able to choose. Choice belongs only to the will, not to sensitive desire.[130] Finally, it is worth noticing that Thomas only speaks of animals and not of children.

Deliberation undeniably is an important component of choice. What

122 *De natura hominis*, c. 33, p. 278. On this subject Nemesius is in agreement with the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. According to the Stagirite choice may not be identified with ὄρεξις, it is a *βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν* (III, 3, 1113a11; VI, 2, 1139a23).

123 *De natura hominis*, c. 33, p. 279. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.* III, 2, 1111b22.

124 *De natura hominis*, c. 33, p. 279. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.* III, 4, 1113a15.

125 *De natura hominis*, c. 33, p. 280. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.* III, 2, 1111b30.

126 *De natura hominis*, c. 33, p. 280-281. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.* III, 3, 1113a4.

127 *De natura hominis*, c. 33, p. 281: *ἔστιν οὖν μικτόν τι ἐκ βουλῆς καὶ κρίσεως καὶ ὀρέξεως.*

128 E. Dobler, *Nemesius von Emesa und die Psychologie des menschlichen Aktes bei Thomas von Aquin* (Werthenstein 1950), p. 105: "Auch hier hat Nemesius nicht ganz originell gedacht. Aehnlich lehrt nämlich auch der Aristoteliker Aspasius, mit dem Unterscheid jedoch, dass er an Stelle von drei konstituierenden Faktoren nur deren 2 annahm: Ueberlegung und Wollen (*βουλή* und *ὄρεξις*)."

129 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 13, a. 1 co.: Unde Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod electio neque est appetitus secundum seipsam, neque consilium solum, sed ex his aliquid compositum. Sicut enim dicimus animal ex anima et corpore compositum esse, neque vero corpus esse secundum seipsum, neque animam solam, sed utrumque, ita et electionem. — Thomas faithfully reproduces the translation of Burgundio.

130 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 13, a. 2 sed contra et co.

does it mean? Does deliberation coincide with inquiry? In the opinion of Nemesius it does not. We may investigate whether the sun is larger than the earth, but this is not a topic of deliberation.[131] Indeed, deliberation is always a kind of inquiry, but the reverse is not true. A man deliberates only about what depends on him, on what he is able to do, the outcome being uncertain.[132] What is at issue is always something to be done, a *prakton*. How could he really deliberate about necessary events, about what happens always in the same way, about what is effected by nature or due merely to chance? Only when something depends on our own initiative, the outcome being uncertain, does deliberation become meaningful.[133] No deliberation is required in the case of scientific knowledge and technical skill. Some arts, however, involve a certain degree of deliberation, as for instance the arts of healing, gymnastics, and navigation.[134] Moreover, deliberation is not concerned with the goal to be pursued but with the means to be used.[135] In this connection Nemesius distinguishes between different modes: some things are necessary, others are contingent; and among the latter some are more probable than their opposite, others are less probable, other again are equally probable. As a result, deliberation is concerned with contingent facts of which both alternatives are equally possible. If a man is unable to perform one of the alternatives, deliberation is meaningless.[136]

Thomas Aquinas fully agrees with Nemesius on the distinction between deliberation and inquiry. According to Aquinas deliberation is a special kind of inquiry, which is necessary because in the field of human activity so much uncertainty occurs. Our actions deal with particular and contingent matters. Consequently without an inquiry no one could ever come to a judgment.[137] For the same reason Thomas, like Nemesius, acknowledges that deliberation is concerned only with matters depending on our initiative.[138] He also wonders whether deliberation is involved in everything we are going to do. He mentions

131 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 283; Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.*, III, 3, 1112b21.

132 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 284. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.*, III, 3, 1112a30.

133 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 285-286. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.*, III, 3, 1112a18-30.

134 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 286. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.*, III, 3 1112a34-b8.

135 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 286. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.*, III, 3, 1112b11 ss.

136 *De natura hominis*, c. 34, p. 287-288. Cf. Aristoteles, *Eth. Nic.*, III, 3, 1112b24 ss.; *Peri Hermeneias*, c. 9.

137 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 14, a. 1, sed contra: Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit: Omne quidem consilium quaestio est, non autem omnis quaestio consilium. — Here again Thomas reproduces rather faithfully the translation of Burgundio: Nam omne quidem consilium quaestio est, non omnis autem quaestio est consilium.

138 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 14, a. 3, Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit: Consiliamur de his quae sunt in nobis et per nos fieri possunt. — The translation of Burgundio is worded as follows: Consiliamur igitur de his quae sunt in nobis et per nos fieri possunt.

two exceptions. One is taken from Aristotle: we do not deliberate about unimportant matters. The other is borrowed from Nemesius: actions depending on technical skill are not deliberated.[139] According to Thomas Aquinas deliberation is an inquiry about the means to be used, not about the end itself. On this issue too he is in agreement with Nemesius, though his doctrine is more intricate than it looks at first glance.[140] A distinction is to be made between the ultimate end and the many subordinate goals of human activity. These subordinate goals are not only determined by deliberation but they depend to a large extent on moral behaviour. Everybody aims at goals that correspond to the moral level of his life.[141]

Nemesius devotes a whole chapter to the question whether some acts truly spring from our initiative, so that a man may be considered to be their source. According to him many people oppose this view. He probably refers not only to pagans but also to Christians.[142] In order to explain human activity Nemesius advances several hypotheses which he successively eliminates. In no way may God be called the cause of our acts, because some of them are wrong and unrighteous. Our actions may not be attributed to necessity either, because they are not always and invariably the same. Might they be produced by destiny? No, for in that case all of them would be necessitated. Furthermore, they are not the work of nature, because the field of nature is the material world of plants and animals. Neither may they be attributed to fortune, since fortune concerns only exceptional and unexpected matters. Neither may chance be their source, since chance belongs only to inanimate beings and animals.[143] All other explanations eliminated, man is to be considered the principle of his acts. Besides, if man were not responsible for his own activity, deliberation would be meaningless, and moral life

139 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 14, a. 4 sed contra: Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod de his quae secundum disciplinam vel artem sunt operibus non est consilium. — The passage to which Thomas refers in the translation of Burgundio is as follows: Neque enim de his quae secundum disciplinam vel artem sunt operibus vel gestionibus est consilium.—ibid., q. 14, a. 4 co.: Et ideo de duobus non consiliamur quamvis ordinentur ad finem, ut Philosophus dicit, scilicet de rebus parvis et de his quae sunt determinata qualiter fieri debent, sicut in operibus artium, praeter quasdam conjecturales, ut Gregorius Nyssenus dicit, ut puta medicinalis, negotiativa et hujusmodi. — The way in which Thomas reproduces the passage of Nemesius slightly departs from the original text: Determinatae enim sunt quae harum rationes, praeter paucas artes vocatas conjecturales, puta medicinalem et gymnasticam et gubernativam.

140 *S.T.*, I-II, q. 14, a. 2, sed contra: Sed contra est quod Gregorius Nyssenus dicit quod non de fine, sed de his quae sunt ad finem est consilium. — The translation of Burgundio: Monstratum autem est quod non de fine sed de his quae ad finem sunt, est consilium.

141 On this subject Thomas takes up the point of view of Aristotle, *Eth. Nic.*, III, 5, 1114a32: *ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ*, taking into account that everybody to a certain extent is the author of his character.

142 *De natura hominis*, c. 39, p. 311: *πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀντιβαίνοντες.*

143 *De natura hominis*, c. 39, p. 312-314.

would no longer be possible. But man is obviously the author of his virtues, which he acquires by repeatedly performing the same acts.[144] Moreover, warnings and exhortations as well as laws would be deprived of value. In short, the proposed thesis is quite unacceptable, for it is clearly against man's natural knowledge of his own activity.[145]

Which acts belong to the realm of our free initiative? Nemesius mentions in general our voluntary acts, or acts that we accomplish willingly, and mainly those that have to do with the soul (*τὰ ψυχικὰπάντα*).[146] The inner world of each individual is in the first place the province of free initiative. In the opinion of the Stoics this was the only room left to human liberty. Nemesius does not go that far. For him, each deed issuing from a previous deliberation is an act of choice, which belongs to our own initiative. This choice is made by our mind, the principle of our behaviour.[147] What does this statement mean in the concrete life of man? To the province of our own initiative belong the whole field of moral action, our technical work, as well as our psychic and intellectual activity.[148]

In his further treatment of the question Nemesius has to cope with two important difficulties: the relationship of human activity to divine providence and the dependence of our behaviour upon our bodily condition. Undoubtedly some interrelationship between human initiative and divine governance has to be admitted. We may be prevented by divine providence from making a choice. After all, human freedom is not unlimited; it is always combined with the interference of God's providential action in the world.[149] In regard to the second difficulty, man is not only spiritual, he is unity of body and soul. Even our highest activities do not escape the influence of our bodily condition. Many

144 *De natura hominis*, c. 39, p. 315: in this passage Nemesius explicitly refers to Aristotle: *ἃ γὰρ ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, ταῦτα μαθόντες ποιοῦμεν.* Cf. *Eth. Nic.*, II. 1, 1103a32.

145 *De natura hominis*, c. 39, p. 316: *φυσικῶς ἄρα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν συγκατέσπαρται.* The value of this knowledge is guaranteed by its natural character.

146 *De natura hominis*, c. 40, p. 317: *κυρίως δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖνἐστι τὰ ψυχικὰ πάντα καὶ περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα.*

147 *De natura hominis*, c. 40, p. 318: *ποιεῖται δὲ τούτου τὴν αἵρεσιν ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἡμέτερος, καὶ οὗτός ἐστι ἀρχὴ πράξεως.* Without stating explicitly that mind is the origin of our decisions, Aristotle apparently suggested this doctrine. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* the Stagirite teaches that the true self of man coincides with the mind (IX, 8, 1168b35-1169a2; X. 7, 1178a2). According to this doctrine the true self of man (*νοῦς*) will be the author of all free initiatives.

148 *De natura hominis*, c. 40, p. 319: *ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα καὶ αἱ κατὰ τέχνην ἐνέργειαι καὶ ἀρεταὶ καὶ πᾶσαι πράξεις ψυχικαί τε καὶ λογικαί.*

149 *De natura hominis*, c. 40, p. 320. Here again Nemesius draws a clear distinction between the free decisions of man and the action of divine providence. In the becoming of the world both constituents are combined; therefore, what happens is a combination, and the outcome may be according to the free decision of man, according to the planning of providence or according to both principles joined (Ibid., p. 321: *μικτῶν δὲ ὄντων γινομένων*).

people refer wrong actions to a defective bodily constitution, so that all responsibility is transferred to the domain of necessity. Nemesius does not agree with them. In his opinion man's behaviour is not necessitated by his bodily condition. Besides, in some cases a defective state of the body is to be attributed to the responsibility of the individuals concerned.[150]

Finally Nemesius attempts to disclose the origin itself of human freedom. Endowed with reason, man has the capacity of free choice, insofar as a reasonable creature is able to deliberate. He is not determined by a given state of things but has the possibility of stepping back and turning over in his mind the constituents of a particular situation. Thus deliberation would be useless if man were unable to act according to his own insight and decision.[151] As a matter of fact, the knowledge at issue here is not speculative but a practical intuition indicating how we must behave in each particular case.[152] Besides, human life is always changeable; it does not remain in the same condition but, as a part of the becoming of the world, it is integrated in it. In the case of man this mutability flows from the fundamental characteristics of his being. Human life has a beginning and the structure of man includes a material principle.[153] This is to be understood against the background of Aristotelian philosophy. If human existence has a beginning, it bears within itself the possibility of not being, since it did not exist before. Its generation entails its corruptibility, for it is inserted in the process of coming to be and passing away. Moreover, a material principle is indeterminate; it is a kind of openness towards further determinations. This principle is constantly present in human life, not only at the beginning but during the whole course of existence. According to Nemesius several degrees of mutability must be distinguished. Spiritual beings living close to the earth and participating in man's activity are more integrated in the becoming process than are higher spiritual beings, who are further removed from the instability of the world.[154] As a result, human liberty bears the same character of mutability: man is able to develop in one of several directions. God cannot be called the cause of

150 *De natura hominis*, c. 40, p. 321-323. Cf. Aristoteles. *Eth. Nic.*, III, 5, 1114a21-31.

151 *De natura hominis*, c. 41, p. 324-325. The same argument has been developed by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his *De Fato* (Cf. G. Verbeke, *Aristotélisme et Stoïcisme dans le De Fato d'Alexandre d'Aphrodisias*, p. 87).

152 *De natura hominis*, c. 41, p. 326. Practical wisdom is called *φρόνησις*, as it is in the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle.

153 *De natura hominis*, c. 41, p. 326.

154 *De natura hominis*, c. 41, p. 327. In this context Nemesius uses two characteristic terms which are to be traced to the Stoics: *ἀπαλλοτριόω* and *προσοικειόω*. Needless to say that the notion of *οἰκείωσις* (*conciliatio* or *commendatio* in the translation of Cicero) plays an important part in the ethical philosophy of the Stoics.

man's wrong deeds because each individual bears the responsibility of his own behaviour. Hence the question arises whether human freedom is to be accounted an evil. Not at all, in the opinion of Nemesius. If man behaves badly, it is not because he has the capacity of choosing, but because his habits acquired through free acts are wrong. Because some people use badly their capacity of choice, human freedom in itself is not to be accounted an evil.[155]

In his treatment of *liberum arbitrium* Thomas Aquinas refers to Nemesius several times. According to Thomas we have to look at the matter very closely. It is not quite accurate to claim that man's activity is free. The heart of the question is choice or decision. That is the meaning of *liberum arbitrium*. Our judgment is free, it is not necessitated in any way by the object we choose.[156] In his further metaphysical explanation the author points to the transcendental background of each particular choice, introducing a kind of inevitable ambiguity. Constantly uncertain and unsatisfied, man has to make decisions; his inner tendencies always reach beyond the particular values he attains. For this reason Thomas, like Nemesius, stresses the fact that man is free insofar as his inner decision is concerned. He may, however, be prevented from doing what he wants. Does a free act originate from reason or free will? Thomas Aquinas mentions the view of Nemesius and John Damascene, who apparently believe freedom to be in immediate connection with reason, because it springs from reason.[157] According to Thomas Aquinas this cannot be correct. Nevertheless, he gives a benign interpretation to the text of his predecessors: it may mean, he says, that freedom is related to the rational soul, to which the will belongs as a faculty; or else it may mean that the first source of freedom is reason, though it is not the immediate principle of choice.[158] Are animals endowed with liberty? It may seem that they are, because they are able to move themselves, which means that they are able to move or not to move. In this context Thomas refers to Nemesius who, arguing against this objection, declares that although the faculty of moving is in itself indeterminate, the judgment or *arbitrium* through which they perform a particular movement is determinate and not

155 Are wrong actions to be attributed to our faculties? Certainly not according to Nemesius; they do not belong to our faculties but to our habits and our choices, in other words to our moral character (*De natura hominis*, c. 41, p. 329: *οὐκ εἰσὶν ἄρα τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ κακίαι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἕξεων καὶ τῆς προαιρέσεως*).

156 *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 1, ad 1.

157 *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 6, obj. 4: Praeterea secundum Damascenum et Gregorium Nyssenum, secundum hoc sumus arbitrio liberi quod sumus rationales. Sed rationales sumus secundum quod habemus rationem. Ergo secundum quod habemus rationem sumus arbitrio liberi; et ita videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit ratio.

158 *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 6, ad 4.

free.[159] Can animals be called free because, like man, they have been generated? Their life also has a beginning and is subject to change. According to Thomas Aquinas this question arises from a misunderstanding. Man is free because he is endowed with reason, as Nemesius, Augustine, and John Damascene teach. Besides, man is able to do wrong because his liberty is subject to change. The instability of human existence generally speaking springs from the fact that life has a beginning. Moral virtue and perversion are constantly present in human existence as possible ways of living. The freedom of man shows a frailty that can never be overcome.[160]

4. Conclusions

The following conclusions may be drawn from our inquiry:

1. Undoubtedly in its own day the contribution of Nemesius to the problem of fatalism and human freedom was important and influential. It was a very valuable attempt to replace pagan destiny by divine providence and save the liberty of man in the face of many objections and criticisms.
2. At the same time the *De natura hominis* was an attempt to initiate a fruitful dialogue between the Christian message and ancient philosophy. Many ideas and theories borrowed from Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus, and other philosophers are combined with Christian doctrine in order to make it understandable and acceptable by intellectuals of that time.
3. The treatise, considered to be a work of Gregory of Nyssa, was highly esteemed by Thomas Aquinas. He refers to it several times, as well as to the *De fide orthodoxa* of John Damascene. And even when he does not quote explicitly from the *De natura hominis* he is generally in agreement with its doctrine. We must acknowledge that the level of philosophical inquiry is far from being the same. Whereas Thomas Aquinas is an outstanding and original metaphysical thinker, Nemesius for the most part reproduces the opinions of previous philosophers and takes an empirical approach to the problems he tackles. The most interesting investigations of Thomas Aquinas concerning providence and freedom do not simply derive from the treatise of Nemesius; they bear the stamp of his own creative mind.

159 *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 2, obj. 2 et ad 2.
160 *De Veritate*, q. 24, a. 2, obj. 4 et ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod incipere a versione vel esse ex nihilo non assignat Damascenus causam libertatis arbitrii, sed causam flexibilitatis liberi arbitrii in malum; causam autem liberi arbitrii assignat tam Damascenus quam Gregorius quam Augustinus rationem.

THE DOCTRINE OF FILIOQUE IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND ITS PATRISTIC ANTECEDENTS

An Analysis of *Summa Theologiae*, Part I, Question 36

Jaroslav Pelikan

IN 1909, commenting on the thirty years that had elapsed since the *Aeterni Patris* of Leo XIII, with its emphasis on the place of the church fathers in Thomas Aquinas,[1] Martin Grabmann registered this complaint: "Leider ist in der an die Enzyklika sich anschliessenden thomistischen Bewegung diese Kontinuität zwischen Patristik und Scholastik nicht genügend beachtet worden."[2] In 1923, the dean of French patrologists, Gustave Bardy, addressed himself to the same question with the judgment: "L'étude des sources patristiques de saint Thomas d'Aquin est à peine commencée."[3] In 1938, G. Geenen was able to quote Bardy's words as still an accurate description of the situation.[4] In 1946, he quoted them again in his fine article on "Saint Thomas et les Pères" for the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique.*[5] And in 1965, two-thirds of a century after Grabmann's comment, Ceslaus Velecky made the wry assertion: "It is strange that the research into these [patristic] sources still remains a Cinderella of Thomist studies, neglected by comparison with studies on St Thomas as an Aristotelian."[6]

In part, of course, the task is complicated by the sheer mass of the material, which makes it necessary for a scholar to confine his attention to some smaller aspects of the problem. For example, in a monograph

1 "Thomas Aquinas: qui, uti Caietanus animadvertit, veteres 'Doctores sacros qui summe veneratus est, ideo intellectum omnium quodammodo sortitus est.'" Denzinger 3139.

2 Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (2 vols.; Freiburg i. Br. 1909-11) 1, 22, n. 2.

3 Gustave Bardy, "Sur les sources patristiques grecques de saint Thomas dans la Ire Partie de la *Somme Théologique*," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 12 (1923) 493.

4 G. Geenen, "L'usage des 'auctoritates' dans la doctrine du baptême chez S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, 15 (1938) 280; see also the same author's study, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses sources pseudépigraphiques," *ibid.*, 20 (1943) 71-80.

5 G. Geenen, "Saint Thomas et les Pères," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, 15, 738.

6 Ceslaus Velecky, "Appendix 3" to Volume 6 of Blackfriars edition of *Summa Theologiae* (London 1965) p. 131.

that was presented as a thesis to the faculty of theology at Toulouse in 1906, M. Duffo examined *Saint Jean Damascène, source de saint Thomas.*[7] Duffo's work has never been published; more generally available is the exhaustive catalogue compiled by J. Durantel, *Saint Thomas et le Pseudo-Denis,* which makes the declaration: "S. Thomas cite Denis fréquemment. Nous avons relevé, sauf erreur, 1.702 citations expresses, 12 mentions générales visant l'œuvre sans citations de textes, 11 passages du commentaire de Maxime et 4 de celui de Hugues de S. Victor."[8] A controversy whose repercussions can still be heard in the recent publication of the Leonine edition of *Contra errores Graecorum*[9] was that launched by F. H. Reusch's study of "Die Fälschungen in dem Tractat des Thomas von Aquin gegen die Griechen,"[10] Thomas's relation to the Greek patristic tradition has been the subject not only of the article by Bardy already cited, but also of the thorough monograph by Ignaz Backes, which identified the method at work in his patristic citations as one, "den Zusammenhang heranzuziehen, in gleicher Weise danach strebend, den wahren Sinn eines Textes herauszustellen, wie die Ehrfurcht vor den Vätern nicht zu verletzen.... Ganz selten und nur in der S. th. kommt eine Erklärung zustande, die der dogmengeschichtlichen Lage Rechnung trägt."[11] As Backes's work shows, perhaps the most satisfactory way of studying the relation of Thomas to the fathers is to concentrate not on the use of one figure throughout the Thomistic corpus, but on one theological theme. This is what Geenen did in his study of baptism, quoted earlier. It is from such close *explication de texte* that one can begin to evaluate such judgments as that of Michel Riquet, that "l'œuvre de saint Thomas est tout autre chose qu'une compilation érudite mais impersonnelle,"[12] by contrast with his "milieu intellectuel," which, according to R. P. Gardeil, "est fait d'hommes qui ont prouvé...à quel degré ils avaient le culte du document."[13]

7 See Bardy, *op. cit.*, p. 493, n. 1; Geenen, "L'usage des 'auctoritates,'" p. 281, n. 6.

8 J. Durantel, *Saint Thomas et le Pseudo-Denis* (Paris 1919) p. 60.

9 *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII p. m. edita* (Rome 1882—) 40-A, 7-8, 13. Wherever possible, I have cited Thomas according to the Leonine edition, adhering to it in text, capitalization, orthography, and punctuation — except that in the last I have used inside quotation marks rather than italics for quotations within quotations.

10 *Sonderdruck aus den Abhandlungen der königlichen bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Munich 1889).

11 Ignaz Backes, *Die Christologie des hl. Thomas von Aquin und die griechischen Kirchenväter* (Paderborn 1931) p. 123.

12 Michel Riquet, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin et les 'auctoritates' en philosophie," *Archives de philosophie* 3 (1926) 124.

13 R. P. Gardeil, "La réforme de la théologie catholique: la documentation de saint Thomas," *Revue Thomiste,* 11 (1903) 202.

Of all the theological themes with which Thomas dealt, the one best suited to such an examination by a historian of the development of doctrine would appear to be the Trinity. His "Trinitarian articles" have been called "unrivalled as precise statements of the Christian faith."[14] In his *Commentary on the Sentences* Thomas himself defined the "cognitio Trinitatis in unitate" as "fructus et finis totius vitae nostrae."[15] It would be possible to examine the doctrine of the Trinity in that commentary and to compare it with his later formulation of the doctrine in the *Summa Theologiae,* thus testing the suggestion of Chenu that in the earlier work Thomas was "exploiting the Dionysian scheme of creative procession," while in the latter, "in accordance with the riches he reaps from Augustine's analyses, he brings to the fore the original relationship of subject to known and loved object in a mind capable of knowing and loving God."[16] We have chosen instead to narrow the topic to the most controversial issue in the trinitarian tradition received by Thomas from the fathers, the doctrine of Filioque, as this was discussed in Part I, Question 36 of the *Summa Theologiae.*[17] For if, as Velecky has claimed, "the doctrine of the Trinity is the key to the whole theology of the *Summa,*"[18] its handling of this controversial issue ought to illumine both the trinitarianism of Thomas and his relation to his "auctoritates." The appeal to authority, as all the monographs remind us, was regarded by Thomas as the weakest of arguments — in philosophy.[19] But in theology the situation was quite different. Here "quae... fidei sunt [preeminently the Trinity], non sunt tentanda probare nisi per auctoritates, his qui auctoritates suscipiunt."[20] Among those "qui auctoritates suscipiunt" were, of course, the separated Christians of the East; yet there were "plures" among them who read these "auctoritates" as proof "Spiritum Sanctum non procedere a Filio," and "inter [eos] fuit etiam Damascenus."[21]

The controversy over the Filioque is, then, a crucial test case for Thomas's use of patristic "auctoritates." But his use of "auctoritates" is also crucial for the history of the Filioque. It was, after all, on the way to the Council of Lyons that Thomas died in 1274; and at that council it was declared to have been "orthodoxorum Patrum atque Doctorum,

14 David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought* (London 1962) p. 267.

15 *In I Sent.*, d. 2, exp.; ed. Mandonnet (Paris 1929) 1, 77.

16 M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas,* tr. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago 1964) pp. 274-75.

17 *Opera,* 4, 375-86. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the *Summa* are to Part I.

18 Velecky, *op. cit.,* p. xx.

19 Cf. Riquet, *op. cit.,* pp. 148-49; Chenu, *op. cit.,* p. 139, n. 19.

20 *S. Th.* I, q. 32, art. 1, resp.

21 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 3.

Latinorum pariter et Graecorum incommutabilis et vera sententia" that "Spiritus Sanctus aeternaliter ex Patre et Filio, non tanquam ex duobus principiis, sed tanquam ex uno principio, non duabus spirationibus, sed unica spiratione procedit."[22] These very qualifications, one "principium" and one "spiratio," were the issues whose patristic antecedents were probed with such care by Thomas, so that in some ways — leaving out of consideration the determinative influence of secular and ecclesiastical politics, both Eastern and Western[23] — we may be entitled to view the dogmatic outcome at Lyons as at least in part an achievement of Thomas Aquinas. Geenen has spoken of "quelques études non publiées," presumably his own and those of other scholars as well, among them one "sur les sources grecques et latines de la doctrine trinitaire" of Thomas.[24] From this unpublished, and hence unavailable, study he has derived the conclusion that Thomas's "théologie trinitaire... est une doctrine latino-grecque, où l'élément latin dominé par la doctrine d'Augustin, dépasse de loin l'influence grecque."[25] Other works on the subject of the Filioque, notably those of Grumel and Malet,[26] do touch on the issue of the use of the fathers, but there would still appear to be need for an analysis of Part I, Question 36 that deals with it *ex professo*.

In the treatment of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, as in his theology generally, Thomas was obliged to come to terms with patristic tradition. Therefore he argued in Part I, Question 36 not only on the basis of what "accommodatum est ex usu Scripturae,"[27] but also from what "ex usu Ecclesiae est accommodatum"[28]; or, as he put it in the corresponding Article of the *Commentary on the Sentences*, his trinitarian authority was "tota Scriptura et totus usus Ecclesiae."[29] The source and norm in the discussion of such issues as procession (or processions) in the Godhead was the "fides catholica."[30] The witnesses to this "fides catholica" were the fathers of the church, or, as he usually denominated them, the

22 Denzinger 850.

23 Deno J. Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258-1282* (Cambridge, Mass. 1959); Stephan Kuttner, "Conciliar Law in the Making: The Lyonese Constitutions (1274) of Gregory X in a MS. at Washington," *Miscellanea Pio Paschini* (2 vols.; Rome 1948-49) 2, 39-81.

24 "Saint Thomas et les Pères," p. 739.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 744.

26 V. Grumel, "S. Thomas et la doctrine des Grecs sur la procession de Saint-Esprit," *Echos d'Orient*, 25 (1926) 257-80; A. Malet, *Personne et amour dans la théologie trinitaire de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1956) pp. 151-55, 161-87.

27 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 1, resp.

28 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 1, ad 1.

29 *In I Sent.* d. 10, q. 1, art. 4, s. c.; ed. Mandonnet, 1, 267.

30 *S. Th.* I, q. 27, art. 1, resp.

"doctores" or "sancti doctores."[31] For the purposes of this analysis we shall concentrate on his use only of the fathers in this Question. Therefore we shall leave out of consideration not only the intriguing quotation from the *Physics* of Aristotle in Article 2, Objection 7, but also the quotation from Anselm in the same passage and the references to "quidam."[32] Moreover, because Thomas himself made an issue of chronology as a principle of interpretation, arguing that the passage of time and the rise of controversy enabled one to make sense of the relation between "primum symbolum" and "sequens concilium,"[33] it may be beneficial to consider these "auctoritates" chronologically, that is, in the chronological sequence in which Thomas and his contemporaries believed them to have arisen historically.

The earliest authority quoted in Question 36 was the apocryphal *Acta Sancti Andreae,* in which the Holy Spirit was said to be "procedentem ex Patre, et in Filio permanentem."[34] This would seem to deny the doctrine of Filioque, for "nihil procedit ab eo in quo quiescit."[35] But this objection did not hold; for in some places "et Filius in Patre manere dicitur, cum tamen a Patre procedat."[36] This appears to have been the only quotation from any such apostolic legend anywhere in Part I of the *Summa,* although there were some in later sections of the work. Nevertheless, Thomas presumably accepted the account at face value and took the words seriously as more or less apostolic in origin. Among the apocryphal *Acta* of the various apostles, the *Acta Sancti Andreae* are generally thought to enjoy the earliest attestation and thus supposedly the most credibility.[37] It would be tempting to make something of the circumstance that Thomas refers specifically to Andrew in this context. By this time it was common among Byzantine theologians to call him πρωτόκλητος,[38] and the legend of his having had the foresight to found a church in what was eventually to be Constantinople had been connected with this title to claim a "primacy" of sorts for the Second Rome.[39] But

31 On this usage and on the entire question, see the penetrating and learned discussion of Joseph de Ghellinck, "Patristique et argument de tradition au bas moyen âge," *Aus der Geisteswelt des Mittelalters* (Münster 1935) 1, 403-26.

32 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 3; and art. 4, resp.

33 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 2.

34 *Acta apostolorum apocrypha,* ed. Constantin Tischendorf (Leipzig 1851) p. 105.

35 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, obj. 4.

36 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 4; apparently Thomas was thinking of such biblical passages as John 15:10, although John 14:10 speaks of "Pater in me manens."

37 Tischendorf, *op. cit.,* p. xl.

38 Cf. E. A. Sophocles, *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods* (Boston 1870) p. 958, *s. v.*

39 Francis Dvornik, *The Idea of Apostolicity in Byzantium and the Legend of the Apostle Andrew* (Cambridge, Mass. 1958).

Thomas's arguments for the primacy of Peter and therefore for the primacy of Rome, even the most sharply polemical ones in *Contra errores Graecorum,* do not seem to have been concerned with this rather lame refutation of the Latin case.[40] It seems, therefore, that the function of this quotation from the *Acts of Andrew* in Thomas's exposition of the Filioque was one of classifying terminology: such terms as "quiescere" or "manere," while authenticated by scriptural and early patristic authority, were not to be treated as though they were technical terms (as, for example, "mittere" and above all "procedere" were); hence it was not valid to argue against the Filioque on the basis of such usage.

Also possessing great antiquity and high cisapostolic authority for Thomas was the Dionysian corpus. For the doctrine of Filioque it was somewhat discomfiting. In his *Commentary on the Sentences* Thomas had quoted the second chapter of *De divinis nominibus* to the effect that "Pater quidem est fontana deitas, Filius et Spiritus sanctus deigenae deitatis, si ita oportet dicere, pullulationes sunt, et sicut flores divinae naturae, et sicut divina lumina a sanctis eloquiis accepimus."[41] As Durantel has noted, all such expressions in Dionysius could be treated by Thomas as symbolic in intent and therefore "ne sont pas sans gêner quelque peu S. Thomas."[42] Unlike the quotation from the *Acts of Andrew,* this passage from Dionysius did not pass from the *Commentary on the Sentences* to the defense of the Filioque in the *Summa.* Instead, there was only one Dionysian reference: "Secundum Dionysium, 'non est audendum dicere aliquid de substantiali divinitate praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sacris eloquiis sunt expressa.'"[43] Since the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son was not stated in Scripture, but only the procession from the Father, the Filioque would seem to be excluded. This passage occurred frequently in Thomas, usually as part of an Objection against the use of one or another *vox* ἄγραφος: for example, "persona" (against which a much more pungent objection could be quoted from Jerome),[44] as well as the far less common "notio."[45] Each time he quoted these words from Dionysius, Thomas replied to the effect that "licet nomen... in Scriptura... non inveniatur..., tamen id quod nomen significat, multipliciter in sacra Scriptura in-

40 Cf. *Contra errores Graecorum* II, 34.

41 *In I Sent.* d. 11, q. 1, art. 1; ed. Mandonnet, 1, 276; Dionysius the Areopagite *De divinis nominibus* 2.7, PG 3, 645 (not 635, as Mandonnet has it).

42 Durantel, *op. cit.,* pp. 141-42.

43 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, obj. 1; Dionysius the Areopagite *De divinis nominibus* 1.1, PG 3, 588.

44 *S. Th.* I, q. 39, art. 3, obj. 1 and obj. 3.

45 *S. Th.* I, q. 32, art. 2, obj. 1.

venitur."[46] Here in Question 36, too, the reply was that "licet autem per verba non inveniatur in sacra Scriptura quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio, invenitur tamen quantum ad sensum."[47]

In another context, to be sure, Thomas argued from the absence of an explicit scriptural warrant that a Greek theologoumenon which had in it echoes of the Filioque or of its equivalent was to be avoided: "Doctores Graecorum communiter dicunt Spiritum Sanctum esse imaginem Patris et Filii. Sed doctores latini soli Filio attribuunt nomen Imaginis: non enim invenitur in canonica Scriptura nisi de Filio."[48] Basically, however, the simpleminded biblicism that could be taken to be the meaning of the words of Dionysius was to be rejected, on the same grounds on which the fathers had refused to accept the Arian objections to ὁμοούσιος.[49] From the frequency with which Thomas quoted these words of Dionysius, almost always in an Objection and for the same purpose, it would seem valid to conclude that they did not have any distinctive place in the discussion of Filioque, except to support the principle of hermeneutics that "regulariter etiam in sacra Scriptura tenendum est, quod id quod de Patre dicitur, oportet de Filio intelligi, etiam si dictio exclusiva addatur," with the important proviso, however, that this did not apply "in illis in quibus Pater et Filius secundum oppositas relationes distinguuntur."[50] Therefore if, as the East insisted and as the West conceded, there was no explicit scriptural proof text for the Filioque, it was nevertheless a valid inference, on the basis of this principle, from the procession "ex Patre." By a *reductio ad absurdum* that would have been even more harmful to theological terminology in Greek than to the vocabulary of the Latin scholastics, Thomas was arguing that such inferences had as much probative authority as verbatim quotations from Scripture. For the purposes of this *reductio ad absurdum,* the oft-repeated words of Dionysius provided a convenient foil.

There is special interest in Thomas's use of the authority of Athanasius. The treatise *Contra errores Graecorum* contained many quotations attributed to Athanasius, but even the care and erudition of the Leonine editors has failed to yield more than the admission, "non repertus," for many of these, although the ideas expressed in them are recognizable as broadly Athanasian.[51] Here in Part I of the *Summa,*

46 *S. Th.* I, q. 29, art. 3, ad 1.
47 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 1.
48 *S. Th.* I, q. 35, art. 2, resp.
49 *S. Th.* I, q. 39, art. 2, ad 2.
50 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 1.
51 See the index, *Opera,* 40-A, 158.

however, Thomas put aside all of these dubious quotations from the *Libellus.* As Bardy notes, "la première partie de la Somme renvoie treize fois à saint Athanase; mais sous ce nom illustre, c'est toujours le symbole pseudo-athanasien qui est mentionné."[52] Thomas did, of course, share the general Western notion that the *Quicunque vult* was the work of the Alexandrian church father.[53] Therefore it was extremely useful to be able to quote the great Greek-speaking theologian of the fourth century against the Greek-speaking theologians of the thirteenth: "Sed contra est quod dicit Athanasius: 'Spiritus Sanctus a Patre et Filio, non factus, nec creatus, nec genitus, sed procedens.'"[54] The same passage from the *Quicunque vult* had appeared earlier, also in a *Sed contra,* as proof that "generatio" was not an appropriate term for the procession of the Holy Spirit;[55] and for this purpose it would have been acceptable also to Eastern thought. In Question 36, however, it served to support the Western argument for the Filioque. The use of it as a clinching proof for this argument, together with the familiar references to the *Quicunque vult* in Part II-II, Question 1,[56] was "une preuve éclatante pour démontrer que les textes des Pères sont une véritable source de la théologie."[57] Earlier Latin disputants against the East had already made use of this passage. It appeared, for example, in the *De haeresibus Graecorum* of Hugo Etherianus,[58] who had lived at the court of Manuel I Comnenus, Byzantine emperor; and this book was translated into Greek.[59] Soon after its use by Thomas, however, the authenticity of the *Quicunque vult,* and especially of the words he had quoted on the Filioque, came under attack from the Greeks. It is interesting to speculate, in the light of Laurent's researches into the Eastern attitude toward this creed,[60] what the Greek reaction would have been at Lyons if Thomas had arrived there and had used this quotation against them as he did in *Contra errores Graecorum* and again in the *Summa.*[61] It seems obvious that it would not have been challenged.

When we consider the next patristic authority employed by Thomas in defense of the Filioque, Athanasius's contemporary and indeed "the

52 Bardy, *op. cit.,* p. 494.
53 See J. N. D. Kelly, *The Athanasian Creed* (New York 1964) pp. 35-48.
54 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, s. c.
55 *S. Th.* I, q. 27, art. 4, s. c.
56 *S. Th.* II-II, q. 1, art. 9-10.
57 Geenen, "Saint Thomas et les Pères," p. 739.
58 Hugo Etherianus *De haeresibus Graecorum* 3.21, PL 202, 393.
59 See PL 202, 230.
60 V. Laurent, "Le symbole Quicumque et l'Eglise byzantine. Notes et documents," *Echos d'Orient,* 39 (1936) 385-404.
61 *Contra errores Graecorum,* II, 27.

Athanasius of the West," Hilary of Poitiers, we come to a source of the highest importance. On the one hand, as Velecky has suggested, he may be "the unacknowledged authority" to whom Thomas was indebted for some of his trinitarian thought.[62] For that matter, some of what Thomas, on this very issue, drew from Augustine was drawn by him, in turn, from Hilary; for despite Alfred Schindler's recent judgment that "tatsächlich [ist] der Einfluss des Hilarius kein sehr tiefgehender und verschwindet vor allem da, wo Augustin über die blosse [*sic*!] Begründung des Dogmas aus der Schrift hinausgeht,"[63] Hilary had probably provided Augustine with much of the exegetical tradition of the Greek fathers and had thus taught him to read the Bible in a trinitarian way.[64] On the other hand, Hilary occupies an influential place in the growth of the Filioque doctrine. He had not fully thought through the implications of the Arian controversies for the deity of the Holy Spirit, and his language about the relation of the Spirit to the Father was therefore vague and uncertain. But he was much clearer in his belief that if the Son was truly equal to the Father in all things, He had to be a participant in the "being sent," hence also in the "proceeding," of the Holy Spirit.[65] Consistently carried out after the full deity of the Holy Spirit had been articulated, this belief led directly to the Augustinian, and to the Western, doctrine of Filioque.

There were three quotations from Hilary in Question 36. The first occurred at the very beginning, where Hilary was cited as authority for the observation that the title "Holy Spirit" was used in Scripture for each of the three persons of the Trinity.[66] From this it seemed to follow that "hoc nomen 'Spiritus Sanctus' non sit proprium nomen alicuius divinae personae," but a name common to all three persons.[67] Without following Hilary's (and Thomas's) exegesis of the specific texts in question, one must acknowledge that the use of the term in the Old and New Testament did constitute a problem if one were insisting upon trinitarian precision. Actually, the most perplexing text of all, and one about which both Hilary and Augustine were troubled,[68] was 2 Corinthians 3:17: "Dominus [sc., Christus] autem Spiritus est." Yet this text

62 Velecky, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

63 Alfred Schindler, *Wort und Analogie in Augustins Trinitätslehre* (Tübingen 1965) p. 129.

64 There is need for further study of the exegesis of specific passages of Scripture in the Greek tradition and of the transmission of this exegesis through Hilary and Ambrose to Augustine, and through him to Western interpreters for more than a millennium.

65 Jaroslav Pelikan, *Development of Doctrine: Some Historical Prolegomena* (New Haven 1969) pp. 120-41.

66 Hilary *De Trinitate* 8.25, PL 10, 254.

67 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 1, obj. 1.

68 Hilary *De Trinitate* 2.32, PL 10, 72-73; Augustine *De Trinitate* 2.10.19, CCSL 50, 105-106.

did not occur in the *Summa* until later.[69] Thomas's response to the difficulty raised by Hilary was to distinguish between "Holy Spirit" as a common noun and as a proper noun, using a statement of Augustine as a resolution.[70] From this it followed that the title, "prout sumitur in virtute duarum dictionum, commune est toti Trinitati."[71] The words of Hilary thus made it possible to see the distinctions between these two usages in the language of Scripture itself. What did not come through in Thomas's discussion, since it was not intended to be an exercise in the history of doctrine but a formulation of doctrine, was the ambiguity still present in the language of Hilary, which prompted him to equivocate as much as he did.

Some of that equivocation was visible in the passage which Thomas next quoted from Hilary. It was taken from the closing paragraph of Hilary's book on the Trinity, in which the author, despairing of any conceptualization that would remove the mystery and the ambiguity of trinitarian doctrine, broke into doxology as an appeal to a higher court. From that doxology Thomas quoted the words: "Conserva hanc, oro, fidei meae religionem, ut semper obtineam Patrem, scilicet te; et Filium tuum una tecum adorem; et Spiritum Sanctum tuum, qui est per Unigenitum tuum, promerear."[72] Now these words were quoted as the *Sed contra* in the article dealing with the issue, "Utrum Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre per Filium."[73] This was, of course, the Eastern alternative to the Filioque, one that seemed safer both in relation to patristic usage and on the basis of intratrinitarian metaphysics. To Thomas, on the other hand, its appearance in patristic usage, and in Western usage at that, suggested that it had to be understood in a manner that could be harmonized with the eventual Western formulation of the Filioque. He therefore set out to determine the various ways in which the preposition "per" could be used, showing that "ex Patre per Filium" was not inconsistent with the Western position, indeed that "potest dici quod Pater per Filium spirat Spiritum Sanctum; vel quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Patre per Filium, quod idem est"[74] — and, although he did not add it right here, "idem" with the formula "ex Patre Filioque." Eastern theologians provided various explanations for the formula "ex Patre per Filium," but refused to accept the identification of this with the Western Filioque.[75]

69 See the index, *Opera*, 16, 57.
70 See p. 329 below.
71 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 1, ad 1.
72 Hilary *De Trinitate* 12.57, PL 10, 471-72.
73 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 3, s. c.
74 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 3, resp.
75 See Martin Jugie, *De processione Spiritus Sancti ex fontibus revelationis et secundum Orientales dissidentes* (Rome 1936) pp. 320-36.

The reason for this refusal becomes evident when we turn to the third and most problematical of the passages quoted by Thomas from Hilary in the explication of the Filioque. At stake in the Eastern opposition to Filioque was the unity of God, which, for Eastern theology, was guaranteed in the context of the dogma of the Trinity by the insistence upon only one ἀρχή in the Godhead, that of the Father, from whom alone both Son and Holy Spirit were coeternally and equally derived. Western language about an eternal derivation of the Holy Spirit "ex Patre Filioque" appeared to compromise this unity of ἀρχή.[76] Therefore Thomas devoted Article 4 of Question 36 to the issue, "Utrum Pater et Filius sint unum principium Spiritus Sancti." Here he had to come to terms with the imprecise, perhaps even downright careless, expressions of the same Western theologians to whom the development of the doctrine of Filioque owed the most. Among these the most embarrassing were, of course, Hilary and Augustine, and in some ways the former more than the latter. For Hilary had permitted himself to say "quod Spiritus Sanctus 'a Patre et Filio auctoribus confitendus est'."[77] From this it would seem to follow that although, economically speaking, "Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, quia sunt unum principium creaturae, dicuntur esse unus Creator," the same did not hold immanently, where "Pater et Filius non sunt unus spirator, sed 'duo spiratores'" and where, consequently, "Pater et Filius non sunt unum principium Spiritus Sancti."[78] Taken as it stood, this formula of Hilary seemed to be a corroboration of the Eastern charge that the idea of Filioque necessarily implied the positing of two ἀρχαί in the Godhead and therefore jeopardized the oneness of God.

The clarification of Hilary's formula proposed by Thomas was aimed at affirming (or reaffirming) one ἀρχή and yet grasping what was correct in the formula. To do this he argued that "'spirans' adiectivum est, 'spirator' vero substantivum." Speaking adjectivally, one could refer to the Father and the Son as "'duo spirantes,' propter pluralitatem suppositorum; non autem 'duo spiratores,' propter unam spirationem."[79] Therefore Hilary was to be exonerated on the grounds that his term, "a Patre et Filio auctoribus," was intended theologically, if not grammatically, only in an adjectival sense. It is, to be sure, not at all clear that this exoneration rested upon an accurate reading of

76 Cf. Martin Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium ab ecclesia Catholica dissidentium* (5 vols., Paris 1926-35) 2, 296-535.

77 Hilary *De Trinitate* 2.29, PL 10, 69; it is interesting that one transmission of the text reads, "qui Patre et Filio auctoribus," without the preposition.

78 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 4, obj. 7.

79 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 4, ad 7.

Hilary's intent, which would appear to have been determined, at least in part, by his attitude toward the relation between the immanent and the economic in the Godhead.[80] Mandonnet has suggested, moreover, that the distinction between "duo spirantes" and "duo spiratores" was not really necessary, since even the noun "spirator" is a "nomen verbale," which is a noun in form but has adjectival force. "Si adjective sumatur spirator," Mandonnet continues, "sunt duo spiratores, si vero substantive, ut in *Summa theologiae* expresse sumitur, non est nisi unus spirator."[81] Thus Thomas's apologia for "a Patre et Filio auctoribus" would appear to be more plausible theologically than historically or even grammatically. It was nevertheless a highly revealing instance of his devotion to the fathers and of his readiness to go to considerable lengths in vindicating their essential orthodoxy.

Coming after the death of both Athanasius and Hilary and shrouded even today in considerable obscurity, the deliberations and creedal decisions of the First Council of Constantinople in 381 figured prominently in the conflicts over the doctrine of Filioque. As quoted by the *Acta* of the Council of Ephesus in 431 and by those of the Council of Chalcedon in 451, the formula of Constantinople read: "Credimus in Spiritum Sanctum, Dominum et vivificantem, ex Patre procedentem, cum Patre et Filio adorandum et glorificandum."[82] Thus the adoration and glory properly belonged to the Father and to the Son, as well as to the Holy Spirit, but the procession was from the Father. But this particular quotation demanded attention not only on material grounds, because of the seeming contradiction between the Western doctrine and the doctrinal decree of the second ecumenical council, but especially on formal or procedural grounds, because of the arbitrary and unilateral Western addition to it. For Thomas went on: "Nullo igitur modo debuit addi in symbolo nostro [i. e., the Western] quod Spiritus Sanctus procedat a Filio: sed videntur anathematis rei, qui hoc addiderunt,"[83] this latter referring to the council's condemnation of those who would tamper with the text of the creed. It would perhaps be too much to say that the East objected as vehemently to the highhandedness of the Western interpolation as to its theological content, but the East certainly did insist that even if the double procession could be explained in an orthodox manner, the Latins had no right to add it to the creed on

80 Cf. Pelikan, *op. cit.*, pp. 131-33.
81 Mandonnet, *op. cit.*, 1, 285, n (a).
82 See A. Hahn, ed., *Bibliothek der Symbole und Glaubensregeln der Alten Kirche* (3rd ed.; Breslau 1897) p. 166.
83 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, obj. 2.

their own. The original collision over the Filioque had come not in a theological disputation about ἀρχή in the Godhead, but in a eucharistic celebration, where the divergent texts of the Nicene Creed had disturbed the peace of the liturgy.[84]

In his answer to Objection 2, Thomas was able to quote the words of the Council of Chalcedon[85] regarding the validity of later statements that had not been explicitly present in conciliar formulas but could be inferred from them. He could therefore conclude that "continebatur tamen implicite in hoc ipso quod dicebatur Spiritus Sanctus a Patre procedere" and that the Western text had merely made this explicit.[86] As for the charge of arbitrary interpolation, he dismissed this with the claim that it was entirely legitimate to add words to the creed, since "expressum fuit auctoritate Romani Pontificis; cuius auctoritate etiam antiqua concilia congregabantur et confirmabantur." In *Contra errores Graecorum* he had sought to prove that "ad dictum pontificem [Romanum] pertineat quae sunt fidei determinare,"[87] whether with or even without a council not being specified. Here in the *Summa* he answered the Eastern objection by claiming for the pope the authority to convoke and confirm universal councils and therefore also to amplify their doctrinal declarations. Needless to say, the historical proof that the ancient councils had in fact been convoked by this authority was wanting, even though it was possible to quote various Eastern theologians, as late as Maximus Confessor,[88] on the prime authority of the see of Peter.

It is not surprising that there were more quotations from Augustine in Question 36 than from any other source except Scripture. When Chenu speaks of "the innumerable texts of Augustine in the works of Saint Thomas,"[89] this is only a slight hyperbole. As Hertling has shown, Augustine was the linchpin of one Article after another in the *Summa*.[90] His doctrine of incorporation into Christ through baptism, for example, was, as Geenen has called it, "la doctrine par excellence exposée" in the tract on baptism; and it was "précisément empruntée au *De Peccat. merit. et remiss. et de remiss. et de baptismo parvulorum* de S.

84 For a convenient summary, see Steven Runciman, *The Eastern Schism* (Oxford 1955) pp. 29-32.

85 See p. 332 below.

86 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 2.

87 *Contra errores Graecorum*, II, 36.

88 Cf. Jaroslav Pelikan, "'Council or Father or Scripture': The Concept of Authority in the Theology of Maximus Confessor," in David Neiman and Margaret Schatkin (edd.), *The Heritage of the Early Church: Essays in Biblical and Patristic Studies in Honor of the Eightieth Birthday of the Very Reverend Georges Vasilievich Florovsky* (Rome 1973) pp. 266-77.

89 Chenu, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

90 G. von Hertling, "Augustinuszitate bei Thomas von Aquin," *Sitzungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, philos.-philol. Klasse (1914) Heft 4, 535-602.

Augustin."[91] If this was true of doctrines in general and of the doctrine of baptism in particular, it is to be expected that it be true *a fortiori* of the doctrine of the Trinity, which was transmitted to later Latin theology largely through Augustine. Here in Question 36 there were three explicit references to him, and in addition a specifically Augustinian theme in which Augustine was not cited as an authority but was nevertheless used as a source. In other parts of the treatise on the Trinity Thomas made use of various Augustinian and pseudo-Augustinian writings; but the principal writing employed there, and the only one employed here, was *De Trinitate.* With Boethius, whose significance we shall assess a little later, Thomas could have said that in his trinitarian theology "ex beati Augustini scriptis semina rationum aliquos in nos uenientia fructus extulerint."[92]

The first quotation from Augustine in Question 36 occurred in the *Sed contra* of Article 1, in combination with the *comma Johanneum*: "Sed contra est quod dicitur I Ioan. ult.: 'Tres sunt qui testimonium dant in caelo, Pater, Verbum et Spiritus Sanctus.' Ut autem Augustinus dicit, VII *de Trin.*, cum quaeritur, 'Quid tres?' dicimus, 'Tres personae.'" The words were quoted several times in the treatise on the Trinity; it is noteworthy that in most of these instances they appeared as a proof text in the *Sed contra.* From the conflation of this formula with the *comma Johanneum* not only here in Question 36 and in Question 30, Article 2, but especially in Question 29, Article 4, it seems that Thomas was quoting from memory or from the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard.[93] In Augustine they were not given as a gloss on the *comma Johanneum* — whatever his relation to this variant reading may have been[94] — and in fact did not appear in this precise form.[95] A formula as terse as this one was, of course, adaptable to many purposes.[96] Within Question 36, Article 1, it performed a rather menial role, compared with that performed by the other quotation from Augustine in the same Article. It enabled Thomas to take account of the absence of a "proprium nomen" for the "processio" and the "relationes" peculiar to the third member of the divine Triad and yet to insist that "persona" was a fitting term and that "ergo Spiritus Sanctus est nomen divinae personae."

91 Geenen, "L'usage des 'auctoritates,'" p. 316, n. 118.

92 Boethius *De Trinitate* pr., *Loeb Classical Library* (Cambridge, Mass., 1918) p. 4.

93 That is the suggestion of Velecky, *op. cit.*, p. 56, n. 3.

94 For a recent study, which changes some of the conclusions of the nineteenth century, see E. Riggenbach, *Das Comma Johanneum* (Gütersloh 1928).

95 "Quid igitur tres? Si enim tres personae..." Augustine *De Trinitate* 7.4.7, CCSL 50, 255.

96 See, for example, Etienne Gilson, *Introduction à l'étude de saint Augustin* (4th ed.; Paris 1969) p. 298, n. 2.

As we have just indicated, the other quotation from Augustine in Article 1 of Question 36 carried out a more distinctive service. The words of Hilary quoted earlier[97] emphasized the difficulty of employing "Spiritus Sanctus" as a designation for one of the Trinity, since in the usage of Scripture each of the three was called "Spiritus." Thomas used Hilary in the Objection as a means of raising this difficulty. Although there was no specific reference to Hilary in Augustine's answer, Thomas neatly provided the appropriate explanation by citing a discussion that appeared in Book V and again in Book XV of Augustine's *De Trinitate*,[98] summarizing it in a paraphrase: "Quia Spiritus Sanctus communis est ambobus, id vocatur ipse proprie quod ambo communiter: nam et Pater est Spiritus, et Filius est Spiritus; et Pater est sanctus, et Filius est sanctus"[99]. Hence "Spiritus Sanctus" could very well be used of Him who proceeded from the Father and the Son. There was a congruence between the title "Holy Spirit," with its ambiguity, and the doctrine of Filioque; and so a problem raised in the Objection became almost an indirect proof in the Response. Eventually, of course, this explanation of the title "Spiritus Sanctus" proved to be one which Thomas found to be rather more clever than convincing. In his careful elaboration of the meaning of "spiratio" he sought to provide a more fundamental explanation, which was, to be sure, not as explicitly Augustinian but which nevertheless drew upon Augustinian precedents.[100]

The most sensitive issue in the doctrine of Filioque, as we have noted, was the Eastern charge that it implied a double ἀρχή in the Godhead and thus that it compromised the monotheistic confession of the church. To meet this grave charge, Thomas had to deal with the embarrassment of Hilary's formula, "a Patre et Filio auctoribus." From Augustine, on the other hand, he drew a definition of the Filioque that could serve as a refutation of the Eastern accusation. As the *Sed contra* to the series of Objections containing Hilary's formula, therefore, Thomas could quote, though not quite verbatim, from Augustine: "Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in V *de Trin.*, quod Pater et Filius non sunt duo principia, sed unum principium Spiritus Sancti."[101] Because of its prominence in Greek polemics against the doctrine of Filioque, the idea of "principium" or ἀρχή needed to be specified. Augustine's statement, "fatendum est Patrem et Filium principium esse

97 See pp. 323-24 above.
98 Augustine *De Trinitate* 5.11.12, CCSL 50, 219-20; 15.19.37, CCSL 50, 513-14.
99 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 1, resp.
100 Cf. Malet, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-23.
101 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 4, s. c.

Spiritus Sancti, non duo principia,"[102] provided a key to such specification.

It was likewise from Augustine's exposition of the Filioque that Thomas drew the axiom, "Pater est principium totius deitatis,"[103] the exegesis of which he worked out in Question 33, Article 1. The same axiom then appeared in a later Objection, to which Thomas replied by identifying the sense in which it was true that the Father was the "principium" both of the Son and of the Holy Spirit "generando et spirando."[104] As part of his counterattack against Greek fire, he was also able to point out an imprecision in Greek trinitarian terminology as compared with Latin: "Graeci utuntur in divinis indifferenter nomine 'causae,' sicut et nomine principii: sed latini doctores non utuntur nomine causae, sed solum nomine principii."[105] This was presumably because "causa," if applied to the relation between the Father and the Son, could not avoid the taint of subordinationism. For the same reason, while "apud Graecos invenitur de Filio vel Spiritu Sancto dici quod principientur," the Latins avoided such language, "ut vitetur omnis erroris occasio."[106] The distinction between "causa" and "principium" could not, however, be maintained with utter consistency; thus in explaining the term, "a Patre per Filium," here in Question 36, Thomas asserted that "haec praepositio 'per' designat in causali aliquam causam seu principium illius actus."[107] But the Augustinian use of "principium," the common translation of ἀρχή, in the sense of "unum principium" proved to be a valuable defensive weapon nevertheless.

There was one other Augustinian element in Question 36, as well as in other Questions, which demonstrated the pervasive authority of Augustine through the very infrequency with which it was attributed to him: the identification of the Holy Spirit as "amor."[108] It helped to nail down the argument for the Filioque by analogy from the relation between word and love in human experience: "Necesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat: non enim aliquid amamus, nisi secundum quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio."[109] It is instructive to follow this analogy of the Holy Spirit as "amor" through the preceding discussion. In Question 27, Article 3, Response, he spoke of "alia

102 Augustine *De Trinitate* 5.14.15, CCSL 50, 223.
103 Augustine *De Trinitate* 4.20.29, CCSL 50, 200.
104 *S. Th.* I, q. 39, art. 5, obj. 6.
105 *S. Th.* I, q. 33, art. 1, ad 1.
106 *S. Th.* I, q. 33, art. 1, ad 2.
107 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 3, resp.
108 Malet, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-29 and *passim.*
109 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, resp.

processio in divinis, quae est processio amoris"; in the *Sed contra* of the next Article of the same Question, he referred without any quotation or proof to "Spiritus Sanctus, qui procedit ut amor"; in Question 28, Article 4, Response, he spoke again of a "processio amoris," again without mentioning Augustine; he did so twice in Question 30, Article 2, once in Objection 2 and again in the *Sed contra*; and the same idea was presupposed in other Articles. When he came to Question 32, Article 1, Objection 2, he made explicit reference to the origin of the analogy, pointing out that "Augustinus vero procedit ad manifestandum Trinitatem Personarum, ex processione verbi et amoris in mente nostra" and adding that he had followed Augustine in this. And then he devoted the whole of Question 37 to an exposition of the name "amor" as a designation for the Holy Spirit, quoting, almost as though in whimsy, Gregory the Great rather then Gregory's own authority, Augustine, as proof in the *Sed contra* of Article 1. But the identification of the third person of the Trinity with "amor" was, to put it mildly, far less explicit in the biblical text than was the identification of the second person with "verbum"; the latter identification was the achievement of the Gospel of John, the former the achievement largely of Augustine. Yet Thomas, together with most of the Western tradition, simply took for granted the validity of this piece of Augustinian trinitarianism, asserting that "secundum quod personaliter sumitur, [nomen amoris] est proprium nomen Spiritus Sancti; sicut Verbum est proprium nomen Filii."[110] And here in the defense of the Filioque he could use it as proof on the assumption of its validity.

As has already been mentioned in the discussion of the "Constantinopolitan" Creed, the text of this symbol, minus the Filioque, had been transmitted through its inclusion in the *Acta* of later councils, specifically those of Ephesus and Chalcedon. Yet each of these councils appeared in Thomas's discussion as something more than a witness to the text of the creed. The condemnatory decrees of Ephesus provided the basis for him to condemn the Greeks through something very much like guilt by association: "Spiritum Sanctum non procedere a Filio, primo fuit a Nestorianis introductum; ut patet in quodam symbolo Nestorianorum damnato in Ephesina Synodo."[111] This must be taken to mean that the doctrine of Filioque was present, albeit "implicite," in the teaching of the church all along, without being either denied or defended by anyone. Then in the fifth century the question was raised for the first time, when Nestorian heresy, presumably as part of the same *Ten-*

110 *S. Th.* I, q. 37, art. 1, s. c.
111 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 3.

denz that denied the idea of Theotokos, also denied the idea of Filioque. As a specific instance of a Nestorian heretic who denied the Filioque, Thomas referred to Theodoret of Cyr. Theodoret had in fact called the Filioque *βλάσφημον τοῦτο*,[112] so that Thomas's historical judgment about the content of Theodoret's doctrine, though not about its novelty, was accurate. In this entire question it is essential to distinguish between a theological affirmation and the historical information that formed its basis. Nevertheless, the reference to Ephesus could not have been very convincing to the Greeks, and even Thomas himself introduced it almost as an *obiter dictum*.

There is much more historical and theological sophistication in his other reference to a council of the fifth century, namely, to Chalcedon. It was, in one sense, also employed as a historical source: "In determinatione Chalcedonensis Synodi dicitur, quod illi qui fuerunt congregati in Concilio Constantinopolitano, doctrinam de Spiritu Sancto tradiderunt, 'non quod minus esset in praecedentibus (qui apud Nicaeam congregati sunt), inferentes; sed intellectum eorum adversus haereticos declarantes.'"[113] But this historical information from Chalcedon about Constantinople was intended to justify the Western interpolation; as it was legitimate for Constantinople to expand the brief formula of 325, "Et in Spiritum Sanctum," into the amplified form that was now used in both Eastern and Western liturgies, so it was legitimate for later generations to expand this, in turn, by adding the Filioque. But the comment of Chalcedon upon the use of Nicaea by Constantinople gave Thomas the occasion to elaborate a more general theory of doctrinal development: "In quolibet concilio institutum fuit symbolum aliquod, propter errorem aliquem qui in concilio damnabatur. Unde sequens concilium non faciebat aliud symbolum quam primum: sed id quod implicite continebatur in primo symbolo, per aliqua addita explanabatur contra haereses insurgentes." So it was, for example, with the Filioque. "Quia igitur in tempore antiquorum conciliorum nondum exortus fuerat error dicentium Spiritum Sanctum non procedere a Filio; non fuit necessarium quod hoc explicite poneretur.... Continebatur tamen implicite in hoc ipso quod dicebatur Spiritum Sanctum a Patre procedere."[114] By tying this theory of development to the authority of Rome, Thomas could argue that under the direction of papal authority the doctrine of the Holy Spirit had moved from its implicit state at Nicaea to a more explicit formulation at Constantinople to a still more explicit formulation in the Western text of the creed.

112 Theodoret *Confutatio XII capitum Cyrilli*, PG 76, 432.
113 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 2.
114 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 2.

Thomas had prepared for his discussion of the Trinity in the *Summa* not only by his biblical commentaries, his *Commentary on the Sentences,* and his *Contra errores Graecorum,* but also by his *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate,* which seems to have been composed in the late 1250's.[115] Through the works of Grabmann and Maritain on the *Expositio,* it has acquired a well-deserved reputation as an epistemological investigation; for in it "St. Thomas treats of the division and methods of the sciences while commenting on Boethius' book on the Trinity" and in so doing "is simply taking his cue from Boethius himself."[116] Yet an examination of the quotations from Boethius, chiefly from the *De Trinitate* and from what was usually called *De duabus naturis*, in the Questions of the *Summa* on the Trinity should not prevent this valid insight from obscuring the specifically trinitarian function of Boethius in Thomas's thought. Several of the most helpful definitions in these Questions came from Boethius.[117] Here in Question 36 Boethius helped Thomas to recognize the connection between person and relation in the Trinity; for "nomina divinarum personarum ad aliquid dicuntur, ut Boethius dicit, in libro *de Trin.*"[118] Professor Pegis's translation of "ad aliquid dicuntur" with "are relative terms"[119] not only renders Thomas's sense; it may also provide an easy explanation of the origin of the earlier quotation ascribed to Boethius, "quod omne nomen ad personas pertinens, relationem significat."[120] In any event, Boethius's rule evoked from Thomas the distinction that "hoc quod dico 'Spiritus Sanctus,' relative non dicatur, tamen pro relativo ponitur, inquantum est accommodatum ad significandam personam sola relatione ab aliis distinctam";[121] from this, in turn, it would follow that the Holy Holy Spirit was distinct from the Son "sola relatione," which led in turn to the Filioque.

The last of the patristic authorities cited by Thomas in Question 36 was John of Damascus. He was also the source of the most overt rejection of the Filioque by any theologian whom Thomas and the church at large regarded as orthodox; for he had written: "Spiritum Sanctum ex Patre dicimus, et Spiritum Patris nominamus: ex Filio autem Spiritum

115 Cf. Bruno Decker, ed., *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate* (Leiden 1965) p. 44.

116 Armand Maurer, "Introduction" to Thomas Aquinas, *The Division and Methods of the Sciences* (3rd ed.; Toronto 1963) p. vii.

117 To mention only two examples, see *S. Th.* I, q. 29, art. 1, ad 4; and q. 30, art. 1, obj. 3.

118 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 1, obj. 2; Boethius *De Trinitate* 5, *Loeb Classical Library,* p. 26.

119 Anton C. Pegis, ed., *Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas* (2 vols.; New York 1945) 1, 342.

120 *S. Th.* I, q. 29, art. 4, s. c.

121 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 1, ad 2.

Sanctum non dicimus, Spiritum vero Filii nominamus."[122] The unequivocal sound of these words had been a crux to other interpreters,[123] some of whom sought to resolve the difficulty by saying that "Damascenus, sicut non confitetur Spiritum Sanctum esse a Filio, ita etiam non negat."[124] Now Thomas also knew how to extricate church fathers, including John of Damascus, from the awkwardness of their own statements about the mysteries of trinitarian doctrine. He had, for example, explained away the Damascene's Sabellian-sounding statement that "tres personae re idem sunt, ratione autem et cogitatione distinguuntur" by proposing that "auctoritas Damasceni sic intelligenda est. Ratione, id est relatione."[125] But in this instance neither synonymics nor emendation would avail. Instead, Thomas put the matter in uncompromising terms. After citing the Nestorian origin of opposition to the Filioque, he continued: "... et plures post ipsum; inter quos fuit etiam Damascenus. Unde in hoc eius sententiae non est standum."[126] There were gentler forms of reproof available to him, such as the principle that "huiusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendae, sed exponendae,"[127] or, more amply stated, that "si qua in dictis antiquorum doctorum inveniuntur quae cum tanta cautela non dicantur quanta a modernis servatur, non sunt contemnenda aut abicienda; sed nec etiam ea extendere oportet sed exponere reverenter."[128] This latter "texte suivant"[129] could conceivably have been applied here. Instead, there came a rejection so blunt as to elicit Cajetan's explanation that Thomas was not hereticating the Damascene, as some interpreters supposed him to be.[130] Compared, for example, with his lenient treatment of Hilary, this must be regarded as a severe dismissal of an orthodox "auctoritas" whom Thomas held in high regard.

In all these ways Thomas's case for the Filioque provides data of more than usual interest for a consideration of his use of patristic authority. His discussion of "spiratores" and "spirantes" in Hilary and of "principium" in Augustine indicates that he was attempting to defend the Filioque inherited from these fathers while correcting the dangerous implications that might be drawn from it. He saw the Eastern refusal to equate "profluere" with "procedere" in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit

122 John of Damascus *De fide orthodoxa* 1.8, PG 94, 832-33.
123 See the long footnote, PG 94, 831-34.
124 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 3.
125 *In I Sent.* d. 2, q. 1, art. 5, ad 1; ed. Mandonnet, 1, 74-75.
126 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, ad 3.
127 *S. Th.* I, q. 39, art. 5, ad 1.
128 *Contra errores Graecorum*, pr., *Opera*, 40-A, 71.
129 Geenen, "Saint Thomas et les Pères," p. 751.
130 *Opera*, 4, 381, par. 28.

as coming "vel ex ignorantia, vel ex protervia,"[131] but it seems fair to suggest that there was more than enough of these two commodities on both sides. Thomas insisted, for example, that "si quis consideret, inveniet 'processionis' verbum inter omnia quae ad originem qualemcumque pertinent, communissimum esse."[132] Yet if "procedere" was meant to be a translation of ἐκπορεύεσθαι, this had, according to the Greeks, to be distinguished from various other terms "quae ad originem qualemcumque pertinent," such as πέμπειν, χεῖσθαι, διαδίδοσθαι, χύσις, μετάδοσις, and others.[133] But even the Latin vocabulary of Thomas still lacked the range and the discrimination to make all of these distinctions. Quoting Durantel's conclusion that Thomas was in a position "vérifier et rectifier le texte grec,"[134] Riquet has suggested that though not "un hélleniste, il en savait assez pour lire."[135] This does not seem to have extended to the ability to read at first hand the most telling of the Greek treatises "contra errores Latinorum" in which such distinctions were set forth. It is significant that despite his direct acquaintance with some Eastern arguments,[136] the only explicit reference to these distinctions was based on a report that "quidam eorum [sc., Graecorum] dicuntur concedere quod 'sit a Filio,' vel 'profluat ab eo': non tamen quod 'procedat,'"[137] the word "dicuntur" suggesting that he had this information at second hand. And of course, his information about the Greek use of ὑπόστασις, like his information about the plural in the Hebrew name for God,[138] was also common property.

As a spokesman for the West, Thomas drew upon both dialectics and patristics to defend the Filioque and to make it defensible. He took it to be an authentic part of apostolic doctrine and of normative tradition. It does seem appropriate, nevertheless, to ask whether his doctrine of the Trinity would have led him to the Filioque if this had not been transmitted to him by what he regarded as the "fides catholica." He was hard pressed to identify what was distinctive about the third person of the Trinity, making "processio" a general term applicable both to the second person and to the third and finding "spiratio" useful but not precise. Behind this question, however, are two much more fundamental ones; their answer lies beyond the scope of the present essay, but they do arise in an analysis of the material. One needs to ask

131 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, resp.
132 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, resp.
133 Cf. Theophylact, *Liber de iis quorum Latini incusantur* 5, PG 126, 228-29.
134 Durantel, *op. cit.*, p. 65.
135 Riquet, *op. cit.*, p. 129, n. 3.
136 See, for example, *S. Th.*, I, q. 36, art. 2, resp.
137 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, resp.
138 *S. Th.* I, q. 29, art. 2, ad 2; q. 39, art. 3, ad 2.

whether the difference underlying the Filioque was merely one of "protervia" and "ignorantia," even merely one of differing attitudes toward tradition and authority. Was it not ultimately a clash between two views of the Godhead and two means of salvaging monotheism within the framework of the trinitarian dogma? Most doctrines of the Trinity can be characterized as tending toward either the tritheistic or the modalistic heresy. The Cappadocians and their successors had to strain to avoid the first, while Western theologians often manifested some inclination toward the second. Coming where it did in the structure of the *Summa,* Question 36, as well as the rest of the treatise on the Trinity, presupposed a doctrine of divine Being, and of the oneness of divine Being, within whose context the Trinity and the Filioque were articulated. There was never any need for Thomas to write a treatise *Quod non tres dii sint,* as there was for Gregory of Nyssa. And if it is contended that his system of revelation required him to have more than a simple unqualified monotheism, one is obliged to ask why two rather than three persons would not have been enough. In a highly revealing passage here in Question 36, Thomas argued that without the Filioque there would be no way to distinguish the Spirit from the Son: "sequeretur quod persona Filii et Spiritus Sancti esset una, habens duas relationes oppositas duabus relationibus Patris. Hoc autem est haereticum, cum tollat fidem Trinitatis."[139] For Thomas the speculative theologian, this seems to have been less than completely satisfying; for Thomas the expositor of patristic tradition, it was argument enough.

139 *S. Th.* I, q. 36, art. 2, resp.

UNITAS, AEQUALITAS, CONCORDIA VEL CONNEXIO

Recherches sur les Origines de la Théorie Thomiste des Appropriations (*Sum. theol.*, I, q. 39, art. 7-8)

Jean Châtillon

LA *Summa theologiae* de saint Thomas d'Aquin revient à plusieurs reprises sur le problème des appropriations trinitaires dans la série des questions qu'elle consacre au mystère des trois personnes divines. Elle y fait très explicitement allusion, tout d'abord, dans l'article où le Docteur Angélique se demande "si la Trinité des personnes divines peut être connue par la raison naturelle" (I, q. 32, art. 1). La réponse à la question ainsi posée est évidemment négative. Saint Thomas récuse avec vigueur la légitimité de toute entreprise, d'où qu'elle vienne, qui tendrait à "prouver la Trinité" par la raison. De telles tentatives, explique-t-il, ne peuvent que compromettre "la dignité de la foi" et porter les infidèles à tourner celle-ci en dérision.[1] Il reconnaît cependant que si les philosophes n'ont pu connaître ce qui appartenait en propre à chacune des trois personnes, à savoir la paternité du Père, la filiation du Fils et la procession de l'Esprit-Saint, ils ont pu néanmoins s'élever jusqu'à la connaissance de certains attributs essentiels, et que ceux-ci peuvent être rapportés à leur tour, par appropriation, à l'une ou l'autre des trois personnes: ainsi en est-il notamment des attributs de puissance, de sagesse et de bonté qui peuvent être rapportés respectivement au Père, au Fils et au Saint-Esprit.[2] L'appropriation est donc présentée ici comme une méthode de recherche et d'exposition destinée à mettre à la disposition du théologien un langage qui lui permettra de

On aura recours habituellement dans cet article aux sigles suivants:

AHDLM = *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* (Paris);
BGPTM = *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters* (Münster in West.);
RTAM= *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* (Louvain).

1 *Sum. theol.*, I, q.32, art. 1, c.
2 Ibid., ad 1.

rendre compte, jusqu'à un certain point et dans certaines conditions, de l'ineffable mystère de la distinction des personnes.

La légitimité de cette méthode et quelques unes de ses applications seront examinées par la suite en deux articles particulièrement importants (I,q.39,art.7-8). Le premier, relativement bref, se place à un point de vue très général. Saint Thomas s'y interroge sur les conditions dans lesquelles on peut approprier certains "noms essentiels" au Père, au Fils ou à l'Esprit-Saint. La position du Docteur Angélique sur ce point est connue. Son exposé ne fait d'ailleurs ici que compléter et préciser ce que l'article précédemment cité avait dit à ce sujet. Bien que les attributs essentiels soient évidemment communs aux trois personnes, leur appropriation à l'une ou l'autre d'entre elles peut être justifiée parce qu'elle contribue à "la manifestation de la foi." La raison parvient en effet à la connaissance de ces attributs à partir de la création. Ceux-ci lui sont donc plus accessibles que les propriétés personnelles connues seulement par la foi. Ils lui permettent ainsi une approche du mystère de la Trinité à laquelle, sans cela, elle ne peut atteindre. Une telle méthode d'exposition ne peut engendrer de confusion dans l'esprit, car les attributs essentiels ainsi considérés ne sont pas appropriés aux trois personnes comme s'ils leur appartenaient en propre (*non sic appropriantur personis ut eis esse propria asserantur*), mais seulement par voie de similitude ou, au contraire de dissemblance.[3] L'équivoque est ici évitée par un recours à un mode d'attribution très particulier, l'appropriation, auquel correspond la catégorie de l'"approprié," sorte de nouveau prédicable, à la fois proche et distinct du "propre" ou de la "propriété."[4]

L'article dont on vient de résumer brièvement l'enseignement ne nous dit rien encore des applications que l'on peut tirer des principes ainsi posés. Celles-ci vont faire l'objet de l'article suivant (art.8) qui entreprend l'examen de quelques unes des formules auxquelles les "saints docteurs" avaient eu recours pour distinguer les trois personnes les unes des autres en leur attribuant, par mode d'appropriation, des "noms essentiels" bien déterminés. Cet article est construit d'une manière assez particulière. Le Docteur Angélique présente bien d'abord, comme

3 Ibid., q. 39, art. 7, c. Sur ces deux modes d'appropriation, par similitude et par dissemblance, voir ci-dessous, n. 101 et 162.

4 Saint Thomas d'Aquin ne nous donne ici aucune définition proprement dite de l'*appropriatio* et de l'*appropriatum*. Mais saint Albert le Grand précisera en logicien la signification de ce dernier terme lorsque, faisant allusion à la manière dont il est composé (*ad-propriatum*), il écrira dans sa *Summa theologiae*, I, tr. XII, q. 48, membr. 1, éd. Borgnet, t. 31, p. 505: "Appropriatum ex modo compositionis et habitudine praepositionis, quae accessum et recessum vicinitatis consignificat, dicit accessum ad proprium. Appropriatum ergo est, quod ratione sui nominis vicinam habet rationem cum proprio."

de coutume, une série d'objections qui sont ici au nombre de cinq, mais celles-ci n'ont d'autre objet que d'introduire quelques formules patristiques ou bibliques dont saint Thomas se propose de justifier la signification trinitaire. Il n'y aura donc pas de *Sed contra*: l'origine même des textes cités leur confère une autorité sur laquelle il n'est pas nécessaire d'insister. Il n'y aura pas davantage de "réponses aux objections," à la fin de l'article: c'est en effet dans le corps de l'article que le Docteur Angélique expliquera de quelle manière il convient d'interpréter chacune de ces formules.

Si nous laissons de côté les textes allégués par la cinquième et dernière objection, où il est uniquement question des "noms" qui peuvent être attribués par appropriation à la seconde personne de la Trinité (*veritas, liber vitae, qui est*), nous constatons que saint Thomas est ainsi amené à s'expliquer principalement sur la signification trinitaire de quatre triades différentes. La première (*aeternitas, species, usus*) vient de Saint Hilaire (*De Trinitate*,II,1). La seconde (*unitas, aequalitas, concordia*) est empruntée à saint Augustin (*De doctrina christiana*,I,5,5). La troisième (*potentia, sapientia, bonitas*) viendrait également de l'évêque d'Hippone, si nous en croyons du moins saint Thomas qui ne nous donne cependant aucune référence précise.[5] La quatrième enfin (*ex ipso, per ipsum, in ipso*) vient d'un verset de l'*Epître aux Romains* (XI,36), dont Augustin encore, cité de nouveau par le Docteur Angélique, avait donné à plusieurs reprises une interprétation trinitaire.

Les témoignages patristiques et bibliques auxquels se réfère saint Thomas et dont l'explication constitue la trame même de son exposé n'ont évidemment pas été choisis au hasard. Tous avaient fait l'objet d'interprétations dont on retrouve aisément la trace chez les théologiens du XII[e] et du XIII[e] siècles et c'est autour d'eux que s'était organisé progressivement le traité des appropriations trinitaires. Tous cependant n'y avaient pas tenu une place égale. Faute de pouvoir les examiner ici

5 Cf. loc. cit., art. 8, obj. 3: "Secundum Augustinum, Patri attribuitur potentia, Filio sapientia, Spiritui sancto bonitas." Alors que tous les textes patristiques cités par les autres objections de cet art. 8 ont pu être aisément identifiés, la très vague référence à Augustin de cette obj. 3 a visiblement embarrassé les éditeurs de la *Somme*. L'édition de la Commission léonine et celle de l'Institut d'études médiévales d'Ottawa (Ottawa 1941) se contentent de renvoyer à Hugues de Saint-Victor (*De sacr.*, I, p. II, 6; PL 176, 208), où il est effectivement question de cette triple attribution, mais où Augustin n'est pas nommé. Il est vrai qu'une partie du raisonnement grâce auquel saint Thomas justifie l'interprétation trinitaire qu'il donne de cette triade (art. 8, c., à partir de *Secundum vero tertiam considerationem*...) apparaît chez Hugues de Saint-Victor (loc. cit., 8, 209-210), mais il n'y est pas davantage question d'Augustin. En fait, comme nous aurons l'occasion de le rappeler plus loin, c'est Abélard qui avait été le premier à traiter d'une manière systématique de cette triple attribution dont l'origine augustinienne avait été discutée dès le XII[e] siècle (cf. ci-dessous, n. 98).

un à un, on voudrait s'en tenir dans cet article à l'histoire du texte que la seconde objection présentée par le Docteur Angélique, au seuil de son article 8, emprunte au *De doctrina christiana*, et tenter de découvrir par quels cheminements la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, a pénétré dans la théologie avant d'arriver jusqu'à saint Thomas. Cette brève enquête ne pourra pourtant pas négliger complètement d'autres formules et d'autres triades dont celle-ci est fréquemment solidaire. Ainsi rencontrera-t-elle dès l'origine la triade *ex ipso, per ipsum, in ipso*, qui est au point de départ de la réflexion théologique d'où devait sortir le traité des appropriations trinitaires.

1. Le *De Doctrina Christiana* d'Augustin

C'est en effet Augustin lui-même qui a associé l'une à l'autre la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, et la triade paulinienne *ex ipso, per ipsum, in ipso*. Pour comprendre à la fois la portée de ce rapprochement et la signification des expressions auxquelles recourt Augustin, il faut reproduire le passage du *De doctrina christiana* auquel sont empruntés les textes que cite saint Thomas, d'abord dans l'énoncé de sa seconde objection, puis dans le corps de son article 8. Augustin s'exprime de la manière suivante:[6]

> Res igitur, quibus fruendum est, pater et filius et spiritus sanctus eademque trinitas, una quaedam summa res communisque omnibus fruentibus ea, si tamen res et non rerum omnium causa, si tamen et causa. Non enim facile nomen, quod tantae excellentiae conueniat, inueniri potest, nisi quod melius ita dicitur trinitas haec unus deus, ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia.[7] Ita pater et filius et spiritus sanctus et singulus quisque horum deus et simul omnes unus deus, et singulus quisque horum plena substantia et simul omnes una substantia. Pater nec filius est nec spiritus sanctus, filius nec pater est nec spiritus sanctus, spiritus sanctus nec pater nec filius, sed pater tantum pater et filius tantum filius et spiritus sanctus tantum spiritus sanctus. Eadem tribus aeternitas, eadem incommutabilitas, eadem maiestas, eadem potestas. In patre unitas, in filio aequalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia, et tria haec unum omnia propter patrem, aequalia omnia propter filium, conexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum.

On sait dans quel contexte s'insère ce développement. L'auteur du *De doctrina christiana* vient d'introduire sa célèbre distinction entre les

6 *De doctr. christ.*, I, 5, 5. Je cite ici le texte de l'édition J. Martin, *Corp. christ.*, 32 (Turnhout 1962), p. 9. Pour la traduction de quelques membres de phrase donnée plus loin entre guillemets, je me suis inspiré de celle de G. Combès-J. Farges, *Œuvres de saint Augustin*, XI, *Le magistère chrétien* (Paris 1949), pp. 185-187.

7 Cf. *Rom.*, XI, 36. Sur le texte de ce verset, tel que le cite ici Augustin, voir ci-dessous, n. 9.

choses dont il faut jouir (*frui*) et celles dont il faut seulement user (*uti*).[8] Il va maintenant parler des premières, et tout d'abord des trois personnes divines qui sont une seule et unique Trinité. Mais il constate aussitôt qu' "il n'est pas facile de trouver un nom qui convienne à une réalité aussi éminente." Peut-on en effet appeler celle-ci une "chose"? N'est-elle pas plutôt "la cause de toutes les choses"? Est-elle même d'ailleurs une "cause"? Finalement Augustin estimera que le mieux est de dire que "cette Trintité est un seul Dieu, de qui (*ex quo*) toutes choses procèdent, par qui (*per quem*) et en qui (*in quo*) toutes choses existent." Cette définition s'inspire directement d'un verset de l'*Epître aux Romains* (XI,36) dont Augustin avait déjà donné à plusieurs reprises et dont il devait donner souvent par la suite une interprétation trinitaire.[9] Pourtant, il ne s'attarde pas ici à expliciter sa pensée en rapportant d'une manière distincte à chacune des trois personnes divines l'*ex quo omnia,* le *per quem omnia* et l'*in quo omnia*[10] du texte auquel il fait allusion. Son intention semble être surtout de rappeler que ce verset de saint Paul affirme simultanément l'unité de la "substance divine" et la distinction des personnes.[11] C'est sur ce point en tout cas qu'il va

8 *De doctr. christ.*, I, 3, 3-4, éd. cit., p. 8.

9 On trouvera dans O. du Roy, *L' intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin* (Paris 1966), pp. 479-483, un inventaire, par ordre chronologique, de tous les passages de l'œuvre de saint Augustin dans lequel celui-ci revient sur ce verset (*Rom.*, XI, 36). Ce tableau ne relève pas moins de quarante-six citations, du *De quantitate animae* (388) au *Contra Maximinum* (428). Dans plus de la moitié des cas, le verset de l'*Epître aux Romains* fait l'objet d'une interprétation trinitaire ou apparaît au moins dans un contexte trinitaire. Cette exégèse n'était pas nouvelle. O. du Roy, ibid., pp. 483-484, en signale un certain nombre d'exemples plus anciens empruntés à Origène (*Com. in epist. ad Rom.*, VIII, 13, PG 14, 1202 AB, dans la traduction de Rufin qui date de 404, et *Com. in Cant.*, Prol., *Griech. Christ. Schriftsteller*, 33, 7, l. 4-6, également dans la trad. de Rufin), et à Ambroise (*Exam.*, I, 5, 19, CSEL 23, 1, 16, l. 1-14). On peut ajouter aussi Athanase, *Adversus Sabellianos*, 13, PG, 28, 117; Eusèbe de Verceil, *De Trinitate*, IV, 21-24, et VII, 24, *Corp. christ.*, 9, p. 62, l. 171-197, et p. 98, l. 210-211; Ambrosiaster, *In epist. ad Rom.*, XI, 36, CSEL 81, pp. 391-392.

10 Ces expressions, notons-le en passant, bien qu'elles se réfèrent certainement à *Rom.*, XI, 36, ne viennent pas de la *Vulgate.* Comme l'a en effet remarqué O. du Roy, op. cit., p. 479, Augustin, lorsqu'il cite ce verset, écrit tantôt, comme il le fait ici: *Ex quo omnia, per quem omnia, in quo omnia,* tantôt, avec la *Vulgate: Quoniam ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso omnia.* O. du Roy, ibid., p. 484, pense que la première formule, dont on connaît plusieurs témoins antérieurs à Augustin et qui reparaîtra souvent dans les commentaires médiévaux, "n'est pas à proprement parler une variante scripturaire, mais un résumé doxologique" qui résulterait de la fusion de *Rom.*, XI, 36, avec *I Cor.*,VIII,6:"Nobis tamen unus Deus, Pater ex quo omnia, et nos in illum; et unus Dominus, Jesus Christus, per quem omnia, et nos per ipsum." Quelle que soit cependant la formule adoptée, lorsqu'Augustin cite la fin du verset, il écrit toujours, avec la *Vulgate*: "Ipsi gloria in saecula saeculorum."

11 Dans les textes où Augustin interprète *Rom.*, XI, 36, d'une manière plus explicite, c'est la distinction des prépositions *ex, per, in,* qui lui permet de conclure à la distinction des personnes; c'est en revanche dans l'emploi au datif singulier du pronom *ipse,* dans la conclusion du verset (*ipsi gloria*), qu'il découvre une affirmation de l'unité de l'essence divine. Voir notamment: *Enarr. in Ps. V, 3, Corp. Christ.*, 28, p. 20, l. 18-21; *De Trinit.*, I, 6, 12, *Corp. christ.*, 50, p. 41, l. 78-41; et aussi les deux textes auxquels saint Thomas emprunte les éléments de la citation factice alléguée

revenir avec insistance dans les lignes suivantes, et lorsque, vers la fin du passage qu'on vient de citer, il en arrivera à déclarer que "dans le Père est l'unité, dans le Fils l'égalité, dans le Saint-Esprit l'harmonie (*concordia*) de l'unité et de l'égalité," ce sera pour ajouter aussitôt, comme le rappellera soigneusement saint Thomas dans le corps de son article, que "ces trois attributs (*tri haec*)[12] ne font tous qu'un à cause du Père," qu' "ils sont tous égaux à cause du Fils," qu' "ils sont tous unis entre eux (*conexa*) à cause du Saint-Esprit."

Comme on peut le constater, la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, n'est introduite ici qu'incidemment. Augustin ne s'attarde pas à la commenter. On remarquera d'ailleurs qu'elle ne reparaîtra jamais, au moins sous une forme identique, dans la série des triades, pourtant si nombreuses, à l'aide desquelles l'évêque d'Hippone devait tenter par la suite de parvenir à une certaine intelligence du mystère.[13] Pour en comprendre le sens, il faut donc revenir d'abord sur l'interprétation de la doxologie paulinienne dont le *De doctrina christiana* l'a rapprochée. Cette exégèse est en effet liée au thème de la création par la Trinité et à la méthode d'ascension intellectuelle, inspirée de *Rom.*,I,20 (*Invisibilia ipsius, a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt ... intellecta*) qui va chercher dans la création le vestige de la Trinité pour s'élever, à partir de là, jusqu'à la connaissance du mystère qu'il reflète. Ceci sera clairement exprimé plus tard par Augustin dans un passage bien connu du *De Trinitate* qui tiendra une grande place dans l'histoire du traité des appropriations.[14] L'interprétation trinitaire de *Rom.*,XI,36, à laquelle se référera saint Thomas dans son obj.4,[15] y sert en effet de conclusion à un long développement dans lequel l'évêque d'Hippone renvoie très explicitement à *Rom.*,I,20, et où il recourt, pour évoquer le mystère de la Trinité, à une triade qui tient une large place dans son œuvre et sa pensée: *unitas*, *species*, *ordo*. La source première de l'unité, de la beauté et de l'ordre qui se manifestent dans la création, vestige du

dans son obj. 4: *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 12, ed. cit., p. 243, 1. 60-62, et *Contra Maximin.*, II, 23, 4, PL 42, 800.

12 Avec G. Combès et J. Farges, op. cit., p. 187, dont j'ai cependant modifié légèrement la traduction, j'ai rendu *tria haec*, faute de mieux et pour éviter l'emploi du mot "choses", par "ces trois attributs". Mais il faut bien souligner que le mot "attribut", étranger au texte d'Augustin, risque d'être équivoque. L'unité dont il est question ici, et surtout l'égalité et la *concordia*, ne peuvent être considérés comme des "attributs divins" au sens où la théologie classique entend ce mot. Le mot "propriété" eût été plus équivoque encore. Saint Thomas, en tout cas, évitera les mots "attribut" ou "propriété" dans le commentaire qu'il donnera de cette formule d'Augustin dans le corps de son article.

13 C'est du moins ce qui ressort d'un examen de la table des principales triades néoplatoniciennes d'Augustin, dressée par O. du Roy, op. cit., pp. 537-540.

14 *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 12, ed. cit., pp. 242-243, 1. 37-62.

15 Ibid., 1. 60-62. Cf. ci-dessus, n. 11.

créateur, ne peut être cherchée que dans la Trinité.[16] C'est donc ici la structure même de la nature créée qui nous renvoie aux trois personnes.

Ces observations nous éclairent sur la signification de la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*. Celle-ci procède de toute évidence d'une réflexion sur le nombre dont l'inspiration rejoint celle d'un ouvrage composé par Augustin quelques années seulement avant le *De doctrina christiana*: le *De musica*. Au livre VI de ce traité, on trouve en tout cas un texte qu'on ne peut manquer de rapprocher de celui qui nous occupe. "Le nombre," écrit en effet Augustin,[17] "commence par l'un, il est beau par l'égalité et la similitude, il est uni par l'ordre." Comme l'a remarqué Dom O. du Roy dans le commentaire qu'il a donné de ce texte où apparaissent déjà tous les éléments de la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, mêlés à ceux de la triade *unitas, species, ordo*, le *De musica* assigne ici "à tout nombre trois moments constitutifs: son origine qui est l'un, sa beauté qui est son égalité ou sa similitude, son lien ou sa cohésion (*copulatur*) qui est son ordre ou son rang."[18] Le *De musica* ne tardera pas d'ailleurs à préciser que ces tendances constitutives n'apparaissent pas seulement dans le nombre, mais dans toute nature, et que par conséquent "tout ce qui est, dans la mesure où il est, a été fait par l'Un, Principe (*ab uno, principio*), au moyen de la Beauté ou de la Forme (*per speciem*) égale ou semblable à lui (*aequalem ac similem*), grâce aux richesses de sa bonté, Charité pour ainsi dire la plus chère, par laquelle sont unis (*iunguntur*) l'Un et l'Un issu de l'Un."[19]

L'inspiration néo-platonicienne de ce vocabulaire et de cette théologie est encore très apparente. Peut-être faut-il y discerner l'influence de Marius Victorinus. Pour ce dernier, en effet, l'Un engendré opère un mouvement de conversion vers la source dont il procède, aussi le Saint-Esprit peut-il être considéré comme le lien ou la connexion

16 Ibid., l. 37-38 et 45-49: "Haec igitur omnia quae arte diuina facta sunt et unitatem quandam in se ostendunt et speciem et ordinem... Oportet igitur ut creatorem *per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspicientes* (cf. *Rom.*, I, 20) trinitatem intellegamus cuius in creatura quomodo dignum est apparet *uestigium* (cf. *Eccli.*, L, 31). In illa enim trinitate summa origo est rerum omnium et perfectissima pulchritudo et beatissima delectatio."

17 *De musica*, VI, 17, 56, PL 32, 1191: "Numerus autem et ab uno incipit, et aequalitate ac similitudine pulcher est, et ordine copulatur."

18 O. du Roy, op. cit., p. 290.

19 *De musica*, loc. cit.: "Quamobrem quisquis fatetur nullam esse naturam, quae non ut sit quidquid est appetat unitatem, suique similis in quantum potest esse conetur, atque ordinem proprium vel locis, vel temporibus, vel in corpore quodam libramento salutem suam teneat: debet fateri ab uno, principio, per aequalem illi ac similem speciem, divitiis bonitatis ejus qua inter se unum et de uno unum charissima, ut ita dicam, charitate junguntur, omnia facta esse atque condita quaecumque sunt, in quantumcumque sunt." Je cite ici la traduction de O. du Roy, op. cit., p. 287, qui commente ce texte ibid., p. 292.

(*conexio*) du Père et du Fils.[20] Augustin reviendra en tout cas souvent sur cette idée que la troisième personne de la Trinité est la "communauté"[21] ou la "société"[22] du Père et du Fils, et c'est dans ce contexte qu'il faut entendre les formules si nombreuses où il affirme que le Saint-Esprit est Charité.[23] Mais cette théologie est inséparable chez lui d'une vision trinitaire de la création qu'ébauchent déjà ses premiers écrits. Les textes du *De musica* qu'on vient de citer le montrent. C'est donc bien dans les mêmes perspectives qu'il faut comprendre le développement du *De doctrina christiana*. La triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, liée à une interprétation trinitaire de la doxologie de l'*Epître aux Romains*, ne prend tout son sens que dans une métaphysique de la création qui découvre simultanément dans le nombre et dans la nature des structures trinitaires propres à conduire à l'intelligence du mystère et à la connaissance du Père, du Fils et de l'Esprit-Saint.

II. Les anciens Commentaires de l'*Epître aux Romains*: Florus de Lyon

Le contexte dans lequel Augustin avait mentionné la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, nous indique que c'est sans doute dans les commentaires de l'*Epître aux Romains* que nous avons quelques chances d'en retrouver la trace. Une rapide enquête suffit en effet à montrer que lorsque les commentateurs médiévaux en viennent à l'explication de *Rom.*,XI,36, ils s'inspirent volontiers de l'exégèse trinitaire d'Augustin et n'hésitent pas à reproduire à ce propos tel ou tel passage de son œuvre. C'est ainsi que la compilation augustinienne de Bède le Vénérable[24] cite textuellement un assez long passage du *De Trinitate*

20 Cf. *Hymnus III*, 1. 242-247, dans Marius Victorinus, *Traités théologiques sur la Trinité*, éd. P. Henry -P. Hadot, *Sources chrétiennes*, 68 (Paris 1960), p. 650:

"Tu, spiritus sancte, conexio es; conexio autem est quicquid conectit duo;
Ita ut conectas omnia, primo conectis duo;
Esque ipsa tertia conplexio duorum atque ipsa conplexio nihil distans uno, unum cum facis duo;
O beata trinitas."

Cf. aussi *Hymnus I*, 1.4-6, et *Hymnus III*, 1. 48, ed. cit., p. 620 et p. 636.

21 Cf. *In Jo.*, tr. XCIX, 7, *Corp. christ.*, 36, p. 586, 1. 4-6.

22 Cf. *Sermo LXXI*, 20, 33, PL 38, 463.

23 Cf. p. ex. *De musica*, VI, 17, 56, PL 32, 1191; *De quantitate animae*, 34, 77, PL 32, 1077; *De fide et symbolo*, 8, 19, PL 40, 191; *De agone christiano*, 16, 10, PL 40, 300. J'emprunte ces références à P. Smulders, "Esprit-Saint (Pères latins)," *Dict. de spiritualité*, t. IV, fasc. 28-29 (Paris 1960), col. 1271.

24 Cette compilation a été étudiée naguère par A. Wilmart, "La collection de Bède le Vénérable sur l'Apôtre," *Rev. bénédictine*, 38 (1926), pp. 16-52, puis, plus récemment par I. Fransen, "Description de la collection de Bède le Vénérable sur l'Apôtre," ibid., 71, (1961), pp. 22-70, qui a inventorié et identifié les extraits d'Augustin cités par ce florilège.

(I,6,12)[25] que nous retrouverons par la suite: l'évêque d'Hippone ne se contente pas d'y affirmer la distinction des personnes et l'unité de l'essence divine en se fondant sur le texte de saint Paul, il y fait aussi allusion à l'égalité du Père et du Fils, évoquée par un texte bien connu de l'*Epître aux Philippiens*.[26] On retrouve des interprétations analogues de *Rom.*,XI,36, toujours inspirées d'Augustin, tout au long du IXe siècle, dans les commentaires de Raban Maur[27] et de Sedulius Scotus,[28] et dans l'*Expositio in epistolas Pauli* imprimée parmi les œuvres de Haymon d'Halberstadt mais que l'on attribue communément à Haymon d'Auxerre.[29] Aucun de ces ouvrages cependant ne mentionne la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*. Celle-ci va pourtant reparaître, vers le même temps, dans une autre compilation augustinienne, celle de Florus de Lyon. Le vaste florilège composé par le diacre lyonnais vers la fin de sa carrière, c'est-à-dire peu avant l'année 860, rassemble, on le sait, un nombre considérable d'extraits augustiniens se rapportant aux passages les plus importants des *Epîtres* de saint Paul et présentés dans l'ordre qu'imposait à leur regroupement le texte de l'Apôtre. A propos de *Rom.*,XI,36, Florus reproduit intégralement le paragraphe du *De doctrina christiana* (I,5,5) qu'on a cité plus haut.[30] Le succès de cette compilation, dont les manuscrits sont nombreux, donne à penser que la citation de Florus n'est pas étrangère à la réapparition, chez les commentateurs et les théologiens du XIIe siècle, de la triade qui nous occupe.

Celle-ci cependant ne semble pas avoir retenu tout de suite l'attention. Comme l'a remarqué en effet L. Ott, on n'en retrouve la trace,

25 Cf. I. Fransen, op. cit., p. 34, qui, à propos de *Rom.*, XI, 33-36, identifie les deux citations suivantes: 1° *Epist. ad Xystum presb.*, CSEL 57, 180, 1. 1 -181, 1.7 (comment. du v. 33); 2° *De Trinit.*, I, 6, 12, PL 42, 826, 1. 6-827, 1. 31 (= *Corp. christ.*, 50, pp. 41-42, 1. 74-106) (comment. du v. 36).

26 *Philip.*, II, 6, cité par Augustin suivant une version légèrement différente de la *Vulgate*: "Qui cum in forma Dei esset, non rapinam arbitratus est esse aequalis Deo."

27 PL 111, 1540 B - 1542 A.

28 PL 103, 109 A.

29 PL 117, 468 AB. Sur l'attribution de cette *Expositio* à Haymon d'Auxerre, voir B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, 2e éd. (Oxford 1952) p. 39, n. 2, qui renvoie à E. Riggenbach, *Hist. Studien zum Hebräerbrief, Forschung. z. Gesch. des neutest. Kanons*, éd. T. Zahn, VIII (Leipzig 1907) pp. 41-201.

30 La *Patr. lat.*, qui reproduit (t. 119, 279-420) l'édition de la compilation de Florus publiée à Venise en 1543, mais sans transcire les extraits d'Augustin dont elle se contente de donner la référence, signale déjà, à propos de *Rom.*, XI, 36, cet emprunt au *De doctrina christiana* (cf. PL 119, 311). Celui-ci est identifié avec plus de précision dans la *Liste des extraits augustiniens* donnée par C. Charlier en appendice à son étude sur "La compilation augustinienne de Florus de Lyon sur l'Apôtre," *Rev. bénédictine*, 57 (1947), pp. 132-186, (*Appendice I*, p. 170). J'ai pu examiner cette citation dans un manuscrit venu de Corbie et copié en 1164 (*Paris, B. N. lat. 11575*, f° 66va). Détail qui n'est pas sans intérêt pour nous, Florus, si nous en croyons du moins ce manuscrit, comme Augustin, écrit bien *concordia*.

ni dans les collections de *Sentences* de l'école de Laon, ni chez Abélard et ses disciples, ni dans le *De sacramentis* de Hugues de Saint-Victor ou dans la *Summa sententiarum*.[31] Cette absence ne saurait trop nous étonner. Les commentaires scripturaires du Xᵉ, du XIᵉ et du début du XIIᵉ siècle qui ont alimenté les premières spéculations des écoles, bien qu'ils persistent à donner de *Rom.*,XI,36, une interprétation trinitaire inspirée d'Augustin, négligent tous, autant du moins que j'ai pu voir, le texte du *De doctrina christiana* qu'avait cité Florus.[32] Ainsi en est-il notamment de la *Glossa* issue de l'école d'Anselme de Laon que citera saint Thomas dans sa quatrième objection. L'examen de quelques uns des manuscrits que l'on compte généralement parmi les témoins les plus anciens de la *Glose* primitive[33] m'a permis de faire les constatations suivantes: la glose interlinéaire, tout d'abord, rapporte explicitement l'*ex ipso* de saint Paul au Père, le *per ipsum* au Fils et l'*in ipso* au Saint-Esprit; les gloses marginales rappellent qu'il faut voir dans les trois prépositions *ex, per, in*, une affirmation de la distinction des personnes et dans le datif singulier *ipsi* celle de l'identité de leur substance;[34] s'inspirant ensuite d'un passage du *De natura boni* d'Augustin dont s'était déjà souvenu Atton de Verceil, elles précisent que dans la formule *in ipso sunt omnia* on ne peut inclure dans l'*omnia* les péchés qui naissent en réalité de la volonté perverse de l'homme;[35] enfin, résumant brièvement l'enseignement que nous avions remarqué dans le *De Trinitate* (VI,10,12), elles reviennent sur cette idée que les créatures sont le vestige de la Trinité et que celle-ci est à la fois origine de toutes choses, beauté parfaite et bienheureuse délectation.[36]

31 Cf. L. Ott, *Untersuchungen zur theologischen Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik, BGPTM* 34 (Münster 1937), p. 569.

32 Cf. pp. ex. Atton de Verceil, *Expositio in epist. Pauli*, PL 134, 247 D- 248 B; Lanfranc, *In Pauli epist. commentarii*, PL 150, 144; Pseudo-Bruno le Chartreux, *Expositio in epist. Pauli*, PL 153, 99 D (commentaire attribué parfois à Raoul de Laon ou à Jean de Tours: voir sur ce point A. Landgraf, *Introducción a la historia de la literatura teológica de la escolástica incipiente*, Barcelona 1956, p. 88). Abélard, dans la brève explication qu'il nous donne de *Rom.*, XI, 36 (*Comment. in epist. Pauli ad Rom.*, éd. Buytaert, *Corp. christ., Cont. med.*, XI, Turnhout 1969, pp. 271-272), se contente de voir dans les trois expressions du verset de saint Paul une allusion à la création des choses, à leur conservation et à leur consommation. On retrouvera une explication analogue dans le *Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in epist. Pauli*, éd. A. Landgraf, *Public. in Mediaeval Studies*, II (Notre Dame 1937), p. 174, d'après lequel cependant l'*ex ipso* de saint Paul correspond à la "cause primordiale", et l'*in ipso* à la cause finale.

33 Je me suis reporté aux mss. *Paris, B.N. lat. 2579, 12322* et *14785*, signalés par A. Landgraf, *Introducción*, p. 98.

34 Cf. *Paris, B. N. lat. 14785*, f° 20v: "*Ex, per, in*, distinctionem personarum indicant; ipse identitatem significat substantie" (texte presque identique dans *Paris, B. N. lat. 2579* et *12322*; cf. aussi PL 114, 510 A). Sur l'origine augustinienne de ces affirmations, voir ci-dessus, n. 11.

35 Cf. ms. cit., ibid., ou PL 114, 510 B: "*Et in ipso sunt omnia* que naturaliter sunt, non peccata que ex uoluntate nascuntur, que naturam uitiant" (cf. Augustin, *De natura boni*, 28, PL 42, 560; Atton de Verceil, op. cit., PL 134, 247 D).

36 Cf. ms. cit., ibid.: "In creaturis uestigium apparet trinitatis. In trinitate summa est omnium

III. Les Commentaires sur l'*Epître aux Romains* de Gilbert de la Porrée, de Pierre Lombard et de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry

L'influence de la *Glossa* anselmienne sera désormais perceptible dans tous les commentaires de l'*Epître aux Romains* de XIIe siècle. Trois d'entre eux cependant, avant l'année 1150, vont s'enrichir d'apports nouveaux, empruntés le plus souvent à Augustin, et introduire ainsi la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, dans leur explication de *Rom.*, XI, 36.

Le premier et le plus ancien est celui que nous a laissé Gilbert de la Porrée dans sa *Glossa super epistolas Pauli.*[37] Cet ouvrage, malheureusement inédit, a dû être composé avant 1140, peut-être dès les années 1130,[38] c'est-à-dire au temps où Gilbert enseignait à Chartres.[39] Voici, établi d'après le manuscrit *Paris, B.N.lat.2580*, f. 32v-33r,[40] le texte de

rerum [origo] et perfecta pulchritudo et beatissima delectatio" (cf. Augustin, *De Trinitate*, VI, 10, 12, *Corp. christ.*, 50, p. 242, l. 46-49, et ci-dessus, n. 14).

37 L'authenticité de cette *Glossa* a été établie par H. Denifle, *Die abendländische Schriftausleger bis Luther über Justitia Dei (Rom., I, 17) und Justificatio* (Mayence 1905), p. 30 ss. On trouvera dans cet ouvrage une liste des manuscrits, enrichie depuis lors par A. Landgraf, *Introducción*, pp. 135-136. Ces listes ont été reproduites par H. C. van Elswijk, *Gilbert Porreta. Sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée, (Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense*, Etudes et documents, 33), (Louvain 1966), pp. 54-58.

38 Cf. H. C. van Elswijk, op. cit., pp. 57-58. Les données chronologiques dont on dispose pour déterminer la date de composition de la *Glossa* de Gilbert dépendent principalement d'un texte souvent cité de Géroch de Reichersberg. Dans son *Libellus de ordine donorum sancti Spiritus* (éd. D. et O. van den Eynde, *Gerhohi Opera inedita*, I, *Spicilegium Pontif. Athenaei Antoniani*, 8, Rome, 1955, p. 71), composé à la fin de l'année 1141 ou au début de l'année 1142 (cf. D. van den Eynde, *L'œuvre littéraire de Géroch de Reichersberg, Spicilegium Pontif. Ath. Antoniani*, 11, Rome 1957, pp. 76-77), Géroch s'en prend avec vivacité à l'interprétation restrictive de *Philipp.*, II, 9, proposée par un certain nombre de gloses sur saint Paul composées par les maîtres de son temps, et parmi lesquels "praecipui sunt magistri Anshelmus et magister Gillibertus et novissime Petrus Longabardus", c'est-à-dire Anselme de Laon, Gilbert de la Porrée et Pierre Lombard. Il ressort de ce témoignage que la *Glossa* de Gilbert, antérieure à celle de Pierre Lombard à laquelle on donne généralement le titre de *Collectanea in epistolas Pauli* et que l'adverbe *novissime* permet de considérer comme la plus récente des trois, a dû être composée avant 1140. C'est pour des raisons de critique interne que H. C. van Elswijk (op. cit., p. 58) estime "serrer la vérité de près en proposant les environs de 1130 comme date de composition de cette glose" de Gilbert.

39 A vrai dire, nous connaissons trop mal la chronologie exacte des déplacements de Gilbert pour être assuré qu'il ait composé sa *Glossa* à Chartres. Si nous nous en tenons cependant aux données biographiques rassemblées par H. C. van Elswijk, op. cit., pp. 15-28, Gilbert, après avoir fréquenté les écoles de Chartres, aurait séjourné à Laon jusqu'en 1117 environ, date à laquelle il serait devenu écolâtre de la cathédrale de Poitiers. Mais il serait revenu bientôt à Chartres où on le trouve en 1124 et où il sera certainement encore en 1137. Il demeurera dans cette ville jusqu'à son départ pour Paris, sans doute en 1141, avant de devenir évêque de Poitiers en 1141 ou 1142.

40 Ce manuscrit vient de Corbie (XIIe s.). J'ai collationné également les mss. *Paris, B.N. lat. 2581*, f. 26v (XIIe-XIIIe s.), *12028*, f. 38v-39r (Saint-Germain des Près, XIIe s.), *14414*, f. 23r-v (Saint-Victor, XIIIe s.), et *Mazarine 258*, f. 18r-v (Feuillants, XIIIe s.), mais ces quatre volumes ne nous offrent que des variantes mineures, parfois fautives. Ce texte avait déjà été publié d'après

l'explication que la *Glossa* de Gilbert de la Porrée consacre à *Rom.*,XI,36. Les chiffres entre crochets, intercalés dans le texte, signalent les différentes triades qui y apparaissent successivement:

> [1] *Quoniam omnia,* non dico peccata que nascuntur ex uoluntate peccantium et naturam uitiant, sed omnia que naturaliter fiunt,[41] sunt *ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso.* Sola enim gratia nos cum nondum essemus predestinauit, aduersos uocauit, impios iustificauit, terrenos glorificauit. Ne igitur simus ingrati, dicamus quod sequitur: *Ipsi gloria in secula. Amen.* Nota quod non ait: de ipso omnia, sed: *ex ipso.* Creata namque ex ipso sunt quoniam opus eius sunt, sed non sunt de ipso, hoc est de substantia eius. Filius autem per quem illa sunt, et spiritus sanctus in quo consistunt, non solum ex ipso, sed et de ipso, id est de substantia eius sunt,[42] neuter tamen uel decisus a plenitudine, uel decedens a singularitate substantie eius, sed substantie plenitudine totus eiusdemque singularitate unus deus, prorsus idem cum ipso.[43] Unde, quamuis personarum trinitatem insinuans uerba diuiserit, dicens: *ex ipso, et per ipsum, et in ipso,* tamen uno pronomine singulari unam trium personarum singularem substantiam debere intelligi demonstrauit, maxime cum postea non nisi semel et singulariter supposuerit: *ipsi,* significationem sine dubio ad intelligendam unam substantiam dirigens.[44] Illud quoque uigilanter attende ne quia patrem uolens intelligi dixit *ex ipso*, intelligas sic ex patre esse omnia ut neges esse uel ex filio uel ex spiritu sancto. Qui forte error subrepere posset ex eo quod filium uolens intelligi non ait : *ex quo,* sed: *per quem*, et spiritum sanctum uolens intelligi non ait: *ex quo,* sed: *in quo,* tamquam scilicet auctoritas qua ex patre sunt omnia ita sit patris quod neque filii neque spiritus sancti sit. [2] Et est quidem in patre auctoritas, in filio uero natiuitas, in spiritu sancto patris filiique communitas.[45] Sed pater non habet patrem, et ideo auctoritas que in eo est non est ex aliquo. Quoniam uero filius natiuitate est patris imago, perfecte implens illum cuius imago est, coequatur eidem, non ille imagini sue,[46] et ideo quecumque in filio est auctoritas ex eo est cui ipse perfectione imaginis coequatur. In spiritu sancto uero, qui non solum ex patre sed etiam ex filio procedit ut amborum non filius sed concordia sit, que inest auctoritas non nisi ex patre et filio ex quibus procedit est. Hoc ergo apostolus uolens intelligi ait: *ex quo omnia.* Nam sicut dictum est auc-

un ms. de Londres (*Brit. Mus., Add. 11853,* f. 41r-v) par M. Simon, "La Glose de l'Epître aux Romains de Gilbert de la Porrée," *Rev. d'histoire ecclésiastique* 52 (1957), pp. 74-75. Mais il était nécessaire de le reproduire ici pour la clarté de l'exposé.

41 *non dico — fiunt*: cf. *Glossa marginalis* (ci-dessus, n. 35); Augustin, *De natura boni,* 28, PL 42, 560.

42 *Nota quod — sunt*: cf. Atton de Verceil, *Exp. in epist. Pauli, ad loc.*, PL 134, 247 D; Augustin, *De natura boni*, loc. cit.

43 *neuter — ipso*: comparer Augustin, *De doctr. christ.*, I, 5, 5, l. 7-10.

44 *Unde — dirigens*: comparer *Glossa marginalis* (ci-dessus, n. 34).

45 *in patre — communitas*: cf. Hilaire, *De Trinitate*, IX, 27, et XII, 51, PL 10, 302 BC et 466 B; Augustin, *In Joh.*, tr. XCIX, 7, *Corp. christ.*, 36, p. 586, l. 4-6.

46 *Quoniam — imagini sue*: cf. Augustin, *De Trinitate*, VI, 10, 11, ed. cit., p. 241, l. 10-12.

toritas omnis in patre de nullo, et que [cumque][47] in filio non nisi ex patre, et quecumque in spiritu sancto non nisi ex patre et filio. [3] Nam in patre unitas, in filio equalitas, in spiritu sancto unitatis equalitatisque concordia. Et tamen hec tria unum omnia propter patrem, equalia omnia propter filium, conexa omnia propter spiritum sanctum.[48] [4] Huius trinitatis in creatura quomodo dignum est apparet uestigium,[49] nam omnia que arte diuina facta sunt, et unitatem quandam et speciem et ordinem in se ostendunt. Nam quicquid est, et unum aliquid est, sicut sunt nature corporum et ingenia animarum, et specie formatur ut corpora figuris et qualitatibus et anime artibus, et ordinem petit uel tenet ut corpora ponderibus et collocationibus et anime delectationibus.[50] [5] Quorum omnium in trinitate est summa origo, perfectissima pulcritudo et beatissima delectatio.[51] [6] Nam eternitas in patre, species in imagine, usus in munere;[52] [7] unum principium ad quod recurrimus, una forma quam sequitur, una gratia qua reconciliamur.[53] Itaque creatorem per ea que facta sunt conspicientes,[54] digne confitemur quod unus deus pater *ex quo omnia,* unus unigenitus christus *per quem omnia,* unum in omnibus donum spiritus *in quo omnia. Ipsi* secundum substantiam singulariter uni sit *gloria in secula. Amen.*

Ce commentaire demeure fidèle, dans l'ensemble, à l'interprétation trinitaire de *Rom.*, XI,36, inspirée d'Augustin, qu'on trouve dans les commentaires plus anciens dont il dépend d'ailleurs de toute évidence. Il reproduit cependant des formules d'Augustin et d'Hilaire qui, semble-t-il, n'avaient pas encore été citées ou ne l'avaient été que rarement. Mais surtout il organise son explication suivant un schéma caractérisé principalement par l'énumération d'une série de triades que les prédécesseurs de Gilbert n'avaient pas toutes connues ou auxquelles ils n'avaient prêté qu'une attention inégale. Ces triades sont au nombre de sept:

1° *Ex ipso, per ipsum, in ipso*, ou *ex quo, per quem, in quo* (*Rom.*, XI, 36, cité selon les deux versions utilisées déjà par Augustin et signalées ci-dessus, n. 10);

47 La leçon *quecumque,* plus satisfaisante pour l'équilibre de la phrase, est empruntée aux mss. *Paris, B. N. lat. 2581, 12028, 14414,* et *Mazarine 258.*

48 *Nam — sanctum*: cf. Augustin, *De doctr. christ.*, I, 5, 5, l. 15-18.

49 *Huius — uestigium*: cf. *Glossa marginalis* (ci-dessus, n. 36); Augustin, *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 12, ed. cit., p. 242, l. 46-47.

50 *nam omnia — delectationibus*: cf. Augustin, ibid., l. 37-44.

51 *Quorum — delectatio*: cf. *Glossa marginalis* (ci-dessus, n. 36); Augustin, loc. cit., l. 47-49.

52 *Nam — munere:* cf. Augustin, *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 11, ibid., p. 241, l. 2-3, citant Hilaire, *De Trinit.*, II, 1, PL 10, 51 A.

53 *unum — reconciliamur*: cf. Augustin, *De uera religione*, LV, 113, *Corp. christ.*, 32, p. 260, l. 138-139.

54 *creatorem-conspicientes*: cf. Augustin, *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 12, ed. cit., p. 242, l. 45-46, citant *Rom.*, I, 20.

2° *Auctoritas, natiuitas, communitas* (combinaison de Hilaire, *De Trinit.*, XII, 21, et Augustin, *In Joh.*, tr. XCIX, 7);
3° *Unitas, aequalitas, concordia* (Augustin, *De doctr. christ.*, 1, 5, 5);
4° *Unitas, species, ordo* (Augustin, *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 12);
5° *Summa origo, perfectissima pulchritudo, beatissima delectatio* (Augustin, *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 12);
6° *Aeternitas, species, usus* (Augustin, *De Trinit.*, VI, 10, 11, citant Hilaire, *De Trinit.*, II, 1);
7° *Principium, forma, gratia* (Augustin, *De uera religione*, LV, 113).

Cette énumération appelle quelques remarques. En ce qui concerne d'abord la triade n° 1, on notera les précisions, empruntées à Augustin, relatives à la signification de l'expression *ex ipso*, et, plus encore, l'insistance avec laquelle Gilbert met en garde le théologien contre toute interprétation qui tendrait à attribuer au Père, et à lui seul, la création des choses, sous prétexte que l'*Epître aux Romains* rapporte à la première personne de la Trinité l'expression *ex ipso*, alors qu'elle dit *per ipsum* à propos du Fils, et *in ipso* à propos du Saint-Esprit. On ne peut conclure de là, explique Gilbert, que l'*auctoritas* qui appartient au Père, n'appartient pas également au Fils et au Saint-Esprit. Il n'est pas impossible que l'auteur de la *Glossa* vise ici l'enseignement d'Abélard qui, en affirmant que la puissance devait être rapportée au Père comme lui appartenant "en propre" et "spécialement"[55] tendait à attribuer à la première personne de la Trinité un pouvoir créateur que n'auraient pas également partagé les deux autres personnes.[56] On notera d'ailleurs que Gilbert ne mentionne pas la triade *potentia, sapientia, bonitas*, qu'il devait critiquer plus tard dans son commentaire sur Boèce.[57] A ces dénominations empruntées directement aux attributs essentiels de la divinité, il préfère manifestement celles que garantissait davantage l'autorité des Pères et qui cherchaient dans la nature créée des analogies apparemment moins équivoques ou plus propres à rendre compte des relations trinitaires.

Sans doute est-ce pour ce dernier motif qu'il insiste longuement sur la triade n°2 (*auctoritas, natiuitas, communitas*) que les théologiens de l'école porrétaire commenteront souvent après lui. Gilbert semble être le premier à l'avoir présentée sous cette forme. Mais il s'inspire à la fois

55 Voir, entre autres textes, Abélard, *Theologia christiana*, I, 25, éd. Buytaert, *Corp. christ., Cont. med.*, 12 (Turnhout 1969), p. 81, l. 290-299; *Theologia scholarium* (dans la recension publiée sous le titre d'*Introd. ad theologiam*), I, 10, PL 178, 992 A, 994 AB.
56 C'est cette attribution spéciale de la puissance au Père que devaient condamner deux propositions du Concile de Sens, en 1140 (cf. ci-dessous, n. 106).
57 Cf. ci-dessous, n. 104.

de saint Hilaire qui avait employé à plusieurs reprises les mots *auctoritas* et *natiuitas* pour désigner le Père et le Fils,[58] et de saint Augustin qui avait déjà dit, on s'en souvient, que l'Esprit-Saint était la *communitas* du Père et du Fils.[59] Gilbert va d'ailleurs s'expliquer sur le sens de ces expressions. L'*auctoritas* convient au Père, parce que celui-ci n'a pas de Père et qu'en lui l'*auctoritas,* commune cependant aux trois personnes, n'est pas *ex aliquo,* mais *de nullo,* ce qui revient à dire que l'*auctoritas* qui lui est propre correspond à son innascibilité. La notion de *natiuitas* indique en revanche que le Fils procède du Père. Reprenant ici une formule d'Augustin, Gilbert rappelle d'ailleurs que le Fils est l'image du Père et qu'il ne peut être que son égal: le Père lui communique donc une *auctoritas* égale à la sienne. Quant au Saint-Esprit, à qui Gilbert rapporte dès maintenant la notion de *concordia,* synonyme de *communitas,* il tiendra du Père et du Fils une *auctoritas* égale, elle aussi, à celle des deux premières personnes dont il procède.

Ces explications qui nous font pénétrer dès maintenant au cœur du mystère trinitaire permettent aisément à Gilbert d'introduire aussitôt la triade n° 3 (*unitas, aequalitas, concordia*) dont la signification est très voisine de celle de la triade précédente. Cette troisième triade est présentée brièvement. La *Glossa* se contente de reproduire quelques lignes du *De doctrina christiana*[60] pour rappeler notamment que les trois éléments qui la constituent "sont tous un à cause du Père, tous égaux à cause du Fils, tous unis entre eux (*conexa*) à cause du Saint-Esprit." Les quatre triades suivantes seront énumérées plus rapidement encore. Les triades 4 et 5 sont présentées dans un contexte emprunté au passage du *De Trinitate* où Augustin lui-même en avait fait mention.[61] Quant aux triades 6 et 7, Gilbert se contente de les évoquer en reproduisant des formules venues du *De Trinitate* et du *De uera religione.*[62]

Il ressort de tout ceci que l'originalité de Gilbert a consisté principalement à regrouper une série de triades empruntées à Augustin ou à Hilaire et parmi lesquelles il faut remarquer la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia,* dont nous n'avions retrouvé la trace, jusqu'à présent, que dans la compilation de Florus de Lyon. Le schéma dû ainsi à l'initiative et à l'érudition de cette *Glossa* n'allait pas tarder à servir de cadre à d'autres spéculations.

58 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 45. Le mot *communitas* n'apparait pas dans les textes où Hilaire fait mention de l'*auctoritas* et de la *natiuitas.*
59 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 21.
60 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 48.
61 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 50-51.
62 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 52-53.

Le second commentaire de l'*Epître aux Romains* qui a fait une place à la triade du *De doctrina christiana* est celui que nous a laissé Pierre Lombard dans ses *Collectanea in epistolas Pauli,* composés vraisemblablement entre 1138-1139 et 1141.[63] Cet ouvrage dépend certainement du précédent, notamment en ce qui concerne l'explication de *Rom.*, XI,36. Nous y retrouvons ici à peu près tout ce que nous avions lu dans la *Glossa* de Gilbert. Deux exceptions notables cependant: Pierre Lombard ne fait aucune mention des deux triades *auctoritas, natiuitas, communitas,* et *aeternitas, species, usus,* inspirées principalement, l'une et l'autre, du *De Trinitate* d'Hilaire de Poitiers. Pourquoi cette double omission? Il est évidemment bien difficile de le savoir. On peut conjecturer cependant que le Lombard a négligé la première de ces deux triades parce qu'il n'a pas réussi à en découvrir l'origine composite et qu'elle lui a semblé dès lors quelque peu suspecte. Quant à la seconde, elle a dû lui paraître chargée d'obscurité, comme il le dira plus tard très explicitement dans ses *Sententiae.*[64]

Pour le reste, le commentaire de Pierre Lombard est beaucoup plus développé que celui de son prédécesseur. Les *Collectanea*, qui prennent soin d'indiquer leurs sources patristiques, citent ici *in extenso* de longs passages d'Augustin auxquels la *Glossa* de Gilbert n'avait emprunté que quelques mots ou tout au plus une ou deux phrases. Ceci est particulièrement sensible à trois reprises. Le Lombard reproduit d'abord les deux longs extraits du *De Trinitate* d'Augustin, relatifs aux triades *origo, pulchritudo, delectatio,* et *unitas, species, ordo,* dont Gilbert n'avait cité que quelques lignes;[65] il recopie intégralement la conclusion

63 Cf. D. Van den Eynde, *Essai chronologique sur l'œuvre littéraire de Pierre Lombard,* dans *Miscellanea Lombardiana* (Novare 1953), pp. 53-55. C'est grâce au témoignage de Géroch de Reichersberg qui mentionne le commentaire du Lombard sur les *Epîtres* de saint Paul dans son *Libellus de ordine donorum sancti Spiritus*, rédigé en 1141-1142 (cf. ci-dessus, n. 38), que le P. van den Eynde a pu avancer que les *Collectanea* avaient été composés avant 1141. Mais cette certitude a été récemment ébranlée par une remarque de P. Classen, *Gerhoch von Reichersberg* (Wiesbaden 1960), p. 412. Ce dernier a fait observer qu'il n'était pas absolument impossible que les mots *et novissime Petrus Longabardus* qu'on lit dans le *Libellus* aient été ajoutés par Géroch lui-même, longtemps après la publication de son traité. Nous ne possédons en effet qu'un seul manuscrit du *Libellus,* le *Reichersbergensis VIII,* que Géroch a fait transcrire vers la fin de sa vie et que P. Classen, op. cit., p. 466, date des années 1160-1166. Le R. P. D. van den Eynde, *L'œuvre littéraire de Géroch de Reichersberg* (Rome 1957), pp. 70-71, a constaté que, dans ce volume, "au moins un passage du *Libellus* porte des traces visibles d'un remaniement postérieur" à la rédaction primitile; il pense que "le cas n'est sans doute pas isolé", mais que, faute "de point de comparaisons suffisants, il n'est plus possible de faire le départ exact entre le texte original et ses remaniements."

64 Cf. *Sent.*, I, d. 31, 2 (Quaracchi 1916), pp. 192-195.

65 Cf. *Collectanea, In epist. ad Rom.*, XI,33-36, PL 191, 1493 C 1-11, qui cite Augustin, *De Trinit.*, VI,10,12, ed. cit., p. 242, l. 45-50, et p. 243, l. 54-57 et 60-61 (cf. ci-dessus, n. 49,51), et *Collectanea,* loc. cit., 1495 A 1 - C 7, qui cite Augustin, ibid., VI,10,11-12, ed. cit., pp. 241-242, l. 9-42 (cf. ci-dessus, n. 46,50).

du *De uera religione* où il est question de la triade *principium, forma, gratia,* que Gilbert n'avait fait que mentionner rapidement;[66] enfin et surtout il reproduit en entier le paragraphe du *De doctrina christiana* que Florus de Lyon avait déjà recopié dans sa compilation et que Gilbert n'avait que partiellement cité lorsqu'il avait introduit dans sa *Glossa* la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia.*[67] En reproduisant ce texte du *De doctrina christiana,* Pierre Lombard, comme Augustin et comme Gilbert, écrit bien *concordia.* C'est en tout cas la leçon qu'a retenue l'édition imprimée[68] et qu'on retrouve dans la plupart des manuscrits. Parmi ceux-ci, cependant, quelques uns écrivent *connexio*[69] ou *concordia uel connexio.*[70] Cette variante témoigne de l'hésitation de certains copistes. Nous ne tarderons pas à en retrouver, sinon l'explication, du moins d'autres exemples.

Un troisième commentaire antérieur à l'année 1150 a fait enfin mention de la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia.* Il s'agit de l'*Expositio in epistolam ad Romanos* de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry. Nous ne connaissons pas la date exacte de cet ouvrage. Nous savons cependant qu'il est antérieur à l'*Epistola ad fratres de Monte-Dei* où Guillaume lui-même le met au nombre des écrits qu'il a déjà rédigés et dont il nous donne la liste.[71] Cette indication a permis naguère à A. Wilmart de préciser que cette *Expositio* avait été certainement rédigée entre 1135 et 1145.[72] On a donc tout lieu de penser qu'elle est postérieure de quelques années à la *Glossa* de Gilbert, peut-être même aux *Collectanea* de Pierre Lombard dont elle semble bien s'inspirer. Le bref développement que Guillaume y consacre à *Rom.*, XI,36, ne fait en effet que citer des textes d'Augustin que nous avions déjà rencontrés dans le commentaire du Lombard. L'*Expositio* reproduit d'abord la plus grande partie du passage du *De uera religione* que nous avions remarqué dans les *Collectanea*;[73] aussitôt après, elle cite le paragraphe du *De doctrina christiana*

66 Cf. *Collectanea,* loc. cit., 1494 A 3 - C 1, qui cite Augustin, *De uera religione*, LV, 113, ed. cit., pp. 259-260, l. 123-145 (cf. ci-dessus, n. 53).

67 Cf. *Collectanea,* loc. cit., 1494 C 1 - D 8, qui cite Augustin, *De doctr. christ.*, I,5,5, ed. cit., p. 9, l. 1-18 (cf. ci-dessus, n. 48).

68 PL 191, 1494 D 5-6. L'édition de Migne reproduit celle qui avait été publiée à Paris en 1535.

69 Ainsi le ms. *Paris, B.N. Lat. 14266*, f. 78r, venu de Saint-Victor et copié au XIIe s.

70 Ms. *Paris, B.N. Lat. 15238*, f. 50ra (Sorbonne, XIIIe s.). J'ai examiné un grand nombre d'autres manuscrits parisiens qui conservent tous la leçon *concordia.*

71 Cf. *Epist. ad fratres de Monte-Dei*, 4, éd. M.-M.Davy (*Etudes de philosophie médiévale*, 29 (Paris 1940), p. 67.

72 Cf. A. Wilmart, "La série et la date des écrits de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry", *Revue Mabillon,* 14 (1924), pp. 157-167.

73 Cf. Guillaume de S.-T., *Exposit.*, PL 180, 669 A 6 - 670 A 5, qui cite Augustin, *De uera relig.*, LV, 113, ed. cit., pp. 259-260, l. 123-141 (cf. ci-dessus, n. 66).

relatif à la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia.*[74] L'édition de Migne qui reproduit celle de la *Bibliotheca Cisterciensis* de Tissier, écrit pourtant ici, non pas *concordia,* mais *connexio,*[75] et rien ne nous permet de penser que cette leçon ne vient pas de Guillaume lui-même. L'*Expositio* de l'abbé de Saint-Thierry s'achève par une courte citation du *De Trinitate* d'Augustin, présente, elle aussi, dans les *Collectanea* de Pierre Lombard.[76]

Il ressort des textes de Gilbert de la Porrée, de Pierre Lombard et de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry qu'on vient de signaler, que la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia* ou *connexio,* avait définitivement pris place dans les commentaires de *Rom.*, XI,36, antérieurs à 1150. Elle n'allait pas tarder à être citée et utilisée par des ouvrages plus spéculatifs ou plus systématiques.

IV. Les Maîtres Chartrains

Ce sont les maîtres chartrains qui ont été les premiers à donner de la formule du *De doctrina christiana*, isolée de son contexte, une interprétation théologique détachée de celle du verset de l'*Epître aux Romains* à laquelle elle avait été primitivement associée. Dans son *De sex dierum operibus*,[77] suivant une méthode qui s'inspirait de celle d'Anselme de Cantorbéry,[78] Thierry de Chartres avait en effet voulu chercher des "raisons" et des "preuves" qui fussent capables de le conduire à la connaissance des trois personnes. Il ne s'agissait pas pour lui, bien entendu, de proposer une démonstration rigoureuse qui aurait permis au théologien ou au philosophe de s'élever par ses seules forces jusqu'au mystère insondable de la Trinité, mais de "rejoindre, par une démarche intellectuelle, une donnée dont l'âme était déjà en possession par la foi."[79] C'est aux arts libéraux, et plus spécialement à

74 Cf. Guillaume de S.-T., ibid., 670 A5-B 5, qui cite Augustin, *De doctr. christ.*, I,5,5, ed. cit., p. 9, l. 1-18 (cf. ci-dessus, n. 67).

75 PL 180, 670 B 3. Je n'ai pu vérifier la présence de cette leçon dans l'unique manuscrit de l'*Expositio* (*Charleville, 172*) que signale A. Wilmart, art. cit., p. 164, n. 1.

76 Op. cit., 670 B 5-8, qui cite Augustin, *De Trinitate*, VI,10,12, ed. cit., p. 243, l. 60-62. La citation de Guillaume est ici plus fidèle à Augustin que celle de Pierre Lombard, *Collectanea*, PL 191, 1493 C 10-11.

77 Ed. N. Haring, "The Creation and Creator of the World according to Thierry of Chartres and Clarembald of Arras," *AHDLMA*, 22, 1955 (1956), 30-47, pp. 194-200.

78 La parenté indéniable de la méthode de Thiery de Chartres avec celle d'Anselme de Cantorbéry a été signalée par L. Ott, *Untersuchungen zur Briefliteratur der Frühscholatik, BGPTMA*, 34, 1937, p. 570, et par E. Jeauneau, "Mathématiques et Trinité chez Thierry de Chartres", dans *Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter*; *Vorträge des II. Internationalen Kongress für mittelalterliche Philosphie*, Köln 31 Aug. — 6 Sept. 1961, (Berlin 1963), pp. 291-292.

79 E. Jeauneau, op. cit., p. 291. Un passage du commentaire sur le *De Trinitate* de Boèce que nous a laissé Clarembaud d'Arras (éd. W. Jansen, *Der Kommentar des Clarenbaldus von Arras zu*

l'arithmétique, que Thierry voulut emprunter ces "raisons." L'exposé de ce qu'il appelle des *probationes arithmeticae*,[80] dont bien des éléments viennent du *De arithmetica* de Boèce, part de la relation qui existe entre "l'Un et l'autre," pour établir ensuite que, en Dieu, "l'Unité engendrée" ne peut être "inférieure ou supérieure à l'Unité qui l'engendre," mais doit lui être "en tout point égale"; cette Unité engendrée est donc "l'Egalité de l'Unité."[81] Dans la conclusion de son traité, Thierry annonce qu'il lui reste maintenant à expliquer comment la connexion (*connexio*) de l'égalité et de l'unité procède de l'une et de l'autre.[82] Le *De sex dierum principiis*, tel du moins qu'il est parvenu jusqu'à nous, ne nous a pas fourni l'explication ainsi promise. Mais les disciples de Thierry, s'inspirant selon toute vraisemblance de son enseignement, ne devaient pas tarder à nous la donner à sa place et à montrer qu'il faut admettre, entre l'Unité qui engendre et l'Egalité qui est engendrée, l'existence d'un troisième terme, relation d'amour qui n'est autre que le Saint-Esprit et à laquelle les maîtres chartrains, à la suite de Thierry lui-même, donneront le nom de *connexio*. Ce mot reparaît dans cinq commentaires chartrains du *De Trinitate* de Boèce qu'on a pris l'habitude de désigner par leur incipit (*Librum hunc, Quae sit, Aggreditur, Tria sunt, In titulo*) et qui s'étendent longuement sur la génération de l'*aequalitas* par l'*unitas* et sur la procession de la *connexio*.[83] On le trouvera, dans un contexte analogue, dans le commentaire du même *De Trinitate* que nous a laissé Clarembaud d'Arras,[84] puis

Boethius De Trinitate, Breslauer Studien zur historischen Theologie, 8, Breslau, 1926, p. 61*), cité et traduit par E. Jeauneau, ibid., p. 292, rend bien compte à cet égard des intentions de Thierry et des maîtres chartrains qui devaient reproduire sa démonstration: "Nous n'avons pas la prétention, écrit Clarembaud, de pouvoir atteindre pleinement à la connaissance de la génération (du Verbe) et de la procession (du Saint-Esprit), car nous croyons que cela est impossible à l'homme. Nous voulons seulement fournir aux apologistes catholiques le moyen de se défendre contre les Juifs et les hérétiques, lesquels s'en tiennent à l'unité divine avec une telle obstination, qu'ils rejettent absolument la trinité des personnes."

80 Thierry de Chartres, op. cit., 30, p. 194.

81 J'emprunte ces formules à l'exposé de E. Jeauneau, op. cit., pp. 290-291. Cf. Thierry de Chartres, op. cit., 36-41, p. 196-198.

82 Cf. Thierry de Chartres, op. cit., 47, p. 200.

83 Cf. *Librum hunc*, éd. W. Jansen, *Der Kommentar...*, p. 12*-14* ou éd. N. Haring, "Two Commentaries on Boethius (*De Trinitate* et *De hebdomadibus*) by Thierry de Chartres," *AHDLMA*, 27, 1960 (1961), 30-38, pp. 100-102; *Quae sit*, éd. Haring, "The Lectures of Thierry de Chartres on Boethius' *De Trinitate*," *AHDLMA*, 25, 1958 (1959), V, 16 et VII, 5-7, pp. 215 et 222-223; *Aggreditur populum*, éd. Haring, "A Commentary on Boethius' de Trinitate by Thierry of Chartres (Anonymus Berolinensis)," *AHDLMA*, 23, 1956 (1957), V, 17-21, pp. 319-321; *Tria sunt*, éd. Haring, "A short Treatise on the Trinity from the School of Thierry of Chartres," *Mediaeval Studies*, 18, (1956), 12, p. 131; *In titulo* (imprimé parmi les œuvres de Bède le Vénérable), PL, 95, 395 B. L'attribution à Thierry de Chartres des commentaires *Librum hunc, Quae sit* et *Aggreditur*, proposée par le R. P. Haring, a été contestée par L. Bataillon, *Rev. des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 43, (1959), pp. 692-693, et 46, (1962), p.508. Leur origine chartraine est néanmoins certaine.

dans un *De quinque septenis* imprimé parmi les œuvres de Jean de Salisbury.[85]

Un lien avait été certainement établi de bonne heure entre ces raisonnements mathématiques et la triade du *De doctrina christiana* dont ils retrouvaient l'inspiration et, pour une part au moins, le vocabulaire. Parmi les traités qu'on vient de signaler, cinq se réfèrent explicitement au texte d'Augustin[86] qu'ils modifient cependant en substituant *connexio* à *concordia.* Aucune tradition textuelle n'autorisait une telle substitution. Celle-ci pouvait cependant trouver une certaine justification dans le *De doctrina christiana* lui-même puisque, on s'en souvient, Augustin avait eu recours au participe passé *conexa* pour dire que l'*unitas,* l'*aequalitas* et la *concordia* étaient étroitement unies entre elles au sein de la Trinité. Est-ce à dire que la formule du *De doctrina christiana* soit à l'origine des spéculations chartraines ou même qu'elle ait été déjà présente à l'esprit de Thierry au moment où celui-ci entreprit de s'expliquer sur la génération de l'Egalité et la procession de la Connexion? Il est évidemment bien difficile de se prononcer à ce sujet. Pour ma part, cependant, je serais porté à croire que c'est seulement après avoir élaboré leurs démonstrations mathématiques et après avoir fixé leur vocabulaire que les chartrains ont remarqué et signalé à quel point la formule du *De doctrina christiana* s'accordait avec leurs propres raisonnements. S'il en était ainsi, on pourrait également penser que la *Glossa in epistolas Pauli* de Gilbert de la Porrée, élaborée en milieu chartrain, a pu contribuer à attirer l'attention de Thierry ou celle de ses disciples sur la triade du *De doctrina christiana.*

Cette dernière hypothèse pourrait trouver un appui dans la chronologie des traités qu'on vient de citer. Sans doute ne connaissons-nous pas exactement la date à laquelle chacun d'eux a été rédigé. Mais si nous rassemblons les indications fournies par W. Jansen et par le R. P. Haring, nous constatons que les premiers traités chartrains qui ont exposé les spéculations dont on vient de parler, mais sans citer la formule du *De doctrina christiana,* ont été rédigés vraisemblablement avant 1135,[87] et que ceux qui la citent datent approximativement des

84 Ed. W. Jansen, op. cit., pp. 61*-63*.

85 PL 199, 961 B.

86 A savoir les commentaires *Quae sit, Aggreditur, Tria sunt, In titulo,* et le traité *De quinque septenis.*

87 D'après W. Jansen, op. cit., pp.134-136, le *De sex dierum operibus* de Thierry de Chartres est certainement antérieur au commentaire *Librum hunc* dont N. Haring, "Two commentaries", *AHDLMA*, 27, 1960 (1961), p.75, nous dit qu'il a dû être composé aux alentours de l'année 1135, peut-être même plus tôt. Ces deux traités ne citent ni l'un ni l'autre le *De doctrina christiana.* La formule d'Augustin n'est pas citée non plus par le commentaire de Clarembaud d'Arras signalé ci-dessus (cf. n. 79 et 84), beaucoup plus tardif que les traités précédents puisqu'il a été composé après la mort de saint Bernard à laquelle il fait allusion, c'est-à-dire après août 1153 (cf. W. Jan-

années 1140-1150.[88] Puisque, comme on l'a vu, la *Glossa in epistolas Pauli* de Gilbert de la Porrée, a été rédigée avant 1140, peut-être même dès 1130, au temps où ce dernier enseignait à Chartres,[89] l'hypothèse selon laquelle la *Glose* de Gilbert ne serait pas étrangère à l'apparition, dans les commentaires chartrains, de la citation du *De doctrina christiana,* devient pour le moins vraisemblable. Les commentateurs de Boèce auraient substitué au mot *concordia* le mot *connexio,* étranger à Augustin et à la *Glossa* de Gilbert, parce qu'ils auraient eu recours à ce terme, aux résonances plus métaphysiques et moins psychologiques, avant même qu'ils eussent relu le *De doctrina christiana.* Quoi qu'il en soit, c'est sans doute sous l'influence des maîtres chartrains que le mot *connexio* a fait dans le vocabulaire théologique du XII[e] siècle cette irruption que nous avons remarquée déjà dans l'*Expositio in epistolam ad Romanos* de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry et dans certains manuscrits des *Collectanea* de Pierre Lombard et dont nous retrouverons bientôt d'autres témoignages.

Les spéculations chartraines ne devaient plus trouver cependant que des échos assez rares ou au moins assourdis. Sans doute le vocabulaire du *De Trinitate* d'Achard de Saint-Victor, antérieur à l'année 1161, s'inspire-t-il encore de celui de Thierry de Chartres,[90] mais bien que cet ouvrage affirme que l'Esprit-Saint est la *connexio* du Père et du Fils,[91] il ne cite pas le texte du *De doctrina christiana.* Le mot *connexio* reparaît d'ailleurs à plusieurs reprises dans les écrits victorins, notamment dans une prose attribuée à Adam de Saint-Victor,[92] dans le *De tribus ap-*

sen, op. cit., p.11). Mais ce commentaire dépend directement du *De sex dierum operibus* de Thierry de Chartres.

88 D'après N. Haring, en effet, le commentaire *Quae sit* serait probablement plus tardif que le *Librum hunc* (cf. "The lectures...," *AHDLMA*, 25, 1958 (1959), pp. 121-122), mais serait de peu antérieur au commentaire *Aggreditur,* composé lui-même entre 1145 et 1150 (cf. ibid., et "A Commentary...", *AHDLMA*, 23, 1956 (1957), pp. 264-265). Quant au commentaire *Tria sunt,* il précéderait de peu le commentaire *In titulo,* composé après le concile de Reims, c'est-à-dire après 1148. Cf. "A short Treatise", *Med. Stud.*, 18 (1956), pp. 129 et 126.

89 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 38-39.

90 Cf. M.-T. d'Alverny, "Achard de Saint-Victor: De Trinitate — De unitate et pluralitate creaturum," *RTAM*, 21 (1954), p. 303. Ce traité a été certainement composé avant qu'Achard ne soit nommé évêque d'Avranches en 1161, probablement même avant qu'il ne soit élu abbé de Saint-Victor en 1155. Sur ce *De Trinitate,* voir aussi J. Châtillon, *Théologie, spiritualité et méthaphysique dans l'œuvre oratoire d'Achard de Saint-Victor (Etudes de philosophie médiévale,* LVIII), (Paris 1969), pp. 119-128.

91 Achard de Saint-Victor, *De Trinitate*, II, 3: "Ipse [Spiritus] siquidem Patris et Filii est connexio"; et *ibid.*, II, 4: "...ut nam ad Filium discretio, sic ad Spiritum sanctum...connexio." Je cite ici la transcription provisoire du *De Trinitate* d'Achard, établie d'après le ms. *Padoue, Anton. Scaff. V.89*, que M[lle] M.-T. d'Alverny a eu l'obligeance de me communiquer et dont je la remercie vivement.

92 Cf. Prose XXII, str. 5, éd. L. Gautier, *Œuvres poétiques d'Adam de Saint-Victor*, I (Paris 1858), p.145 (PL 196, 1458), v. 25-30:

"Patri proles est aequalis,
Nec hoc tollit personalis,

propriatis de Richard sur lequel nous reviendrons plus loin,[93] et dans un sermon inédit pour la fête de la Purification du prieur Gauthier[94]; mais si ces derniers textes évoquent la triade augustinienne, celui de Gauthier de Saint-Victor est le seul qui fasse allusion à des spéculations sur les nombres susceptibles de rappeler celles des Chartrains. La triade *unitas, aequalitas, connexio*, reparaît en revanche, dans un contexte néo-platonicien dont les résonances chartraines ont été remarquées, dans les *Theologicae regulae* d'Alain de Lille.[95] On en reconnaît également les deux premiers termes (*unitas, aequalitas*) dans une curieuse définition de la vérité, inspirée à son tour des vues de Thierry de Chartres, due au Cistercien Hélinand de Froidmont.[96] Le souvenir de ces démonstrations mathématiques tendra néanmoins à s'estomper jusqu'à ce que Nicolas de Cues, au XVe siècle, leur prête à nouveau attention.[97] On en redécouvrira seulement quelques échos dans un certain nombre d'écrits de la fin du XIIe siècle et du début du XIIIe que nous aurons bientôt l'occasion de signaler, mais dont les sources principales doivent être cherchées ailleurs.

Amborum distinctio.
Patri compar Filioque,
Spiritalis ab utroque
Procedit connexio."

93 Cf. ci-dessous, n. 119.

94 Ms. *Paris, B.N. lat. 14589*, f.28v-29r: "Per esse [homo] emulatur Patrem, per intelligere Filium, per uiuere Spiritum sanctum. Hec enim tria, etsi sint communia tribus personis, tamen singula ad singulas personas referuntur, ut potentia, sapientia, bonitas, unitas, equalitas, concordia. Unde in Patre unitas, in Filio equalitas, in Spiritu sancto unitatis equalitatis connexio... Unitas ad Patris personam respicit, quia cum ipsa sit origo omnium numerorum, non habet a quo sit... Equalitas autem ideo [Filius] dicitur, quia in ipso occurrit prima pluralitas et prima dualitas, uelut secunda unitas primaque distinctio uel discretio, quod totum nichil aliud est nisi ut ostendatur esse a solo Patre, ita quod est ei equalis... Concordia uel connexio dicitur amborum [Spiritus] ut ostendatur esse ab utroque, ita quod utrique consubstantialis." Sur les sermons de Gauthier, qui fut élu prieur de l'abbaye de Saint-Victor à la mort de Richard, en 1173, voir J. Châtillon, "Sermons et prédicateurs victorins de la seconde moitié du XIIe siècle," *AHDLMA*, 32, 1965 (1966), pp. 40-44.

95 Cf. *Regula IV*, PL, 210, 625 AB, et E. Jeauneau, *Note sur l'Ecole de Chartres* (Chartres 1965), p. 6, n. 29 (extrait du *Bulletin de la Société archéologique d'Eure-et-Loir*, Mémoires, t. 23, 1964, qui reproduit une étude puliée dans *Studi mediaevali*, 3e sér., V, 2, 1964, pp. 821-865). La *Reg. IV* d'Alain de Lille renvoie à la *Reg. III* (ibid., 624 CD) qui cite elle-même un texte du Ps.-Hermes Trismegiste (*Liber XXIV philosophorum*, éd. C. Bäumker, *Abhandlungen aus dem Gebiete der Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte. Festgabe Hertling*, Fribourg en Br. 1913, p. 31): "Monas gignit monadem, et in se suum reflectit ardorem." Saint Thomas d'Aquin (*Sum. theol.*, I, q. 32, art. 1, ad 1) refusera plus tard toute signification trinitaire à cette *auctoritas*. Signalons qu'Alain de Lille se souvient également de la triade du *De doctrina christiana* dans un *Sermo de Trinitate* publié par Mlle M.-Th. d'Alverny, *Alain de Lille* (*Etudes de philosophie médiévale*, 52) (Paris 1965), p. 254.

96 Cf. *Sermo II in Natali Domini*, PL 212, 489 C - 490 D, analysé par M.-D. Chenu, "Une définition pythagoricienne de la vérité au moyen âge," *AHDLMA*, 28 (1961), pp. 7-13. Hélinand fut abbé de Froidmont au début du XIIIe siècle.

97 Cf. E. Jeauneau, op. cit., p. 7, qui renvoie à Nicolas de Cues, *De docta ignorantia*, I,7-9, éd. E. Hoffmann et R. Klibansky (Leipzig 1932), pp. 14-19, et I,24, ibid., pp. 48-51, et au *De pace fidei*, ed. R. Klibansky et H. Bascour (Londres 1956), p. 21, 5-10, et p. 25, 1-6.

V. Les *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard et le *De tribus appropriatis* de Richard de Saint-Victor: l'influence d'Abélard

La triade du *De doctrina christiana* va être en effet de plus en plus souvent citée dans les écrits théologiques de la seconde moitié du XIIe siècle. Les maîtres de ce temps considéreront le texte d'Augustin, même lorsqu'ils n'en connaîtront pas l'origine, comme une *auctoritas* qu'on ne peut négliger mais qui, en même temps, pose au théologien des problèmes d'interprétation délicats. Ils lui feront donc bien vite subir un traitement théologique nouveau. Jusqu'à présent, les commentateurs de l'*Epître aux Romains* s'étaient contenté de reproduire la formule et les brèves explications d'Augustin. Les maîtres chartrains, quant à eux, s'étaient longuement expliqué sur les rapports de l'unité, de l'égalité et de la *connexio*, mais lorsqu'ils en étaient arrivés au texte du *De doctrina christiana*, ils s'étaient borné à leur tour à affirmer, à la suite d'Augustin, que l'unité était "dans" le Père, l'égalité "dans" le Fils et la *connexio* "dans" le Saint-Esprit. Nul ne s'était interrogé vraiment sur la nature et la signification de cette présence "dans" chacune des trois personnes de l'unité, de l'égalité et de la *connexio*. Nul ne s'était encore hasardé, à propos des trois éléments de cette triade, à parler de "propriétés" ou même d'"attribution," moins encore d'"appropriation."

La problématique et le vocabulaire théologiques n'allaient pas tarder à subir une évolution. Celle-ci serait le fruit d'un rapprochement bientôt opéré entre les triades énumérées par la *Glossa* de Gilbert de la Porrée ou les *Collectanea* de Pierre Lombard, et la triade *potentia, sapientia, bonitas*, dont l'interprétation trinitaire avait provoqué, durant la première moitié du XIIe siècle, des conflits théologiques aigus.

L'histoire de ces controverses est bien connue. C'est Abélard qui avait été le premier, semble-t-il, à rapporter explictement la puissance au Père, la sagesse au Fils et la bonté au Saint-Esprit, et à accumuler en faveur de sa thèse une masse assez considérable de témoignages bibliques et surtout patristiques, empruntés principalement à Augustin.[98] Bien qu'il prît soin de rappeler que ces trois attributs ap-

98 Cf. notamment *Theologia scholarium (Introd. ad theologiam)*, I, 8-12, et II, 13-14, PL 178, 989-998 et 1069-1072; *Theologia christiana*, I, 4-7, 15-33, et IV, 86-91, éd. Buytaert, *Corp. christ., Cont. med.*, XI, pp. 73-75, 77-86, et 306-309; *Theologia summi boni*, éd. Ostlender, *BGPTM*, 35, 2-3 (Münster 1939), pp. 85-86; *Apologia*, éd. Ruf, dans P. Ruf — M. Grabmann, *Ein neu aufgefundenes Bruchstük der Apologia Abälards (Sitzungberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Philos.-hist. Abteilung, 1930, H.5), (Münich 1930), p. 22. Le problème de l'origine de cette triade s'était posé de bonne heure. Robert de Melun, défenseur d'Abélard (cf. ci-dessous, n. 107), déclare que l'attribution de ces trois noms aux trois personnes divines est professée par les

partenaient également aux trois personnes, l'auteur de la *Theologia scholarium* n'en disait pas moins clairement que la puissance, la sagesse et la bonté pouvaient être attribuées "spécialement" au Père, au Fils ou à l'Esprit-Saint comme s'ils leur appartenaient "en propre."[99] L'interprétation de ces formules eût exigé qu'on s'interrogeât sur la signification qu'elles revêtaient chez Abélard. Il n'est pas douteux que, pour lui, les mots humains sont toujours incapables de rendre compte d'une manière adéquate de la réalité divine et que par conséquent des mots tels que "propre," "propriété" ou "attribution," en théologie trinitaire, ne peuvent être entendus en leur sens original.[100] Toujours est-il qu'un théologien aussi averti que Hugues de Saint-Victor consentira lui aussi, non sans précautions, il est vrai, à rapporter la puissance au Père, la sagesse au Fils et la bonté ou la bénignité au Saint-Esprit.[101] Beaucoup d'autres maîtres de ce temps tiendront des

"saints docteurs" (*Sententiae*, I, p. III, c. 17, éd. R.M. Martin-R.M. Gallet, *Œuvres de Robert de Melun*, t. III/2, Louvain 1952, p. 65, l. 8-9) et s'en prend un peu plus loin à ceux qui en contestent l'origine augustinienne: on pourrait très facilement convaincre de mensonge, déclare-t-il, quiconque nierait qu'elle a été enseignée par Augustin (ibid., c. 18, p. 66, l. 1-23). Mais lui-même ne cite aucun texte à l'appui de cette affirmation catégorique, et son éditeur (op. cit., p. 65; en note) se contente de fournir un certain nombre de références patristiques, dont quelques unes avaient déjà été signalées par Abélard, et auxquelles il faut joindre celles que nous donne J. Ribaillier dans Richard de Saint-Victor, *Opuscules théologiques (Textes philosophiques du moyen âge*, 15 (Paris 1967), p. 185, n. 1. Mais si ces textes parlent parfois de la puissance du Père, de la sagesse du Fils ou de la bonté de l'Esprit-Saint, aucun d'entre eux ne rapporte simultanément et distinctement ces trois attributs aux trois personnes divines. Il est donc exagéré de dire, comme l'a fait R. Baron, *Science et sagesse chez Hugues de Saint-Victor* (Paris 1957), p. 26, n. 114, que "cette triade est tout à fait traditionnelle." Plus exact me paraît être le jugement de D. van den Eynde, *Essai sur la succession et la date des écrits de Hugues de Saint-Victor (Spicilegium Pont. Athen. Antoniani*, 13), (Rome 1960), p. 68, n. 115, qui écrit: "Pour autant que je sache, la littérature antérieure à Abélard ne connaît pas la triade spécifique *potentia* — *sapientia* — -*benignitas* et ne l'applique pas, comme telle, aux trois personnes de la Trinité. Malgré l'importance qu'il lui attribue, le maître du Pallet n'a pas trouvé le moyen de l'introduire dans sa collection de textes patristiques qui s'appelle *Sic et non*, pour la simple raison que les textes à propos font défaut."

99 Traitant de ces diverses attributions, Abélard emploie fréquemment les deux adverbes *proprie* et *specialiter* que ses adversaires lui reprocheront vivement. Voir p.ex. *Theologia scholarium (Introd. ad theologiam*), I, 10, PL 178, 991 CD, 992 AC, 994 AC, 995 A et D, etc.

100 Sur les problèmes que pose à Abélard le langage humain lorsqu'on y recourt pour parler de Dieu, et sur le sens du mot "propriété" en théologie, voir J. Jolivet, *Arts du langage et théologie chez Abélard (Etudes de philosophie médiévale*, 57), (Paris 1969), pp. 296-300, et aussi S. Otto, *Die Funktion des Bildbegriffes in der Theologie des 12. Jahrhunderts, BGPTM*, XI, 1, (Münster 1963), pp. 73-77. S. Otto a bien montré notamment comment l'équivocité de la notion de propriété chez Abélard ne permettait pas à ce dernier d'élaborer une théorie satisfaisante de l'appropriation.

101 Cf. Hugues de Saint-Victor, *De sacramentis*, I, p. II, 6-8, et p. III, 26-27, PL 176, 208-210 et 227-230; *De amore sponsi et sponsae*, ibid., 989A; *De tribus diebus*, 1, 16, 21-23, ibid., 811-813, 823-824, 831-833; *In Hierarchiam coel. sancti Dionysii*, PL 175, 1062C, etc. Sur l'enseignement de Hugues relatif à la triade *potentia, sapientia, benignitas*, voir J. Hofmeier, *Die Trinitätslehre des Hugo von St. Viktor* (*Münchener theologische Studien*, II. Syst. Abt., 25), (Münich 1963), pp. 225-227, et D. E. Luscombe, *The School of Peter Abelard* (*Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life & Thought*, Ser. II, vol. 14), (Cambridge 1969), pp. 187-188. Il faut remarquer chez Hugues une curieuse justification de l'utilisation trinitaire de cette triade. Ici-bas, en effet, les pères, plus âgés que leurs fils, sont souvent aussi plus faibles; les fils, en revanche, sont moins expérimentés que

positions analogues, tout en les nuançant diversement.[102]

L'enseignement d'Abélard s'était pourtant heurté bien vite à l'opposition de maîtres tels que Gauthier de Mortagne[103] ou Gilbert de la Porrée,[104] et surtout à l'hostilité de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry[105] et de saint Bernard.[106] La thèse d'Abélard, précisée et nuancée, devait pourtant s'imposer grâce à l'intervention de théologiens parmi lesquels, outre Pierre Lombard et Richard de Saint-Victor que nous allons retrouver, il faut compter surtout Robert de Melun dont le plaidoyer devait jouer un rôle décisif.[107]

leurs pères; quant à l'esprit humain, il est souvent rempli d'orgueil et de suffisance. Il est donc fort utile de rapporter la puissance au Père, la sagesse au Fils et la bonté à l'Esprit-Saint, afin de prévenir les interprétations défavorables dont les noms de Père, de Fils et d'Esprit-Saint pourraient faire l'objet (cf. *De sacramentis*, I, p. II, 8, PL 176, 209-210). Cette justification singulière devait connaître un grand succès et être reprise par la plupart des théologiens qui traiteront par la suite de la triade en question. Saint Thomas d'Aquin s'en souviendra également et parlera à ce propos d'appropriation *per viam dissimilitudinis*, par opposition à l'appropriation *per viam similitudinis* (cf. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 39, art. 7, c., et art. 8, c.). Il retrouvera ainsi, dans son vocabulaire, le thème dionysien qui semble bien être à l'origine de l'explication de Hugues. Ce dernier avait en effet longuement commenté dans son *In Hierarchiam coelestem sancti Dionysii* (PL 175, 960-990) le chapitre de la *Hiérarchie céleste* (II, PG 3, 163-165) dans lequel le Ps.-Denys traite des symboles sembables et des symboles dissemblables et de la supériorité de ceux-ci sur ceux-là. Cf. R. Roques, *Connaissance de Dieu et théologie symbolique d'après l'In Hierarchiam coelestem sancti Dionysii de Hugues de S.-V.*, dans *Recherches de Philosophie*, III-IV (Paris 1958), pp. 232-245, et S. Otto, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

102 Voir notamment, et parmi beaucoup d'autres, Guillaume de Conches, *Philosophia mundi*, I, 5, PL 172, 44 D — 45 A; *Summa sententiarum*, I, 10, PL 176, 56 D — 58 D; *Sententiae divinitatis*, éd. B. Geyer, *BGPTM*, VII, 2-3 (Münster 1909), p. 170*; maître Herman, *Sententiae*, 6-7, PL 178, 1702-1703; *Sententiae Florianenses*, 8-9, éd. H. Ostlender, dans *Florilegium patristicum*, 19 (Bonn 1929), p. 4; Roland Bandinelli, *Sententiae*, éd. Gietl (Fribourg-en-Br. 1891), pp. 21-22; maître Omnebene, cité par Gietl, ibid., p. 21; *Sententiae Parisienses*, éd. A. Landgraf, *Ecrits théologiques de l'école d'Abélard* (Louvain 1934), pp. 7-9; *Ysagoge in theologiam*, 3, éd. A. Landgraf, ibid., pp. 241-242, 257, 263; *Sententiae divinae paginae*, éd. F. Bliemetzrieder, *BGPTM*, 18, 2-3 (Münster 1919), p. 7; etc.

103 *De Trinitate*, 8 et 13, PL 209, 583-584 et 588-590.

104 *In Boecii De Trinitate*, I, 2, 16, et II, 1, 30, éd. N. Haring, *The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers* (*Pont. Instit. of Med. Stud.*, Studies and Texts, 13), (Toronto 1966), pp. 61 et 169. Voir aussi, parmi les disciples de Gilbert, Clarembaud d'Arras, *In Boethium De Trinitate*, éd. W. Jansen, op. cit., pp. 48*-49*.

105 *Disputatio adversus Abaelardum*, 2, PL 180, 250 A - 251 C; *De erroribus Guillelmi a Conchis*, ibid., 333-334; *Epist. ad Bernardum*, 3, PL 182, 532 B. Voir aussi la *Disputatio adversus dogmata Petri Abaelardi*, I, égarée parmi les œuvres de Guillaume (PL 180, 285-298), mais qui n'est pas de lui et pourrait être de Thomas de Morigny d'après M.-B. Carra de Vaux Saint-Cyr, "Disputatio catholicorum patrum adversus dogmata Petri Abaelardi," dans *Rev. des Sciences philos. et théol.*, 47 (1963), pp. 205-220. On remarquera cependant que dans son *Aenigma fidei*, 56-60, éd. M.-M. Davy, *Guillaume de S.-T.: Deux traités sur la foi* (Paris 1959), pp. 140-145 (PL 180, 421-432), Guillaume avait admis, à certaines conditions et non sans précautions, la légitimité de l'attribution de la puissance au Père, de la sagesse au Fils et de la bonté au Saint-Esprit.

106 Voir surtout *Epist. CXC*, ou *Tractatus de erroribus Abaelardi*, 1, 3, PL 182, 1056 A, 1058 D-1059 A, et les n[os] 1 et 13 des *Capitula Abaelardi* qui devaient être condamnés en 1140 au Concile de Sens et dont une nouvelle édition critique vient d'être publiée par Dom J. Leclercq, "Les formes successives de la lettre-traité de saint Bernard contre Abélard," *Rev. bénédictine*, 78 (1968), pp. 103-104. On trouvera d'abondantes indications sur l'histoire de cette controverse dans D. E. Luscombe, op. cit., pp. 115-119.

107 Cf. Robert de Melun, *Sententiae*, I, p. III, c. 17-29, éd. R. M. Martin - R. M. Gallet,

Ces controverses avaient été ainsi à l'origine d'un effort d'élaboration doctrinale dont les résultats n'allaient pas tarder à se manifester. Les théologiens allaient être amenés à étudier dans toute leur ampleur les problèmes posés par la distinction des personnes et à examiner avec plus d'attention tous les "noms" susceptibles d'être attribués à chacune d'entre elles. Avant même que Robert de Melun n'intervienne dans les conflits dont on vient de rappeler brièvement les principales étapes, Pierre Lombard s'était déjà occupé de ces questions dans les longs développements que ses *Sententiae* (I, d.26-36) consacrent à la distinction des personnes, à leurs propriétés et aux problèmes posés par leur attribution éventuelle à l'une ou l'autre des trois personnes. Dans ces pages, le Lombard s'interroge aussi bien sur la signification des noms personnels qui viennent de l'Ecriture que sur celle de plusieurs triades d'origine patristique. Ainsi examine-t-il d'abord la triade d'Hilaire de Poitiers (*aeternitas, species, usus*) qu'il avait négligée dans ses *Collectanea* et qu'il déclare ici obscure et équivoque,[108] puis celle du *De doctrina christiana* d'Augustin;[109] il traitera plus loin, et en des termes favorables empruntés à Hugues de Saint-Victor, de celle qu'Abélard avait introduite dans la théologie (*potentia, sapientia, bonitas*);[110] plus loin encore il s'occupera de celle de l'*Epître aux Romains.*[111] Tout au long de ces exposés, Pierre Lombard recourt fréquemment aux notions de "propriété" et d'attribution. A propos de la triade *unitas*, *aequalitas*, *concordia,* notamment, il se pose la question de savoir pourquoi on peut ainsi "attribuer" l'unité au Père et l'égalité au Fils.[112] Sa réponse, qui ne doit rien à l'enseignement chartrain,[113] ne fait que reprendre, à vrai dire, ce que Gilbert de la Porrée avait déjà laissé entendre. Le Lombard se borne à expliquer que l'unité est attribuée (*attribuitur*) au Père parce que celui-ci ne procède de nul autre et qu'il n'est donc pas *ab alio,* étant

Œuvres de Robert de Melun, t. III/2 (Louvain 1952), pp. 65-90, et aussi *Questiones [theologice] de epistolis Pauli*, ed. cit., t. II (Louvain 1938), pp. 27-28. Sur le rôle de Robert de Melun dans cette affaire et sa dépendance à l'égard d'Abélard, voir R. M. Martin, "Pro Petro Abaelardo," *Rev. des sciences philos. et théol.*, 12 (1923), pp. 308-333; U. Horst, "Beiträge zum Einfluss Abaelards auf Robert von Melun," *RTAM*, 26 (1959), pp. 314-333; D. E. Luscombe, op. cit., pp. 286-290.

108 Cf. Pierre Lombard, *Sententiae*, I, d. 31, c. 2, éd. Quaracchi, pp. 192-195.

109 Ibid., c. 2-6, ed. cit., pp. 195-199. Pierre Lombard reproduit ici (c. 2, p. 195) le texte du *De doctrina christiana* qu'il avait cité auparavant dans ses *Collectanea* (cf. ci-dessus, n. 67). Il en néglige cependant les premières lignes (l. 1-7); il intervertit d'autre part l'ordre des phrases et cite les lignes 15-18 avant les lignes 7-15, de façon à mettre en évidence la phrase concernant la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia.*

110 Ibid., d. 34, c. 3-4, pp. 217-218.

111 Ibid., d. 36, c. 3-5, pp. 227-229.

112 Ibid., d. 31, c. 3, p. 196: "*Quare Patri attribuitur unitas*: Sed plurimos movet, quod Patri attribuit [Augustinus] unitatem, Filio aequalitatem ... Cur ergo Patri attribuitur unitas et Filio aequalitas?"

113 Comme l'avait déjà remarqué L. Ott, *Untersuchungen*, pp. 571-572.

bien entendu que le Fils et l'Esprit-Saint sont un avec le Père.[114] Pour le reste, il en revient au vocabulaire d'Augustin: l'égalité est "dans" le Fils parce que celui-ci ne peut être que l'égal du Père qui l'a engendré et l'égal de l'Esprit-Saint qui procède des deux premières personnes[115]; et la *concordia*, appelée aussi *connexio*, est "dans" l'Esprit-Saint parce que celui-ci, qui est amour, unit à la fois le Père au Fils et le Fils au Père, et que par lui toutes choses sont harmonieusement unies (*per eum omnia connexa*).[116]

L'intérêt de ces développements ne réside pas dans la nature des réponses, dépourvues d'originalité, que Pierre Lombard apporte aux questions posées, mais dans le recours à la notion d'attribution qu'on y remarque, et dans le rapprochement, encore assez vague et lointain, établi entre les triades anciennes et celle d'Abélard. On s'achemine ainsi vers une théologie des appropriations, qu'avaient ébauchée les théologiens à l'occasion des controverses relatives à la triade *potentia, sapientia, bonitas*, et qui va tendre à prendre en considération la série complète des triades patristiques dont les commentateurs de l'*Epître aux Romains* avaient entrepris de dresser l'inventaire.

C'est le témoignage d'une évolution analogue, mais plus avancée encore parce que plus tardive, que nous trouvons dans l'opuscule de Richard de Saint-Victor auquel on devait donner par la suite le titre, quelque peu trompeur ou au moins anachronique, de *De tribus appropriatis*.[117] Ce court traité a pour objet de répondre aux questions d'un certain Bernard, dont l'identité n'a jamais pu être établie,[118] qui désirait connaître le sentiment du théologien victorin sur l'interprétation trinitaire des triades *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, et *potentia, sapientia, bonitas*. Le rapprochement opéré entre ces deux triades

114 Loc. cit.

115 Ibid., c. 5, pp. 198-199.

116 Ibid., c. 6, p. 199: "*Quare in Spiritu sancto dicitur esse virtus, concordia vel connexio.*" L'interprétation que Pierre Lombard donne de la triade du *De doctrina christiana* dans ses *Sententiae* a été exposée naguère par L. Ott, op. cit., pp. 571-572; elle a été évoquée brièvement par J. Schneider, *Die Lehre von Dreieinigen Gott in der Schule des Petrus Lombardus (Münchener theologische Studien*, II. Syst. Abt., 22), (Münich 1961), p. 112.

117 Ed. J. Ribaillier, dans Richard de Saint-Victor, *Opuscules théologiques (Textes philosophiques du moyen âge*, 15), (Paris 1967), pp. 182-187. "Ce titre n'est pas primitif," écrit le R.P. Ribaillier dans son introduction (op. cit., p. 174). Le verbe *appropriare* et le substantif *appropriatio* sont d'ailleurs étrangers au vocabulaire de cet opuscule composé sans doute aux alentours de l'année 1160 (ibid., p. 174). La *Table idéologique des principaux mots latins* de ces *Opuscules théologiques* (ibid., pp. 355-375) nous révèle que le verbe *appropriare* n'apparaît que dans le court traité intitulé *De spiritu blashemiae* (VI, ed. cit., p. 129), lequel, selon toute vraisemblance, est postérieur au *De tribus appropriatis* (cf. J. Ribaillier, ibid., pp. 114-115).

118 On a longtemps identifié ce correspondant de Richard avec saint Bernard, mais L. Ott, op. cit., pp. 567-568, et J. Ribaillier, op. cit., pp. 18-21, ont montré que cette hypothèse ne résistait pas à l'examen. D'après le R. P. Ribaillier (ibid., p. 21), cet énigmatique Bernard serait un chanoine régulier, peut-être un ancien disciple de Richard.

par Bernard est à lui seul déjà significatif. L'exposé de Richard l'est davantage encore. Dans sa réponse, ce dernier recourt en effet parfois à la notion de propriété, plus souvent à celle d'attribution, aussi bien d'ailleurs pour la première triade que pour la seconde, mais avec plus d'insistance encore que Pierre Lombard, notamment en ce qui concerne la *concordia*, appelée aussi, à plusieurs reprises, *connexio.*[119] Il était donc admis, dès maintenant, que les deux triades posaient des problèmes analogues, sinon même identiques. Comme l'a d'ailleurs remarqué le R. P. Ribaillier dans la suggestive étude qu'il a consacrée à l'opuscule en question,[120] celui-ci a dû être rédigé à une époque où les controverses relatives à l'interprétation trinitaire de la triade *potentia, sapientia, bonitas*, s'étaient apaisées. La voie était désormais ouverte. Les théologiens allaient pouvoir s'enquérir librement des conditions dans lesquelles les attributs ou les noms essentiels de la divinité pouvaient être rapportés à l'une ou l'autre des trois personnes.

VI. Les Théologiens Porrétains.

Avec la *Glossa in epistolas Pauli* de Gilbert de la Porrée, les *Collectanea* et les *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard, et aussi, jusqu'à un certain point, les commentaires sur Boèce de Thierry de Chartres et de ses disciples, nous disposons des sources principales dont allaient désormais s'inspirer, directement ou indirectement, tous les théologiens qui citeraient et commenteraient la triade du *De doctrina christiana.*

C'est d'abord dans une série d'ouvrages qui ont largement subi l'influence de Gilbert de la Porrée et qui ont contribué directement à l'élaboration définitive du traité des appropriations trinitaires que nous allons la retrouver. Si nous nous en tenons aux indications chronologiques généralement admises, il faut citer ici en premier lieu la *Summa Quoniam homines* d'Alain de Lille, composée, nous dit son éditeur, "entre 1155 et 1165, très probablement vers 1160."[121] Cet ouvrage a pour premier mérite de présenter des divisions d'une remarquable clarté. Le livre I, qui traite de la *théologia apothetica* ou *supercelestis*, par opposition à la *theologia ypothetica* ou *subcelestis* qui fait l'objet du livre II, est tout entier consacré à la Trinité. Il est lui-même divisé en deux parties: la première traite de l'unité de l'essence divine, la seconde de la pluralité des personnes. Cette seconde partie, subdivisée à son tour en six *tractatus*, s'occupe successivement des

119 Cf. op. cit., pp. 184-185.

120 Ibid., pp. 172-174.

121 Cf. P. Glorieux, "La Somme 'Quoniam homines' d'Alain de Lille," *AHDLMA*, 20, 1953 (1954), p. 116.

notions d'essence et de personne (*tr.I*), puis des "noms essentiels" de la divinité (*tr.II*), avant d'en arriver aux "noms personnels." A propos de ceux-ci, Alain de Lille introduit une distinction nouvelle entre les *nomina quae approprіantur nomine et re* ou *nomine et significatione*, c'est-à-dire les noms relatifs tels que Père, Fils et Saint-Esprit (*tr.III*), et les *nomina quae appropriantur nomine et non re:*[122] c'est à cette dernière catégorie qu'appartiennent les noms personnels énumérés par les trois triades qui font l'objet des trois derniers *tractatus*:

1° *Potentia, sapientia, bonitas* (tr. IV. éd. Glorieux, 80-113, p. 226-248);
2° *Unitas, aequalitas, communitas* (tr. V. ibid., 114-121, p. 248-255);
3° *Aeternitas, species, usus* (tr. VI, ibid., 122-131, p. 255-269).

Ce qui frappe tout d'abord ici, c'est l'effort accompli par la *Summa Quoniam homines* pour regrouper et mettre en quelque sorte en parallèle les trois triades venues d'Abélard, du *De doctrina christiana* d'Augustin et du *De Trinitate* d'Hilaire. Les *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard les avait sans doute déjà étudiées, mais d'une manière qui n'avait rien de systématique et qui ne semblait pas se soucier de leur faire subir un traitement théologique identique, ni même de les comparer les unes aux autres. Mais il faut remarquer surtout qu'Alain de Lille recourt maintenant à un vocabulaire nouveau. Il ne parle plus de "propriétés," mais de "noms personnels," ce qui lui permet d'éviter beaucoup plus aisément les équivoques que d'autres, avant lui, avaient eu tant de peine à surmonter. Sa principale innovation, cependant, consiste à introduire dans son exposé le verbe *appropriare* qui revient constamment sous sa plume, et dont pourtant ses prédécesseurs, semble-t-il, n'avaient jamais fait usage en théologie trinitaire. Sans doute ne peut-on affirmer que l'auteur de la *Summa Quoniam homines* soit vraiment le créateur de ce terme.[123] On ne peut douter en revanche qu'il ait contribué à lui donner le sens nouveau qu'il allait désormais revêtir.

122 Ed. P. Glorieux, op. cit., tract III, 62, p. 210: "Sciendum igitur quod nominum que attribuuntur personis, alia appropriantur personis nomine et significatione, alia nomine tantum"; 80, p. 226: "Pertractatis hiis que de nominibus personalibus dicenda erant que personis appropriantur nomine et re, agendum est de illis que appropriantur nomine et non re."

123 Grâce à l'obligeance de M. Pierre Michaud-Quantin, j'ai pu consulter le fichier du *Glossaire du latin philosophique médiéval* de la Sorbonne. Je n'y ai trouvé aucun texte relatif aux mots *appropriare* ou *appropriatio*, entendus au sens qui nous intéresse ici, antérieur à un commentaire de la *Glossa in epistolas Pauli* de Gilbert de la Porrée (ms. *Paris, B. N. lat. 686,* f. 39v et 54v, cité par A. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik*, IV/1, Ratisbonne 1955, p. 30, n. 7 et p. 31, n. 9). Mais ce commentaire, qui date de la fin du XIIe siècle et sur lequel nous reviendrons plus loin, dépend lui-même, sinon d'Alain de Lille, du moins de Simon de Tournai qui dépend d'Alain de Lille (cf. ci-dessous, n. 143-144). Le *Glossaire* ayant déjà inventorié le vocabulaire philosophique et théologique d'un grand nombre d'ouvrages du XIIe siècle, et le *De*

Pour le reste, il faut reconnaître qu'Alain de Lille est encore largement tributaire des théologiens qui l'avaient précédé. En ce qui concerne la triade *potentia, sapientia, bonitas*, notamment, il établit entre les deux manières opposées dont on peut "approprier" ces noms aux trois personnes une distinction qui deviendra, chez saint Thomas d'Aquin, la distinction entre appropriation par ressemblance et appropriation par dissemblance, mais dont l'origine doit être cherchée chez Hugues de Saint-Victor.[124] Peut-être faut-il également considérer comme un lointain écho des spéculations chartraines les brèves indications relatives aux notions d'unité, d'égalité et de pluralité que nous donne la *Summa Quoniam homines* à propos de la triade *unitas, aequalitas, communitas.*[125] Une telle dépendance ne saurait nous surprendre de la part de l'auteur des *Theologicae regulae.* Il faut reconnaître cependant qu'elle demeure ici incertaine et peu visible.

Mais un autre ouvrage d'inspiration porrétaine, rédigé sans doute peu de temps après la *Summa Quoniam homines* qu'il a certainement connue et utilisée, doit retenir notre attention. Il s'agit des *Sententiae* ou *Institutiones in sacram paginam* de Simon de Tournai, qui ont dû être composées entre 1160 et 1165 et dont M. Schmaus a publié naguère tout ce qui se rapporte à la théologie trinitaire.[126] On y remarque en effet un long exposé relatif à la notion de personne et aux appropriations que Simon devait d'ailleurs reproduire dans son *Expositio symboli Athanasii.*[127] L'auteur des *Institutiones* ne recourt plus seulement au verbe *appropriare* mais aussi au substantif *appropriatio.* Il reprend à son compte les distinctions proposées précédemment par Alain de Lille, notamment celle des deux modes opposés d'appropriation qui venait de Hugues de Saint-Victor,[128] et surtout la distinction entre *appropriatio*

spiritu blasphemiae de Richard de Saint-Victor où nous avons remarqué la présence du mot *appropriare* (cf. ci-dessus, n. 117) étant lui-même, selon toute vraisemblance, postérieur à la *Summa Quoniam homines*, il y a tout lieu de penser qu'Alain de Lille est un des premiers, sinon même le premier, à avoir introduit ce mot dans la langue théologique.

124 *Summa Quoniam homines*, ed. cit., tr. IV, 80, pp. 226-227. Cf. ci-dessus, n. 101.

125 Ed. cit., tr. V, 114, p. 248.

126 Cf. M. Schmaus, "Die Texte der Trinitätslehre in den Sententiae des Simon von Tournai," *RTAM*, 4 (1932), pp. 59-72, 187-198, 294-307. D'après P. Glorieux, op. cit., p. 116, qui renvoie à O. Lottin, "Alain de Lille, une des sources des Disputationes de Simon de Tournai," *RTAM*, 17 (1950), pp. 175-186, "on ne peut douter...que...Simon de Tournai se soit inspiré d'Alain et de sa Somme dans ses *Disputationes* et déjà même dans ses *Institutiones*. D'autre part, ajoute P. Glorieux, ces *Institutiones*, "antérieures à Pierre de Poitiers, ont utilisé, comme l'a démontré le P. van den Eynde ("Deux sources de la Somme théologique de Simon de Tournai," *Antonianum*, 24, 1949, pp. 19-42), deux écrits des environs de 1160, à savoir la Glose de Rufin sur le Décret de Gratien et le *Speculum ecclesiae*. Il faut donc les dater de 1160-1165."

127 Cet ouvrage a été publié d'après un manuscrit du Mont-Cassin dans la *Bibliotheca Casinensis*, t. IV (Mont-Cassin 1880), pp. 322-346 de la seconde partie du volume (*Florilegium patristicum*). Les développements relatifs à la notion de personne et aux appropriations trinitaires, empruntés aux *Institutiones*, occupent, dans cette édition, les pp. 327-332.

128 Cf. *Institutiones*, éd. M. Schmaus, loc. cit., 6, pp. 63-64, et ci-dessus, n. 124 et 101.

nominum et rerum et *appropriatio nominum et non rerum.*[129] C'est de ce second type d'appropriation que relèvent les "noms" énumérés par une série de triades, beaucoup plus nombreuses que celles dont avait traité la *Summa Quoniam homines*, et que Simon de Tournai examine tour à tour, dans l'ordre suivant:

1° *Potentia, sapientia, bonitas* (éd. Schmaus, 5, p. 63-64);
2° *Operatio, dispositio, conservatio* (ibid., 6, p. 65);
3° *Auctoritas, nativitas, communitas* (ibid., 7, p. 65);
4° *Unitas, aequalitas, concordia* (ibid., 8, p. 66-67);
5° *Unitas, species, ordo* (ibid., 9, p. 67);
6° *Summa origo, perfectissima pulchritudo, beatissima delectatio* (ibid., 9, p. 67-68);
7° *Aeternitas, species, usus* (ibid., 9, p. 67-68);
8° *Ex quo, per quem, in quo* (ibid., 10, p. 68).

Ce schéma, dans ses grandes lignes, coïncide d'une manière frappante avec celui que nous avions remarqué dans la *Glossa in epistolas Pauli* de Gilbert de la Porrée. On ne peut douter qu'il en dépende. Simon de Tournai, il est vrai, y a ajouté la triade *potentia, sapientia, bonitas* (n°1) que Gilbert avait contestée ailleurs;[130] mais cette triade, qu'Alain de Lille avait commentée, avait acquis maintenant droit de cité en théologie depuis les interventions de Pierre Lombard et de Robert de Melun. Il y ajoute également une triade nouvelle, *operatio, dispositio, conservatio* (n°2), mais celle-ci n'a d'autre objet que d'approprier aux trois personnes divines trois opérations *ad extra* mises en relation avec les trois attributs opératifs de puissance, de sagesse et de bonté. En revanche, Simon de Tournai néglige la triade *principium, forma, gratia*, qui venait du *De uera religione* d'Augustin, mais cette omission est dépourvue de signification car Gilbert n'avait mentionné cette triade qu'en passant et sans la commenter. La dépendance de Simon de Tournai à l'égard de la *Glossa* de Gilbert de la Porrée apparaît d'ailleurs avec évidence si l'on met en parallèle les textes où ces deux théologiens énumèrent les triades 5-7 qu'on vient de signaler. L'exposé de Gilbert était fait presque uniquement de phrases ou de lambeaux de phrases empruntés au *De doctrina christiana* (I,5,5) et au *De Trinitate* (VI,10,11-12) d'Augustin, mais disposés suivant un ordre très différent de celui où ils se présentaient dans ces deux ouvrages de l'évêque d'Hippone. Simon de Tournai reproduit ces brefs extraits dans l'ordre qu'avait adopté Gilbert, en y ajoutant simplement quelques com-

129 Ibid., 4, l. 1-3, p. 63; 5, l. 1, p. 63; 7, l. 1, p. 65.
130 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 104.

mentaires; une confrontation des textes montre bien d'autre part qu'il ne s'est pas reporté à Augustin, mais qu'il s'est contenté de suivre de très près la *Glossa* de son illustre prédécesseur.[131] Avec Simon de Tournai, en tout cas, le dossier patristique relatif aux appropriations trinitaires est maintenant constitué. Nous en retrouverons les éléments chez la plupart des théologiens qui viendront par la suite. La triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia*, que Simon attribue d'ailleurs à Hilaire[132] et dont il nous donne une interprétation où il faut peut-être encore reconnaître un lointain écho de l'enseignement chartrain,[133] y occupe une place qu'elle ne perdra plus.

Des ces *Institutiones* de Simon de Tournai, et donc aussi de son *Expositio symboli Athanasii*, il faut rapprocher une *Glossa* anonyme sur les *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard, attribuée longtemps, mais à tort, à Pierre de Poitiers,[134] et dont la rédaction est antérieure à l'année 1175.[135] On y retrouve une version courte de l'exposé consacré à la

131 Voici les deux passages de Simon de Tournai (*Institutiones*, ed. cit., 9, l. 1-11 et 28-32, pp. 67-68), relatifs aux triades 5-7. On pourra les comparer aux paragraphes [4]-[6] du commentaire de *Rom.*, XI, 36, de la *Glossa* de Gilbert de la Porrée reproduit plus haut; les mots imprimés en italiques correspondent aux emprunts de Simon de Tournai à la *Glossa* dont tous les éléments reparaissent ici: "*Huius* autem *Trinitatis in creatura* quoquomodo *apparet vestigium. Nam omnia quae arte divina facta sunt, et unitatem quandam et speciem et ordinem in se ostendunt. Nam quidquid est, et unum aliquid est, sicut sunt* corpora vel spiritus, *et specie* formantur, *ut corpora figuris et qualitatibus et animae a[r]tibus, et* petunt *vel* tenent *ordinem, ut corpora ponderibus, ut quae* minus sunt affinia terrae, minus sunt gravia et econverso, *et collocationibus*, ut quanto sunt graviora, tanto deprimantur inferius, et quanto leviora, tanto extollantur altius, *et animae delectationibus.* Delectantur enim in eo, ut exemplar coelestis, ad quod creatae sunt, ordinis imitentur. *Quorum omnium*, scilicet unitatis, speciei et ordinis, *in Trinitate est summa origo, perfectissima pulchritudo et beatissima delectatio... Nam aeternitas in Patre,* et ei nomine, non re appropriatur aeternitas sicut supra auctoritas. Species autem creaturarum ad perfectissimam pulchritudinem Filium. *Species* enim *in imagine.* Ordo verso eorum refertur ad beatissimam delectationem Spiritum sanctum. *Usus* enim *in munere.*"

132 Cf. ed. cit., 8, l. 10, p. 66: "In Patre ergo ab Hilario dicitur esse unitas, in Filio vero aequalitas." De même, ibid., l. 14: "... ideo adiectum est ab Hilario: in filio vero aequalitas."

133 Ibid., l, 2-4, 6-7, 10-12. Les allusions aux propriétés des nombres sont en réalité moins apparentes encore chez Simon de Tournai que chez Alain de Lille. Les *Institutiones* se bornent à rappeler que l'unité est le principe de tous les nombres, et à dire quelques mots des notions d'unité, d'altérité et d'égalité.

134 C'est Casimir Oudin, *Comment. de scriptoribus ecclesiasticis* (Leipzig 1722), II, 1501, qui avait fait don de cette *Glossa* à Pierre de Poitiers. Cette attribution, déjà contestée par O. Lottin, *RTAM,* 2 (1930), pp. 81-82, a été rejectée par P. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers (Publications in Mediaeval Studies*, I), (Notre Dame 1936), pp. 153-162.

135 La date de cette *Glossa* a fait l'objet de nombreuses recherches. P. S. Moore, op. cit., pp. 151-153, a établi qu'elle était antérieure aux *Sententiae* de Pierre de Poitiers, composées vers 1175. O. Lottin, "Le premier commentaire connu des Sentences de Pierre Lombard," *RTAM*, 11 (1939), pp. 64-71, a montré à son tour qu'elle devait être également antérieure au livre VI des *Allegoriae super Novum Testamentum* (PL 175, 879-904) qu'il croit pouvoir attribuer à Richard de Saint-Victor en se référant à une étude P. S. Moore, "The Authorship of the Allegoriae super Vetus et Novum Testamentum," *New Scholasticism*, 9 (1935), pp. 209-225; ainsi la *Glossa* aurait-elle été composée avant 1173, date de la mort de Richard. C'est à partir de ces observations que A. Landgraf, *Introducción a la historia de la literatura theológica de la escolástica incipiente* (Barcelone

notion de personne et aux appropriations trinitaires par Simon de Tournai. Ce texte, publié récemment par M. Hödl,[136] reproduit de longs passages des *Institutiones*, le plus souvent presque mot pour mot. On y retrouve donc le même vocabulaire, les mêmes distinctions, les mêmes triades, à l'exception cependant de la triade *ex quo, per quem, in quo*, qui, chez Simon de Tournai, venait en dernière position. On peut évidemment s'interroger sur le sens de la relation qui unit l'exposé de la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de Poitiers à celui de Simon de Tournai. Comme il arrive toujours en pareil cas, il est difficile de savoir si c'est la version courte qui recopie la version longue en l'abrégeant, ou si c'est la version longue qui développe et amplifie une version courte plus ancienne. C'est à cette seconde explication que se rallie M. Hödl. Selon lui, le texte de la *Glossa* correspondrait à une première rédaction que Simon de Tournai aurait ensuite reprise, développée et améliorée dans ses *Institutiones* et dans son *Expositio symboli Athanasii*.[137] Quoi qu'on pense de la solution apportée ainsi à un problème d'histoire littéraire

1956), p. 172, a pu avancer que la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de Poitiers aurait été rédigée, au moins partiellement, avant 1173, probablement même vers 1160-1165. Mais si les livres I-IV des *Allegoriae super Novum Testamentum* font bien partie du *Liber exceptionum* de Richard et sont donc son œuvre comme l'avait montré P. S. Moore, il n'en va pas de même des livres V-VII, et donc aussi du livre VI, qui doivent en être séparés et ne peuvent donc être attribués à Richard, comme l'avaient d'ailleurs remarqué L. Ott (*Untersuchungen zur Briefliteratur der Frühscholastik*, *BGPTM*, 34, 1936, p. 652) et A. Landgraf lui-même ("Familienbildung bei Paulinenkommentaren des 12. Jahrhunderts," *Biblica*, 13, 1932, pp. 170 ss.). L. Hödl, *Von der Wirklichkeit und Wirksamkeit des dreieinigen Gottes nach der appropriativen Trinitätstheologie des 12. Jahrhunderts* (Münich 1965), p. 19, pour sa part, situe la composition de la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de Poitiers entre 1160 et 1170. Mais son opinion est fondée sur cette conviction que le texte trinitaire inséré dans la *Glossa* et qu'il publie dans son étude (cf. ci-dessous, n. 136) est antérieur aux *Institutiones* de Simon de Tournai, ce qui ne me semble pas absolument certain (cf. ci-dessous, n. 137). Il faut donc s'en tenir, jusqu'à plus ample informé, au *terminus ad quem* indiqué par P. S. Moore: 1175.

136 Op. cit., pp. 19-22.

137 Ibid., pp. 19-22. Les arguments que présente M. Hödl en faveur de sa thèse ne manquent pas de solidité. Sa démonstration ne m'a pourtant pas entièrement convaincu, et cela pour deux raisons: 1° L'exposé des *Institutiones* de Simon de Tournai (éd. Schmaus, pp. 60-68) me semble s'intégrer d'une façon tout à fait cohérente dans son ouvrage; en revanche, la version abrégée fait un peu figure de hors d'œuvre dans la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de Poitiers où elle apparaît (au moins dans le ms. *Paris, B. N. lat. 14423*, f. 49ra-50ra, que j'ai pu examiner) à la suite des gloses relatives à *Sent.*, I, d. 8, avec lesquelles elle n'a apparemment rien à voir. 2° Si la version longue, telle qu'on la trouve dans les *Institutiones* ou dans *l'Expositio symboli Athanasii* de Simon de Tournai est certainement mieux venue et plus satisfaisante, dans l'ensemble, que la version courte de la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de Poitiers, ce qui encourage M. Hödl à voir dans la rédaction longue un texte amélioré et plus tardif, il n'en va pas toujours ainsi: les *Institutiones* attribuent notamment à Hilaire la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia* (cf. ci-dessus, n. 132), alors que la *Glossa* la restitue à juste titre à Augustin (éd. Hödl, p. 18, o). Si la *Glossa* était antérieure aux *Institutiones* et à l'*Explanatio symboli*, Simon de Tournai n'aurait pas commis dans ces deux ouvrages une erreur qu'il avait précédemment évitée et dans laquelle retomberont d'ailleurs ceux qui s'inspireront de son traité. Cela dit, il reste que, quelle que soit la solution de ce petit problème, les opinions exprimées dans ces différents ouvrages sont bien celles de Simon de Tournai, comme nous l'apprend ce *secundum meam sententiam* (*Institutiones*, ed. cit., 4, p. 63, l. 57-58) sur lequel M. Hödl a justement attiré notre attention (op. cit., p. 20-21).

dont M. Hödl est le premier à reconnaître qu'il ne présente qu'un intérêt secondaire,[138] la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de Poitiers témoigne de la place que commençait à prendre, durant le troisième quart du xiie siècle, un traité des appropriations, solidement structuré autour du schèma de Gilbert de la Porrée, et dû certainement à Simon de Tournai, dont le succès n'allait pas tarder à s'affirmer.

On va en effet le retrouver déjà dans les *Sententiae* de Pierre de Poitiers, composées vraisemblablement peu avant 1170,[139] et qui recopient tout simplement le long développement de Simon de Tournai relatif aux appropriations.[140] Tous les éléments de cet exposé reparaîtront bientôt, vers la fin du xiie siècle, dans deux autres ouvrages d'inspiration porrétaine, les *Quaestiones theologicae* de maître Martin[141] et le *Speculum universale* de Raoul Ardent,[142] qui font l'un et l'autre de larges emprunts, sur ce point, à Simon de Tournai. On ne sera évidemment pas surpris de retrouver, vers le même temps, la série des triades énumérées par Gilbert de la Porrée dans un commentaire inédit de la *Glossa in epistolas Pauli* de Gilbert qui en reprend tous les éléments dans son explication de *Rom.*,XI,36,[143] et y reproduit à son tour de nombreux extraits des *Institutiones* de Simon de Tournai.[144]

138 Op. cit., p. 22.

139 Cf. P. S. Moore, *The Works of Peter of Poitiers* (Notre Dame 1936), pp. 39-41.

140 Cf. Pierre de Poitiers, *Sententiae,* I, 22, éd. P. S. Moore — M. Dulong (*Publicat. of Med. Stud.*, VII), (Notre Dame 1943), pp. 183-193, qui reproduisent mot à mot, sauf quelques lignes d'introduction (p. 183, l. 1-4) et de conclusion (p. 193, l. 265-267), le texte de Simon de Tournai, *Institutiones*, éd. M. Schmaus, loc. cit., 4-10, pp. 63-68. Pierre de Poitiers reviendra plus loin sur la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia* (op. cit., 29, p. 234, l. 105-124) et l'attribuera alors à Augustin, alors que dans le ch. 22 (p. 188, l. 132 et 137), à la suite de Simon de Tournai (cf. ci-dessus, n. 132), il en avait fait don à Hilaire.

141 Dans la question *De distinctione personarum,* ms. *Paris, B. N. lat. 14556,* f. 287r.

142 Ms. *Paris, Mazarine 709,* f. 112v-113r. Raoul Ardent et maître Martin, comme Pierre de Poitiers, dépendent l'un et l'autre, de toute évidence, des *Institutiones* ou peut-être de l'*Expositio symboli Athanasii*, mais non de la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de Poitiers. Eux aussi attribuent la triade du *De doctrina christiana* à Hilaire et non à Augustin.

143 Ms. *Paris, B. N. lat. 686,* f. 47va-48vb. A cet ouvrage sont apparentés des commentaires analogues contenus dans le ms. *Boulogne 24* (comment. de l'*Epître aux Romains* seulement), et *Rome, Vallicelliana C. 57,* signalés par A. Landgraf, *Introduccion*, p. 138. Nous ne connaissons malheureusement ni les auteurs ni les dates de ces commentaires. Celui du ms. *Paris, B.N. lat. 686* a été attribué autrefois à Nicolas d'Amiens († après 1203) par H. Denifle (*Die abendländische Schriftausleger bis Luther*, Mayence, 1905, p. 40 ss.), mais A. Landgraf, op. cit., p. 138, estime que les arguments proposés par le savant Dominicain sont insuffisants.

144 La dépendance de ce commentaire à l'égard des *Institutiones* de Simon de Tournai est moins étroite que celle des ouvrages de maître Martin et de Raoul Ardent. Elle est cependant évidente et souvent très apparente, comme on pourra en juger par la brève comparaison suivante, donnée à titre d'exemple:

Simon de Tournai, *Institutiones*, éd. Schmaus, 10, l. 5-12, p. 68:	*Commentarium in Gilberti Glossam*, *Paris, B.N. lat. 686*, f. 47vb:
Hae enim *praepositiones, scilicet de et ex, cum sint causales, tamen,* sumuntur *in diversa*	"Nota quod non ait, etc." *He prepositiones, scilicet de et ex, cum sint causales, in diuersa*

Une parenté étroite unit entre eux tous ces écrits porrétains qui témoignent du progrès accompli par la théologie des appropriations durant cette période.

VII. Les Théologiens de la Fin du xiie Siècle et du Début du xiii^e

Il ne serait pas difficile, désormais, de suivre à la trace la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia* ou *connexio* dans la littérature théologique, et de recueillir à ce sujet une ample moisson de textes. Sans doute faudrait-il prêter attention à quelques témoignages isolés, tels que celui de sainte Hildegarde de Bingen. En réponse à une lettre de l'évêque Eberhard de Bamberg qui l'avait interrogée à ce propos, la célèbre visionnaire s'emploie à donner à son correspondant une explication mystique de la triade du *De doctrina christiana.*[145] Mais une enquête de ce genre devrait surtout suivre les deux pistes privilégiées dans lesquelles les ouvrages précédemment cités l'invitent à s'engager: les commentaires de l'*Epître aux Romains* d'une part, les gloses et les commentaires sur les *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard d'autre part.

A partir du milieu du xiie siècle, en effet, tous les commentateurs des *Epîtres* de saint Paul s'inspirent, soit de la *Glossa* de Gilbert de la Porrée, soit surtout des *Collectanea* de Pierre Lombard. Quelques sondages m'ont permis de constater que ces commentaires demeuraient fidèles à l'interprétation trinitaire de *Rom.*,XI,36, qui s'était définitivement imposée, et que la plupart d'entre eux continuaient à prêter attention à la triade *unitas, aequalitas, concordia* ou *connexio.* Beaucoup sans doute n'ajoutent pas grand chose à ce qu'avaient dit

ratione causae. De enim *significat materialem causam,* sed *ex dat auctoritatis et causae efficientis intelligentiam. Si enim dicam: annulus est de auro, significo aurum esse materiam. Si dicam: ex hoc patre est filius ille, significo* efficientem *causam. Quare cum non simus de Deo* Patre *tanquam materia, sed simus ex eo tanquam efficiente causa, non dixit Apostolus: de ipso* sunt omnia, *sed: ex ipso sunt omnia, significans omnium auctorem et causam efficientem.*

tamen accipiuntur *ratione cause.* Altera *enim,* id est *de, significat materialem causam,* reliqua, id est *ex, dat auctoritatis et cause efficientis intelligentiam. Si enim dicam: anulus est de auro, significo aurum esse materiam. Si dicam: ex hoc patre est ille filius, significo* efficientie *causam. Quare, cum non simus de deo tanquam* de *materia, sed simus ex eo tanquam efficiente causa, non dixit apostolus: de ipso, sed: ex ipso sunt omnia, significans* eum *omnium* esse *auctorem et causam efficientem.*

145 Sur cette correspondance, voir L. Ott, *Untersuchungen*, p. 576. La lettre d'Eberhard, qui fut évêque de Bamberg de 1146 à 1172, et la réponse de sainte Hildegarde, qui, comme le remarque L. Ott, ne doit rien à la théologie des appropriations trinitaires alors en cours, ont été imprimées dans PL 197, 167-171. Dans sa requête relative à la signification de cette triade, dont il ne semble pas connaître l'origine augustinienne, l'évêque s'en tient à une formulation différente de celle du *De doctrina christiana* et écrit: "In Patre manet aeternitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu sancto aeternitatis aequalitatisque connexio" (op. cit., 168 AB).

leurs prédécesseurs.[146] Plusieurs d'entre eux cependant persistent à introduire dans leurs exposés des considérations arithmétiques plus ou moins développées, dans lesquelles il faut voir encore un lointain souvenir des spéculations chartraines.[147] Fait remarquable cependant, les commentaires que j'ai pu examiner ne semblent pas connaître les précisions et les distinctions relatives aux appropriations trinitaires dont la théologie était pourtant redevable aux maîtres porrétains.[148]

Une exploration systématique des commentaires sur les *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard nous permettrait de rassembler une quantité de textes beaucoup plus considérable encore. Ces ouvrages rencontrent tous, inévitablement, les quatre triades dont le maître des *Sentences* avait traité avant eux et qu'il avait présentées dans un ordre qui devait bientôt s'imposer définitivement:

1° *Aeternitas, species, usus (Sententiae*, I, dist. 31, c. 2);
2° *Unitas, aequalitas, concordia* ou *connexio* (ibid., c. 2-6);
3° *Potentia, sapientia, bonitas* (ibid., dist. 34, c. 3-4);
4° *Ex ipso, per ipsum, in ipso* (ibid., dist. 36, c. 3-5).

La triade du *De doctrina christiana*, que Pierre Lombard avait examinée avec attention, tient ici une place qui est loin d'être négligeable. Elle fera donc l'objet de développements relativement abondants dans tous les ouvrages qui suivent le texte ou au moins le plan du Lombard, et parmi lesquels on peut citer, à titre d'exemple, les *Sententiae* de Gandulphe de Bologne,[149] la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de

146 Ainsi p. ex. l'explication de *Rom.*, XI, 36, que nous trouvons dans le ms. *Paris, Mazarine 176*, f. 176vb-177ra, ne nous apprend rien de plus que celle de la *Glossa* de Gilbert de la Porrée dont elle dépend visiblement. Sur ce commentaire anonyme du ms. *Mazarine 176*, voir A. Landgraf, *Introducción*, p. 205.

147 Des considérations de ce genre, très proches de celles que nous avions remarquées dans le *Sermo in Purificatione*, probablement plus tardif, de Gauthier de Saint-Victor (cf. ci-dessus, n. 94) apparaissent dans les anonymes *Quaestiones in epist. Pauli, In epist. ad Rom.*, q. 283, PL 175, 501 BC (sur cet ouvrage, imprimé parmi les œuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor, mais qui ne peut être antérieur aux années 1160 ou 1170, voir P. Glorieux, "Essai sur les Quaestiones in epist. Pauli du Pseudo-Hugues de Saint-Victor," *RTAM*, 19 (1952), pp. 48-59). Des justifications arithmétiques analogues, souvent même plus développées, se retrouvent dans le commentaire sur l'*Epître aux Romains* d'Etienne Langton, ms. *Paris, B. N. lat. 14443*, f. 284rb-va, et surtout dans celui de Hugues de Saint-Cher, éd. Paris, 1538, f. LVv, dont le goût pour les spéculations numériques a été remarqué par C. Spicq, *Esquisse d'une histoire de l'exégèse latine au moyen âge* (Paris 1944), p. 292.

148 A l'exception cependant du commentaire sur la *Glossa in epist. Pauli* de Gilbert de la Porrée, dont il a été question plus haut (cf. ci-dessus, n. 143-144) et qui dépend ici de Simon de Tournai.

149 Cf. *Magistri Gandulphi Bononiensis Sententiarum libri quatuor*, éd. J. de Walter (Vienne-Bratislava 1924), I, 47, pp. 34-36.

Poitiers dont il a été question précédemment,[150] une autre *Glossa* anonyme, d'origine porrétaine également, conservée dans le manuscrit *Paris, Mazarine 758,*[151] puis, plus tard, dans les commentaires sur les *Sentences* de Hugues de Saint-Cher,[152] d'Alexandre de Halès,[153] de saint Albert le Grand,[154] de saint Bonaventure[155] et de saint Thomas d'Aquin,[156] pour ne citer que les plus connus et les plus accessibles.

L'extrême abondance de ces ouvrages, qui se recopient d'ailleurs souvent les uns les autres, ne nous permet pas d'en entreprendre ici l'examen. Celui-ci risquerait d'ailleurs d'être assez décevant. Contraints de s'en tenir à l'ordre des distinctions et des chapitres du premier livre des *Sentences* qui leur servait de guide, et donc d'examiner séparément les triades dont avait traité cet ouvrage sans pouvoir les regrouper systématiquement comme l'avaient fait les porrétains, ces commentateurs se trouvaient dans l'impossibilité de constituer un véritable traité des appropriations. Leur fidélité au texte et au plan du Lombard devait avoir cependant une conséquence qui mérite d'être signalée. Elle allait en effet conduire les théologiens à effectuer un choix parmi les trop nombreuses triades dont le XIIe siècle s'était occupé et à concentrer leur attention sur celles qu'avaient retenues les *Sententiae.*

Ce sont finalement les auteurs des *Sommes* du XIIIe siècle qui recueilleront le fruit du labeur de ces commentateurs. Déjà la *Summa aurea* de Guillaume d'Auxerre, dont le plan s'inspire encore de très près de celui des *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard, s'était efforcée de rapprocher les unes des autres les quatre triades que nous avons rencontrées tout à l'heure.[157] Mais la disposition générale des questions qui leur sont consacrées dans cet ouvrage reste encore imparfaite et maladroite. Dans la *Summa theologica* d'Alexandre de Halès, en revanche, nous trouvons un traité des appropriations trinitaires bien organisé,

150 Cf. ms. *Paris, B. N. lat. 14423,* f. 58vb-59ra. Cet exposé, qui se rapporte à *Sent.*, d. 31, est évidemment distinct du développement consacré aux appropriations trinitaires que le même ouvrage introduit à la suite des gloses relatives à la dist. 8, et dont il a été question plus haut (cf. ci-dessus, n. 137).

151 Cf. ms. *Paris, Mazarine 758*, f. 35rb-36vb. Sur le porrétanisme de cette glose et sur sa dépendance à l'égard de la *Glossa* du Pseudo-Pierre de Poitiers, voir A. Landgraf, *Introducción*, pp. 139 et 174.

152 Cf. *Sent.*, I, d. 31, ms. *Paris, B. N. lat. 3073*, f. 17vb. Hugues de Saint-Cher introduit ici des considérations qui ne sont plus seulement empruntées à l'arithmétique, mais aussi à la géométrie.

153 Cf. *Glossa in quatuor libros Sententiarum*, I, d. 31, 23-35 (Quaracchi 1951) I, pp. 309-318. Voir aussi d. 19, 27, ibid., pp. 205-206.

154 Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 31, art. 9-14, éd. Borgnet (Paris 1893) 26, pp. 110-119.

155 *In I Sent.*, p. II, art. 2 (Quaracchi 1882,) I, pp. 545-549.

156 Cf. *In I Sent.*, d. 31, q. 3, art. 1-2.

157 Cf. Guillaume d'Auxerre, *Summa aurea,* éd. Pigouchet (Paris 1500) I, 8, f. XIX-XXI, mais les quatre triades dont avaient fait mention les *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard sont présentés ici dans un ordre différent. C'est à l'obligeance du R.P. Ribaillier que je dois d'avoir pu retrouver ces références à la *Summa aurea*.

divisé en quatre questions qui examinent successivement, et fort longuement, les quatre triades des *Sentences*.[158] C'est un plan identique que suivra plus tard la *Summa theologiae* de saint Albert le Grand dans son *Tractatus de appropriatis*, divisé également en quatre questions qui traitent des mêmes triades et dans le même ordre.[159] Saint Thomas d'Aquin procéde d'une manière semblable dans l'article de la *Summa theologiae* (I,q.39,art.8) qui avait été au point de départ de notre enquête. Le Docteur Angélique y examine en effet, dans un ordre inchangé, les quatre triades des *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard qui font l'objet, avant lui dans la *Summa* d'Alexandre de Halès, et après lui dans celle d'Albert le Grand, de quatre questions beaucoup plus développées.

VIII. Le Traité des Appropriations Trinitaires de Saint Thomas d'Aquin

Le court traité des appropriations trinitaires constitué par les deux articles de la *Summa theologiae* de saint Thomas d'Aquin (I,q.39,art.7-8) est donc issu d'une longue maturation théologique dont nous connaissons maintenant les étapes principales. C'est évidemment aux *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard, aux commentaires que ses contemporains avaient donné de cet ouvrage, à leurs commentaires de l'*Epître aux Romains* et aux premières *Sommes* du XIII[e] siècle que le Docteur Angélique a emprunté la plus grande partie des matériaux qu'il met en œuvre dans sa propre synthèse. C'est sans doute par leur intermédiaire que sont parvenues jusqu'à lui les justifications augustiniennes qu'il nous donne de la triade d'Hilaire,[160] ou encore le lointain souvenir des spéculations chartraines dont on retrouve la trace dans son bref com-

158 Cf. Alexandre de Halès, *Summa theologica*, Lib. I, p. II, Inq. II, tract. II, sect. II: *De nominibus personalibus appropriatis*, (Quaracchi 1924) I, pp. 640-658. Alexandre de Halès annonce lui-même en ces termes les divisions de cette sect. II (op. cit., p. 640): "Quaeritur ergo primo de appropriatione aeternitatis, speciei et usus; secundo, de appropriatione unitatis, aequalitatis, concordiae; tertio, de appropriatione potentiae, sapientiae, bonitatis; quarto, de appropriatione verborum Apostoli: *Ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso.*" On reconnaît bien là les quatre triades des *Sententiae* de Pierre Lombard énumérées précédemment.

159 Cf. Albert le Grand, *Summa theologiae*, I, Tract. XII: *De appropriatis*, q. 48-50, éd. Borgnet (Paris 1895) 31, pp. 504-525. Un sommaire analogue à celui d'Alexandre de Halès annonce l'examen successif, dans le tract. XII, des quatre triades de Pierre Lombard. En fait, les triades *aeternitas, species, usus*, et *unitas, aequalitas, concordia sive connexio*, font l'objet des q. 48 et 49. C'est dans la q. 50 qu'Albert le Grand traite successivement de la triade *potentia, sapientia, bonitas* (membr. I) et de la triade *ex ipso, per ipsum, in ipso* (membr. IV).

160 Cf. *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 39, art. 8, c. On notera cependant le soin avec lequel saint Thomas, dans cet article, justifie l'appropriation de la *species* au Fils. C'est dans ce passage, cité souvent par les commentateurs qui traitent de l'esthétique du Docteur Angélique, que ce dernier énumère les trois caractères du beau: l'intégrité ou la perfection, la proportion et l'éclat. Cf. aussi *In I Sent.*, I, d. 31, q. 2, art. 1, c.

mentaire de la triade du *De doctrina christiana*,[161] ou enfin la distinction, inspirée de Hugues de Saint-Victor, mais indéfiniment reprise par les théologiens du XIIᵉ et du XIIIᵉ siècle, relative aux deux manières opposées dont on peut approprier aux trois personnes les attributs de puissance, de sagesse et de bonté.[162] Pourtant, bien que nous ne sachions pas dans quelle mesure saint Thomas d'Aquin a pu fréquenter Alain de Lille, Simon de Tournai et les maîtres porrétains, c'est de leur enseignement qu'il demeure pour une large part l'héritier. Ce sont en effet les théologiens porrétains qui avaient été les premiers à rassembler les éléments du dossier patristique dont la *Summa theologiae* reproduit l'essentiel et à les organiser dans un traité solidement structuré. Ce sont eux aussi qui avaient eu systématiquement recours aux mots *appropriare* et *appropriatio*, et qui avaient réussi, grâce à ce vocabulaire nouveau, à surmonter les ambiguïtés et les équivoques où s'étaient embarrassés leurs prédécesseurs.

Le Docteur Angélique présente cependant d'une manière nouvelle les quatre triades patristiques dont il entreprend l'examen. Il se méfie visiblement d'une théorie des appropriations qui ne serait que déductive et partirait d'un certain nombre de notions abstraites pour conclure de là à la distinction des personnes. Il rappelle donc avec insistance que notre intelligence ne parvient à la connaissance de Dieu qu'à partir des créatures.[163] Mais il s'efforce surtout de distinguer les différentes espèces d'appropriations auxquelles correspondent les quatre triades traditionnelles, afin d'opérer entre elles un classement systématique, fondé sur les diverses manières dont chacune d'elles considère la réalité divine. Il précise donc que les deux premières triades considèrent Dieu absolument, tel qu'il est en lui-même, en tant qu'il est (*aeternitas, species, usus*), ou en tant qu'il est un (*unitas, aequalitas, connexio*), sans se préoccuper encore de son activité causale ou de ses opérations *ad extra*. Les deux autres triades, en revanche, considèrent Dieu en tant qu'il est cause des choses (*potentia, sapientia, bonitas*), ou dans ses relations avec les effets dont il est la cause (*ex ipso, per ipsum, in ipso*). Ces deux points de vue sont en réalité complémentaires, aussi les deux triades qui s'y rapportent sont elles étroitement associées l'une à l'autre et ex-

161 Ibid. Saint Thomas se borne ici à énoncer quelques affirmations concernant les notions d'unité, d'altérité et d'égalité, et leurs rapports réciproques dans la *connexio*. Mais il ne faut pas oublier qu'il avait formulé auparavant les plus expresses réserves à l'égard des spéculations, d'origine platonicienne, relatives au nombre trois, ou à l'Un, principe des choses (cf. *Sum. theol.*, q. 32, art. 1, ad 1).

162 Ibid., et aussi art. 7, c. Cf. ci-dessus, n. 101, et Pierre Lombard, *Sent.*, I, d. 34, 4, ed. cit., p. 218; Alain de Lille, *Summa Quoniam homines*, ed. cit., 80, pp. 226-227; Simon de Tournai, *Institutiones*, ed. cit., 5, p. 64, etc.

163 *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 39, art. 8, c.

pliquées l'une par l'autre dans les exposés que saint Thomas leur consacre.[164] Leur rapprochement permettra d'ailleurs au Docteur Angélique de justifier une nouvelle appropriation qui rapporte désormais la cause efficiente au Père, la cause formelle au Fils et la cause finale au Saint-Esprit.[165]

Cette interprétation, à vrai dire, ne faisait que prolonger, dans le cadre de la théorie aristotélicienne des quatre causes, une réflexion dont les origines remontaient fort loin. Dès les premières lignes du paragraphe du *De doctrina christiana* (I,5,5) qu'on a reproduit au début de cet article, Augustin s'était en effet demandé si la Trinité, au lieu d'être une chose (*res*) comme il l'avait dit d'abord, n'était pas plutôt "la cause de toutes les choses", et ce recours à la notion de cause l'avait amené à évoquer aussitôt la triade paulinienne *ex quo, per quem, in quo*. L'expression *in quo* demeurait cependant obscure, aussi Augustin avait-il pris soin, quelques années plus tard, dans son *De natura boni*,[166] d'expliquer pourquoi l'Apôtre avait écrit *ex ipso* et non *de ipso*. Tout ce qui est *de ipso*, avait-il précisé, est également *ex ipso*, mais non l'inverse. Le ciel et la terre sont effet *ex ipso*, parce qu'ils ont été créés par Dieu, mais ils ne sont pas *de ipso* parce qu'ils ne sont pas "de sa substance" (*de substantia eius*). Si un homme engendre un fils et s'il bâtit une maison, on peut dire que le fils et la maison sont *ex ipso*, mais seul son fils est *de ipso*; la maison, elle, est de terre et de bois (*de terra et ligno*). Ces explications avaient été reprises par certains exégètes médiévaux;[167] elles devaient reparaître dans la *Glossa in epistolas Pauli* de Gilbert de la Porrée[168] puis dans les *Collectanea*[169] et les *Sententiae*[170] de Pierre Lombard. Les théologiens porrétains, qui n'avaient pas tardé à attribuer à leur tour une signification causale aux prépositions *ex* et *de*, avaient pu ainsi rapporter plus explicitement encore la préposition *de* à la cause matérielle et la préposition *ex* à la cause efficiente: c'est parce que nous ne venons pas de Dieu comme d'une matière, mais que nous dépendons de lui comme d'une cause efficiente, que l'Apôtre n'a pas écrit *de ipso*, mais *ex ipso omnia*.[171] Saint Thomas

164 Ibid., et q. 45, art. 6, ad 2. C'est également en mettant en relation ces deux triades que saint Thomas explique le texte de *Rom.*, XI, 36, dans son *Commentaire de l'Epître aux Romains, ad loc.*, qui ne mentionne ni la triade d'Hilaire, ni celle du *De doctrina christiana.*

165 *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 39, art. 8, c.

166 27, PL 42, 560.

167 Cf. p. ex. Atton de Verceil, *Exp. in epist. Pauli, In Rom.*, XI, 36, PL 134, 247D.

168 Voir le texte de Gilbert cité plus haut, [1], et n. 42.

169 PL 191, 1493 B.

170 I, d. 36, ed. cit., p. 227.

171 Voir entre autres les textes empruntés aux *Institutiones* de Simon de Tournai et au commentaire anonyme de la *Glossa* de Gilbert de la Porrée, cités ci-dessus, n. 144.

d'Aquin semble bien se souvenir de ces explications, qu'il présente cependant d'une manière un peu différente, lorsqu'il précise que la préposition *ex* peut être entendue aussi bien de la cause matérielle que de la cause efficiente, mais que, comme il ne peut y avoir en Dieu de causalité matérielle, c'est bien la causalité efficiente qu'il faut rapporter au Père à qui a déjà été approprié l'attribut de puissance[172] et à qui sera bientôt appropriée l'œuvre de la création.[173]

La relation établie par le Docteur Angélique entre le *per ipsum* de saint Paul et la cause formelle trouvait à son tour de nombreuses justifications dans la tradition. Tout ce que saint Augustin avait dit de la *species*, de la *pulchritudo* ou de l'art divin, rapportés à la sagesse et à la seconde personne de la Trinité, allait en ce sens.[174] La triade du *De uera religione (principium, forma, gratia)* qu'avaient citée Gilbert de la Porrée et Pierre Lombard,[175] avait d'ailleurs fait une place, dans la théologie des appropriations, à la notion de forme qui conduisait tout naturellement à celle de cause formelle.[176]

Le rapport entre l'*in ipso* de saint Paul et la cause finale était sans doute moins immédiatement suggéré par les textes anciens dont s'inspirait le Docteur Angélique. Pourtant il était déjà affirmé par le *Commentarius Cantabrigiensis in epistolas Pauli*, issu de l'école d'Abélard, qu'on a rencontré plus haut.[177] Le lien métaphysique qui unit entre elles les notions de bien et de fin était d'autre part trop familier à saint Thomas pour qu'après avoir approprié à l'Esprit-Saint l'attribut de bonté, il pût hésiter à lui approprier également la causalité finale.[178]

172 *Sum. theol.*, I, q. 39, art. 8, c.

173 Ibid., q. 45, art. 6, ad 2.

174 Saint Thomas s'inspire visiblement de ces thèmes augustiniens lorsque, toujours dans son art. 8, il approprie la cause formelle à la seconde personne de la Trinité. Il note cependant que la préposition *per* désigne parfois ce qui appartient en propre au Fils, et ne lui est donc pas simplement approprié; c'est de cette manière notamment qu'il faut interpréter le *per* de *Jo.*, 1, 3: "Omnia per ipsum facta sunt."

175 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 53 et 66.

176 Dans la q. 46, art. 3, c., où il revient sur l'appropriation de la puissance au Père et de la sagesse au Fils, saint Thomas substitue cependant aux notions de cause efficiente et de cause formelle de la q. 39, celles de *principium effectivum* et de *principium exemplare.*

177 Cf. ci-dessus, n. 32, *in fine.*

178 Cette appropriation des trois causes débouche, chez saint Thomas, sur une appropriation des opérations *ad extra.* Le Docteur Angélique s'explique surtout à ce sujet dans la q. 45, art. 6, ad 2, où il approprie au Père la *creatio* et au Saint-Esprit la *gubernatio* et la *vivificatio* (cf. aussi q. 39, art. 8, c., où il est dit, à propos du Saint-Esprit: "sua bonitate eas [*sc.* res] conservat et gubernat.") L'opération appropriée au Fils est moins clairement définie par la q. 45, art. 6, ad 2, qui se contente d'écrire: "Filio autem appropriatur sapientia, per quam agens per intellectum operatur." Faisant écho à cette doctrine, tout en la précisant, la théologie classique, à l'époque moderne, appropriera généralement au Père la *creatio,* au Fils la *dispositio* et au Saint-Esprit la *gubernatio* (cf. p. ex. A. Chollet, art. "Appropriations aux personnes de la sainte Trinité," *Dict. de théol. cathol.,*

Le Docteur Angélique est-il le premier à avoir approprié simultanément et d'une manière aussi explicite la cause efficiente au Père, la cause formelle au Fils et la cause finale au Saint-Esprit? La nécessité où l'on est de mettre un point final à cet article ne nous permet pas d'entreprendre ici l'enquête qui serait nécessaire pour apporter une réponse à cette question. Pourtant, quelques sondages rapides me donnent à penser qu'on trouverait sans trop de peine un certain nombre d'antécédents à cette triple appropriation. Dans un texte qui n'a aucun rapport avec les spéculations arithmétiques évoquées plus haut, Thierry de Chartres avait déjà rapproché la cause efficiente de Dieu, la cause formelle de sa Sagesse et la cause finale de sa Bénignité.[179] Deux commentaires inédits de l'*Epître aux Romains*, attribués respectivement au Dominicain Guerric de Saint-Quentin[180] et au Franciscain Jean de la Rochelle,[181] approprient explicitement ces trois causes aux trois personnes de la Trinité dans leur explication de *Rom.*, XI,36. Si

I (3e tirage), Paris, 1923, col. 1712.) Cette triade rappelle celle que nous avions remarquée précédemment chez Simon de Tournai, *Institutiones*, éd. Schmaus, *RTAM*, 4 (1932), 6, p. 65 (*operatio, dispositio, conservatio*) qui reparaît, par exemple, dans le commentaire de l'*Epître aux Romains* attribué à Guerric de Saint-Quentin et signalé ci-dessous, n. 180.

179 Cf. Thierry de Chartres, *De sex dierum operibus*, éd. N. Haring, *AHDLMA*, 22, 1955 (1956), 2, pp. 184-185.

180 Cf. ms. *Paris. B. N. lat. 15603,* f. 6vb. Ce commentaire, attribué à Guerric de Saint-Quentin par P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle* (Paris 1933), p. 55, approprie simultanément la cause efficiente et l'*operatio* au Père, la cause formelle et la *dispositio* au Fils, la cause finale et la *conservatio* au Saint-Esprit.

181 Cf. ms. *Paris. B. N. lat. 15536,* f. 190r. "*Quoniam in ipso,* etc. Quod exponit beatus b. sic: Quid est deus ex quo omnia creabiliter et non seminabiliter, et li ex dicit causam efficientem; *per ipsum sunt omnia*, ne alium actorem uel alium opificem arbitremur, et li per notat causam formalem extrinsecam, quod notatur per hoc quod dicit opificem; *in ipso sunt omnia*, non quasi in loco, sed quasi in uirtute, et li in notat causam finalem. Demum subiungit idem b.: *ex quo omnia*, tanquam uno actore, principio omnium; *per quem omnia*, ne alterum inducatur principium; *in quo omnia*, ne inducatur locus alter. Sic ergo patet quod deus est causa efficiens, finalis et formalis omnium rerum, et ideo in ipso est omnis ratio operum eius. Dicit ergo quoniam *in ipso est*, suple potentia que est causa efficiens omnium, et *per ipsum* est sapientia qui est causa formalis omnium rerum, et *in ipso* est bonitas que est causa finalis omnium rerum." D'après L. Delisle, *Inventaire des manuscrits de la Sorbonne* (Paris 1874), p. 14, ce commentaire serait la suite de celui qui nous est transmis par le ms. *Paris. B. N. lat. 15602,* lequel, toujours d'après L. Delisle (ibid., p. 16), serait l'œuvre de Jean de la Rochelle. P. Glorieux, op. cit., ne mentionne pas le commentaire du ms. *15536*, et dit simplement de celui du ms. *15602* qu'il est "probablement l'œuvre de Jean de la Rochelle" (op. cit., pp. 22-23). Le *beatus b.* auquel se réfère le texte cité ci-dessus ne peut évidemment être que saint Bernard, qui avait effectivement écrit, dans son *De consideratione (V, 6, 14,* PL 182, 793 C, ou *S. Bernardi Opera*, éd. J. Leclercq - H. M. Rochais, t. III, Rome 1963, p. 478, l. 11-17): "*Ex quo omnia*, creabiliter, non seminabiliter; *per quem omnia*, ne alium auctorem atque alium opificem arbitreris; *in quo omnia*, non quasi in loco, sed quasi in virtute. *Ex quo omnia,* tanquam uno principio, auctore omnium; *per quem omnia,* ne alterum inducatur principium, artifex; *in quo omnia,* ne tertium inducatur, locus. *Ex quo omnia,* non de quo, quia non est materia Deus: efficiens causa est, non materialis." Saint Bernard, qui ne parle ici ni de la cause formelle, ni de la cause finale, se souvient du *De natura boni* d'Augustin (cf. ci-dessus, n. 166); la distinction qu'il établit entre la cause matérielle et la cause efficiente, représentées par les prépositions *de* et *ex*, est identique à celle des maîtres porrétains (cf. ci-dessus, n. 171).

ces ouvrages appartiennent bien aux deux théologiens à qui on les a donnés, il faut en conclure que cette triple appropriation était couramment admise par les maîtres parisiens de la première moitié du XIIIe siècle. En toute hypothèse, saint Thomas d'Aquin aura eu le grand mérite de rassembler en une synthèse de quelques pages dont il faut admirer à la fois la précision, la densité et la clarté, tous les éléments d'une théologie des appropriations trinitaires que ses prédécesseurs avaient mis plus d'un siècle à élaborer.

ST. THOMAS ON THE HABITUS-THEORY OF THE INCARNATION

Walter H. Principe C.S.B.

IN his theology of the Incarnation Thomas Aquinas frequently refers to the three famous opinions on how God became man that are outlined by Peter Lombard in Book III of his *Sentences.*[1] In Thomas, as in most of his contemporaries, the theology of the Incarnation is so intertwined with interpretation of these opinions that the one cannot be understood apart from the other. The valuable insights to be gained from examining Aquinas' interpretation of these opinions can be seen from a study that has been made of Thomas' changing views about the first opinion or "assumptus-homo theory."[2] The present study will

Sigla

Haring, *Gilbert* — N. M. Haring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porrée Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154)," *Mediaeval Studies* 13 (1950) 1-40.

Hypostatic Union I; II; III — Walter H. Principe, *The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century,* Vol. I: *William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto 1963); Vol. II: *Alexander of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto 1967); Vol. III: *Hugh of Saint-Cher's Theology of the Hypostatic Union* (Toronto 1970).

Lombard, *Sent.* III, 6, 1; p. 573 — Peter Lombard, *Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber III, distinctio 6, caput 1; edd. PP. Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 2nd ed. (Quaracchi 1916) p. 573.

Thomas Aquinas:

Comp. th., 209; 403, p. 95 — *Compendium theologiae*, caput 209; in *S. Thomae Aquinatis opuscula theologica*, Vol. I, ed. R. A. Verardo (Rome 1954) no. 403, p. 95.

In Philip. 2, 2; 60, p. 102 — *S. Thomae Aquinatis super epistolam ad Philippenses lectura*, caput 2, lectio 2; ed. R. Cai, *Super epistolas S. Pauli lectura*, 8th ed., Vol. II (Rome 1953) no. 60, p. 102.

In III Sent. d. 2, q. 1, a. 1, qla. 1, resp. [sol.; exp. text.; arg.]; 21, p. 56 — *Scriptum super Sententiis*, Liber III, distinctio 2, quaestio 1, articulus 1, quaestiuncula 1, responsio [solutio; expositio textus; argumentum]; ed. M. F. Moos (Paris 1933) no. 21, p. 56.

1 See *Sent.* III, 6-7; pp. 573-89. Cf. *Sent.* III, 10 (pp. 593-97) and III, 21-22 (pp. 644-54).

2 H.-F. Dondaine, "Qualifications dogmatiques de la théorie de l'*Assumptus-homo* dans les œuvres de s. Thomas," *Les sciences philosophiques et théologiques* (Paris: Vrin, 1941-42: the only volume to appear) 163-68. As the title suggests, this study is limited to Thomas' judgment about the dogmatic tenability of the opinion and does not go into the theological issues.

The names "assumptus-homo theory" or "assumptus-theory" for the first of Lombard's opinions, "subsistence-theory" for the second and "habitus-theory" for the third originated with B. Barth, "Ein neues Dokument zur Geschichte der frühscholastischen Christologie," *Theologische Quartalschrift* [Tübingen] 100 (1919) 400-26; 101 (1920) 235-62; see esp. p. 423. The names have proved useful not only because they focus on the most characteristic feature of each opinion but also because they help to avoid the confusion introduced by some medieval theologians who changed the numbering of the opinions: see Dondaine, p. 163, n. 2, and *Hypostatic Union* I, 196, n. 28, and 201-02, n. 53.

For bibliography on the three opinions see ibid. I, 197-198, n. 31. Thomas' attitude towards the opinions is discussed in some detail by P. Galtier, *L'unité du Christ* (Paris 1939) 176-99 passim, but Galtier's understanding of the habitus-theory is defective.

examine Thomas Aquinas' presentation of the third opinion or "habitus-theory," and will then investigate the historical accuracy of his presentation as well as the role played by his reaction to this opinion in his own theology of the Incarnation.

1. Thomas Aquinas' Presentation of the Habitus-Theory

Among Thomas Aquinas' most important expositions of the habitus-theory are those found in his commentary on Book III of the *Sentences*, in the *Contra Gentiles*, the *Summa theologiae*, and the *Compendium theologiae.* Shorter accounts of the theory are given in a *quaestio quodlibetalis*, the *Lectura super epistolam S. Pauli ad Philippenses*, and the *Quaestio disputata de unione Verbi Incarnati.*

Scriptum super Sententiis

In the *Scriptum super Sententiis* Thomas' main presentation of the habitus-theory is found, as one would expect, in his discussion of the questions regularly debated in the context of distinctions 6 and 7 of Book III of Lombard's work. Before that, only a few explicit allusions to one or other of the opinions are to be found.[3] Two of these earlier texts describe the positions of the third opinion. In one Thomas says that some interpret a text of Lombard as referring to "the opinion of those who said that Christ, according as he is man, is not something but is having himself in a qualitative way."[4] Here Thomas links the habitus-theory with the teachings that Christ as man is not *quid* or *aliquid* and that the human nature is to be understood according to the category of quality rather than substance.

In the second text Thomas speaks of those who deny that the conjunction of body and soul in Christ resulted in "some humanity." For Thomas this opinion is akin to those of various heretics, for it destroys the truth of Christ's humanity and the dignity of his body. For if Christ's soul were not united to his body as its form so that one *quid* resulted from them, then Christ could not be a true man nor could his body be truly living.[5]

3 *In III Sent.* d. 1, q. 2, a. 4, resp.; 130, p. 41 (second opinion on union in hypostasis or supposit as well as in person). Ibid., d. 4, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 1, resp.; 41, p. 165 (identity of *suppositum, individuum hominis* and *persona Filii Dei* according to the second opinion). Ibid.; 43, p. 165 (*unum esse Christi* taught by the second opinion).

4 "'Errant igitur qui nomine humanitatis etc.' ...vel tangit [Lombardus], ut quidam dicunt, opinionem eorum qui dicebant Christum, secundum quod est homo, non esse quid, sed qualiter se habens: quod infra tangetur, d. 6." *In III Sent.* d. 2, exp. text.; 158, pp. 87, 88.

5 "Ad tertiam quaestionem sciendum est quod quidam posuerunt Deum assumpsisse animam et corpus, non ita quod ex eorum conjunctione aliqua humanitas resultaret. Et haec opinio similiter veritatem humanitatis tollit et dignitatem corporis Christi. Non enim Christus verus homo esse potuit, nec corpus ejus vere vivum, nisi anima corpori unita fuisset ut forma ejus, ita quod ex eis unum quid efficeretur. Sed de hac opinione infra dicetur, 3 d." Ibid., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, qla. 3, sol; 79, p. 69.

When Aquinas comes to Lombard's exposition of the three opinions and their supporting authoritative texts, he undertakes an unusually lengthy summary and analysis of Lombard's text. He first describes very accurately Lombard's procedure and then examines the tenets of each of the opinions, indicating their points of agreement and disagreement. This, his most detailed exposition of the habitus-theory, deserves careful examination.[6]

First comes a statement of the points on which all three opinions agree and which distinguish the opinions from heresies of the past. All three opinions hold for only one person, the divine person, in Christ, and thereby avoid the heresy of Nestorius. All posit in Christ two natures and three substances (divinity, soul, and body, the latter two constituting human nature according to all the opinions); thereby they avoid the error of Eutyches with his doctrine of one nature in Christ. All agree that these two substances in which human nature consists were assumed by the Word; thereby they avoid the Manichean error denying the assumption of flesh. All hold that what was assumed did not exist prior in time (but only in nature) to the union; thereby they avoid an error, mentioned by John Damascene, that the divine person first assumed an intellect and afterwards became man. Thomas remarks that this seems to be the error of Origen when he posited the creation of souls before bodies.[7]

Next follows a long discussion as to how each opinion differs from the other two. Each opinion will be seen to differ, Thomas says, according to two basic comparisons of the three substances in Christ, first, according to the comparison of soul and body with each other, in that human nature consists in them, and, second, according to the comparison of soul and body to the divine person, in that these two were assumed by the divine person.[8]

The third opinion differs from the first two according to each of these comparisons. As for the relation of soul to body in Christ, the first two opinions posit something (*aliquid*) composed from soul and body, and this is assumed, whereas the third opinion maintains that these two substances are divided from one another and are assumed by the Word without being composed with each other in any way. Thus when the third opinion says that human nature is assumed by the Word, it takes human nature in a material sense as referring to the parts of human nature, just as the parts of a house are called a house.[9] With respect to

6 For his summary of Lombard's procedure see ibid., d. 6, divisio textus; 8, p. 217. For this analysis of the opinions see ibid., 9-11, pp. 217-21.
7 Ibid.; 9, pp. 217-18.
8 Ibid.; 10, p. 218.
9 "Differt autem tertia opinio a primis duabus quantum ad comparationem animae et corporis

the second comparison, that of Christ's soul and body to the divine person, the third opinion differs from the first two by positing an accidental conjoining or union of these two substances to the Word in the way that a garment is joined to a man or that an angel assumes a body in order to be seen in the body. The first and second opinions, on the other hand, say that soul and body were conjoined to the Word not accidentally but substantially as to personal *esse.*[10]

These, then, are the unique positions of the third opinion according to Thomas Aquinas: a denial of the union of soul and body in Christ; a denial of any composition of soul and body in Christ; a denial of any human *aliquid*; human nature in Christ means simply his body and soul, the parts of human nature; the union of body and soul to the Word is not substantial or personal, but accidental.

Thomas is manifestly more concerned with the differences between the first and second opinions, for he examines these differences in much greater detail than he does those of the third opinion with respect to the others.[11] Only after this extensive contrast and comparison of the first two opinions does he return to the third in order to show some of the consequences of its unique basic positions. According to Thomas' analysis, because this opinion denies the union of soul and body in Christ, it holds first of all that "man" does not predicate something composed of body and soul concerning Christ; it predicates only the parts of human nature, so that when Christ is said to be "man," this means that Christ has a soul and body united to him accidentally.[12]

The second position of the third opinion is that "man" is predicated of Christ accidentally, not in the category of substance (*quid*) but in that of quality or habit (*in quomodo se habet*), as when a man is said to be clothed. A third consequence of the denial of a union of soul and flesh in Christ is that the two substances do not belong to the personality of the Son of God, but are related to him extrinsically. Many other consequences follow from these positions, Thomas adds, if one considers

quia primae duae opiniones ponunt aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, quod est assumptum; tertia vero ponit has duas substantias esse divisas ad invicem, et sine aliqua compositione a parte Verbi assumptas esse. Unde cum dicitur natura humana assumpta a Verbo, sumit naturam humanam materialiter, id est partes humanae naturae, sicut partes domus dicuntur domus." Loc. cit.

10 "Differt etiam a primis duabus quantum ad comparationem harum duarum substantiarum ad tertiam; quia ponit has duas substantias conjunctas Verbo accidentaliter, sicut vestis conjungitur homini, et sicut Angelus assumit corpus, ut in eo videatur; primae vero duae opiniones dicunt, non accidentaliter, sed substantialiter quantum ad esse personale Verbo conjunctas esse." Loc. cit.

11 Ibid.; 10-11, pp. 218-20.

12 "Tertia vero opinio, quia negat unionem animae ad carnem in Christo, ideo primo ponit quod homo non praedicat de Christo aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed partes humanae naturae; ut sit sensus: *est homo*; id est habet animam et corpus sibi unita accidentaliter." Ibid.; 11, p. 221.

the root of the opinion.[13] Later on in his own commentary Thomas will draw out some of these consequences.

In a final section Thomas shows different ways in which the various opinions pair together in agreement against the remaining opinion. The first and second opinions agree that man predicates *quid* of Christ, whereas the third denies this.[14] Against the first opinion, which holds for two supposits in Christ, the second and third agree that there is only one supposit, but they assert this for different reasons. The second opinion says that the divine person stands under each nature substantially, the third that the divine person stands under the divine nature substantially but under the human nature accidentally. Thomas gives the example of one supposit for "man" and "white": because the same person is both man and white, he means, there are not two supposits or persons.[15] Again, the first and third opinions agree that the human nature does not pertain to the personality of the divine person, the first opinion because it holds that the human nature is made substantial (*substantificatur*) through itself, the third because it holds that the human nature is in no way a substance. Both therefore can agree, but for different reasons, that the divine person remained as simple after the Incarnation as before, a position contrary to the second opinion's teaching that there was after the Incarnation a "composed person."[16]

Although Thomas spends much more time comparing the first and second opinions in his questions within the distinctions of Book III, he alludes often enough to the third opinion and devotes the entire question 3 of distinction 6 to its teachings. In most cases he repeats in different contexts his basic interpretation of this opinion: soul and body are not united in Christ;[17] they fail to form some composite or composed person except in a broad sense of "composed" as "placed with another."[18] One reason why this opinion teaches a lack of composition

13 "Et ideo secundo ponit quod homo praedicatur de Christo accidentaliter, non in quid, sed in quomodo se habet; ut cum dicitur homo indutus. Et ideo tertio ponit quod duae substantiae non pertinent ad personalitatem Filii Dei, sed extrinsecus se habent ad ipsam. Et multa alia ex his opinionibus sequuntur, si quis radicem opinionum considerat." Loc. cit.

14 "Primae enim duae opiniones conveniunt in hoc quod utraque ponit quod homo de Christo praedicatur in quid: in quo differunt a tertia quae hoc negat." Loc. cit.

15 "Similiter tertia convenit cum secunda in hoc quod ponit quod in Christo non sunt duo supposita, quamvis differenter; quia secunda ponit quod supponitur utrique naturae substantialiter, tertia vero quod divinae substantialiter et humanae accidentaliter; sicut album et homo non est aliud et aliud suppositum, sed idem quod supponit homo copulat album: in quo differunt a prima quae ponit in Christo duo supposita." Loc. cit.

16 "Similiter prima et tertia conveniunt in hoc quod humana natura non pertinet ad personalitatem divinae personae, quamvis differenter; quia prima ponit quod substantificatur per se, tertia autem quod nullo modo. Unde utraque ponit quod divina persona sicut fuit simplex ante incarnationem, ita est simplex post incarnationem: in quo differunt a secunda." Loc. cit.

17 *In III Sent.* d. 6, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; 107-08, pp. 244-45. Cf. ibid., d. 6, exp. text.; 125, p. 248.

18 Ibid., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, resp.; 94-95, pp. 241-42. Cf. ibid., d. 6, exp. text.; 129, p. 250.

is that for it the union of soul and body to the Word is accidental.[19] Throughout his commentary on distinction 6 Thomas' constant refrain is that the habitus-theory teaches such an accidental union;[20] because this opinion holds that the union of body and soul to the Word is accidental, it says that *homo* does not predicate *quid* or *aliquid* concerning Christ but rather a habitus or a having itself in a certain way (*aliquo modo se habens*).[21]

A few additional doctrines are presented by Thomas Aquinas as consequences of this opinion's basic teaching. In agreement with the second opinion and in opposition to the first, he says, it denies two supposits in Christ and maintains that Christ is only one; this unity, however, is for it not a unity *per se* as it is for the second opinion, but an accidental unity like that of a white man.[22] Later on Thomas remarks that this view of the union as accidental leads to the conclusion that Christ has a twofold *esse*, one substantial and the other accidental.[23]

Can it be said that man became God? The third opinion, not holding for a human supposit, agrees with the second, Thomas says, that it is false to say this in the proper sense.[24] With respect to the predestination of Christ, the third opinion in his view also agrees with the second: this predestination of Christ as to its source in grace and as to its effects is

19 "Similiter tertia opinio dicit quod est esse superadditum ad esse divinae personae accidentaliter; unde anima et corpus non dicuntur partes personae, sicut nec accidentia subjecti. Unde neutra [opinio, sc. prima vel tertia] ponit personam Verbi compositam." Ibid., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, resp.; 94, p. 241.

20 "...sic non diceret quod praedicaret quid, sed quod esset accidentaliter unitum, sicut dicit tertia opinio." Ibid., q. 1, a. 1, qla. 1, ad sed contra; 29, p. 227. "Quod autem habet esse completum in quo subsistit, non potest uniri alteri nisi tribus modis: vel accidentaliter, sicut tunica homini, et hunc modum unionis ponit tertia opinio." Ibid., q. 1, a. 2, resp.; 45, p. 230. "...tertia vero [dicit] quod [Christus] est unum per accidens, sicut homo albus." Ibid., q. 2, a. 1, resp.; 66, p. 235. "Opinio tertia...ponit quod partes humanae naturae adveniunt divinae personae accidentaliter...." Ibid., q. 2, a. 2, resp.; 81, p. 239. "...tertia [opinio] ponit quod non subsistit assumptum, nec persona in eo, sed est esse accidentale superadditum." Ibid., q. 3, a. 2, resp.; 119, p. 247: this article (nos. 113-23, pp. 245-47) gives the main discussion of whether the union is accidental within the context of the third opinion. See also ibid., exp. text.; 129, p. 250.

21 "...secundum vero tertiam [homo] non praedicat aliquid, sed aliquo modo se habens." Ibid., exp. text.; 124, p. 247. "Quarta, quod homo de Deo non praedicat quid, sed habitum...." Ibid.; 129, p. 250. See also the first text in n. 20.

22 "Et quia plurale est geminatum singulare, ideo Christus non posset dici aliqua, nisi essent in eo duo supposita naturarum: quod negat secunda opinio et similiter tertia. Et ideo utraque opinio dicit quod Christus est unum; sed secunda dicit quod est unum per se; tertia vero, quod est unum per accidens, sicut homo albus." Ibid., q. 2, a. 1, resp.; 66, p. 235.

23 "Similiter opinio tertia, quia ponit quod partes humanae naturae adveniunt divinae personae accidentaliter, ponit duo esse, unum substantiale et aliud accidentale." Ibid., q. 2, a. 2, resp.; 81, p. 239.

24 "Secunda autem opinio et tertia ponunt quod homo, prout de Christo praedicatur, non habet aliud suppositum quam suppositum aeternum. Sed secunda dicit quod homo supponit suppositum aeternum; tertia autem, quod homo copulat ipsum, sicut termini accidentales. Et quia illud suppositum nunquam non fuit Deus, ideo haec est falsa secundum hoc: *Homo factus est Deus.*" Ibid., d. 7, q. 2, a. 2, resp.; 73, pp. 270-71. See also ibid., d. 6, exp. text.; 124, p. 248.

not by reason of the one supposit of the Son of God but rather by reason of the assumed nature which is united to the Son of God and which did not always exist; because it did not always exist, the effects of grace were foreseen in it and this constitutes its predestination.[25] Thomas seems to imply, finally, that the third opinion holds that even in his death Christ remained a man because, as he says, it maintained that even before his death he was a man not by a union of soul and body but only by a union of each to the Word. Since these latter unions continued in the triduum of death, he would for them still be a man.[26]

What, according to Thomas, are the reasons behind the special teachings of the third opinion or habitus-theory? Those who held this opinion, he says, believed that every composite of body and soul has the *ratio* of a man. But since they refused to agree with the first opinion that a man was assumed or that Christ was two, they developed the teaching that the assumed soul and body were not united to each other.[27] Another root of this opinion was that it held that the human nature was not assumed to the *esse* of the divine person; from this it concluded that an accidental *esse* is added by reason of the human nature in the Incarnation.[28] A still further reason for the development of this theory, Thomas adds, was its desire to show that there is no change in the divine person in the Incarnation and no increase in the number of persons in the Trinity; this led to its denial of a human *quid* in Christ.[29] This is the nearest Thomas comes in the *Sentences* to saying that the third opinion denied a human *quid* in Christ in order to avoid seeing a human person in Christ; he will bring out this point more clearly in later works. Important as a source of this theory's use of the category of habitus, Thomas realizes, is the number of patristic texts authorizing such use; many of these are quoted by Lombard at this point.[30]

25 Ibid., d. 7, q. 3, a. 1, resp.; 85-89, pp. 273-74.

26 "'Et ipse forte ante mortem...' Hoc dicit propter tertiam opinionem quae nondum erat suo tempore damnata quae dicebat quod etiam ante mortem erat hoc modo homo." Ibid., d. 22, exp. text.; 168, p. 690. The words quoted are those of Lombard's text (*Sent.* III, 22, 1; p. 651). See also Thomas' discussion of Lombard's position, *In III Sent.* d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; 14-17, pp. 663-64.

27 "Tamen ista opinio videtur ex eodem fonte processisse cum prima, scilicet ex hoc quod credebant omne compositum ex anima et corpore habere rationem hominis. Et ideo, quia prima opinio posuit animam et corpus unita ad invicem esse assumpta, coacta fuit ponere hominem esse assumptum et Christum esse duo. Haec autem opinio, ut hoc negaret, posuit animam et corpus esse assumpta non unita." Ibid., d. 6, q. 3, a. 1; 108, pp. 244-45.

28 "Tamen etiam quantum ad hanc positionem procedit ab eodem fonte cum prima [opinione], scilicet ex hoc quod humana natura non assumeretur ad esse divinae personae. Unde prima ponebat quod assumptum esse habebat per se, in quo subsistebat; haec autem tertia ponit quod non subsistit assumptum, nec persona in eo, sed est esse accidentale superadditum." Ibid., q. 3, a. 2, resp.; 119, p. 247.

29 Ibid., exp. text.; 129-30, p. 250.

30 Ibid.; 130, p. 251. Cf. ibid., q. 3, a. 2, arg. 1; 113, p. 245.

Here it may be asked how Thomas Aquinas judges the third opinion or habitus-theory with respect to the teaching of faith. Attacking its teachings both by reasoning and by quotations from authority, he names it a heresy on two counts. A union of body and soul is necessary for the notion of man and of all his parts, he argues, whereas a lack of this union would mean that man or flesh would be such only equivocally, as when one calls a portrait a man. The third opinion, by denying the union of Christ's soul to his flesh, cannot escape the conclusion that Christ is not a true man or that his flesh is not true flesh. Such a conclusion, Thomas continues, is against an article of faith, and therefore this opinion is not only false but heretical and was condemned by Pope Alexander in a council.[31]

Thomas' second reason for judging this theory heretical is found in his discussion of its use of habitus within the question whether the human nature is accidentally united to the Word. In a *sed contra* argument he quotes a decretal of Pope Alexander III, "Cum Christus," which condemns those who say "Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid." Thomas, that is, identifies this statement with the third opinion's use of habitus and sees both as equivalent to an accidental union, even though in the answer to the first argument he shows how habitus can be understood of Christ in a non-accidental way.[32] Using the decretal's condemnation of the *non est aliquid* doctrine, Thomas says that accidental predication does not predicate *aliquid* but only *aliqualiter se habens*, so that if the decretal is to be followed, man cannot be an accidental predicate.[33]

The same argument is pursued further in the main reply at this point. The only way that a substance can be accidentally united to

31 "Responsio. Dicendum quod unio animae ad carnem constituit rationem hominis et omnium partium ejus. Unde remota anima, non dicitur homo neque oculus neque caro nisi aequivoce, sicut homo pictus. Et ideo si tollatur unio animae Christi ad carnem ejus, sequitur quod non sit verus homo, neque caro ejus vera: quod est contra articulum fidei. Et ideo haec opinio tertia non solum est falsa, sed haeretica et in Concilio a Papa Alexandro condemnata." Ibid., q. 3, a. 1, resp.; 107, p. 244. Thomas is evidently alluding to the decretal, *Cum Christus*, of Alexander III, which he quotes in the following article and which we shall see next. Thomas uses the argument about the need for union of body and soul for a true man or true flesh several times, e.g., ibid., exp. text.; 129 & 130, pp. 250 & 251. In discussing whether Christ during the three days of his death was a man, Thomas uses the same argument (ibid., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; 14-15, p. 663): in fact, for him Christ's state in the triduum is the same as that taught by the third opinion — a union of body and soul to the divine person without their union to each other.

32 Ibid., d. 6, q. 3, a. 2, sc 1 & ad 1; 114 & 120, pp. 246 & 247. On the various condemnations issued by Alexander III see *Hypostatic Union* I, 201, n. 52. The text, which Thomas quotes with insignificant variations, is most readily available in H. Denzinger and A. Schönmetzer, eds., *Enchiridion Symbolorum...*, 34th ed. (Barcelona 1967) no. 750.

33 "Sed contra est Decretalis Alexandri Papae: 'Cum,' inquit, 'Christus sit perfectus Deus et perfectus homo; qua temeritate audent quidam dicere quod Christus, secundum quod homo, non est aliquid?' Sed praedicatum accidentale non praedicat aliquid, sed aliqualiter se habens. Ergo homo non est praedicatum accidentale." Ibid., d. 6, q. 3, a. 2, sc 1; 114, p. 246.

another substance is either through bodily contact or through movement of one substance by the other. Since bodily contact with the divine person is impossible, to hold that the union in Christ is accidental, as this opinion does in his view, means that the union in Christ is seen as that of the divine person moving the human nature as an angel does in assuming a body in order to be seen, or as the Holy Spirit did when he was seen in a dove.[34] This type of assumption, however, does not allow what is assumed to be predicated of the one assuming it, nor can the the properties of the former be transferred to the latter. Therefore, Thomas concludes, "this opinion cannot say that the Son of God is truly man or that he truly suffered; and therefore, since it denies a truth of the articles of faith, it was condemned as heretical."[35]

It is interesting to note that this is the only place in the *Sentences* where Thomas Aquinas attacks the doctrine that Christ as man is not *aliquid*. We shall see later that at this period he was not ready to affirm *aliquid* of the human nature of Christ without precise qualification,[36] so that he found some difficulty with the decretal. His reduction of the doctrine that Christ as man is not *aliquid* to an accidental union made it easier for him to attack it; this reduction may be significant in assessing his own position.

Thomas Aquinas also attacks the third opinion for its imprecision in theological method when it uses the authoritative texts employing habitus with respect to the union in Christ. These texts, he says, are only comparisons and should not be taken properly: "...Sed haec omnia per similitudinem dicuntur, et non per proprietatem."[37] Thus he criticizes the habitus-theory for moving from metaphor or comparison to proper or strict predication of the category of habitus, a method that in theology leads to error.[38]

34 "...quod est in se substantia, non potest esse accidens alicujus, quamvis conjunctio unius substantiae ad alteram possit esse accidens, ut sic una substantia alteri accidentaliter advenire dicatur, sicut vestis homini. Sed hoc non potest esse nisi dupliciter: vel quod conjungatur ei secundum contactum, sicut vestis homini vel sicut dolium vino; aut sicut mobile motori, sicut Angelus conjungitur corpori quod assumit. Et cum contactus non sit nisi corporum, oportet dicere, quod humana natura non potest advenire divinae personae nisi sicut mobile motori, ut dicatur Christus hoc modo assumpsisse naturam humanam, sicut Angelus corpus assumit, ut oculis mortalium videatur, sicut in *Littera* dicitur; et sic Spiritus sanctus visus est in columba." Ibid., resp.; 117, p. 246.

35 "Haec autem assumptio non vere facit praedicari assumpta de assumente, neque proprietates assumpti vere transfert in assumentem; non enim Angelus assumens corpus ad hominis similitudinem vere est homo, neque vere habet aliquas proprietates hominis...:Unde patet quod haec opinio non potest dicere quod Filius Dei vere sit homo vel vere sit passus; et ideo cum negat veritatem articulorum, condemnata est quasi haeretica." Ibid.; 118, pp. 246-47.

36 See below, p. 413.

37 *In III Sent.* d. 6, exp. text.; 130, p. 251.

38 A final point in the *Sentences*: Peter Lombard summarizes an argument made by supporters

Thus the *Scriptum super Sententiis* provides considerable material showing Thomas' views about the teaching and worth of the habitus-theory. In his later works he returns from time to time to this theory and although his analyses are less detailed than those seen above, some noteworthy developments occur.

Quaestio quodlibetalis 9

The ninth quodlibetal question adds nothing of importance to what has already been seen in the *Sentences*. The third opinion, Thomas says, maintains no union in Christ of soul and body either to constitute a man, as the first opinion held, or to constitute a human nature, as the second opinion held. It said that human nature is to be understood "multipliciter, id est pro partibus eius, scilicet anima et corpore, cum dicamus humanam naturam assumptam a Verbo." For Thomas this makes it clear that Christ would not be truly said to be a man and that his human nature would not be a true human nature. Therefore, he concludes, it was condemned as heretical.[39]

Lectura super epistolam S. Pauli ad Philippenses

In commenting on Philippians 2, 7: *Habitu inventus ut homo*, a text constantly quoted in this area, Thomas gives two possible explanations of *habitu*. It may refer to Christ's exterior way of life and in particular to his acceptance of all the defects and properties of human nature except sin.[40] It may also refer to Christ's taking humanity itself as a habit, that is, the fourth kind of habitus in which the habitus itself is changed but does not change the one having it. An example of this kind of habitus is clothing. Human nature in Christ may be likened to this kind of habitus for it came to the divine person in such a way that it did not change the person but was itself changed and made better by being filled with grace and truth.[41]

of the habitus-theory against their opponents saying that if God were man essentially or man were God essentially, then, if God had assumed man in the female sex, a woman would have been God essentially and God would have been a woman essentially (*Sent.* III, 6, 4; p. 579). Nothing more is added — apparently for them this was so absurd as to need no comment! Thomas remarks quite simply about this possibility: "...patet non esse inconveniens" (*In III Sent.* d. 6, exp. text.; 129, p. 250). He qualifies this, however, when he says further on: "Et tamen simpliciter concedendum est quod potuit assumere sexum femineum de potentia absoluta loquendo, quamvis non fuisset ita congruum" (Ibid., d. 12, exp. text.; 86, p. 390).

39 *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, q. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1.

40 "Tertio naturae humanae conditiones ponit, dicens *et habitu inventus ut homo*, quia defectus omnes et proprietates continentes speciem, praeter peccatum, suscepit. Et ideo habitu inventus ut homo, scilicet in exteriori conversatione, quia esuriit ut homo, fatigatus fuit, et hujusmodi." *In Philip.* 2, 2; 60, p. 102.

41 "Vel habitu, quia ipsam humanitatem accepit quasi habitum. Est autem habitus quadruplex.

Referring to the threefold opinions given by Lombard, Thomas remarks that some have used this text erroneously by saying that Christ's humanity came to him accidentally. This is false because the supposit of divine nature became a supposit of human nature and therefore came to it not accidentally, but substantially. Aquinas adds that this does not mean that the divinity did not come naturally to Christ, but that it is predicated substantially of him.[42] This adds little new to what has been seen. The positive statement of Thomas himself, however, is important; it shows how Thomas' discussion of this opinion leads him to formulate his own position more clearly. We shall see this in more detail in the third section of this study.

Summa contra Gentiles

The discussion of the habitus-theory in the *Contra Gentiles* opens with a rather sympathetic approach to the intentions of its adherents but ends with a more severe and detailed condemnation of it as a heresy than has been seen thus far. More clearly than in the *Sentences*, Thomas states that proponents of this theory sought to avoid, on the side of the humanity, a human person and, on the side of the Word, a change in the divine person. After first stating the teaching of Catholic faith against Nestorius and Eutyches, Thomas explains that because this teaching seems foreign to what human reason experiences, some "later persons" asserted the following position concerning the union: because "man" is constituted from the union of soul and body and "this man" from "this" soul and "this" body, and because "this man" designates a hypostasis or person, they sought to avoid positing in Christ some hypostasis or person other than that of the Word. They did so by maintaining that Christ's soul and body were not united with each other and that there was not some substance made from them: this they did to avoid the error of Nestorius.[43]

Unus mutat habentem, et ipse non mutatur, ut stultus per sapientiam. Alius mutatur et mutat, ut cibus. Alius, qui nec mutat, nec mutatur, ut annulus adveniens digito. Alius, qui mutatur, et non mutat, ut vestimentum. Et per hanc similitudinem natura humana in Christo dicitur habitus, qui sic advenit divinae personae, quod non mutavit ipsum; sed mutata est in melius, quia impleta est gratia et veritate....Dicit ergo *in similitudinem hominum factus*, ita tamen quod non mutatur, *quia habitu inventus* est *ut homo*." Ibid.; 61, p. 102. One recognizes the divisions of habitus given by Augustine, *De Diversis Quaestionibus LXXXIII*, 73, 1 (PL 40, 84), and summarized by Lombard, *Sent*. III, 6, 6 (pp. 580-81).

42 "Sed advertendum est quod ex hoc verbo *habitu*, etc., aliqui erraverunt. Unde tangitur triplex opinio VI distinct. III *Sentent*. Prima est quod humanitas Christi advenit ei accidentaliter, quod est falsum: quia suppositum divinae naturae factum est suppositum humanae naturae; et ideo accidentaliter non advenit ei, sed substantialiter, non quod divinitas naturaliter non advenit ei, sed substantialiter praedicetur de ipso." Ibid., 62, p. 102.

43 "Sed quia hoc alienum videtur ab his quae naturalis ratio experitur, fuerunt quidam posteriores talem de unione positionem asserentes. Quia enim ex unione animae et corporis con-

Those holding this opinion, Thomas goes on, also sought to avoid the error of Eutyches. For them, he says, the only way a subject could have something substantial to it which it did not have by nature would be by a change in that subject. But in the Incarnation the Word is entirely unchangeable. They were left with two alternatives, either to posit that the assumed soul and body pertained to the nature of the Word which he had from eternity, that is, the divinity, or to say that the Word assumed a human soul and body accidentally rather than substantially. In order to avoid the heresy of Eutyches, they rejected the first alternative and chose the second, comparing the Word's assumption of body and soul to a man's clothing himself.[44]

As will be seen later, Thomas Aquinas is historically more accurate in discerning the roots of the habitus-theory than he is in stating its positive teaching. It is against this positive teaching as he views it, that is, the denial of an union of body and soul in Christ and an accidental union of the soul and body with the Word, that he directs the force of his arguments and his accusation of heresy. Some of these arguments have already been seen; some are new. As in the *Sentences*, Thomas states that this opinion is entirely opposed to the teaching of faith because a lack of union of body and soul in Christ would mean that he is not truly in the species man, that he is called man only equivocally, that his body is not a true human body because it is not vivified by union to a rational soul.[45] A new argument along these lines adds that his soul would not be a truly human soul, and so there would not be a truly human nature, because the human soul is naturally able to be united to a body, and if a soul is never united to a body to constitute something (*aliquid*) it is not a human soul.[46]

As for the attempts of the habitus-theory to avoid Eutyches' heresy by positing an accidental union like that of clothing, Thomas asserts

stituitur homo, sed ex hac anima et ex hoc corpore hic homo, quod hypostasim et personam designat; volentes evitare ne cogerentur in Christo ponere aliquam hypostasim vel personam praeter hypostasim vel personam Verbi, dixerunt quod anima et corpus non fuerunt unita in Christo, nec ex eis aliqua substantia facta est, et per hoc Nestorii haeresim vitare volebant." *Contra Gentiles* IV, 37, [1].

44 "Rursus, quia hoc impossible videtur quod aliquid sit substantiale alicui et non sit de natura eius quam prius habuit, absque mutatione ipsius; Verbum autem omnino immutabile est: ne cogerentur ponere animam et corpus assumpta pertinere ad naturam Verbi quam habuit ab aeterno, posuerunt quod Verbum assumpsit animam humanam et corpus modo accidentali, sicut homo assumit indumentum; per hoc errorem Eutychetis excludere volentes." Loc. cit.

45 Ibid., [2]-[4].

46 "Amplius. Anima humana naturaliter unibilis est corpori. Anima igitur quae nunquam corpori unitur ad aliquid constituendum, non est anima humana: quia *quod est praeter naturam, non potest esse semper*. Si igitur anima Christi non est unita corpori eius ad aliquid constituendum, relinquitur quod non sit anima humana. Et sic in Christo non fuit humana natura." Ibid., [5].

that this attempt not only fails but indeed ends in Eutychianism. If the Word is united only in that way, the human nature was not the nature of the Word. Therefore, the Word did not subsist in two natures just as a clothed man does not subsist in two natures. But Eutyches was condemned for this very teaching that the Word does not subsist in two natures.[47] Another argument new to this work, and not without a touch of humour, states that if the Word assumed human nature only as a kind of clothing by which he could be seen by human eyes, it would have been useless for him to assume a human soul because it is by nature invisible.[48]

After these arguments, Aquinas now takes up the cudgels and rains blow after blow on this theory by reducing it in one way or another to the following heresies: that of Nestorius because it posits an accidental union;[49] that of Eutyches because its teachings would mean that the Word did not subsist in two natures; that of Arius and Apollinaris, in part at least, because it held that the body of Christ lacked animation by a rational soul; that of Manes, in part, because its views would make the body of Christ to be an imaginary body in that the soul would not be united to the flesh to constitute something.[50] Rather more mercifully he concludes the chapter by saying that the theory arose from a literal reading of Paul's words, *Habitu inventus ut homo*, which those supporting the theory should have understood as metaphorical and not as an exact likeness in every detail. Christ's human nature is like a garment in so far as the Word was seen through visible flesh as a man is seen through his garment. But if the union of a man and his apparel is accidental, that of the Word and human nature is not.[51]

47 "Praeterea. Si Verbum unitum est animae et corpori accidentaliter sicut indumento, natura humana non fuit natura Verbi. Verbum igitur, post unionem, non fuit subsistens in duabus naturis: sicut neque homo indutus dicitur in duabus naturis subsistere. Quod quia Eutyches dixit, in Chalcedonensi Synodo est damnatus." Ibid., [6]. In the following paragraph Thomas repeats an argument against this opinion that has been seen in the *Sentences*: What happens to clothing is not referred to the clothed man; according to this view, therefore, it could not be said that God was born or suffered by reason of the assumed body. A further argument in the same chapter [par.9] develops an argument similar to that in the *Sentences* about the Holy Spirit's assuming a dove's appearance to be seen: the communication of idioms is not possible between the dove and the Holy Spirit as it is between the two natures of the Son of God. But the habitus-theory would make the Son's assumption of human nature like that of the Holy Spirit's assuming the appearance of a dove. For the arguments in the *Sentences* see above, p. 389.

48 "Adhuc. Si Verbum assumpsit humanam naturam solum ut indumentum, quo posset hominum oculis apparere, frustra animam assumpsisset, quae secundum suam naturam invisibilis est." *Contra Gentiles* IV, 37, [8].

49 Ibid., [10]. A similar reduction of the habitus-theory to Nestorianism occurs ibid., IV, 41, [7].

50 Ibid. IV, 37, [10].

51 Ibid., [11], quoted below, n. 117.

Expositio super epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos.
Lectura super Johannem.

Although Thomas Aquinas' commentaries on Romans and on John mention the first opinion or assumptus-theory briefly,[52] I have found no direct discussion in them of the third opinion or habitus-theory. The commentary on Romans contains a brief discussion of the correctness of such sentences as "Christus secundum quod homo est Filius Dei," and "Christus secundum quod homo est persona," but these are discussed independently of any reference to the opinions.[53] The sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid." is not mentioned. In the commentary on John, Thomas explains the meaning of the statement, "Verbum est homo," by saying that the Word is said to be man in the same way anyone else is man, that is, as "having human nature," and this not by being human nature itself, but as a divine supposit united to human nature.[54] It is interesting to note in this text his introduction of the concept of relation in order to show how the human nature can be united to the Word without change on the part of the Word. Where the third opinion introduced the category of habitus to understand this lack of change, Thomas invokes the category of relation: in fact, he uses the very phrase *se habere ad Deum* concerning the creature's relation to God.[55]

Quaestio disputata de unione Verbi Incarnati

A brief paragraph in this disputed question summarizes the habitus-theory in terms like those found in the *Contra Gentiles*. Thomas says that supporters of this opinion were trying to avoid Nestorius' position of a duality of persons in Christ. Therefore they maintained that the Word assumed a soul and body without their being united to each other, so that no human person would be constituted from the soul and body. Thomas labels this an accidental union. He argues that its position gives rise to an even greater inconvenience than Nestorius' position

52 *See Expositio super epistolam S. Pauli ad Romanos*, cap. 1, lect. 2 (ed. R. Cai, *Super espistolas S. Pauli lectura*, 8th ed., Vol. I [Rome 1953] no. 36, pp. 8-9), and *Lectura super Johannem*, cap. 1, lect. 7 (ed. R. Cai [Rome 1952] no. 171, p. 34).

53 Cap. 1, lect. 3; Cai, nos. 53-54, p. 12.

54 "Si vero quaeris quomodo Verbum est homo, dicendum quod eo modo est homo quo quicumque alius est homo, scilicet habens humanam naturam. Non quod Verbum sit ipsa humana natura, sed est divinum suppositum unitum humanae naturae." Cap. 1, lect. 7; Cai, no. 172, p. 34.

55 "Hoc autem quod dicitur *Verbum caro factum est*, non aliquam mutationem in Verbo, sed solum in natura assumpta de novo in unitatem personae divinae dicit. *Et Verbum caro factum est*, per unionem ad carnem. Unio autem relatio quaedam est. Relationes autem de novo dictae de Deo in respectu ad creaturas, non important mutationem ex parte Dei, sed ex parte creaturae novo modo se habentis ad Deum." Ibid.; pp. 34-35.

because it would mean that Christ was not truly a man, since the notion of man consists in a union of soul and body. For this reason, he adds once more, this error was condemned under Alexander III in the Council of Tours.[56] One has the impression that in this question Thomas is giving a stereotyped presentation of the opinion without having reflected once again on its positions.

Summa theologiae

The same impression is given by the relatively few references to the third opinion in the *Summa theologiae*. After asserting the need for Christ's soul to be united to his body if he is to be a man in the same sense as other men, Aquinas declares that to deny this union of body and soul in Christ is heretical in that it derogates from the truth of Christ's humanity.[57] That he has the third opinion in mind is clear from his reply to the first argument. The argument had said that a union of soul and body in Christ would result in a human person or hypostasis other than that of the Word of God; Thomas' reply begins by saying that this was the reasoning motivating "those who denied the union of soul and body in Christ."[58] Thomas' reply is important in its own right:

> This happens in those who are simply men and nothing more (*in puris hominibus*) because the soul and body are joined in them in such a way that they exist *per se*. But in Christ they are united to each other as linked to something more principal which subsists in the nature composed from them. And for this reason there is not constituted from the union of soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person, but that very conjoined reality comes to the person or hypostasis that exists prior to it.[59]

In a long article rejecting an accidental union of natures in Christ, Thomas again alludes briefly to the habitus-theory. He first repeats what he has just said about the desire of its proponents to preserve a

56 "Quidam vero cum Nestorio sustinentes humanam naturam accidentaliter Verbo advenisse, voluerunt evitare dualitatem personarum quam ponebat Nestorius, ponentes quod Verbum assumpsit animam et corpus sibi invicem non unita; ut sic non constitueretur persona humana ex anima et corpore. Sed ex hoc sequitur maius inconveniens, quod Christus non vere fuerit homo; cum ratio hominis consistat in unione animae et corporis. Et ideo etiam hic error damnatus est sub Alexandro III in Concilio Turonensi." A. 1c.

57 III, q. 2, a. 5c.

58 "...ex hac ratione moti videntur illi qui negaverunt unionem animae et corporis in Christo; ne per hoc scilicet cogerentur personam novam aut hypostasim in Christo inducere, quia videbant quod in puris hominibus ex unione animae ad corpus constituitur persona." Ibid., ad 1.

59 "Sed hoc ideo in puris hominibus accidit quia anima et corpus sic in eis coniunguntur ut per se existant. Sed in Christo uniuntur ad invicem ut adiuncta alteri principaliori quod subsistit in natura ex eis composita. Et propter hoc ex unione animae et corporis in Christo non constituitur nova hypostasis seu persona, sed advenit ipsum coniunctum personae seu hypostasi praeexistenti." Loc. cit.

unity of person through their denial of a union of body and soul. He then adds that they went on to say that the separated soul and body "were united to the Word accidentally so that in this way the number of persons would not be increased. And this is the third opinion which the Master gives...."[60] That "the Word of God was united to man according to a putting on as of clothing, as the third opinion says," is no different from the Nestorian position that "the Word of God was united to Christ the man according to indwelling as in his temple." This means an accidental union, and the third opinion is even worse than the Nestorian doctrine because "it says something worse than Nestorius did, namely, that the soul and body are not united." Because it teaches an accidental union, the third opinion should not in fact be called an opinion but rather a heresy condemned by the Church in her councils.[61]

The *sed contra* argument of this same article makes the same link between a denial of a human *quid* in Christ and the teaching of an accidental union of natures in him as has been seen in earlier works.[62] What is accidentally predicated, Thomas argues, does not predicate a *quid*, but rather "quantum vel quale vel aliquo modo se habens." If the human nature in Christ came to the divine person only accidentally, the statement that Christ is man would not predicate a *quid* but only a *quale* or *quantum* or *aliquo modo se habens*. But this would be against the decretal of Pope Alexander rejecting the temerity of those daring to say that Christ as man is not *quid*.[63]

I have found no other direct references to the third opinion in the *Summa theologiae* except for a passing allusion to it in the discussion of the statement, "Deus est homo." Those who deny a union of body and soul in Christ, Thomas says, "did not maintain that God is true man but held that he is said to be man figuratively, by reason of the parts" of

60 "Alii vero, volentes servare unitatem personae, posuerunt Christi animam non esse corpori unitam, sed haec duo, separata ab invicem, esse unita Verbo accidentaliter, ut sic non cresceret numerus personarum. Et haec est tertia opinio quam Magister ibidem [in sexta distinctione tertii libri *Sent.*] ponit." III, q. 2, a. 6c.

61 "Alia vero opinio incidit in errorem Nestorii quantum ad hoc quod posuit unionem accidentalem. Non enim differt dicere quod Verbum Dei unitum est homini Christo secundum inhabitationem sicut in templo suo, sicut dicebat Nestorius; et dicere quod unitum fuit Verbum Dei homini secundum induitionem sicut vestimento, sicut dicit tertia opinio. Quae etiam peius dicit aliquid quam Nestorius, scilicet quod anima et corpus non sunt unita....Similiter etiam prima opinio, quae ponit duas hypostases, et tertia, quae ponit unionem accidentalem, non sunt dicendae opiniones, sed haereses in Conciliis ab Ecclesia damnatae." Loc. cit.

62 See above, pp. 386, 388-89, 391-92.

63 "...illud quod accidentaliter praedicatur, non praedicat quid, sed quantum vel quale vel aliquo modo se habens. Si ergo humana natura accidentaliter adveniret, cum dicitur: Christus est homo, non praedicaretur quid, sed quale aut quantum aut aliquo modo se habens. Quod est contra decretalem Alexandri Papae...." III, q. 2, a. 6 sc.

human nature.[64] Indirectly, the third opinion is involved in Thomas' discussion as to whether Christ was a man in the three days of his death. Here he recalls Lombard's position that at that time Christ was still a man because it sufficed for him to be a man that the Word have or be united to a body and soul: whether the body and soul were united or not made no difference to the essential constitution of man. Thomas at this point does no more than allude to his previous discussion about the union of soul and body in Christ, where he had identified such a position about Christ as man with the third opinion.[65] By doing so, however, he appears to link Peter Lombard with those who held the third opinion, at least on this particular point.

Although these are the only references to the habitus-theory in the *Summa theologiae*, we shall see that Thomas Aquinas, in his own responses to various arguments in other questions, comes to grips with a number of problems that the theory had raised in the history of the theology of Christ.

Compendium theologiae

Although the *Compendium theologiae* gives basically the same presentation of the habitus-theory as the works already seen, it introduces slight refinements that are worth noticing. Thomas links the teaching of this theory on a union according to habitus, seen as an accidental union, with the principle that everything coming to something already complete in *esse* must be joined to it accidentally.[66] In the *Summa theologiae* Thomas makes the latter principle the source of a separate argument concluding to an accidental union, but he does not link it with the example of habitus as he does here.[67] In the *Compendium* he once again notes this opinion's attempt to avoid a human person in Christ through its teaching a lack of union of body and soul.[68]

64 "...illi qui posuerunt quod in Christo anima et corpus non fuerunt unita, non posuerunt quod Deus sit verus homo, sed quod dicatur homo figurative, ratione partium." III, q. 16, a. 1c.

65 "Magister etiam *Sent.* in XXII dist. III libri, posuit quod Christus in triduo mortis fuit homo alia ratione: quia credidit quod unio animae et carnis non esset de ratione hominis, sed sufficit ad hoc quod aliquid sit homo, quod habeat animam humanam et corpus, sive coniuncta, sive non coniuncta. Quod etiam patet esse falsum ex his quae dicta sunt in Prima Parte, et ex his quae supra dicta sunt circa modum unionis." III, q. 50, a. 4c. Thomas' judgment of Lombard's position is more severe here than earlier, *In III Sent.* d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; 17, p. 664.

66 "Considerantes enim quidam, quod omne quod advenit alicui post esse completum, accidentaliter ei adiungitur, ut homini vestis, posuerunt quod humanitas accidentali unione fuerit in persona Filii Divinitati coniuncta, ita scilicet quod natura assumpta se haberet ad personam Filii Dei sicut vestis ad hominem." 209; 403, pp. 94-95.

67 See *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 6, arg. 2.

68 209; 403-404, p. 95.

Here again there is a certain compression and linking of arguments kept separate before, because this doctrine is now linked with the example of clothing in an unusual way.[69]

Some of Thomas' arguments against this opinion are familiar from his other writings, for they bear on the truth of Christ's humanity.[70] As for the example of habitus, the judgment is almost verbally the same as in the *Summa theologiae*: The use of this example by them is no better than Nestorius' example of indwelling in a temple and it is worse because it cannot profess Christ to be a true man.[71] The communication of idioms is also pressed against this theory. A clothed man cannot be a person of the clothing and cannot be in the species of clothing; but the Son of God must be said to be a person of human nature and to be of the same species as other men.[72]

The preceding survey of Thomas Aquinas' presentation of the third opinion or habitus-theory shows a firm continuity in his basic understanding of its unique positions. At the same time certain new refinements or emphases appear in works written after the *Scriptum super Sententiis*. These refinements are most evident concerning Thomas' explanation of the motivations leading to the development of the opinion and his own arguments against the opinion.

2. The Historical Accuracy of Thomas Aquinas' Presentation of the Habitus-Theory

Recent research on the three opinions has given a clearer picture both of the motivations and of the actual teaching of supporters of the third opinion.[73] It is in the light of this research that one can form a judgment on Thomas Aquinas' historical accuracy in his exposition of the habitus-theory. Since Thomas lacked the twelfth-century texts

69 "Si igitur anima in Christo fuisset corpori unita, videre non poterant quin sequeretur quod ex tali unione constitueretur persona. Sequeretur ergo in Christo duas esse personas, scilicet personam assumentem, et personam assumptam: in homine enim induto non sunt duae personae, quia indumentum rationem personae non habet. Si autem vestis esset persona, sequeretur in homine vestito duas esse personas. Ad hoc igitur excludendum, posuerunt quidam animam Christi unitam nunquam fuisse corpori, sed quod persona Filii Dei animam et corpus separatim assumpsit." Loc. cit.

70 See 209; 404, p. 95.

71 Loc. cit. For the *Summa theologiae* see above, p. 396.

72 209; 404, p. 95.

73 The assessment of the opinions which follows is based mainly on Haring, *Gilbert*, pp. 26-39, and *Hypostatic Union* I, 64-70, 196-208. Both studies give many texts from the twelfth century, together with references to other studies.

enabling modern scholars to understand this opinion but rather had to rely on Lombard's text and on the accounts of his more immediate predecessors, it is understandable that he falls short of complete accuracy in his presentation of the habitus-theory. What this recent research also reveals, however, is the rather surprising fact that the third opinion or habitus-theory, in its relatively unsophisticated approach, comes closer to some of Thomas' views on the Incarnation than might have been expected if one were to judge from Thomas' own statements about the opinion.

Thomas Aquinas is historically accurate when he repeats so often that proponents of the habitus-theory were motivated by the desire to avoid asserting a human person in Christ. This was indeed the fundamental problem faced by supporters of each of the three opinions; their differences came precisely in the way in which they tried to solve this problem.[74]

Thomas Aquinas is also historically accurate in saying that the third opinion, in order to avoid a human person in Christ, made the statement, "Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid." He is inaccurate, however, when he identifies the statement with the teaching of the third opinion because this statement in fact was accepted as well by those who professed the second opinion or subsistence-theory. This can be seen from careful analysis of the second opinion, and it is stated clearly by a well-informed author of the twelfth century, John of Cornwall, who says: "It should also be observed that this third opinion holds in common with the second that Christ is not some substance consisting of flesh and soul and that Christ as man is not something."[75] The second and third opinions differed not concerning this expression and the doctrine it implied but rather in their positive explanation of the mode of union in Christ and in their attitude towards the question whether the person of Christ is composed or not. "[The third opinion] differs [from the second] on this," John continues, in that it holds "that the person of Christ is not composed of two natures or three substances."[76]

Thomas would undoubtedly have been surprised to know that the second opinion, which he views as the correct, orthodox position,[77] held

74 See Haring, *Gilbert*, pp. 28, 34, and *Hypostatic Union* I, 67-68, 199-204.

75 "Notandum etiam quod hec tertia sententia commune habet cum secunda quod Christus non est aliqua substantia constans ex carne et anima et quod Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid." *Eulogium ad Alexandrum Papam tertium*, 1; ed. N. M. Haring, *Mediaeval Studies*, 13 (1951) 261.

76 "Hoc habet diuersum quod persona Christi non est ex duabus naturis siue tribus substantiis composita." Loc. cit.

77 "Sic ergo patet quod secunda trium opinionum quas Magister ponit, quae asserit unam hypostasim Dei et hominis, non est dicenda opinio, sed sententia catholicae fidei. Similiter etiam

that Christ as man is not *aliquid*. Both opinions held this view because they could not see how Christ as man could be an individual substance (an *aliquid*) and not be a human person. After the double condemnation of this teaching in 1170 and 1177 by Pope Alexander III, who as a professor had taught the opinion he now condemned,[78] theologians had to adjust their teachings on Christ as *aliquid*, but they did not have to give up their positive teachings on the mode of union in terms of subsistence or habitus because these addressed themselves to a different aspect of the question. That is why the first opinion or assumptus-theory did not win the day and why the second opinion or subsistence-theory was still able to develop in such a way as to become the common opinion in the thirteenth century.[79]

Again, Thomas Aquinas is historically accurate when he says that the habitus-theory had a special teaching about the union of body and soul in Christ, but he misinterprets this teaching when he says the theory denied any kind of union between soul and body and held that they were united only to the Word. It is clear from many texts of the twelfth and even of the early thirteenth century that the habitus-theory did not deny a union of body and soul in Christ. What it denied was a union of body and soul in such a way as to produce of itself a human substance, *aliquid*, or person, independently of the union with the Word. A theologian by the name of Udo, whose *Sententiae* were written about 1160 to 1165 and who supports the habitus-theory, writes:

> The notion of conjoining is different in Christ from that in an ordinary man: for in a man there is only one union, namely, of soul and flesh, which suffices to make a man: but in Christ there is a twofold union, that is, one of the soul and flesh, which does not suffice to make Christ to be a man... There is also another union, namely, that of the soul and flesh to the divinity, and this suffices to make Christ to be a man....[80]

prima opinio, quae ponit duas hypostases, et tertia, quae ponit unionem accidentalem, non sunt dicendae opiniones, sed haereses in Conciliis ab Ecclesia damnatae." *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 6c. Thomas was less severe towards the first opinion in his earlier works; see the article by Dondaine referred to in n. 1.

78 "Ad hec dicimus, Christum terciam personam esse in Trinitate, sed secundum quod Deus, nec secundum quod homo, presertim cum secundum quod homo non sit persona, et ut verius loquamur nec menciamur, nec aliquid; non enim ex eo, quod Christus homo est, aliquid, sed potius, si fas est, dici potest alicuius modi." Rolandus Bandinelli, *Sententiae*; ed. A. M. Gietl, *Die Sentenzen Rolands nachmals Papstes Alexander III* (Freiburg im Br. 1891; reprint, Amsterdam 1969) 175-77.

79 See *Hypostatic Union* I, 67-70, 201-08, on the development and adjustments of the various opinions.

80 "Alia est ratio conjunctionis in Christo et alia in puro homine: in homine enim tantum est una unio, scilicet animae et carnis, quae sufficit ad hominem faciendum: in Christo autem duplex est unio, una videlicet animae et carnis, quae non sufficit ad faciendum Christum esse hominem....Est et alia unio, scilicet animae et carnis ad divinitatem, quae sufficit ad faciendum Christum esse hominem...." Text from the critical edition being prepared by Rev. J. N. Garvin,

Supporters of the habitus-theory were simply trying to point out that the union of body and soul in Christ failed to have the same result as in other men, that is, a human person. Thomas himself makes the same point frequently with respect to the question of a human person distinct from the divine person. And, as will be seen in the third part of this study, Thomas himself finds that he must make careful distinctions when it comes to the question of asserting the existence of a human substance or *aliquid* in the united body and soul of Christ.

Where did Thomas Aquinas acquire this inaccurate view of the third opinion's teaching about the relationship of soul and body in Christ? It is not contained in Peter Lombard's description of the third opinion, even though his discussion of whether Christ was a man in the triduum of his death could furnish some grounds for such an interpretation of his own views on the union of body and soul.[81] It is more likely that Thomas took his interpretation from his immediate predecessors. It is true that in the late twelfth century, several decades after the appearance of the habitus-theory, some presentations of its views on the manner of union of soul and body in Christ could give the impression that it denied any union at all. But influential theologians of the early thirteenth century such as Godfrey of Poitiers and William of Auxerre clearly stated that the habitus-theory taught a union of body and soul with each other, and others such as Alexander of Hales make no association of the habitus-theory with a denial of union of body and soul with each other in Christ.[82]

It seems to have been Hugh of Saint-Cher, a Dominican master writing between 1230 and 1232, who introduced the idea that the

C.S.C., of the Medieval Institute of the University of Notre Dame, to whom I am grateful for the loan of the text. For further remarks and texts on the habitus-theory's teaching on the union of soul and body in Christ, see *Hypostatic Union* I, 68, 204-206.

81 "Cum ergo illa susceptio per mortem non defecerit, sed Deus homini et homo Deo, sicut ante, unitus erat vere; et tunc Deus erat homo et e converso, quia unitus animae et carni; et homo mortuus erat, quia anima a carne divisa erat. Propter separationem animae a carne mortuus, sed propter utriusque secum unionem, homo. Non autem sic erat homo, ut ex anima et carne simul iunctis subsisteret, ex qua ratione dicitur aliquis alius homo. Et ipse forte ante mortem hoc etiam modo erat homo, et post resurrectionem fuit; in morte vero homo erat tantum propter animae et carnis secum unionem, et mortuus propter inter illa duo divisionem." Lombard, *Sent.* III, 22, 1; pp. 650-51. Cf. Thomas Aquinas' commentary on Lombard's text, *In III Sent.*, d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; 14-17, pp. 663-64, and in the text above, n. 65. The words of Thomas in the *Sentences* at this point show that he did not interpret Lombard as holding the position of the habitus-theory, as he understood it, on the lack of union of body and soul in the Incarnation.

82 For the twelfth-century presentations see *Hypostatic Union* I, 205-06. For Godfrey and William see William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tr. 1, q. 1, cap. 9; no. 7, in *Hypostatic Union* I, 282. The text is really Godfrey of Poitier's, but it was copied into at least some MSS of William's *Summa* and circulated as William's views. On this see ibid., pp. 242-45. For Alexander of Hales' authentic works see *Hypostatic Union* II, 203. I have found no statements in the *Summa Fratris Alexandri* or in the *Commentary on the Sentences* by Bonaventure ascribing to the third opinion the teaching that there was no union of body and soul in Christ in the Incarnation.

habitus-theory denied a union of body and soul with each other in Christ. Arguing against this theory, he says: "Again, if in Christ there was not one thing conjoined from body and soul, therefore there was never a separation of soul and body. Therefore Christ was never dead."[83] He adds an argument that will be used later by Thomas Aquinas: "In what way, therefore, is he said to be truly dead? But they say that the soul gave life to the body. But I think it unintelligible that a soul that is not conjoined should give life."[84]

Thomas Aquinas' immediate source for his interpretation may have been Albert the Great, although Albert does not ascribe to the habitus-theory an outright denial of union of body and soul in Christ. Introducing the third opinion as an "error," Albert begins his summary of its seven positions as follows: "The first [position] is that although there is a twofold natural union, namely that of soul to flesh and of flesh and soul with the deity, neither of these [unions] made some one thing: for neither did the soul and flesh, when united, make one man, nor did the nature of man and the Son of God, when united, make one person..."[85] Albert's reply also seems to recognize that this opinion held for some kind of union, but he finds its idea of the union insufficient: "There are three reasons against the first [position]: because the body of man does not sense or live with natural life by being joined to the soul by any kind of conjoining whatsoever, but [only] by being conjoined to it as to its perfection and act. Therefore, either Christ's body did not sense or live by natural life and with natural sensation, or it was necessary that his soul be united to his body as act to potency or to its proper matter."[86] Albert is thus, even while opposing this position, more nuanced and somewhat closer to the original opinion than was

83 "Item, si in Christo non fuit unum conjunctum ex corpore et anima, ergo numquam fuit separatio animae et corporis. Ergo Christus numquam fuit mortuus." *Scriptum super III Sent.* d. 6; no. 108, in *Hypostatic Union* III, 201.

84 "Quomodo ergo dicitur vere mortuus? Sed dicunt quod anima vivificabat corpus. Sed credo quod non est intelligibile quod anima non conjuncta vivificet." Ibid.; no. 110, ibid. III, 201. See also ibid., pp. 62-63.

85 "Ex primo capitulo trahunt septem positiones hujus erroris, quae omnes falsae sunt. Prima est, quod cum duplex sit unio naturalis, scilicet animae ad carnem, et carnis et animae cum deitate, quod in Christo neutra illarum fecit unum aliquod: nec enim anima et caro fecerunt unum hominem unita, nec natura hominis et Filius Dei fecerunt unam personam unita..." *In III Sent.* d. 6, G, exp. text.; ed. S. Borgnet, *B. Alberti Magni...opera omnia* (Paris 1894) XXVIII, 139.

86 "Sunt autem tres contra primam [positionem]: quia corpus hominis non sentit nec vivit vita naturae, per hoc quod conjungitur animae quacumque conjunctione: sed per hoc quod conjungitur ei ut perfectioni et actui: aut igitur Christi corpus nec sentiit, nec vixit vita naturali et naturali sensu: aut oportuit, quod corpori esset unita anima ut actus potentiae vel materiae propriae." Ibid.; XXVIII, 140.

Thomas Aquinas, who interpreted the third opinion's view as an absolute denial of union of soul and body.[87]

It has been seen that Thomas Aquinas constantly interprets the third opinion's use of habitus to mean that it taught an accidental union of the human nature to the Word. In this respect also he has only partially grasped the motivation of the opinion and has misinterpreted its teaching on the mode of union.[88] He is partially correct when he says that its supporters, in appealing to the category of habitus, wanted to avoid a human substance in the sense of a human person in Christ.[89] What was equally and perhaps more important to them in their use of habitus was their desire, when explaining the statement that God *became* man, to eliminate any change in the person of the Word by reason of the Incarnation. Rejecting the category of substance and wishing to understand the union according to one of the categories, they thought that authoritative texts of scripture, Augustine, and others gave them a basis for likening the human nature to a habitus that comes to a person without changing him. As Lombard says in describing the opinion:

> He is said to become true man because he took the truth of flesh and soul. We read that he is said to have taken these two into the singularity and unity of his person not because those two or anything composed of them is one person with the Word or is the Word, but because by the coming of these two to the Word the number of persons was not increased so that there came to be a quaternity in the Trinity, and because the very person of the Word, which previously was without a garment, was not divided or changed by taking up [this] garment, but remains one and the same unchanged [person]. They say that God became man according to habitus.[90]

This insistence on a lack of change was directed especially against the second opinion's teaching that in the Incarnation the person of the

87 Thomas' first statement on this subject (in n. 5 above) might be interpreted as similar to Albert's more nuanced position, but he soon speaks of the lack of union of body and soul in absolute terms (see text in n. 9 above).

88 See Haring, *Gilbert*, pp. 35-36, esp. n. 84.

89 See ibid., pp. 28-29, 34.

90 "Qui ideo dicitur factus verus homo, quia veritatem carnis et animae accepit. Quae duo etiam in singularitatem vel unitatem suae personae accepisse legitur, non quia illa duo, vel aliqua res ex illis composita, sit una persona cum Verbo, vel sit Verbum, sed quia, illis duobus accedentibus Verbo, non est personarum numerus auctus, ut fieret quaternitas in Trinitate; et quia ipsa persona Verbi, quae prius erat sine indumento, assumtione indumenti non est divisa vel mutata, sed una eademque immutata permansit. Qui secundum habitum Deum hominem factum dicunt." *Sent.* III, 6, 4; p. 579.

Word was "factam *compositam* ex divinitate et humanitate."[91] Although Thomas Aquinas, on the authority of John Damascene, will accept the notion of a "composed person" in Christ,[92] he would agree with this concern of the habitus-theory to avoid any change on the part of the Word. Moreover, with the same concern, he himself makes use of a category with an affinity to the category of habitus when he says that the union is a *quaedam relatio*; he does so for the same reason as those using habitus, that is, because it gave him a way of understanding the union of the human nature to the divine person in which all newness or "change" is on the part of the human nature that is assumed whereas the divine person, terminus of the relation, remains unchanged.[93] It is true that Thomas acknowledges the third opinion's concern to eliminate change in the divine person,[94] but it is unfortunate that he saw it as taking the category of habitus and the example of clothing to be so literally applicable to the union that, in his view, it taught an accidental union. An accidental union was not included in this theory's use of habitus any more than in Thomas' own use of the category of relation or of a term even more closely related to habitus, *habitudo*: "...Secundum humanam naturam non adveniat sibi [Filio Dei] novum esse personale, sed solum nova habitudo esse personalis praeexistentis ad naturam humanam."[95]

Thus it must be concluded that although Thomas Aquinas perceives the underlying motivation of the third opinion or habitus-theory, he fails on several counts to interpret its teachings accurately. He thereby passes over some points in it that are quite close to his own positions. Moreover, because of his own historical influence, he left later authors, some in our own day, with a false impression on the teachings of this opinion. At this point, however, one must recall the remarks of M.-D. Chenu that Thomas Aquinas, in reporting, analyzing and discussing opinions of the past does not proceed "in the manner of a pure historian," but rather seeks to extract from positions he judges erroneous whatever illumination they can give both by the elements of truth they contain and by the consequences implied by their errors.[96] If

91 Lombard, *Sent.* III, 6, 3; p. 576.

92 *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 4. In his *Sentences* he is more cautious about using the expression: see *In III Sent.* d. 6, q. 2, a. 3, resp. (95, p. 242), and ibid., d. 11, a. 3, resp. (50, p. 367).

93 See *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 7c, and the text from his commentary on John's gospel quoted above, n. 55.

94 See *In III Sent.* d. 6, exp. text. (130, p. 250), and the text from *Contra Gentiles* quoted above, n. 44.

95 *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, a. 2c. In this text, the *nova habitudo* would be real on the part of the nature assumed rather than on the part of the person: this is clear from one of the replies in the same article (ad 4m). See also the text in n. 55.

96 *Introduction à l'étude de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Montreal-Paris 1950) 162-167; trans. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes, *Toward Understanding Saint Thomas* (Chicago 1964) 191-196.

Thomas was less successful in seeing all the positive elements in the habitus-theory, it was because as teacher or apologist he was using the opinions on the Incarnation not so much as descriptions of the past but rather as models of typical positions that were possible concerning the Incarnation. As teacher or apologist he wished to bring out the inner coherence of such typical positions and to show more clearly where each position, as he interpreted it, could lead if it were followed to its logical conclusions. In any case, in reacting to these opinions, even only partially understood, he was led to emphasize or develop certain positions of his own on the Incarnation. It is to his emphases and developments made in reaction to the habitus-theory that we now turn.

3. Thomas Aquinas' Theology of the Incarnation in Reaction to his Understanding of the Habitus-Theory

Given the method of disputation and discussion so prevalent in medieval theology, one may expect to find that even a theory judged erroneous would provide an opportunity for an author to embark upon fruitful new developments or at least to lay stress on certain aspects of his own thought. Thomas Aquinas undoubtedly develops most of his theology on the Incarnation independently of his reactions to the habitus-theory, but his response to it does shed light on his doctrine in this area.

For Thomas, as we have seen, the habitus-theory denied a union of body and soul in Christ. In rejecting this position Thomas is led to insist strongly and constantly not only on their union but also on the necessity of such a union in all men, and in Christ as well, if Christ is to be a true man like other men. Some of his responses have already been seen. Here we need only recall the varieties they take: this lack of union would mean that the *ratio* of man is found in Christ only equivocally; Christ is not a true man; he does not have a true human nature; he is not in the same species "man" as other men. The same lack of reality would have to be affirmed of the parts of Christ — his flesh especially, or his eyes or his bones: these would be said of him only equivocally or metaphorically if his soul were not united to his flesh.[97] The same principle is applied to the soul: it would not be a true soul if it were not united to his flesh.[98] Christ would not have true human sensation

97 See the texts quoted above, nn. 5, 31, 56, 64, and 65. See also *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, q. 9, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1; *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 5; *Comp. th.*, 209; 404, p. 95.
98 See *Contra Gentiles* IV, 37, [5] quoted above, n. 46.

without a union of body and soul.[99] Indeed, he would be a phantasm only appearing to be like other men.[100]

A closely-related and important doctrine emerges in Aquinas' rebuttal of a lack of union of soul and body in Christ, that is, his affirmation that the flesh of Christ is not vivified by the Word but by the soul of Christ acting as a formal cause. In the *Sentences*, while discussing the third opinion, he faces an argument saying that the Word suffices to give life to the flesh of Christ so that there is no need for the soul to be united to the flesh. Thomas replies that "the Word gives life to the flesh of Christ actively but not formally, and therefore there is required a soul to give life formally."[101] The same argument and reply, both developed more fully, recur in the *Summa theologiae* in a question whose first argument shows that Thomas has the habitus-theory in mind. His reply to the problem is as follows:

> The principle of bodily life is twofold. One is effective, and in this way the Word of God is the principle of all life. The other way in which something is a principle of life is formally. For since "for living things to be is to live," as the Philosopher says in II *De Anima*, just as anything is formally through its form, so a body is and lives through its soul. And in this way the body could not live through the Word, which cannot be the form of a body.[102]

Because Thomas Aquinas interprets the habitus-theory as teaching an accidental union in Christ, he opposes it by emphasizing certain doctrines about the Incarnation. Although in this respect his arguments against Nestorianism are more developed, those opposed to the habitus-theory are also worth noting.

We have already seen one of his responses in which, after discussing the example of clothing in terms of an accidental union, he eliminates any possibility of an accidental union in Christ and sees the habitus-theory as leading logically to a heresy denying the communication of

99 "Sequeretur etiam ulterius quod Christi corpus sentire non potuit, non enim sentit corpus nisi per animam sibi coniunctam." *Comp. th.*, 209; 404, p. 95.

100 "Si enim anima non est unita carni ad alicuius constitutionem, phantasticum erat quod videbatur Christus similis aliis hominibus ex unione animae et corporis constitutis." *Contra Gentiles* IV, 37, [10].

101 "Ad quartum dicendum quod Verbum vivificat carnem Christi active, non autem formaliter; et ideo requiritur anima quae formaliter vivificet." *In III Sent.* d. 6, q. 3, a. 1 ad 4; 112, p. 245.

102 "...duplex est principium vitae corporalis. Unum quidem effectivum. Et hoc modo Verbum Dei est principium omnis vitae. Alio modo est aliquid principium vitae formaliter. Cum enim 'vivere viventibus sit esse', ut dicit Philosophus, II *De An.*; sicut unumquodque formaliter est per formam suam, ita corpus est et vivit per animam. Et hoc modo non potuit corpus vivere per Verbum, quod non potest esse corporis forma." III, q. 2, a. 5, ad 3. Cf. the following: "Sequeretur etiam quod Christus vere mortuus non fuerit [if there were no union of soul and body]. Mors enim est privatio vitae. Manifestum est enim quod Divinitatis vita per mortem privari non potuit, corpus autem vivum esse non potuit, si ei anima coniuncta non fuit." *Comp. th.*, 209; 404, p. 95.

idioms in Christ.[103] Within the same discussion Thomas introduces an argument that recurs in several of his works, that is, what comes to something after its *esse* is complete is an accident, so that the human nature in Christ, coming to the Son of God after his *esse* is complete, must come accidentally.[104] Thomas' reply agrees that Christ's human nature comes to the Son of God after his *esse* is complete, but he denies that it comes accidentally because it is drawn into union in that very *esse* of the Son of God, just as the body will come to the soul in the resurrection.[105] This reply, which is important for the questions of the unity of *esse* in Christ and for the unity of man, receives a very full and important elaboration when the same argument is met in the *Summa theologiae.*[106] Although in this work the argument and reply are not so directly related to the habitus-theory as in the *Sentences*, its entry in the *Sentences* in the discussion of this theory shows that the third opinion's position is the origin of the argument and the occasion for Thomas' important responses throughout his works.

Elsewhere the accidentality of the union seen by Thomas in the teaching of the habitus-theory is opposed by the doctrine of the communication of idioms. This has already been seen in one text from the *Sentences*,[107] and it recurs at least twice in the same work. Speaking of the statement, "God is man," Thomas says that the third opinion, by espousing an accidental union, holds that this statement involves predication by way of inherence, as when a man is said to be white. This is most improper, he replies, because this opinion, which holds that the body and soul come to the Son of God like a garment, could predicate man of God only denominatively, that is, it would say that God is humanized in the way a man is said to be clothed.[108]

103 See above, p. 389.

104 "Omne quod advenit post esse completum est accidens. Sed humana natura advenit Filio Dei post esse completum ipsius. Ergo advenit ei accidentaliter." *In III Sent.* d. 6, q. 3, a. 2, arg. 2; 113, p. 245. This argument is repeated, with slight variations, in *Contra Gentiles* IV, 40, [13], and in *Summa theologiae* III, 2, 6, arg. 2.

105 "Ad secundum dicendum quod quamvis adveniat post esse completum, non tamen est accidentaliter adveniens; quia trahitur ad unionem in illo esse, sicut corpus adveniet animae in resurrectione." *In III Sent.* q. 3, a. 2, ad 2; 121, p. 247.

106 "...illud quod advenit post esse completum, accidentaliter advenit, nisi trahatur in communionem illius esse completi. Sicut in resurrectione corpus adveniet animae praeexistenti; non tamen accidentaliter, quia ad idem esse assumetur, ut scilicet corpus habeat esse vitale per animam. Non est autem sic de albedine, quia aliud est esse albi, et aliud est esse hominis cui advenit albedo. Verbum autem Dei ab aeterno esse completum habuit secundum hypostasim sive personam; ex tempore autem advenit ei natura humana, non quasi assumpta ad unum esse prout est naturae, sicut corpus assumitur ad esse animae, sed ad unum esse prout est hypostasis vel personae. Et ideo humana natura non unitur accidentaliter Filio Dei." III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 2.

107 See above, p. 389.

108 "...cum haec duo [anima et corpus] secundum hanc opinionem adveniant Filio Dei quasi habitus, non potest homo proprie praedicari de eo nisi denominative; sicut nec vestis de homine, sed dicitur homo vestitus." III, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; 29, p. 261. A similar statement recurs in a later discussion of the expression *homo dominicus*; see ibid., q. 1, a. 2, resp.; 48, p. 265.

The *Contra Gentiles* likewise invokes the communication of idioms several times in order to oppose this theory: if the Word assumed a soul and body as a man does a garment, it could not be said that God was born or suffered because of the assumed body,[109] nor could the Son of God be said to have become man or to be less than the Father according to the assumed nature.[110] A similar argument occurs briefly in the *Lecture on Philippians*.[111]

Still in opposition to this theory's supposed teaching of an accidental union, Thomas makes several important statements about the subsistence of the Word in two natures. In a chapter of the *Contra Gentiles* devoted exclusively to the habitus-theory, he argues that its teaching would mean that "after the union, the Word did not subsist in two natures, just as a clothed man is not said to subsist in two natures. Because Eutyches said this, he was condemned in the Council of Chalcedon."[112] The reason for this deduction is slightly amplified in a subsequent paragraph: "Nothing subsists in that which is accidentally united to itself."[113]

An interesting variation of this statement occurs in the *Lecture on Philippians*, again in a discussion of the habitus-theory. This opinion, Aquinas says, erred by holding that "the humanity of Christ came to him accidentally, which is false because the supposit of divine nature became a supposit of human nature, and therefore it did not come to him accidentally but substantially."[114] A similarly striking statement in the *Summa theologiae* about the subsistence of the Word in human nature has already been seen.[115]

Thus, although Thomas Aquinas is historically inaccurate in saying that the habitus-theory taught an accidental union, his responses to it on this score serve to bring out his own positive positions on the union in several different directions and in formulas that are both clarifying and striking.

Closely related to these developments are Aquinas' explanations of the meaning of habitus when he meets it in authoritative texts as an

109 See IV, 37, [7].
110 See ibid., [9]; cf. ibid., IV, 39, [1].
111 See text above, n. 42.
112 See text above, n. 47.
113 "Ex hoc etiam quod dixit accidentalem unionem Verbi ad animam et carnem humanam, sequitur quod Verbum post unionem non fuit subsistens in duabus naturis, quod Eutyches dixit: nihil enim subsistit in eo quod sibi accidentaliter unitur." *Contra Gentiles* IV, 37, [10].
114 See text above, n. 42.
115 See above, p. 395. In discussing the habitus-theory, Thomas also speaks forcefully of Christ as a "person of human nature": "Adhuc autem homo vestitus non potest esse persona vestis aut indumenti, nec aliquo modo dici potest quod sit in specie indumenti. Si igitur Filius Dei humanam naturam ut vestimentum assumpsit, nullo modo dici poterit persona humanae naturae, nec etiam dici poterit quod Filius Dei sit eiusdem speciei cum aliis hominibus...." *Comp. th.*, 209; 404, p. 95.

example of the Incarnation. In each case Thomas' concern is to avoid seeing in the example an indication of an accidental union. After denying that the union in Christ is accidental, Thomas admits that the human nature in Christ has some likeness to an accident: first, because it comes to the divine person after his *esse* is complete, just as clothing and all other accidents come to their subject; second, because the human nature in Christ is a substance in itself and comes to another as clothing does to a man; third, because the human nature is bettered by its union with the Word and does not change the Word, just as clothing takes the form of the one wearing it without changing the wearer.[116] Finally, just as a man is seen through his clothing, so the Word of God appeared visibly to men through the "clothing" of human nature.[117] Through such comparisons Thomas seeks to exploit the positive values of the example of habitus without opening the way to an accidental union in Christ. As has been suggested earlier, this was in part the intent of proponents of the habitus-theory themselves.[118]

The most important reaction of Thomas Aquinas to the third opinion, and the most important clarification of his own theology of the Incarnation, occurs when he meets the doctrine, thought by him to be identical with this opinion, which said: "Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid." Although, as has been seen, Thomas refers several times to the ecclesiastical condemnation of this statement,[119] he accepts the positive statement that Christ according as he is man is *aliquid* only with certain important qualifications that illuminate his own theology of the union in Christ.

To understand Aquinas' response to the third (and indeed to the second) opinion on this point, one must situate his statements within a broader context, that is, within his statements about the individual human nature of Christ. At least twice in the *Sentences* he speaks of the

116 "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod natura humana in Christo habet aliquam similitudinem cum accidente, et praecipue cum habitu, quantum ad tria. Primo, quia advenit personae divinae post esse completum, sicut habitus et omnia alia accidentia. Secundo, quia est in se substantia et advenit alteri, sicut vestis homini. Tertio, quia melioratur ex unione ad Verbum et non mutat Verbum; sicut vestis formatur secundum formam vestientis et non mutat vestientem." *In III Sent.* d. 6, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1; 120, p. 247. The third of these comparisons is made again in *In Philip.* 2, 2 (text above, n. 41) and in *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1. An alternative interpretation, one likely closer to the true one, is also given in *In Philip.* 2, 2 (text above, n. 40).

117 "Habet igitur natura humana assumpta quandam indumenti similitudinem, inquantum Verbum per carnem visibilem videbatur, sicut homo videtur per indumentum: non autem quantum ad hoc quod unio Verbi ad humanam naturam in Christo fuerit modo accidentali." *Contra Gentiles* IV, 37, [11]. Cf. *Summa theologiae* III, q. 2, a. 6 ad 1.

118 See above, pp. 403-404.

119 See above, pp. 388, 389, 390, 395, 396. In three places he says that the condemnation referred to the teaching on a lack of union of body and soul, which is not the same thing as a denial of *aliquid.* See the texts above, nn. 31, 56, and *De unione Verbi Incarnati*, a. 1c.

human nature of Christ as a substance in itself: *in se substantia.*[120] Within the same distinction, however, he says that Christ's human nature is not directly contained in the genus of substance because it is not a thing subsisting completely through itself; it is called a substance in the same way one speaks of the human hand as a substance, that is, by contrast with an accident.[121] For the same reasons he says that Christ as man (*homo*) is a substance of rational nature, but only as *this* man (*iste homo*) is he an individual substance of rational nature and therefore a person; only *iste homo* designates the subsistent of human nature, that is, the divine person.[122]

In the *Contra Gentiles* the meaning of Christ's human nature is further clarified. After having explained that *hic homo* designates a particular substance, and therefore a hypostasis (that of the Word) in Christ, he says that it would be incorrect to apply the same argument that had been made about *hic homo* to Christ's human nature: "If anyone should transfer the same objection to human nature, saying it is a certain substance that is not universal but particular and hence a hypostasis, he is evidently deceived. For even in Socrates or Plato human nature is not a hypostasis, but that which subsists in it is a hypostasis."[123] If Christ's human nature is said to be a substance, it is not as hypostasis is a particular substance: "But that [the human nature of Christ] is a substance and is particular is not said in that sense in which a hypostasis is a particular substance. For a substance, according to the Philosopher, is spoken of in two ways, namely, with reference to a supposit in the genus of substance, which is called a hypostasis, and with reference to a quiddity, which is the nature of the thing."[124] Thomas then indicates that the human nature of Christ is a part subsisting in the whole that is Christ: "But the parts of any substance are not called par-

120 See *In III Sent.* d. 6, q. 3, a. 2, ad 1; 120, p. 247 (quoted above, n. 116). Cf. ibid., resp.; 117, p. 246.

121 "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod substantia, secundum quod est genus, non proprie praedicatur de parte. Manus enim si esset substantia, cum sit animata, esset animal — nihil enim est in genere quasi directe contentum sub eo, nisi quod habet naturam aliquam complete — tamen dicitur manus esse substantia, secundum quod substantia divi[di]tur contra accidens; et similiter dico de natura humana in Christo." Ibid., q. 1, a. 1, qla. 1, ad 1; 26, p. 226.

122 "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est substantia rationalis naturae. Sed secundum quod iste homo, est individua substantia rationalis naturae. Unde secundum quod iste homo, est persona; sicut secundum quod iste homo, est Deus." Ibid., d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 1, ad 1; 50, p. 338.

123 "Sed si quis eandem obiectionem ad humanam naturam transferat, dicens eam esse substantiam quandam non universalem sed particularem, et per consequens hypostasim: — manifeste decipitur. Nam humana natura etiam in Sorte vel Platone non est hypostasis: sed id quod in ea subsistit, hypostasis est." IV, 49, [ad 10].

124 "Quod autem substantia sit et particularis, non secundum illam significationem dicitur qua hypostasis est particularis substantia. Substantia enim, secundum Philosophum, dicitur dupliciter: scilicet pro supposito in genere substantiae, quod dicitur hypostasis, et de eo quod quid est, quod est natura rei." Loc. cit.

ticular substances in this way as if they were subsisting through themselves; rather, they subsist in the whole."[125] From this text it is clear that for Aquinas Christ's human nature, when spoken of as a substance, refers to the quiddity rather than to a hypostasis, and this quiddity is that of a part of the whole rather than the subsisting whole.

Can the human nature of Christ be called an individual, a singular, a particular? Yes, Thomas replies within a long grammatical analysis in the *Sentences*: these are names of "second imposition," that is, names signifying logical entities rather than realities, and they signify the particular in any genus and not only in the genus of substance. On the other hand, names such as "a thing of nature," "supposit," "hypostasis," and "person" cannot be used of the human nature of Christ because, signifying the particular as found only in the genus of substance, they always refer to something complete and subsisting through itself.[126] But just as this hand can be called "individual," "singular," and "particular," so can the human nature of Christ.[127] The same doctrine is expressed with greater clarity in the disputed question *De unione Verbi Incarnati*, within the same kind of grammatical analysis and with the same conclusion. Human nature in Christ can be called a *certain* individual or particular or singular, but it cannot be called a hypostasis or supposit or person.[128]

In the *Summa theologiae*, the human nature of Christ is referred to as "a certain individual in the genus of substance," like the human hand, which is not a complete substance but only part of substance. Because Christ's human nature does not exist separately through itself but rather in something more perfect, that is, in the person of the Word of God, it does not have its own personality.[129] Later on in the same work Thomas

125 "Sed neque partes alicuius substantiae sic dicuntur particulares substantiae quasi sint per se subsistentes, sed subsistunt in toto." Loc. cit.

126 "...omne nomen designans particulare secundum respectum ad proprietates, designat etiam ipsum per respectum ad naturam communem. Hoc ergo potest fieri dupliciter: — vel per nomen primae impositionis: et sic est hypostasis communiter in omnibus substantiis, persona vero in rationalibus substantiis; — vel per nomen secundae impositionis; et sic est individuum inquantum est indivisum in se, singulare vero inquantum est divisum ab aliis, unde singulare est idem quod divisum. Est etiam alia differentia attendenda inter ista; quia quaedam istorum significant communiter particulare in quolibet genere, sicut particulare, individuum et singulare; quaedam vero tantum particulare in genere substantiae, sicut res naturae, suppositum, hypostasis et persona. Quia vero ratio substantiae est quod per se subsistat, inde est quod nullum istorum dicitur nisi de re completa per se subsistenti. Unde non dicuntur neque de parte neque de accidente, de quibus alia dici possunt quae in omnibus generibus inveniuntur. Quamvis enim haec albedo vel haec manus dicatur individuum vel singulare, non tamen potest dici hypostasis vel suppositum vel res naturae." In III Sent. d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, resp.; 22-23, p. 225.

127 "Sicut enim haec manus dicitur individuum vel singulare vel particulare; ita humana natura in Christo est individuum, singulare et particulare." Ibid.; 24, p. 226.

128 A. 2c.

129 "Sciendum est tamen quod non quodlibet individuum in genere substantiae etiam in

implies by his example of the hand that the human nature of Christ can be called "a certain kind (*quaedam*) of individual substance" but not a person, and he says it may be called "a certain kind (*quoddam*) of individual or singular."[130] Here as always in Aquinas the qualifications *quaedam* and *quoddam* show that he uses the word thus qualified in an analogical and not univocal sense; human nature in Christ is not an individual substance, individual, or singular in exactly the same sense as are other substances. *A fortiori*, it is not a human hypostasis or person.

With this background in mind, we may approach Thomas Aquinas' discussion of the statement, "Christus secundum quod homo non est aliquid." What for him does *aliquid* mean with reference to Christ's human nature and how may it be applied to him? The most direct treatment of this problem is found, as would be expected, in distinction 10 of Book III of the *Sentences*, for this is where Lombard raises the issue most clearly. The discussion of *aliquid*, however, is surprisingly brief: there is no question explicitly on this point; what there is occurs within discussion of the question whether Christ as man is *individuum*.[131] Here in distinction 10 Thomas repeats what he has said in distinction 6, that is, that although *individuum* is found in both substances and accidents, it is only in substance and not in accidents that *individuum* has the notion of something subsisting. "Christ's human nature," Thomas continues, "is a certain kind of individual, but Christ is not that individual; rather he is a subsisting individual. Taking "individual" in this way, which is the way it is predicated of Christ, there is in Christ only one individual, just as there is only one person. Hence just as Christ is not a person as man, so is he not an individual."[132]

rationali natura habet rationem personae, sed solum illud quod per se existit, non autem quod existit in alio perfectiori. Unde manus Socratis, quamvis sit quoddam individuum, non tamen est persona, quia non per se existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in suo toto. Et hoc etiam potest significare in hoc quod persona dicitur substantia individua; non enim manus est substantia completa, sed pars substantiae. Licet ergo haec humana natura sit quoddam individuum in genere substantiae, quia tamen non per se separatim existit, sed in quodam perfectiori, scilicet in persona Dei Verbi, consequens est quod non habeat personalitatem propriam." III, q. 2, a. 2, ad 3.

130 "...substantia individua quae ponitur in definitione personae, importat substantiam completam per se subsistentem separatim ab aliis. Alioquin manus hominis posset dici persona, cum sit substantia quaedam individua; quia tamen est substantia individua sicut in alio existens, non potest dici persona. Et eadem ratione nec humana natura in Christo, quae tamen potest dici individuum vel singulare quoddam." Ibid., III, q. 16, a. 12, ad 2.

131 Q. 1, a. 2, qla. 2; 44-45, 53-56, pp. 336-37, 338-39.

132 "...individuum invenitur et in substantiis et in accidentibus. Secundum autem quod in substantiis est, habet de ratione sui quod sit subsistens: non autem secundum quod in accidentibus invenitur. Et utroque modo invenitur in Christo; tamen altero tantum modo praedicatur. Humana enim natura in Christo est quoddam individuum; sed Christus non est illud individuum, sed est individuum subsistens. Et hoc modo accipiendo individuum, secundum quod de Christo praedicatur, est in Christo unum tantum individuum sicut et una persona. Unde sicut Christus non est persona secundum quod homo, ita nec individuum." Ibid.; 53, p. 338.

It is one of the arguments in this question about *individuum* that raises the problem of *aliquid*. "Christ as man is *aliquid*," it says. "But he is not something universal; therefore he is something particular. Therefore as man he is an individual."[133] Thomas agrees that Christ as man is *aliquid*, but he denies that one can conclude that as man he is therefore something universal or particular because, he says, it is accidental to man (*homo*) to be universal and particular. Therefore it is accidental to say, "Man is something (*aliquid*) particular." *Per se* predication would involve saying, "This man (*iste homo*) is something (*aliquid*) particular." "Consequently," Thomas concludes, "Christ is not something (*aliquid*) particular as man, but only as *this* man."[134]

Let us observe carefully the implications of this reply. Thomas Aquinas is saying in fact that he does not accept the statement, "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid" if *aliquid* means *aliquid particulare*. Only if *iste* is added to *homo*, *iste homo* designating "a determinate supposit of human nature, which is the eternal supposit,"[135] will he accept such a phrase according to *per se* predication. The only way he might accept the phrase without the *iste* would be by viewing it as an example of predication *per accidens*. Thomas reinforces his judgments on *aliquid* by making exactly the same distinctions with respect to the expression, "Christus secundum quod homo est individuum." Christ, he says, is not an individual as man, but only as this man (*hic homo*), the latter term again standing for the subsisting subject, the divine person.[136] All that he will say about Christ as man is that he has an individual *nature* according as he is man.[137]

133 "Videtur quod sit, secundum quod homo, individuum. Christus enim, secundum quod homo, est aliquid. Sed non est aliquid universale. Ergo est aliquid particulare. Ergo secundum quod homo, est individuum." Ibid., arg. 1; 44, pp. 336-37.

134 "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est aliquid; non tamen sequitur: ergo secundum quod homo, est aliquid universale vel aliquid particulare; quia homini accidit esse universale et particulare. Unde haec est per accidens: *Homo est aliquid particulare*; haec autem per se: *Iste homo est aliquid particulare*. Unde Christus non est aliquid particulare secundum quod homo, sed secundum quod iste homo." Ibid., ad 1; 54, p. 339. Behind this distinction lies a principle about *per se* predication implied in the reduplicative phrase, *secundum quod*. Thomas had explained earlier that "id quod in aliqua propositione reduplicatur cum hoc quod dico, *secundum quod*, est illud per quod praedicatum convenit subjecto. Unde oportet quod aliquo modo sit idem cum subjecto et aliquo modo idem cum praedicato." Ibid., d. 10, q. 1, resp.; 23, pp. 331-32. Cf. ibid., qla. 2, sol.; 32-33, pp. 333-34.

135 "Cum autem dicitur: *Iste homo*, demonstrato Christo, includitur ex vi demonstrationis determinatum suppositum humanae naturae, quod est suppositum aeternum, secundum secundam opinionem: cui supposito per se convenit Deum." Ibid.; 33, p. 334.

136 "Ad secundum dicendum quod de ratione individui, secundum quod de Christo praedicatur, est quod sit per se subsistens. Et hoc non convenit Christo secundum quod homo, sed secundum quod hic homo. Unde non oportet quod sit individuum secundum quod homo." Ibid., d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, qla. 2, ad 2; 55, p. 339.

137 "Unde non sequitur, si humana natura est individuum, quod Christus, secundum quod homo, sit individuum; sed quod habeat individuam naturam." Ibid., ad 3; 56, p. 339.

Does Thomas Aquinas maintain this position concerning Christ as man in his later works? In the *Summa theologiae* he does not treat the phrase explicitly, but, from what he says about *aliquid* and about similar expressions speaking of Christ as man, one may conclude that he would affirm in one way that Christ as man is *aliquid* and would deny it in another way. The final articles of question 16 of Part III examine phrases such as "Christ as man is a creature," "Christ as man is God," "Christ as man is a person."[138] In these articles the same grammatical principle is applied throughout: in the phrase, *Christus secundum quod homo*, the word *homo* can be referred back to the subject, *Christus*, by the reduplicative phrase *secundum quod* either by reason of the eternal uncreated supposit or by reason of the human nature.[139] Thomas adds that in such referral by reduplication *homo* is more properly taken for the nature than for the supposit since it is referred back to the subject by reason of the predicate, which is taken formally.[140] Applying these principles, he concludes regarding the first two expressions that one should concede more than deny that Christ *secundum quod homo* is a creature, and should deny more than concede that Christ *secundum quod homo* is God.[141]

Can anything be concluded from these principles about the statement, "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid"? Thomas' application of these principles to the third expression examined in question 16, "Christus secundum quod homo est persona," will provide an indirect aid to answering this question. But before examining it, we must look at Aquinas' discussion of the term *aliquid* in this context, that is, in the following question on the unity of Christ. An argument, traditional in debates on the three opinions and on the question of Christ as man being *aliquid*, says that "Christ is something that the Father is and something that the Father is not. Therefore Christ is something and something. Therefore Christ is two."[142] The debate turns on the meaning of *aliquid quod non est Pater*, for *aliquid quod est Pater*

138 Aa. 10-12.

139 "Respondeo dicendum quod cum dicitur: Christus secundum quod homo, hoc nomen homo potest resumi in reduplicatione vel ratione suppositi, vel ratione naturae." III, q. 16, a. 10c. Cf. aa. 11c, 12c.

140 "Sciendum tamen quod nomen sic resumptum in reduplicatione magis proprie tenetur pro natura quam pro supposito; resumitur enim in vi praedicati, quod tenetur formaliter; idem enim est dictu: Christus secundum quod homo, ac si diceretur: Christus secundum quod est homo." Ibid., a. 10c. Cf. the second text quoted above in n. 134.

141 For the first of these see a. 10c, and for the second a. 11c.

142 "Christus est aliquid quod est Pater, et est aliquid quod non est Pater. Ergo Christus est aliquid et aliquid. Ergo Christus est duo. " Ibid., q. 17, a. 1, arg. 4. On the growth of the question of the unity or duality of Christ within the discussion of the question of Christ as *aliquid*, see *Hypostatic Union* I, 68-70, 206-08. For an example of the argument in the early thirteenth century see William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea* III, tr. 1, q. 1, cap. 3; nos. 5 & 10, in *Hypostatic Union* I, 257 & 258.

refers to the divine nature, which even in the abstract is predicated of the Father and the Son. Thomas goes on:

> But when it is said: "Christ is something that the Father is not," the "something" is taken not for human nature itself as signified in the abstract, but as signified in the concrete — yet not according to a distinct supposit, but according to an indistinct supposit, that is, in so far as it stands under the nature but not under the individuating properties.[143]

That is, Thomas refers *aliquid*, when it designates Christ's human nature, to the one supposit, the divine person, although it fails to designate this supposit as distinctly as would, for example, the name "Jesus," since the term *aliquid* does not point out individuating properties of the human nature in which the supposit is found.

This differentiation between indistinct and distinct supposits is already present in the body of the article. Here Thomas says that in the statement, "Christus est homo," the word *homo* signifies the one having the humanity (*habens humanitatem*), but it does so only indistinctly; by contrast, the name "Jesus" signifies distinctly the one having the humanity because it signifies him under the determinate individual properties of Jesus.[144] Can these remarks be applied similarly to the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid"? The import of Thomas' teaching is clear: *aliquid* refers to the supposit having the human nature, that is, to the divine person, and not to the nature taken in itself apart from the supposit or person. Because of the equivalence of supposit and person, it seems legitimate to apply to the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est *aliquid*," the same principles as he applies to the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est *persona*."

This latter sentence is discussed in article 12 of question 16, that is, just before this discussion of *aliquid*. There the rules of articles 10 and 11 about *homo* in reduplication are applied again, but with a slight nuance. "As has been said above," Thomas begins, "this term 'homo' when placed in reduplication can be accepted either by reason of the supposit or by reason of the nature. Therefore, when it is said, 'Christ as man is a person,' if [homo] is accepted by reason of the supposit, it is

143 "...cum dicitur: Christus est aliquid quod est Pater, ly aliquid tenetur pro natura divina, quae etiam in abstracto praedicatur de Patre et Filio. Sed cum dicitur: Christus est aliquid quod non est Pater, ly aliquid tenetur non pro ipsa natura humana secundum quod significatur in abstracto, sed secundum quod significatur in concreto; non quidem secundum suppositum distinctum, sed secundum suppositum indistinctum; prout scilicet substat naturae, non autem proprietatibus individuantibus." *Summa theologiae* III, q. 17, a. 1, ad 4.

144 "Aliter tamen habens humanitatem significatur per hoc nomen homo; et aliter per hoc nomen Iesus, vel Petrus. Nam hoc nomen homo importat habentem humanitatem indistincte, sicut et hoc nomen Deus indistincte importat habentem deitatem. Hoc autem nomen Petrus, vel Iesus, importat distincte habentem humanitatem, scilicet sub determinatis individualibus proprietatibus...." Ibid., c.

clear that Christ as man is a person, because the supposit of human nature is nothing other than the person of the Son of God."[145] Now if the analysis of *aliquid* already seen is applicable in a parallel fashion, it would mean that if *secundum quod homo* refers to the supposit in Christ, then Christ as man is *aliquid* because *aliquid* refers to the supposit of human nature, even if indistinctly (this, incidentally would be true of *persona*, which refers to the supposit or person indistinctly). The sentence would really mean that Christ as man is some indistinctly designated supposit of human nature, a supposit that is not a human supposit but rather a divine supposit or person.

Thomas continues his analysis of the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est persona," by saying that if *secundum quod homo* refers to nature rather than to supposit, the sentence is true in one way and false in another. If *secundum quod homo* refers to nature in the sense that it belongs to human nature to be in some person, the sentence is again true "because everything that subsists in human nature is a person. But [*secundum quod homo*] can be understood such that there is owed to human nature in Christ its proper personality, caused from the principles of human nature. And in this way Christ as man is not a person because human nature does not exist through itself separately from the divine nature, which is required by the notion of person."[146]

Again, since *aliquid* refers to the divine supposit or person, it seems justified to draw parallel conclusions about the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid," when *secundum quod homo* is taken to refer to the nature rather than to the supposit. In that it belongs to human nature to be in some supposit, it would be true to say that Christ as man is *aliquid* because everything that subsists in human nature is a supposit, which the term *aliquid* designates. But if *secundum quod homo* is taken to refer to nature in the sense that there is owed to human nature in Christ its proper supposit, caused from the principles of human nature, then it is untrue to say that Christ as man is *aliquid* because human nature does not subsist through itself separately from the divine nature, which is required by the notion of supposit.

145 "...sicut supra dictum est, iste terminus homo, in reduplicatione positus, potest accipi vel ratione suppositi, vel ratione naturae. Cum ergo dicitur: Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, si accipiatur ratione suppositi, manifestum est quod Christus, secundum quod homo, est persona, quia suppositum humanae naturae nihil est aliud quam persona Filii Dei." Ibid., q. 16, a. 12c.

146 "Si autem accipiatur ratione naturae, sic potest intelligi dupliciter. Uno modo, ut intelligatur quod naturae humanae competat esse in aliqua persona. Et hoc etiam modo verum est; omne enim quod subsistit in humana natura, est persona. Alio modo potest intelligi ut naturae humanae in Christo propria personalitas debeatur, causata ex principiis humanae naturae. Et sic Christus, secundum quod homo, non est persona, quia humana natura non est per se seorsum existens a divina natura, quod requirit ratio personae." Loc. cit.

If our interpretation is correct, Thomas Aquinas has introduced nuances into his position by comparison with that in the *Sentences*. There he had required that *iste* be added to *homo* so that it would be clear that *homo* in the sentence refers to a supposit; only with this addition would he accept the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid (particulare)." Without *iste*, he would reject the sentence if one were judging it as predication *per se* and not *per accidens*. In the *Summa theologiae*, on the other hand, just as under certain conditions he accepts the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est persona," without requiring the addition of *iste* to *homo*, so, it seems, he would accept the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid,"again without requiring the addition of *iste* to *homo*. He would, however, reject the sentence, "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid," if *secundum quod homo* referred to a human supposit caused by principles of human nature as if the human nature subsisted by itself and by its own principles.

Now it is a striking historical fact that it is precisely this last understanding of "Christus secundum quod homo est aliquid" that was rejected by supporters of the second and third opinions in the twelfth century and that led them to say: "Christus secundum quod homo *non* est aliquid."[147] They were insistent, against those who held the first opinion with its doctrine that "hominem quendam ex anima rationali et humana carne constitutum" was "assumptum a Verbo et unitum Verbo,"[148] that Christ's human nature, taken precisely as human nature, was not a supposit or person: in this sense they said that Christ as man is not *aliquid*. Thus by a strange quirk of history an opinion, perhaps misunderstood and certainly condemned in the twelfth century — a condemnation upheld by Thomas Aquinas — was in fact the position of Thomas Aquinas both in his *Sentences* and, if our interpretation is correct, in the *Summa theologiae*—in the latter, at least so far as the logic of his statements is concerned. The positive meaning of all this for Thomas' own doctrine is that these intricate analyses show once again how strong is his insistence on the unity of person and supposit in Christ, and how persistently he seeks to eliminate a human supposit in Christ's human nature.

That such a turnabout concerning *aliquid* could happen derived from the fact that Thomas Aquinas was not close enough to the twelfth-century proponents of this position to have their texts at hand so as to know their position exactly. The opinions, and the teaching on *aliquid*,

147 See above, pp. 399-401.
148 Lombard, *Sent.* III, 6, 2; p. 574.

evolved throughout the later twelfth and early thirteenth century, so that Thomas, who was generally quite careful in his historical analyses, failed to see how much the habitus-theory, and the related but not identical teaching about Christ as man not being *aliquid*, were in their fundamental intuitions in accord with his own clearer and more profound doctrine of the mode of union in Christ.

In a reply to his Master General seeking his opinion about a series of articles, Thomas Aquinas said: "It would have been easier for me to make a reply if it had been your pleasure to write down the reasons for which the aforesaid articles were either asserted or attacked. For in that way I could have made a reply better [directed] toward the intention of those who are in doubt. Nevertheless I have tried, so far as I could grasp the matters, to reply in each case to that which gave rise to the doubt...."[149] Lacking the original texts and faithful reports concerning "the reasons for which" the positions of the habitus-theory "were either asserted or attacked," Thomas Aquinas' replies were not always exactly directed to these positions as they were actually held in the twelfth century. Nevertheless, the responses he did make to what he saw its positions to be were frequent enough and significant enough that to follow his presentation of this theory and his responses leads to a fuller understanding of his own theology of the Incarnation.

149 "Fuisset tamen mihi facilius respondere, si vobis scribere placuisset rationes, quibus dicti articuli vel asseruntur vel impugnantur. Sic enim potuissem magis ad intentionem dubitantium respondere. Nihilominus tamen, quantum percipere potui, in singulis ad id quod dubitationem facit, respondere curavi...." *Responsio ad Fr. Ioannem Vercellensem de articulis XLII*, Prooemium; in *S. Thomae Aquinatis opuscula theologica*, Vol. I, ed. R. A. Verardo (Rome 1954) no. 772, p. 211.

SAINT THOMAS ET SES PRÉDÉCESSEURS ARABES

Louis Gardet

I

VUE D'ENSEMBLE

DEPUIS les études précises de MM. Et. Gilson et A. Forest, pour ne citer que les plus suggestives,[1] l'apport des philosophes de langue arabe et d'influences musulmanes à la synthèse philosophico-théologique de Thomas d'Aquin est bien connu.[2] Non qu'il soit pleinement explicité encore. Et peut-être les citations d'Avicenne ont-elles été analysées de plus près que celles du *Commentator*, non moins décisives cependant. On ne peut que souhaiter que soit établie un jour une liste exhaustive des références à Averroès, parallèle à la liste des références avicenniennes dressée par A. Forest d'abord, et C. Vansteenkiste ensuite[3]: sans omettre d'ailleurs les autres docteurs musulmans moins fréquemment cités.

On peut répartir les "sources arabes" de saint Thomas sous trois chefs principaux: a) les *mutakallimûn*, "loquentes in lege Maurorum," — très approximativement les "théologiens"; b) Abû Hâmid al-Ghazzâlî, appelé "la preuve de l'Islam" (*hujjat al-islâm*), et qui sera l'Algazel latin; c) l'ensemble des *falâsifa* ou "philosophes hellénistiques de l'Islam," se répartissant à leur tour en deux groupes bien distincts: les "Orientaux," principalement Ibn Sînâ (Avicenne), et les "Occidentaux" ou Maghribins, principalement Ibn Rushd (Averroès). Peut-être conviendrait-il d'y joindre Ibn Hazm, le strict zâhirite andalou.

Il serait fort utile que des spécialistes du moyen âge latin poursuivissent une recension complète et analytique de ces diverses "sour-

1 Sans oublier les travaux qui firent date des PP. Mandonnet, Chenu, Roland-Gosselin, et de bien d'autres.

2 L'expression "philosophes arabes" (d'où "prédécesseurs arabes") est courante et commode. Il s'agit en fait de philosophes qui, à une exception près, n'appartenaient point à l'ethnie arabe. Ils écrivaient en arabe (parfois en persan) et illustrèrent l'aire culturelle arabo-musulmane (et irano-musulmane).

3 Voir A. Forest, *La Structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1931), Appendice, 331-360; C. Vansteenkiste, "Avicenna-citaten bij S. Thomas", *Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, Het Spectrum* (Utrecht 1953), 437-507.

ces" à travers toutes les œuvres de saint Thomas. Mais c'est selon une autre perspective que nous voudrions proposer aujourd'hui quelques remarques. Pouvons-nous situer ces divers emprunts, discussions ou réfutations, à la fois par rapport à la pensée de saint Thomas et par rapport à la pensée arabo-musulmane prise en son contexte propre? Nous avons là, dans l'histoire des idées, un exemple assez rare de "dialogue" spontané à travers la variété de deux cultures et climats religieux, monothéistes l'un et l'autre, mais fort différents. C'est du point de vue de l'islamisant, un peu restreint sans doute, mais que nous ne croyons pas sans intérêt eu égard à la synthèse thomiste, que nous nous placerons d'abord.

Faut-il revenir sur les grandes entreprises de traductions arabo-latines qui marquèrent les XII[e] et XIII[e] siècles, et qui sont comme le deuxième panneau du diptyque ouvert à Bagdad (IX[e]-X[e] siècle) par les traductions gréco-arabes?[4] Nous en connaissons non seulement les données essentielles, mais les circonstances historiques. Il suffit de renvoyer aux travaux qui virent le jour voici quelques décennies,[5] et aux abondantes discussions auxquelles l'averroïsme latin donna lieu. L'"arrivée des Arabes" (et d'Aristote à travers eux) enrichit singulièrement l'Occident chrétien, mais non point toujours sans luttes ni dommages. La suite des condamnations de 1210, 1215, 1231, 1270, 1277, visaient premièrement à assurer une défense de la théologie chrétienne en sa spécificité.[6] Elles n'allèrent pas sans de nombreuses et peut-être inévitables confusions, et l'on sait les interprétations fallacieuses auxquelles les deux dernières, la dernière surtout, soumirent la pensée thomiste.

Comment donc saint Thomas en usa-t-il à l'égard des "Arabes"? Il nous donne ici un exemple remarquable de sa façon de procéder, de son ouverture d'esprit à toute recherche du vrai, quel qu'en soit le climat de pensée. Ce n'est pas à *une* école qu'il se réfère, mais à toute ligne

4 Voir à ce sujet nos résumés ap. *Introduction à la théologie musulmane* (en collaboration avec M. M. Anawati, 2[e] éd. Paris 1970), 195-200, 244-248 et réf.

5 Par exemple, R. de Vaux,"La première entrée d'Averroès chez les latins", *RSPT* (Paris 1933); le même, *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin* (Paris 1934); Manuel Alonso, "Notas sobre les traductores toledanos, Domingo Gundisalvi y Juan Hispano", *Al-Andalus* 1943; le même, *Averroès, textos y documientos* (Madrid-Grenade 1948); Ugo Monneret de Villard, *Lo Studio dell'Islam in Europa nel XII e nel XIII secolo* (Città del Vaticano 1944); G. Théry, *Tolède, grande ville de la renaissance médiévale* (Oran 1944); M.-Th. d'Alverny, "L'Introduction d'Avicenne en Occident", *Revue du Caire* 141 (1951), 130-139, etc.

6 "La pointe tournée contre Saint Thomas, dans cette fameuse condamnation de 1277, ne doit pas distraire notre attention de sa teneur générale et du champ chrétien qu'elle recouvre et défend", M. D. Chenu, *La Théologie comme science au XII[e] siècle* (2[e] éd. 1943, p. 118; 3[e] éd. Paris 1957).

philosophique ou philosophico-théologique susceptible d'éclairer ses propres investigations. Il s'appuie sur les Pères — et pas seulement sur Augustin — autant qu'il les peut connaître. Nous pouvons dire de même qu'il en appelle au témoignage des "philosophes arabes," — tantôt pour l'agréer, tantôt pour le critiquer ou réfuter, — dans toute la mesure où il lui est accessible. Au temps de ses premiers écrits, il y eut, en Occident latin, un fort courant avicennisant. Plus tard, l'influence d'Averroès dominera. Saint Thomas ne fut ni avicennisant ni averroïste, mais il sut dégager les axes du système avicennien ou de la pensée rushdienne qui se croisaient avec sa propre élaboration de théologie chrétienne. Et non seulement il ne fut ni avicennisant — encore moins avicenniste — ni averroïste, mais on peut dire qu'il contribua grandement à "digérer" et canaliser les influences d'Ibn Sînâ et d'Ibn Rushd qui risquèrent plus d'une fois d'infléchir la pensée médiévale.[7]

A coup sûr, il ne put guère les situer par rapport à leur propre climat socio-culturel. D'un point de vue historique, ce reste infiniment regrettable. Quand l'Aquinate rencontre telle ou telle opinion des "Arabes", il l'accueille pour elle-même, pour la part qu'elle draine de vérité ou d'erreur objectives. Cela se vérifie d'abord à propos des références "mineures": *mutakallimûn*, Kindî, Fârâbî, Ghazzâlî (Algazel), Ibn Bâjja (Avenpace), Ibn Tufayl (Abubacer)... C'est parfois comme au second degré qu'il les rencontre et utilise: ainsi Avenpace à travers Averroès.[8] Les seuls "Arabes" vraiment personnalisés à ses yeux sont le "platonisant" Avicenne et l'aristotélicien Averroès: encore que lui échappaient les raisons précises qui commandaient par exemple certains jugements sévères du second sur le premier.

Dans une récente et riche étude, M. Et. Gilson souligne que c'est à l'ontologie d'Avicenne et à la "physique" d'Averroès que se réfère le plus volontiers l'Aquinate.[9] Si bien que les positions avicenniennes "intéressent toute la métaphysique de saint Thomas, et par conséquent sa théologie"[10]; tandis qu'il citera Averroès avec abondance par exemple dans ses commentaires des *Physiques* d'Aristote, et en accueillera l'apport sur un plan plus strictement philosophique.—Sans doute cette répartition éclairante pourrait-elle être nuancée ici ou là. Dans la mesure où des principes de psychologie rationnelle animent des conclusions théologiques, Averroès, lui aussi, sera écouté: dans les traités

7 Voir *Introduction à la théologie musulmane*, 264-273 et réf.

8 V.g. *Sum. theol.*, I, 88, 2, c.

9 "Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 1969 (1970), 89-121.

10 Ibid., 109.

de la *Somme Théologique* sur l'âme humaine et la pensée humaine, l'importance des renvois à l'un et l'autre philosophe arabe s'équivalent à peu près. La précision apportée par M. Gilson n'en reste pas moins éclairante quant à l'œuvre et aux procédés de saint Thomas.[11] Mais qu'en est-il eu égard à Ibn Sînâ et à Ibn Rushd eux-mêmes? Le premier se présenterait-il en climat musulman comme un quasi-"théologien", le second comme un pur philosophe? Il ne nous semble pas sans intérêt de cerner la question de plus près; elle intéresse au premier chef ce dialogue des cultures qu'illustra le XIIIe siècle latin.

II

Le Climat Culturel Musulman

Nous nous excusons de rappeler brièvement une courbe historique bien connue, et que ne peut pas ne pas évoquer tout manuel de philosophie ou de théologie musulmanes.

A de rares exceptions près, ce sont les textes de cette discipline appelée en arabe *falsafa* qui sollicitèrent l'intérêt des grandes entreprises de traductions médiévales. *Falsafa* est la transcription très probable de philosophia; elle fut l'œuvre des *falâsifa* (sg. *faylasûf*). Le terme peut se rendre bien sûr par "philosophie".[12] Il serait plus juste de préciser cependant qu'il s'agit là d'*une* école philosophique, école très brillante d'ailleurs, et aux tendances fort diverses, mais où se retrouvent un certain nombre d'attitudes communes. Au contraire de l'exégèse coranique (*tafsîr*), du droit (*fiqh*), et de la défense des données de foi (*'ilm al-kalâm*), la *falsafa* n'est pas en Islam une "science religieuse." Bien plutôt serait-elle considérée comme "science étrangère," ou du moins marginale. Ce n'est en effet qu'au IIIe-IVe siècle de l'hégire qu'elle prit naissance, sous l'influence massive de ces traductions du grec en arabe[13] que patronaient les Califes: Platon et surtout Aristote (et Plotin et Proclus confondus avec Aristote); les grands commentateurs grecs d'Aristote; des textes de la Stoa, ou ces traités apocryphes du pseudo-Empédocle et du pseudo-Pythagore qui exercèrent tant d'influences.[14]

Très vite, à partir du moins de Fârâbî, les *falâsifa* considérèrent cet apport grec comme un acquis irrécusable de la raison en recherche du

11 Voir ci-après, 440-441, la position adverse d'Asin Palacios et son "averroïsme théologique de S. Thomas d'Aquin".

12 "Philosophie" au sens large se dit *hikma* en arabe, mot-à-mot: "sagesse".

13 Tout d'abord par l'intermédiaire du syriaque; par la suite directement du grec.

14 Il faut y joindre les traités scientifiques de Galien et de Ptolémée, qui commanderont toute la physiologie et toute la cosmologie des *falâsifa*.

vrai. Ils ne l'opposèrent point à la foi coranique, et se donnèrent toujours comme musulmans. La *falsafa* et la Loi religieuse seront pour eux comme deux données également valables et dont il s'agira d'établir l'accord. Ils y revinrent maintes fois, et Ibn Rushd tout autant, sinon plus que ses prédécesseurs orientaux. La foi, pour les *falâsifa*, est bien demandée au peuple; mais les sages, eux, doivent s'élever aux hautes vérités intelligibles. Le problème majeur et sans cesse évoqué ne sera donc pas celui de la raison et de la foi, mais de l'harmonie à établir entre une vision du monde philosophique et la Loi révélée (*shar'*). Et sans doute les explications cosmologiques, noétiques, métaphysiques, se nuanceront au gré tantôt des influences reçues ou choisies, tantôt du génie de chaque auteur. Mais toujours elles considèreront comme acquises la production des choses par émanation (au sens strict) de l'Etre premier, l'éternité de la création ainsi entendue (Kindî excepté), l'existence des Intelligences séparées, et l'unicité de l'Intellect agent (*al-'aql al-fa''âl*), "donateur des formes" du monde sublunaire, illuminateur des intellects humains et source de toute connaissance.

La *falsafa* connut deux moments historiques privilégiés: du IXᵉ siècle au début du XIᵉ, au temps de la *falsafa* orientale des Kindî, Fârâbî, Ibn Sînâ; et de la fin du XIᵉ à la fin du XIIᵉ siècle, au temps de la *falsafa* occidentale (ou maghribine) des Ibn Bâjja, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Rushd. Or, la fin du XIᵉ siècle et le début du XIIᵉ furent marqués par une violente réaction de l'orthodoxie sunnite contre Fârâbî et surtout Ibn Sînâ. Ce fut d'une part la très célèbre attaque de Ghazzâlî (Algazel) dans le *Tahâfut al-falâsifa* ("L'effondrement des *falâsifa*"), d'autre part les sévères condamnations du "théologien" (*mutakallim*) et hérésiographe Sharastânî, surnommé "le tombeur des *falâsifa*."

Il faut avoir cette histoire culturelle présente à l'esprit si l'on veut apprécier les diverses tendances des "philosophes hellénistiques de l'Islam," et mesurer par exemple la portée de l'opposition, faut-il dire de la mauvaise humeur d'Ibn Rushd à l'égard d'Ibn Sînâ. Tous subirent l'influence directe d'Aristote, et S.Y. Suhrawardî[15] appelle Kindî, Fârâbî et Ibn Sînâ "péripatéticiens (*mashshâ'yûn*) récents." Tous étudièrent de près le Stagirite et ses commentateurs. Ibn Sînâ lut quarante fois les *Métaphysiques* d'Aristote avant que le commentaire de Fârâbî lui en ouvrît le sens...Mais les *falâsifa* orientaux subirent plus encore l'influence de Platon et surtout de Plotin. Ou plutôt, c'est à Plotin confondu avec Aristote[16] qu'ils durent leur inspiration la plus

15 Philosophie et sûfî iranien, condamné à mort et exécuté à Alep sur l'ordre de Salâh al-Dîn (Saladin), en 587 H./1191, à l'âge de 36 ans.

16 Deux textes célèbres: a) la pseudo-*Théologie d'Aristote*, extraits des *Ennéades* IV-VI, légèrement glosés en un sens monothéiste par le traducteur syriaque Ibn Nâ'ima de Hims; b) le

profonde. Or, la pensée sunnite dominante et le *kalâm* officiel ne virent aucunement en cette ligne plotinisante une possibilité d'accord avec la foi musulmane.

Ici, une distinction supplémentaire. Le cas d'Abû Ya' qûb al-Kindî[17] mériterait d'être traité à part. Le moyen âge latin connut surtout de lui son *De Intellectu* (*Risâla fî l-'aql*) et quelques autres petits traités. Il est peut-être dommage que soit restée ignorée sa position même à l'égard des données de foi. Il est, semble-t-il bien, le seul des *falâsifa* qui ait établi un rapport de subordination entre la recherche philosophique et la Loi religieuse. Et peut-être le dut-il à l'influence de Jean Philopon, si bien mise en lumière par le Pr. Walzer.[18] Il est le seul en tout cas qui, au terme de sa démarche philosophique, ait accepté la possibilité ("prouvée" par la Loi) d'une création *ex nihilo* commencée dans le temps et de la résurrection des corps. Il est également le seul *faylasûf* dont on ait fait parfois un "théologien," plus exactement un "docteur en *kalâm*," du tout premier *kalâm* constitué, celui des écoles mu'tazilites. Il fut en fait à la charnière de la *falsafa* et du mu'-tazilisme, reprenant et défendant mainte thèse du second, mais selon des procédés apodictiques directement influencés par la logique et la pensée grecques. L'œuvre de Kindî était prégnante d'une "philosophie musulmane" au sens strict des termes. Il reste que sa pénétration d'Aristote, de Platon et de Plotin n'eut point la force déductive de celle de ses grands successeurs, — et que par ailleurs des événements historiques (socio-culturels) bloquèrent les perspectives par lui ouvertes.

Kindî vivait à la cour de Bagdad. Il fut contemporain de la réaction du Calife Mutawakkil, menée au nom de l'orthodoxie sunnite[19] contre les mu'tazilites. Quelques années plus tard, un nouveau *kalâm* devait prendre son essor, centré sur la défense de la Transcendance et de l'absolue Liberté divines. La réalité ontologique de la liberté humaine, dont les mu'tazilites avaient été les défenseurs, se résorbera en la toute-puissante et indépendante Volonté du Très Haut "que l'on n'interroge pas." Ce fut l'école ash'arite. Elle dominera l'enseignement officiel jusqu'à l'aube du xxe siècle.

Livre de l'explication d'Aristote au sujet du Bien pur, extraits de l'*Elementatio theologica* de Proclus, connu au moyen âge latin comme le *Liber de Causis*.— Sur les bases de ces confusions historiques, Fârâbî écrira son *Accord de Platon et d'Aristote*.

17 Le seul parmi les *falâsifa* à appartenir à l'ethnie arabe; appelé volontiers "le philosophe des Arabes."

18 *Greek into Arabic* (Oxford 1962), v. "New Studies on Al-Kindî", 175-205.

19 Les sunnites (*ahl al-sunna*), qui entendent demeurer fidèles à la tradition (*sunna*) du Prophète, peuvent être considérés comme les tenants de la foi musulmane en ses dominantes officielles.

Si opposés qu'ils puissent être les uns aux autres, mu'tazilites et ash'arites sont bien des "théologiens," si l'on veut traduire par "théologie" cette "science religieuse" que fut et demeure le *'ilm al-kalâm*. En fait, il s'agit moins d'une théologie intelligence de la foi (au sens de saint Augustin) que d'une apologie défensive des valeurs de foi. Si la *falsafa* dut son existence aux traductions des philosophes grecs, c'est dès la bataille de Siffîn (37 H./655) que commencèrent les discussions du *kalâm*. L'influence grecque s'exercera sans doute sur le vocabulaire, et plus tard sur les modes d'argumenter; en son fonds cependant, la problématique est d'inspiration directement musulmane.

Les rapports de la *falsafa* et du *kalâm* ne sont aucunement ce que seront les rapports philosophie-théologie en chrétienté. Fârâbî déjà est fort réticent sur la valeur du *kalâm*[20]; Ibn Sînâ l'ignore; Ibn Rushd le condamne sans rémission.[21] En réplique, les docteurs en *kalâm* des écoles ash'arite et hanafite-mâturîdite, — écoles officielles en Islam sunnite,—ne cessèrent, à partir du xiᵉ siècle, d'attaquer la *falsafa*. Dans son *Tahâfut*, Ghazzâlî relève trois thèses des *falâsifa* (entendons Fârâbî et surtout Avicenne) qu'il déclare entachées d'impiété (*takfîr*): éternité du monde, non connaissance divine des singuliers, interprétation allégorique de la résurrection des corps. Avicenne n'était, ni de près ni de loin, un "docteur en *kalâm*" (*mutakallim*).

De leur vivant il est vrai, l'"orthodoxie" musulmane de Fârâbî et d'Ibn Sînâ ne fut point mise en question. C'est qu'ils appartenaient à un milieu fortement imprégné de shî'isme, voire délibérément shî'ite.[22] Or, les gnoses shî'ites, et leurs interprétations des textes du Coran, allaient dans un sens plus volontiers émanatiste que créationiste, et permettaient toutes les audaces du "sens caché." A partir du xiᵉ siècle, le shî'isme recula devant la résurgence sunnite.[23] Au temps d'Ibn Rushd, l'Islam officiel, en Andalus et au Maroc, était activement et même combativement sunnite.

Ibn Bâjja et Ibn Tufayl furent, eux aussi, néoplatonisants. Il n'en alla plus de même pour Ibn Rushd qui est certainement le plus aristotélicien de tous les *falâsifa*, le seul vraiment aristotélicien peut-

20 Voir son *Ihsâ' al-'ulûm* ("Catalogue des Sciences", éd. Palencia, Madrid, 1932).

21 Dans ses deux petits traités d'auto-défense (cf. ci-après), *Fasl al-maqâl* et *Kashf 'an manâhij al-adilla*.

22 Le shî'isme ou "parti de 'Alî" (*shî'at 'Alî*) se sépara du sunnisme dès l'an 37 de l'hégire. L'opposition, d'abord politique (plus exactement politico-religieuse), et centrée sur les conditions de validité de l'*Imâma* ou Califat, en vint à susciter des attitudes de foi et des climats de pensée qui divergeront profondément.

23 A l'heure actuelle, les shî'ites sont, en Islam, très fortement minoritaires (moins du dixième de l'ensemble des musulmans).

être. Son opposition à l'égard d'Avicenne? Elle relève, nous semble-t-il, d'un triple motif.

Le premier, et le plus décisif en un sens, est d'ordre historique. Au contraire d'Avicenne, Ibn Rushd dut défendre son orthodoxie musulmane contre les juristes (*fuqahâ'*) de son temps et de son milieu.[24] Il partait avec le handicap du *Tahâfut* de Ghazzâlî et des attaques de Shahrastânî. Or, c'est essentiellement Avicenne qui était visé par l'un et par l'autre. Aux yeux du moyen âge latin, Averroès fut par antonomase le Commentateur, et l'on peut dire que ses commentaires d'Aristote restent l'œuvre capitale de sa vie. Mais dans l'obligation où il était de défendre son "orthodoxie," il nous laissa trois petits traités et tout un ouvrage d'*apologia sua*. L'ouvrage en question, *Tahâfut al-tahâfut* ("L'effondrement de l'effondrement") entend être une réplique directe à Ghazzâlî. Et puisque ce dernier dénonçait la *falsafa* sur des thèses avicenniennes, c'est, dira Ibn Rushd, qu'Ibn Sînâ l'y avait incité de par la faiblesses de certains de ses arguments et de certaines de ses positions.[25]

Le deuxième motif est la fidélité d'Ibn Rushd envers le Stagirite, s'opposant à l'inspiration plotinienne d'Ibn Sînâ. Dans la mesure où l'augustinisme médiéval avait intégré des influences néoplatonisantes, on comprend la séduction que put exercer sur lui un certain avicennisme. Mais il ne s'agit aucunement, dans la vue du monde avicennienne, d'une primauté reconnue à des valeurs de foi, il ne s'agit aucunement d'une théologie fondée sur un donné révélé (et il s'agit moins encore d'une apologie défensive du type *'ilm al-kalâm*). Si la métaphysique d'Ibn Sînâ, dans ses chapitres concernant les choses divines (*ilâhiyyât*), intègre des thèmes tels que la prophétie, la prière, la vie future, c'est que, selon lui, la connaissance du sage peut s'élever, sous la lumière de l'Intellect agent, aussi loin en valeurs intelligibles que la révélation reçue par le prophète. Mais le prophète, de par la perfection de sa puissance imaginative, et la spéciale illumination en elle reçue, peut enseigner ces mêmes vérités au peuple, sous mode de symboles et d'allégories,—ce que ne saurait faire le sage. Et le rôle et même

24 Il avait bénéficié, au début de sa carrière, du soutien du Sultân almohade. C'est à la demande du Sultân Abû Ya'qûb Yûsuf qu'il avait entrepris de commenter Aristote. Plus tard, sous le successeur de Abû Ya'qûb, les *fuqahâ'* andalous obtinrent son exil au Maroc et condamnèrent ses œuvres au bûcher. Il mourut à Marrakech.

25 Si l'on reprend les trois thèses marquées par Ghazzâlî de la note d'"impiété": Ibn Rushd maintient l'éternité du monde, et entend prouver qu'une interprétation "profonde" des textes coraniques n'y est point opposée; pour la résurrection des corps, il se borne à affirmer sa révérence à l'égard de l'enseignement prophétique, sans traiter vraiment la question. Sa notion de connaissance divine des singuliers par contre est certainement plus conforme au Coran que ne l'était la notion avicennienne.

l'existence du prophète s'inscrit dans le déterminisme universel des choses. Rien de commun ici avec la foi musulmane comme telle, et la libre disposition par laquelle Dieu se choisit ses prophètes et envoyés. Sur ce point précis, nous verrons Ibn Rushd reprendre les thèses de son prédécesseur oriental, les corrigeant et modifiant sans doute, mais selon une problématique toute semblable. La différence majeure entre Ibn Rushd et Ibn Sînâ ne se situe point dans un rapport entre philosophie et théologie; elle est liée à cette mystique intellectualiste inhérente à toute influence plotinienne, et qu'Ibn Rushd récusait.[26]

Le troisième motif est la minutie des analyses du *Commentator*, son souci d'exactitude et de révérence à l'égard du texte d'Aristote, opposés aux vues plus larges et plus élaborées d'Ibn Sînâ. Ce sont des commentaires qui se veulent très près des textes que nous avons du premier; ce sont des œuvres de synthèse personnelle que nous a laissées le second. Certes, il est difficile d'entériner d'un trait de plume cette opposition-là. C'est parfois Ibn Rushd qui, en métaphysique, s'avance dans une ligne assez proche des conclusions de saint Thomas: ainsi sa notion de création directe par la Science divine, et donc la connaissance divine des singuliers.[27] C'est parfois Ibn Sînâ qui, en noétique et anthropologie par exemple, maintient, au contraire d'Ibn Rushd, l'individualité *post mortem* de l'intellect possible, fondant ainsi la survie personnelle de l'âme séparée. Mais l'un comme l'autre, ne l'oublions pas, affirment l'éternité (nécessaire et voulue) du monde, et le rôle illuminateur de l'Intellect agent, unique et séparé.

L'auto-défense d'Ibn Rushd ne consista aucunement à se replier sur un plan "philosophique." Elle vise à montrer l'harmonie de la *falsafa* et de la Loi religieuse. Les rapports qu'il établit entre la saisie intelligible du sage et la connaissance du prophète sont peut-être plus nuancés que chez Ibn Sînâ; ils ne sont pas radicalement autres. Pour Ibn Rushd, les ennemis des sages comme des prophètes sont les accusateurs de la *falsafa*, les "dialecticiens," c'est-à-dire les docteurs en *kalâm* (*mutakallimûn*), "esprits malades" qui, par leur méthode et leurs discussions, ont "mis en pièce la Loi religieuse et ont divisé les gens complètement."[28] La réplique d'Ibn Rushd aux "théologiens," c'est de mettre en cause la légitimité même de leur discipline. Et soit dans le *Fasl al-maqâl*, soit dans le *Tahâfut al-tahâfut*, il n'hésite pas à aborder à

26 Alors qu'Avicenne, comme le dit très bien le Père Chenu (*Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas*, Paris 1950, p. 176) "avait comme transsubstantié l'aristotélisme en une mystique néoplatonisante": grâce aux extraits des *Ennéades* et de Proclus, attribués à Aristote.

27 Thèse explicitement traitée dans un bref écrit traduit en latin *Epistola ad amicum*, et cité dans le *Pugio Fidei* de Raymond Martin.

28 *Fasl al-maqâl*, éd. et trad. franç. de L. Gauthier (Alger 1942), 29.

son tour, tout comme Ibn Sînâ, des thèmes "théologiques" tels que l'éternité du monde, le rôle du prophète, le miracle, etc.

On voit donc la portée de son accusation quand il stigmatise l'œuvre d'Avicenne comme "une sorte de moyen terme entre les Péripatéticiens et les docteurs en *kalâm*"[29]..."Il ne pouvait rien dire de plus dur contre son prédécesseur," souligne à juste titre M. Gilson.[30] Faire d'un *faylasûf* un quasi-*mutakallim*, c'était avant tout, pour Ibn Rushd, lui reprocher la faiblesse de ses arguments philosophiques, le comparer à ces "dialecticiens" (*jadaliyyûn*) du *kalâm* aux interprétations fragiles ou fallacieuses. Disons que c'est là un argument *ad hominem* du péripatéticien contre le néoplatonisant. Ibn Rushd voit bien en Avicenne un "philosophe,"[31] mais l'accuse, parce que platonisant, de se contenter, sur le plan philosophique, d'arguments aussi peu probants que ceux du *kalâm*.

III

Les *Mutakallimûn* ("Loquentes in Lege Maurorum")

Cette incursion dans la pensée musulmane va nous permettre de préciser jusqu'à quel point les "Arabes" furent connus du moyen âge latin, et plus précisément de saint Thomas; et de signaler en cours de route certains contresens historiques dont ils furent victimes.

Dans quelle mesure le *kalâm* lui-même, et ses rapports avec la *falsafa* furent-ils connus? Quand saint Thomas discute et réfute les *mutakallimûn* dans la *Somme Contre les Gentiles*,[32] il ne vise guère que les positions philosophiques de l'atomisme mu'tazilite ou ash'arite,— il serait plus juste de dire: de *certaines lignes* mu'tazilites ou ash'arites. Que sont pour lui ces *loquentes* (traduction littérale de *mutakallimûn*)? Le "in lege Maurorum" (ou "*Saracenorum*") ajouté par les traductions latines devait lui donner une idée assez juste de leur position de "défen-

29 Et. Gilson, art. cit., 113, à propos du commentaire sur *Physiques* II, 3, t. comm. 225 (cité, ibid., 95), où Averroès récuse la preuve avicennienne de l'existence de Dieu par la causalité efficiente: "Via autem qua processit Avicenna in probando Primum Principium est via Loquentium, et sermo ejus semper invenitur quasi medius inter Peripateticos et Loquentes". — Nous verrons ci-après (p. 442-443) que cette preuve d'Ibn Sînâ est en réalité fort différente de la *via Loquentium*.

30 Art. cit., ibid.

31 Dans le *Fasl al-maqâl* (éd. cit., 11) Ibn Rushd fait explicitement de Fârâbî et d'Ibn Sînâ des *falâsifa*, et entreprend de les laver de l'accusation d'impiété portée contre eux par Ghazzâlî.

32 Voir à ce sujet l'analyse de M. Et. Gilson, "Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin" (*Archives*, 1926-1927), § 1 "critique thomiste des motecallemin", 13 et ss. M. Gilson a dressé un tableau de 6 thèses "atomistiques" critiquées par saint Thomas. Deux autres peuvent leur être jointes, en référence à *Sum. cont. Gent.*, III, 69 et 97. Voir *Intr. theol. musul.*, 285 et notes.

seurs des croyances religieuses." Mais il en parle toujours collectivement, sans distinction ni d'auteurs, ni d'écoles.

Miguel Asin Palacios entreprit, il est vrai, de prouver que saint Thomas avait des docteurs en *kalâm* une connaissance quasi-directe, à travers des textes traduits par Raymond Martin. Selon lui, l'article de la *Sum. cont. Gent.* (II, 29) qui réfute les deux positions contraires du pur volontarisme divin et d'un Dieu "nécessité" renverrait à l'opposition, à l'intérieur du *kalâm*, entre ash'arites et mu'tazilites.[33] Rien ne nous semble moins sûr. Certes, pour les mu'tazilites, Dieu est "tenu" de faire le bien, selon une obligation "morale" (non une "nécessité" physique ou ontologique) qui vient de la perfection même de son Etre et de sa toute Justice. Mais dans son acte créateur, il est absolument libre, comme l'homme à son tour est libre en ses actes, de par le "pouvoir contingent" créé en lui par Dieu. Les mu'tazilites affirment la liberté humaine au nom de la Justice divine, — les ash'arites en nient le fondement ontologique au nom de la Toute Puissance du Très Haut; le bien et le mal, selon eux la récompense et le châtiment, n'ont d'autre raison d'être que le libre Vouloir de Dieu, qui en décide à son gré. — Mais pour les uns comme pour les autres, mu'tazilites comme ash'arites, Dieu Un, Créateur absolu et Juge des juges, n'est aucunement "nécessité" selon un déterminisme de l'existence. De pouvoir absolu, la création, commencée dans le temps, eût pu ne pas être.

C'est là peut-être ce qui sépare le plus radicalement d'une part les tendances, même opposées, du *kalâm*, de l'autre la *falsafa*. Pour les *falâsifa*, maghribins ou orientaux, l'Etre premier ne peut pas ne pas produire le monde de toute éternité. Pour Averroès comme pour Avicenne, tout s'inscrit selon un déterminisme existentiel, aussi bien le "libre choix" (*ikhtiyâr*) de l'homme que les actes nécessaires des êtres non doués d'intelligence. Or c'est bien cette théorie-là (et non "l'obligation morale" mu'tazilite) que saint Thomas semble avoir en vue quand il s'élève contre l'erreur de ceux "qui divinam potentiam limitantes dicebant Deum non posse facere nisi quae facit...."[34]

Un texte parallèle l'indiquerait mieux encore.[35] Les deux erreurs à écarter sont d'une part celle des *mutakallimûn* (nommément désignés, en référence à Maïmonide) pour qui il ne saurait y avoir de loi naturelle, le feu produisant chaleur ou froid au gré de la Volonté divine, et d'autre part l'affirmation (anonyme) que "l'ordre des causes vient de la divine Providence selon un mode de nécessité." Or, nous avons ici

33 Cf. "Los origenes de la teologia escolastica", *Mélanges Mandonnet II* (Paris 1930).
34 *Sum. cont. Gent.*, II, 29 in fine.
35 Ibid., III, 97.

presque mot pour mot la définition avicennienne de la Providence (*'inâya*),[36] et selon une problématique étrangère au mu'tazilisme comme à l'ash'arisme.

Comment saint Thomas connut-il l'atomisme du *kalâm* et sa négation des causes secondes? Fidèle à son souci de multiplier des équivalences-filières, Asin Palacios s'efforce d'établir deux sources possibles: a) certains développements de l'hérésiographe-polémiste Ibn Hazm, extraits de son *Fisal* et traduits en latin: mais en fait, c'est le problème de la nécessité de la révélation et de son utilité pour la race des hommes qui, selon Palacios lui-même, serait ici en jeu[37] (nous y reviendrons); b) des textes de Ghazzâlî traduits par Raymond Martin.[38] Certains passages du *Tahâfut al-falâsifa* (connu de Maïmonide et de Raymond Martin)? Ce reste possible, voire probable. Mais si le *Tahâfut* expose en effet le volontarisme divin ash'arite, c'est pour réfuter les *falâsifa*, non point les mu'tazilites. N'oublions pas, au surplus, que l'atomisme du *kalâm* s'origine chez Abû l-Hudhayl al-'Allâf, l'un des plus notables mu'tazilites de Basra. — L'*Iqtisâd*, traité de *kalâm* de Ghazzâlî? Cela nous semble beaucoup plus douteux. Et à supposer même que des extraits de l'*Iqtisâd* aient été traduits par Raymond Martin (?), il reste que la théorie atomistique du *kalâm* n'y apparaît qu'en *obiter dictum*, à propos seulement de la résurrection des corps.[39]

Si quelques textes de Ghazzâlî cités dans l'*Explanatio Symboli* de Raymond Martin purent guider saint Thomas dans sa connaissance du *kalâm*, sa source principale n'en demeure pas moins indirecte, à travers Maïmonide. Le texte ci-dessus noté de *Sum. contr. Gent.* III, 97, renvoie explicitement à Rabbi Moyses. Et les pertinentes analyses proposées par ailleurs de l'atomisme ash'arite[40] peuvent toujours s'expliquer, semble-t-il, par des références au *Guide des Egarés*.[41] Un changement de perspective cependant: Maïmonide, lui, connaissait l'évolution de la pensée musulmane et son milieu socio-culturel; aussi rattache-t-il cet atomisme à la "preuve" du commencement temporel du monde, et il a historiquement raison. Saint Thomas, sans se soucier de l'évolution de la problématique musulmane, va directement au nœud

36 Voir réf. ap. Louis Gardet, *La Pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* (Paris 1951), 131-132.

37 Voir son grand ouvrage (5 vol.) *Abenhazam de Cordoba* (Madrid 1927-1932).

38 Cf. *Los origines*, art. cit.

39 *Iqtisâd* (Le Caire, s.d.), 87.

40 *Sum. cont. Gent.*, I, 87 in fine; II, 24 (*id.*), III, 65, 69, etc. Voir Et. Gilson, "Pourquoi Saint Thomas a critiqué Saint Augustin", art. cit.

41 *Dalâlat al-Hâ'irîn*, trad. de l'arabe par S. Munk, nouvelle ed. (Paris 1960), I, 185-189, 342, et surtout 377-419, où Maïmonide résume en "douze propositions" les thèses philosophiques du *kalâm*.

philosophique du problème, à la vue discontinue du monde et à la non densité ontologique du créé que postulaient les thèses du *kalâm*. Mais il n'est pas jusqu'au jugement d'ensemble porté (un peu vite) par saint Thomas sur la *stultitia* des *loquentes in lege Maurorum* qui ne rejoigne les appréciations dédaigneuses de Maïmonide.[42] Une meilleure et plus directe connaissance du *kalâm* eût évité sans doute cette condamnation sommaire.

En conclusion de ce paragraphe: a) pour saint Thomas, les *mutakallimûn* sont bien des docteurs "in lege Maurorum," nettement distingués par là même des "philosophes" qui se recommandaient de la pensée grecque; b) il ne semble pas avoir vraiment distingué mu'tazilisme et ash'arisme, ni situé les raisons profondes de leur opposition à l'intérieur de la "science du *kalâm*"; c) à travers Maïmonide (et quelques textes peut-être de Ghazzâlî), il a suffisamment connu les thèses cosmologiques de l'atomisme ash'arite pour les résumer avec pertinence, mais non pour en marquer les limites historiques: thèse dominante de certaines lignes mu'tazilites et du premier ash'arisme, cette vue atomistique du monde, à partir du XIe siècle, sera souvent écartée au profit du semi-conceptualisme des "modes" (d'origine mu'tazilite aussi) par l'ash'arisme dit "des modernes."

Les *loquentes in lege Maurorum* n'intéressèrent saint Thomas que dans la mesure où leur négation de toute efficace des causes secondes concrétisait — face au déterminisme existentiel des *falâsifa* — l'une des erreurs à combattre en toute question touchant à la toute Puissance divine dans ses rapports avec le monde. Evanescence du créé et déterminisme existentiel sont les "corrélatifs d'opposition" (*muqâbal*) entre lesquels la pensée musulmane ne cessa d'osciller. Nous ne croyons pas exagéré de dire que la solution de saint Thomas — Dieu fait agir nécessairement les causes nécessaires, et librement les causes libres, car la création est une libre et réelle participation d'être et d'agir, — nous ne croyons exagéré de dire que cette solution-là fut parfois comme postulée par certaines vues mu'tazilites ou mâturîdites, et certaines analyses d'un Ghazzâlî ou d'un Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî. Peut-être est-ce en prolongeant ces tentatives de jadis, dans la perspective universalisante de telle ou telle réponse thomiste, que pourrait s'opérer une rencontre entre *'ilm al-kalâm* et théologie chrétienne, que certaines ignorances ou erreurs historiques de la pensée médiévale ne permirent pas de poursuivre vraiment.

42 V. g. *Guide*, I, 187.

IV

A propos d'Algazel

On connaît de reste le contresens dont fut victime Ghazzâlî.[43] Il était, nous l'avons rappelé ci-dessus, le grand pourfendeur des *falâsifa* orientaux: beaucoup moins au nom du *'ilm al-kalâm* comme tel[44] qu'au nom des exigences de la foi coranique. Dans son autobiographie du *Munqidh*, il répartit l'héritage du Stagirite en trois parts bien distinctes: la logique et les mathématiques, qui peuvent et même doivent être acceptées; la physique (à la fois sciences physiques et philosophie de la nature) qui peut être gardée, à la condition toutefois qu'elle ne contredise pas l'enseignement du Coran; la métaphysique enfin ou "science des choses divines" (*ilâhiyyât*), qui, elle, s'avère fort dangereuse. Sous la forme que lui ont donnée Fârâbî et Ibn Sînâ "l'ensemble des erreurs qui s'y trouvent peut se ramener à vingt: dont trois doivent être taxées d'impiété (*takfîr*),[45] et dix-sept d'innovation blâmable (*bid'a*). C'est pour détruire le système par eux bâti sur ces vingt questions que nous avons écrit notre *Tahâfut*."[46]

Or, comme toutes les fois qu'il entreprenait de réfuter des erreurs à ses yeux contraires à la foi, Ghazzâlî, en un premier ouvrage, résuma très objectivement le système de ses adversaires. Le *Tahâfut* fut donc précédé de tout un traité, intitulé *Maqâsid al-falâsifa* ("Les buts des *falâsifa*"). Le style de Ghazzâlî est clair et précis, et d'une éloquence plus arabe que celui d'Ibn Sînâ. Il faut reconnaître que les *Maqâsid* sont parfois d'un abord plus aisé que les grandes œuvres avicenniennes ou que les traités de Fârâbî. On comprend l'intérêt qu'ils éveillèrent chez les traducteurs médiévaux. Dès la première moitié du XIIe siècle, l'équipe Ibn Dâwûd-Gundisalvi, le premier rendant oralement le texte arabe en langue romane, le second passant du roman au latin, devait traduire les *Maqâsid*. Cette "première vague de traductions" apporta les *De Intellectu* de Kindî et de Fârâbî (et quelques autres de leurs traités), et seulement deux sections du *Shifâ'* d'Avicenne. Ce fut peut-être bien

43 Pour la connaissance de Ghazzâlî au moyen âge latin, voir D. Salman, "Algazel et les latins", *Archives* (1935-1936), 103-127.

44 Tout comme Maïmonide un siècle plus tard, Ghazzâlî en blâme la faiblesse argumentative. Il écrivit lui-même un traité de *kalâm*, l'*Iqtisâd*, mais prit grand soin, dans les "préambules", d'en limiter la portée à un rôle purement médicinal: pour "guérir les douteurs de leurs doutes." Ghazzâlî est avant tout un "spirituel". S'il fallait caractériser d'un mot son attitude intellectuelle, nous dirions qu'il ne fut ni *mutakallim*, ni *faylasûf*, mais "réformateur" (*islâhî*).

45 Cf. ci-dessus, p. 426.

46 *Munqidh min al-dalâl* (éd. du Caire 1372 H./1952), 68. (Le *Munqidh* a été traduit en français, aux éd, Budé, par le P. Fârid Jabre sous le titre "Erreur et Délivrance").

par les *Maqâsid* que la *falsafa* (orientale) fut d'abord connue en son ensemble.

C'est donc tout normalement que Ghazzâlî fut considéré par le moyen âge latin comme un fervent disciple d'Aristote. Il est à noter par ailleurs que les citations d'Algazel le plus fréquemment tirées des *Maqâsid* se rapportent à des points discutés en *falsafa*. Pour nous borner à cet exemple: il semble bien qu'Algazel ait passé spécialement aux yeux de saint Thomas pour le "philosophe arabe" qui soutient la possibilité d'une infinité actuelle d'âmes séparées. La thèse est attribuée tantôt à Avicenne et Algazel à la fois,[47] tantôt à Algazel seul.[48] Saint Thomas précise qu'elle est soutenue par "les Arabes" en raison de leur affirmation de l'éternité du monde; et qu'ils estiment possible cette infinité actuelle parce qu'il ne s'agit là que d'un infini accidentel (*infinitum per accidens*). Il réfute en détail cette opinion d'un point de vue proprement philosophique dans la *Somme Théologique*, I, 7, 4, et conclut: "impossibile est igitur esse multitudinem infinitam in actu, etiam per accidens. Sed esse multitudinem infinitam in potentia possibile est."

Or, cette possibilité d'une "multitude infinie en acte *per accidens*" est effectivement soutenue par Avicenne. Mais telle n'est point la vraie pensée de Ghazzâlî. Il ne la mentionne qu'en résumant la *falsafa*, au maximum à titre d'argument *ad hominem* ("et même en ce cas-là..."), non pour la faire sienne. Quand il la rencontre dans la XXe question du *Tahâfut* (résurrection des corps), c'est pour l'écarter en fait "dès lors que l'on repousse l'éternité du monde." Son attitude est ici assez semblable à celle de saint Thomas dans la *Somme contre les Gentils*, II, 81. Saint Thomas reconnaît que si Aristote écarte un infini en acte dans les corps matériels, il n'en va plus de même pour les substances immatérielles, mais ajoute: "certum tamen est circa hoc nullam difficultatem pati catholicae fidei professores, qui aeternitatem mundi non ponunt." Si nous remplaçons "foi catholique" par "foi musulmane," nous retrouvons le Ghazzâlî du *Tahâfut*.

Sommes-nous donc en présence d'un cas précis où l'Aquinate se serait, sans le dire, référé au *Tahâfut*? A notre sens, rien ne permet de l'affirmer. Si saint Thomas avait connu la vraie position d'Algazel, tout porte à croire qu'il l'aurait mentionnée, au lieu d'en faire sur ce point un disciple d'Avicenne... Les textes parallèles relevés par Asin Palacios chez Ghazzâlî et la *Somme contre les Gentils* sont certainement suggestifs. Mais n'est-ce pas extrapoler que de conclure chaque fois à une filière historique? Il est vrai, l'*Explanatio Symboli* précéda de

47 V. g. *Sum. cont. Gent.*, II, 81, 3^r^, et *Sum. theol.*, I, 7, 4, c.
48 Ainsi *Sum. Theol.*, I, 43, 2, ad 8.

quelques années la *Somme contre les Gentils* (le *Pugio Fidei*, au contraire, lui est nettement postérieur); et Raymond Martin y évoque des traités où Ghazzâlî expose sa pensée personnelle.[49] Saint Thomas connut-il par ce biais un Algazel négateur des causes secondes et professant un pur volontarisme divin? Et la difficulté de faire cadrer de telles thèses avec les développements des *Maqâsid* expliquerait-elle son silence? Nous sommes ici dans un domaine tout hypothétique. Ce qui est sûr, en tout cas, c'est que les parallèles établis, s'ils suggèrent des rencontres possibles, ne prouvent aucunement une filière ou une influence. Il suffit de revenir à l'exemple ci-dessus proposé. Pour réfuter l'existence d'une multitude infinie actuelle *per accidens*, nous avons bien la "rencontre" du *Tahâfut* et de la *Somme contre les Gentils*, se référant l'un et l'autre au commencement temporel du monde enseigné par la foi. Mais nous avons dans la *Somme Théologique* (I, 7, 4) une réfutation par des arguments philosophiques détaillés, qui n'appartient qu'à saint Thomas.

Faut-il signaler une autre hypothèse de recherche d'Asin Palacios?[50] Il suggère que le plan de la *Somme Théologique* fut inspiré par le plan de l'*Iqtisâd*, le traité de *kalâm* de Ghazzâlî. Il faut avouer que la comparaison reste bien générale et superficielle. En premier lieu, nous n'avons aucune preuve que l'*Iqtisâd* fût vraiment connu du moyen âge latin. Mais surtout: le plan de la *Somme* ne se dégagera-t-il pas bien plus clairement à travers une courbe historique qui part du *De Fide orthodoxa* du Dasmascène, passe par les *Summae* du XIIe siècle et l'évolution des *Questiones disputatae*? Par ailleurs, rien dans l'*Iqtisâd* ne saurait évoquer le fameux "cercle d'or" de la *Somme*[51]; et le plan de tout traité de *kalâm* ne se peut justifier sans recourir aux discussions des premiers temps de l'Islam, dont la portée est moins spécifiquement théologique que politique (politico-religieuse).

Pour saint Thomas, Ghazzâlî reste bien Algazel, l'aristotélisant auteur des *Maqâsid*. Plus encore que pour les docteurs en *kalâm*, on peut regretter que le *Tahâfut* et surtout maint développement de l'*Ihyâ' 'ulûm al-dîn*[52] n'aient pas été connus ou mieux connus des latins. Car

49 Précisons cependant que c'est le *Pugio* qui se réfère nettement au *Tahâfut*, à l'*Ihyâ'*, au *Maqsad al-asnâ*, au *Mîzân al-a'mal*, au *Mishkat al-anwâr*, au *Munqidh*: Raymond Martin connaissait donc non seulement le Ghazzâli adversaire des *falâsifa (Tahâfut)*, mais l'auteur spirituel, soucieux d'"orthodoxie" certes, ouvert cependant à des influences néoplatonisantes.

50 Dans l'article déjà cité, "Los origines..."

51 Si, vers la fin de sa vie, les écrits "spirituels" de Ghazzâli accueillent certaines vues plotiniennes (empruntées à ses adversaires *falâsifa*), aucune influence de cette sorte ne se manifeste dans l'*Iqtisâd*, traité de *kalâm* au demeurant fort classique.

52 "Revivification des sciences de la religion": c'est le grand œuvre de Ghazzâlî, qui lui assurera une gloire durable dans la culture arabo-musulmane.

fréquemment l'ash'arisme évolué de Ghazzâlî vient buter sur d'apparentes antinomies qui furent au cœur des débats du moyen âge chrétien, et spécialement des analyses thomistes: unité ou pluralité de la forme substantielle dans le composé humain; unité ou pluralité de l'âme humaine[53]; la toute Puissance divine en son absolue indépendance et l'acte de libre-choix de la créature...Nous songeons par exemple aux analyses de l'*Ihyâ'* où Ghazzâlî s'efforce de préciser les rapports de l'intelligence et de la volonté dans l'acte libre. Elles se situaient, il est vrai, dans le contexte "volontariste" des traditions ash'arites, où tout "motif" de l'intellect devient "détermination".[54] Combien éclairante eût été une discussion de ces textes ghazzâliens par saint Thomas, — et plus encore peut-être de certains textes de Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî (XIIe-XIIIe siècle), qui s'essaya à une vue plus large où s'unissent Volonté et Sagesse divines.[55] L'ignorance mutuelle des latins et de ces ash'arites "modernes" fut certainement, de part et d'autre, dommageable.

V

Avicenne et Averroès

Qu'il s'agisse des docteurs en *kalâm* en leur ensemble, ou de Ghazzâlî plus spécialement, il ne faut donc ni traiter par prétérition, ni valoriser indûment la connaissance qu'en put avoir l'Aquinate. Elle resta limitée. L'atomisme du *kalâm* ash'arite retint l'attention de saint Thomas dans la mesure où il typifiait une vision des choses opposée au déterminisme des *falâsifa*; et, à travers les *Maqâsid*, s'établit une confusion jamais dénoncée explicitement entre les "Péripatéticiens" de l'Islam et Ghazzâlî.

En fait, les grandes "sources arabes" de saint Thomas, ce furent les *falâsifa*, et plus précisément Avicenne et Averroès. On peut distinguer deux vagues de traductions au XIIe siècle: la première (Ibn Dâwûd-Gundisalvi), déjà signalée à propos des *Maqâsid*, la deuxième, faite directement sur l'arabe par Gérard de Crémone. A nous en tenir aux *falâsifa*, elles apportèrent maints traités de Kindî et de Fârâbî, le début du *Shifâ'* d'Avicenne, et son *Qânûn fî l-tibb*.[56] La troisième vague de

53 Avicenne affirme l'unité substantielle de l'âme; Ghazzâlî semble au contraire maintenir la distinction tripartite: âme végétative, âme sensitive, âme raisonnable.

54 Dieu seul dira encore Ghazzâlî dans l'*Ihyâ'* (éd. du Caire 1325 H./1933), t. IV, 219-220, peut vraiment être appelé "libre", car il agit "sans motif". L'absolu volontarisme divin des ash'arites ne serait pas sans évoquer ici la notion cartésienne de liberté.

55 Dans son traité de *kalâm*, le *Muhassal*, Fakhr al-Dîn Râzî reste fidèle à la critique ash'arite du "motif déterminant"; mais la problématique s'élargit dans son *Grand Commentaire* du Coran.

56 Qui exerça une telle influence sur les médecines arabe et latine.

traductions fut décisive. Elle se situe au début du XIIIe siècle. Michel Scot à Tolède et en Italie, Hermann l'Allemand de Tolède, et les traducteurs de Burgos, pour ne citer que les plus notables, revinrent à la méthode en deux temps, arabe-roman-latin: ainsi devinrent accessibles la seconde partie du *Shifâ'* (Burgos), des commentaires de Fârâbî, Avicenne, Averroès sur l'*Ethique à Nicomaque*, la *Rhétorique*, la *Poétique* (Hermann l'Allemand), quelques traités d'Avicenne et surtout les Commentaires d'Averroès (par les soins de Michel Scot et de son équipe). Ce n'est guère qu'en 1170, à la demande du Sultân almohade, qu'Ibn Rushd avait entrepris de commenter Aristote. La traduction de cette œuvre capitale verra le jour dès 1220, et se répandra dans le monde latin à partir de 1230.[57]

Elle avait été précédée par la connaissance, non point exhaustive, mais du moins assez large des *falâsifa* orientaux. Telle est sans doute la raison la plus obvie des abondantes citations d'Avicenne dans le *Commentaire des Sentences* et les premières œuvres de saint Thomas. Certes, le *Commentator* était connu déjà,[58] mais c'était alors l'avicennisme qui marquait la pensée médiévale. Par la suite, à partir en tout cas de la *Somme contre les Gentils*, saint Thomas citera Averroès plus fréquemment qu'Avicenne. Ici, nous croyons très opportune la remarque de M. Gilson: cela ne signifie point, comme on a pu le dire, une diminution de l'influence d'Avicenne,— "saint Thomas citera moins Avicenne (...), mais il l'aura assimilé une fois pour toutes."[59] Et dans la mesure où Averroès représentait la pensée d'Aristote d'une part, où s'esquissait d'autre part le drame de l'averroïsme latin, c'est le Commentateur qu'il s'agissait maintenant de discuter et situer.[60]

Saint Thomas fut certainement très sensible au "platonisme" (il serait plus juste de dire néoplatonisme) d'Ibn Sînâ. "Et ideo tam Plato quam Avicenna, in aliquo ipsum sequens...."[61] Ce membre de phrase, qui appartient au traité *Du Gouvernement divin*, pourrait illustrer bien

57 La chronologie de Michel Scot reste incertaine. Selon le P. de Vaux (cf. "La première entrée d'Averroès", art. cit., 199 et ss. et 219): "la première entreprise importante de traduction d'Averroès doit se placer à la cour de Frédéric II, un peu avant 1210", et "Michel Scot y eut sinon un rôle exclusif, au moins une part prépondérante". Selon le P. Théry, ce serait à Tolède, non en Italie, que Michel Scot aurait mené à bien "la plupart" de ses traductions, et aux alentours de 1220 (op. cit., 63).

58 La rédaction du *Commentaires des Sentences* date de 1254-1256, donc vingt-cinq ans environ après l'"arrivée" d'Averroès. Saint Thomas déjà l'y utilise.

59 "Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age", 105.

60 On doit dater la crise averroïste (Siger de Brabant) en 1266-1270, la rédaction de la *Somme théologique* en 1267-1273, et la première condamnation de l'averroïsme en 1270. (Voir l'éclairant tableau dressé par le P. Chenu à la fin de *Saint Thomas d'Aquin et la Théologie*, Paris 1959).

61 *Sum. theol.*, I, 115, 1, c.

d'autres remarques de l'Aquinate.[62] Averroès, en comparaison, sera le péripatéticien, et cela est parfaitement conforme à la réalité des faits. L'utilisation diverse que fit saint Thomas d'Avicenne et d'Averroès trouve là son explication. Ce sont deux "philosophes" auxquels il s'adresse, et nourris l'un comme l'autre d'Aristote. Mais l'Aristote très néoplatonisé d'Avicenne s'ouvrait à des problématiques nouvelles, liées sans doute au monothéisme musulman, mais selon une ligne de mystique intellectualiste issue de Plotin, et sans référence à des valeurs de foi comme telles. Ghazzâlî et Shahrastânî ne s'y sont point trompés. Redisons-le: en dépit de l'attaque *ad hominem* d'Ibn Rushd,[63] rien dans la démarche d'Avicenne, alors même qu'il traite des "choses divines," ne le rapproche des *loquentes in lege Maurorum*. C'est, il est vrai, le théologien Thomas d'Aquin qu'intéressaient ces problématiques nouvelles. Pour reprendre une distinction de Jacques Maritain, nous dirions volontiers que la démarche philosophique avicennienne fut non seulement sur ce point une "servante" de la théologie thomiste, mais une *research worker*, une découvreuse de domaines nouveaux: nous en donnerons ci-après quelques exemples.

Ce que demanda au contraire saint Thomas aux précisions d'analyse du Commentateur, et à son aristotélisme de base, ce fut, plus directement, un perfectionnement d'outillage philosophique. Sans aucune servilité, certes! On connaît la rapide et globale sévérité du *De Unitate Intellectus*: "Averroes qui non tam fuit peripateticus quam peripateticae philosophiae depravator."[64] Face en effet à ce qu'on pourrait appeler le monisme matérialiste d'Amaury de Bène, voici que surgissait une nouvelle interprétation d'Aristote, qui, à la suite de toute une lignée de commentateurs grecs et arabes, aboutit à un émanatisme à la fois spiritualiste et déterministe. Création éternelle, découlant nécessairement de la Science divine, Intellect agent unique, et intellect possible se résorbant en l'Intellect agent dans l'acte ultime de connaissance, distinction de l'essence et de l'existence dans la créature n'étant qu'une

62 Saint Thomas sut déceler le "platonisme" (néoplatonisme) d'Avicenne à travers la traduction latin du *Shifâ'*.—Avicenne cependant considérait cette "somme" comme un ouvrage destiné au "vulgaire philosophant", et la maintenait par là même en des cadres aristotéliciens éprouvés (cf. son introduction au *Mantiq al-mashriqiyyîn*, "La logique des Orientaux", éd. du Caire 1328 H./1910, p. 3). Sa "vraie pensée", il entreprendra de la révéler dans la *Hikma al-mashriqiyya* ("La Sagesse orientale") dont il annonce la rédaction. Nous n'avons point l'ouvrage lui-même, mais de nombreux écrits peuvent en être rapprochés, ou peut-être le constituer déjà en partie: *Ishârât, Gloses sur la "Théologie d'Aristote", al-Risâla al-adhawiyya fî amr al-ma'âd*, et les divers traités dits "mystiques". Ce n'est plus exactement l'Avicenne que connut saint Thomas, mais c'est un Avicenne que certaines analyses de saint Thomas semblent avoir entrevu.

63 Cf. ci-dessus, p. 428 et réf.

64 Cf. M. D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, 163.

distinction de raison.[65] Saint Thomas ne cessera de réfuter ces thèses rushdiennes, sur le plan philosophique même. Et sur bien des points,— individualité de l'âme séparée, distinction réelle de l'essence et de l'existence,— il sera plus près d'Avicenne que d'Averroès. Mais peut-être les critiques de ce dernier lui furent-elles un appoint dans sa révision et correction de l'extrincécisme avicennien, pour qui l'existence "arrive" (*accidit*) à l'essence.[66]

Aussi bien, ce jugement sévère qui voyait dans le *Commentator* un *depravator* reste-t-il isolé. Saint Thomas critiqua et réfuta Averroès[67]; il n'en marqua pas moins une haute estime pour nombre de ses analyses,[68] — et lors même qu'il n'en adopte pas les conclusions.[69] Remarquable est sa liberté à l'égard d'Avicenne et d'Averroès. Maintes fois, il les corrige l'un par l'autre. Il ne leur doit, ni à l'un ni à l'autre l'éclairement philosophique qui sous-tend sa théologie; mais il se sert de leurs arguments, parfois en prise directe, parfois à travers la réfutation même qu'il en propose, pour mettre au point le revêtement conceptuel des intuitions de base.

VI

Le Cas d'Ibn Rushd

Avant d'illustrer ces propos par quelques exemples, nous nous permettrons un dernier ensemble de remarques. Averroès fut certainement pour saint Thomas le Commentateur par excellence. Ce sont ses Grands, Moyens et Petits Commentaires d'Aristote qui furent traduits, et sur lesquels s'appuya d'abord l'averroïsme latin. Mais nous avons rappelé ci-dessus qu'Ibn Rushd fut en outre l'auteur d'un certain nombre de "textes de circonstance," où il défendait contre Ghazzâlî, et, à travers lui, contre les docteurs de la Loi (*fuqahâ'*) andalous, l'orthodoxie musulmane de la *falsafa*. Ce faisant, il fut "théologien,"—à tout le moins apologète,— et tout aussi "théologien" qu'Ibn Sînâ. Si l'on

65 Voir sur ce dernier point la critique d'Avicenne par Ibn Rushd dans son *Abrégé de la Métaphysique*, commentant Aristote, *Metaph.*, V, 7.

66 "On sait que l'existence est un accident survenu à ce qui existe, dit encore Maïmonide (très avicennien en cela); c'est pourquoi elle est quelque chose d'accessoire à la *quiddité* de ce qui existe. Ceci est une chose évidente et nécessaire dans tout ce dont l'existence a une cause", *Guide des Egarés*, I, 57 (trad. Munk, I, 230-231).

67 V. g. *Sum. theol.*, I, 66, 2, C.; 117, 1, C. et ad 2, etc.

68 V. g. Ibid., I, 54, 5, C.; 87, 1, ad 3; II-II, 171, 2, sed contra, etc.

69 V. g. Ibid., I, 88, 1, C (opinion très longuement analysée et discutée), etc. Nous nous bornons à quelques références prises dans la *Somme Théologique*; bien d'autres pourraient être glanées, entre autres dans la *Sum. cont. Gent.* ou les *Quaest. disp.*

tient compte du souci très vif d'auto-défense que les circonstances exigèrent de lui, on peut dire que sa problématique est sur ce point assez proche de celle de son prédécesseur oriental: toute centrée sur les rapports de la *falsafa* et de la Loi religieuse révélée (*shar'*), et sur l'interprétation (*ta'wîl*) du sens réel (*haqîqa*) de la Loi à la lumière de la *falsafa* et de ses certitudes apodictiques.

Et voici qu'Ibn Rushd connut ce paradoxal destin: a) Au contraire d'Avicenne, sa pensée philosophique n'eut guère d'audience dans le monde musulman.[70] Il y fut connu surtout comme juriste, et jusqu'au début du XXᵉ siècle, c'est sa *Bidâya*, son traité de droit (*fiqh*), qui seul était lu dans les Grandes Mosquées-Universités. C'est à travers l'Occident que l'Islam contemporain a redécouvert Ibn Rushd philosophe. b) Cette audience réduite fut compensée par une énorme influence dans le monde latin. Les querelles autour de l'averroïsme furent loin d'être dirimées par les condamnations de 1270 et 1277. Faut-il rappeler les débats suscités à Padoue jusqu'à l'aube de la Renaissance? Sans doute est-ce d'abord le commentateur d'Aristote qui fut étudié, discuté, écouté, non l'apologète de la *falsafa*. Il semble cependant que les "œuvres de circonstance," dont on ne trouve aucune mention explicite chez saint Thomas, aient été suffisamment connues par ailleurs pour alimenter — non sans confusion — la fameuse thèse des "deux vérités." c) A l'époque contemporaine, c'est au contraire à l'auto-défense d'Ibn Rushd que s'intéressent principalement les islamisants occidentaux,[71] et, à leur suite, divers penseurs musulmans. Les commentaires sur Aristote ne se trouvent point en édition arabe courante, au contraire du *Tahâfut al-tahâfut*,[72] et de trois petits traités apologétiques réunis à l'ordinaire sous le titre *Falsafat Ibn Rushd*, "la philosophie d'Ibn Rushd."[73]

C'est donc par son œuvre objective de commentateur qu'il marqua d'abord le moyen âge latin; et c'est à son œuvre "apologétique", tout orientée par des thèmes touchant aux valeurs de foi, qu'il doit de nos jours une audience recouvrée. Faut-il ajouter que de part et d'autre les perspectives risquent d'en être faussées? Pour connaître l'Ibn Rushd

70 Les causes en sont mutiples. Nous ne pouvons songer à les résumer ici, cela nous conduirait à trop de références à l'histoire arabo-musulmane. En bref: elles tiennent avant tout aux climats religieux et culturels très différents où vécurent les deux "philosophes".

71 Ainsi les travaux de Asin Palacios, A. F. Mehren, M. Horten, L. Gauthier, S. van den Bergh, M. Alonso, H. A. Wolfson, etc. Un effort est accompli, certes, pour intégrer le Commentateur, mais c'est avant tout sur ses œuvres "apologétiques" qu'Ibn Rushd est jugé.

72 Editions courantes au Caire (heureusement corrigées par l'édition critique du Père Bouyges). Excellente traduction anglaise annotée de S. van den Bergh, 2 vol., (Oxford-Londres 1954).

73 Ce sont les traités déjà mentionnés ci-dessus, note 21, et l'*Epistola ad amicum*.

historique, c'est à la fois le commentateur et l'apologète qu'il faut étudier de près; et ce sont peut-être bien les commentaires, malgré leur genre impersonnel, qui nous donneraient sa vraie pensée.

Saint Thomas eut-il accès aux "œuvres de circonstance"? Asin Palacios s'est efforcé de le prouver. Ses arguments sont parallèles à ceux qu'il mit en avant au sujet de Ghazzâlî. Là aussi, la source de saint Thomas serait Raymond Martin. De fait, le *Pugio Fidei* témoigne de la connaissance non seulement des commentaires d'Ibn Rushd, mais aussi du *Tahâfut al-tahâfut*, du petit traité sur la Science divine, et peut-être du *Fasl al-maqâl.* Mais le *Pugio* doit être daté, très probablement, de 1278[74]; il est donc postérieur à la mort de saint Thomas. Et si Maïmonide par ailleurs connaissait ces œuvres "rushdiennes", il ne les cite pas explicitement dans le *Guide des Egarés.* A nous en tenir à ces arguments de critique externe, rien ne prouve que saint Thomas eut conscience de cette "dimension apologétique" d'Averroès. Compte tenu de ses habitudes de travail, nous restons persuadé qu'il eût mentionné ces textes, au moins par référence globale, s'il les avait utilisés comme il utilisa les commentaires.

Critique interne? C'est très précisément au sujet de la révélation, de sa nécessité et de son utilité pour les hommes, qu'Asin Palacios entend établir une filière Ibn Rushd - saint Thomas.[75] Quand il parle de "l'averroïsme de saint Thomas d'Aquin," c'est bien un "averroïsme *théologique*" qu'il entend désigner. Nous ne reviendrons pas en détail sur ce point que nous avons discuté ailleurs.[76] Nous ne pouvons que redire ici: une "rencontre" sur tel aspect d'une question ne signifie nullement filière historique, surtout quand le *lumen sub quo* qui commande le débat est fort différent de part et d'autre. Sans doute les raisons mises en avant pour la révélation de vérités de soi accessibles à la raison se recoupent. Mais les "sources" de saint Thomas ne seraient-elles pas saint Augustin et Maïmonide[77] bien plus qu'Ibn Rushd? Quant aux vérités dont la raison peut connaître l'existence, mais non l'essence, il suffit de rappeler qu'elles sont pour Ibn Rushd ou bien des vérités contingentes, présentes ou futures, ou bien des prescriptions positives et

74 Cf. (avec réf.) U. Monneret de Villard, *Studio dell'Islam*, 37, n. 5 et 55.

75 En son étude devenue célèbre "El Averroismo teologico de Santo Tomas de Aquino", *Homenaje à D. Francisco Codera* (Saragosse 1904), 271-331.

76 Voir *Intr. theol. musulm.*, 283, n. 3, et *Les grands problèmes de la théologie musulmane: Dieu et la destinée de l'homme* (Paris 1967), 172-175.

77 Pour Maïmonide, voir P. Synave, "La révélation des vérités divines naturelles d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin", *Mélanges Mandonnet I*, 327-370. La mise au point philosophique du P. Synave concernant les rapports Maïmonide - saint Thomas nous semble beaucoup plus pertinente que la thèse de M. Asin concernant Averroès - saint Thomas.

cultuelles: le tout fondé sur une notion de prophétisme situé comme tel dans l'universel déterminisme de l'existence.

En fait, la position d'Ibn Rushd "théologien" ne diffère point substantiellement ici de celle d'Ibn Sînâ. Peut-être insiste-t-il plus que son prédécesseur sur la supériorité du prophète par rapport au sage. Il reste que pour lui, comme pour les *falâsifa* orientaux, prophètes et sages s'élèvent aux mêmes vérités suprêmes. Mais les prophètes seuls y atteignent sans effort. Ils reçoivent, dans leur intelligence et leur imaginative, une illumination de l'Intellect agent si parfaite[78] qu'eux seuls sont capables d'enseigner le peuple (*al-'awâmm*) par mode de symboles et d'allégories, et de discerner les prescriptions positives qu'il convient d'impérer. Le sage ou philosophe reconnaît cette supériorité. Il se soumet aux obligations cultuelles, et retrouve dans la Loi religieuse, sous forme symbolique, l'expression des vérités intelligibles auxquelles l'a conduit sa recherche.[79] Il ne s'agit donc point de "deux vérités"; il s'agit d'une seule vérité, mais atteinte sous deux modes différents.[80] Dès lors, le sage ou philosophe (et lui seul) sera justifié à traiter la Loi religieuse selon une herméneutique interprétative (*ta'wîl*), où il retrouvera, par l'ésotérisme du sens caché, toutes les grandes lignes de sa propre vision du monde. Obligation stricte lui est faite de ne point communiquer cette herméneutique au peuple.

Est-il besoin de souligner que nous sommes aussi loin que possible ici de la problématique de saint Thomas sur la révélation des "vérités surnaturelles" et les rapports de la raison et de la foi?

VII

Trois Exemples

Nous proposerons, pour conclure, trois exemples susceptibles d'illustrer comment et par quels procédés saint Thomas utilise des apports avicenniens ou rushdiens. Ils éclairent, nous semble-t-il, cette attitude faite à la fois de respect pour la pensée des "prédécesseurs

78 Pour Kindî et Ibn Sînâ, l'intellect possible est illuminé par l'Intellect agent (et l'ensemble des Intellects séparés), et l'imaginative par les Ames célestes; pour Fârâbî et Ibn Rushd, l'Intellect agent illumine et l'intellect possible et l'imaginative. Avoir admis l'intermédiaire des Ames célestes sera l'un des reproches d'Averroès à l'égard d'Avicenne.

79 Ce fut le thème central du fameux "roman philosophique" d'Ibn Tufayl (Abubacer), *Hayy Ibn Yaqzân* (traduit en latin par Pococke sous le titre *Philosophus Autodidactus*). Ibn Tufayl présenta au Sultân almohade le jeune Ibn Rushd, et fut (ainsi) à l'origine des commentaires sur Aristote.

80 Léon Gauthier a insisté avec raison sur ce point. Voir *La théorie d'Ibn Rochd sur les rapports de la religion et de la philosophie* (thèse de doctorat 1909), et *Ibn Rochd (Averroès)* (Paris 1948).

arabes," et de liberté à leur égard, que nous avons signalée en cours de route.

1. *La saisie de l'être dans le jugement d'existence.* M. Et. Gilson souligne à bon droit[81] l'abondance des citations littérales d'Avicenne dès que saint Thomas veut préciser que l'être est *id quod primum cadit in conceptione mentis.* Il n'y a pas de doute que des textes avicenniens ont servi ici d'aiguillon au réalisme critique de l'Aquinate et à l'accent mis par lui sur l'acte d'être. De même, et en conséquence, pour les distinctions entre être et chose d'une part, entre essence et existence dans l'être créé d'autre part. Mais c'est immédiatement dans une vue créationiste (libre création *ex nihilo*), et donc selon une participation d'être intrinsèquement analogique, que saint Thomas resitue les analyses du *faylasûf.*

Cela est particulièrement sensible dans cet "approfondissement de la cause efficiente" que signale encore M. Gilson.[82] A la suite d'Aristote,[83] la notion de cause efficiente (*al-'illa al-fâ'ila*) fut couramment analysée en *falsafa* et en philosophie shî'ite. En raison même de l'émanatisme plotinien qui dominait les horizons de pensée, elle fut considérée, en sa notion première appliquée à Dieu, comme productrice de l'être et de tout l'être, *dans esse* dit fort bien saint Thomas citant Avicenne.[84] Elle fut mise en regard de la cause finale (*al-'illa al-ghâ'iyya*) appelée "cause des causes,"[85] et même "cause efficiente des causes efficientes."[86] Un texte des *Ishârât* précise l'interaction des deux causes extrinsèques: c'est "par le moyen de sa quiddité que la cause finale est cause," mais "l'idée qu'elle représente appartient à la causalité de la cause efficiente."[87] Dès lors, la preuve de l'existence de Dieu sera précédée par une double démonstration: a) impossibilité d'un nombre infini en acte de causes efficientes et matérielles; b) impossibilité d'un nombre infini de causes finales.[88] Et Dieu sera "la Cause première absolue," "Cause de toutes les autres causes." Cause efficiente suprême sans doute, puisque Principe de tout être et de tout l'être possible, mais transcendant toute distinction efficience-finalité dans l'"innovation absolue" (*ibdâ' mutlaq*).[89]

81 "Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age", 108.
82 Ibid., 109.
83 *Physiques*, II, 3 et *Métaphysiques*, V, 2.
84 *In II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 2, ad 1 (cf. Et. Gilson, ibid.).
85 *Shifâ', Ilâhiyyât* (Le Caire 1380 H./1960), II, 292.
86 *Ishârât* (éd. Forget, Leyde 1892), 139. L'expression se trouve déjà dans Kindî, v. g. *Rasâ'il* (éd. Abû Ridâ, Le Caire 1369 H./1950), I, 248.
87 *Ishârât*, 140 (trad. franç. de A. M. Goichon, *Livre des Directives et Remarques*, Paris 1951, 356).
88 Cf. *Shifâ'*, ibid., 327-343; *Ishârât*, 141-142.
89 Voir analyses et références dans notre article "'Illa", *Encyclopédie de l'Islam*, 2ᵉ éd., 1970, 1158-1160.

Pour saisir toutes les coordonnées d'une telle preuve, il faut garder présent à l'esprit l'émanatisme "nécessaire et voulu" qui préside à l'idée de "création," la production des êtres s'opérant par une descente dialectique d'Intellects, (d'Ames), de Corps célestes. Ibn Rushd, en récusant la preuve avicennienne, entendit-il récuser également ce recours à une création non immédiate?[90] Ou fut-il guidé, plus simplement, par sa fidélité aux *Physiques* d'Aristote?[91] — Nous voyons en tout cas que la causalité efficiente de saint Thomas, si elle dépasse et approfondit la causalité motrice aristotélico-rushdienne, ne se confond point avec la causalité efficiente au sens d'Ibn Sînâ. Car cette dernière, en rigueur de termes, est "émanatrice" plutôt qu'"efficiente"; elle ne pouvait dès lors qu'écarter une authentique analogie de l'être, dans une sur-univocité "où l'être peut s'affirmer de tout selon le même genre, mais non pas immédiatement de tous les êtres."[92]

Ajoutons pour mémoire que la preuve avicennienne, quoi qu'en dise Ibn Rushd, *n'est pas* la preuve du *kalâm.*[93] Celle-ci, en effet, est *a novitate* (non *a contingentia*) *mundi.* En outre, elle relève, en ses premières formulations, d'une "logique à deux termes" mettant en rapports mutuels (corrélatif d'opposition, *muqâbal*) Dieu seul Réel, et la créature évanescente, *Haqq-khalq.*[94] Plus tard, et précisément sous l'influence des *falâsifa* orientaux qu'ils combattaient, les ash'arites "modernes" (à partir du XIe-XIIe s.) organiseront leur preuve sous mode syllogistique. Il y eut ici influence d'Avicenne sur les *mutakallimûn*, non l'inverse. Il reste que la notion de cause efficiente jouera différemment. Avicenne, par delà l'analogie limitée du "nécessaire par soi" et "nécessaire par autrui," tend à l'univocité de l'être; le *kalâm* tend à une équivocité pure entre le Créateur et la créature. Au XIVe-XVe siècles encore, Jurjânî, dans les "préambules philosophiques" de son grand traité de *kalâm*, récusera l'efficace des causes secondes sur leur effet.

Revenons à Ibn Sînâ et à la "première saisie" de l'intellect. Il ne s'agit pas chez lui d'une intuition abstractive fondée sur un jugement, comme chez saint Thomas. Il s'agit d'un concept d'être, d'un "état de l'être" (*hâl al-mawjûd*), existant d'une sorte d'existence logique qui se prend en opposition au non-être. Aussi bien, la vraie preuve de l'existence de Dieu, celle réservée aux "privilégiés" (*al-khawâss*), ne se-

90 Qu'il combat explicitement dans le *Tahâfut al-tahâfut* et l'*Epistola ad amicum.*
91 Cf. ci-dessus, p. 427.
92 Et. Gilson, "Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot", *Archives* (1927), 110-111.
93 Nous trouvons cette dernière telle que saint Thomas put la connaître, dans Maïmonide, *Guide des Egarés*, I, 74 (trad. Munk, I, 421-435).
94 Cf. Louis Gardet, "Dieu — le Réel (*Allâh al-Haqq*)", *Studia Missionalia*, (Rome 1968), 57-61.

ra point, pour Ibn Sînâ, la preuve par la cause efficiente. Ce sera la preuve "par l'idée d'être,"[95] selon une univocité de l'être comme tel, considéré comme tel, indépendamment de son existence concrète. Cet essentialisme radical, aboutissement du monisme avicennien, c'est peut-être cela qu'Averroès visait déjà à travers sa critique de la preuve par la cause efficiente. Et nous voyons avec quelle indépendance les formules avicenniennes sur l'être objet de la pensée, même reprises *ad litteram*, ont été utilisées par saint Thomas selon la perspective tout autre du primat de l'*acte* d'être. En ontologie comme en noétique, saint Thomas reprend à son compte certaines questions ouvertes, et certaines expressions élaborées par le *faylasûf* oriental. Mais il les situe selon des lignes de synthèse qui n'appartiennent qu'à lui. L'influence exercée par la vision du monde avicennienne, ce n'est pas, au moyen âge latin, chez l'Aquinate que nous la trouverons; mais d'une part (noétique) dans le courant de l'"augustinisme avicennisant," et d'autre part (notion de la "nature commune," sur-univocité de l'être) chez Jean Duns Scot. M. Gilson l'a montré avec force[96]: les oppositions de Duns Scot à saint Thomas s'originent chez Avicenne.

2. *La notion de prophétie*. Ce n'est aucunement la notion même de prophétie que saint Thomas emprunte à son devancier. La prophétie, dit-il, ne requiert aucune disposition ou qualité préalable dans le sujet. C'est Dieu qui dispose l'âme à en recevoir le don, puis le lui accorde.[97] Les seules dispositions requises regardent l'*usage* de la prophétie, qui reste, lui, *in potestate prophetae*.[98] Seul, peut-être, l'accent mis sur l'intermédiaire "habituel" d'un ministère angélique[99] pourrait évoquer (rencontre ou emprunt) l'enseignement des *falâsifa*.[100]

La foi musulmane est centrée sur la notion de prophétie. Dans leur

95 V. g. *Ishârât*, 146.

96 C'est le thème même du très éclairant article ci-dessus cité, *Avicenne et le point de départ de Duns Scot*. Voir également *Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age*, 109-112.— L'expression "augustinisme avicennisant" proposée par M. Gilson a été discutée. Sans doute n'aurait-elle point été acceptée par les tenants de ce courant médiéval. Mais en nous reportant aux textes mêmes d'Ibn Sînâ, et quelles qu'aient été les critiques de Guillaume d'Auvergne contre le *faylasûf*, nous la croyons, quant à nous, parfaitement justifiée: la plupart des augustiniens et augustinisants médiévaux empruntèrent à Avicenne les arguments même qui fondaient nombre de leurs thèses philosophiques, — croyant un peu vite avoir désamorcé son monisme et déterminisme existentiels, et certaines vues cosmologiques qui y étaient liées.

97 Cf. *Sum. theol.*, II-II, 3, c. — Un rapprochement serait à établir ici avec la foi musulmane, non avec la *falsafa*.

98 Cf. ibid., 4, c. et *De Veritate*, 12, 5.

99 *Sum. theol.*, ibid., a. 4.

100 Cet intermédiaire angélique, reconnu par les *falâsifa*, est chez eux au point de jonction d'une double influence, coranique et hellénistique.

souci d'accorder leur vision du monde à la Loi religieuse, les *falâsifa* ne pouvaient pas ne pas la rencontrer. Et cela vaut tout autant pour Ibn Rushd "apologète" que pour Fârâbî ou Ibn Sînâ. Saint Thomas connut certainement le chapitre du *Shifâ'* qui traite du sujet; non moins des textes d'Ibn Rushd et les exposés et discussions de Maïmonide.[101] Or, l'explication donnée par les *falâsifa* comme étant la vraie nature de la prophétie, saint Thomas en fera ce qu'il appelle une "prophétie naturelle"; et c'est à Avicenne qu'il se réfère. — Aucune influence ici sur la notion proprement théologique, mais une sorte d'annexe philosophique, "similitude déficiente" de la prophétie proprement dite.

Il n'est que de comparer les textes mêmes d'Avicenne,[102] et les deux textes majeurs où saint Thomas définit et discute la "prophétie naturelle."[103] L'homme par ses propres forces (et la nature angélique plus encore) peut acquérir une certaine connaissance des choses à venir, non plus en elles-mêmes, comme dans le *lumen propheticum*, mais dans leurs effets: cela, à la mesure de la "perfection de la vertu imaginative et de la clarté de l'intelligence."[104] Or, telles sont, mot pour mot, les deux premières conditions qui, dans le déterminisme existentiel avicennien, feront de tel homme un prophète. Pour les *falâsifa*, cette prophétie, illumination nécessaire de l'Intellect agent reçue dans un intellect possible prédisposé par nature, sera infaillible. Pour saint Thomas, elle est de soi faillible. Pour les *falâsifa*, elle atteint aux vérités suprêmes. Pour saint Thomas, son objet, au contraire de l'objet de la "prophétie divine," ne dépassera jamais les capacités naturelles de la raison, et sera reçu non plus immédiatement, mais par l'intermédiaire de causes secondes. Et les communications des anges déchus n'en sont qu'un exemple privilégié.[105]

Nous avons ici l'un des cas les plus nets d'un emprunt de saint Thomas à la problématique de ses prédécesseurs arabes. Mais cet emprunt en resituant leur pensée dans une synthèse de théologie chrétienne, en est en quelque sorte la réfutation. Aussi bien, les questions du *De Veritate* qui traitent de la nature de l'illumination prophétique se référeront plus d'une fois, elles aussi, aux vues des *falâsifa*: ce sera, en général, pour les discuter ou rectifier.[106]

101 Cf. Bruno Decker, *Die Entwicklung der Lehre von der prophetischen Offenbarung von Wilhelm von Auxerre bis zur Thomas von Aquin* (Breslau 1940).

102 Pour nous borner à cette référence: *Shifâ', Illâhiyyât*, II, 441-443 (textes parallèles dans *Najât*, *Ishârât*, etc.).

103 *De Veritate*, 12, 3 et 4; *Sum. theol.*, II-II, 172, 1 et 2.

104 *Sum. theol.*, ibid., a. 1, c.

105 Ibid., a. 5.

106 *De Veritate*, q. 12, en particulier a. 6 et 7.

3. *Le principe d'individuation.* Nous renvoyons aux études fort bien menées de M. Forest et du P. Roland-Gosselin.[107] Sans revenir sur les détails de l'élaboration thomiste, signalons du moins cet exemple de l'outillage technique que saint Thomas n'hésita pas à emprunter à ses devanciers *falâsifa*; il montre par ailleurs que l'arrivée d'Averroès ne signifia nullement un abandon de ce que pouvait apporter Avicenne.

Avicenne comme Averroès sont fidèles à Aristote en faisant de la matière le principe de l'individuation.[108] Mais le premier précisera[109] *materia signata quantitate determinata*, matière "déterminée" en raison du double principe par lui admis de la "forme de corporéité" et de la "forme spécifique." C'est l'un des points où Averroès s'opposera à son prédécesseur; et l'on sait que pour lui, pour éviter ce recours à une notion platonisante de "forme", le principe d'individuation est la *materia signata quantitate interminata*, selon des dimensions préexistantes en la matière.

Nous avons chez saint Thomas des prises de position successives. Dans le *De Ente et Essentia*, il emprunte à Avicenne sa notion de "quantité déterminée," mais selon une acception qui ne doit plus rien à la "forme spécifique." Dans le *Commentaire des Sentences* et du *De Trinitate* de Boèce, par contre, il adopte la formule d'Ibn Rushd; et, dans le *De Veritate*,[110] mentionne les *dimensiones praeintellectae in materia*. Cependant ces "dimensions indéterminées" qui, au sens d'Ibn Rushd, préexistent réellement dans la matière antérieurement à la forme, sembleront par la suite à saint Thomas compromettre le vrai hylémorphisme de l'unité des formes substantielles. Si bien que dans la *Summa Theologica*, il reviendra, pour expliquer le principe d'individuation, à une matière "déterminée en fonction de la quantité," et qu'il appellera *quantitas dimensiva*.[111]

D'autres exemples de ce très souple procédé d'investigation pourraient être donnés: ainsi la distinction de l'essence et de l'existence dans l'être contingent, réelle comme le voulait Ibn Sînâ (au contraire d'Ibn Rushd), mais non point "extrinsèque" comme l'exigeait le monisme émanatiste avicennien. Rares sont les élaborations philosophiques où n'apparaît point quelque référence, directe ou indirecte, à l'un ou l'autre *faylasûf*. Mais plus rares encore sont les cas où

107 A. Forest, op. cit., 234-257; M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, *Le "De Ente et Essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Le Saulchoir 1926), 104-117.

108 Au contraire de tout un courant de pensée shî'ite qui, en Islam, explique l'individuation par la forme.

109 V. g. *Ishârât*, 98.

110 5, 9, ad 6.

111 III, 77, 2, c.

la solution adoptée est pleinement conforme à l'enseignement de l'un ou de l'autre. C'est en fonction de vues plus larges, — et plus larges encore que la simple fidélité à Aristote, — que saint Thomas repense et resitue les apports des "Arabes". Ils lui donnèrent à pied d'œuvre des matériaux de toute première importance pour mettre en place son outillage philosophique; ils n'infléchirent jamais les lignes fondamentales de sa synthèse.

CONCLUSION

Nous le disions au début de ces pages: l'analyse exhaustive de ce que put apporter à saint Thomas la pensée philosophique (*falsafa*) et "théologique" (*'ilm al-kalâm*) du monde musulman est à poursuivre. Il est hautement souhaitable que soient menés à bien, patiemment, des travaux analogues à ceux d'A. Forest et C. Vansteenkiste. Un triple *requisit* nous semble devoir les commander.

a) Tout d'abord, une collaboration suivie entre médiévistes et islamisants. Saint Thomas ignora sans doute bien des circonstances socio-culturelles qui commandaient les prises de position du *kalâm* ou de la *falsafa*. Nous croyons cependant que ces circonstances-là ne peuvent qu'éclairer du dedans la portée de l'outillage conceptuel des "philosophes arabes" dont il se servit si volontiers. Son génie sut bien des fois opérer les rectifications nécessaires. Nous avons tout à gagner à en comprendre les conditions et la portée historique, eu égard à la pensée musulmane elle-même.

b) En outre, une telle collaboration médiévistes-islamisants devrait permettre de résoudre certaines difficultés des traductions. Grâce aux travaux patients des érudits, les textes sont ou seront dans un jour prochain à notre disposition. Nous songeons ici, par exemple, aux travaux de Mlle M.-Th.d'Alverny sur l'Avicenne latin,[112] et au texte arabe du *Shifâ'* publié au Caire, en édition critique, sous la direction du Prof. Ibrahim Madkour.[113] Il faut souhaiter qu'un effort analogue (à

112 Voir, en particulier, les travaux préparatoires présentés dans la chronique "Avicenna latinus", *Archives d'Hist. doctr. et litt. du Moyen Age*, 1961-1970. Egalement: "Les traductions d'Avicenne (Moyen Age et Renaissance)", *Avicenna nella storia della cultura mediaevale* (Academia dei Lincei, Rome 1957), etc. Grâce à ces travaux, M[lle] Simone Van Riet a pu publier le *Liber De anima seu sextus De naturalibus* (Louvain 1968), édition critique de la traduction latine médiévale (psychologie du *Shifâ'*).

113 Par ailleurs, le texte arabe du *De anima* (*Shifâ'*) a été publié à Bratislava (1956) par Jan Bakos, et à Oxford (1959) par M. F. Rahmân; sans oublier les éditions critiques bien connues du P. Bouyges (Beyrouth), qui mirent, entre autres, à la disposition des spécialistes, les grands textes de la querelle des *Tahâfut*.— Mentionnons encore les éditions de textes arabes, *Aristote chez les Arabes* (Le Caire 1947), *Plotin chez les Arabes* (Le Caire 1955), etc., de M. A. Badawî: s'y trouvent et la pseudo-*Théologie d'Aristote* et les *Gloses* d'Avicenne sur la pseudo-*Théologie*, etc.

peine commencé) se poursuive sur les textes arabes et latins des commentaires d'Averroès.

Les traductions médiévales sont précises, mais très littérales. La connaissance directe des texte arabes peut les éclairer. Elle peut permettre aussi d'éviter certains faux-sens. A titre d'exemple: l'arabe philosophique distingue nettement *dhât* (essence) et *mâhiyya* (quiddité). La *mâhiyya*, c'est ce qui répond à la question *mâ* (*quid*), c'est ce qui est "compréhensible" — au sens étymologique — pour la raison humaine, le définissable. Or, si Avicenne a bien dit qu'il n'y a pas de *mâhiyya* en Dieu, il n'a jamais dit que Dieu n'a point de *dhât*. Il a dit avec force que le *dhât* de Dieu, l'Essence divine, est Son être (*mawjûd*): selon une problématique à la fois différente et très proche de celle du *kalâm*, qui fait du *mawjûd* (être, existence) l'"attribut de l'essence" (*sifat al-dhât*).[114]

c) Une troisième exigence nous semble devoir porter sur la spécificité des lumières (*lumen sub quo*) qui commandent respectivement la synthèse thomiste, l'apologie défensive du *kalâm*, la philosophie hellénistique de la *falsafa*. Il faut bien voir ici que des rencontres d'expression, parfois la similitude des problèmes matériellement pris, ne signifient point forcément filières ou emprunts. Les recherches d'Asin Palacios nous ont valu de très précieux relevés de textes, fort éclairants. Mais d'une part, de simples possibilités (ainsi la connaissance que saint Thomas *aurait* pu avoir de l'*Iqtisâd*) ne sauraient constituer des preuves historiques; et d'autre part une non considération de cette spécificité des lumières ne peut que conduire à des affirmations trop rapides de similitudes supposées. Nous songeons à cet "averroïsme théologique" par lequel le savant espagnol voulut expliquer la thèse centrale de saint Thomas sur la révélation.

Enfin — ce n'est plus une exigence, mais un souhait — il conviendrait que les spécialistes de saint Thomas soient attentifs à divers travaux, parallèles aux leurs, qui ont vu le jour en climat musulman. Des chercheurs musulmans s'intéressent, eux aussi, à l'influence du *kalâm* ou de la *falsafa* sur la pensée médiévale latine, spécialement sur l'Aquinate. Ils s'y intéressent en fonction, cette fois, de leur propre passé culturel. C'est ainsi un élargissement des perspectives qu'il nous proposent, et peut-être une voie pour faire aboutir, à travers le temps et l'espace, ce dialogue si bien inauguré aux XIIe-XIIIe siècles. Par la force des choses, il ne pouvait se poursuivre alors que sur des points limités. Il appartient peut-être à notre temps de le reprendre et de l'élargir.

114 Autre aporie: *tasdîq*, selon le contexte, veut dire tantôt "jugement" (2° opération de l'esprit), et tantôt adhésion intérieure de foi (par "jugement de véridicité"). Or, les traductions latines ont parfois rendu *tasdîq*-jugement par *fides*.

SAINT THOMAS D'AQUIN ET LA *MÉTAPHYSIQUE* D'AVICENNE

Georges C. Anawati O.P.

DANS la mémorable étude qui ouvre les *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge,*[1] M. Gilson s'est posé une question à première vue assez étrange. Il se demande, en effet, "Pourquoi saint Thomas a critiqué saint Augustin?"

Quand on connaît la place que S. Augustin occupe dans la tradition chrétienne, il semble en effet étonnant que le Docteur Angélique ait cru devoir critiquer, du point de vue philosophique, le maître par excellence des penseurs chrétiens médiévaux. La raison, M. Gilson l'a mise en évidence, c'est qu'à l'époque de S. Thomas, l'augustinisme avait été compromis précisément par Avicenne et que, dorénavant, opter pour l'évêque d'Hippone, c'était s'engager dans une ligne avicennienne qui compromettait à la fois la doctrine de la connaissance, celle de la causalité et, en fin de compte, les rapports entre Dieu et le monde. C'est dire à la fois la profonde influence de l'auteur du *Shifâ'* et les réserves qu'elle suscita chez le plus grand penseur chrétien du moyen âge.

L'étude des rapports de la philosophie d'Avicenne avec celle de s. Thomas d'Aquin remonte déjà à de nombreuses années. Mais depuis un demi-siècle surtout, elle a attiré l'attention d'un certain nombre de chercheurs occidentaux. La place de choix dont jouissait le Docteur Angélique jusqu'à ces dernières années dans la formation des clercs dans l'Eglise catholique a multiplié les travaux sur les sources de sa pensée, le développement de sa doctrine, etc. Très vite on s'est aperçu que les "philosophes arabes," en particulier Avicenne et Averroès, ont joué un grand rôle dans la transmission de la pensée d'Aristote en Occident au moyen âge et que leur étude approfondie n'était pas moins nécessaire que celle de ce dernier pour la pleine compréhension de la pensée des grands penseurs chrétiens du moyen âge. Pour ne citer qu'un témoignage de M. Gilson, voici ce qu'il disait déjà au sixième Congrès international de philosophie en 1926: "On n'obtiendra aucune in-

1 1 (1926), 6-127.

terprétation correcte des philosophies médiévales tant que l'on n'aura pas fait précéder leur étude de celle des philosophies arabes qu'elles réfutent ou dont elles s'inspirent. La pensée arabe et la pensée latine que nous tendons plus ou moins à isoler dans la pratique, ont été en continuité historique et l'étude que nous en faisons doit tenir compte de cette continuité plus qu'il n'a été fait jusqu'ici". Et plus loin: "L'une des tâches les plus urgentes qui s'imposent serait la réédition des traductions latines médiévales des philosophes arabes en général, et d'Avicenne en particulier."[2]

Aussi vit-on une série d'importants travaux consacrés à Avicenne soit à s. Thomas mais où les doctrines des deux grands penseurs étaient confrontées. Pour nous en tenir aux travaux importants consacrés surtout à la *Métaphysique* d'Avicenne, mentionnons les travaux suivants:

Tout d'abord la traduction, en allemand, de cette *Métaphysique* du *Shifâ'*,[3] entreprise en 1907 par Max Horten qui contient en notes de nombreux textes de s. Thomas. Le *Metaphysices Compendium* de Mgr. Nematallah Carame,[4] qui est une traduction latine moderne de la *Métaphysique du Najât*. On sait que ce dernier est un résumé du *Shifâ'* dont il reproduit quelquefois des chapitres entiers.[5] La traduction, exécutée à Rome sur les conseils du P. Gény, professeur à la Grégorienne, est accompagnée de nombreuses notes et références à s. Thomas.

La même année 1926 paraissait une édition critique du *De ente et essentia*, une des premières œuvres de s. Thomas et où l'influence d'Avicenne est prépondérante. L'édition était faite très soigneusement par le P. Roland-Gosselin, un des professeurs du Centre d'Etudes dominicain du Saulchoir où les études historiques concernant la pensée de s. Thomas étaient particulièrement en honneur.[6] A la suite du texte critique, où les renvois à la traduction latine d'Avicenne sont signalés, le savant éditeur a établi une étude historique très précise sur deux

2 "L'étude des philosophes arabes et son rôle dans l'interprétation de la scolastique," *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy* (1927), 596.

3 Max Horten, *Die Metaphysik des Avicenna* (Leipzig 1907). Reproduction photostatique, 1960.

4 N. Carame, *Avicennae Metaphysices Compendium* (Rome 1926). Mgr. Carame était un prélat maronite, établi à Rome qui connaissait admirablement l'arabe, sa langue maternelle. La plus grande partie de l'introduction (pp. xiii-xlvii) à laquelle a collaboré le Prof. Sestili, a pour objet la doctrine d'Avicenne. Cf. C. R. (Chenu) dans *Bulletin thomiste* 2 (1927-29), n. 88, p. (31).

5 En fait le *Najat* (*Salus*) est composé d'*extraits* quasi littéraux du *Shifâ'*. M[lle] Goichon, dans son livre *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne)* (Paris 1937), 499-503, a donné une table de concordance des textes du traité de l'âme du *Najât* copiés sur le *Shifâ'* avec le texte original de celui-ci et sa traduction médiévale. Les derniers chapitres de la Métaphysique du *Shifâ'* se retrouvent dans la *Najât*.

6 Cf. la collection *Bibliothèque thomiste* fondée par le P. Mandonnet (le directeur actuel est le P. Chenu), qui jusqu'en 1971 avait publié 39 volumes, chez Vrin.

points capitaux de la métaphysique avicennienne: le principe de l'individuation et la distinction réelle entre l'essence et l'existence. Une enquête soignée était également poursuivie auprès des principaux philosophes et théologiens du moyen âge.

Presqu'en même temps paraissait le très important article de M. Gilson, signalé plus haut: "Pourquoi s. Thomas a critiqué s. Augustin?" où le maître des études philosophiques médiévales mettait en vif relief l'enjeu de l'option que faisait s. Thomas pour se dégager de la pensée augustinienne de son époque, compromise par l'avicennisme. Nul doute que cette très longue étude, très documentée et fortement pensée, fut le point de départ de nouvelles recherches. Les trois volumes de Mgr. Masnovo, *De Guglielmo d'Auvergne a s. Tommaso d'Aquino,*[7] décrivent, en fait, l'influence de l'avicennisme sur la pensée de ces grands auteurs. Il en est de même de la thèse importante d'Aimé Forest, consacrée à l'étude de *La structure métaphysique du concret selon saint Thomas d'Aquin.*[8] C'est surtout par confrontation avec la pensée avicennienne que l'auteur caractérise la position de s. Thomas. Cela est si vrai qu'il a jugé indispensable de recueillir le plus grand nombre de textes de s. Thomas mentionnant explicitement Avicenne et de les reproduire en appendice à sa thèse (près de 250 textes).[9]

A son tour le P. de Vaux, en 1934, pour fournir à son hypothèse d'un avicennisme latin une base documentaire, éditait dans ses *Notes et textes sur l'avicennisme latin aux confins du XIe-XIIIe siècles,*[10] contenant, en particulier, l'édition critique du *De fluxu entis.* Là aussi des comparaisons avec les positions de s. Thomas éclairent utilement le texte.

Continuant son travail directement sur Avicenne et sur ce qu'elle considère comme l'axe de sa métaphysique, Mlle M.-A. Goichon publiait en 1937 sa thèse sur *La distinction de l'essence et de l'existence d'après Ibn Sina (Avicenne).*[11] Cette fois, comme pour le cas de Mgr. Carame, Mlle Goichon joignait à la connaissance de la philosophie scolastique sa science d'arabisante. Sa thèse contient près de quarante textes de s. Thomas se rapportant à la doctrine d'Avicenne. Quelques années plus tard elle devait d'ailleurs consacrer trois conférences, faites

7 3 vol. (Milan 1945-46).

8 (Paris 1931). Sur cet livre voir le jugement de M. Gilson dans son article "Avicenne en occident au moyen âge", *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 36 (1969) 104, n. 14: "...livre, toujours indispensable"; "ce remarquable travail".

9 331-360. Les œuvres dépouillées sont les suivantes: 4 *Sent., De ente et essentia, De principiis naturae, De veritate, In Boethium de Trinitate, De potentia, Summa contra Gentiles,* 8 *Phys., De generatione et corruptione, Metaph., Quodlibeta, Summa theol.* (Ia pars seulement), *De virtutibus, De spiritualibus creaturis, De anima, De unitate intellectus, De substantiis separatis seu De angelorum natura.*

10 (Paris 1934).

11 (Paris 1937).

à Oxford, à *La philosophie d'Avicenne et son influence en Europe médiévale.*[12]

En 1938 M. Jean Paulus publiait une importante thèse sur *Henri de Gand. Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique*, où, de nouveau, la pensée métaphysique d'Avicenne était soulignée avec vigueur et sa comparaison avec celle de s. Thomas établie avec pénétration.[13]

Plus récemment, M. Louis Gardet, fidèle à la méthode de philosophie et de théologie comparées, ne manquait pas, dans *La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne*,[14] d'instituer, sur plus d'un point, une fructueuse confrontation de la pensée avicennienne avec la pensée thomiste.

Il faudrait à côté de ces ouvrages et de ces mémoires, citer un certain nombre d'articles qui ont plus particulièrement étudié Avicenne du point de vue de la pensée thomiste: celui du P. Bouyges, *L'idée génératrice du "De Potentia" de s. Thomas*,[15] qui a essayé de montrer que la question disputée du *De Potentia* de s. Thomas était en fait destinée à réfuter la position émanatiste d'Avicenne. Ce travail servit de point de départ à une thèse plus longue de M[lle] Béatrice Zedler dont un important chapitre, "Saint Thomas and Avicenna in the *De Potentia*," fut publié dans la revue *Traditio.*[16]

De même citons deux études où deux aspects de la métaphysique avicennienne sont comparés à la métaphysique de s. Thomas: l'article de G. Smith, "Avicenna and the Possibles,"[17] et celui de J. Collins, "Intentionality in the Philosophy of Avicenna."[18]

Les fêtes du Millénaire d'Avicenne[19] suscitèrent également quelques articles ou communications qui, sur l'un ou l'autre point, confrontaient la pensée métaphysique des deux auteurs: un article de H. D. Dondaine, professeur au Saulchoir, "A propos d'Avicenne et de saint Thomas (de la causalité dispositive à la causalité instrumentale),"[20] et deux communications au congrès de Téhéran, celle de M[lle] Goichon, "Un chapitre de l'influence d'Ibn Sina en Occident, le *De Ente et Essentia* de s. Thomas d'Aquin,"[21] et celle de l'auteur de ces lignes, "Avicenne et s. Thomas d'Aquin."[22]

12 (Paris 1944).
13 (Paris 1938).
14 (Paris 1951). Cf. notre long compte rendu dans *Revue thomiste* (1961) 109-135.
15 *Revue de philosophie* (1931) 113-131, 247-268.
16 6 (1948) 105-149.
17 *New Scholasticism* 17 (1943).
18 *The Modern Schoolman* 21 (1944) 204-215.
19 Sur ce millénaire cf. G. C. Anawati, "L'œuvre scientifique du Congrès d'Avicenne de Téhéran", (21-30 avril 1954), *Mideo* 2 (1955) 351-356; "Chronique avicennienne" 1951-1960, *Revue thomiste* 60 (1960) 613-634.
20 *Revue thomiste* 51 (1951) 441-453.
21 *Le livre du Millénaire d'Avicenne* 4 (Téhéran 1956) 118-131.
22 Ibid. 139-148.

Enfin signalons deux thèses qui ont été dernièrement soutenues et qui portent sur la confrontation de la métaphysique d'Avicenne et celle de s. Thomas: celle de S. Renzi, *La fondazione radicale dell'essere nella metafisica avicenniana,* soutenue à l'Angelicum,[23] et celle de A. G. Judy, "The Use of Avicenna's *Metaphysics* VIII, 4 in the *Summa contra Gentiles.*"[24]

De l'ensemble de ces travaux quelles sont les conclusions que l'on peut tirer en ce qui concerne l'influence de la métaphysique d'Avicenne sur la pensée de s. Thomas d'Aquin? Pour répondre d'une façon précise à cette question, il est indispensable de ne pas perdre de vue les considérations suivantes:

1. L'œuvre de s. Thomas est immense et s'est succédée dans le temps sur une période de près de trente ans. Les travaux des spécialistes de sa doctrine ont montré que, bien que les grandes lignes de cette doctrine soient restées fidèles à ses intuitions de base, il y a eu cependant une maturation, un développement de la pensée et, sur certains points, des rectifications apportées dans les œuvres postérieures. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que, rallié au début à la causalité dispositive d'Avicenne pour l'explication de l'action sacramentelle, il l'abandonne par la suite et adopte la causalité instrumentale. Même évolution au sujet de l'individuation et du problème de la matière indéterminée, de la question du mixte, etc.

23 La thèse n'a pas été imprimée mais divers chapitres l'ont été: Stanislao Renzi, "Una fonte della IIIa via: Avicenna," *Freib. Zeit. Phil. Theol.* 13-14 (1966-67) 283-293; "La fondazione radicale dell'essere possibile nell'Avicenna latino", *Aquinas* 9 (1966) 294-313; "L'essere necessario e l'essere possibile in Avicenna", *Aquinas* 10 (1967) 40-52; "La fondazione radicale dell'essere possibile nel'Avicenna latino", *Aquinas* 10 (1967) 153-169; "L'attributo operativo del primo principio degli essere in Avicenna", *Aquinas* 10 (1967) 260-270; "Carattere intellectivo della fondazione radicale dell'essere possibile in Avicenna", *Studi e ricerche di scienze religiose* (Rome 1968) 273-287.

24 Thèse de licence inédite présentée à l'Institut Pontifical d'Etudes Médiévales, Toronto, 1969. On pourrait allonger beaucoup cette liste. Contentons-nous de mentionner les travaux suivants, que nous classons par ordre chronologique. (Ne sont signalés que les travaux où se fait une confrontation entre s. Thomas et la métaphysique d'Avicenne): E. Gilson, *L'être et l'essence* (Paris 1948); *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto 1949), (cf. le très long C.R. du P. Isaac dans le *Bulletin thomiste* 8 (1951) 39-59; A. Lobato, "Avicena y santo Tomas," *Est. Filos.* (Las Caldas) 4 (1955) 45-80; 5 (1956) 83-130, 511-551. B. Zedler, "St. Thomas, Interpreter of Avicenna," *The Modern Schoolman* 33 (1955) 1-18. L. de Raeymaeker, "L'être selon Avicenne et selon s. Thomas d'Aquin," *Avicenna Commemoration Volume* (Beruni) A. H. 370 - A. H. 1370 (Calcutta 1956) 119-131; "La esencia avicenista y la esencia tomista," *Sapientia* 11 (1956) 154-165 (cf. le C.R. du P. Geiger dans le *Bulletin thomiste* 10 (1957-59) 163-4). M. de Contenson, "S. Thomas et l'avicennisme latin," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques* 43 (1958) 3-31. T. O'Shaughnessy, "St. Thomas' Changing Estimate of Avicenna's Teaching on Existence as an Accident," *The Modern Schoolman* 36 (1958-59) 245-60; "St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of the One," *Gregorianum* 41 (1960) 665-79. C. Giacon, "In tema di dipendenze di S. Tommaso da Avicenna," *L'Homme et son destin* (Louvain 1960) 535-544. E. Gilson, "Avicenne et les origines de la notion de cause efficiente," *Atti XII Congr. intern. filos.* 9 (1960) 121-130; "Avicenne en occident au moyen âge," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 36 (1969) 89-121.

2. S. Thomas a cité abondamment Avicenne, du moins à première vue. Le P. Vansteenkiste a repris le travail de M. Forest et a essayé de relever tous les textes de s. Thomas où il mentionne explicitement Avicenne.[25] Il en a trouvé près de 450. Ce n'est pas négligeable... Evidemment en comparaison des citations d'un s. Augustin ou d'Aristote, le chiffre prend un caractère plus relatif. De plus, beaucoup de textes sont identiques — quant au sens du moins, car souvent s. Thomas semble citer de mémoire — et répétés cinq ou six fois. Il reste cependant que ce nombre est assez révélateur de l'influence, ne serait-ce que matérielle, d'Avicenne sur s. Thomas. Sans compter qu'il y a très probablement des passages qui utilisent implicitement certaines distinctions avicenniennes. A partir du moment où on intègre organiquement une notion ou une distinction, on n'éprouve pas le besoin de dire d'où on l'a empruntée.

Nous devons toutefois faire remarquer, — il y a déjà longtemps que la remarque a été faite, — que les citations d'Avicenne, nombreuses dans les premiers écrits de s. Thomas, se font plus rares par la suite. Beaucoup plus maître de sa propre doctrine, il se dégage de tout ce qui ne concorde pas avec celle.

3. S. Thomas a toujours gardé pour Avicenne un grand respect et le ton à son égard est toujours courtois. Il le considère comme un maître et est heureux de constater, sur certains points, l'accord de sa doctrine avec la foi chrétienne.[26] Souvent ses citations se terminent par un *sicut dixit Avicenna* comme pour apporter un *confirmatur* décisif. Jamais il n'aura à son égard les paroles dures que dans un moment d'indignation il aura pour Averroès, "corrupteur bien plus que commentateur" (*depravator potior quam Commentator*). Quand il refuse de suivre son opinion, il se contente de dire: "Sur ce point, il ne faut pas suivre Avicenne,"[27] ou "c'est à tort (*irrationabiliter*) qu'Avicenne a rejeté l'opinion d'Aristote,"[28] ou bien: "Avicenne fut trompé par..." (*deceptus fuit*),[29] etc. Peut-être l'espèce de respect affectueux que s. Thomas montra toujours pour Platon, même lorsqu'il le critique, rejaillit in-

25 C. Vansteenkiste, "Avicenna-Citaten bij S. Thomas", *Tijdschrift voor philosophie* 15 (1953) 457-507. Cf. l'analyse de cet article par E. Gilson dans *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 36 (1969) 104 ff. et n. 14.

26 "Et ideo accipienda est via Avicennae...", *In Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 4, a. 3, c. "Dicendum secundum Avicennam..." 2 *Sent.* d. 13, q. 1, a. 3, ad 4. "Similiter Avicenna istum errorem reprobat satis efficaci ratione..." 2 *Sent.* d. 17, q. 2, a. 2, c. "Alia opinio est Avicennae, quae verior videtur," 4 *Sent.* d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, ql. 2, ad 2.

27 "...in hoc non est standum auctoritate Avicennae", 2 *Sent.* d. 16, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 3. "Dictum Avicennae quantum ad hoc non sustinemus", 4 *Sent*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 9; mais il essaie quand même de le sauver: "nisi forte velimus dicere quod Avicenna intelligit..."

28 2 *Phys.* lect. 1.

29 10 *Metaph.* lect. 3.

consciemment sur Avicenne souvent ramené, au point de vue doctrinal, aux positions platoniciennes.[30]

4. Il ne faut pas oublier que, même quand s. Thomas emploie certaines distinctions ou certaines expressions d'Avicenne, il ne le fait pas toujours dans le même sens que ce dernier. Fidèle à sa propre intuition et à la cohérence de sa doctrine, il ne craint pas d'employer le langage de ses adversaires dans son propre sens, de reprendre, par exemple, à son compte une formule d'Avicenne en lui donnant un sens nettement différent.

5. Enfin, et ceci s'adresse surtout aux arabisants qui seraient tentés de s'appuyer trop fortement et trop exclusivement sur le texte arabe d'Avicenne pour prendre en faute s. Thomas critiquant Avicenne, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que l'Avicenne qu'utilise le Docteur Angélique est celui des traductions latines. Et il n'est pas du tout exclus que certains aspects de sa doctrine aient été interprétés dans un sens défavorable à l'auteur du *Shifâ'*, à la suite des critiques acerbes et quelquefois injustifiées adressées par Averroès à son coreligionnaire. Il était difficile pour un s. Thomas ignorant l'arabe et ne connaissant qu'une partie des œuvres d'Avicenne d'échapper complètement aux jugements malveillants que le Philosophe de Cordoue portait contre son collègue de Boukharah.... Cela justifierait la distinction proposée par J. Paulus entre l'Avicenne "fictif" présenté par Averroès et qui n'a pas manqué d'agir fâcheusement sur les scolastiques, et l'Avicenne "réel" que nous découvrent les œuvres d'Avicenne lues objectivement, au besoin en recourant au texte arabe lui-même.

Ces considérations vont nous permettre de présenter d'une façon schématique les rapports de la métaphysique d'Avicenne avec la pensée de s. Thomas. Nous allons dans une première partie signaler les notions, les définitions, les distinctions d'Avicenne que s. Thomas cite et qu'il fait siennes. Dans une deuxième partie nous mentionnerons les points de doctrine où, au contraire, s. Thomas refuse de suivre Avicenne et considère ces positions erronées. Dans cette deuxième partie, nous mettrons aussi les distinctions ou les notions avicenniennes que s. Thomas utilise mais après les avoir redressées selon sa propre doctrine.

30 "Quia Platonici et Avicenna..." *De potentia*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 5; "Quidam enim, ut Plato et Avicenna..." *Quodl.* 9, a. 11, c.; "Et sic in hoc Avicenna cum Platone concordat.." *Summa theol.* 1, 84, 4, c.

I. Notions, Définitions ou Distinctions d'Avicenne Approuvées par S. Thomas

A. *Pour l'enseignement de la métaphysique*

1. Il faut l'apprendre après les sciences naturelles car dans ces sciences il y a beaucoup de notions comme la génération, la corruption, le mouvement dont on a besoin en métaphysique. Egalement après les mathématique: la métaphysique doit en effet étudier les substances séparées et donc connaître le nombre des sphères, leur ordre, etc. Quant aux autres sciences, comme la musique, la morale, etc., elles servent *ad bene esse (In Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 9).

B. *Genre, espèce, différence. Rapports avec le tout. Nature.*

2. La quiddité de ce qui se trouve dans un genre n'est pas son *esse* (1 *Sent.* d. 19, q. 4, a. 2, c; 2 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, ad 1).
3. Le genre est pris des principes matériels, l'espèce des principes formels (2 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, obj. 4; d. 36, q. 1, a. 5, sed contra).
4. La différence désigne toute la nature de l'espèce, autrement elle ne pourrait pas lui être attribuée, mais elle ne la désigne qu'à partir des principes formels (2 *Sent.* d. 5, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2).
5. Le genre n'est pas intelligé dans la différence comme une partie de son essence mais comme de l'être en dehors de l'essence (*De ente et essentia* 2, ed. Roland-Gosselin, p. 17).
6. La différence ne dit aucune forme qui ne se trouve implicitement dans la nature du genre (2 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 6, ad. 1).
7. Le genre signifie le tout mais indistinctement; aussi se rapproche-t-il de la raison de matière (2 *Sent.* d. 18, q. 1, a. 2, c.).
8. La définition de la substance "ce qui n'est pas dans un sujet" n'est pas exacte, car l'être n'est pas un genre. Ni non plus la définition "ce qui existe pas soi." La véritable définition, c'est "ce qui a une quiddité demandant à exister par soi et non dans un autre" (1 *Sent.* d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2; 2 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, c.; 4 *Sent.*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, ql. 1, ad 2; *De potentia,* q. 7, a. 3, ad 4; *Quodl.* 9, a. 5, ad 2).
9. C'est l'intelligence qui produit l'universalité dans les choses (*De ente et essentia* 3, p. 28).
10. L'universel est perpétuel et incorruptible; il peut être entendu en deux sens (*De veritate*, q. 1, a. 5, ad 14).
11. La considération de la nature est triple: en tant qu'elle existe dans les êtres singuliers, en tant qu'elle existe dans l'intelligence de celui qui

la saisit, en elle-même, abstraction faite de toute considération (*Quodl.* 8, a. 1, c.).

12. Bien que la nature engendre tel homme, elle entend cependant engendrer l'homme (3 *Sent.* d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2).

13. La première intention de la nature, c'est l'espèce spécialissime (*Quodl.* 8, a. 2, c.).

C. *Le sujet. L'individuation.*

14. Tout accident est causé par la substance parce que le sujet est ce qui, complet en lui-même, offre à autre chose l'occasion d'exister (*subjectum est quod in se completum, praebens alteri occasionem essendi)* (1 *Sent.* d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2.).

15. Dans ses premiers ouvrages, s. Thomas a affirmé que le principe de l'individuation des substances matérielles était la matière. Mais il y a eu hésitation sur la manière dont elle jouait ce rôle. Au début, à la suite d'Avicenne, il admet une "forme de corporéité," qui entraîne nécessairement la quantité en acte et ses dimensions. Cette matière principe d'individuation n'est pas à confrondre avec la matière commune, partie essentielle de la définition. Il affirme dans le *De ente et essentia* (2, pp. 10-11) "Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta sit individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata; et dico materiam signatam quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur."

Dans le commentaire du deuxième livre des *Sentences* (2 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 1) reparaît la théorie de la corporéité, forme première et une notion empruntée à Averroès (dans le *De substantia orbis*) de "dimensions indéterminées," antérieures dans la matière aux dimensions déterminées. Dans le commentaire du troisième livre des *Sentences*, il ne mentionne que ce dernier principe comme principe d'individuation.

Dans le commentaire du *De Trinitate,* les dimensions indéterminées sont préférées aux dimensions déterminées à cause des changements continuels qui affectent les déterminations quantitatives de l'individu au cours de sa vie. Mais à partir du *Summa contra Gentiles,* la théorie des "dimensions indéterminées" ne paraît plus jamais.

16. Dans le *De ente et essentia* (2, pp. 12ff) s. Thomas expose et accepte la position d'Avicenne concernant le corps. Celui-ci peut avoir deux acceptions: le corps comme genre; il signifie alors une chose possédant une forme de laquelle peuvent procéder trois dimensions quelle que soit cette forme, qu'une perfection ultérieure puisse en dériver ou non. Dans ce sens le corps sera le genre de l'animal. L'autre acception, c'est le corps signifiant une chose qui a une forme im-

pliquant la détermination des trois dimensions *cum praecisione*, c'est-à-dire à l'exclusion de toute perfection ultérieure. Dans ce dernier cas, le corps sera la partie intégrante et matérielle de l'animal.

D. *L'être; l'essence et l'existence. Les causes.*

17. Le nom *ens* vient de *esse* et celui de *res* de la quiddité (1 *Sent.* d. 25, q. 1, a. 4, obj. 2 et c; 2 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 1, c. etc.).

18. L'être et l'essence, c'est ce que l'intelligence conçoit en premier lieu. Cette assertion capitale est exprimée par s. Thomas sous diverses formes et toujours rapportée à Avicenne au début de sa *Métaphysique*: "Ens est illud quod primo cadit in conceptione humana, ut Avicenna dicit" (*In Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 1, a. 3, obj. 3); "Primum cadens in apprehensione intellectus est ens, ut Avicenna dicit" (1 *Sent.* d. 38, q. 1, a. 4, obj. 4); "Primo in intellectu cadit ens" (1 *Metaph.* lect. 2); "Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quo omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio *Metaphysicae* suae" (*De veritate*, q. 1, a. 1, c.).

19. L'*esse* n'est pas un genre (2 *Sent.* d. 11, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2).

20. Dans tout être créé l' *esse* est autre que l'essence et n'entre pas dans sa définition (*Quodl*, 9, a. 6). Pour la distinction réelle de l'essence et de l'existence, voir Roland-Gosselin, *Le "De ente et essentia" de s. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1948): chez Avicenne, pp. 150-156, chez s. Thomas d'Aquin, pp. 185-199. Sur le rapport des deux, voir surtout pp. 197-198. La distinction est réelle chez les deux. S. Thomas s'inspire d'Avicenne mais le corrige dans le sens de sa doctrine: l'*esse* joue par rapport à l'essence qu'il actualise le rôle d'acte: "Oportet igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad potentiam" (*Summa theologiae* 1, 3, 4, c.).

21. Division de la cause efficiente en: perfective, dispositive, adjuvante et *consilians* (5 *Metaph.* lect. 2).

22. Posée la cause suffisante, l'effet suit nécessairement, à supposer qu'aucun empêchement ne vienne entraver l'action de la cause, explique s. Thomas (6 *Metaph.* lect. 3; *De veritate* q. 23, a. 5, obj. 1; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 17, obj. 4). De même la cause disparaissant, l'effet disparaît (1 *Sent.* d. 37, q. 1, c.).

23. L'agent divin donne tout l'*esse* en tant que créateur du monde; l'agent naturel donne seulement le mouvement (1 *Sent.* d. 7, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; 1 *Sent.* d. 9, q. 2, a. 2, obj. 2).

24. L'agent qui agit par son essence est l'Agent premier (1 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 4, a. 2, sed contra 2).

25. La vérité de l'énonciation se réduit aux premiers principes évidents comme à ses premières causes et en particulier à ce principe:

l'affirmation et la négation ne sont pas vraies en même temps (1 *Sent.* d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, c.).

26. "Veritas cujuslibet rei est proprietas sui esse quod stabilitum est ei" (définition d'Avicenne, *Metaph.* 8, c. 6, Venice, 1508, fol. 100ra), (4 *Sent.* d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 4; *Summa theol.* 1, 16, 1, c.).

27. Tout vrai n'est tel qu'un vertu de la Vérité première (*De veritate* q. 21, a. 4, obj. 5).

E. *La relation*

28. Elle ne se réfère pas par une autre relation (*De potentia*, q. 3, a. 3, ad 2).

29. Elle n'est pas numériquement identique dans les deux extrêmes (4 *Sent.* d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 3).

30. Elle n'est pas réelle entre l'être et le non-être *(De potentia,* q. 3, a. 1, ad 7).

31. Les relations de raison peuvent être multipliées *(De veritate*, q. 3, a. 8, ad 4).

F. *Dieu*

32. Dieu n'est pas dans un genre (1 *Sent.* d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, c; *In Boethium de Trinitate*, q. 6, a. 3, c.).

33. En Dieu l'essence est son propre *esse* (1 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 4).

34. Dieu est unique: démonstration d'Avicenne: "et haec est via Avicennae" (2 *Sent.* d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, c; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 5, c.).

35. Dieu est l'Etre nécessaire (*De veritate,* q. 24, a. 10, obj. 4; *De potentia*, q. 2, a. 3, c.).

36. Dieu se connaît (*De veritate,* q. 2, a. 2, c.).

37. La connaissance de Dieu n'est pas évidente ("Deum non esse per se notum"), (1 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 2, c.).

38. Dieu est le seul libéral à proprement parler (*Summa contra Gentiles* 1, 93, 7).

39. Dieu agit par son essence (1 *Sent.* d. 42, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 2.).

G. *Création ex nihilo*

40. Même si le monde est éternel, on peut dire qu'il est créé *ex nihilo* (1 *Sent.* d. 5, q. 2, a. 2, c) parce que *ex nihilo* peut indiquer soit un ordre temporel soit un ordre de nature (2 *Sent.* d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2, sed contra; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 14, ad 7, sed contra).

H. *Les anges*

41. Les anges sont identifiés aux substances séparées: "Les créatures spirituelles qu'Avicenne et certains autres appellent intelligences et que nous appelons anges" (*Summa theol.* 1, 65, 4, c.). Les anges sont à colloquer dans le prédicament substance (2 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 1, a. 5, c.). S. Thomas rapporte l'assertion d'Avicenne disant que pour les philosophes, les intelligences des sphères représentent ce que le Coran appelle les anges supérieurs comme les Chérubins et les Séraphins, tandis que les âmes des sphères représentent les anges messagers (2 *Sent.* d. 14, q. 1, a. 3, c.).

42. Les substances spirituelles séparées sont simples, absolument dénudées de matière (*De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 11, obj. 17).

43. Dans les substances simples créées, personne et nature ne diffèrent pas réellement bien qu'en elles l'accident diffère de la substance (3 *Sent.* d. 5, q. 2, a. 1, obj. 4).

44. Dans les substances spirituelles, il y a autant d'individus qu'il y a d'espèces (*De ente et essentia,* 4, p. 34).

45. "Dans les substances simples la quiddité est *simpliciter* la substance même, mais elle en diffère quant au mode de signifier, car la quiddité est signifiée comme forme, tandis que la *res* elle-même est *simpliciter* signifiée comme subsistante" (1 *Sent.* d. 26, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3).

I. *Problème du mal*

46. "Avicenne a fait dans sa *Métaphysique* une très utile division du mal," que s. Thomas résume et synthétise (2 *Sent.* d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, c.).

47. Au-dessus de la sphère de la lune, le mal n'existe pas (*De veritate*, q. 5, a. 9, c.).

II. La Critique Thomiste d'Avicenne

S. Thomas a donc emprunté à Avicenne un certain nombre de distinctions ou de définitions. Mais, comme nous le signalions plus haut, il garde à son égard le plus entière liberté et, en définitive, si on caractérise avant tout l'avicennisme comme un "essentialisme," i.e. une philosophie des possibles, des essences, celle de s. Thomas en diffère profondément en ce qu'elle se présente comme une philosophie de l'être existant.

De cette position fondamentale découlent un certain nombre d'oppositions faites par s. Thomas à la métaphysique avicennienne. Les principaux reproches qu'il lui fait sont les suivants:

1. *L'extrincésisme de la causalité efficiente*

S. Thomas associe Avicenne à Platon dans le reproche qu'il lui fait d'ôter aux causes secondes leur efficacité. "Et ainsi Platon, et Avicenne qui le suit en certains points, affirmaient que les agents corporels agissent selon les formes accidentales en disposant la matière à la forme substantielle. Mais la perfection ultime obtenue par l'introduction de la forme substantielle, provient du principe immatériel" (*Summa theol.* 1, 115, 1, c.).

Dans le même sens: "D'autres ont dit que les formes provenaient totalement de l'extérieur soit par participation des idées comme le pose Platon soit de l'Intellect Agent comme l'affirme Avicenne et que les agents naturels disposent seulement la matière à la forme (*De virtutibus in communi*, a. 8, c.).

Ailleurs (dans *Summa contra Gentiles*, 2, 74), s. Thomas montre qu'au fond la position d'Avicenne se ramène à celle de Platon car "il n'y a pas de différence entre recevoir la science d'une seule intelligence séparée ou de plusieurs; dans les deux cas cela revient à dire que notre science n'est pas basée sur les données sensibles, ce qui va contre l'expérience; celle-ci montre que celui qui est privé d'un sens est également privé de la science qui correspond à ce sens."

S. Thomas va plus loin: il trouve que la position de Platon est plus logique avec ses prémisses quand il affirme que la connaissance est d'autant plus profonde que l'âme s'éloigne davantage du sensible tandis qu'Avicenne voudrait que plus on retourne aux phantasmes corporels plus on se dispose à recevoir l'influence de l'intellect séparé (Cf. *Summa contra Gentiles*, 2, 74).

Par ailleurs, s. Thomas repousse la théorie avicennienne de l'intellect agent séparé comme s'opposant à l'enseignement religieux: "sequitur aliquid fidei nostra repugnans" (*Q. disp. De Anima*, a. 5, c) et à l'expérience: celle-ci montre que chaque homme peut, quand il veut, abstraire l'universel du particulier et donc le principe qui est à la base de cette abstraction lui est propre (ibid. et *Q. disp. De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 10, c; *Summa theol.* 1, 79, 4, obj. 4 et Resp.).

2. *La création médiate*

Que la théorie de l'intellect agent séparé aille contre la foi vient de ce que la source de notre illumination est aussi la source de notre béatitude. Et pour la même raison s. Thomas repoussera avec force la théorie avicennienne de la création par intermédiaires car la béatitude de l'homme consiste à rejoindre son principe. A plusieurs reprises s. Thomas réfute cette création médiate par l'intermédiaire des anges,

basée sur le principe que de l'Un ne peut venir que l'un. Il montre qu'une telle doctrine: a) mène à l'idolâtrie (2 *Sent.* d. 1, a. 3; d. 18, q. 2, a. 2; 4 *Sent.* q. 1, a. 3, ql. 3; *Contra Gentiles*, 2, 120; *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 4). b) Elle est logiquement liée à des erreurs touchant à la fin de l'homme (2 *Sent.* d. 18, q. 2, a. 2). c) Elle est liée à des erreurs concernant le rôle des anges dans le plan providentiel et leur action sur les volontés humaines (*De veritate*, q. 22, a. 9; q. 5, a. 10). d) Elle porte atteinte à la toute-puissance divine: l'action de Dieu se trouve déterminée à un premier effet unique selon un mode nécessaire (*Contra Gentiles*, 2, 21-22; 1 *Sent.* d. 43, q. 2, a. 1).

3. *La création nécessaire*

Une des affirmations essentielles de la révélation est l'infinie liberté de Dieu. Aussi le déroulement nécessaire du monde à partir de Dieu ne pouvait être accepté d'aucune manière par s. Thomas et il multiplie les arguments pour montrer qu'on ne peut assigner aucune nécessité à cette création: nécessité de nature, de volonté, de justice ou nécessité de science (*De potentia,* q. 3, a. 15). Bien qu'Avicenne ne soit pas visé dans cette dernière réfutation, il n'y a pas cependant de doute que ce soit lui qui est visé. En effet, s. Thomas parle de l'erreur de certains philosophes affirmant "ex hoc quod Deus intelligit, fluit ab eo ipso de necessitate talis rerum dispositio" (*Contra Gentiles*, 2, 26), et donne cinq arguments pour la réfuter, basés principalement sur la toute-puissance divine.

4. *La création éternelle*

Concernant l'éternité du monde, la position de s. Thomas a été toujours très nette. Pour lui le commencement du monde dans le temps est un fait que l'on ne connaît que par la foi. La raison démontre la relation de création qui relie le monde à Dieu mais elle est impuissante à elle seule de démontrer ni que le monde a commencé ni qu'il est éternel. Le Docteur Angélique a recueilli toutes les objections soulevées par les partisans ou les adversaires de l'éternité du monde et il a montré que ni les unes ni les autres n'avaient de valeur apodictique (2 *Sent.* d. 1, q. 1, a. 5, obj. 7 et 12).

Parmi les objections soulevées par les partisans de l'éternité contre un monde ayant commencé dans le temps, certaines sont dues à Avicenne, en particulier celle qui est basée sur la relation nécessaire de l'effet avec la cause efficiente. S. Thomas montre que la cause peut être naturelle ou volontaire (*De potentia*, q. 3, a. 17, ad 4).

5. *Négation du libre-arbitre*

S. Thomas reproche à la théorie avicennienne de l'émanation nécessaire d'aboutir à la négation du libre-arbitre chez l'homme. En effet pour Avicenne, de même que les mouvements des corps sont déterminés par les mouvements des corps célestes, de même les mouvements de leur âme de sorte que notre volonté se trouve causée par la volonté de l'âme céleste. Théorie qui "est absolument fausse" (*omnino falsum*), affirme s. Thomas et qui, de plus, va à l'encontre de la foi chrétienne pour qui Dieu, qui est la fin immédiate de la vie humaine, est aussi celui qui meut librement notre volonté (cf. *De veritate*, q. 5, a. 10; q. 22, a. 9, c; 2 *Sent.* d. 15, q. 1, a. 3, c; *Contra Gentiles*, 3, 87).

6. *La négation de la résurrection des corps*

S. Thomas rapporte dans les *Sentences* (4 *Sent.* d. 44, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 1) l'opinion de certains philosophes dont Avicenne, qui ne croient pas à la résurrection des corps et interprètent métaphoriquement les peines de l'âme. Il rejette cette opinion (cf. également *De veritate*, q. 26, a. 1, c.).[31]

7. *La prophétie naturelle*

Pour s. Thomas, la prophétie proprement dite, prise au sens large (synonyme de révélation divine) soit au sens strict (préconnaissance des futurs contingents) ne peut venir que de Dieu. Elle est surnaturelle et ne requiert aucune disposition ou qualité préalable dans le sujet (accord de la théologie chrétienne avec le kalâm musulman contre les Falâsifa).[32] Quant à la "prophétie naturelle," elle consiste dans la connaissance des choses non par elles-mêmes mais dans leurs causes; l'homme peut l'acquérir par voie expérimentale, elle est à la mesure de "la perfection de la vertu imaginative et de la clarté de l'intelligence" (*Summa theol.* 2-2, 172, 1 et 3). Mais c'est une prophétie improprement dite, elle n'est qu'une similitude déficiente de la prophétie proprement dite.

8. *Connaissance des singuliers par Dieu*

Voici comment s. Thomas expose et réfute la position d'Avicenne sur ce point:

> Certains, comme Avicenne (*Metaph.* 8, ch. 6 vers le milieu) et ces disciples, soutiennent que Dieu connaît chacun des singuliers d'une ma-

31 Cf. notre article, basé sur la *Risâla al-aḍḥawiyya* d'Avicenne, "Un cas typique de l'ésotérisme avicennien: sa doctrine de la résurrection des corps," *Revue du Caire* (1951) 68-94. Depuis ce traité a été édité critiquement et traduit (en italien): Avicenne, *Epistola sulla vita futura* (Padova 1969), par F. Lucchetta.

32 Cf. F. Rahman, *Prophecy in Islam* (London 1958), et L. Gardet, *La pensée religieuse d'Avicenne* (Paris 1951), ch. 4: Le prophétisme et les vérités religieuses.

nière universelle (*quasi in universali*), du moment qu'il connaît toutes les causes universelles desquelles est produit le singulier, comme si un astronome, s'il connaissait tous les mouvements du ciel et les distances des corps célestes, connaîtrait toute éclipse qui se produirait jusqu'à cent ans. Mais il ne les connaîtrait pas en tant qu'elles sont singulières comme s'il les savait être maintenant ou ne pas être. C'est de cette manière qu'ils ont posé que Dieu connaissait les singuliers non comme s'il regardait leur nature singulière mais par la position des causes universelles.

Mais cette position n'est pas soutenable parce qu'à partir des causes universelles, il ne résulte que des formes universelles s'il n'y a pas quelque chose qui vient individuer les formes. Or quel que soit le nombre des formes universelles réunies ensemble, elles ne constitueront jamais un singulier parce que cette collection de formes peut être intelligée comme existant dans plusieurs ... L'effet universel est proportionné à la cause universelle, l'effet particulier à la cause particulière. (2 *Sent.* d. 3, q. 2, a. 3: 1 *Sent.*, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1; d. 38, q. 1, a. 3; *De veritate,* q. 8, a. 11).

9. *L'unité de la substance concrète et le caractère accidentel de l'existence*

Il reste deux points sur lesquels s. Thomas a constamment fait porter sa critique. A première vue ils peuvent paraître d'importance secondaire mais ils correspondent en fait à des positions entièrement différentes concernant le fondement de la métaphysique.

Le premier est celui de l'unité de la substance concrète. Certains, dit s. Thomas, ont cru que l'un qui se convertit avec l'être est identique à l'un principe du nombre. A partir de là deux erreurs contraires ont pris naissance: Pythagore et Platon voyant que l'un qui se convertit avec l'être n'ajoute rien à celui-ci mais exprime la substance de l'être en tant qu'elle est indivise, s'imaginèrent qu'il en était de même de l'un principe du nombre. Et comme le nombre est composé d'unités, ils pensèrent que les nombres étaient les substances de tous les êtres.

Dans un sens contraire, poursuit s. Thomas, Avicenne, considérant que l'un principe du nombre ajoutait quelque chose à la substance (autrement le nombre composé d'unités ne serait pas une espèce de quantité), crut que l'un qui se convertit avec l'être ajoute quelque chose à la substance de l'être comme le blanc à l'homme. Ce qui, ajoute s. Thomas, est manifestement faux. Car si une chose était une par quelque chose de surajouté à celle de l'être, il faudrait que cette nature accidentelle surajoutée à l'être soit une à son tour, et si elle ne l'est pas par elle-même, on est obligé de reculer jusqu'à l'infini. Aussi faut-il s'arrêter au premier (*Summa theol.* 1, 11, 1, ad 1).[33]

33 Cf. T. O'Shaughnessy, "St. Thomas and Avicenna on the Nature of the One", *Gregorianum*

L'autre point important reproché à Avicenne c'est celui de l'accidentalité de l'existence par rapport à l'essence.[34] Que l'essence soit distincte de l'existence dans tout être autre que Dieu, s. Thomas l'admet et ce sera même une des positions centrales de sa métaphysique. Il dira même que l'*esse est adveniens extra* (*De ente et essentia*, 4, p. 34), mais cela "ne signifie pas ici que l'exister s'ajoute du dehors à l'essence, comme ferait un accident, mais qu'il lui vient d'une cause efficiente transcendante à l'essence, donc extérieure à elle, qui est Dieu."[35]

C'est en partant de l'essence qu'Avicenne aboutit forcément à considérer l'*esse* qui l'affecte comme un accident. S. Thomas, au contraire, part de l'être existant et il fait de l'*esse* ce qu'il y a de plus intime et de plus profond dans cet être; le rapport de l'*esse* à l'essence n'est pas le rapport de deux entités du même ordre, d'un accident à une substance, même d'un point de vue logique, mais le rapport d'acte à puissance. Les deux points de vue sont entièrement différents. "Entre l'extrinsécisme avicennien de l'acte d'être," dit M. Gilson, "et l'intrinsécisme thomiste de l'acte d'être, aucune conciliation n'est possible. On ne passe pas de l'un à l'autre par voie d'évolution mais de révolution."[36]

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
Cette affirmation de M. Gilson, que nous faisons entièrement nôtre, va nous permettre de conclure en quelques mots notre brève étude. S. Thomas s'est profondément assimilé la *Métaphysique* d'Avicenne. Il en a retenu comme valables certains éléments, certaines distinctions qui, au besoin rectifiées, lui ont permis de mettre au point maint outillage conceptuel. Nous avons signalé plus haut cet apport. Mais la façon vigoureuse dont il a réagi contre "l'essentialisme" avicennien et a repoussé son émanatisme déchéant et ses conséquences: création éternelle, nécessaire et par intermédiaires, non-connaissance par Dieu des singuliers, extrinsécisme de la causalité et de l'existence, montre que d'aucune manière on ne peut qualifier d'avicennienne la synthèse théologique thomiste.

41 (1960) 665-679. "It may have been that St. Thomas in attributing such teaching to Avicenna was using his name as a convenient label to designate a class of doctrines that made the one univocal....It is likely too that certain errors in Gundissalinus' Latin translation of the *Shifâ'* from which Thomas drew his information about Avicenna's doctrine, confirmed his opinion of the Arabian's teaching on the nature of the one". Ibid. 678.

34 Cf. T. O'Shaughnessy, "St. Thomas' Changing Estimate of Avicenna's Teaching on Existence as an Accident," *The Modern Schoolman* 36 (1958-59) 245-260.

35 E. Gilson, *Le thomisme*, 6e éd. (Paris 1965), p. 180, n. 61.

36 Ibid., p. 181.



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MOTION IN A VOID: AQUINAS AND AVERROES

James A. Weisheipl O.P.

THE concept of the void has attracted the attention of philosophers and scientists since pre-Socratic times. There are, however, a number of aspects of the void that should be distinguished before discussing the particular one we are concerned with in this paper. One generic category for the concept of the void is some kind of space or "place in which there is nothing."[1] On the Aristotelian hypothesis that every body is either heavy or light, one might concretize the definition of the void in the phrase "that in which there is nothing heavy or light."[2] Aristotle has very little to say about space, but he devotes five chapters to the nature of "place" and four to the concept of the "void." The notion of place is a very complex one, involving both the innermost boundary of the containing body and the formal immobility of the containing body itself, so that bodies can be said to move in and out of places. It can be defined as "the innermost (immoveable) boundary of the container."[3] Place thus involves a qualitative environmental container that is somehow immobile relative to the system of the universe. While the qualitative environmental container is sufficient to explain the natural movement of bodies for Aristotle, the quantitative immobility of the container need not be taken as something absolute, as I have tried to show elsewhere.[4] For Aristotle the whole universe is a plenum. Therefore a void would be some kind of place devoid of every body. A *locus sine corpore locato* is not a contradiction in terms, as E. J. Dijksterhuis would have us believe,[5] but an attempt to define and circumscribe the notion of void.

P. H. Wickstead and F. M. Cornford are undoubtedly correct when they say that *κενόν* (void) comes nearer to our "space" than *τόπος*

1 Arist., *Phys.*, IV, 7, 213 b 32-33.
2 Ibid., 214 a 4-5.
3 *Phys.*, IV, 4, 212 a 20-21.
4 *Nature and Gravitation* (River Forest, Ill. 1955) pp. 74-76.
5 *The Mechanization of the World Picture* (Oxford 1961) p. 39.

(place).[6] Space, as such, denotes essentially some kind of dimensionality. This dimensionality can be real and physical, as when we give the extension between two bodies and there is real quantity belonging to another body between them. This is one common usage in all measurements. These dimensions are quantities belonging to the intervening body, but for practical purposes they can be temporarily disregarded. In other words, the intervening dimensions or quantity are not relevant to the case. We simply want to know the space available or the distance to be covered. Even if there were no intervening body with its proper dimensions, we would still speak of dimensions. Thus dimensionality, as such, abstracts from the question whether or not there is a real accident of quantity belonging to any body. Further, there is mathematical space, which is nothing more than a geometrical description of a situation in reference to determined coordinates. In Euclidean geometry there is nothing between a point, line, or figure, and the coordinates. While we do not speak of mathematical space as a void, because there is no advantage is doing so, it can nevertheless suggest the nature of emptiness, non-being, the void. Finally, there is imaginative space, a kind of mental framework, within which objects of imagination are placed. Immanuel Kant was so struck by the natural inevitability of some spatial dimensionality that he thought it must be an a priori condition of the human mind, a condition which makes experience possible. This framework or screen is a kind of absolute space, much like Plato's "matter" or "winnowing basket" within which, or against which, we project images, including mathematical points, lines, and figures. When we speak of "space" beyond the universe, whether this be the Aristotelian universe or our present collection of gallaxies, the kind of space that is required by human philosophy is nothing more than a *quid imaginativum.*[7]

By "void" in this paper we mean an empty space existing outside the mind, a space that has absolutely nothing in it. Even the term "nothing" is to be taken strictly as meaning no objective reality whatever, neither being, nor force, nor resistance. When we ask the more sophisticated question whether there could be a motion of a real body through a void, we grant the existence of such a void as an hypothesis. We wish to know whether there would be movement of a natural body through such a void, if one did exist.

6 *Aristotle, The Physics*, Loeb ed. (London 1963) I, 271.

7 St. Thomas, *In III Phys.*, lect. 7, n. 6; see J. A. Weisheipl, "Space and Gravitation," *The New Scholasticism*, 29 (1955) 175-223.

The question was a serious one in Greek antiquity and it aroused considerable discussion in the Middle Ages, as we shall see. The question is also of interest to modern historians of science, who see in the medieval position on this question one of the fundamental obstacles to the rise of the new physics of the seventeenth century. Anneliese Maier in particular maintains that the universal teaching on the question of motion in a void involved a major obstacle to the rise of modern science. In her paper of 1960[8] she noted that two basic medieval hypotheses may be singled out as the most significant and the most fatal for the birth of classical physics.

The first of these[9] is the theorem that qualities, as such, are independent factors with their own laws in natural processes, quite distinct from quantitative factors. That is, as "intensive magnitudes" they are only parallel to extensive and quantitative magnitudes, presumably susceptible to mathematical treatment, but were not. This aspect of Anneliese Maier's hypothesis will not be considered in this paper.

The second is much more important and relevant to the problem with which we are concerned.[10] Since "omne quod movetur ab alio movetur," according to A. Maier every movement requires a particular mover bound to it and generating motion directly. Moreover, every normal movement of a successive nature requires, over and above the mover, a resistance that opposes the moving force and is overcome by that force, for without resistance there would be no motion (*motus*), but change (*mutatio*), that is, an instantaneous change of place.[11]

This second theorem of the so-called Scholastics is highly complex. Each part must be considered before the implications of the whole can be fully understood. The first part is "Omne quod movetur ab aliquo movetur": every movement requires a particular mover bound to it and generating motion directly. I have presented my views on this point in *Isis* some years ago.[12] Briefly, I argued that practically all historians, and many philosophers interested in medieval thought, have mistranslated and misunderstood the Latin phrase. It does not mean, and never

8 "Ergebnisse der Spätscholastischen Naturphilosophie," *Scholastik*, 35 (1960) 161-187.

9 Ibid., 169-170.

10 Ibid., 170.

11 "Das andere Prinzip ist der Satz 'Omne quod movetur ab aliquo movetur': jede Bewegung erfordert einen partikulären, mit ihr verbundenen und sie unmittelbar erzeugenden Beweger; und jede normal, sukzessiv sich vollziehende Bewegung erfordert überdies einen Widerstand, der sich der vis motrix entgegensetzt und von ihr überwunden wird; denn ohne Widerstand würde sich kein *motus*, sondern eine *mutatio*, d. h. eine in instanti erfolgende Ortsveränderung ergeben." loc. cit.

12 "The Principle *Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur* in Medieval Physics," *Isis*, 56 (1965) 26-45.

did mean, that everything here and now moving needs a mover; for Aristotle this is true only of violent motion. This principle was formulated in antiquity, particularly by Aristotle, as applicable to passive principles of motion. Today it is largely a question of bad grammar, turning the Greek middle or passive voice and the Latin passive into a vernacular active. Even Averroes was misled by the Arabic rendering of the Aristotelian principle, and it was upon this that he built his own natural philosophy. Whatever is to be said of the Arabic formulation, it is not the meaning in Latin or for the Latin Scholastics. St. Thomas Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, and even Siger of Brabant, an ardent Averroist, saw the predicament this would lead to and opposed the Averroist view, but they had few followers in a detail such as this. Ockham also dismissed the necessity of the scholastic principle, but for very different reasons. We must remember that in the fourteenth century there were at least five different philosophical schools: the Averroists, the Thomists, the Scotists, the Nominalists, and a variety of eclectics defending Platonic and Augustinian elements. Therefore care must be taken when speaking of "Scholastic Physics" in the Middle Ages. We must be especially careful not to fall into the Averroist error of thinking that Aristotle was god and that Averroes was his prophet.

In this paper I should like to consider the other elements in Anneliese Maier's "most important and most fatal" hypothesis of the Scholastics: (1) that all motion properly so-called requires a resistance which opposes the moving force, (2) that without resistance there would be no motion (*motus*), strictly so-called, but only change (*mutatio*), and (3) that without resistance, such as in a void, there could be only instantaneous change, that is, without time. Miss Maier goes on to say that "these principles hold for every local motion, inertial movement as it was called later, as well as others that flow from local motion... and which one and all stand in contradiction to classical physics."[13] For A. Maier, as for Averroes before her, motion in a void would be motion without resistance, and therefore it cannot possibly exist. The crucial point for Maier and for Averroes is that resistance is essential to the possibility of motion; without resistance, as would be the case of motion in a void, there cannot be any motion (*motus*, *κίνησις*) at all.

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13 Loc. cit. 170.

The problem of motion in a void and, indeed, the existence of a void itself, goes back to the dilemma raised by Parmenides, who insisted that only what *is* can be real; whatever does not exist cannot be real.[14] However, a void seems to exist between bodies of whatever kind and between numbers; therefore it would seem that the void is real. But by definition a void is "that which does not exist"; therefore bodies cannot be separated by a void, since a void is non-being and cannot exist. Separation, for Parmenides, is only an illusion. Moreover, local motion also seems to require a void, for bodies can move only into places devoid of bodies. However, since the void is non-being and cannot exist, neither can local motion exist. More important, there cannot be γένεσις or coming-into-being, for every "coming into being" must come from something or nothing. If it comes from something, then it already exists; if it comes from nothing, then it can never begin, for nothing does not exist. Latin philosophers and historians pose the dilemma of Parmenides very simply: a being cannot come into being from nothing, for *ex nihilo nihil fit*; and it cannot come from something already existing, for *quod est, non fit.* Consequently all motion and change is logically impossible; what appears to be multiplicity and movement is only an illusion. They belong to the way of "seeming," or "opinion." The way of "truth" declares that all being exists as one and immobile.[15]

The first serious response to the dilemma of Parmenides came from the Atomists, Leucippus and Democritus. They conceded that real being, ultimate being, namely the atoms, could not be generated or annihilated. However, by making one simple alteration in the philosophy of Parmenides, the appearance of change and motion — even the multiplicity of being — could be preserved. That one simple alteration was the admission that non-being, the void, was just as real as being itself. If this were granted, there could be a multiplicity of atoms, constructs from atoms, and numbers. More important, the possibility of motion — at least local motion — could be preserved.[16] But as for the atoms themselves, they were as ungenerable and indestructible as the single Being of Parmenides.

Even the demonstration by Anaxagoras that air is a body did not deter the Atomists, because even air had to be considered a body insufficient to constitute a void. The Atomists could explain all kinds of motion without admitting the generability of atoms. In other words,

14 *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. H. Diels (7th ed. with additions by W. Kranz) frag. 7-8.

15 See Kirk & Raven, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (Cambridge Univ. Press 1957) 277-282.

16 Ibid. 404-409.

atoms themselves could not be generated or corrupted. The void within bodies could explain condensation and rarefaction, while a void outside bodies could explain local motion, growth, alteration, birth and death. This solution was an alluring one to physicists and to metaphysicians. Even Aristotle commended Democritus for his method and for having brought the study of physics back to respectability.[17] We must remember that for the Atomists the void was not only a condition of motion, but the very cause of motion. It is not a question of whether some vacua exist in the universe, or whether man can produce a vacuum. It is a question of whether the movements we see in the universe are to be explained in terms of bodies and the void. It is not even a question of "nature abhorring a vacuum," or whether the void outside the entire universe is real or not. For Leucippus and Democritus it was simply whether the movements evident in the universe must be explained by postulating a void. "In the acceptance of void (Leucippus) was consciously correcting an Eleatic axiom."[18] "At the same time Leucippus remained faithful to the principles of his probably Ionian background."[19]

Aristotle took the view of the Atomists seriously, even though he deals specifically with the void in only four chapters of his *Physics*, Bk.IV, cc.6-9. His arguments are not always demonstrative. Dealing with the void, he arrives at different conclusions; many are simply arguments contradicting the hypothesis of a void. Because of the complexity of these chapters, many readers of Aristotle have been misled by the apparent variety of conclusions. While Aristotle was aware of the Atomists throughout his works, notably the *Physics* and *De generatione*, we are concerned only with the difficult chapters of Bk.IV, cc.6-9.

After discussing the nature of place (τόπος) in the Fourth Book of the *Physics*, Aristotle turns to the void (κενόν), and says, "The investigation of similar questions about the void, also, must be held to belong to the physicist — namely whether it exists or not, and how it exists or what it is — just as about place" (213 a 11-13). The entire four chapters, 6 to 9, are a kind of disputation in which arguments are given for and against the existence of a void, and finally the limited sense in which it can be said to exist. In the sixth chapter he lists the three previous arguments from the Atomists and two additional arguments from the Pythagoreans, namely, that there must be a void in the heavens to separate the stars, and that there must be a void between numbers to

17 Arist., *De gen. et corrup.* 1, 2. 315 a 34-315 b 32; cf. 316 a 14-15; 324 b 35-325 a 2.
18 Kirk & Raven, op. cit. 406.
19 Ibid.

keep them distinct. In the seventh chapter, where he tries to determine the exact meaning of the void, he shows that there is often a confusion between place and void, "void" often serving the function of "space" and "place." In essence, a void is a place devoid of any body whatever (213 b 30-214 a 6).

In a lengthy chapter 8, Aristotle refutes the notion of the void as existing separate from body, using six different arguments leading to different immediate conclusions, but all leading up to the general conclusion that there can be no motion in a void. The first argument (214 b 13-35) considers the vacuum as undifferentiated space. If a natural body were placed in it, the body could not move, for there are no directions. Second (215 a 1-13), if there is no natural motion there can be no unnatural or violent motion. Third (215 a 13-18), if there is no medium, as is required for violent motion, there can be no violent motion. Fourth (215 a 19-23), the void is completely undifferentiated; there is no "up" or "down," and therefore there cannot be motion, but eternal rest, or, if a body were put into motion, it would continue *ad infinitum* until stopped by a weightier body. Fifth (215 a 23-24), the void is postulated because it yields to bodies, but this quality is equally present in every direction; therefore it would have to move in all directions at once, and consequently it would not move at all. Finally (215 a 24-216 a 8), between any two movements there must be a ratio between any two times, as long as both are finite; but there is no ratio of void to full. In other words there is no ratio between zero and any number. Therefore motion would be instantaneous, and hence impossible. Concluding this section, Aristotle says "These are the consequences that result from a difference in media" (216 a 12).

It is relatively clear what might happen according to Aristotle if the motion of bodies had to be explained by a void instead of by natural place. A variety of things might happen, but it would not be the motion we know bodies to have in the world we live in. First, there could be no natural motion of certain bodies "up" and other bodies "down," for in a void there are no preferential environments towards which different bodies are wont to move. Second, there could be no "violent" or compulsory motion, for this presupposes that it is "natural" for light bodies to move up and heavy bodies to move down. Third, in Aristotle's view and in that of Plato, all violent or non-natural motion must be explained in terms of some "medium" as the extrinsic instrumental cause of continued motion.[20] Fourth, a body might be eternally at rest unless

20 For a fuller explanation of this, see J. A. Weisheipl, "Natural and Compulsory Movement," *The New Scholasticism,* 29 (1955) 50-61.

moved by something already in motion, or a body in motion would go on *ad infinitum* in a straight line unless a more powerful body stopped or deflected it. Fifth, there might be no motion at all, or in every direction at once, for the void is equally susceptible to motion in all directions. Sixth, there might be instantaneous motion, which is not true motion at all because there is no medium to be divided, and between zero and any number there must be a ratio such that $S = 1/0$, where S is the speed and the divider is zero, as in the absence of any medium. For Aristotle, all of these arguments, or perhaps any one of them, is sufficient to show that natural motions in the universe cannot be explained by postulating a void distinct from bodies, as the Atomists contend.

In chapter 9, Aristotle considers briefly the interstices in bodies as voids, e.g., when one body absorbs another and when one body expands and occupies more room. If there were no vacuum within bodies, the Atomists say, there could be no contraction and expansion. But if there were no contraction and expansion, either there would be no movement of this kind, such as we see taking place, or the universe would bulge, as Xuthus, the Pythagorean of Croton, said, or air and water must always change into equal amounts. For example, if air has been made out of a cupful of water, then conversely out of an equal amount of air a cupful of water must have been made — or there must be a void within bodies. There is no other way — so the argument of the Atomists goes — for compression and expansion to take place. There are four possibilities, and three of them are absurd; therefore compression and expansion must be explained in terms of a void existing within bodies.

Aristotle answers this briefly. The Atomists want to place little void spaces within the interstices of bodies. But if nothing moves in a void separate from bodies, neither can anything move in the interstices. Aristotle goes on to state his own doctrine of condensation and rarefaction, based on the doctrine of potency and act, which was not considered by the Atomists. "Our statement is based on the assumption that there is a single matter for contraries, hot and cold and other natural contrarieties, and that what exists actually is produced from a potential existent (*ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν γίνεται*), and that matter is not separable from the contraries but its being is different, and that a single matter may serve for color and heat and cold" (217 a 22-26). This is Aristotle's own doctrine of alteration, one type of which is condensation and rarefaction, or compression and expansion. Therefore, there is no void outside of bodies or within them, unless one wishes to call the *potential* a void. In this case, the matter of the heavy body is "void" with respect to the natural place downward, just as the matter of light bodies is "void" with respect to their natural place upward. Thus,

in locomotion the void is the potential element in the body that needs to be fulfilled. Alteration, on the other hand, has to do with passivity and impassivity, which permit or resist change (217 b 23-27). In this case passivity could be called a void. Aristotle concludes, "So much, then, for the discussion of the void, and of the sense in which it exists and the sense in which it does not exist" (217 b 27-28). Since neither the Atomists nor anyone else use the term "void" to designate the potential principle in moving bodies, it must be said that Aristotle denies the need for postulating a void to explain motion.

Are we to say, then, that Aristotle denies the possibility of motion in a void outside the context of the arguments presented?

The most devastating argument of the Atomists, and the one Aristotle spends most time on, is the sixth one presented above. He seems to argue from the necessity of some resisting medium not only to show that differentiation of speed arises from differentiation of the medium, but also to the absolute necessity of some resisting medium for the possibility of motion at all. His stated principle is that between any two movements there must be a ratio of times (216 a 9); in the absence of a medium "there is no ratio of void to full" (216 a 11). Therefore, the commentators concluded, in a void motion would be instantaneous, for the body would have to be in position A and in position B at the same time, *in instanti*. Aristotle does not say explicitly that motion in a void would be instantaneous, but it is the only conslusion one can draw from his premises.

Most commentators have taken this to be Aristotle's personal position, forgetting that he is arguing from the premises of the Atomists. Thus David Ross says, "(Aristotle) has been misled by thinking of velocity as essentially the overcoming of resistance and not as the traversing of a certain distance in a certain time."[21] E. J. Dijksterhuis also understands this to be Aristotle's personal opinion: "In a void there would be no resistance to motion, and thus, in view of the inverse proportion between the velocity and the density of the medium, the fall would have to proceed instantaneously, i.e., the falling body would have to reach the end-point at the same moment at which the fall starts."[22] For Dijksterhuis, this and the other arguments are "emotional rather than logical in character, an expression of self-assertion rather than a refutation."[23] A. C. Crombie states that "Aristotle's 'law' (that $V = P/R$) expressed his belief that any increase

21 *Aristotle's Physics* (Oxford 1936) 61.
22 *The Mechanization of the World Picture* (Oxford 1961) 40.
23 Ibid.

in velocity in a given medium could be produced only by an increase in motive power. It also followed from the 'law' that in a void bodies would fall with instantaneous velocity; as he regarded this conclusion as absurd, he used it as an argument against the possibility of a void."[24] In like manner all the modern exegetes of Aristotle's arguments against the void presume that the content of each argument, particularly the sixth, is an expression of Aristotle's own doctrine. The number of medieval and modern exegetes who interpret Aristotle in this way is too numerous to list here. They credit Aristotle with the formula $V = F/R$, maintaining that resistance is essential for all motion in such a way that if $R = O$, then motion must be instantaneous.

More attentive exegetes are careful to point out that in the passage on the void Aristotle argues from the position of the Atomists to intrinsic absurdities. Thus, for the Atomists, the void is postulated as the sole source of motion, while for Aristotle the *natural body itself* is the principle of motion and rest; all that is needed is a place to go, namely natural place. After discussing the sixth argument at great length, St. Thomas says, "And so it is better and simpler to say that the argument induced by Aristotle is an argument to contradict a position taken (*ratio ad contradicendum positioni*), and not a demonstrative argument strictly speaking (*simpliciter*)."[25] Those who postulate a void do so that motion would be possible, and so according to them the cause of motion arises on the part of the medium that permits motion. Consequently Aristotle argues against them "as though the whole cause of swiftness and slowness were on the part of the medium."[26] But if "nature" is the cause of velocity, as Aristotle firmly believes, then there is no need to postulate the void. However, Aristotle makes no mention of his own doctrine in this argument, as he does in the first, second, and third, namely the distinction between "natural" and "violent" motion. All that he is saying in the sixth argument is that, if the void is the whole cause of motion and its velocity, then in a void there would be no way to account for obviously different ratios of velocity through it; with the reason for slowness gone, there could be only instantaneous velocity, which is not *motus*. In other words, Aristotle would not admit that the void or the medium is the whole cause of motion. Rather, the cause of motion is the nature of the body itself, moving through some medium that must be divided over some distance in a given time. This is the only interpretation consistent with Aristotle's teaching throughout the

24 *Medieval and Early Modern Science* (New York 1959) II, 48-49.
25 *In IV Phys.*, lect. 12, n. 10.
26 Ibid.

Physics. For him, all natural bodies contain within themselves the principle of motion and rest, i.e., φύσις; the medium can only resist or assist in the traversal of distance in a given time. Since in the sixth argument Aristotle makes no mention of the nature in bodies as the cause of motion, it cannot be taken as an expression of his own doctrine, but only as an argument "to contradict the position" of his adversaries.

In late antiquity John Philoponus (fl. 480-547) objected to Aristotle's sixth argument precisely on the grounds that speed is proportional to the weight of the body, and that the function of a resisting medium is only to retard the body's motion, thereby allowing the possibility of motion in a void.[27] While Philoponus considers this to be contrary to Aristotle's position, it is in fact a principle of Aristotle's own doctrine that he is defending.

In a relatively long comment on text 71 (= 215 a 25-b 20) of *Physics*, Book IV devoted to this matter, the Spanish Moslem, Averroes (1126-1198), preserves an objection of Ibn-Badja (d. 1138), another Spanish Moslem, known to the Christians as Avempace. Ibn-Badja's contention that Aristotle's argument is "false" is based on time and the divisibility of all motion: Aristotelian notions used show that the sixth argument will not hold good on Aristotelian grounds.[28]

Avempace, contends that every motion has a determined natural velocity by virtue of a proportion between the body itself and the cause that generated it. By removing all additional resistances, such as that produced by the medium and friction, there is still left a natural body capable of moving in a natural time. In the Seventh Book of his *Physics* commentary, according to Averroes (*Phys.* IV, comm. 71), Avempace proves this by a visible example and by a rational argument: 1) we see every day that the celestial bodies, whose motion is in no way impeded by resistance, move with a definite velocity according to a definite time, 2) the distance over which all bodies must traverse is divided by *prius* and *posterius*, before and after, from which it follows that motion takes place not in an instant, but in a determined time. It is true, Avempace

27 See relevant section in M. R. Cohen and I. Drabkin, *A Source Book in Greek Science* (Cambridge 1958) 217-221; Edward Grant, "Motion in a Void and the Principle of Inertia in the Middle Ages," *Isis*, 55 (1964) 266.

28 The text of Averroes used in this paper is that of the *editio princeps*, Padua 1472, containing the medieval translation of both Aristotle and Averroes. However, this edition has no foliation. For recent discussion of the opposition between Averroes and Avempace, see Pierre Duhem, "Le vide et le mouvement dans le vide," in *Le Système du Monde*, 10 vols. (Paris 1913-1959) 8, 7-120; Avempace is discussed on pp. 10-16. E. A. Moody, "Galileo and Avempace," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 12 (1951) 163-193, 375-422; abbreviated in *Roots of Scientific Thought*, ed. P. P. Wiener & A. Noland (New York 1957) 176-206. Edward Grant, "Motion in the Void and the Principle of Inertia in the Middle Ages," *Isis*, 55 (1964) 265-292.

says, that one can substract "accidental impediments" such as a medium. But it does not thereby follow that the proportion between speeds of motion is like the proportion of one impediment to another, so that if there is no resisting medium, the motion would be without time, but rather like the proportion of one slowness (or velocity) to the slowness of the other. In other words, there would still be a proportion between the velocity of one body with an "accidental impediment" to another body with no accidental impediment, because their times are proportionate. Thus, for Avempace, all impediments are to be subtracted from the natural velocity of the body; and when all are subtracted, as in a void, there is still left a body moving with natural velocity. Moody expresses this in the modern formula: $V = P\text{-}M$.[29] Hence a resisting medium is not at all necessary for motion. At this point we come into conflict with Averroes' entire doctrine of motion and his opposition to Ibn Badja.

Basic to Averroes' concept of motion is the medium. According to Averroes, for all free fall of heavy bodies there must be not only the natural mover (*movens*, or *motor*) attached to the body and generating motion, but there must also be a resisting medium to help the movement downward. The same holds true of light motion upward; there must be a mover moving the body upward and a resisting medium to help it climb. In other words, every body moving must have a mover conjoined to the body, a *motor conjunctus*, here and now moving it. But Averroes knew perfectly well that he could not say that the "form," or mover, *per se* moves the body, for this would be to describe a living body. Living things move themselves *per se* by parts, the living soul being the efficient cause of these parts moving one another. Averroes' ingenious explanation was that the "form," or mover, in inanimate things *per se* moves the resisting medium, which in turn moves the matter. Thus, for Averroes, the substantial form of the body moves the matter only *per accidens* by means of the resisting medium.[30] By allowing form to act in its own right on the resisting medium, instead of acting directly on the matter, Averroes preserves the important distinction between living and non-living movement.

Basically Averroes' doctrine of motion rests on a complete dichotomy between matter and form, body and soul, moved and mover, in a given composite. He believes that form in inanimate bodies can act as a true *efficient* cause of its own motion, instead of being simply an active prin-

29 Op. cit., 186.
30 Averroes, *De caelo*, III, comm. 28; cf. St. Thomas, *In III De caelo et mundo*, lect. 7, nn. 8-9; J. A. Weisheipl, "The Principle *Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur* in Medieval Physics," *Isis*, 56 (1965) 26-45.

ciple of natural motions.[31] "Motor est forma et res mota est materia."[32] Such a dichotomy between matter and form is much more than Aristotle would allow between two intrinsic principles of a natural substance that is an *unum per se*. Nevertheless, for Averroes the resistance to motion is an absolutely essential element in every motion. Without resistance there can be no motion.

Averroes gives a lengthy answer to Avempace's argument in favor of natural velocity even in a void. For Averroes, resistance can arise from three sources. First, it can arise from the *position* of the mobile body which is to be moved to another place; in this case resistance arises from the body to be moved. Second, it can arise from the *nature* of the body moved, as in violent motion where nature overcomes the imposed force. Third, it can arise from the *medium* through which the body moves. In celestial bodies there is only resistance arising from position. In living things there is a resistance to the mover both from the body and from the medium. According to Averroes, Avempace's objection applies only to the third kind of resistance, namely the medium. In this case, if the medium were subtracted from the movement of animals, there would still remain the proportion of times to time. But in heavy and light bodies there is no increase in velocity unless this is done by decreasing the resistance. Thus, if all increase of velocity arises solely from the medium, then removing all resistance, such as in a void, the speed would be infinite. Averroes rejects the idea of "subtracting" or adding velocities by adding or subtracting media, for when motion is slower every part of that motion is decreased, while by increasing a line not every part of that line is made greater. Therefore, the speed of motion can be increased not simply by subtracting the medium, but by increasing or decreasing the proportion between mover and body moved. And if the moving force is divided by zero, the velocity can only be instantaneous.[33] The cause of Avempace's error, according to Averroes, is that he thinks that slowness and swiftness are motions to be added or taken away from natural motion, just like a line added to a line. In other words, Averroes claims that velocity arises from the proportion between the moving force and the body moved; for him there must always be some proportion between a moving force and the resistance. If no resistance arises from the body itself, or from the medium, or from the nature of the body, there can be no proportion

31 J. A. Weisheipl, "The Concept of Nature," *The New Scholasticism*, 38 (1954) 377-408.
32 Averroes, *Phys.*, IV, comm. 71.
33 "In naturalibus vero diversitas aut equalitas est propter diversitatem aut equalitatem proportionis motoris ad rem motam." Averroes, *Phys.*, IV, comn. 71.

between the velocities of the two motions compared one to the other. If there is no resistance (that is, zero resistance), the body will move instantaneously, that is, without time and without divisibility of that motion.

Averroes answers Avempace's argument about celestial motions by saying that there is indeed resistance between body and the moving force, both of which are *in act*, whereas in natural motions there is no resistance between the form and matter, which is only *potential*. Therefore in natural free fall of bodies motion can arise only from the resistance of the medium.

Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on the *Physics*, Book IV, lect. 12, rejects Averroes' arguments as *omnino frivola*. He goes on to explain:

> Although the quantity of slowness is not like a continuous quantity, so that motion is added to motion, but rather is like an intensive quantity, as one whiteness is more white than another, nevertheless the quantity of time, from which Aristotle argues, is like a continuous quantity, so that time can be made longer by adding time to time. Hence by subtracting all the time that is added by the resistance, there would still be a natural time for natural speed.

For St. Thomas, what is added and subtracted is not the medium, but time. Even when all resistance is taken away and the additional time taken because of it, there still remains natural velocity in the time necessary to traverse a distance: "Unde subtracto tempore quod additur ex impediente, remanet tempus naturalis velocitatis."[34]

Applying this view to natural motions upward and downward, St. Thomas says,

> If the form, which the generator gave, were removed, there would theoretically remain a quantified body (*corpus quantum*); by the very fact that it has a natural inertia to being moved, it has a resistance to the mover. There is no other way of conceiving resistance in celestial bodies to their movers. Hence not even in heavy and light bodies would the argument of Aristotle follow, according to what he says.[35]

A natural body with its form needs nothing else to move in a void. This should not be taken to imply that, for St. Thomas, the form is in any way the mover, the efficient cause, the *motor* of natural motion downward or upward.[36] The form is nothing more than the active principle of natural motion and rest. Therefore all that is needed is a

34 St. Thomas, *In IV Phys.*, lect. 12, n. 10.

35 Ibid.

36 See J. A. Weisheipl, "The Principle *Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur* in Medieval Physics," *Isis*, 56 (1965) 26-45.

natural body with an active principle of movement and the term toward which the motion is destined. The resisting medium in itself contributes nothing to the possibility or impossibility of motion unless it is greater than the moving power, in which case there is no motion at all.

To recapitulate the discussion up to this point, it can be said that the sixth argument of Aristotle against the Atomists is not and never was Aristotle's own doctrine. He takes a position contrary to his own and argues from it to a patent absurdity. On the other hand, Averroes accepts the sixth argument as part of Aristotle's teaching and he makes it a cornerstone of his own doctrine of motion. St. Thomas is fully aware of the difference between Avempace, who claims that Aristotle's argument is false, and Averroes, who insists on its absolute validity. St. Thomas insists that Aristotle's argument is only *ad contradicendum positioni*, and that according to Aristotle's own principles motion in a void is possible.

Aquinas was about 45 when he wrote his commentary on the *Physics* and about 47 when he wrote his unfinished commentary on *De caelo et mundo* in 1272. After a clear and precise recognition of the errors of Averroes, he says,

> ...the motion of heavy and light bodies does not come into being from the generator by means of any other moving principle; it is not even necessary (*neque oportet*) to look for any other resistance in this motion than that which exists between the generator and the body generated. And so it follows that air is not required for natural motion out of necessity, as in violent motion, because that which moves naturally has within itself an innate power (*sibi inditam virtutem*), which is the principle of motion.[37]

In this passage St. Thomas does not discuss the void, but simply rejects Averroes' position demanding a resisting medium for both natural free fall of bodies and for violent motion of heavy bodies upward. In other words, St. Thomas does not recognize any resistance necessary for motion other than exerted by a body being generated in the first place. Once a body is generated, it needs no resistance for it to move upward or downward or any other natural way. This is diametrically contrary to the foundation of Averroes' principles of natural science.

It is interesting to note that when Aquinas was only a young man of about 30, he was already aware of Averroes' rejection of Avempace in text 71. In the fourth Book of the *Sentences*, dist. 44, q. 2, a. 3, ql. 3 ad 2, which was written in 1256, he raises various questions about the resurrected body, among them the possibility of their moving from one

37 *In III De caelo*, lect. 8, n. 9.

place to another instantaneously. In the second objection favoring the instantaneous transportation of glorified bodies from place to place, the objector quotes the Philosopher in text 71.[38]

> He argues that...if there is motion in a void, (the body) would have to move in an instant, i. e., without time, because a void does not resist a body at all, while a plenum does. Thus there would be no proportion between motion which takes place in a vacuum and one which takes place in a resisting medium. For two motions to take place in time, there must be proportional velocities, since every time is proportional to time. But no plenum can resist a glorified body, which can co-exist with another body in the same place, however this may take place. Therefore, if (a glorified body) moves, it moves in an instant.

This is the objection. Although the reply is rather long, I shall quote a substantial part of it, since this passage is rarely, if ever, referred to in contemporary literature, and never translated.[39]

> To understand the proof of the Philosopher, as the Commentator expounds it in the same place (comm. 71), it must be noted that one must take the whole as a unit, namely resistance of the body to the moving power, and resistance of the medium through which it moves, and any other resisting force whatever, so that one talks about the *quantitas tarditatis* of the whole motion according to the proportion of resistance of moving power to the body resisting in any way whatever, either *ex se* or *ex alio extrinseco*. For it is necessary that the moving body always resists the mover in some way, because the moving power and the body moved, the agent and the patient, inasmuch as they are such, are contraries. (1) Sometimes the body resists the mover *ex seipso* or because it has the power inclining it to move in the opposite direction, as is evident in violent motions, or at least, because it has a place contrary to the place intended by the mover; this kind of resistance is found in celestial bodies with respect to their movers. (2) Sometimes, however, the body resists the moving force *ex alio tantum* and not *ex seipso*, as is evident in the natural motion of heavy and light bodies, since by their very form they are inclined to such motion, for it is a form impressed by the generator which is the *per se* mover of heavy and light bodies. On the part of matter there is no resistance or power inclining to a contrary motion or to a contrary place, because "place" does not pertain to matter unless it is quantified by dimensions brought about by natural form. Hence there cannot be any resistance except on the part of the medium, which resistance is connatural to their motions. (3) Sometimes resistance arises from both sources, as is evident in the movement of animals. When, therefore, there is no resistance to motion except on the part of the body, as happens in

38 The Vives edition of 1874 gives the erroneous source, text 75, and the Parma edition of 1858 refers to text 73. The correct reference is text and comm. 71.

39 The text used for this translation is the Paris, Vives edition of 1874, 11, 332.

celestial bodies, then the time of motion is measured by the proportion of mover to body. In cases such as these, the argument of Aristotle does not apply, because if all media are removed, there would still remain motion in time.

But in those motions where there is resistance only on the part of the medium, one takes the measure of time arising from the impediment of the medium solely. Hence, if one were to subtract the medium altogether, there would remain no impediment. In this case it would either move in an instant or in a time equal to the time it would take to move in empty space and a plenum, because, granting that it would move in time through a void, that time would be proportional to the time it would have if it moved in a plenum.[40] It is possible, however, to imagine another body with the same proportions more subtle than the body by which the place was full, in which, if the other space were equally filled, it would move through that plenum in the same short time as formerly it did in a vacuum, because the more one adds to subtlety, by that much one subtracts from the quantity of time (*quantitate temporis*); and the more subtle the medium, the less it resists. But in other motions in which there is resistance from the mobile body and from the medium, the quantity of time is computed from the proportion of the moving force to the resistance of the body and from the medium together. Hence, granted that the medium is totally subtracted or does not impede, it does not follow that motion would be in an instant, but that the time of motion would be measured only by the resistance of the body. Nothing absurd follows if a body were to move at the same rate of time in a plenum as in a void, if we imagine an extremely subtle body, because the greater the determined subtlety of the medium, the greater is its tendency to diminish the slowness in motion. Hence one can imagine a subtlety so great that it would tend to make less slowness than that slowness which the resistance of the body would have. And so the resistance of the medium would add no slowness to the motion.

It is, therefore, evident that although the medium does not resist glorified bodies inasmuch as it does not prevent two bodies from being in the same place, in no way whatever would their motions be instantaneous, because the very body itself offers resistance to the moving power by the fact that it has a determined position (in place), just as has been said of celestial bodies.

The basic position St. Thomas takes throughout the entire discussion in the *Sentences* is that if all media and all additional forces were taken away, there would still be movement in a void. St. Thomas recognizes only three kinds of resistance: (1) *ex seipso*, that coming from the body itself (a) in coming into being, i. e., the resistance between the body

40 All the printed editions consulted have "per vacuum" in this place; but this fails to makes sense. However, the fragment preserved by Capreolus *(Defensiones Theologiae*, II dist. 6, q. 1 ad 7, ed. Tours 1902, 3, 419) reads "per plenum," which is correct.

being generated and the generator, (b) the force of the natural inclination resisting a contrary motion, as in violent motions, and (c) the internal inertia of bodies being moved in place, as in celestial bodies; (2) *ex alio extrinseco*, that coming from the resisting medium through which the body must pass, as in free fall of bodies; and (3) a combination of internal and external resistance, as in the case of animals moving themselves. Once a body has been generated, like water from air, there may or may not be a resisting medium to hinder its natural motion. If there is a medium, the heavier the body is the slower it moves; if there is no medium, the body moves with natural velocity because of the distance to be traversed in a natural time. The basic reason for this is that all bodies and all distances are divisible. Granting this divisibility of the continuum, there follows that time itself is divisible. Therefore a body would move in a void more swiftly than it would in a plenum. But in either case these motions would take time, and time is proportional to time as long as both are finite. Therefore T_1: T_2: :V_1: V_2. For St. Thomas, at least in the commentary on the *Sentences*, it is possible for a body to move in a void with the same time as a body moving in a very subtle medium. In this case the medium would make little or no difference; there is always the natural velocity of a given body, whether there were a medium or not. Thus, unlike Averroes, who demands a medium for the very possibility of motion, St. Thomas holds that the medium is irrelevant to the possibility of motion, and may even be absent altogether, as in a void.

It is important to note that for St. Thomas, as for Aristotle and perhaps for Averroes, the motion under discussion is not only local motion, but also alteration and augmentation. These too can take place in a void, and these too encounter analogously the same kind of resistance.

The position taken by St. Thomas was adopted and maintained by his followers throughout the centuries. Philosophers and theologians, such as John Capreolus,[41] Domingo de Soto,[42] John of St. Thomas,[43] Cosmo Alamanno[44] and many others strongly defended the position of St. Thomas against Averroes. Domingo de Soto, for example, is well aware that he is arguing against "an extremely common position that is being proposed as Aristotle's, which some think can be gotten out of Chapter

41 *Defensiones Theologiae*, II, dist. 6, q. 1 ad 7, ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues (Tours 1902) 3, 418-422.

42 *Super octo libros Physicorum Arist. Quaestiones*, IV, q. 3, a. 2 (Salamanca 1555) fol. 66v-67v. I am grateful to Rev. W. A. Wallace for the use of the text and his translation of the question.

43 *Cursus Philosophicus*: Phil. Nat., I, q. 17, a. 2, ed. B. Reiser (Turin 1933) 365-369.

44 *Summa Philosophiae*: Physica, q. 20, a. 3-4, ed. F. Ehrle (Paris 1885) 197-202.

8, text 71 and the following" *(vulgatissima illa sententia, quae circumfertur tanquam Aristotelis, quam elici putant ex c. 8, text 71 et infra).* There can be no doubt that the opinion of Averroes, demanding resistance for every motion, and the correlative notion that in a void a body would move instantaneously, were common in late medieval physics. Domingo de Soto refers to Paul of Venice (*In II Sent.*) and Gregory of Rimini (*In II Sent.*, dist. 6, q. 3, a. 2), "whom practically all of the Nominalists follow."[45] It was a prevalent opinion when Galileo was a student and professor at Pisa.

In his early work *De motu*, c. 10, (ca. 1590), Galileo goes to great lengths[46] to demonstrate, in opposition to Aristotle, that if there were a void, motion in it would not take place instantaneously, but in time. His arguments are not so much against Aristotle, as against the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle. Galileo begins by saying:

> Aristotle, in Book 4 of the *Physics*, in his attempt to deny the existence of a void, adduces many arguments. Those that are found beginning with text 64[47] are drawn from a consideration of motion. For since he assumes that motion cannot take place instantaneously, he tries to show that if a void existed, motion in it would take place instantaneously; and, since that is impossible, he concludes necessarily that a void is also impossible. But, since we are dealing with motion, we have decided to inquire whether it is true that, if a void existed, motion in it would take place instantaneously. And since our conclusion will be that motion in a void takes place in time, we shall first examine the contrary view and Aristotle's arguments.[48]

It should now be clear that Galileo was not the first to refute the Averroist interpretation of Aristotle. There was a long tradition on this subject reaching back to St. Thomas, Avempace and Philoponus. Galileo was certainly aware of this, for in defending motion in a void, he explicitly cites "Scotus, Saint Thomas, Philoponus, and others."[49]

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By way of conclusion it would be well to summarize the views explained above. Although the problem is very difficult, and the Scholastic terms are unfamiliar to many, this is an important subject in High and Late Scholastic thought. In this paper we have discussed the

45 Op. cit., fol. 66vb.
46 *De motu*, trans. and annotated by I. E. Drabkin (Madison 1960) p. 41 f.
47 I. E. Drabkin translates this as "section," but he mistakenly identifies the Bekker numbers; the reference should be to 214 b 11 ff.
48 Ibid. p. 41.
49 Ibid. p. 49.

opinions of four major figures on the question of motion in a void: Aristotle, Avempace (Ibn Badja), Averroes, and St. Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle dealt with the void in the fourth Book of his *Physics*. Having discussed the problems of place, he felt it also necessary to discuss the void. The void was a vital problem in pre-Socratic philosophy, because the Atomists, notably Leucippus and Democritus, tried to explain the possibility of motion in face of the paradox of Parmenides and his disciples. The Atomists postulated the void and indivisible atoms as the only possible explanation of movement witnessed in the real world. Aristotle tried to revive the concept of *φύσις* or "nature" to explain motion, and therefore he postulated natural place and natural motion. In order to maintain his over-all philosophy of nature, he had to face the real problem of motion in a void. He presented six difficulties about motion in a void in order to deny the need of a void in nature. Some of the arguments against the void postulated by the Atomists presuppose a distinction between "natural" and "violent" motions. But the sixth and last argument tried to show that if the void were postulated as the cause of motion, then it would follow that motion in a void would be instantaneous, that is, without time, for force divided by zero resistance would be instantaneous.

A great number of commentators thought this expressed Aristotle's personal view of dynamics, which can be stated in the formula: $V = F/R$, where V is the velocity, F the moving force, and R the resistance of a medium. The implication of interpreting Aristotle in this way is that all motion needs *resistance* in order for bodies to move at all. In the Latin West, the first to oppose this notion was Avempace, or Ibn Badja. He claimed that even if all media were removed, as in a void, there would still be the natural resistance of the body coming into existence, that is, between mover and moved, and the natural body would still move in time over a given distance. Avempace argued that if there were no resistance, such as a medium, the measure of motion would be the subtraction of all resistance from the natural force of the body, as in free fall of bodies. His position has been interpreted to mean $V = F - R$. The crux of the problem discussed is not so much the instantaneous or temporal nature of motion, but the need for resistance in all motion. This brief passage from Avempace's argument in Book VII of the *Physics* was reported by Averroes in Book IV, commentary on text 71.

Averroes, the ardent defender of the very words of Aristotle on all occasions, opposed Avempace, insisting that all movement, natural or violent, required a medium. The natural fall of free bodies required a medium, so that the form could move the matter of the body downward; for Averroes, "form" was the *per se* mover of the medium and the *per*

accidens cause of the body's movement. Averroes, like Aristotle, had no problem in showing that violent motion needed a medium, for in their view the medium carried "the power to move." Thus both natural and violent motion needed a resisting medium, though in different ways. Without a medium there could be no movement at all under any circumstances. Therefore, Averroes concluded that movement without a medium would have to take place in an instant (*in instanti*), and this is not motion (*motus*) at all, but the simultaneous occupation of two places at once. If the resistance is zero in the formula V = F/R, then motion would be instantaneous.

St. Thomas Aquinas rejected Averroes' arguments as "frivolous," contending that whenever one removes a hindrance, like a resisting medium, the body would move naturally in a given time over a given distance with "natural velocity." This "natural velocity" depends upon the distance to be covered, a magnitude that can be divided, and the time taken to cover that distance, a derived magnitude that can also be divided. Therefore, without resistance, the force of the φύσις itself would move over a given distance in a given time. In other words, St. Thomas denied that motion in a void would be instantaneous. More important, he denied the need for resistance derived from the medium. From this it follows that St. Thomas denied in principle that the formula V = F/R expresses Aristotle's dynamics except for violent or mechanical motion. Although many modern historians of Aristotelian physics accept this formula as authentically Aristotelian, St. Thomas and his followers would not consider it to be an expression of authentic free fall of bodies. For them, once a body is generated it has an innate force to do what comes naturally; it does not move the medium or the "matter," but just moves faster in a void than in a plenum.

What we have tried to show is that the sixth argument in chapter 8 against the void does not represent Aristotle's own view, but is only an argument *ad contradicendum positioni*. The formula V = F/R cannot be derived from Book IV, c. 8, for it neglects the essential element in the whole of Aristotlian physics, namely that φύσις is the principle of motion and rest, and therefore the body moves spontaneously downward if it is a heavy body, and upward if it is a light body. The formula V = F/R is also found by modern historians of science to be implicit in Book VIII, c. 5, of Aristotle's *Physics*. We have not discussed this problem, for it is a different one altogether. In that passage Aristotle gives the example of the "shiphaulers," but here Aristotle is clearly discussing a problem of mechanics, which is not "natural" motion.[50] In

50 See Edward Grant, "Aristotle's 'Shiphaulers' and Medieval Criticisms of His Law of Motion," in *Acts of the Ithaca Congress of the History of Science* (Paris 1962) 587-590.

this paper we have not been concerned with mechanical motion, but only with the free fall of bodies in a void. We have argued that such motion does not need resistance or a medium according to Aristotle and St. Thomas, whereas it does need resistance according to Averroes and his followers.

At the beginning of this paper we noted the view of Anneliese Maier regarding the obstacles in medieval physics that prevented the growth of modern classical physics. She pointed to two basic hypotheses as the most important and the most fatal for the birth of modern classical physics. The more significant of the two was the hypothesis that every movement required a particular mover bound to it and generating it directly, and every normal movement of a successive nature required, besides, a resistance which opposes the moving force and which is overcome by that force, for without resistance there could be no motion (*motus*), but only change (*mutatio*), i. e., and instantaneous change of place.[51]

The first part of this "fatal" hypothesis was discussed in my paper on "Omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur," already cited. In this paper we showed that the view proposed by Maier is Averroist and not universally held in the Middle Ages. The second part of the "fatal" hypothesis was discussed in this paper. We have pointed out that this opinion was also Averroist, and not universally held in medieval physics. There can be no doubt that it was commonly held by Averroists and Nominalists; Domingo de Soto even called it *sententia vulgatissima*. Nevertheless, the notion that "every motion required a resistance which opposes the moving force and which is overcome by that force," and that without this force, as in a void, all motion would take place instantaneously, was rejected by the whole Thomistic and probably Scotistic tradition. Galileo rejected the Averroist hypothesis, and he was well aware that he had precursors in this rejection, namely "Scotus, Saint Thomas, Philoponus, and some others." When there is a strong vital tradition for the opposing view, it is misleading to present the Averroist position as the common "Scholastic teaching."

The teaching of St. Thomas, rejecting both a conjoined mover (*motor conjunctus*) and the need for resistance in all natural motion, is much more compatible with the views of modern classical physics than the Averroist teaching on both points. By this we do not mean that Thomistic natural philosophy prepared the way for classical physics. This would be to claim too much. But it is clear that a specifically Averroist physics did exist in medieval philosophy and that it was vigorously opposed by St. Thomas and others. Only when the Averroist physics was rejected could modern classical physics begin.

51 A. Maier, loc. cit.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS

1274-1974

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Foreword
by
Etienne Gilson



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ST. THOMAS AND HIS CONTEMPORARIES

WILLIAM OF AUVERGNE, JOHN OF LA ROCHELLE AND ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE OLD LAW

Beryl Smalley

I

Introduction

"Then I saw the patriarchs and prophets exulting in wondrous joy at having reached that country which once they greeted from afar, at witnessing the fulfilment of what they had foreseen in the spirit, and at having passed from weary waiting to eternal glory."

THESE words are spoken by *Desiderium vitae aeternae*, describing the joys of heaven in a dialogue *De custodia interioris hominis* ascribed to St. Anselm of Canterbury.[1] *Desiderium* expresses the medieval Catholic view of the Old Testament in pictorial form. Moses, both patriarch and prophet, gave a divinely revealed law to God's chosen people as a preparation for the New Law of the Gospel, which would come in the fullness of time. Then the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Mosaic Law would be superseded, though the moral precepts would remain as having timeless value. So much was common doctrine throughout the middle ages. Readers will expect me to add that the ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Old Law were held to "prefigure" the New Law in their allegorical sense, being interpreted of Christ and the sacraments of the Church, and to signify moral teaching in their tropological sense.[2] So indeed I should have said before reading the *De legibus* of William of Auvergne. Since reading it, I prefer to say that belief in the allegorical and tropological interpretation of the Old Law was general, but not quite universal. Even supposing that it *was* universal, however, the common doctrine raised many questions on the nature and effects of the Mosaic precepts, which admitted of diverse answers. My aim in this paper is to study St. Thomas's place in the chain of question and answer: "...ici comme souvent, il synthétise une

1 *Memorials of Saint Anselm*, ed. R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt (Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi i, London 1969) 358. The tract originated in St. Anselm's circle; see ibid. 354-5.
2 See H. de Lubac, *Exégèse médiévale. Les quatre sens de l'Ecriture* (Paris 1959-1964).

large tradition, qu'il perfectionne en la dotant d'une forte structure intellectuelle", as Dom Gribomont wrote of his theology on the bond between the two Testaments.[3] The evolution of this wide tradition and its complexity need more detailed analysis than they have received hitherto.

The Law, as transmitted in the Old Testament, posed problems as difficult, though different, for those who read it "all of a piece" as it does for modern scholars who see it as "composite". Its divergent traditions, its traces of magic and primitive rites, and the miscellaneous grouping of many precepts were baffling. How could one reconcile a God-given code, strange and anomalous as it was, with that beauty, reason and harmony which belonged to the divine plan for the universe and for man's place within it? Lack of the tools of modern research closed one approach to the problem; but others were tried. A striking change of approach came about in the twelfth and thirteenth century schools.

The patristic tradition as known to medieval scholars stemmed from the Latin translation of Origen. He approached the Old Law as an apologist for the faith against both pagan philosophers and Jews and as a preacher to Christians. To the Jews, who continued to observe their Law, he exposed and derided the irrationality and seeming futility of many precepts: he sought and found biblical texts where precepts contradicted one another; other texts commanded practices which were "absurd" and even impossible to act upon; they made sense only if interpreted as figures of the Christian revelation to come. To pagan philosophers he argued that the Old Testament should be read in its spiritual sense. He urged upon Jews and pagan philosophers alike that irrational, absurd and impossible precepts had the function of pointing us to the need for a spiritual interpretation. Some precepts had no literal sense at all; most of them demanded a spiritual interpretation of "the letter". Origen admitted the historical reality of much of his text, but history as such did not interest him.[4] As a preacher he couched his teaching to the faithful in his spiritual interpretation of the Old Testament. These homilies won for themselves a unique place in medieval spirituality.[5] St. Gregory the Great's exegesis reinforced the

3 "Le lien des deux Testaments, selon la théologie de Saint Thomas", *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses* xxii (1946) 71.

4 R. M. Grant, *The Letter and the Spirit* (London 1957) 95-6; M. Simon, *Verus Israel. Etude sur les relations entre chrétiens et juifs dans l'empire romain (135-425)*, 2nd ed. (Paris 1964) 87-121, 189-203, gives a general background.

5 See among numerous studies on the subject J. Leclercq, *Receuil d'études sur S. Bernard et ses écrits* (Storia e letteratura xcii, Rome 1962) passim.

stress on spiritual interpretation. Both Origen and St. Gregory contributed largely to the compilation of the *Glossa ordinaria* on the Pentateuch.[6] St. Jerome's Hebrew scholarship and St. Augustine's more practical discussion of difficulties arising from the literal sense of the Law also influenced the glossators, but could do little to alter a settled mode of thought.[7] A monastic commentary on *Leviticus* by Ralph of St. Germer of Flaix, written towards the middle of the twelfth century, achieved the distinction, rare for a monastic book, of becoming a standard school text:[8] it was priced in the Paris stationers' list of 1275-1286. Ralph on *Leviticus* came too late to be quoted in the *Gloss*, but excerpts from it were often copied into the margins of manuscripts of the *Gloss* and it served as a standard supplement to the *Gloss* in lectures on *Leviticus* until the late thirteenth century. Ralph's commentary on the central book of the Law passed on the patristic spiritualist interpretation in its most extreme form. Paradoxically, he shows what a literally minded exegete could make of it. The schoolmen therefore had to come to terms with him, accepting, rejecting or modifying what they found in the *originalia*, in the *Gloss* excerpts and in their standard medieval commentary.

Ralph set out to dissuade his brethren at St. Germer from overrating Jewish arguments in favour of the permanence of the whole Mosaic Law. The Jewish case for it was known to them, and perplexed the more simple minded. He counter-attacked along three lines. God himself witnessed through his prophet Ezechiel "quod dederat eis praecepta non bona" (*Ezech.* xx, 25).[9] Other texts from the prophets denounced sacrifices as inefficacious or insufficient. This proved that the ceremonial precepts given by Moses were not good in themselves, but were merely "the image of righteousness" or "foreshadowings". Moses

6 R. Wasselynck, "L'influence de l'exégèse de S. Grégoire le Grand sur les commentaires bibliques médiévaux", RTAM xxxii (1965) 157-204. Gilbert the Universal compiled the *Gloss* on the Pentateuch, in concert with the circle of Anselm of Laon, at some time between c. 1110 and 1128; see B. Smalley, *The study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1952) 60-62; "Les commentaires bibliques de l'époque romane: glose ordinaire et gloses périmées", *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* iv (1961) 15-22; R. Wasselynck, op. cit. 186-92.

7 A gloss in the standard *Gloss* on *Lev.* xix, 27-28, a ban on shaving the beard and making incisions in the skin, offers a rational explanation; these things were forbidden as pagan practices: "Sicut barbari faciunt....nec in honore demonum cicinnos nutrire et vovere, sicut student pagani puerorum capita demonibus offerre, quod maxime videtur hic prohibere." It represents a garbled version of Raban Maur's commentary on the text (PL 108, 457-458). But this type of explanation is rare enough in the *Gloss* to stand out as remarkable.

8 B. Smalley, "Ralph of Flaix on Leviticus", RTAM xxxv (1968) 35-82; I shall refer to it as "Ralph". I also draw on material to be published in a paper in RTAM on "The influence of Ralph of Flaix".

9 This text has been variously interpreted throughout the history of exegesis; see for instance J. Lindblom, *Prophecy in Ancient Israel* (Oxford 1965) 184.

and the wise men of the Old Testament understood them in this manner. The divine revelation to Moses included a prophetic vision of Christ's coming and even of Christian values, such as the pre-eminence of virginity. The rank and file of the Jewish people, on the other hand, took the precepts in their literal sense, since they could not understand the inner meaning. Moses veiled his face, so that they failed to perceive the brightness of his countenance (*Exod.* xxxiv, 33-35). In the same way he concealed the prophetic secrets of the Law under dark sayings. Ralph goes on to make his third point: many precepts, besides being inconsistent with others or childish, would not "stand according to the letter"; that is, they could not have been observed; they had no literal meaning and were put there in order to prove to the wise that their true meaning must be sought in the spiritual sense only. Ralph examined each precept in the course of his commentary to test whether it could "stand according to the letter". For instance, an example to the contrary, which struck him as the most telling of all, was provision for leprosy in clothes and houses (*Lev.* xiii, 47, xiv, 36). "How can clothes and houses be leprous?" he asked.[10] It must be added that Ralph did his best to establish the literal sense where he thought he could do so, and he appreciated literal *moralia*. Precepts enjoining kindness to travellers and strangers called forth warm admiration. He credited observance of the Law with positive value, in that it taught obedience to the one true God. But the gist of his commentary is to present the Law as a cryptogram.

His readers had to cope with another tradition, deriving from St. Jerome and from contemporary Jewish rabbis. Master Andrew of St. Victor, stimulated by the example of his master Hugh, wrote commentaries on the literal sense of Old Testament books, beginning with the Pentateuch (before about 1147). He learned some biblical Hebrew and consulted rabbis on their exegesis. His Jewish teachers drew mainly on rabbinic tradition and on the standard works of Rabbi Solomon of Troyes (d. 1105) in what they told him.[11] There is no evidence to suggest that Andrew doubted the validity of the interpretation according to the four senses. He probably thought of himself as "laying

10 Quoted in "Ralph" 64: "Cum in plerisque locis, immo pene ubique satis appareat, legem spiritualiter intelligendam esse, dum ea sepius loquitur que nisi ad mysteria relata fuerint insipida prorsus et fatua sentiunt; nescio tamen si alicubi apertius quam in hoc lepre tractatu, ubi vestis leprosa et sicut sequentia continent domus leprosa introducitur". See "Ralph" 52-67 for anti-Jewish polemic.

11 See my *Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, op. cit. 83-185 and "L'exégèse biblique du 12e siècle", *Entretiens sur la renaissance du 12e siècle*, ed. M. de Gandillac and E. Jeaneau (Paris 1969) 273-293. My pupil Mrs. G. A. C. Hadfield (née Ten Kate) is preparing a doctoral thesis on Andrew's exegesis, with special reference to his knowledge of Hebrew and to his Jewish sources.

the literal foundation" for the spiritual interpretation, which he left to others. He was accused of "judaising" in his exegesis of the prophet Isaias, but never of a "judaising" approach to the Old Law. What distinguished him from Ralph was that he took for granted the historical fact of *legalia*. All precepts had a literal meaning for Andrew, even when it escaped him. He had never seen leprosy in clothes and houses; if the texts referred to stains, then who should judge which were leprous and which were not?[12] He did not dismiss these precepts as verbal puzzles. His factual approach to the Old Law had more importance than his discussion of its details. His treatment of them was skimpy compared with his much fuller comments on Old Testament history and prophecy. Like Ralph, he wrote after the compilation of the *Gloss*, but he supplied "masters of the sacred page" with a guide to the literal sense of those books which he expounded, until Nicholas of Lyre replaced him in the fourteenth century.

Discovery of an anonymous commentary on *Leviticus*, probably written in the 1120s or '30s in a North French school, shows that St. Victor was not the only centre of biblical scholarship. The anonymous commentator must have been a contemporary of Hugh of St. Victor, but he worked independently. He, too, learned Hebrew and drew upon rabbinic sources. He, too, accepted all precepts as literally true.[13] His commentary deserves mention here, even though it remained almost unknown, because it helps to account for Andrew's success in the schools. The Anonymous proves that the literal sense of the Law was evoking a new curiosity.

Masters of the sacred page preferred the Victorine approach to Ralph's. They came round to it slowly. Hugh had stressed that the literal foundation must be properly laid; Andrew obeyed him. At first, however, masters would quote Andrew on the literal sense along with Ralph and earlier sources, without noting the contrast of method. That is hardly surprising, seeing that Andrew never discussed method; he merely set an example by studying the literal sense. We can see how Ralph's influence persisted in a marginal note to the *Histories* of Peter Comestor on the precepts concerning leprosy: "It is clear that not all which is said of the diverse kinds of leprosy can be taken according to

12 Quoted in "Ralph" 66: "Lepram in vestibus vel domibus vel huiusmodi, de quibus lex agit, in nostris partibus vel nostris temporibus non vidimus, nisi forte lepram dicit maculas quasdam, quas in huiusmodi frequenter inveniri constat. Sed que macula sit leprosa, que autem non, qui diiudicare nosset non facile inveniri posset".

13 B. Smalley, "An anonymous commentary on the literal sense of Leviticus of the early twelfth century", RTAM xxxvi (1969) 78-99.

the letter".[14] Peter the Canter, in his lecture-commentary on *Leviticus* (c. 1170-1196), quoted much from Ralph and did not criticise his position at all. His blind acceptance of Ralph's method had an untoward effect, since Hugh of St. Cher borrowed from the Chanter in his postill on *Leviticus* (1230-1235). His borrowings included many quotations from Ralph; Hugh also quoted from Ralph directly. The Dominican master's postills on Scripture became a standard school text. Hence he popularised certain passages where Ralph had queried the literal sense or else rejected it outright. Nevertheless, rethinking on the validity of the literal sense was already in process: Hugh's incautious use of the Chanter did not deflect the current trend. Stephen Langton, teaching at Paris c. 1180-1206, took pains to discriminate between the senses. Annotators of the *Gloss* and the *Histories* of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries show an increasing anxiety to distinguish the senses from one another, deciding which glosses expound the literal sense and which the spiritual. Finally William of Milton or Middleton O.F.M. achieved clarity in his lectures on *Leviticus* about 1248.[15] He handles Ralph in a masterful way, quoting him independently of his sources on both the literal and the spiritual senses, distinguishing between them, and avoiding all those passages where Ralph had rejected "the letter".

The masters had worked out a method for the practical purpose of lecturing on the books of the Law. They treated it as an historical fact instead of trying to decode a cypher. But a satisfactory theory of the relations between the senses had to wait for St. Thomas. The trouble was that lecturing on Scripture, as practiced in the schools, gave masters little opportunity to discuss the Law as a whole. The master began with an introductory lecture on his book or group of books setting out the facts on authorship, date and intention, in so far as these were known to him. Then he expounded his text phrase by phrase. The procedure did not lend itself to discussion of general problems. Further, he aimed at making his text *praedicabilis*. He was instructing his pupils on their religious and moral duties as future prelates and preachers and was training them to preach in their turn: lectures provided raw material for sermons. Exegesis according to the four senses offered a commodious hold-all for the combination of biblical scholarship and

14 PL 198, 1206. It is not known whether the glosses printed in the Migne edition of the *Histories* were written by the Comestor himself or by a pupil or reader.

15 P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIe siècle* (Paris 1933/4) no. 304; A. B. Emden, *A Bibliographical Register of the University of Cambridge* (Cambridge 1963) 407. It is not certain that the Paris and Cambridge friars of the same name were identical, though it seems probable from the dates. The lectures on *Leviticus* must have been given in Paris, judging from the diffusion of manuscript copies.

homiletics. The proportion varied from one master to another; the ingredients remained the same. The Bible supplied every need. A writer of the late twelfth century, "B", a priest or canon of Troyes, lists a series of metaphors in praise of Scripture. Most of them are conventional enough, but one is striking. "B" compares "the letter" of Scripture to "a harlot, open to any sense whatsoever". He specifies:

> Sicut enim meretrix multis, immo quam plurimis, sese exponit, ita in littera multiplex est sensus: est enim sensus historialis, allegoricus, tropologicus.[16]

He expresses crudely but truthfully the aptitude of the biblical text to convey any Catholic teaching which the lecturer found suitable to his audience. To give one example: the creatures allowed or forbidden as food in the Law were traditionally interpreted tropologically as virtues and vices. The theme could be developed and spiced with satire on contemporary manners at the lecturer's pleasure.

The allegorical interpretation linked the two Testaments together. William of Auxerre explains the meaning of *rota in medio rotae* in Ezechiel's vision when writing his *Summa aurea* (1222-1225). Tradition taught that it signified the two Testaments: how do they form "a wheel within a wheel"? William gives a traditional answer: "The masters say that the New Testament is in the Old according to prefiguration, and the Old in the New according to exposition".[17] It is easy to see why the rules of their faculty obliged masters of the sacred page to lecture on a book of the Old and a book of the New Testament concurrently. The theme of promise and fulfilment gave unity to their piecemeal exposition of texts.

The *Summa aurea* makes a convenient bridge between lectures on Scripture and theological *quaestiones*, sentences, sentence-commentaries and treatises. This type of discussion encouraged deeper

16 Quoted by E. Jeauneau, "'Nani gigantum humeris insidentes'. Essai d'interprétation de Bernard de Chartres", *Vivarium* v (1967) 94-95. The writer tells me that the comparison "littera-meretrix" occurs in the *Quaestiones naturales* of Adelard of Bath, ed. M. Müller, *Beitr. zur Gesch. der Philos. etc.* xxxi (2) 1934, 12: "Omnis quippe littera meretrix est, nunc ad hos, nunc ad illos affectus exposita."

Adelard was referring to philosophic texts, not to Scripture. The context of his remark is: "...prius ratio inquirenda sit, ea inventa auctoritas, si adiacet, demum subdenda."

It is not clear whether "B. of Troyes" took his comparison directly from Adelard and applied it to Scripture or whether it was current when he wrote.

17 Ed. Paris, 1500, foll. 243vb-244ra. William of Auxerre is discussing the contrast between the burdens imposed by the Old and the New Law respectively. It is objected by some that Ezechiel's vision would imply that they were of equal weight. William has to answer the objection. I use the *Summa aurea* for illustration because it was widely read. On William of Auxerre see C. Ottaviano, *Guglielmo d'Auxerre (Biblioteca di Filosofia e scienza* xii, Rome 1950).

thought on problems arising from *legalia.*[18] First of all, did writers in a theological context regard all precepts of the Old Law as literally true? The answer is that we do find traces of the same confusion as appears in lectures on Scripture, but they are early and few. Peter of Capua in his *Summa* (c. 1201-1202) raises the question: Did the Old Law include precepts impossible to observe? He gives an opinion ascribed to "quidam" without committing himself: all precepts were imposed upon all Jews, not as binding each Jew to observe them all *ad litteram*, but as binding each to observe *ad litteram* such as he could, and to observe all "mystically", at least.[19] "Mystically" may refer to a spirit of obedience here; it is used rather ambiguously. Roland of Cremona, the first Dominican master to teach at Paris, takes Ralph's interpretation uncritically into his *Summa* (1228-1230):

> Likewise there was something in the Law which could not be understood according to the letter in any way, such as: *You shall eat the oldest of the old store: and new coming on, you shall cast away the old* (*Lev.* xxvi, 10). That precept would force the Jews to resort to the spiritual understanding....[20]

It seems strange that an innocent promise of abundance should have struck commentators as meaningless according to the letter, until we turn to the ingenious objection made by Ralph on the words *Vetustissima veterum comedetis*: why eat the *oldest* before the *old*?

> Let the Jew, who accepts the fleshly sense only of abundance, tell the reason why the *old* should be cast out and the *oldest* eaten, when they should rather have cast out the *oldest* and eaten the *old.*[21]

Ralph had interpreted the *stores* as the sacraments of the Old and New Laws respectively.[22] Hugh of St. Cher telescoped the passage into:

18 See especially A. M. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* iii, 1 (Regensburg 1954) 19-108.

19 Quoted ibid. 34: "Quidam etiam dicunt, quod cuilibet erant omnia precepta, non ut ad litteram omnia observaret, sed quedam ad litteram, que posset, et omnia saltem mistice".

20 Quoted ibid. 59: "Similiter aliquid erat in lege, quod nullo modo poterat intelligi ad litteram, ut istud: vetustissima veterum comedetis et novis supervenientibus vetera abicietis. Istud cogebat iudeos recurrere ad spiritualem intelligentiam". I use the Douai version as the most faithful translation of the medieval Latin Vulgate.

21 *The New English Bible. The Old Testament* (Oxford/Cambridge 1970) 167. "Your old harvest shall last you in store until you have to clear out the old to make room for the new."

22 Ed. Marburg/Cologne, 1536, lib. XIX, cap. viii, pp. 295-296: "Que igitur sunt vetera, quae praedicuntur proiicienda? Nos vetera intelligimus legis sacramenta....Haec igitur vetera, novis supervenientibus proiiciuntur, quia dum novi testamenti suscipimus instituta, legis caeremonias servare contemnimus.....vetustissima veterum comedimus, quia iam non iustitiae figuris sub tempore datis oneramur, sed ipsius iustitiae, que apud Deum aeterna est, pane reficimur. Aliaque dicat iudeus, qui carnalem tantum in his amplectitur abundantiam, quae sit ratio ut vetera proiiciantur et vetustissima comedantur, cum quod vetustissimum est magis proiici, vetera vero comedi deberent. Quod si haec non solum in scripturis, verumtamen in nostris affectibus velimus advertere, vetus est cupiditas, quae veterem facit hominem...."

> Obiectio contra iudaeos: nam et si vetera proiiciuntur, multo fortius vetustissima. Mystice vero non est obiectio.[23]

Roland would sometimes deny that his text had a literal or historical sense in his commentary on Job;[24] he carries over the ambiguity of terms into his *Summa*.

However, such passages are exceptional. Masters generally assumed that the precepts could be taken as literally true. The framework for their discussions was a saying, sometimes ascribed to St. Augustine:

> The Law was given as a sign to the perfect, as a burden and scourge to the froward, as tutor to the simple and sucklings.[25]

The first phrase safeguarded the mystical sense of the Old Law, as understood by the élite, the second its penal character, and all three enabled theologians to interpret it as "burdensome" rather than nonsensical or absurd. William of Auxerre takes it in this way. He answers objections raised by texts from the prophets declaring that sacrifices were unpleasing to God. Such texts had figured in Ralph's arguments against the Jews. William gives three reasons for God's displeasure: the sacrifices were offered in the wrong spirit, without right intention; they were offered at the wrong time, after truth had dispersed shade (i.e. the prophets were foretelling the New Law); God did not prescribe sacrifices *voluntate absoluta, sed quasi coacta.* He imposed them as preventive of evil, not as good in themselves, to restrain the Jews from idolatry, just as he permitted divorce, since otherwise they would have

23 *Post. in Bib.* (Paris 1530-1545) i, fol. 120rb: "Obiectio contra iudeos: Nam et si vetera proiiciuntur, multo fortius vetustissima. Mystice vero non est obiectio. Nam vetustissima sunt unitas essentie trinitatis personarum, que comedere debet omnis homo et masticare dentibus fidei".

24 Quoted by A. Dondaine, "Un commentaire scripturaire de Roland de Crémone 'Le livre de Iob'", *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* xi (1941) 124: "Sensus ystorialis hic nequaquam invenitur. Non enim piscatores, ut opinor, sagenas implent pelle ceti, neque gurgustium piscium capite illius." The text is *Iob*, xl, 26.

Roland's commentary followed his *Summa*, to which he refers in it; ibid. 118-123. Hence he may have used Hugh of St. Cher's postill, compiled soon after 1230.

25 William of Auxerre, *Summa aurea*, ed. cit. fol. 243va: Solutio: "ut dicit beatus Augustinus, lex fuit data perfectis in signum, duris et superbis in onus et flagellum, rudibus et mamotrectis in pedagogum"; ibid., fol. 101ra: "Lex data est rudibus in pedagogum, duris in flagellum, perfectis in signum."

See *Gal.* iv, 24: *Itaque lex paedagogus noster fuit in Christo,* also *Mat.* xxiii, 4; *Luc.* xi, 46. The saying occurs in various forms, as in Peter the Chanter's *Summa*, ed. J.-A. Dugauquier, *Analecta mediaevalia Namurcensia* iv (1954) 13: "Queritur de sacramentis legalibus que data sunt in signum perfectorum et iugum superborum et pedagogum infirmorum." It is found earlier in *Sententie divine pagine, Sententie Anselmi, Ysagoge in theologiam*; see the references given by Dugauquier, ibid; also Hugh of St. Victor, ed. O. Lottin, "Questions inédites de Hugues de Saint-Victor", RTAM xxvi (1959) 202, no. 27: "Multis de causis data est lex... Quibusdam de se presumentibus data est in onus... Quibusdam, scilicet perfectis, ut Moysi et Aaron et aliis iustis, data est in signum...."

None of the editors has identified the saying as a quotation.

killed their unwanted wives. William goes on to consider the objection that certain precepts were absurd. He tackles it apropos of a classic puzzle: why did the priest who sacrificed the red heifer have to cleanse himself afterwards? Rabbinic tradition, though William may not have known it, also regarded the precept (*Num.* xix, 1-10) as obscure: King Solomon understood the causes of all the sacrifices except that of the red heifer.[26] William classifies the impurity incurred by the priest as "burdensome"; he compares it to the ban on eating pork. Neither precept had any other literal cause or reason: the true cause must be sought in allegory or morality. Pork was forbidden in order to signify that we should not imitate a dirty, greedy animal. The sacrifice of the red heifer signified the Eucharist: the celebrant must beware of sullying his conscience after performing the holy rites. William at least allowed historical reality to precepts for which he could find no literal cause or reason beyond the fact that they were intended to be burdensome.[27]

Some theologians made an effort to clarify the link between St. Augustine's first and third phrases: the Law was given as a sign to the perfect and as a tutor to the simple. They asked themselves what it was like for the simple people, who had to perform burdensome, and to them incomprehensible duties. Simon of Tournai in his *Summa* (towards 1165) compared them to the simple laymen of his own day, who would recite the Lord's prayer with devotion, but without understanding; they knew only that it profited them to salvation.[28] Roland of Cremona probed further. The very fact that some precepts of the Law put a strain on belief would lead simple Jews to enquire from spiritual men or prophets what the true meaning was. Roland instances the sending of the scapegoat into the wilderness, carrying the sins of Israel written on a scroll tied to its head, and the apparent nonsense in

26 Quoted by Maimonides, *Guide of the Perplexed* iii, 26, translated by S. Pines with introduction and notes by L. Strauss (Chicago 1963) 507-8. The source is given by the editors.

27 *Summa aurea*, op. cit. fol. 243va: "Erant igitur multa in lege que ad litteram non habebant aliquam causam sue institutionis nisi onus et flagellum; secundum vero allegoriam et moralitatem causam aliquam habebant, sicut quod iudei non comederent carnes porcinas ad litteram non habebat aliquam causam nisi onus, sed secundum moralitatem patet ratio; non enim debemus imitari gulosos et immundos. Similiter immunditia illa, quam contrahebat sacerdos ex immolatione vitule rufe, tantum instituta fuit in onus secundum litteram, sed secundum moralitatem sacerdos ille qui immolabat vitulam rufam significabat sacerdotem nostrum qui confixit eucharistiam, qui postquam celebravit timere debet ne indigne contrectaverit. Unde immundum se debet reputare usque ad vesperem, id est usque ad contritionem que est finis et consumptio peccati".

28 Quoted by Landgraf, op. cit. 32: "Litteralis doctrina non erat superflua rudibus, licet non caperent spiritualem intelligentiam, quia venerabantur litteram continentem spiritualem intelligentiam.....Quo modo nunc aliquis simplex profert dominicam orationem non intelligens eam, et devotione prolationis et veneratione littere citra eius intellectum, quod orat, imperat et salvatur...."

the promise on the oldest and the old stores.[29] The Dominican friar, belonging to a later generation than Simon of Tournai, thought more highly of the intelligence to be found among the "simple". Both men were feeling their way towards a question which would be raised still later: why did the spiritual leaders and prophets of the Old Testament keep simple Jews in the dark, instead of enlightening them on the mystical significance of the legal precepts? Why did they fail to imitate Christian preachers, who expounded the spiritual senses of Scripture from their pulpits?

These were fringe problems, raised *en passant.* Theologians naturally took more interest in the effects of observance on the Old Testament Jews. What merit did observance of *legalia* confer? How far was it meritorious and justificatory? They had to harmonise many conflicting texts from the Bible and the Fathers.[30] A more positive evaluation of observance came slowly to the fore. It had been generally accepted that faith in God's promises as a ground for obedience conferred merit: the righteous men of the Old Testament were justified, even though they had to wait for deliverance until Christ came to save them.[31] Theologians reached agreement on the effects of circumcision at an early stage: circumcision had the same effect as baptism in that it freed from original sin.[32] The parallel between baptism and circumcision was so current as to find expression in poetry:

Circumcisa caro lavit sub lege reatus,
illud agens quod agit fons sub cruce sanctificatus,

wrote Hildebert of Lavardin (d. 1133).[33] The efficacy of other sacraments and ceremonies of the Old Law offered more difficulty and provoked much discussion. Eventually it came to be held that they did not confer grace, as did Christian sacraments; nor was observance meritorious in itself; but faith and charity sufficed to make observance meritorious and justificatory. The simple did not need to have explicit faith in the inner meaning of *legalia*; general belief in the Law's divine

29 Quoted ibid. 58-59: "Non enim poterat aliquis homo, qui sensum haberet, credere, quod ideo, quod hircus portabat cedulam, in qua erant scripta peccata iudeorum, in desertum, quod ideo eis erant dimissa peccata. Et ideo cogebantur credere in aliquem venturum, qui dimitteret peccata, vel ad minus cogebantur querere a viris spiritualibus vel a prophetis, quid hoc esset, et ipsi eis exposuisse misterium et ita fidem acquisivissent, et ita iustificati fuissent.... Similiter aliquid erat in lege, quod nullo modo poterat intelligi ad litteram....Istud cogebat iudeos recurrere ad spiritualem intelligentiam, et ita quodam modo iustificabat eos...."

30 Landgraf, op. cit. 59-60.

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid. 61-108.

33 *Carmina minora* no. 39 II, ed. A. B. Scott (Teubner 1969) 29. There is no evidence for the date of no. 39.

character and charity they did need. William of Auxerre and others reached a clearer formulation by distinguishing between *opus operans* and *opus operatum*. William answers the question "whether *legalia* justified" as follows:

> The *opus operans* is the action itself, that is the sacrifice of a bull or a lamb, which justified when it was done in charity. The *opus operatum* is the actual flesh of the bull or lamb which was sacrificed, which certainly did not justify. In the New Law, on the other hand. both *opus operans* and *opus operatum* justify, because the flesh of Christ (the *opus operatum*) is justificatory. Thus, when it is asked whether the sacraments of the Old Law justified, we grant that they did as *opus operans*, as the foregoing reasons have proved; but they did not justify as *opus operatum*.[34]

The outcome of discussion had been to raise *legalia* to a higher level than the Lombard had allowed them in his *Sentences*. By the early 1220s a more indulgent view was being taken of observance, if not of the literal content of *legalia*.

Perhaps the Catharist heretics in Italy and the *terra Albigensium* prompted the change of attitude. Cathars rejected the Old Testament as devilish: it emanated from the god of this bad visible world, in their view. Hence they forced defenders of the Catholic Church to stress the divine origin and beneficient character of *legalia*. Preaching missions and debates with heretics before and during the Albigensian crusades brought a spate of tracts against the heretics.[35] The crisis must have made an impression on teachers in the northern schools: some joined in polemic. Although its effect is elusive, we can suppose that the crisis stimulated thought in two ways: the Cathars made an arbitrary use of the spiritual interpretation, dismissing the literal sense altogether in favour of a spiritual sense, where it suited them, They therefore brought out the need for careful definition of the relationship between the senses in Catholic exegesis.[36] By attacking the Old Law as wholly evil, they led

34 *Summa aurea*, op. cit. fol. 243va. On the origin of the distinction between *opus operans* and *opus operatum* see Landgraf, op. cit. 54-60.

35 See Christiane Thouzellier, *Catharisme et Valdéisme en Languedoc à la fin du* XII*e et au début du* XIII*e siècle*, 2nd ed. (Paris/Louvain 1969).

36 Durand of Huesca, a Valdesian who returned to Catholicism and wrote against the heretics, gives examples of how the Cathars interpreted Gospel texts according to the spiritual sense only; he replies to them that the mystical sense does not destroy, but derives from the literal or historical sense; ed. Christiane Thouzellier, *Une Somme anti-cathare. Le liber contra Manichaeos de Durand de Huesca* (Spicilegium sacrum Lovaniense. Etudes et documents xxxii, 1964) 94, 149, 150, 159, 207. But Durand uses the mystical sense in a confused and ambiguous way himself on *Job* xxviii, 6: *Locus sapphiri lapides eius* etc.: "Sed nos sensum eorum exuflando, quia istorice non potest apte intelligi, ad sensum misticum recurramus....Et sic intelligenda est predicta sentencia beatissimi Iob, ab hereticis depravata" (258). His mystical interpretation is that the earth signifies the Synagogue, the source of Scripture, and the holy Jews of the Old Testament. What he has done is to reject the "literal sense" because it contains a metaphor, and pass straight to the allegorical

Catholic theologians to think more deeply about its literal sense as a guide to God's chosen people. The dualist heresies may explain in part why Maimonides' *Guide of the Perplexed* found eager readers, when it reached the schools in its Latin translation.

Maimonides or Rabbi Moses (1135-1204) finished his *Guide* soon after 1190.[37] Its contents interest us here only in so far as it deals with the Law. Maimonides, as a Jewish philosopher and practicing Jew, had much the same aim as his predecessor Philo Judaeus (d. soon after 40 A. D.). He wanted to harmonise the Law with a philosophic account of the deity and the cosmos, without compromising its sacred and binding character for Jews. Philo solved his problem by presenting the Law as an allegory, though he regarded its literal sense as true and binding on his people. The content of philosophy had changed since then. Maimonides had to take another road. He read Plato's *Republic* and noted its philosopher kings, also Aristotle's *Politics* with its insistence on the common good as a criterion for good government. The Jews for whom he wrote were perplexed by the untidiness and irrationality of their Law. Maimonides guided them not by allegorising, but by rationalising. He defended the political and religious value of the Law as it stood. He presented Moses in the dual role of a prophet and of a philosopher ruler, transmitting wise laws for the constitution and running of the Jewish state. The Law as a whole united the tribes of Israel and joined them together as a community, whose cult brought social and religious cohesion. Maimonides dwelt on the justice and mercy of many precepts and on the ethical values inculcated by commands such as those concerning good treatment of neighbours and pity to birds and beasts. Such precepts had "clear utility". His main argument on those precepts whose utility was not so clear amounted to a wide application of the principle that sacrifices and ceremonies aimed at weaning the Jews from idolatry. Moses taught his people to avoid the superstitions and pagan rites of the Egyptians and other gentiles, with whom they had contacts, by prescribing a cult which bore no resemblance to any other. This dictated the choice of animals to be offered as sacrifices and the mode of slaughter, for example. Maimonides "traces an impressive, but quite unhistorical picture of paganism in biblical times" in order to contrast Mosaic to pagan worship. The Jews, emerging from slavery in

sense. Mlle Thouzellier dates his *Liber* 1222-1223, *Catharisme*, op. cit. 299. Although, as she shows, Durand had had a good education and was well-read, he was out of touch with the northern schools, where the confusion between the metaphorical and the mystical senses of Scripture was being cleared up at the time.

37 On Maimonides' life and writings see G. Vajda, "La pensée religieuse de Maïmonide", *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* ix (1966) 29-49, where a full bibliography is given.

Egypt and tainted by gentile customs, needed settled rules and prescribed ritual; without such precepts, they would have lapsed into idol worship like their neighbours. Blood sacrifices, prohibitions and purifications all led them to honour God and to feel a holy awe in his presence. Maimonides does not explain why a code adapted to the state of Jewish society at a particular point in its history should retain its value after paganism had disappeared.[38] This failure on his part could only increase his appeal to Christian readers, since they could fill the gap in his argument. They saw *legalia* as a passing phase in the history of salvation.

His explanation had the further advantage that the general covered the particular. He presented the ceremonial precepts as "God's gracious ruse" to draw men to himself;[39] hence not every detail need have a cause assigned to it. Worship called for rules and regulations. Numbers and kinds of offerings had to be specified; but specification was not always significant in detail. The whole Law commanded nothing absurd; its seemingly petty orders could be subsumed in its general plan, to provide for the common good of Israel.

The perplexing reproaches made by the prophets against sacrifices, and Ezechiel's saying that the precepts were not good (xx, 25) fell into place quite easily. Maimonides could explain the text of Jeremias: *When I brought your forefathers out of Egypt, I gave them no commands about whole-offering and sacrifice* (vii, 22), a dictum, he says, "which has been regarded as difficult by everyone whose words I have seen or heard."[40] The first intention of the Law was worship of the one true God. The sacrifices, prescribed at a later stage, were only means to an end. The prophets blamed the Jews for neglecting the first intention; God reproaches his people through his prophets:

> You, however, came and abolished this end, while holding fast to what has been done for its sake. For you have doubted my existence...And still you continue to repair to the temple of the Lord, offering sacrifices, which are things that have not been intended in the first intention.[41]

The *Guide* offered reasons to an age in love with reason. It had another point of contact with scholastic exegesis: its author shared the philosophers' low opinion of the capacities of the common people. The Law gave to the vulgar all they needed to know in the perfect city.[42]

38 Ibid. 46.
39 *Guide* iii, 32 and 45, ed. cit. 526, 580.
40 Ibid. iii, 26, 27, 508-510.
41 Ibid. iii, 32, 530-531.
42 Vajda, op. cit. 48.

Moses and the élite understood the philosophy behind the words. Scripture included all science and metaphysics. Significantly, Maimonides writes that to forbid formal worship and sacrifices would have been equivalent to forbidding formal prayers in favour of pure meditation in his own day.[43] His belief in a hierarchy of wisdom corresponded to the Christian teaching that the élite of the Old Testament already belonged to the New, in that they perceived the prefiguration of the Gospel in *legalia*. Hence the *Guide* accorded with Christian tradition in presenting the Law as wholesome for all, sufficient for the people, and a mine of deeper wisdom for the élite.

There is still no study of the text of the Latin translation.[44] The *Guide* was written in Arabic, but was soon translated into Hebrew and thence into Latin. Michael Scot has been credited with the Latin version on plausible evidence. He would have made it in Italy after leaving Toledo "by 1220 at the latest".[45] It used to be thought that William of Auvergne was the first schoolman to quote from the Latin version about 1230. We now know that Alexander of Hales O.F.M. anticipated him. Alexander quotes Maimonides' classification of the Old Testament precepts under fourteen heads in his *Glossa* on the *Sentences*, given as lectures at Paris while he was still a secular, probably 1223-1227.[46] He ascribes the quotation, copied in full, to "quidam expositor, licet non sanctus". As it comes towards the end of his *Glossa*, we can deduce that the Latin *Guide* had reached Paris not long before 1227, and that it made a quick entry into the schools. Alexander of Hales and William of Auvergne were followed by John of La Rochelle in his contribution to the *Summa* which goes under the name of Alexander, by Vincent of Beauvais O.P., the encyclopaedist, and by St Thomas.[47] The *Guide*

43 *Guide* iii, 32, 526. The two central places in Scripture for philosophic and mystical teaching were the account of creation and Ezechiel's vision of the chariot.

44 F. van Steenberghen has noted this as one desideratum among many, *La philosophie au XIIIe siècle* (Louvain/Paris 1966) 339. For a list and analysis of some Latin MSS and the early editions, see W. Kluxen, "Literargeschichtliches zum lateinischen Moses Maimonides", RTAM xxi (1954) 23-35.

45 L. Thorndike, *Michael Scot* (London 1965) 28-29. Michael was at Bologna by 1220. It is not known when he entered the service of the emperor Frederich II, perhaps in 1220, perhaps not until 1224; ibid. 32-33.

46 *Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi* ii (Quaracchi 1954) 471 (*Bibl. Franc. schol. med. aevi* xiv). The quotation is from the *Guide* iii, 36. It occurs in the earliest recension of the *Glossa*, designated by the editors as 'A'; a later recension, 'E', of the 1230s, adds 'Moyses' after "licet non sanctus". On the dates of the various books of the *Glossa*, see xii, 110*-116*, xiii, 21*; xv, 18* of *Bibl.Franc.* etc.

47 The best account of the Latin translation and its influence on the schoolmen is still J. Guttmann's "Der Einflüss etc." in *Moses Ben Maimon*, ed. W. Bacher, M. Brann and M. Simonsen (Leipzig 1908) 135-230. Guttmann could not have known of the recent research on Michael Scot nor of the quotation of the *Guide* in Alexander's *Glossa*, which was not discovered until 1946.

reached Oxford in time to be quoted by Richard Fishacre O.P. in his commentary on the *Sentences* about 1243; he quotes Rabbi Moses at least three times on the literal reasons for *caeremonialia*.[48] It is an impressive picture: the *Guide*, probably translated into Latin by Michael Scot in Italy soon after 1220, was used by a secular teacher at Paris soon before 1227, then by another secular, William of Auvergne, and then by Franciscans and Dominicans alike. A book catches on if it broaches problems which concern its readers and if its answers forestall or put more clearly what readers had in mind beforehand. The *Guide* had just this relevance in the early thirteenth century.

Still, much depended on the first Christian writer who sponsored the *Guide* in a big way. William of Auvergne was the first to unlock and display its teaching. Any suspicion of unorthodoxy on his part would have compromised it. On the other hand, a timid use would have blurred its significance. William was a theologian of high repute and unimpeachable orthodoxy. He grasped its meaning and drew out the implications boldly. We shall see how he fitted it into the framework of his doctrine. His commitment to it was so personal and so daring as to pose problems to his successors. We shall not understand St. Thomas's approach to the Old Law unless we begin by looking at its presentation in William's *De fide et legibus*. Since his ideas and his temperament coloured his use of the *Guide*, we must start by making a general study of William.

48 MS Oxford, Oriel College 43, foll. 333ra, 336rb, 338va on *Sent.* IV, i, 4,5,7. Fishacre quotes the opinions that uncleanness was instituted in the Law in order to induce feelings of reverence and fear, that all ceremonies were intended to strengthen faith in God and to prevent idolatry, and that regulations on circumcision had reasonable causes. On Fishacre see A. B. Emden, *A Bibliographical Register of the University of Oxford to A. D. 1500* ii (Oxford 1958) 685, and especially D. A. Callus, "The Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford", *Proceedings of the British Academy* xxix (1944) 259.

II

William of Auvergne

William came from Aurillac in the Auvergne.[1] He studied at Paris and then taught as a doctor of theology from sometime before 1222 to 1228; he was a canon of Notre-Dame by 1223. A disputed election to the bishopric of Paris brought him to Rome in 1228 to forward an appeal lodged by his chapter. Gregory IX quashed the election as uncanonical and provided and consecrated William to the bishopric, which he held until his death in 1249. His career as scholar and bishop corresponds to the ideal picture painted by masters of the Sacred Page in their sermons and lectures: the scholar must prepare himself for pastoral care by his study of Scripture; as master he will lecture, dispute and preach; finally, when raised to prelacy, he will practice what he has learnt and taught to his pupils. William strongly resembles Robert Grosseteste, his contemporary, bishop of Lincoln 1235-1253, another living model of a scholar bishop, as the scholars saw him.[2] Both William and Robert threw themselves heart and soul into the duties of pastoral care, striving to reform abuses, making visitations, preaching and promoting study, giving spiritual guidance and befriending the mendicant friars as precious helpers in their task. Both were strict disciplinarians. Both had to negotiate difficult business with their respective governments and with the papal Curia, though William showed more diplomacy and less intransigeance than his English colleague. Their output as scholars also has features in common. Both had an exceptionally wide range of interests. Neither of them used the normal scholastic mode of presentation, partly because they lacked the necessary feeling for system and order, and partly for the more positive reason that it would have cramped their style. They preferred to preach and teach and discuss theological problems in the same treatise, instead of using separate compartments. Further, they shared a rare gift of originality. The resemblance ends at this point, since each was original in his own way.

We have no comprehensive study of William, but detailed work on early scholasticism has built him up as an innovator: "He was one of the great thirteenth-century thinkers and has received less than his due only

1 See the notice and bibliography by P. Viard in *Dictionnaire de la spiritualité* vi (1967) 1182-92.

2 M. Gibbs and J. Lang, *Bishops and Reform 1215-1272* (Oxford 1934); *Robert Grosseteste Scholar and Bishop*, ed. D. A. Callus (Oxford 1953, reprinted 1969); S. Gieben, "Bibliographia universa Roberti Grosseteste ab an. 1473 ad an. 1969", *Collectanea Franciscana* xxxix (1969) 362-418.

because even greater men followed him".[3] His early lectures on *Proverbs*, *Ecclesiastes* and the *Canticle* show him as one of the first to bring the *Libri naturales* to bear on exegesis and to argue against current doubts on the immortality of the soul. His praise of the new religious Orders shows his receptivity.[4] His lectures on the *Canticle* struck Dr. Riedlinger as a marked contrast to the average school treatment of this book. William dwelt on the corruption of the Church, the bride of Christ, in more personal, violent language than any other exegete of the time permitted himself. His satire bit so deep that Hugh of Saint-Cher, basing his postill on William's, felt obliged to muzzle him. Hence William on the *Canticle* circulated through a Dominican medium with the mordancy softened.[5] We shall see how a Franciscan applied the same process to *De legibus*. William's *De bono et malo*, another early work (1223-1228), has been edited recently. It brings out his interest in human nature and his fondness for Cicero's *De officiis*.[6] His *Magisterium divinale*, a collection of tracts put together to form a *Summa*, serves the historian as a quarry for discovery of new or budding ideas. William's extensive early use of Arabic philosophers and scientists has been noted.[7] He was a precursor of St. Thomas in seeking rational proof for God's existence, rejecting St. Anselm's ontological argument.[8] He was a precursor, too, in his teaching on the unity of the soul; he was original on the problem of synderesis; he was one of the first Paris masters to attach liberty to the will[9] and to arrive at the concept of *Limbus puerorum*.[10]

Nowhere does he strike a line of his own more forcibly than in *De legibus*, which concerns us here. It formed part V (together with its twin, *De fide*) of the *Magisterium divinale*. A reference in *De legibus* to his *De sacramentis*, written about 1228, and another in his *De universo*, 1231-1236, date *De legibus* between these years. It therefore belongs to the beginning of his episcopate, probably about 1230.[11]

3 R. Weberberger, "*Limbus puerorum*. Zur Entstehung eines theologischen Begriffes", RTAM xxxv (1968) 128.

4 B. Smalley, "Some Thirteenth-Century Commentaries on the Sapiential Books", *Dominican Studies* ii (1949) 326-337; for MS Arsenal 64 read 84.

5 *Die Makellosigkeit der Kirche in den lateinischen Hohenliedkommentaren des Mittelalters* (BGPTM xxxviii, 3, 1958) 241-256.

6 J. R. O'Donnell, "Tractatus Magistri Guillelmi Alvernensis *De bono et malo*", *Mediaeval Studies* viii (1946) 245-299.

7 R. de Vaux, *Notes et textes sur l'Avicennisme latin aux confins des XIIe-XIIIe siècles* (Paris 1934) 17-22, 37-38.

8 A. Masnovo, *Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a S. Tommaso*, 2nd ed. (Milan 1945-1946) i, 41.

9 O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale aux XII*e *et XIII*e *siècles* (Louvain 1942-1960) i, 463; ii, 134-137, 340.

10 R. Weberberger, op. cit. 128-133.

11 J. Kramp, "Des Wilhelm von Auvergne *Magisterium divinale*", *Gregorianum* i (1920) 538-

William distinguishes himself from contemporaries by his grasp of a situation. He listened to men who did not raise their objections in formal academic debate. Hence he uncovers areas of doubt which might have gone unrecorded. To take a striking example: he attacks those who hold that the adherent of any faith, law or sect may be saved, provided that he believes sincerely that it comes from God. His deeds are pleasing to God, they say, provided that he does them for God's sake. William gives their reasons. An exclusive view of religion would mean that the multitude of the damned and the tiny proportion of the saved would reflect on God's mercy. Further, Christians presume in claiming salvation for themselves alone; and as only good Christians will be saved it follows that hell will be overcrowded: God could not be so pitiless as that. The background to such doubts was probably disputations with Jews and conversions to Judaism on the one hand.[12] The Church reacted by tightening regulations against the Jews and by burning the Talmud at Paris; William took a leading part in this. On the other hand, Islam was victorious in the Holy Land and the Reconquest of Spain disclosed hordes of Muslims, who resisted conversion. It was natural that Christians should wonder whether their religion counted as the only true one.[13] But William exposes an elusive frame of mind when he selects it for frontal attack. He does not say who the doubters were, only that they were numerous. He answers them by pointing out first that the doubter should have recourse to prayer: God will surely enlighten one who seeks the truth earnestly. Secondly, he compares the natural and supernatural orders: nature produces many vile in contrast to very few precious things; hence we need not be surprised that few go to heaven. Thirdly, he argues from God's love of justice.[14] St. Thomas's *Contra gentiles* shows up as a more sophisticated

584; ii (1921) 42-78. I have used a photographic reproduction of the Paris/Orleans, 1674 edition of William's *Opera*. My references will be to pages of vol. i. I have slightly altered punctuation and spelling. Collation of this edition with an early manuscript for selected passages is reassuring; variants are few and do not materially alter the sense where they occur; see appendix, below, p. 69.

12 For some recent work on disputations between Jews and Christians and on judaising Christians, see B. Z. Wacholder, "Cases of Proselytizing in the Tosafist Responsa", *Jewish Quarterly Review* N.S. li (1960-1961) 288-315; S. Stein, *Jewish-Christian Disputations in Thirteenth-Century Narbonne. An Inaugural Lecture delivered at University College London* (London 1969).

13 Doubt found collective expression in the parable of the three rings. Three sons each inherit a ring given him by his father. The rings look alike, but one is genuine and the others counterfeit. They stand for the three faiths, Christian, Jewish and Muslim. God, the Father in heaven, alone knows which is the true one. For variants of the story and its significance see M. Penna, *La parabola dei tre anelli e la toleranza nel medio evo* (Turin 1953).

14 *De Legibus* xxi, p. 60. Lottin, op. cit., ii, 409-411, points out that William of Auxerre also taught that prayer would be efficacious for the solution of doubts. There is a great contrast, however, between the types of doubt envisaged: William of Auxerre thought in terms of casuistry

argument on the same theme. It aimed at providing a reasoned defence of the Christian faith for use against Jews and Muslims and against Christians led astray by Greco-Arabic philosophy.[15] William's arguments are unconvincing in comparison, just as the objections that he answers are less intellectual. But William at least gives the simpler doubters a right to be heard. His willingness to confront objections will help to explain his attitude to exegesis.

His use of the *Guide* is already well known. It has been asked why he never quoted the author by name, whereas he did not scruple to name Avicenna. The reason is surely that Avicenna died in 1037 and Maimonides in 1204; hence he came within the conventional span during which later writers would not quote him by name; near contemporaries were called *quidam* or *aliqui.*[16] In the same way, Alexander of Hales had quoted him as *quidam expositor, sed non sanctus*, to distinguish him from Christian scholars, as we have seen. William advertised instead of concealing his debt to Maimonides. Alexander quoted from the *Guide* once only; he did not mention the author's rationalisation of precepts which had no obvious reason, such as the ban on wearing clothes woven of wool and flax together (*Deut.* xxii, 11). Such precepts were figurative, though Alexander accepted that they had a literal meaning (if not a reason) for the Old Testament Jews.[17] William, on the contrary, took over the leading idea of Maimonides: *legalia* aimed at weaning the Jews from idolatry; hence they forbad all practices which recalled pagan rites. William echoed the *Guide* on other reasons: the offering of unblemished beasts in sacrifice taught the honour due to God; the burning of offerings and the sending out of the scapegoat signified repentance, in that sins were symbolically destroyed or cast out, in order to teach the sinner to set his sins behind him.[18] He mentions the marvellous cures reported in the *Guide* in discussing the precepts on leprosy.[19] The influence goes deeper than mere quotation.

and scruples of conscience; William of Auvergne was concerned with the more fundamental question of rival religions.

15 M.-D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1950) 247-254.

16 The reasons previously suggested (see Masnovo, op. cit. i, 118-124) are that William would not quote Maimonides by name because he was a Jew, and alternatively that the *Guide* was presented as a compilation, rather than as an original work. Neither reason convinces me.

17 *Glossa*, op. cit. 460-461: "Nam alia sunt praecepta mystica, alia non. Mystica autem, alia sunt caerimonialia, alia sacramentalia...Caerimonalia sunt quorum non est evidens ratio, quale est hoc: *Non indues contextum ex lino et lana.* Haec autem et illa dicuntur figurativa. Sed figurativa sunt rei faciendae, aut rei futurae....Quae autem sunt figurativa rei faciendae manserunt in thurificio et aqua benedicta." Ibid. 543: "Erit ergo duplex adimpletio (Veteris Legis), scilicet cum sacramenta Novae Legis succedunt aliis, et cum succedunt litteralibus intellectibus caeremonialium intellectus spirituales."

18 *Guide* III, 46, 584, 589, 591; *De legibus* viii, 38, 40.

19 Ibid. xi, 43.

William made the *Guide* his own. He will elaborate on the arguments, finding further evidence for those pagan practices and superstitions, which according to Maimonides the Law combatted by prescribing their opposites.[20] Even more interesting, he criticises Maimonides openly or by implication, in the belief that he, as a Christian bishop, could give better reasons for the literal causes of precepts than a Jewish philosopher could do.

William is both a personal and digressive writer. Professor Gilson points to the influence of Avicenna on his dialogue with his reader, addressed as *tibi*, and in his constant use of phrases like *revertamur ad id in quo eramus*;[21] the former at least could have derived from Maimonides as well. It will clarify his thesis, therefore, if we begin with his conclusion and then work backward through his proofs. He claims to have made the following points:[22] 1) seemingly absurd precepts had just and reasonable causes and hence must be understood in their literal sense; they were imposed on a simple people, needing to be weaned from idolatry; the time demanded them; 2) many similar bans obtain "among us" even today; certain practices are forbidden as superstitious and recalling Judaism or "Saracenism". All the more reason why the Old Law should have warded off contamination.

Why did William feel a compulsion to defend the literal reasons for *legalia*? The *Guide* stimulated him to go one better in doing so; but other influences worked on him. They appear in his account of the nature and purpose of law in general at the beginning of *De legibus*: nothing but the best was worthy of the divine lawgiver. Hence the Old Law had to fit into his concept of what law ought to be.

He begins with a few remarks on the law of nature, stressing its intrinsic character: laws imposed from without are not laws at all, properly speaking; moral values reside in the soul, radiating from divine wisdom.[23] St. Isidore's list of the attributes of good human law supplies the framework for William's. Isidore wrote:

> Erit autem lex honesta, iusta, possibilis, secundum naturam, secundum

20 Ibid. xiii, 44.

21 "Avicenne en Occident au moyen âge", AHDLMA xxxvi (1969) 91-93.

22 *De legibus* xv, 46: "Licet autem ex his clarum tibi sit, et merito, quod iuxta litteram intelligenda sunt ea quae absurda videntur esse in lege, et quia causas habent iustas et rationabiles suae praeceptionis et suae prohibitionis, et quod tempus illud et populi ruditas et ineruditio idolatriaeque proximitas et vicinitas praecepta et prohibitiones huiusmodi requirebant, ostendimus etiam tibi quod magna pars eorum etiam apud nos extant, sicut prohibitiones observationum superstitiosarum, quas proxime enumeravimus, et quia etiam tales praeceptiones et prohibitiones fiunt apud nos propter speciem Judaismi et Saracenismi aliarumque superstitionum suspiciones. Et propter hoc merito ex similibus causis similes praeceptiones et prohibitiones primitivo illo populo, et idolatriae innutrito et circumquaque obsesso, multo fortius faciendae fuerunt."

23 O. Lottin, *Le droit naturel chez Saint Thomas d'Aquin et ses prédécesseurs* (Bruges 1931) 40, n. 1.

consuetudinem patriae, loco temporique conveniens, necessaria, utilis, manifesta quoque...[24]

William renders this in his own words, quoting a current dictum in addition:

Dicamus igitur quia lex verissima ratione nihil aliud est quam honestas legibilis, id est descripta religionis praeceptis, iuxta quod dictum videtur: lex est scriptum assistens honestis, prohibens contrarium...[25] Lex est honestas integra seu completa, legibilis et descripta litteris et ad observantiam imperata.[26]

The definition of good law sets the tone for William's treatment of *legalia*. The outward observance imposed on the Jews must have echoed the precepts of the law of nature and have measured up to the standards set by Isidore for good human laws. Taking the Ciceronian *honestum* as a starting point, he presents the Law of Moses as an *alphabetum honestatis*. True, it formed part, not the whole, of the perfect, eternal Law of the Gospel. Its function was to prepare an uneducated people to receive the Gospel, by teaching them their *alphabetum honestatis*, according to their limited understanding, "quia naturalis honestatis regulas continet et mandata." William justifies his description of the Old Law, which he will then prove in detail:

The whole Law contains nothing which lacks a rational cause for commanding, forbidding or narrating. There is nothing absurd or irrational in it, and this appears clearly in many items which have obvious worth and usefulness.[27]

His defence aims at showing that the Old Law reached Isidorian standards. It was worthy or decorous (*honesta*); it accorded with nature; it was suited to its time and place; it was necessary and useful, just and possible; it was manifest, having been published and set down in writing. William realised only too well that his predecessors had found

24 *Etym.* II, x; V, xxi, ed. W. Lindsay (Oxford 1911). This passage from St. Isidore forms the subject of an article of the *Summa* (Ia2ae, q. 95, a. 3). It was so well known previously that we find it in a gloss added to a copy of the *Gloss* on the Psalter, soon after the mid twelfth century, MS Paris, B.N. lat. 105: *Beatus vir.* Ab honesto incipit. *In cathedra pestilentie non sedit.* Ab utili. *Erit tanquam lignum.* A possibili.

See B. Smalley, "Les commentaires bibliques de l'époque romane", *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale* iv (1961) 19-20.

25 This dictum, "lex...contrarium", was current in the thirteenth century, with slight variations. St. Albert ascribed it to Cicero, but it is not in his works; see O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, op. cit. ii, 16-17.

26 *De legibus* i, 18. I cannot find the actual verbal source of William's definition of law; it may be his own.

27 Ibid. ii, 29. See also xvi, 47: "Et quoniam iam defendimus et declaravimus litteralem intelligentiam legis, in his quibus absurda penitus et nullatenus possibilia videbatur..."

many precepts quite the opposite; they had been regarded as unworthy, unfitting, useless or impossible to observe.

He first defends the multiplicity of laws: why did the *alphabetum honestatis* have to include so many precepts? Maimonides explained it on the grounds that the Jews had to be warned against many diverse kinds of idolatry. William adds two other reasons: children cannot understand generalisations; they need instruction in detail, just as bread must be broken before they can chew it;[28] secondly, God provided what would occupy their minds; the Law offered ample matter for study.[29] Scarcity of books and fewness of precepts would have turned the Jews towards profane learning and would have led them astray. This danger appeared later in their history, especially when they were overrun by the Saracens. Then they studied pagan philosophy, which led them to apostatise, since many precepts began to look absurd and futile.[30] William had Maimonides' apologetic purpose in mind at this point in his argument. The *Guide* was written for perplexed Jews, who doubted in consequence of their philosophic studies.

We pass from content to enforcement. Maimonides justified the harsh penalties imposed by the Law in the interests of good order: "To the wicked the existence of a judge who renders tyranny impossible is harmful and grievous."[31] William heartily agrees. He discourses at length on the need for *disciplina*. Men still have to be forced as well as taught to act rightly. He sums up as follows:

> This is the surest and firmest ground (of the judicial penalties), that discipline must be applied, and not teaching only.[32]

He goes on to argue against those soft-brained persons who illogically disapprove of the death penalty, while accepting the need for lesser deterrents.[33] The Church, as he noted, still had to legislate against the survival of pagan practices in the form of superstition and magic: "We shall refute those errors concerning idols which have existed, and still do," he says in his preface.[34] Many Old Testament laws against idolatry had kept their relevance. Maimonides could have given even more

28 *De legibus* i, 24. A common analogy for God's condescension to human understanding; see R. W. Southern and F. S. Schmitt, *Memorials of St. Anselm*, op. cit. 274: apples have to be cut up for children on account of their soft teeth and small mouths.

29 This idea derives from Augustine's *De vera religione* xvii, PL 34, 136.

30 *De legibus* i, 24.

31 *Guide* II, 39, 380-1; III, 35, 536.

32 *De legibus* i, 27.

33 Ibid. William's experience as a bishop on the need for *disciplina* corresponded to St. Augustine's, though William does not quote him; see Peter Brown, *Augustine of Hippo* (London 1967) 236-241.

34 *De legibus*, 2.

weight to the argument in their favour. William's sharpest criticism of the *Guide* turns on the interpretation of *Deut.* xxii, 6: the wayfarer who finds a nest with a sitting bird in it may take the young, but must let her go, that he may prosper and have a long life. Maimonides grouped this text among precepts which inculcated pity: if God requires mercy towards birds and beasts, then how much more to men?[35] William dismisses the explanation as laughable and childish. Had pity been the object of the precept, then it would have been less cruel to take the hen bird and leave the young; the blessing attached to the precept, moreover, seems too great for so trivial an action. He explains it instead as directed against magicians, who used birds and their eggs or chicks for fertility rites and auguries: "Many fools still think it lucky to find certain objects and keep them as pledges of good fortune: old women cannot be weaned of the idea." Similarly, Christians still make incisions in the skin and carry figures, drawn or engraved, just as the Jews were forbidden to do (*Lev.* xix, 28); this is yet another detestable relic of idolatry. The Church today would sternly correct persons who observed Jewish or Saracen customs, even if these were harmless in themselves, such as refraining from servile work on Saturdays.[36] William draws on his experience as bishop and director of conscience here: he tells us in *De virtutibus* that he used to be consulted on temptations by demons.[37]

He also brings his personal scientific interests to bear on the diagnosis of leprosy by the priests of the Law. Earlier commentators had stumbled over the references to "leprosy in walls" (*Lev.* xiv, 36). Ralph of Flaix regarded it as the clearest proof of the absurdity of the Law *ad litteram*; others had followed him or had done their best to "save" its literal meaning.[38] William had no difficulty with the text. He had himself been questioned about a stone in a certain abbey, which was said to be "cancerous" because it was rotting away; and he had observed dry rot in wood.[39]

We see a gentler side of him when he christianises Old Testament worship. The sacrifices were not prescribed with the sole intention of weaning the Jews from idolatry, "as certain persons have held". *Quidam* refers to Maimonides, who wrote:

> The first intention of the Law consists only in your apprehending Me and not worshipping someone other than Me....Those laws concerning

35 *Guide* III, 48, 600.
36 *De legibus*, xiv, 45-46.
37 Ibid. xi, ed. cit. 131.
38 See above, p. 13, n. 8.
39 *De legibus*, xi, 42-43.

> sacrifices and repairing to the Temple were given only for the sake of this fundamental principle.[40]

William was hardly fair to his author, reading "*first* intention" as "one and only";[41] he could pick up hints on other purposes in the ritual precepts. However, he puts forward seven other reasons in addition to prevention of idolatry. The sacrifices were instituted to honour God and to teach the Jews to observe the rites which he alone had prescribed for them. The slaughter of animals signified God's justice and mercy; the Jews learnt the lesson that God in his justice could have visited them with death for their sins, instead of sparing them in his mercy. The act of sacrifice impressed on their minds what they read in their books. William invented a pious thought (*cogitatio*) which would have been used by those making sacrifice:

> Mors nobis imminebat quemadmodum istis animalibus, cui utique de iustitia tua tradere nos poteras, sed per misericordiam tuam vel liberati sumus vel liberari nos petimus, O Deus.

A cross-reference sends us to a later passage, where he invents prayers for use at sin offerings:

> He who slaughtered or burned the animals would state in deed, and also in word, as we believe: "The sins for which I offer these animals perish and vanish, just as they do".[42]

William wrote a treatise on Christian prayer, *De rhetorica divina*, the most popular of his books. It includes a choice of prayers for use by the faithful.[43] He could easily surmise what devotions would have suited the Israelites. The sacrifices were a memorial to divine goodness. The offerers gave part of them to God and kept part for themselves, to signify that they owed all to God's blessing. The sacrifices sanctified those who offered, cleansing them from the stains of their sins, by God's virtue and mercy. Here William commits himself to the much-discussed view that *legalia* sanctified.[44] They also brought men into closer relationship to God. The offering of gifts and sharing at the holy table made them seem in some way to be table-mates with him, just as the family table

40 *Guide* III, 32, 530; see also ibid. 527 and III, 29, 517-518 and III, 46, 582.

41 I checked the Latin translation of the *Guide* from MS Oxford, Bodl. 437, to see whether the translation had led William astray, but it has "prima intentio legis est", and "prima intentio...", foll. 91, 92, 93v, 94.

42 *De legibus*, ii, 29; xxiv, 72.

43 P. Viard, *Dict. de spiritualité* op. cit. 1190. He lists a "prayer to Moses" among them, which would be interesting, but it must be a mistake; I cannot find any prayer to Moses in *De rhetorica divina*.

44 He explains later that this was not *propria virtute*, in contrast to Christian sacraments. See below, p. 42.

brings men into closer relationship with their human parents. God indicated his presence from time to time by sending fire from heaven to consume his share of the sacrifices, as though in his stead. Sacrifices unified God's people, drawing many individuals together to make up one household and family. Sharing bodily food is the distinctive mark of the latter. Similarly sharing of spiritual food and drink makes one spiritual family and household. William defines "spiritual food and drink" as that which is hallowed, and where spiritual rather than bodily nourishment is sought. This definition enabled him to classify the Old Testament sacrificial meals as "spiritual". Finally, the sacrifices had a social-religious function in bringing men to worship together;[45] here again he draws on his experience:

> Food and drink cause men to assemble in the same place on the same occasion as nothing else does. That is why the Church has founded infirmaries, where physical refreshment is prepared; otherwise few or none would assemble there. Hence God in his great wisdom and mercy willed that food and drink should be shared in his house and at his altar, in order that the community of his people should be brought there and should be bound to them more closely. He willed that sacrifices should be sacred to him, in order that the people should partake of them as God's gifts and not as their own property, and as sacred, not common. The people would therefore acknowledge him as father of the family, who gave them life and food, and would refrain from evil, when they saw themselves admitted to communion or participation in holy things.[46]

William postulated that all his seven reasons for the sacrificial precepts would have been explained to the Jews in sermons. It could not have been otherwise. The wise and holy fathers of old would not have offered sacrifice without praises, blessings and discourses; they would not have left their people in total ignorance of divine matters. Who will believe that God's worship has ever lacked prayer and praise, seeing that these things are foremost and most pleasing to him in our services? The argument was hypothetical, as William knew. Evidence for prayers at sacrifice in the Old Testament is conspicuous by its absence. William got round it by suggesting that evidence had been lost, just as Maimonides had pointed to lost evidence on the nature of pagan

45 The *Guide* gave William a lead by implication on the subject of pilgrimage, III, 46, p. 592. The reason for the utility of pilgrimage is well known. For such a gathering results in a renewal of the Law, this being a consequence of people being affected by it and of the fraternity that comes about among them because of it. See also III, 39, 551 on the social function of the second tithe, which was to be spent on food in Jerusalem, and hence brought men together.

46 *De legibus*, ii, 29-30. The same point is made later: people would not frequent confraternity meetings unless cooked meals were provided; xxviii, 97.

practices.[47] "If these prayers and praises had come down to us", writes William, "they would have taught us clearly the causes and uses of this kind of rite".[48] A further reason for the sacrifices was to provide for the needs of the priests and leave them free to attend to divine service and to teach their people.[49]

William made a real effort to think himself back into Old Testament times. He tried to recreate the value and ethos of the Old Law, as administered by his predecessors, the levites, He could sympathise with them in their struggle to educate their flock. The Old Law, according to him, had a positive content, as well as a negative purpose against idolatry. Earlier Christian commentators had dwelt lovingly on the Tabernacle and its physical appearance. It took William to set up a pulpit beside the Jewish shrine. His historical method was anachronistic, in that he made the past look much like the present, as was usual in the middle ages. The interesting point is that he brought it to bear on the educative value of *legalia*, taken *ad litteram*.

Having expounded his own view, he turns to earlier exegesis. Commentators had interpreted the precepts all too often in a spiritual sense only. They had seen *legalia* as a veil or foreshadowing of the New Law and had neglected their literal value for the ancient Jews. William names no one, but he may well have directed his reproaches against Ralph of Flaix, since the latter's commentary on *Leviticus* was standard. The whole tradition, deriving from Origen and exemplified by Ralph comes in for criticism. Certain precepts had been classified as "absurd according to the letter". William turns the objection upside down. Absurd indeed they would have been, if they had lacked a literal meaning. The law-giver and his law would have been "barbarous", had they been incomprehensible. What could be sillier than to suppose that a wise prophet and lawgiver would have ordered his people to observe what they could not comprehend? It would have amounted to deception and mockery on his part. How could a leader and teacher fulfil his office unless he explained the law he gave? If he failed to do so, he would lead his people astray. To propound commandments which had no literal meaning, without announcing the fact, would have led the recipients to suppose a literal sense, where none was, or else left them, an ignorant people, to work out the secret, hidden meaning for themselves. Would a wise, loyal man refuse to speak openly to the people whom he had undertaken to teach? That would have involved him in

47 *Guide*, III, 29, 521.
48 *De legibus*, ii, 30.
49 Ibid.

fraud and dissimulation. William quotes a tag from rhetoric: "Sermo interpres animi est".[50] A lawgiver who refused to speak plainly would have concealed his mind instead of revealing it. Moses had followers, too. Would all later doctors of the law have left the people in ignorance of its hidden meaning? The prophets at least would have mentioned it, since God sent them to correct errors. According to the traditional view, the precepts and bans of the Old Law were addressed to the "new people", the Christians. They alone could understand the hidden meaning, which was reserved for them and not for the ancient Jews. William counters this objection. He begins by quoting St. Paul: *Now we know that what things soever the Law speaketh, it speaketh to them that are within the law* (*Rom.* iii, 19). He goes on to argue that the Law had no need to carry an inner, spiritual meaning for the benefit "of us, who were not yet there". There was no need for the Law to speak to us in figures after the Church had been established, for then the Gospel truth reached us, bare and plain. He thought it most unlikely that the whole Jewish people, dedicated for so long to the study of their Law, would not have discerned the error of taking it in its literal sense only, if there had been another. William ends by anticipating a query which might be raised. It occurred to him that he was claiming to understand the moral value and rational character of *legalia* better than "the modern Jews" did themselves: they ignored the literal reasons for their laws. Was he not making the literal sense as difficult to grasp as the spiritual? He answers that the learned men among the ancient Jews would have understood well enough. The uneducated could have been brought to understand quite easily, given the prevalence of idolatry around them, which supplied the most obvious reason. That their former knowledge has perished is due to the passage of time, to their afflictions and dispersal and to their neglect of study. The reasons for their negligence in studying their Law are avarice, to which the Jews are prone, and love of gentile philosophy.

To sum up: William has anticipated St. Thomas in accounting the whole intention of the sacred writer as included in the literal sense. Further, he was the first commentator, to my knowledge, to break away from a narrow verbal concept of "the letter". Medieval exegetes had been dogged by it. Even scholars who took the literal interpretation seriously had still thought in terms of the *superficies litterae*. When commenting on the literal sense of *legalia* they restricted themselves to the exact form of the rites prescribed and took small pains to bring out their meaning for the ancient Jews. True, William had the advantage of writing in the framework of a treatise, instead of lecturing on his text,

50 Ibid. xv, 46, from Cicero, *De Legibus* i, 10: "Interpresque mentis oratio..."

clause by clause, as was done in the schools; but he also benefited from his careful reading of the *Guide*. Now he must leave the *Guide* and pass to the spiritual sense of *legalia*. So far, he has never denied that the Law has a spiritual sense for Christians. He has merely insisted that it had a literal sense for the Jews, who could understand it and profit from its lessons. *De legibus* presents it as an *alphabetum honestatis* and not as a veil or cryptogram.

What will he make of the spiritual meaning? The answer is rather elusive: perhaps it was intended to be. Conventional passages alternate with eccentric ones. William first states the proposition that Law of necessity has not only a literal, but a manifold spiritual meaning "from God", deducible from the literal, which enlightens the mind and edifies the soul. He proves it from the Law and the prophets themselves.[51] Many texts show us that the Law had an inner meaning. David the psalmist, to quote only one illustration, prayed that his eyes might be opened to consider the wondrous things of the Law (*Ps*. cxviii, 18). He had wit enough to understand the literal meaning of the Law (which William has already described as comprehensible even to simple men); therefore, he must have prayed for understanding of its higher meaning. The proof texts are buttressed by an argument from analogy. A human master teaches the pupils in his school according to their individual needs; some are dull and others clever. How much more does God, the supreme teacher, adapt his lessons to his pupils' various grades of intelligence? The Scriptures offer infinite variety, like a table groaning with good fare, where each guest will find nourishment suited to his appetite. William then launches into praise of Scripture of a traditional kind.[52] It sounds like part of a *principium*, the lecture in praise of Scripture given by a doctor at his inception. William may have used his own or borrowed from someone else.[53] So far, so good. Disconcertingly, however, he does not specify the content of the inner meaning which David prayed to have revealed to him. Did it refer to an understanding of the Old Testament prophecies of Christ? William may have presupposed that such was the case; but how odd that he fails to mention it!

51 Ibid., xvi, 47: "Patefaciemus post haec quia non solum litteralem intelligentiam habet lex. sed etiam spiritualem multiplicem a Deo, ut omnino intellectus illuminativus et aedificativus animarum, qui ex ea elici potest in ea necessario sit; et primum ostendemus hoc ex ipsius legis et prophetarum testimoniis."

William has already mentioned the existence of an élite among the Jews, though without elaborating on it; see cap. i, 23: "Quemadmodum nec omnes Hebraei temporis illius ad vetus testamentum pertinebant, ut dicit Augustinus: immo erant in populo illo qui ad novum pertinent" (*sic*).

52 Ibid., 47-8. Scripture is likened to a mine, having veins of precious metals and jewels, to a garden of delights, to a wine cellar and to a medicine chest.

53 None of the many sermons listed by J. B. Schneyer, *Wegweiser zu lateinischen Predigtreihen des Mittelalters* (Munich 1965) looks like a *principium* or inaugural lecture, but William must have given one.

There is still a chance for him to bring it in, since he passes to the spiritual senses of Scripture, after proving their existence. And here comes the novelty.[54] The spiritual interpretation, he tells us, proves a stumbling block to many; it strikes them as "imposition" rather than "exposition". He will try to satisfy them. His apology for the spiritual senses against their critics falls into four parts. Nobody can take offence at two modes of interpretation. Prophetic signs, expressed by means of deeds or speech were intended to be understood figuratively; he gives examples of what today we should call symbolic gestures or metaphors. On his own showing, these should really have been covered by the literal interpretation, since they belonged to teaching designed for instruction of Old Testament Jews. The third mode of interpretation is inoffensive also: we find a spiritual sense by drawing out the consequences of the literal. Thus bans on bodily idol worship had a moral significance: the command not to worship golden idols signified that plain gold must not be worshipped either, and forbad the sin of avarice. Paris masters of the sacred page classified William's third mode of interpretation as *moralitas secundum litteram*; they distinguished it from moralisation of texts, since it represented a deduction from the literal sense; it was not a "morality" in the strict sense of the term.[55] Logically, William should have included it in his account of the literal interpretation, since he argued that the precepts conveyed moral teaching according to their literal sense and reasons.

The fourth mode of interpretation gives offence to many. William sees the force of their objections and goes at least half way to meet them. This fourth mode is by comparison. There is no harm in it, if only exegetes would stick to comparisons instead of using signification. But they make things signify what they were never meant to, which is abusive. God did not teach in that way, when he spoke through his prophets. He used comparisons. William illustrates comparison in carefully chosen words:

> *As a woman that despiseth her lover, so hath the house of Israel despised me* (*Ierem.* iii, 20). God did not say that the woman's contempt signified the children of Israel's contempt nor that her lover signified himself.... Rather he expressed a mode or obvious likeness between the woman's contempt of her lover and the conduct of the children of Israel.

The prophet should serve as a model to exegetes. William continues:

> If exegetes and doctors would only speak in this way in their allegories and tropologies and anagogical interpretations, they would do justice to

54 See appendix, pp. 69-71 for the full text, which I summarise here in translation, giving references to the quotations in it.
55 B. Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages*, op. cit. 234.

Scripture and would not insult the intelligence of their readers and hearers.

Instead, they make one thing signify another as a figure or prophecy, when it was neither said nor done in order to signify any other thing, which gravely offends their hearers. William gives a sample of this kind of distortion. He chooses the story of David's adultery with Bethsabee and the slaying of her husband Uria (II *Reg.* xi-xii). David acted as an adulterer, traitor and murderer. Yet he is said to signify Christ, while the good Uria is said to signify the devil. David's adultery with Bethsabee is said to signify Christ's pure, stainless union with the Church of the gentiles. This sort of teaching angers many. It destroys or at least weakens their faith in holy exposition of Scripture. William has picked on a current allegorical interpretation, deriving from St. Gregory's *Moralia*, as he must have known.

The objectors see two flaws in the use of signification. First, David's action was not intended to signify something else. Secondly, they think it most unlikely that the action was recorded in order to signify something else either. William (more or less identifying himself with them) explains how the David story may be used as a comparison: *just as* David loved Bethsabee and procured the death of her husband, *so* Christ loved the Synagogue and freed her from those who had held her in subjection, in order to honour her in spiritual marriage and make her his queen in heaven. If exegetes would make and explain such comparisons in a fitting way, they would run no risk of offending their hearers and would be listened to gratefully. Use of comparisons is a natural mode of teaching, found in Scripture, too. Commentators raise further scandal by their unskilled, fanciful inventions, which do violence to their text; they neglect St. Jerome's warning against excessive use of tropology. Instead of keeping to the point, they go off at a tangent, as when they interpret the branches and baskets in the dreams told to Joseph (*Gen.* xli) as signifying something different from what Joseph said they meant.

William closes this surprising chapter with a second conventional passage in praise of Scripture; but a trenchant summary of his views comes immediately after:

> We have explained that the Law has all the meaning proper to wholesome teaching, which can be deduced from it, in addition to its literal sense; but this is not whatever can be imposed abusively and violently upon it, repugnant to the letter. Such twisting of the Scriptures is not exposition, but rather abusive imposition. God in his goodness intended that all the meaning proper to wholesome teaching, which can be deduced from it *fittingly*, should be understood in Holy Scripture.

He has thrown overboard the current technique of lecturing on Scripture according to the four senses. Those *distinctiones*, which listed the properties of things for use in the spiritual exposition, rank by implication as idle fancies. Comparisons are admissable, significations are not:

> Verbum ergo significandi est quod in parte ista graviter offendit auditores atque lectores.[56]

Finally, William explains why *legalia* have been banned by the Church as superfluous under the new dispensation. Now, if ever, was the time for him to describe them as *umbra futurorum*. He does not. He explains instead that the sacrifices had no power to cleanse of themselves: they pleased God only because they demonstrated devotion and obedience and had useful purposes, such as maintaining the priesthood. The Church has found better ways of providing for divine worship and maintaining her priests.[57] Hence *legalia* no longer serve the needs of the new spiritual people, which has spiritual knowledge in the Gospel. William passes to two questions. First, why were *legalia* imposed on the righteous, as well as on the weak and ignorant, seeing that the righteous did not need symbolic actions to teach them to avoid sin and idolatry? Secondly, why did God withhold the true means of sanctification from his chosen people? The answer to the first question is that the righteous observed the ceremonial precepts in order to avoid scandal and schism. The second question receives the familiar answer that the people as a whole would not have understood them.[58] William now makes a new point: the prophets marked a further stage in education. They invited the people to spiritual worship and inner holiness, blaming mere outward observance.[59] The teaching of the prophets succeeded to that of the Law and came closer to perfection. Then at last, came the perfect excellence of the Gospels.[60] *De legibus* closes with an account of the

56 See appendix, below p. 70.

57 *De legibus*, xxviii, p. 97: "Manifestum est quod postquam ista offeruntur, necesse habent illa cessare tanquam superflua quantum ad emundationem et sanctificationem, quare quamcito ista imposita et exposita sunt, cessare oportet illa, et ideo spirituali populo interdicta sunt merito, evangelio coruscante. Spirituali enim populo, hoc est spiritualia cognoscenti, nec necessaria sunt ad eruditionem neque ad emundationem vel sanctificationem neque ad eas quas diximus, scilicet ad conservationem et retinentiam in Dei honorificantia et cultu, neque ad alimoniam sacerdotum, cum alias et melius et honestius provideatur sacerdotibus spiritualibus. Quare manifestum est nullo modo ea esse necessaria. Deo autem accepta vel placita impossibile est esse, nisi propter utilitatem populi sui. Ergo manifestum est quia, facto spirituali populo, nec Deo placita sunt...."

58 Ibid., 98.

59 He quotes *Ierem*. iv, 3; vi, 10; ix, 26. The crucial text *Ezech*. xx, 25: *Dedi eis praecepta non bona* is not mentioned, however.

60 *De legibus*, xxviii, 99: "Unde postmodum per prophetas paulatim ad spiritualem cultum et interiorem sanctificationem invitati sunt, sicut apparet Hierem. 4, ubi dicitur... Iam igitur manifestum est, quia nec veritas nec virtus nec salubritas huiusmodi sacrificiorum causa fuit ut imponeretur populo Hebraeorum, sed sicut generaliter verum est quia pro rudibus et novitiis perfecta

seven sacraments of the Church, which have superseded the legal sacrifices. William's last opportunity to present the latter as figurative of the former has passed.[61] It follows that he could not allow the righteous of the Old Testament any presage of Christian sacraments.

The omission must have been intentional. We can see the influence of Maimonides in William's view of the superior type of wisdom possessed by the Old Testament élite. Like Maimonides, he restricts it to a higher concept of holiness and understanding of true religion or philosophy. It contrasted with external religion, though the latter had its uses, as wise men realised. This view in its turn sends us back to the beginning of *De legibus*, where William presents law in general as depending on the dictates of mind and heart. But this wisdom, it seems, excluded an understanding of *legalia* as *umbra futurorum*.

Full of curiosity, I turned next to William's lectures on Scripture, to his aids to preaching and to his sermons, to discover whether he put his theories into practice. Did he avoid allegories and tropologies, substituting comparison for signification? His lectures belong to an early stage of his career as a teacher. Here he used allegories and tropologies, as did everyone else.[62] He had not yet begun to criticise them. A study of his many unprinted sermons would have taken too long; but one has been edited, a university sermon, preached 1230-1231,[63] and therefore roughly contemporary with *De legibus*. Here he avoids allegories and tropologies altogether. His colleagues, Philip the Chancellor and others, preaching in the same year, use them freely.[64] William produced two aids to preachers, both undated. One has been edited by de Poorter. It does not mention the four senses. William dwells on the usefulness of fitting comparisons:

ab initio non traduntur vel imponuntur... Et doctrinae legis successit doctrina prophetarum tanquam perfectioni vicinior; tandem autem advenit evangelicae perfectionis excellentia, ultra quam non est quo se extendat in vita ista perfectio sanctitatis, et ideo praenominata rudimenta et initialia in adventu eius penitus cessaverunt et interdicta sunt toto orbe..."

61 Ibid. Several pages are dovoted to the sacraments of the Christian Church to conclude *De legibus*, but nowhere here are they described as having been prefigured or foreshadowed by *legalia*.

62 See B. Smalley, "Some Thirteenth-Century Commentaries etc" op. cit. 330. I looked again at the copy of William on *Proverbs* in MS Oxford, Bodl. 292. Here is a specimen of his exegesis: "*Dominus sapientia fundavit terram* (iii, 19): Ad litteram planum est...Mistice autem terram ecclesie fundavit Christus...*Stabilivit celos prudentia*. Celos vero enim contemplativos stabilivit...*Pes tuus non impinget* (23)... Pes autem iste caritas intelligitur..." (foll. 371vb, 372rb).

63 Edited by M. M. Davy, *Les sermons universitaires Parisiens de 1230-1231* (Etudes de philosophie médiévale xv, 1931) 149-53. William takes as his theme *Numquid ordinem caeli nosti* (Iob xxxviii, 33). He distinguishes the literal from the spiritual order of the heavens, but he includes in the literal interpretation of the text: "hujus caeli litteralis ordinem non videntur nosse. Ordo caeli litteralis possunt vocari stellae et hujusmodi... Secundus ordo caeli spiritualis et sublimis est, ubi sedet auctor universitatis, deinde seraphim..." (150).

64 Ibid. 161, 193, 244-5, 365.

> Convenienter rerum similitudo multum valet ad loquendum, sicut videri potest quando aliter rei natura sive proprietas explicatur.

Thus the Holy Spirit may be likened to fire or Christ to the sun, provided that the preacher explains the likeness. He stresses the need for logical order of ideas and he admits the use of *distinctiones, divisiones, interpretationes et definitiones*. The *distinctio*, which he cites as an example, lists only the literal senses of the word: "est pax peccatoris, praedicatoris etc".[65] The unprinted *De faciebus mundi* again recommends comparisons, drawn "from the book of nature and of art", with many examples.[66] Again it does not mention the four senses. So William satisfied me that he was consistent. He avoided allegories and tropologies, as soon as he had begun to reflect on their arbitrary character and had heard them attacked in the schools. Then he resorted to comparisons as a better mode of teaching.

One difficulty remained. William praised the Cistercian abbot, Joachim of Fiore, as having displayed *donum intellectus* in his commentary on the Apocalypse and in his *Liber concordie novi et veteris testamenti*. This passage, which has been discussed by students of Joachism, occurs in William's *De virtutibus*,[67] following next but one to *De legibus* in his *Magisterium divinale*. Joachim's type of spiritual exposition should not have pleased William on the evidence of *De legibus*. However, the praise of Joachim must be taken in its context. William is explaining how the "gift of understanding" differs from the spirit of prophecy and from faith. The prophet sees by divine illumination. The gift of understanding, on the other hand, enables us to discover the inner meaning of hidden things and signs:[68]

> Huic dono loquentur caerimoniae legis omnes et figurae,[69] similiter parabolae, aenigmata et visiones prophetarum, ut dicit Iob, quia intelligentia est opus in visione.[70]

In other words, prophets have the vision; those gifted with understanding expound their utterances. Men have the gift of understanding in varying degrees; it calls for effort and exercise. It may

65 A. de Poorter, "Un manuel de prédication médiéval", *Revue néo-scolastique* xxv (1923) 198, 203.

66 MS Oxford, Bodl. Digby 30, fol. 50-50v. On this treatise see H. Caplan, "Mediaeval *Artes Praedicandi*. A Hand-List", *Cornell Studies in Philology* xxiv (1934) 30; "A Supplementary Hand-List", ibid. xxv (1936) 20, 23.

67 M. Reeves, *The Influence of Prophecy in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford 1969) 41-42.

68 *De virtutibus* xi, 152-3.

69 *Iob* xx, 3: *Spiritus intelligentiae meae respondebit mihi.*

70 *Dan.* x, 1.

attain to such clarity and sharpness as to resemble the spirit of prophecy. He cites Joachim as an example:

> Debes etiam scire quia istud donum, scilicet donum intellectus, tantae claritatis est et acuminis in quibusdam, ut valde assimiletur spiritui prophetiae, qualem crediderunt nonnulli fuisse in Abbate Joachim et ipsemet de seipso dixisse dicitur, quia non erat ei datus spiritus prophetiae, sed spiritus intelligentiae. Si quis autem inspexerit libros eius, quos scripsit super Apocalypsim et super concordiam duorum testamentorum, mirabitur donum intellectus in eo.

He goes straight on to explain that the gift of understanding differs from faith in that its object is deep, hidden matters, which are veiled in mystery or suggested by means of signification, whereas faith concerns basic principles. *Donum intellectus* carries neither the certainty of vision nor the certainty of truth which is arrived at by demonstration; exegetes of the Law and the Prophets do not use proofs, but "declarative narrations" only. The point of the definition comes at the end. William stresses that everything which is understood by *donum intellectus* can be acquired by teaching (*doctrina*). Every prophecy and mystery of which the gift confers understanding can be explained by teaching and set down clearly in writing by its possessor. Each virtue described in *De virtutibus* has its corresponding vice. The vice opposing *donum intellectus* is brutish idleness, which leads to neglect of study and reading.

De virtutibus raises the same problem as *De legibus*, in that William refers to exposition of the inner meaning of the Law and other mysteries without specifying its content. What manner of understanding them did *donum intellectus* confer? He does not tell us. His main aim in describing it comes out clearly, nonetheless. He was pleading for diligent application to study and teaching of the mysteries of Scripture. Joachim served as an example of a man who disclaimed the gift of prophecy (so it was said), but who applied himself to study and who published his studies for the benefit of others. Whether William accepted Joachim's findings, or whether he reserved judgment, cannot be decided from what he wrote. Joachim's exegesis, daring as it was, had no place for the mechanical allegories and moralities that William disliked. He wanted to keep abreast of current trends, as we know from his defence of the new Orders. Joachim's authentic writings were being discussed; the scandal which would break out on *spuria*, circulated by his disciples, had yet to come. William may therefore have been noting new ideas, perhaps without examining them.[71]

71 He certainly did not entertain any idea that a third and more spiritual age was still to come, since the gospel had brought full spiritual perfection within men's reach.

I have defended his consistency in applying his theories. Their internal coherence cannot be defended. William's account of the spiritual interpretation and its relationship to the literal is incomplete and muddled. As I understand it, he saw the spiritual interpretation as an extension of the literal; it was not to be "imposed" at the whim of the exegete. The story of David's adultery was not enacted or even recorded as an allegory: why impose allegory upon it? The thesis raised basic problems, which he did not formulate, on the relationship between the Old and New Testaments. The Old Law educated and prepared the chosen people to receive the New. He was sure of that. But was it a prefiguration, perceived by the wise, in addition to serving as an *alphabetum honestatis*? Had the Old Testament élite an implicit or explicit faith in the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation and the Redemption? *De legibus* gives no answer. It raises questions instead; and these are crucial. We hear that many persons canvassed the exclusive truth of Christianity. Even more surprisingly, we hear that many persons took offence at the exposition according to the four senses. We cannot identify the former; the latter must have been students in the faculty of theology at Paris, since William writes that they read and heard expositions of Scripture. William deplores the first type of doubting, but shares the second. The vogue for allegorical interpretation of sacred texts has gone in waves. Each crest has been followed by reaction and "debunking". Yet it has always survived criticism.[72] We depend on *De legibus* for the surprising information that one period of reaction against allegory occurred at Paris in the second quarter of the thirteenth century.

William wrote under its impact. He threw out suggestions which would have altered the technique of medieval exegesis, had they been followed. They were not followed; allegory survived. William's theory suffered from a fatal combination of flaws. It was both original and inchoate, too original to appeal and too inchoate to be adopted. We shall see that it failed to win acceptance in the schools.

72 J. Pépin, *Mythe et allégorie. Les origines grecques et les contestations judéo-chrétiennes* (Paris 1958).

III

JOHN OF LA ROCHELLE

De legibus was quoted, though not swallowed whole. Much of it is woven into the texture of the *Tractatus de praeceptis et legibus* which forms part of the *Summa* ascribed to Alexander of Hales O.F.M. Modern research has established that John of la Rochelle O.F.M. compiled the *Tractatus*. It is older than the *Summa*. John collaborated with Alexander in preparing some parts of the latter, 1236-1245, but his teaching on natural law differs from Alexander's, as we have it in Alexander's *Sentences*, to such an extent that we must credit John with authorship of the *Tractatus*; it represented an original contribution to the *Summa*.[1] John was master of theology at Paris in 1238 and died in February, 1245. The exact date of his *Tractatus* is not known, but he must have been writing it during William's lifetime, while William was bishop of Paris, 1228-1249.[2] This would explain why he always quoted or referred to *De legibus* anonymously.

John quotes it verbally and sometimes slavishly. He copies out the passage on leprosy, where William wrote that he himself had seen dry rot in wood.[3] But slavish transcription of what appealed to him in *De legibus* went together with a critical and selective treatment of William's doctrine on the Old Law. This is important for two reasons: it shows how a contemporary reacted to the novelties in *De legibus*; it decided the form in which *De legibus* was passed on to the many readers of "Alexander's" *Summa*. Direct knowledge of William's treatise must have been rarer than knowledge of it *via* John's *Tractatus* as contained in the famous *Summa* of the Franciscan school.

John's reaction to *De legibus* can be put quite simply. He held to the traditional doctrine that *legalia* had not only a literal, but also a spiritual sense as signs, foreshadowings or figures of the New Law. William never said so: John keeps recurring to it in no uncertain terms. He classifies the precepts of the Old Law according to their three pur-

1 O. Lottin, op. cit. i, 128, 135; ii, 19, 52; W. H. Steinmüller, "Die Naturrechtslehre des Joannes von Rupella und des Alexander von Hales", *Franziskanische Studien* xli (1959) 310-422.

2 I shall quote the *Tractatus* from the edition in *Summa theologiae Alexandri Halensis*, part iii, vol. IV (Quaracchi 1948), using the editors' numbers and page references. They give exact references to both quotations from and allusions to the *De legibus*.

3 No. 518, p. 774. John copies "sicut vidimus".

poses: *moralia* clarified the law of nature; *iudicialia* repressed evil desires and served as a scourge for the wicked; *caeremonialia* signified the law of grace:

> ...figurae erant futurorum. et quantum ad hoc erat (lex) iustis in signum.[4]

William had described "signification" as a stumbling block.[5] John defends it explicitly. The ceremonial precepts were given

> ad manifestationem et testimonium futurae gratiae.[6]
> Sed lex Moysi, quantum ad figuralia, facit cognitionem credendorum et ad ipsam pertinet.[7]
> ...lex Moysi includit legem naturalem per explicationem in moralibus, legem vero gratiae per figurationem in caeremonialibus.[8]
> Lex quantum ad figuralia erat ducens in Christum.[9]

The figurative nature of the Old Law raises the question: did the ancient Jews who offered sacrifice according to its precepts understand their significance as prefigurations of the coming Redemption? The command of the psalmist, *sing ye wisely* (xlvi, 8), argues that they should have, since wisdom involves understanding. John answers that doctors and priests were bound to understand the true significance of their sacrifices explicitly. Simple men, on the other hand, were bound to realise only that they were pleasing to God, which carried with it an implicit understanding of their value as signs. He draws a parallel: scholars and prelates are bound to understand the articles of the faith explicitly, but simple men only implicitly.[10] It has already been stated that these figures were a sign of future grace *quoad perfectos.*[11] John adopts the traditional doctrine that *caeremonialia* carried signs of future grace for the Old Testament élite, who could understand their spiritual meaning, whereas the rank and file could not. Again he departs from *De legibus*. William never identified the inner meaning of the Old Law, as studied by the wise among the Jews, with prophecies or figures of Christ. He had asked why signs should have been written into the Old Law for the benefit of Christians, who were still unborn. John answers his query without raising it explicitly: The *figuralia* of the Old

4 No. 259, p. 367-8.
5 "Verbum ergo significandi est quod in parte ista graviter offendit auditores atque lectores". See below, p. 70.
6 No. 259, p. 369.
7 No. 260, p. 370.
8 Ibid.
9 No. 262, p. 373.
10 No. 531, p. 807.
11 No. 267, p. 392.

Law still remain for us to read as past signs of the future, even after their fulfilment and abrogation.[12]

John's very arrangement of chapters shows how wedded to tradition he was. Before considering the literal sense of *caeremonialia*, he establishes that they had a spiritual sense in two chapters on *De intellectu praeceptorum caeremonialium*. This was to reverse the order of their treatment in *De legibus*. John begins by asking: "Utrum in caeremonialibus universaliter sit intelligentia litteralis", as some (William) have held.[13] He puts forward William's arguments in favour of the proposition: the legislator would have failed in his duty had he veiled his meaning instead of teaching his people plainly, and so on. His reply is that the alleged inconveniences are just the opposite: it is fitting that divine wisdom and divine law should be conveyed darkly. John's reasons betray some confusion, since he adduces both parables and metaphors to prove his point; these should have been included in the literal sense, strictly speaking. He adds that the spiritual sense was put there for the benefit of an élite. His conclusion is to deny the proposition, with the proviso that although it is not true *universaliter*, *most* of the precepts did have a literal sense and reason as well as a spiritual; *a few* of them, however, had a spiritual reason only.[14] Then he argues that they *all* had a spiritual meaning in a section headed "Qualiter in praeceptis caeremonialibus sit intelligentia spiritualis".[15]

Here he adapts William's account of the spiritual sense ingeniously to fit his thesis. First, he records objections to the spiritual interpretation. According to St. Augustine in *De doctrina christiana* all teaching is conveyed either by things or by signs. Some (William) ascribe a literal sense to all the ceremonial precepts. In that case, teaching is conveyed by things; these things cannot also be signs; consequently they convey no spiritual meaning. Secondly, it is abusive to deduce signs from things which were not intended to signify, and hence to seek a spiritual meaning in them (William again). Thirdly, the prophets taught by comparisons and not by significations; therefore it is unfitting to seek a spiritual interpretation where none was intended (William again).

12 No. 269, p. 398: "... immo adhuc habent eam (auctoritatem signandi) ut possit adhuc homo legere in ipsis; sed quod prius significabant ut futurum, modo significant ut praeteritum, et sic remanet significantia non mutata".

13 No. 516, p. 759.

14 Ibid., p. 760: "Ex iis igitur manifeste relinquitur non esse necesse in praeceptis caeremonialibus Legis universaliter esse sensum sive intelligentiam litteralem. Propterea breviter dicendum est, quod clarius erit in sequentibus, quod in aliquibus et pluribus praeceptorum caeremonialium praeter spiritualem intelligentiam sensus fuit et ratio litteralis, in aliquibus vero et paucis tantum ratio spiritualis, propter rationes praedictas quod infra manifestabitur".

15 No. 517, p. 760.

Fourthly, one thing designates another more fittingly and surely univocally than equivocally: a thing should have one meaning only. The spiritual interpretation must be fitting. Therefore each word or deed recorded in Scripture should have one spiritual meaning only. All the holy expositors who find multiple meanings err in doing so. It is fitting, too, that good should signify good, and bad, bad. John adduces William's objection to the allegorical interpretation of David's adultery with Bethsabee as referring to Christ and the Church. He names St. Gregory (as William had not done), so as to leave no doubt as to the authentic source of the allegory. This last objection also derives from William. All in all, John has made a fair and logical survey of William's arguments against "abusive" allegories and moralities.

He answers them by making William argue against himself. The first objection is disposed of by a distinction: the ceremonies were "things", and as such they were ordered to the worship of the Creator; they were also "signs", and as such they prefigured the Saviour's grace. He then quotes William's defence of what William regarded as legitimate spiritual interpretation, that is, the elucidation of metaphor or symbol, deduction *per consequentiam* and teaching by the method of comparison. William's conventional praise of Scripture is quoted, with his statement that all wholesome teaching may be drawn from it. John adds a gloss of his own:

> Most fittingly are many meanings signified by one, in order that the Law's intention may correspond to God's goodness.

The gloss falsifies William's thought. John's sleight of hand is remarkable. He has answered William's objections to the traditional spiritual interpretation by manipulating William's own words and adding to them. The spearhead of William's attack has been blunted.

A more straightforward use of *De legibus* appears in the next chapter, *De ratione caeremonialium praeceptorum.*[16] Having given priority to the spiritual sense of the ceremonies, and denied a literal reason for them *en bloc*, John felt free to approve the notion that many or most had a rational cause *ad litteram*. He supplemented *De legibus* by a direct study of the *Guide*, which is sometimes quoted by name independently of *De legibus.*[17] John copies at length from William's defence of the precepts as rational and from his rebuttal of charges that some of them were irrational, futile or absurd in the literal sense.

16 No. 518, p. 763. The full extent of John's use of *De legibus* is shown by the Quaracchi editors in their admirable footnotes.

17 This also appears in the footnotes; John refers to Rabbi Moses, no. 263, p. 377 and to "Expositor legis Iudaeorum", no. 518, p. 763; there are other examples.

William's rather jumbled presentation of his defence is even improved upon. John classifies its heads in a more logical order. There were four reasons for the precepts in their literal sense. Some were necessary for the institution of religion, as were circumcision and the Passover, some to warn against error, some to promote worship of the Creator, and some for a compound of the last two reasons. John says apropos the third reason that three things are required to attract the rational mind to divine worship: decorum, dignity and cheerfulness (*decorum, honestum, iucundum*). These things appear in the precepts. Here we have an echo of William's account of Old Testament rites. John made further use of *De legibus* in a detailed study of the sacrifices,[18] "Utrum sacrificia legalia fuerint vera sacrificia". Oddly enough, he did not single out any precept as having no literal reason but only a spiritual, although he had refused to allow them a literal reason *universaliter*. His reservation protected him against the charge of too close adherence to *De legibus*, but did not need to be applied in particular, it seems. He dots the "i"s and crosses the "t"s in a later section headed "De differentiis sacrificiorum in Lege",[19] where he sets out the spiritual (allegorical and moral) interpretation of the sacrifices, in addition to the literal reason that they were instituted for the honour of God.

Hence the gist of William's rationalisation of *legalia* passed into school tradition via the *Tractatus*. John took just as much from *De legibus* as would fit into his conservative framework, and no more. But his quotations are full and verbal enough to convey some of the original warmth and power. William's defence of the literal reasons for the precepts became acceptable when once it had been isolated from its dangerous context. He was alive, and a highly respected prelate, when John wrote his *Tractatus*. John processed *De legibus* discreetly so as to avoid open criticism. One would like to know what William thought of the alterations.

18 No. 525, p. 797.
19 No. 537, p. 814.

IV

St. Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas needed his clear mind when he turned to the literal and spiritual senses of Scripture: he had to fight a war on two fronts. On one front, he had to engage in a mopping up operation. Masters of the sacred page had widened the literal sense of Scripture so as to include verbal simile, metaphor, parable and symbolic action or gesture. Words and actions recorded in Scripture had to be explained according to their first intention; their spiritual interpretation was an addition, not a substitute. But the masters had worked their way to this method without accounting for it by any systematic reasoning, as far as we know. Consequently their terminology remained confused. Neither William of Auvergne nor John of la Rochelle achieved consistency in his handling of biblical metaphor and symbolism. Maimonides either raised or brought to a head a further problem on the literal interpretation of the Old Law. Had all its precepts, excluding *moralia*, some literal reason, as well as a literal sense (as a code actually given to the Jews)? Or were some precepts to be taken as irrational in their literal sense, apart from their divine purpose to prefigure the New Law? The question had wide implications, since it made scholars think about the legislator's aims in their historical context. On this front St. Thomas put forward a theoretical justification for the wider meaning now currently accorded to the literal sense, and distinguished it from the spiritual senses more clearly than had been done before.

On his second front, the traditional three spiritual senses had come under fire from William of Auvergne, voicing the objections of unnamed masters or students. St. Thomas was conservative enough to defend the spiritual senses. It would be interesting to know whether he read William's *De legibus*; if so, he met the attack in its full force. He certainly read and used John's *Tractatus*, where he could find a bowdlerised version of *De legibus* and perhaps guess at the original. Lottin, whose opinion must be respected, thought it probable that St. Thomas read *De legibus* directly and not only *via* the *Tractatus*.[1] I have

1 O. Lottin, *Psychologie et morale*, op. cit. iii, 592, 709. On St. Thomas's use of John's *Tractatus* see also G. Lafont, *Structures et méthodes dans la Somme théologique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1961) 213.

found no textual proof that he did. More important, is the evidence of his *quaestiones disputatae*, given during his first regency at Paris, 1256-1259.[2] The regent master would announce the subject for disputation beforehand; then he presided over the exercise and "determined" at its close. Naturally he would choose a subject connected with some live issue, which would stir up interest and controversy.[3] Among the questions chosen by St. Thomas are: Whether Holy Scripture has senses other than the literal hidden in its words? How many spiritual senses are there? Are they to be found in writings other than Scripture? The choice of these three questions indicates that William's attack on allegories, tropologies and anagogies still had echoes in the schools. Some of St. Thomas's colleagues and pupils in the theological faculty must have doubted the validity of the fourfold interpretation, at least as currently practised, or wanted to be assured that it rested on a valid theory. He posted the problem for disputation in order to satisfy doubters.

The first question was crucial. Once the existence of a spiritual sense "Hidden in the Letter" had been established, it would be plain sailing to make the traditional threefold division of the spiritual into allegorical, moral or tropological and anagogical. The first two objections come from *De legibus*, retailed in John's *Tractatus*:

> Quia dictionibus semel sumptis non est utendum aequivoce vel multipliciter. Sed pluralitas sensuum facit multiplicem locutionem. Ergo in eadem locutione sacrae Scripturae non possunt plures sensus latere. Praeterea, sacra Scriptura ordinata est ad intellectum...Sed multiplicitas sensuum obnubilat intellectum. Ergo non debet in sacra Scriptura multi sensus esse.[4]

In substance it is objected that the purpose of Scripture is to instruct us clearly on one thing at a time. The third objection must have occurred to many masters of the sacred page in the course of their lectures: if there are several senses in Scripture, it will give rise to error, since interpretation will be arbitrary; the exegete will have no check on his arguments. The fourth follows on: the literal sense alone has authority in argument; therefore we cannot posit a spiritual sense as well. The fifth and last objection brings us back to William and John:

> Praeterea, quicumque sensus ex verbis alicuius trahitur quem auctor non intendit, non est sensus proprius; quia auctor per unam scripturam non

2 M. D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1950) 241-242.
3 Ibid., 242-245; P. Glorieux, "L'enseignement au moyen âge. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la Faculté de Théologie de Paris au XIII[e] siècle", *AHDLMA* xxxv (1969) 123-128.
4 *Quodl.* VII, q. vi, a. 1, ed. R. Spiazzi, i (Rome/Turin 1928) 145.

potest intelligere nisi unum, quia non contingit plura simul intelligere, secundum Philosophum. Ergo non possunt esse plures sensus proprii sacrae Scripturae.

This gives the gist of William's argument which he illustrated by the story of David's adultery: we should keep to the sense intended by the sacred writer, instead of making him mean something else and turning his factual record into an allegory of Christ and the Church.

St. Thomas's solution of these problems is too well known to need more than a bare summary here.[5] He focussed attention on the twofold authorship of Scripture, human and divine, and hence on the diverse methods employed first by the human authors and then by the Holy Spirit who inspired them. The human authors would sometimes convey their teaching by means of metaphor, symbolism, analogy and parable. We find the same genres in pagan literature, especially in poetry. The literal sense includes all that the writer meant to express, a rule which applies to both sacred and profane literature. Prophecy and moral instruction, for instance, may be expressed in Scripture through figures of speech or action. We must include both the author's teaching and his way of putting it over to his audience in our reading of the literal sense. This definition of the literal sense as "all that the writer intended" cleared up a persistent muddle in terminology. The spiritual sense, in contrast to the literal, depended exclusively on the intention of God, the first cause and author of Scripture. God, as cause and author of all history, could give a significance to the events recorded and to the things described by the human authors of Scripture, which they, inspired though they were, could not possibly grasp, but which later revelation made plain. The Holy Spirit could express the divine meaning in figures over and above those employed by his human instruments:

Sicut enim homo potest adhibere ad significandum aliquas voces vel aliquas similitudines fictas, ita Deus adhibet ad significationem aliquorum ipsum cursum rerum suae providentiae subiectarum.[6]

Hence the spiritual interpretation in its threefold division is "founded on the literal"; St. Thomas gave new content to the stock phrase. According to him, interpretation in the spiritual sense meant beginning from where the literal interpretation ended and only after it had been exhausted. His distinction between the senses made firmer ground for the rule (already partly accepted) that argument must proceed from

5 *Quodl.* VII, q. vi, p. 145-148. St. Thomas returns to the senses of Scripture in the *Summa* Ia, q. 1, a. 8-10. His treatment of it here is both more comprehensive and more succinct than in the *Quodlibet*. I have taken both the *Quodlibet* and this part of the *Summa* into account in summarising his solutions.

6 *Quodl.* VII, q. vi, a. 3, p. 148.

the literal sense only. God saw to it that everything needed for salvation should be found somewhere in Scripture according to the letter. The distinction between literal and spiritual senses enabled St. Thomas to mark off the Bible from other literature. In the Bible the actual course of the history recorded had a spiritual significance unknown to its actors and writers. That could not apply to any other kind of writing, but only to Scripture, of which the Holy Spirit was author and man merely the instrument.[7]

The solution neatly disposed of William's objections to the allegorisation of King David's misdeeds: they were not committed, nor probably were they recorded, in order to signify Christ's marriage to his Church; so William argued.[8] According to Thomist theory there could be no question of intention to signify either on the part of King David or of the historian. The Holy Spirit intended that the misdeeds and their record should have an allegorical significance, which was unrecognisable at the time. All carping at allegories, moralities and anagogies would cease when this touchstone was applied to them. Their justification in Thomist theory would make it otiose to resort to comparisons instead of significations, as William had urged upon exegetes. The spiritual interpretation could be used without doing violence to the sacred writers' intentions. It must have relieved the scrupulous: allegories, moralities and anagogies had divine authority, whereas comparisons represented mere human inventiveness.

Thomist doctrine on the four senses has been much discussed. Personally I see it differently after reading William's *De legibus*. Before that surprising experience I put too much emphasis on St. Thomas's care for a better definition and better understanding of the literal sense.[9] Now I would classify this as a mopping up operation, designed to remedy confusion and to justify deeper study of the literal sense. His more powerful guns, as I picture it in the light of *De legibus*, were trained in defence of the traditional fourfold interpretation against William's attack. Further study of the section *De veteri lege* in his *Summa* has confirmed my change of mind. St. Thomas was more middle-of-the-road than he seemed to me on first acquaintance with his teaching.

In any case, his doctrine on the senses is incomplete and leaves a gap to be filled in. He allows for Old Testament prophecies of Christ within the context of the literal sense. He justifies the allegorical interpretation, according to which historical events signify Christ and his

7 Ibid.
8 See above, p. 41, and appendix, below, p. 70.
9 See my *Study of the Bible*, op. cit. 300-306.

members as shadows of truth; then he explains that when Christ is referred to (directly) by means of a simile or metaphor, this does not go beyond the literal sense; the image of *the stone cut out of a mountain without hands* in Daniel's interpretation of King Nabuchodonosor's dream (*Dan.* ii, 34) is given as an example of a prophecy of Christ according to the literal sense.[10] The problem how to distinguish passages which had a Christological meaning in the literal sense, as intended by the lawgiver or prophet, from those which were allegories, had already presented itself to exegetes. They were left to fumble. By what rules should the exegete judge whether a text which had been traditionally interpreted as a prophecy of Christ belonged to the literal sense or the allegorical? What limits should he set to the prophet's foresight? St. Thomas gave no guidance here. Did he offer guidance in the application of his own principles to exegesis? His literal exposition of the book of Job is a brilliant example: he treated the content as a discussion of the ways of divine Providence.[11] But the choice of this book suited his genius as a philosopher theologian perfectly. The precepts and institutions of the Old Law demanded a different approach. *De veteri lege* shows him applying the principles set forth in *De veritate* and at the beginning of the *Summa*.

A study of *De veteri lege* must begin with its sources. It fits into the framework of the whole section *De legibus*, a treatise on divine, eternal, natural and human law. St. Thomas had a strong feeling for the rational character of law in general. He has been claimed as a true jurist, in spite of his lack of legal training: "Saint Thomas se situe admirablement dans la ligne spirituelle des grands romanistes médiévaux."[12] We know that he read and pondered the *Guide*: he quoted Rabbi Moses independently and directly.[13] The going gets harder when we confront *De veteri lege* with its main secondary source, John's *Tractatus*.[14] The Dominican doctor took up the problems of the Old Law where the Franciscan had left off. He rearranged and rethought the *Tractatus*, though he neither copied it verbally nor mentioned it by name. No one as yet has collated the two. All I can undertake to do in this paper is to

10 *Quodl.* VII, q. VI, a. 2, op. cit. p. 147.

11 *Expositio super Iob ad litteram, Opera* xxvi, ed. Leon., 1965.

12 J. M. Aubert, *Le droit romain dans l'œuvre de Saint Thomas* (Paris 1955) 76, 79, 139.

13 See the thorough survey by J. Guttman, *Das Verhältniss des Thomas von Aquino zum Judentum und zur jüdischen Literatur* (Göttingen 1891) 33-92; on his criticism of Maimonides see H. Liebeschütz, "Eine Polemik des Thomas von Aquino gegen Maimonides", *Monatschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judenthums* lxxx (1936) 93-96.

14 I have used the edition and translation with occasional minor changes in the new publication of the *Summa* on the Old Law by the English Dominicans, xxix (London 1969) by D. Bourke and A. Littledale. Unfortunately the editors confine themselves to cross-references and to authors quoted by name in the *Summa*. They ignore the relationship between the *Summa* on the Old Law and John's *Tractatus*. Otherwise the volume is very useful.

offer an impressionistic sketch of the order of questions and articles in the *Tractatus* and the *Summa* respectively. The samples that I have chosen relate to the nature and content of the Old Law and to the ceremonies in particular. Sections on *moralia* and *iudicialia* will be omitted. The comparisons will show that St. Thomas posed much the same questions as John. Differences between the two scholars occur mainly in the ordering of their material. St. Thomas sometimes altered the sequence of articles given by the *Tractatus* inside one question; sometimes he made more drastic changes.

Tractatus I	*Summa* 1a 2ae
Q.I: De latione Legis mosaicae	Q. 98
259 a.1) De utilitate lationis Legis	a.1) Utrum lex vetus fuerit bona
260 a.2) An lex Moysi sit necessaria ad salutem	(included in a.1)
261 a.3) De tempore lationis Legis	a.6) Utrum lex vetus convenienter data fuerit tempore Moysi
262 a.4) Quibus debuit dari Lex	a.4) Utrum lex vetus dari debuit populo Judaeorum
263 a.5) De Legis latore. An lex Moysi sit lata a bono et a solo Deo	a.2) Utrum lex vetus fuerit a Deo
264 a.6) Utrum lex Moysi sit lata a Deo per ministerium angelorum	a.3) Utrum lex vetus data fuerit per angelos

The *Summa* follows a more logical order than the *Tractatus*. St. Thomas proceeds from the top downward. The Old Law was good; it was given by God as necessary to salvation by the ministry of angels to the Jews at a fitting time. His a.5 explains why the Old Law, given to the Jewish people, as stated in a.4, was not binding upon all. St. Thomas's a.5 corresponds to a much later article in the *Tractatus*, where John considers a miscellany of questions, under the heading *De personis* (no. 530).

Q.II of the *Tractatus* deals with points which St. Thomas had condensed into q. 98, a.1, *Utrum lex vetus fuerit bona*. A glance will show how he abridged his source; one article sufficed for all the following:

Tractatus (265-268)

a.1) De continentia Legis quantum ad genera contentorum; a.2) De continentia Legis quantum ad qualitatem contentorum; (i) Utrum omne quod continetur in Lege sit sanctum (ii) bonum (iii) iustum.

Tractatus	*Summa*
269 Q.III: De impletione legis Moysi per Christum	Q.106: De lege evangelica etc
271 Q.IV: De onere observantiae legis mosaicae	Q.107, a.4) Utrum lex nova sit gravior quam vetus
274 Q.V: De iustificatione per Legem[15]	Q.100, a.12; Q. 103, a.2.

St. Thomas preferred to tackle problems arising from comparison between the Old and New Laws after, not before, he had finished discussing the content of the Old Law. Again, his arrangement looks tidier than John's. The question whether observance of the legal precepts in Old Testament times justified the observers made a bridge between the two and fitted into discussion of the legal precepts. Hence it came earlier in the *Summa* than in the *Tractatus*.

Tractatus II, sect. iii: De caeremonialibus	*Summa*
516 Q.I, cap. i: Utrum in caeremonialibus universaliter sit intellectus litteralis	Q.102, a.2) Utrum habeant causam litteralem, vel solum figuralem
517 cap.ii: Qualiter in praeceptis caeremonialibus sit intellectus spiritualis	(included in a.2)
518 Q.II: De ratione caeremonialium praeceptorum. An habeant causam observantiae litteralem, an solum mysticam et figuralem	a.1) Utrum praecepta caeremonialia habeant causam (also included in a.2)
A. in generali	(also included in a.2)
B. in speciali	
1) in circumcisione	a.5) De causis sacrorum
2) in Phase	
3) in victu	a.6) De causis observantiarum
4) in vestitu	(included in a.6)
5) circa actum indifferentem	
6) circa immunditiarum cavendarum	
7) purificationis immunditiarum	
8) sacrificiorum, in genere, in speciali	a.3) De causis sacrificiorum
9) altaris	a.4) De causis sacramentorum
10) tabernaculi	(included in a.4)
11) circa ordinationem ministrorum	
12) circa ornatum sacerdotum seu ministrorum	
13) solemnitatum	

15 The numbers 270, 272-3 of the *Tractatus* deal with subordinate points. I have omitted them in order to make the scheme of my comparison clearer.

St. Thomas has succeeded in reducing thirteen articles to six by dividing ceremonies into categories: sacrifices, sacraments, sacred things and observances. He considers most of the points raised by John within the scope of fewer articles.

Tractatus	*Summa*
Q. III	
519 De numerositate caeremonialium	Q.101, a.3) Utrum debuerint esse multa caeremonialium praecepta
520 De differentia caeremonialium in genere	a.4) Utrum caeremonia veteris legis convenienter dividantur in sacrificia, sacra, sacramenta et observantias

Again, it was tidier to clear up the problem of why there were so many ceremonial precepts before descending to particular items and to group them under separate headings. St. Thomas therefore inverted John's order. As we have seen, he divided them into categories; and he saved himself from redundancy in considering their causes: John's thirteen articles are more than halved in the *Summa*.

My comparison will have shown that St. Thomas had the *Tractatus* on his desk or at least in his mind, when he compiled *De veteri lege*. The sketch will have given some idea of how he set its questions in his own order. He makes one major change of structure in that he treated the ceremonial precepts before instead of after the judicial.[16] A comparison of the internal matter of separate articles, where the questions coincide, gives the same impression: St. Thomas borrowed arguments *pro* and *contra* from John, sometimes conflating them. Thus in q. 101, a. 2, on whether the ceremonial precepts are figurative, he abridges six objections, taken by John (no. 516, p. 759) from William of Auvergne, into one:

> It is the duty of every teacher to make himself easily understood, as Augustine says. This seems necessary most of all in propounding a law, since its commands are conveyed to the people. Hence a law ought to be clear, as Isidore says. If then the ceremonial precepts were given as figurative of something, it would seem that Moses, in failing to explain what they figured, did not transmit them in a proper manner.

But he adds other objections of his own. His replies and conclusions often agree with John's in substance.

16 St. Thomas probably did so out of respect for the biblical text: *Haec sunt praecepta et caeremoniae atque iudicia* (*Deut*. vi, 1). He quotes it in q. 99, a. 4. A further difference between his treatment of *iudicia* and John's is that St. Thomas limits himself here to the judicial precepts of the Old Law, whereas John spreads his net wider; he discusses contemporary judicial problems.

There is no time for a more detailed collation here. St. Thomas restructured his source into a clearer, more logical pattern. He sorted out the pieces and fitted them together as it pleased him. What did he make of its doctrine? The short answer is that he rethought it in terms of his theory of causality.

This appears in his very first questions on the Old Law in general, "whether it is good", (q. 98, a. 1). St. Thomas replies to objections by defending the Old Law on the grounds that it conformed to reason by restraining the appetite and by forbidding all sins which are contrary to reason. Then he considers "the ordering of things to a given end". Human law is directed towards the temporal peace of the State, divine law towards bringing man to the attainment of his goal of eternal happiness. Hence the latter has to do more than regulate external actions: "it is required to make man totally equipped to share in eternal happiness, something which can be achieved only by the grace of the Holy Spirit". It follows from consideration of ends that the Old Law is good, but imperfect in comparison with the New Law; the conferring of grace was reserved to Christ. The crucial text: *I gave them statutes which were not good* (*Ezech.* xx, 25) has taken its place as the first authority *contra*. St. Thomas refers it to the ceremonial precepts, as had normally been done. Ralph of Flaix, representing the older tradition, had used it to discredit the educative value of *caeremonialia*, whereas William of Auvergne, following Maimonides, had taken *not good* as referring to the disposition of those who performed ceremonies unworthily. John of la Rochelle did not consider the Ezechiel text. St. Thomas steers a middle course. The ceremonial precepts were said by the prophet to be *not good* because they showed up man's need for cleansing (being instituted as sin-offerings etc.), but they did not (in contrast to the sacraments of the New Law) confer the grace by which men could be cleansed of their sins. Thus he relates the Ezechiel text to the nature and purpose of the Old Law; it was good, but imperfect.

He begins his discussion of the ceremonial precepts *secundum se* (q. 101, a.1) by framing a question of his own: "Does the reason of the ceremonial precepts reside in the fact that they concern the worship of God?" This question gives him scope to explain his principle. The ceremonial precepts, even those which at first sight do not seem to belong to divine worship, are particular applications of the moral precepts which order man to God, just as the judicial precepts are applications of those which order man to his neighbour. "Whatever is preparatory to a particular end comes under the science dealing with that end". The ceremonial precepts are rules of salvation, which order man to God. "Accordingly those which concern the worship of God are

called ceremonial". St. Thomas has stated his own formula just before he begins to draw on John's *De legibus*, which cannot have been accidental. The theme of "ends" will recur even when he is borrowing. Thus he answers the question (a. 2), whether the ceremonial precepts had a literal cause or only a figurative, by relating them to their purpose: "The reason for whatever is done in view of an end must be looked for in that end. Now the end of the ceremonial precepts was twofold; they were ordained for the worship of God at that time, and for prefiguring Christ". Their purpose was *ordinatio mentis in Deum*, as he states repeatedly (q. 101, a. 2-4, q. 102, a. 1-5). He also fits *ordinatio* into his doctrine on the body-soul relationship (q. 101, a. 2): "Worship is twofold: internal and external. For since man is made up of soul and body, both must be used for the worship of God, the soul by interior worship, the body by exterior....As the body is ordered to God by the soul, so exterior worship is ordered to interior".

We may now turn to his teaching on the significance of *caeremonialia*. St. Thomas subscribed to and underlined John's argument that they had both a figurative and a literal cause. Like John he begins by establishing that they had a figurative cause: divine teaching had to be adapted to a crude people; divine mysteries must be expressed in figures (q. 101, a. 1). Like John he argues that they had a literal cause as well (q. 102, a. 2). His arguments have a more cutting edge than his predecessor's. The objections are (1) circumcision and the sacrifice of the paschal lamb were signs only: how much more so the other ceremonies? (2) the effect is proportionate to the cause. All the ceremonial precepts are figurative. Therefore they have a figurative cause only; (3) many precepts, such as the number of animals prescribed for sacrifice, are indifferent in themselves; therefore they cannot have any literal cause. He replies by arguing for a literal cause on the ground that ceremonies provided for divine worship "at that time". They warded off idolatry, recalled God's goodness and disposed the mind to his worship. St. Thomas draws a parallel between legal precepts and prophetic words. The prophet spoke words which applied to his own time and which also figured what was to come. Similarly, circumcision and the passover signified God's covenant with Israel and her delivery from Egypt according to their literal sense, but they also prefigured the sacraments of the New Law. The other ceremonies likewise were instituted not only as figures of the future, but also to regulate divine worship there and then. The answer to objection (2) is that it would be conclusive only if the ceremonial precepts were given *solely* to prefigure the future. The answer to the objection on indifferent precepts (3) disposes of the whole difficulty once and for all, though particular cases come

up for discussion later. St. Thomas refers back to his treatment of particulars in human laws (q. 96, a. 1 and 6). Human laws should be ordered to the common good of the body politic in principle. Their particulars vary according to the will of their framers. In the same way "many particulars in the ceremonies of the Old Law have no literal cause, but only a figurative, though *taken in the abstract, they have also literal causes*". His parallel between human and divine laws enabled St. Thomas to steer a middle course. He avoided making a categorical statement that some precepts had no literal cause, as John had done; he avoided making the equally categorical statement that *all* precepts had a literal cause, as William had done. Divine and human laws alike, in Thomist theory, were directed to an end in principle, which covered particular applications.

The literal reasons for *caeremonialia* interested him. He studied their particulars, supplementing John by direct recourse to the *Guide*. He did not always agree with John. The Franciscan had argued, copying William, that the precept against boiling a kid in the milk of its dam (*Exod.* xxiii, 19) was directed against idolatry, and gave no other reason for it. The same applied to John's explanation for the precept not to take the hen with her young from a nest (*Deut.* xxii, 6). Here again, he followed William, who had scouted Maimonides' suggestion that such precepts inculcated pity. St. Thomas preferred to hold that they did inculcate pity, as well as warning against idolatry and superstition. He expands on the argument:

> As to the affection arising from sentiment, it is operative also with regard to animals; for since pity is roused by the sufferings of others, and animals can feel pain, man can feel pity for them. And if he is often moved in this way, he is more likely to have compassion for his fellowmen... Therefore the Lord, in order to stir to compassion the Jewish people, naturally inclined to cruelty, wished to exercise them in pity even to animals, by forbidding certain practices savouring of cruelty to them (q. 102, a. 6).

His thoughtful interest in literal reasons for particular precepts did not prevent him from tipping the balance in favour of John's defence of their figurative reasons. *Caeremonialia* as figures have a privileged place in the Thomist scheme. This comes out in the contrast made between ceremonial and judicial precepts (q. 104, a. 4). The judicial precepts were figurative in a different way from the ceremonial (q. 104, a. 2): "It seems to be characteristic of the ceremonial precepts that they were instituted as figures of something." They regulate divine worship; things pertaining to God must be conveyed in figures, as being beyond our reason, whereas what concerns our neighbour is not beyond our

reason. St. Thomas explains that a precept may be figurative in two ways: "First, primarily and in itself, in that it was enacted primarily to be a figure of something. The ceremonial precepts were figurative in this way; for they were instituted in order to be figurative of something connected with the worship of God *and the mystery of Christ*". Here, then, he classifies under the heading "figurative" the purpose of the ceremonies, both as regulating divine worship at that time and as prefiguring Christ. He sees their primary meaning as figurative in both senses. The judicial precepts, on the contrary, were figurative only in the way that the whole history of God's chosen people was figurative: the judicial precepts of this people, like their deeds and wars, are interpreted allegorically and morally as well as literally. Those of gentile peoples differ from the Jewish in that they are not interpreted allegorically and morally; they have a literal meaning only. St. Thomas is applying his doctrine on the senses of Scripture: God, as the first author of sacred history, has given it a mystical content peculiar to Revelation. But *caeremonialia* have a special place within it. Their special character is brought out again on the question: "Do the judicial precepts bind in perpetuity?" (a. 3). St. Thomas answers that neither the ceremonial nor the judicial precepts bind in perpetuity: both have been voided by the New Law. But they were voided in different ways. The ceremonies "became not only dead, but deadly to those who should keep them after Christ had come, and particularly after the promulgation of the Gospel. The judicial precepts, on the other hand, are dead, since they have no binding force, but not deadly". The reason given is that "the ceremonial precepts were figurative primarily and in themselves, being instituted principally as figuring the mysteries of Christ yet to come. Consequently their observance would militate against the truth of faith, in which we profess that these mysteries are now fulfilled". A legislator today might re-enact Old Testament *iudicialia* without committing mortal sin, provided that he did not order them to be observed "as binding through enactment in the Old Law". "The judicial precepts were not instituted as figuring, but as ordering the state of that people, which was directed to Christ".

St. Thomas has made a clear statement: the ceremonial precepts were instituted *principally as figuring the mysteries of Christ yet to come*. Hence they fall into a different class; St. Thomas has set them apart from the rest of Old Testament history, including *iudicialia*. Their literal meaning for the Jews slips into the background, as soon as he contrasts them with the judicial precepts. He repeats the traditional allegories and moralities concerning ceremonies in what strikes a modern reader (and his modern editors) as tedious detail. Much of it is

borrowed from John, but the borrowing stems from St. Thomas's determination to apply his principle at whatever cost in tedium. A principle was at stake indeed. Since the primary significance of ceremonies included their figurative meaning, that is, allegories and moralities, then the latter must be set forth at length. It seems that William of Auvergne's neglect or rejection of the figurative sense of the ceremonies had spurred on St. Thomas to emphasise it, whether he knew of William's attack at first hand or indirectly. He defended the figurative sense of the ceremonies at unusual length; such prolixity is too rare in the *Summa* to be accidental. The theme recurs in other sections too: Christ's passion was a true sacrifice, prefigured by the blood offerings of the Old Testament, though truth surpassed its figure (3a, q. 48, a. 3).

Modern experts on Thomism put forward divergent views on the structure and organisation of the *Summa*, seen as reflecting its author's mind. Some would interpret the sequence as outlining the process of withdrawal and return to God; others see it as Christ-centred;[17] others find the key in the author's concept of *Heilsgeschichte.*[18] All agree on one point: St. Thomas was constrained by his reasoning to interpret the Old Testament ceremonies and sacraments as prefigurations of the New; the structure and doctrine of the *Summa* demanded that he should.

St. Thomas's re-shaping and re-thinking of John's *De legibus* thus tied it into his *ensemble.* He produced a more convincing justification of the figurative meaning of *caeremonialia* than had been offered previously. It was more telling in two ways: St. Thomas gave a general theory on the relations between the senses as a background; he understood and allowed for the new enthusiasm for discovering a literal reason in the precepts. He both satisfied critics and upheld the traditional view of ceremonies as figurative. A moderate position, clearly argued, will often win acceptance. So it did here: we hear nothing further of William's attack on "significations".

Finally we must ask the question: how much, in St. Thomas's view, did Moses and other wise men of the Old Testament perceive of the figurative meaning of ceremonies? The distinction between élite and common herd belonged to tradition and could be taken for granted. Ralph of Flaix ascribed understanding of the figurative meaning to Moses and the élite, but denied it to the people, from whom, indeed,

17 G. Lafont, *Structures et méthodes dans la Somme théologique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1961), gives a summary of earlier views and his own.
18 M. Seckler, *Le salut et l'histoire. La pensée de saint Thomas d'Aquin sur la théologie de l'histoire*, transl. from the German (Paris 1967).

their teachers took pains to hide it behind the veil of the literal meaning. William of Auvergne challenged this traditional view on the grounds that all precepts of the Old Law had a literal reason, which teachers were bound to explain to the people. He admitted that wise men could gain a deeper understanding by dint of study than could be conveyed to the people, but its content he never specified. William avoided stating that the deeper meaning acquired by study included understanding of the prefigurative value of *caeremonialia*. John of la Rochelle re-stated the traditional view in a modified form. His distinction between explicit and implicit belief enabled him to put it more precisely and to allow the Jewish people a better understanding of their rites: "modern" scholars and prelates are bound to understand and believe in the articles of the *credo* explicitly, but simple men only implicitly. Just so, ancient doctors and priests were bound to understand the true figurative meaning of their sacrifices explicitly, whereas the people were bound to implicit belief only. The people had only to believe that their sacrifices would please God for reasons which passed their understanding.

St. Thomas agreed with John and he explored the subject further. He decided in *De veritate* that the ancients knew the whole faith, *quasi in universali implicite credentes.*[19] But the elders and leaders of the people were bound to believe some truths of the faith explicitly. They were bound to explicit belief in the Trinity, even before the Fall. After the Fall, they were bound also to explicit belief in redemption to come.[20] Explicit belief in a future redemption carried implicit faith in the incarnation and passion with it (2a 2ae, q. 1, a. 1). All those who resisted the devil before Christ's passion were able to do so through faith in his passion, although it had not yet come to pass (3a, q. 49, a. 2). The faith of the ancients was the same as ours, apart from the difference in period. They believed, explicitly in some matters, implicitly in others, truths which would come about in the future, whereas we believe truths which have been manifested to us in the past. The ancient fathers, as teachers of this faith, received from God such knowledge as they needed to convey to their people at the time, whether openly or in figures. Full knowledge would come with Christ. Understanding was given by stages, as God adapted his teaching to men in the various periods of their history: boys have to learn the lesser things first, and a crowd must be brought to understanding of things unheard of previously by degrees.[21]

19 *De Veritate*, q. 14, a. 12; ed. R. Spiazzi i (Rome/Turin, 1948) p. 304.
20 Ibid. a. 11, p. 302-3.
21 *Summa contra gentiles* 4, 23; ed. Leon. (Rome 1934) 517.

St. Thomas accepted the traditional three stages: before the Law, under the Law, the time of grace.

Did revelation by stages mean that implicit belief in the figurative value of ceremonies became more explicit as time went on? We might expect the answer to be "yes", since St. Thomas says that those who lived closer in time to Christ had more explicit knowledge, giving St. John the Baptist and the apostles as examples (2a 2ae, q. 2, a. 1-2). But the answer is really "no". The negative comes out clearly in his questions on prophecy (2a 2ae, q. 174, a. 1-2). Moses was the greatest of the Old Testament prophets *simpliciter*. The quality of prophecy did not improve within each of the three stages of salvation (before the Law, under the Law, time of grace). On the contrary, the first revelation within each of the three stages excelled those following in its own stage. Hence the revelation granted to Moses excelled those granted to later prophets under the Law, just as the Gospel excelled anything which followed it in the time of grace. The Baptist and the apostles, therefore, shared in the first and best revelation of the third period. St. Thomas refused to admit a progressive revelation within each of the stages of the history of man's salvation. His refusal formed the crux of his case against the Joachites. He rejected their hope of a new gospel of the Holy Spirit.[22] It is more important here that he differed from William of Auvergne also. William had stated his belief in a progressive revelation "under the Law". The prophets of Israel, according to William, called their people to a more interior worship than the legal precepts enjoined. He presented the Law as wholesome and rational, but argued that it could be supplemented and improved upon, though not voided, before it ceded to the New Law of Christ.[23]

In the Thomist view of revelation the best comes first in each successive stage. That is why the figurative value of ceremonies and sacrifices claims a central place in his synthesis. They give coherence to his picture of the history of salvation. The ceremonial and sacrificial precepts conveyed implicit faith to the whole Jewish people, who practised them for the honour of God (1a 2ae, q. 101, a. 2). They all observed rites which signified the future expiation of sin by Christ. They shared in this expiation "by professing faith in the Redeemer in figurative sacrifices" (ibid. q. 102, a. 5). But the Jewish people were divided into two groups. The priests had more explicit knowledge than the rest, just as they played a more direct part in divine worship:

> Hence the high priest alone, once a year, entered into the inner tabernacle, the Holy of Holies, signifying that the final perfection of man is his

22 See M. Reeves, op. cit. 67-69, 161.
23 See above, p. 42.

entrance into that world. Into the outer tabernacle, the Holy Place, the priests entered daily, but not the people, who only had access to the court, because the people could conceive what was corporeal, but the inner meaning could only be seen by the wise through reflection (q. 102, a. 4, ad 4).

To the state of the Old Law the people and the priests were related in different ways. The people looked on at the bodily sacrifices offered in the court. The priests, however, were intent on the meaning of the sacrifices, since they had more explicit faith in the mysteries of Christ, and so they entered into the outer tabernacle, for some things were veiled from the people concerning the mystery of Christ, while they were known to the priests, though even to them they were not fully revealed, as subsequently in the New Testament (ibid.).

St. Thomas, like John of la Rochelle, transposed the distinction between priests and people, clergy and laity, as he knew it, back into the Old Testament. The priests of the Old Law shared with Moses and the élite a more explicit understanding of the ceremonial mysteries than was vouchsafed to the people. As he explained in *De veritate, minores* in Christian times were bound to have explicit faith in the creed in general and in the Church's teaching; explicit faith in each article of the creed could not be demanded of *minores* as it was of *maiores.*[24] The same sort of difference obtained under the Old Law.

To sum up the results of this long enquiry: St. Thomas on the Old Law stands out from his background as an intelligent conservative. He thought out the traditional doctrine and put his learning at its disposal. It corresponded to his most cherished convictions on the divine scheme of salvation. The patriarchs and prophets still "greet their country from afar". St. Thomas yielded to none of his predecessors in the foresight which he accorded to the Old Testament élite. Priests and elders understood the figurative meaning of ceremonies and sacrifices explicitly, though they could not foresee the Gospel story in detail. The whole Jewish people was bound to believe implicitly what their elders believed explicitly. *Caeremonialia* had a central place in revelation. Their significance broke through the limits which St. Thomas himself had set to the definition of the literal sense of Scripture. The spiritual sense of Scripture, as he taught elsewhere, eluded the sacred writers' understanding, having been put there by God: The New Testament alone revealed the spiritual senses to Christians. But Moses and the élite had a partial understanding of the mystical sense of ceremonies. "Partial" is perhaps too weak an adjective for the explicit faith and clear pre-view which enabled them to pierce the veil of their legal code, as St. Thomas imagined things.

24 *De Verit.* p. 303-4. See also *Summa* 2a 2ae, q. 2, a. 6.

Dom Gribomont has made the pertinent comment that St. Thomas in speaking of implicit (I would add "partially explicit") knowledge, always stresses knowledge of reality implied in the object, as clearly known. Today, as Dom Gribomont says, we think more of the consciousness of the knowing subject. We feel more curiosity about the sacred writers' psychology.[25] The insight applies to medieval scholarship in all fields. The medieval clerk read both profane and sacred books for the sake of their content, as sources of wisdom. His authors interested him less than their teaching; he did not envisage them clearly as persons. So we need not wonder that St. Thomas focussed his attention on the content, literal and mystical, of the Mosaic Law, without enquiring what Moses had in mind. Paradoxically, this neglect of the question has the result of making the Thomist treatment of the Old Law look less dated and anachronistic today than William of Auvergne's. St. Thomas avoided rash speculation on its historical setting. William floundered in a quagmire because he ventured on to the terrain of biblical and ancient history. The schoolmen as a class had little use for history as such and were ill equipped to deal with it. St. Thomas dammed up William's line of enquiry and turned speculation into more profitable channels. He clarified and fortified tradition, partly in reaction to William's attack on allegories and moralities. John had bowdlerised *De legibus*; St. Thomas supplied a powerful counter argument, sustained throughout his *Summa* wherever he touched on ceremonies. *De legibus* therefore had a negative rather than a positive effect: it provoked refutation. St. Thomas's genius took its toll, as genius will, in making men forget his predecessors.

And yet was it all gain that he put William's opinions on the shelf, to moulder there permanently? William's answer to the question "What do we know about Moses?" would amuse a modern biblical scholar.[26] But the questions he asked matter more than his naïve answers. What did Old Testament history convey to readers or hearers when it was first recorded? What was the lawgiver's purpose? What did the Law mean when it was first received? Few of the questions raised in the schools have kept such relevance today. William was no match for the Angelic Doctor in the middle ages. For that very reason he seems closer to us when he discusses the Old Law. St. Thomas had the better mind; William showed more curiosity and imagination.

25 Op. cit. (above, p. 12, n. 3), 80. The difference between medieval and modern approaches to authors makes it hard to adapt Thomist doctrine on the interpretation of Scripture to problems of modern exegesis and theories on inspiration and revelation; see the account of various attempts to do so by J. T. Burtchaell, *Catholic Theories of Biblical Inspiration since 1810* (Cambridge 1969) 131 and passim.

26 See. G. Widengren, "What do we know about Moses?", *Proclamation and Presence. Old Testament Essays in Honour of Gwynne Henton Davies*, ed. J. I. Durham and J. R. Porter (London 1970) 21-47.

APPENDIX

William's account of the spiritual senses in *De legibus* is so novel that it seemed advisable to check the edition from an early manuscript. The editors do not state what manuscripts they used. I chose MS Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 15755 as the earliest available; it belonged to the Sorbonne. Mlle Marthe Dulong kindly described it and collated it with the edition for me. She puts it probably in the mid-thirteenth century. It is written in black ink in a rather tremulous hand, "more like a hand used for documents than a real book hand". The chapters are marked by red and blue initials. There are no chapter headings or numbers and no marginalia, at least on these pages. The manuscript has some variations from the edition, which do not alter the sense in any material way. Some of the manuscript readings are inferior to the edition; others suggest slight improvements. I transcribe the text of the edition (pp. 48-49), noting the MS variants in brackets (fol. 49vb).

Quarta significatio est per similitudinem rerum, quae non ad hoc factae sunt ut significent; et haec est quae multos offendit, et propter hoc quia abusivum eis videtur res ad (in) signa trahere, quae non ad significandum factae sunt, quale est id (illud) Hieremiae 8 (xiii):[1] Nunquid sicut facit figulus iste non potero vobis (*add.* facere) domus Israel, ait Dominus. Dissipatio enim vasis quae prius fiebat, et formatio vasis alterius (*add.* non ad hoc)[2] factae sunt ut significarent; et cum eis ad significandum usus est Deus (Dominus), neque offenderetur quis audiens huiusmodi expositiones seu interpretationes, si diceretur ei hoc modo: Quemadmodum dicit (ibi dixit) Dominus: Nunquid non sic facere vobis potero? ubi de significatione nihil locutus est, sed de similitudine tantum. Quemadmodum et Hieremiae tertio, non dixit quicquam de significatione, sed similitudinem et modum tantum expressit dicens: Quomodo si mulier contemnat amatorem suum, sic contempsit me domus Israel (*add.* etc).[3] Non dixit, quia contemptus huius mulieris significaret contemptum filiorum Israel, nec dixit quod amator huius significaret ipsum, neque dixit quod dissipatio aut reformatio vasis prophetia esset vel parabola eius quod ipse operatus (operaturus) esset in populo Israel (*add.* hoc modo), vel quod figulus esset figura ipsius, sed expressit modum seu similitudinem notam inter opus figuli et opus suum, et inter factum mulieris contemnentis amatorem suum et factum populi Israel, quo modo si loquerentur sacri expositores et doctores in allegoriis et tropologiis suis (*add.* et) etiam anagogicis

1 xviii, 6.
2 The MS reading is better here: the breaking of one vase and the making of another were not meant to signify, but to resemble what God could do to Israel.
3 iii, 20.

interpretationibus, et scripturae satisfacerent et audientium sive legentium intellectus non offenderent. Sed quia dicetur (dicunt): "Tale quid significat tale quid, et est figura seu prophetia aut parabola talis rei", cum alterum propter alterum significandum nec factum nec dictum videatur, offendunt graviter audientes. Quemadmodum se habet in facto David et Uriae, quod legitur in 11 (*add.* secundi) et 12 Regum, ubi dicitur quod David, qui utique proditor erat in facto illo, et adulter atque homicida, significat Christum, Urias autem, vir sanctus et fidelis, diabolum (Dyabolus). Et iterum (*add* de) adulterina illa copula Davidis de (David et) Bersabee, proditione et homicidio execrabili[4] significat sanctissimum matrimonium et immaculatissimam copulam Christi et Ecclesiae de gentibus, quae (*om.*) auribus multorum multam indignationem ingerunt, fidemque sacrarum expositionum aut penitus in eis abrogant aut multum laedunt. Primum, quia istud non est factum ad significandum, nec verisimile est multis quod propter hoc sit scriptum. Si autem ita dicerent: "Quo modo rex David Bersabee adamavit et pro (MS pre) amore ipsius mortem viri procuravit, quo modo illam regali connubio honoravit et regali solio exaltavit, sic rex coelorum Christus Dominus synagogam adamavit et, procurata morte magistratus seu principatus eius, cui velut marito suberat, eam connubio suo spirituali honoravit et coelestis regni solio sublimavit", si, inquam, de modo tantum aut similitudine mentionem facerent, et ipsam similitudinem decenter et diligenter prosequentes exponerent, absque offensione ulla audientium hoc fieret. Eodem modo de Ecclesia de (et) gentibus, quod procurata morte diaboli, morte (*om.*) scilicet spirituali, cui velut marito suberat, unde et vocabat ipsum Bahalim, quod interpretatur vir meus,[5] quod sic et sic ei fecit, non solum pacifice, sed gratanter (graviter) etiam audiretur. Verbum ergo significandi est quod in parte ista graviter offendit auditores atque lectores, quamquam verum sit quod omnium duorum similium, quorum alterum est intellectui nostro propinquius, nobisque notius, signum naturale est id (*om.*)[6] minus noti atque ab intellectu nostro remotioris. Signum, inquam, est naturale illius et velut liber in quo legitur; unde et quasi natura docente altero ad alterum declarandum utimur. Hoc ergo modo sacri doctores et expositores sane et absque offendiculo ullo dicere possunt quia (quod) factum illud de Bersabee factum significavit ecclesiae de gentibus; significavit (*add.* inquam) propria similitudine, tanquam naturali designatione. Licet autem Spiritui sancto et scriptoribus eius notioribus similibus (similitudinibus)[7] uti ad minus nota significanda et declaranda. Secundo, propter rerum dissimilitudinem et nimiam (nimiamque distantiam), ubi magis violenta est significatio (significationis impositio)[8] in ipsis quam rerum significatarum expositio. Et in hoc errant imperiti multi, qui nesciunt qualiter tractandum sit verbum veritatis, sed ingenium suum, ut ait Hieronymus, facere nolunt ec-

4 Both MS and edition seem to omit several words: "dicunt quod" would make sense.

5 Jerome gives "vir eius" as the meaning of *Bala* (*Ios.* xix, 3), *Liber de interp. nom Hebr.*, PL 23, 802, but it does not relate to the context. William's allusion is obscure. Perhaps another passage has dropped out of the text.

6 A better reading.

7 A better reading.

8 A better reading.

clesiae sacrificium (sacramentum),[9] et propter hoc dixit super Abacuc: Tropologia libera est et tantum legibus circumscripta, ut pietatem sequatur in intelligentiae sermonisque contextu (intelligentia sermonisque contextum), nec in rebus multum inter se contrariis violenta sit copulandis.[10] Tertium, est ignorantia explicandi prosequendique similitudines, ex quo defectu accidit et illud quod diximus, ut non credatur expositionibus, maxime ubi ex similitudine potissimum significant. Cessante namque in his rerum similitudine, cessat et significatio apud audientes. Quartum, est ignorantia eius videlicet quod solum in negotio significat, sicut accidit in somniis quae exposuit Ioseph in 40 et 41 Genesis. Tres enim propagines et tria canistra panum propter numerum tantum significaverunt tres dies, de quibus agitur, et solus ternarius quantum ad dies (*om.*) illos significat. Erraret enim intolerabiliter qui canistra vel propagines in significationem dierum detorquere vellet. Propter hoc dictum est (*add.* quod) sacra scriptura est velut cithara, in qua non omnia sonant (sanant).[11]

9 Wrong reading.

10 On Abac. i, 6-11, PL 26, 1281-2: "Historia stricta est et evagandi non habet facultatem. Tropologia libera, et his tantum legibus circumscripta, ut pietatem sequatur intelligentiae sermonisque contextum, nec in rebus multum inter se contrariis violenta sit copulandis."

11 Wrong reading. See Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, PL 42, 463.

THE *QUINQUE VIAE* AND SOME PARISIAN PROFESSORS OF PHILOSOPHY

William Dunphy

HISTORICAL studies on the influence of Thomas Aquinas have focused naturally enough on his fellow theologians. A recent work entitled *The Early Thomistic School* names five Oxford and nine Parisian professors as strongly influenced by Aquinas, all of whom were theologians.[1] There have been fewer studies of Aquinas's influence on his contemporaries in the Faculty of Arts,[2] though we know in what high esteem he was held by the Parisian Masters of Arts thanks to the remarkable letter sent by them to the General Chapter of the Dominican Order immediately after Aquinas's untimely death in Italy.[3] We have no reason to believe that a comparable letter was sent from his own Faculty of Theology. Further, given the troubled relations between the Faculties of Arts and Theology at Paris during the 1260's and 1270's, it is certainly extraordinary that all the Masters of Arts should have looked upon a theologian as a co-worker in their task of shedding light on the mysteries of nature and in interpreting the writings of the great philosophers.

Indeed, the growing suspicion by theologians concerning the Christian orthodoxy of these Masters of Arts matched a growing resentment on the part of some philosophers at what they considered to be unwarranted interference in their affairs by theologians. The Lenten *Collationes* of St. Bonaventure bear witness to the former,[4] while

* The research for this article was supported by a grant from the Canada Council.

1 F. J. Roensch, *The Early Thomistic School* (Dubuque 1964). One of them, however, is Peter of Auvergne, who had a notable career in the Faculty of Arts before becoming a theologian.

2 See, for example, O. Lottin, "Saint Thomas d'Aquin à la faculté des arts de Paris aux approches de 1277," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 16 (1949) 292-313: R. A. Gauthier, "Trois commentaires 'averroistes' sur l'Ethique à Nicomaque," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 16 (1947-48) 187-336.

3 The text of the letter can be found in A. Birkenmajer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, XX, 5 (1922) 2-4. See also his "Neues zu dem Brief der Pariser Artistenfacultät über den Tod des hl. Thomas von Aquin," *Xenia Thomistica* 3 (Rome 1925) 57-72.

4 See especially the *Collationes in Hexaemeron* delivered at Paris in 1273 in *Opera Omnia* V (Quaracchi 1891) and in another version edited by F. Delorme (Quaracchi 1934).

Boetius of Dacia's *De aeternitate mundi* is a passionate statement of the latter.[5]

The *Cartulary* of the University of Paris documents these disturbing developments within the Faculty of Arts and the severe reactions to them by the Bishop of Paris, Stephen Tempier. First, the Bishop condemned thirteen carefully selected philosophical propositions in 1270 and, seven years later, he followed this intervention with the wholesale condemnation of two hundred and nineteen theses. This latter condemnation provides indirect testimony to Aquinas's influence within the Faculty of Arts. The Bishop denounced those "studying in Arts at Paris" who had overstepped the limits of their own Faculty by proposing the condemned propositions for discussion. Since a number of them were drawn from the writings of Thomas Aquinas, Dom O. Lottin has suggested that one of the targets intended by the Bishop was Aquinas and this, precisely because of his influence on the Faculty of Arts.[6] A more thorough study of Aquinas's presence to these professors of philosophy in the period between the condemnations of 1270 and 1277 could assist our understanding of this important moment of tension in the history of western thought.

I propose in this article to examine in some detail the different ways in which two Parisian philosophical commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics* utilized certain theological texts of Thomas Aquinas on the question of God's existence. Both commentaries are in the style of "Questions" and both were composed during the crucial years between 1270 and 1277.

One is a set of questions on Book Eight of the *Physics* found in manuscript Munich Clm. 9559, fol. 40rl-vl, edited in 1941 by Philippe Delhaye and ascribed by him to Siger of Brabant.[7] Since a number of scholars have questioned that attribution,[8] (successfully, I think), this work will be designated simply as the Munich *Questions on Book Eight of the Physics*. The other set of questions on Book Twelve of the

5 See the edition by G. Sajó (Berlin 1964).

6 *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, ed. H. Denifle and E. Chatelain (Paris 1889) I, 449-560. For the text of the decree of 1270, see 486-87; for that of 1277, see 543-58. See also O. Lottin, art. cit. 312.

7 *Siger de Brabant, Questions sur la Physique d'Aristote*, ed. P. Delhaye (Louvain 1941). Although these questions are published as one work with the *Questions on Physics I-IV* that immediately precede them in the manuscript, they were copied by different scribes and were apparently joined together by the compiler of the manuscript.

8 See, for example, A. Maier, "Les Commentaires sur la Physique d'Aristote attribués à Siger de Brabant," *Revue philosophique de Louvain* 47 (1949) 334-350; A. Zimmerman, *Die Quaestionen des Siger von Brabant zur Physik des Aristoteles* (Cologne 1956); G. Sajó, "Boèce de Dacie et les Commentaires anonymes inédits de Munich sur la Physique et sur la Génération attribués à Siger de Brabant," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 25 (1959) 21-58.

Metaphysics are from Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* and are edited for the first time below.

A simple inspection of the titles of a few questions from these two works reveals their significance for a study of the influence of St. Thomas on the Parisian Faculty of Arts. The Munich *Questions on Book Eight of the Physics* ask:

Utrum primum principium esse sit manifestum in entibus.
Utrum primum principium esse in entibus possit demonstrari.
Utrum sit ponere Primum in entibus.

Peter of Auvergne's *Commentary on Book Twelve of the Metaphysics* asks:

Utrum ex se sit manifestum aliquas substantias separatas esse.
Utrum substantias separatas esse possunt demonstrari.
Utrum necesse sit ponere substantias aliquas separatas.
Utrum sit ponere primum principium.

Historians of mediaeval thought are generally agreed that the triadic sequence of questions concerning 1) the need to demonstrate God's existence, 2) the possibility of such a demonstration, and 3) examples of such a demonstration, seems to have originated with Thomas Aquinas.[9] His *Summa contra Gentiles* (*SCG*) 1, 10-13 and his *Summa theologiae* (*ST*) 1, 2, 1-3 use the successful fulfillment of the third step as the indispensable foundation for all that follows in those works.[10]

In his earlier work, the *SCG*, directed to those intellectuals who do not accept the testimony of either the Old or New Testaments, St. Thomas proposes "to set forth the arguments by which both philosophers and Catholic teachers have proved that God exists."[11] It is interesting that in this chapter the philosophers' arguments come first, in great detail, with many specific references to the text of Aristotle. It is only in the thirty-fifth and final paragraph that he proposes an argument formulated by a Catholic teacher, John Damascene, but with the observation that this argument is also hinted at (*etiam innuit*) by Averroes.

9 A possible foreshadowing of this logical sequence of questions can be found in Avicenna's discussion of the subject matter of metaphysics, where he rejects the position that God is that subject because no science proves the existence of its subject and God's existence is proven in metaphysics. Here is the key text in that discussion: "Igitur aut (Deum esse) est manifestum per se aut desperatum per se quod non possit manifestari ulla speculatione. Non est autem manifestum per se, nec est desperatum posse manifestari quia signa habemus de eo." *Meta.* 1, 1 (Venice 1508) fol. 70r2.

10 "Inter ea vero quae de Deo secundum seipsum consideranda sunt, praemittendum est, quasi totius operis necessarium fundamentum, consideratio qua demonstratur Deum esse. Quo non habito, omnis consideratio de rebus divinis necessario tollitur." *SCG* I, 9.

11 Ibid. 1, 13, 1; tr. A. Pegis (New York 1955) 85.

In the *ST*, however, directed to an audience of beginners in the study of Catholic truth, where St. Thomas had promised to set forth "briefly and clearly" the things that pertain to sacred doctrine, he introduces examples of proofs of God's existence with the flat statement that "the existence of God can be proved in five ways."[12] There is only one specific reference to a philosopher, Aristotle, and this occurs in the fourth way, which most historians ascribe rather to the Platonic tradition.

In what ways then would professors in the Parisian Faculty of Arts find use for Aquinas's theological treatment of the question of God's existence? A Christian professor, charged with guiding his students through a reading of Aristotle's *Physics*, might naturally associate a demonstration of the existence of a first unmoved mover in Book Eight with a proof for the existence of God. Even more so, a Christian commentator on Book Twelve of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* could scarcely dissociate in his own mind a proof of God's existence from a demonstration of the existence of an eternal immaterial substance, wholly in act, especially since in this book Aristotle expressly calls such a being God.[13]

In fact, similar associations had already been made, albeit in different ways, by Avicenna and Averroes. Indeed, their handling of the question of demonstrating God's existence was so different that no professor in the Arts Faculty could avoid taking sides in the controversy as to whether such a proof belongs to the science of physics or metaphysics.

Avicenna, with his recognition of a *causa agens* (the *creator mundi*) that is not merely a source of motion but a source of being (*principium essendi*), insisted that it is in the science of metaphysics that we demonstrate the existence of "the Most High God."[14] Averroes, on the contrary, denied the philosophical need for any creative causality and insisted that it is impossible to prove the existence of an immaterial being except by way of motion.[15] Thus the existence of God or the prime mover is properly and exclusively proved in the science of physics. The task of the metaphysician is to demonstrate that the prime mover, whose existence had already been proven in physics, is the principle of sensible substance in the orders of formal and final causality.[16] He

12 St. Thomas, *ST* 1, 2, 3.
13 Aristotle, *Meta.* XII, 7, 1072b 30.
14 Avicenna, *Meta.* VI, 1, fol. 91r2, and 1, 1, fol. 70r1-2.
15 Averroes, *In XII Meta.* c. 5 (Venice 1574) fol. 293 C.
16 Ibid. c. 6, fol. 294 K-L; see also *In II Meta.* c. 6, fol. 31 E.

sharply criticized Avicenna's proof of God's existence, saying that it is false, weak, and in no way demonstrative, for even the more certain of its statements do not pass beyond the merely probable.[17]

How then did mediaeval Christians handle this controversy? The thirteenth century interpreters of Aristotle whose main concerns were theological did not hesitate. Obviously, they could not prefer an Averroistic Aristotle whose first principle was not a creator, i. e., where the notion of efficient causality was restricted to that of a *causa movens*. On this point at least, the Avicennian view of efficient causality would carry the day, so that in attempting to formulate proofs of the existence of God these theologians would feel free to view them as properly metaphysical rather than as restricted to a proof from motion in physics.

Albert the Great, for one, while agreeing with Averroes that in physics we primarily study material and moving causes and in metaphysics formal and final causes, nevertheless insisted that demonstrations of God's existence were proper to metaphysics. Even proving the first cause by way of motion is not a physical proof, for we do not arrive at just a first cause of motion *qua* motion, but rather at the first cause of that motion which serves as the instrumental cause of the outpouring of all being from the First.[18]

Thomas Aquinas also, in this instance, preferred Avicenna to Averroes. By including the case of the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent within the emanation of the whole of being from the universal cause who is God, Aquinas regularly uses as interchangeable the terms *causa efficiens, causa movens* and *causa agens*. Thus he can call God both the prime unmoved mover of the *Physics* and the first, wholly actual, eternal substance of the *Metaphysics*.[19]

But what about those mediaeval Christians whose professional interests required them to explain the writings of Aristotle and other philosophers to students in a university Faculty of Arts? Certainly at

17 Averroes, *In I Phy.*, c. 83, fol. 47 F-H; *In VII Phy.*, c. 3, fol. 340 E-F.

18 "Et si accipiatur per motum prima causa, hoc non est, ut sciatur, inquantum est movens talem motum, sed potius inquantum ipse ambit virtute et forma sua mobile et motum quod est instrumentum fluxus totius entis ab ipso, et hoc modo non considerat ipsum physicus." Albert, *In XI Meta.* tr. 1, c. 3; ed. B. Geyer, *Opera Omnia* XVI (1960-64) 462, 53-463, 10. For a complete understanding of Albert's own views, however, one must bear in mind his numerous protestations that in his Aristotelian commentaries he is primarily concerned with merely presenting the peripatetic position.

19 "Et sic terminat Philosophus considerationem communem de rebus naturalibus in Primo Principio totius naturae qui est super omnia Deus benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen." St. Thomas, *In VIII Phy.* lect. 23. "Et hoc est quod concludit, quod est unus princeps totius universi, scilicet primum movens, et primum intelligibile et primum bonum, quod supra dixit Deum, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen." *In XII Meta.* lect. 12.

Paris in the second half of the thirteenth century the detailed commentaries of Averroes on Aristotle would prove more immediately useful to them in resolving textual difficulties than the more personal philosophizing of Avicenna, whose works were not intended as a textual commentary on Aristotle. As Aristotle merited the title "the Philosopher," so Averroes truly merited the title "the Commentator." But believing, as good Christians, in a universe produced *ex nihilo* by a creating God, how far could they follow Averroes's insistence that since no creating cause was needed in philosophy, the existence of a God conceived as the first unmoved mover could and must be demonstrated only by way of motion, and that only in physics? Clearly, some accommodation was in order.

Two of the better known of these Parisian professors, Siger of Brabant and Boetius of Dacia, usually identified by historians as "Latin Averroists,"[20] used neo-platonic doctrines found in Proclus and the *Liber de Causis* to make this accommodation. Boethius, while ruling out any proof for the existence of a creating God in the science of physics, apparently locates such a demonstration in metaphysics. Indeed, as authorities for a metaphysical notion of creation, he cites the *Liber de Causis* and *Averroes*![21]

Siger of Brabant appears to be more concerned on this point not to undermine the interpretative authority of Averroes. In the classic *locus* at which to raise the Avicennian-Averroistic dispute, namely in discussing the question whether the subject matter of metaphysics is being *qua* being or God, Siger rejects the contention of Averroes that it is God. However, he softens this rejection by noting Averroes's insistence, against Avicenna, that the metaphysician must accept from the natural philosopher God's existence as already proved. What ought I to hold, Siger asks? Well, he argues, it is not necessary that it belong to one and the same science to posit both the conclusion of a demonstration and the middle term whereby it is demonstrated. Now the middle term whereby God is proved in metaphysics is drawn from nature, as Aristotle does in Book Twelve of the *Metaphysics*: "quasi hoc supponens *ex physicis*." Therefore, on this point, Averroes is right.[22]

Against this background, let us now see how the author of the Munich *Questions on Book Eight of the Physics* and Peter of Auvergne

20 See, for example, E. Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York 1955) 389-402.

21 Boetius of Dacia, *De aeternitate mundi*; ed. G. Sajó (Berlin 1964). For the exclusion of creation from the consideration of the natural philosopher, see p. 45. For the metaphysician's proper concerns in treating creation, see pp. 50 and 54. Note his citation there not only of the *Liber de Causis*, but also of Averroes.

22 Siger of Brabant, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* 1, 1; ed. C. Graiff (Louvain 1948) 4.

selectively use the theological texts of Aquinas in dealing with the question of God's existence.

Before addressing himself to the actual text of the *Physics* and the question of the eternity of motion, the author of the Munich commentary inserts a block of five questions that one might expect to find in a commentary on the *Metaphysics*. He introduces the first two questions as follows: "Since the metaphysician accepts the existence of the first principle from the natural philosopher, first of all we ask: Whether the existence of a first principle in beings is self-evident; second, Whether this existence can be demonstrated."[23] The third question asks: Whether it belongs to the metaphysician to demonstrate the existence of a first principle. In his generally Avicennian answer to this question the author contends that the existence of God is not accepted as proven in any science other than *this one*, since all sciences other than *this one* deal with some determinate being that is less than *ens commune*. Hence, if God's existence is to be proven in any science, it ought to be done in *this one*.[24] On this basis it is clear that *this science* is metaphysics, and the author appears to conclude against his initial assumption, namely that "the metaphysician accepts the existence of the first principle from the natural philosopher."

The fourth question, which sets forth three proofs for the existence of God in close textual affinity with Aquinas's *ST* 1, 2, 3, explicitly names Avicenna as the author of the *tertia via*. The fifth of these introductory questions extends the metaphysical problematic by asking whether beings other than the first could be *ex se necesse esse*.[25] From these introductory questions one might infer that the author was interested in placing before his students a solution to the philosophical enigma of God's existence other than Averroes's prior to turning to the text of the *Physics* with its proof, based on the eternity of motion, of a first unmoved mover.

As we have seen, the first of the Munich questions asked: Whether it is manifest or self-evident that there be a first principle among beings. The first argument for an affirmative answer closely parallels the second affirmative argument in the *ST* to the question: Whether the proposition "God exists" be self-evident. Those propositions are said to be self-evident that are known simply by knowing the meaning of the terms. Thus, by knowing the meaning of the name "God," we also know that God exists. Unlike Aquinas, the Munich question does not

23 Ed. Delhaye, 188.
24 Ibid. 192-3.
25 Ibid. 193-6.

reflect the famous Anselmian argument in the *Proslogion.*[26] In fact, as might be expected, both Peter of Auvergne and the author of the Munich text regularly eliminate any purely theological traces from the texts of Aquinas when they transfer them to the context of discussions in the Faculty of Arts.[27] We shall not specifically note each one of these eliminations.

The second argument for the affirmative parallels the third affirmative argument in Aquinas's *ST*, namely that the existence of some truth is self-evident, for he who denies that there is truth must affirm at least that the denial is true. From this we can infer the existence of that which is most true or Truth, which is then identified with the first principle or God.[28]

A single argument *contra* appears in slightly different form in these works and is drawn from Aristotle: No one can think the opposite of that which is self-evident; but some have denied the existence of a first principle. The reader is left to draw the conclusion that it is not self-evident that there be a first principle.[29]

Both the Munich question and the *ST* begin their solutions of the question with a twofold distinction between the ways in which something can be self-evident, namely *quoad nos* and *non quoad nos.* Both develop the argument, though in slightly different ways, to the conclusion that the proposition "God exists" is indeed a self-evident proposition in itself, but not *quoad nos.* The *ST* explicitly refers to a Boethian text from *De Hebdomadibus*, while the Munich text simply uses Boethian phrases from that text.[30] It then easily disposes of the two arguments for the affirmative by using the above distinction.[31]

The parallel text from Peter of Auvergne asks a slightly different question. Instead of inquiring about God, Peter asks: Whether it be self-evident that some separate substances exist. One reason for this would be that the Aristotelian text on which he is commenting sought to prove the existence of a class of substances separate from matter. Peter an-

26 Ibid. 188; *ST* 1, 2, 1, obj. 2.

27 For example, neither author follows Aquinas who, in the *ST*, cites passages from Exodus, The Psalms, John, Paul, Damascene and Augustine.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid. 189.

30 Ibid. The Munich text also uses the Boethian distinction between those *per se notae* propositions whose terms are known commonly by all men, and those whose terms are known by wise men only (*cujus terminorum rationes sunt notae ipsius sapientibus*). It does not, however, go as far as the *Impossibilia* of Siger of Brabant which argues that "*Deum esse est verum, etiam necessarium, et sapientibus per se notum.*" See P. Mandonnet, *Siger de Brabant et l'averroïsme latin*, (Louvain 1911) II, 74-5.

31 Ibid.

nounces his intention to deal with separate substances before treating of God's existence.[32]

Peter's first argument for an affirmative answer to the question is basically the same as that found in the Munich text, but it is more closely related to the *SCG* than to the *ST*. It is interesting that Peter here uses a phrase which betrays a certain difficulty he felt in maintaining his resolve to treat universally of separate substances before God. His argument is based on the principle that "no proposition is more true or manifest than one in which the same item is predicated of itself." Now this is the case with the proposition "Separate substances exist," because nothing is predicable of separate substances other than their very substance. But here Peter hastens to add the revealing reservation: "at least in the case of the first substance."[33]

Peter's second argument does not correspond to that of the Munich text, but rather to an argument found in both the *ST* and the *SCG*. Here again his language is closer to that of the *SCG* than to that of the *ST*. It states that things naturally known are self-evidently known, and that separate substances are in that category because knowledge of them is naturally desired by man as his supreme perfection and happiness.[34]

Before solving the question, Peter attempts a general explanation, clearly inspired by the *SCG*,[35] why some people would think it idle to question whether the existence of separate substances be self-evident. According to him, their conviction arises from a custom which acquires the force of nature with us. From an early age we have been accustomed to hearing from others that separate substances exist, and so it seems self-evident to us that some separate substances exist as though that knowledge were natural to us.[36]

Peter solves the question by making the philosophical distinction between those things more knowable in themselves but less knowable to us, and those things less knowable in themselves but more knowable to us. Then he argues that while separate substances are supremely in act, nevertheless they are at the furthest remove from sensible things whence our knowledge takes its origin. Hence they are not clearly knowable to us. After all, as Aristotle said, our intellects are, with

32 Peter of Auvergne, *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam* XII, 6a. See below, II, p. 95.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., p. 96. Cf. St. Thomas, "Praedicta autem opinio provenit partim quidem ex consuetudine qua ex principio assueti sunt nomen Dei audire et invocare. Consuetudo autem, et praecipue quae est a puero vim naturae obtinet: ex quo contingit ut ea quibus a pueritia animus imbuitur, ita firmiter teneat ac si essent naturaliter et per se nota." *SCG* I, 11, 1.
36 Ibid. Note that once again Peter shifts from the discussion of separate substances in general to *ipse Deus*.

respect to the most knowable things in nature, as the eye of the bat is to the light of the sun.[37]

Comparable textual affinities are to be found in the next question where the issue is the possibility of demonstrating the existence of God (*ST*, *SCG*), the first principle (Munich text), or separate substances (Peter's text). The Munich question's two arguments for the negative side are identical in substance with the second and third arguments of the *ST*; Peter's two arguments are more closely related to two of those in the *SCG*, but with one interesting difference. The *SCG* relates an argument based on the words of certain philosophers who show that, in God, what answers the question *quid est* is identical to what answers the question *an est*. Now, since we cannot know through reason the *quid est* of God, then neither can we by reason demonstrate the existence of God.[38]

The argument in Peter's work starts, as does the Munich text and the *ST*, with the declaration that what-a-thing-is (*quod quid est*) is a principle of demonstration. But, unlike the other two texts, the minor premise of which is that we cannot know the *quid est* of God, Peter's argument states that the *quod quid est* of separate substances is identical with their *esse*. Then, instead of affirming with the *SCG*'s argument that we cannot know the *quid est* of God, Peter's argument states that since there is nothing about separate substances that does not belong to their *quod quid est*, we cannot demonstrate their existence because it is not possible to demonstrate the same thing from itself.[39]

All the passages we are comparing use the Aristotelian distinction between demonstration through the cause (*propter quid*) and demonstration through the effect (*quia*) to maintain respectively that the existence of God or a first principle or separate substances can indeed be demonstrated, but only through effects. The ways in which they make use of this distinction, however, differ sufficiently for us to observe the selectivity of the two philosophical commentaries in their use of Thomistic texts.

Since the *SCG* merely states that "the art of demonstration teaches us to conclude to causes from effects,"[40] Peter turns here to the text of the *ST*. This text is more concise than are the two commentaries in setting forth the two kinds of demonstration. Both the author of the Munich text and Peter expand those descriptions providing a close verbal link with a distinction they had made in their preceding questions, namely

37 Ibid. p. 96.
38 St. Thomas, *SCG* 1, 12, 3.
39 Peter of Auvergne, below, pp. 96-7.
40 St. Thomas, *SCG* 1, 12, 6.

between those things which are more or less knowable *secundum naturam et quoad nos*. Peter, for example, describes *propter quid* demonstration as proceeding from those things which are more known according to their nature to those things which are more unknown according to their nature, whereas the *quia* type proceeds *ex ignotioribus secundum naturam, notioribus tamen nobis, ad notiora secundum naturam, ignotiora quoad nos.*[41]

A similar expansion of the more compact text of the *ST* occurs where Aquinas said simply that from any effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated. The Munich text expands the notion of effect to include both proximate and remote effects, those proportioned to the cause and those not so proportioned. Further, where Aquinas simply concluded that the existence of God is demonstrated through effects known to us, the Munich text asserts that "since all things other than the First have their being (*esse*) from that First itself as from their cause, and (since) a cause is not able to produce any effect, except according to its being, the existence of the first principle can be demonstrated from the existence of its effects."[42]

The text of Peter's response presents further proof that he is thinking about God while talking about separate substances. He moves from talk about demonstrating the existence of the *substantia prima*, through a mention of the *causa prima* discussed by the *Liber de Causis*, to concluding that we can demonstrate (*quia*) the existence of separate substances by using as middle term the nominal definition of separate substances as this is drawn from their sensible effects.[43]

Here the Munich text interjects the question as to where one properly demonstrates the existence of God, i.e., in physics, as Averroes claimed, or in metaphysics, as Avicenna held. A look at the Munich author's resolution of this problem, together with a report of Peter's position, will enable us to judge the extent to which these authors introduce non-Thomistic elements into their handling of the *quinque viae*.

The Munich author contrasts the position of Averroes to that of Avicenna in terms of the effects claimed to be the most appropriate for the demonstration of the existence of the first principle. If one chooses the nature of motion itself, then Averroes is correct in insisting that the demonstration is proper to physics. If, however, one chooses the nature of being, the possible and the necessary, then Avicenna is right. But if we recognize that in *quia*, unlike *propter quid*, demonstrations there can

41 Peter of Auvergne, below, p. 97.
42 Ed. Delhaye, 190.
43 Peter of Auvergne, below, p. 97.

be as many different demonstrations of the cause as there are different kinds of its effects, then we need not regard the positions of Averroes and Avicenna as mutually exclusive. Thus, the Munich author concludes, both the natural philosopher and the metaphysician prove the existence of the first principle, but they do so in different ways. The natural philosopher begins with an effect, namely motion, that is more known to us through sensible evidence. The metaphysician starts from an effect, namely being or the possible and the necessary, that is more known to us through intellectual evidence.[44]

Although the author does not state his preference for the Avicennian or metaphysical proof, one can infer this from the implied superiority of intellectual over sensible evidence and from his remark that the effects with which the metaphysician begins are effects *per se* of the first principle and belong to the first principle as such (*ut sic*).[45]

Peter of Auvergne's treatment of this question is found within his answer to the question raised at the beginning of his commentary as to what constitutes the subject matter of metaphysics.[46] There, after noting Averroes's charge that Avicenna erred (*peccavit*) in this matter, Peter insists rather that it was Averroes who had erred. He begins by repeating the general principle laid down in the Munich text, namely that since the *esse* of an effect can come only from its cause, we can demonstrate the existence of that cause from an effect more known to us. However, Peter adds a consideration which enables him to include an Averroistic proof from motion, while at the same time subordinating it to the more essential and truer (*essentialius et verius*) metaphysical proof: "When a conclusion can be demonstrated through several middle terms, it is demonstrated more truly through that middle term which is more proportioned, similar and akin to that conclusion." Now, Peter continues, the nature of the possible, as used by the metaphysician, is closer to the conclusion "God exists" than the effect, motion, used by the natural philosopher. This is so because the proximate effect of the First is not motion but rather the "being" of something mobile. Thus, Peter concludes, although the existence of God can be demonstrated in both physics and metaphysics, it is done more essentially in metaphysics.[47] We will return to this hierarchical ordering principle of the proofs when we compare Peter's position with that of Thomas Aquinas.

44 Ed. Delhaye, 191-2.

45 Ibid., 192.

46 Peter of Auvergne, *Q. in Meta.* 1, 1. This text has been edited by A. Monahan, *Nine Mediaeval Thinkers* (Toronto 1955) 152-55.

47 Ibid. "Quare etsi in utraque scientia, scilicet naturali et divina, probetur Deum esse, essentialius tamen in scientia divina." 154.

Since Peter intends to treat the question of proofs for the existence of separate substances before the proofs for the existence of the first principle, we can see how one professor adapts the *quinque viae* of Aquinas to two different problems. The arguments denying the existence of separate substances stress the self-sufficiency of an eternally moving world of generable and corruptible beings; such a world has no need of any separate substances. In fact, as Averroes argues against the Platonists, there could be no efficient causal relationship between such substances and our world.[48]

After an appeal to the evident intention of Aristotle's proofs in Book Twelve of the *Metaphysics* and Book Eight of the *Physics*, Peter's argument *in oppositum* begins with a statement of Aristotle that in every genus there is something first and greatest which is the principle and measure of everything else in that genus. The argument affirms that this is the case in the genus of beings. It concludes that this "first," precisely as indivisible and non-accidental, must be a substance, and a separate or immaterial one at that.[49]

Peter begins his answer to the question by stating that Aristotle seems to have produced two arguments in this matter. The first, in Book Eight of the *Physics*, is based on the eternity of motion, while the second, in Book Two of the *Metaphysics*, is based on the order that obtains among efficient causes.[50]

The first demonstration, starting from the familiar axiom "Everything that is moved must be moved by another" and the manifest fact that we see something being moved, concludes to the existence of a something wholly immobile. Mindful of the question asked here, Peter concludes that this wholly immobile substance cannot in any way be material, and therefore we must posit the existence of separate substances.[51]

The second of the Aristotelian demonstrations, which Peter had identified as based on the order of efficient causes, is clearly located within the realm of Aristotelian moving causes. It is interesting that, in this question, Peter consistently couples the following terms: *in causis agentibus vel moventibus; agens sive movens*; *causa agens et movens prima.* We might also notice that Peter avoids any development of his conclusion that there is some immobile and immaterial substance, to Aristotle's next step, namely that there is a plurality of such substances.[52]

48 *Q. in Meta.* XII, 6c, below, p. 98.
49 Ibid. We will see in the following question how this argument, reminiscent of the *quarta via* of the *ST*, is seemingly downgraded by both Peter and the Munich text.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid. p. 99.

Peter next offers a further demonstration for which he gives credit to Avicenna. Starting from the complete division of being into the possible and the necessary, and assuming that there exists some determinate being, he concludes to the necessity of positing some first being which is necessary of itself. Since this being is first, it must be simple and therefore prior to all composition, and thus immaterial. Once again Peter's conclusion is in the singular.[53]

Noteworthy among Peter's replies to the three arguments that deny the necessity of positing separate substances is his widening the scope of the discussion of an eternal world from the plane of "moving cause" to that of "agent causality." He agrees with the first argument's statement that "everything that is generated is generated by something similar to itself in name and in species," but he restricts this to the immediate cause of generation. Peter denies that such a causal explanation of our world can be sufficient. To be sufficient, it must include a cause of being as being, which cause is both first and being itself through its own substance, such that no other beings have existence except in so far as this first cause bestows being on them and also conserves them in being.[54]

Returning to our texts, let us consider their treatment of the question: Whether God (first principle) exists. With minor differences, there is a strict correspondence between the two arguments presented by the Munich text, Peter, and the *ST* to show that God (first principle) does not exist.[55] The first of these two arguments is based on the contrary to fact conclusion that evil would not exist if we posit the existence of God understood to be someone infinitely good. The reason for this is that, if one of two contraries were infinite, it would destroy the other.[56]

The second argument is based upon the assertion that since nature, for natural effects, and intellect or will, for rational effects, are sufficient causes to explain the totality of phenomena (*omnium apparentium*), there is no necessity to posit any further cause such as God (first principle).[57]

There is, however, a marked difference in their respective treatments of the arguments *contra*. The *ST* simply cites the text from Exodus: *Ego sum qui sum*, the author of the Munich text uses an argument similar to the *quarta via* of the *ST*, whereas Peter presents arguments paralleling both the fourth and fifth ways.

53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
55 Since the *SCG* is not in the form of a *quaestio*, there can be no comparisons with it until we come to the actual examples of demonstrations.
56 Ed. Delhaye, 193; Peter of Auvergne, below, p. 101; St. Thomas, *ST* 1, 2, 3, obj. 1.
57 Ed. Delhaye, 193; Peter of Auvergne, below, p. 100; St. Thomas, *ST* 1, 2, 3, obj. 2.

The Munich text's presentation of the *quarta via* as merely one of its arguments *contra* would seem to imply a judgment that this kind of demonstration is not of sufficient quality to be included in the Master's own determination or solution of the question. Perhaps to him it had too strong a Platonic flavor, although it is here that Aquinas chose to make his only explicit reference to Aristotle in the *quinque viae*. Perhaps also, for our commentator, Aristotle's denial that "being" is a genus in the strict sense of the term, would preclude the use here of the Aristotelian principle cited in the *ST*, namely that *quod dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis.*

At any event, the author of the Munich text avoids using the term "genus" and simply says that where there is a more and a less, there must be posited a greatest (*maxime tale*); now this is the case among beings, for there are greater and lesser beings, all of which are called "beings" by reference to a First Being; therefore there is a First Being whose nature it is to exist (*ens enim primum dicimus illud cujus ratione existere*).[58]

Peter of Auvergne also seems to demote the *quarta via* by making it the first example of his arguments *in oppositum*. He may have felt that this was fitting in a commentary on Aristotle, since even the *SCG* introduces this proof by saying only that it may "be gathered from the words of Aristotle" and that it requires a still further inference to reach the conclusion that there exists something that is supremely being whom we call God.[59]

Peter points to the Second and Fourth Books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* for the principle that *in quocumque genere est ponere magis et minus tale, et simpliciter tale.* Now in the genus of beings there are some that are more and less perfect, so that we must posit in beings something that is most perfect, in the sense of absolutely, and in the prime instance, perfect. This is the first principle.[60]

The reluctance of these two commentators to include this argument among those contained in their personal resolutions of this question may reflect their greater professional sensitivity and fidelity to the text of the historical Aristotle than was the case with the less historical and freer theological perspectives of Aquinas's *ST* and *SCG*.

Peter's second argument *in oppositum* parallels the *quinta via*, which Aquinas says is based on the governance found among things, although

58 Ed. Delhaye, 193.
59 St. Thomas, *SCG* 1, 13, 34.
60 Peter of Auvergne, below, p. 101.

Peter does not mention the role of a directing intelligence for such governance. The argument's major premise is that among several things ordered with respect to one another, something one must be posited as first among them. For, as Proclus proved, every order both begins from, and terminates in, something one. Now there is an order among beings, as Aristotle proves further on; therefore there exists some one first being ordering them, whom we understand to be the first principle.[61]

Once again, there seems to be a downgrading of this proof as seen from its location within the structure of Peter's text. Perhaps one of his criteria for inclusion within his personal solution of the question was whether an argument had actually been used by some philosopher to prove the existence of a first principle or God. Even St. Thomas, in his *SCG*, intended its version of the *quinta via* to be an example of an argument whereby Catholic teachers proved that God exists, and indeed explicitly credits the Christian theologian, John Damascene, with it.[62]

We turn now to the treatment of the *prima via* by our three authors. All give basically the same argument from motion, and all see the need to link the conclusion, namely that some unmoved mover exists, to the further statement that this indeed is what we call "God" or "the first principle."[63]

The *secunda via* of each text, however, provides more striking comparisons. The Munich text and the *ST* announce that it is based upon the nature of efficient causality. Peter, however, says that it is based on the necessity of arriving at a First within an order of causes, and while he also concentrates on the order of efficient causality, he mentions the possibility of proving the existence of a first principle from the orders of formal and final causes.[64]

Further, while all our texts speak of an order of efficient causes, they use quite different terminology, a diversity that seems to reflect different preoccupations or concerns. As we noted above, Averroes and Avicenna held different views on the nature of efficient causality. Averroes was faithful to Aristotle in restricting this kind of causality to that which originates a change through motion. Avicenna was faithful to his own vision of reality by subordinating moving causality to a higher way of causing something to be, namely by creation. As Etienne Gilson has justifiably pointed out, if we assume that the *prima via* of St. Thomas concludes to the first efficient cause of motion, then the

61 Ibid.
62 St. Thomas, *SCG* 1, 13, 35.
63 Ed. Delhaye, 193-4; Peter of Auvergne, below, pp. 101-2. St. Thomas, *ST* 1, 2, 3.
64 Peter of Auvergne, below, p. 102.

secunda via becomes superfluous.[65] Why then did St. Thomas use the *secunda via*, and, in the *SCG*, even attribute it to Aristotle? And, a more important consideration for Thomas's contemporaries, if Averroes could endorse the *prima via* yet reject the *secunda via*, and if Avicenna reversed this position, how could Aquinas simply use them both?

Gilson's answer to this question concerns at its deepest level the fundamental attitude of Thomas Aquinas as a theologian toward philosophers and the progress of philosophy in search of truth:

> In effect, if one could demonstrate the existence of a First Unmoved Mover by the way of Averroes, and that of a First Efficient Cause by the way of Avicenna, the two ways are good because they both conclude to the existence of a First Being whom we name God. It matters little that their authors do not agree since, in the thought of Thomas himself, the moving cause is only one variety of efficient cause, namely the efficient cause of movement.[66]

Professors in the Faculty of Arts, however, charged with leading their students through the works of the great philosphers, could hardly adopt such a supra-philosophical perspective. Here, the author of the Munich text seems to fall into a trap. After announcing that his second demonstration is based *ex natura efficientis*, and that it is found in Book Two of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, he asserts that an efficient cause does not move except in virtue of a First, with the result that if we posit no first mover (*primum movens*), there will be no other movers. Now since there are other movers, it is necessary to posit a First. This is the trap. Faithful as Averroes had been to the text of Aristotle, the author of the Munich text has given, not a second demonstration, but rather another variation of the *prima via*. He seeks to avoid this by adding a final sentence: "Since therefore it is evident that there exists some subsequent being (*aliquod posterius ens*), clearly there will be some first being (*aliquod ens primum*)."[67] The case of Peter of Auvergne is quite different. He had several times earlier in his work[68] made good use of the distinction between efficient causes *unde principium motus* and *unde principium esse*, and had identified the proof from motion as

65 E. Gilson, "Trois leçons sur le problème de l'existence de Dieu," *Divinitas* 5 (1961) 30-2.

66 Ibid., 60-1. See also 64-6 and especially note 7, 66.

67 Ed. Delhaye, 194. If the author of the Munich *Questions on Book Eight of the Physics* were also the author of the *Questions on Physics I-IV* published as one work by P. Delhaye, he could have used here the twofold efficient cause *unde principium motus* and *unde principium esse* developed in Book II, 12 (p. 100) together with the account given there to explain why Aristotle always defined efficient causality in terms of the *unde principium motus*.

68 Peter of Auvergne, *Q. in Meta.* III, 3 and III, 4. See my "Two Texts of Peter of Auvergne on a Twofold Efficient Cause," *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964) 287-301.

proper to the science of physics. An effect of God less remote from Him than motion, namely the *esse* of changing things, could be used for a different demonstration that would be proper to the science of metaphysics.[69] Thus, when Peter begins his *secunda via*, he uses a different terminology in order to emphasize its distinction from the *prima via*. He speaks of a *causa activa*, and takes as his starting point something newly made (*quod hoc factum est de novo*) to arrive at a *faciens non factum* who is first in the order of *causis agentibus*, and not acted upon either *per se* or *per accidens*. Peter then adds that all understand this to be the first principle.[70]

The *tertia via* also reveals the close dependence of the Munich text on the *ST*, together with a corresponding independence of Peter's text *vis à vis* the *ST*. The *SCG* is, of course, not involved in the comparative study of the *tertia via* for the simple reason that it is not found there. Both commentaries explicitly attribute this proof to Avicenna and follow the *ST* for its starting point, namely that we find in reality some beings that are possible in that they are able to be and not to be. Peter alone gives the example that Aquinas used in the *ST*: we experience beings undergoing generation and corruption.[71]

But now there is a curious shift. St. Thomas, for his own reasons and no doubt within the theological designs of his work, follows Moses Maimonides in constructing from some remarks of Aristotle a demonstration that if all beings were corruptible, i.e., containing the possibility not to be, then in an eternal world all such possibilities would at some time come about, and thus at some time nothing at all would exist. Both Maimonides and Aquinas conclude from this that there must exist some being whose existence is not merely possible but necessary. Both theologians further conclude from this that there exists a necessary being whose necessity is uncaused, and indeed is the cause of whatever necessity other beings have. This necessary being all call "God" and, as a devout Jew, Maimonides adds, "may His name be sublime."[72]

The author of the Munich text, though attributing this proof to Avicenna, follows Aquinas in the Maimonidean blend of Avicenna and Aristotle. He concludes to the existence of some being whose existence is necessary, and further concludes to the existence of some being whose necessity to exist is of itself, namely the first principle.[73]

69 *Q. in Meta.* I, 1; ed. Monahan, 154.
70 Ibid. XII, 6d. See below, p. 102.
71 Ed. Delhaye, 194; Peter of Auvergne, below, ibid.
72 St. Thomas, *ST* 1, 2, 3; See Moses Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed*, II, 1, tr. S. Pinès (Chicago 1963) 247-9.
73 Ed. Delhaye, 194.

Peter of Auvergne, however, after announcing the Avicennian paternity of this proof, sticks more or less closely to the text of Avicenna. Since nothing which is of itself indeterminate with respect to being or not being can determine itself to be, every possible being that actually exists is determined by another. That other has the necessary determination of its existence either from itself or from another. Since we cannot push on indefinitely in these causal determinations of the possibilities to exist, we must come to some being whose existence is necessary of itself, which, Peter adds, we call the First Being.[74]

Here Peter adds some remarks which, had they counterparts in the texts of Thomas Aquinas, might have simplified the attempts of countless historians to synthesize the *quinque viae*.[75] "Although," Peter says, "the preceding demonstrations are different in words, nevertheless they are essentially the same except for the fact that one is more universal, the others less universal." Following this principle of communality or universality, the *tertia via* is judged to be more common, followed by the *secunda via* and last of all, the way from motion.[76]

We have already seen the philosophical reasons for this rating. In a *quia* type of demonstrating the existence of a cause, there can be different demonstrations depending on the choice of effect as their starting points. And depending on how much affinity, proportionality and nearness the effect has to the cause, the truer and more essential the demonstration of that cause will be. But what does Peter mean by saying that one demonstration is "more common" or "universal" than another?

It would seem that, viewing God as a universal cause, i.e., as one whose causal power extends to every being as to its effect, the most immediate effect of God's creative causality, namely being, would be the most universal or common effect. The remainder of the effects of this divine causality could then be ranked according to the number of intermediate or secondary causes required to produce it. Thus some effects could be considered as more remote and thus less universal or common. This seems to reflect a neo-platonic influence such as the doctrine of the *Liber de Causis*, which holds that the first, in the sense of the most immediate, effect of the Creator is *esse*, which is thus more common, say, than the effects "life" or "rationality." Further, the view that the demonstration based on the division of being into the possible and the necessary is more common, i.e., as closer to the causality of the First, than the demonstration based on the notion of the agent and its

74 Peter of Auvergne, below, pp. 102-3. Cf. Avicenna, *Meta.* I, 7, fol. 73r1-2.
75 See Gilson's remarks on these attempts in his "Trois leçons...," op. cit. 39-46.
76 Peter of Auvergne, below, p. 103.

effect (*ex ratione agentis et acti*) seems clearly to be of Avicennian parentage.

Continuing his theme of the basic similarity of the three proofs, Peter next says that they all rest on two principles: 1) that it is impossible for the same thing in the same respect to be at once in act and potency; 2) that their starting points are evident to the senses.[77]

The second of these two common principles is of interest for the subsequent history of how mediaeval theologians evaluated philosophical proofs for the existence of God. Given Peter of Auvergne's hierarchical ordering of the three proofs, with Avicenna's in first place because it is "more common" than the other two, historians might consider Peter to be a possible forerunner of the position taken by the theologian, Henry of Ghent, because Henry also expresses a preference for Avicenna over Aristotle. The reason for this preference, Henry tells us, is that Avicenna's proof proceeds *ex via propositionum universalium intelligibilium, non ex via testificationis sensibilium.*[78]

Peter's second principle, however, places him squarely in the empirical tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Common to all three ways to prove the existence of God, Peter affirms, is the foundational principle that they are based on the sensible evidence that something in fact exists, namely as being moved, as causing something efficiently, and as possible.

What conclusions emerge from this brief study? First of all, given the selective use our authors made of the Thomistic texts, it would be quite rash to speak of an "early Thomistic school" within the Parisian Faculty of Arts. The author of the Munich *Questions on Book Eight of the Physics* does not manifest much awareness of the *SCG*; he follows more closely the order and treatment of the *ST* on the question of God's existence. He does adapt this treatment to the Faculty of Arts by eliminating its obvious theological elements. One notable failure, however, is the lack of any clear distinction between his first and second proofs. What made sense within the freer theological perspectives of Aquinas requires an explicit translation within its new context in a philosophical commentary.

Peter of Auvergne reveals a more magistral touch in his approach to Aquinas for help on the Aristotelian text. His selective use of both the *SCG* and the *ST* in dealing with this question of God's existence shows a greater familiarity with Aquinas's work than does the Munich text. It

77 Ibid.

78 Henry of Ghent, *Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum Theologiae*... A. 22, q. 5 (Paris 1520) fol. 134v D. See the three-part article by A. C. Pegis, "Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent," *Mediaeval Studies* 30 (1968) 226-247; 31 (1969) 93-116; 33 (1971) 158-179.

reveals also his appreciation that the purpose and method of the *SCG* makes it more adaptable to an audience in the Faculty of Arts. Peter's excursions beyond the letter and meaning of the Thomistic texts should be evaluated in their own right in terms of the independence and depth of his personal philosophy rather than, as in the past, in terms of his fidelity or infidelity to a supposed discipleship to Aquinas.

Finally, much work remains to identify the author of the Munich text, formerly ascribed to Siger of Brabant, and to evaluate in its own right the thought of Peter of Auvergne. One thing, however, is clear. We find here two Masters in the Faculty of Arts who do not hesitate to use the writings of a Master in the Faculty of Theology to further their work of interpreting the writings of the philosophers. And they do this at a time of great friction between their respective Faculties, just after one of Bishop Tempier's ecclesiastical condemnations of selected philosophical propositions and on the eve of another, more massive, condemnation. Thus, the choice of Aquinas by these two commentators as the theologian to help them handle the controverted question of how a philosopher deals with the question of God's existence is a factual confirmation of the sentiments so movingly expressed in the letter from the Masters in the Faculty of Arts on the occasion of the death of Thomas Aquinas.

TEXT

While there are eleven manuscripts known to contain Peter of Auvergne's *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam*,[1] I have chosen to edit the following four questions from Book XII as they are found in a single manuscript, Vienna lat. 2330, fol. 95rl-96rl.[2] There are a number of reasons for this choice. First of all, the first three of these four questions are not found in any of the other manuscripts. However, a marginal note in the Vienna text explains that they are taken *ex reportatione antiqua.*[3] Secondly, the manuscript which I have used as a basic text in editing other questions from this work, namely Paris, BN lat. 16158, fol. 163rl-258v2, breaks off abruptly just before the *solutio* of our fourth question. Further, the Vienna text does not contain any significant variations from the six manuscripts containing this latter question, with the exception of three brief passages which I call attention to in my apparatus. Finally, the Vienna text appears to be the oldest one we have. There is both internal evidence for a *terminus a quo* of 1274[4] and external evidence for a conjectured *terminus ad quem* of 1277.[5]

1 Until recently, we knew of only seven of them, which are listed and briefly described in my "Two Texts of Peter of Auvergne on a Twofold Efficient Cause," *Mediaeval Studies* 26 (1964) 288-9. C. J. Ermatinger first called my attention to two more manuscripts containing this work of Peter. The first, Vatican, Pal. lat. 1059, fol. 1rl-9v2, contains Peter's commentary on Books I-II, while the second, Vat. lat. 2173, fol. 78rl-209vl, has a collection of questions on Books I-IX and XII culled from the works of three or four authors, including Peter, whose questions comprise four of the six questions of Book VIII, all but one in Book IX, and all of those in Book XII. A. Zimmerman, in his *Ontologie oder Metaphysik?* (Cologne 1965) 211, first pointed to Peter as the author of the *Commentary on the Metaphysics* I-IX found in ms Oxford Merton College 292, fol. 240rl-323v2, hitherto tentatively ascribed to Simon of Faversham, and to a truncated version of Peter's work in ms Cambridge Peterhouse 152, fol. 117rl-127rl, which breaks off at question 23 (not 17) of Book I. While these recent discoveries add little to the purpose of this article, they do provide much information of assistance in investigating the complex relationships that obtain at least among the three versions of Peter's work that have come down to us.

2 See the extensive inventory of this manuscript by the Dominican scholars, A. Dondaine and L. J. Bataillon, "Le manuscrit Vindob. lat. 2330 et Siger de Brabant," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 36 (1966) 153-261.

3 Fol. 95rl.

4 There is a textual reference in XII, 6d to Simplicius's *Commentary on the De Caelo* which, while translated by William of Moerbeke as early as June, 1271 and apparently promised to the Parisian Faculty of Arts by Thomas Aquinas, had not been received by them at the time they wrote their remarkable letter to the Dominican General Chapter at Lyons in May, 1274.

5 The external evidence involves the alteration of attributions of four works from Siger of Brabant to Peter of Auvergne in an index to the manuscript, plus two cryptograms in the upper margins of two of the works identifying them as actually belonging to Siger. See the cautious conjectures by Dondaine and Bataillon, op. cit., 154-60 and 176. They describe them as "particulièrement fragile," but they do indicate that the alterations could be linked to the period following the Parisian condemnation of 1277.

PETRI DE ALVERNIA

Quaestiones in Metaphysicam
Liber XII, *Quaestio* 6a

Utrum substantias separatas esse sit manifestum ex se.

Sed quoniam tres erant substantiae, etc.[1]

Quaeritur circa partem istam in qua Philosophus incipit determinare de primis principiis substantiarum quae sunt substantiae sempiternae* et a materia separatae. Probat autem Philosophus quod necesse est esse aliquam substantiam sempiternam, immobilem, semper agentem et actu existentem, iterum immaterialem omnino. Et quia talis substantia ponitur esse principium primum, ideo quaeritur circa illud, utrum sit ponere principium primum.

Sed ante hoc quaeratur universaliter de substantiis separatis, utrum scilicet ex se sit manifestum aliquas substantias separatas esse.

[1] Quod sic videtur: Nulla propositio verior et manifestior est illa in qua idem de se praedicatur. Sed ista est hujusmodi, "Substantiae separatae sunt," quia omne quod praedicatur de substantiis separatis nihil est aliud quam substantia ipsarum, saltem de prima substantia. Quare manifestum est ex se aliquas esse substantias separatas.

[2] Item, quae naturaliter sunt nota, ex se nota sunt et manifesta. Substantiae autem separatae notae sunt naturaliter. Quod enim secundum naturas suas notae sint, patet secundo hujus;[2] vocat enim Aristoteles eas manifestas in natura. Quod etiam nobis naturaliter notae sint, patet, quia cognitio earum naturaliter appetitur a nobis, cum felicitas et summa perfectio humana consistat in cognitione principiorum separatorum; et unumquodque naturaliter appetit suam perfectionem. Patet ergo quod universaliter cognitio substantiarum separatarum naturaliter appetitur a nobis. Et cum nullus appetitus sit frustra, oportet quod ipsae sint naturaliter nobis notae.

Oppositum arguitur: Illud non est ex se manifestum in cujus cognitione contingit errare, sicut voluit Aristoteles quarto hujus.[3] Haec enim est ratio prin-

* Following the other MSS. The Vienna MS. reads *separatae*.

1 Aristotle, *Meta.* XII, 6, 1071 b3.
2 Aristotle, *Meta.* II, 1, 993 b11.
3 *Meta.* IV, 3, 1005 b11-14.

cipii per se noti, quod circa ipsum non contingat errare. Multi enim philosophorum circa principia erraverunt. Posuit enim Empedocles universaliter principia prima agentia esse litem et amicitiam; alii autem posuerunt alia.

Ad hoc est intelligendum dictum aliquorum, quod consideratio substantiarum separatarum, cum sint separatae, frivola est, quia viso quid est quod significatur per nomen, statim manifestum est ipsas esse. Et istud dictum habent ex consuetudine quae quasi quaedam natura est. Quia enim ex principio aetatis nostrae consuemus audire ab aliis quod sunt aliquae substantiae separatae, et ipse Deus, ideo istud quasi nobis naturaliter est notum; et ideo credimus ex se manifestum esse quod sint aliquae substantiae separatae.[4]

Notandum tamen est quod aliqua notiora sunt secundum naturam suam, ut simplicia magis et quae magis habent rationem actus. Alia autem sunt notiora nobis, ignotiora autem secundum naturam suam, ut composita quae sunt propinquiora sensibilibus; et cognitio nostra ex sensibilibus ortum habet.

Dicendum ergo est ad quaestionem quod substantiae separatae secundum naturam suam manifestissimae sunt, ut quod maxime rationem actus habent; nobis autem immanifestae, ut quod sunt a sensibilibus remotae. Et hoc dicit Aristoteles secundo hujus,[5] quod intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima in natura sicut oculus vespertilionis ad lucem solis.

Ad primam rationem dicitur quod haec propositio, "Substantiae separatae sunt," manifestissima est secundum naturam suam, nobis autem non. Vel dicendum quod propositio illa in qua idem de se praedicatur manifestissima est cum rationes terminorum nobis manifestae sunt; hujus autem propositionis rationes terminorum nobis manifestissimae non sunt. Non enim nobis manifestissimae sunt substantiae separatae, nec omne quod de ipsis praedicatur.

Ad aliud dicitur quod illa quae naturaliter nota sunt, ex se sunt manifesta secundum naturam suam, nobis autem non sunt manifesta, (fol. 95r2) ut dictum est. Et quod arguitur, quod nobis sunt etiam manifestae substantiae separatae, dicendum quod cognitio ipsarum naturaliter appetitur a nobis. Et cum appetitus sive desiderium non sit respectu habenti sed magis respectu habendi, concludi potest quod non habemus cognitionem substantiarum separatarum secundum quod in natura sua sunt cognoscibiles.

Quaestio 6b

Utrum possit demonstrari substantias separatas esse.

Consequenter, quaeritur utrum substantias separatas esse possunt demonstrari.

[1] Videtur quod non: quod quid est enim principium est demonstrationis; nunc autem in substantiis separatis idem est quod quid est et etiam ipsum esse. Non enim est aliquid in eis quod non pertineat ad quod quid est ipsarum.

4 Cf. St. Thomas, *SCG* I, 10, 1 and I, 11, 1.
5 *Meta.* II, 1, 993 b9-11.

Cum ergo non contingat idem ex seipso demonstrari, non contingit demonstrari esse ipsas substantias separatas.

[2] Item, principium cujuscumque demonstrationis est definitio. Substantiarum autem separatarum non est definitio; sicut enim patet ex septimo hujus,[1] substantiae simplicis non est definitio. Quare, etc.

In oppositum est opinio omnium philosophorum. Probat enim Aristoteles hic, et etiam octavo *Physicorum*,[2] quod necesse est esse aliquas substantias separatas.

Ad hoc est dicendum quod dupliciter est demonstratio, sicut patet ex primo *Posteriorum*,[3] scilicet 'quia' et 'propter quid'. Demonstrare autem propter quid est demonstrare effectum per causam, et illa est demonstratio potissima. Alia est demonstratio quae est quia, quae demonstrat causam per effectum. Prima autem demonstratio procedit ex notioribus secundum naturam ad ignotiora secundum naturam. Secunda autem procedit ex ignotioribus secundum naturam, notioribus tamen nobis, ad notiora secundum naturam, ignotiora quoad nos.

Dicendum ergo quod substantia prima non potest demonstrari esse demonstratione 'propter quid' quia ejus non est altera causa. Potest tamen demonstrari ex effectibus ejus qui nobis manifesti sunt. Possumus enim ex istis aliquo modo demonstrare causam primam esse, quamvis causa prima sit super omnem narrationem, sicut scribitur *Libro de Causis*;[4] et hoc quantum est ex natura sua et ex se. Potest tamen in narratione nostra cadere secundum analogiam ad alias causas primas. Medium autem quo possunt substantiae separatae demonstrari est definitio significans quid est quod dicitur per nomen. Nomen autem ipsarum sumptum est ex eis quae sunt principia cognoscendi ipsarum. Haec autem sunt sensibilia ab ipsis causata.

Ad primam rationem dicendum quod ad demonstrandum non accipitur pro principio quod quid est quod est tota substantia ipsius, quia ipsum praesupponit esse. Quaestio enim 'quid est' praesupponit quaestionem 'si est', ut patet ex secundo *Posteriorum*.[5] Sed ad demonstrandum esse de aliquo debet accipi pro medio definitio significans quid est quod dicitur per nomen.

Ad secundam rationem dicendum quod, etsi substantiae separatae non possint habere definitionem significantem quid est ipsius rei, quia solum talis definitio est substantiae compositae ut patet ex septimo hujus,[6] substantiae tamen separatae potest esse definitio quae significat quid est quod dicitur per nomen. Haec autem definitio medium est ad demonstrandum aliquid de ipsis.

1 *Meta.* VII, 15, 1040 a9.
2 Cf. *Phy.* VIII, 6.
3 Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* I, 13, 78 a22.
4 *Liber de Causis*, prop. VI.
5 Aristotle, *Anal. Post.* II, 1, 89 b34.
6 Cf. *Meta.* VII, 15.

Quaestio 6c

Utrum necesse sit ponere substantias separatas.

Consequenter, quaeritur utrum necesse sit ponere substantias aliquas separatas.

[1] Quod non videtur, quia si sic, aut hoc esset propter generationem entium aut propter conservationem. Non propter generationem, quia omne quod generatur, generatur ex sibi simili nomine et specie, et ex materia quae manet in re generati. Substantiae autem separatae non conveniunt cum substantiis inferioribus generabilibus et corruptibilibus nomine et specie, nec etiam sunt materia ipsorum. Quare non est necesse ipsas ponere propter generationem ipsorum entium nec etiam propter conservationem ipsorum in esse, quia sicut res esse consequitur ex principiis suis intrinsecis ita ex eisdem potest conservari in esse; eadem enim sunt principia dantia esse et conservantia in esse. Quare, etc.

[2] Item, non necesse habemus ponere substantias separatas nisi propter transmutationem istorum inferiorum generabilium contingentiarum. Nunc autem ipsae non possunt esse principia transmutationis substantiarum materialium, quia immateriale non transmutat materiale, sicut Commentator vult septimo hujus[1] contra Platonem.

[3] Item, non ponit Aristoteles substantias separatas immobiles et aeternas nisi ut sint principia motus aeterni. Sed propter hoc non est eas necesse ponere. Virtus enim in magnitudine aeternaliter alterat ista inferiora. Quare propter motum non est necesse ponere substantias immateriales aeternas.

Oppositum patet ex intentione Aristotelis in libro isto et octavo *Physicorum.*[2]

Item, in unoquoque genere est aliquod primum et maximum* quod est principium et mensura omnium eorum quae sunt in genere illo, ut visum est decimo hujus.[3] Et sic est in genere entium. Et hoc est indivisibile, ut patet in eodem decimo.[4] Istud autem primum non potest esse aliquod corpus nec aliquod materiale quoniam tunc esset divisibile. Quare, etc. Item, nec potest esse aliquod accidens, quoniam accidens non est principium esse ipsius substantiae. Est ergo substantia immobilis et immaterialis.

Ad hoc dicendum quod necesse est ponere aliquas substantias separatas. Et ad hoc videtur Aristoteles adducere duas rationes, quarum prima est ex aeternitate motus, ut in octavo *Physicorum*,[5] alia ex ordine causarum efficientium ad invicem, secundo hujus.[6]

Prima autem demonstrationum est haec. Omne quod movetur, necesse est ab alio moveri, sicut probatum est septimo *Physicorum.*[7] Nunc autem videmus

* MS. reads *minimum.*
1 Averroes, *In VII Meta.* c. 28 (Venice 1574) fol. 178 C.
2 Cf. *Phy.* VIII, 6.
3 *Meta.* X, 1, 1052 b18-20.
4 Ibid. 1052 a30-1.
5 Cf. *Phy.* VIII, 1.
6 *Meta.* II, 2, 994 a1-19.
7 *Phy.* VII, 1, 241 b24-242 a15.

aliqua manifeste moveri. Ergo ab alio moventur. Et istud aliud aut movetur aut est immobile. Si movetur, ulterius ab alio movebitur et eadem erit quaestio de illo alio sicut prius. Et ita vel procedetur in infinitum in mobilibus et motis, quod probatum est esse impossibile in septimo *Physicorum*[8] et secundo hujus,[9] aut erit tandem devenire ad aliquid immobile penitus. Istud autem non potest esse aliqua substantia materialis quoniam omnis talis mobilis est, cum materia sit principium passivum transmutationis. Necesse ergo habemus ponere substantias separatas praeter motum ipsum.

Alia demonstratio Aristotelis est quia in essentialiter ordinatis, primum movens est causa omnium moventium posteriorum, ut si A moveat B, et B moveat C, tunc A movet B per se et movet C per ipsum B. Aut ergo in mobilibus et motis erit devenire ad movens primum aut in ipsis procedetur in infinitum. Si procedatur in infinitum, cum in infinitis non sit primum, et in essentialiter ordinatis (fol. 95vl) si non est primum, nec est aliquod posteriorum quia primum causa est omnibus posterioribus, ut dictum est; et ita si in causis agentibus vel moventibus sit processus in infinitum, sequitur quod penitus non sit agens sive movens, quod est omnino impossibile. Necesse est ergo ponere aliquam substantiam quae sit causa agens et movens prima omnium aliorum entium. Illa autem non potest esse substantia mobilis et materialis. Quare ex ordine causarum agentium necesse habemus ponere aliquam substantiam immobilem et immaterialem.

Avicenna etiam in *Metaphysica* sua[10] aliam demonstrationem adducit, quae sumitur ex parte necessitatis ipsius esse. Omne enim quod est aut ex se necesse est esse aut ex se possibile esse. Necesse enim et possibile totum ens universaliter evacuant et dividunt. Sumatur ergo aliquod ens determinatum. Quaero aut illud necesse est esse ex se aut possibile est esse. Si primo modo, tunc ex seipso determinatur ad esse, et tunc erit ens primum. Et si sic, tunc de necessitate erit substantia simplex et immaterialis, quia quacumque substantia materiali et composita est aliquid prius, saltem componentia ipsa. Quare, etc.

Si autem illud ens ex se tantum possibile sit esse, tunc ex se non determinatur ad esse, sed ex alio. Et tunc eadem fiet quaestio de illo alio sicut de isto. Et ita vel procedetur in infinitum, quod est impossibile, vel tandem devenietur ad aliquod ens primum quod ex se est necessarium; et tale erit substantia immobilis et immaterialis, ut prius ostensum est.

Ad primam rationem dicendum quod substantiae separatae necessariae sunt, et propter productionem entium in esse et propter conservationem* eorum in esse. Non enim producitur aliquod causatum in esse nisi ex causa sufficiente. Non est autem causa sufficiens in istis transmutabilibus antequam reducantur ad transmutans intransmutabile, ut probatum est octavo *Physicorum*.[11] Et ideo quamvis omne quod generatur ex sibi simili nomine et specie generetur quantum ad generans immediatum, istud tamen non potest

* MS. reads *productionem*.

8 Ibid.

9 *Meta.* II, 2, 994 a11-19.

10 Avicenna, *Meta.* I, 7 (Venice 1508) fol. 73r1-v1.

11 Cf. Aristotle, *Phy.* VIII, 1.

esse causa sufficiens antequam reducatur in causam primam quae quidem est ipsum esse per substantiam suam. Et ideo causa est entis secundum quod ens. Et ita alia ab ipso non sunt entia nisi inquantum largitur eis esse; sic et ea conservat in esse.

Ad secundam dicitur quod dupliciter est transmutatio: quaedam quae est aeterna quae solum est motus localis, et hujusmodi tantum circularis, ut probatur octavo *Physicorum*;[12] quaedam autem sunt transmutationes quae non possunt esse aeternae aequaliter, ut generatio et corruptio et hujusmodi. Cum ergo dicit Commentator[13] quod immateriale non transmutat materiale, dicendum quod verum est immediate nisi mediate corpore intransmutabili secundum substantiam suam, transmutabili tamen secundum ubi. Haec autem transmutatio aeterna est; et ita substantiae separatae non possunt immediate transmutare aliquid transmutabile transmutatione non aeterna. Transmutare tamen possunt aliquid transmutabile transmutatione aeterna.

Ad aliud dicitur quod motus aeternus non sit nisi a virtute infinita. Omnis autem virtus in magnitudine existens, finita est. Et haec probata sunt octavo *Physicorum*,[14] ex quibus in fine concludit Aristoteles[15] quod movens primum non est virtus in magnitudine. Et quod arguitur de sole et aliis corporibus superioribus, quod aeternaliter alterant ista inferiora, dicendum quod hoc non est nisi in virtute moventis primi, quod est virtutis infinitae; quod etiam necesse est ex se modo agendi. Omnia autem alia necessaria ex se sunt modo recipiendi, sicut dicit Commentator supra octavum *Physicorum*.[16]

Quaestio 6d

Utrum sit ponere primum principium in entibus.

Consequenter quaeritur, descendendo specialiter ad primam substantiam quae omnium primum principium, quamvis de hoc dictum sit, utrum scilicet sit ponere primum principium.

[1] Videtur quod non: Primum principium non ponitur esse nisi ex ipso possint reddi causae omnium eorum quae fiunt hic. Si ergo aliquo modo possint reddi causae omnium apparentium et eorum quae fiunt aliter quam ponendo primum principium, non erit tunc necesse ponere ipsum. Nunc autem hoc bene contingit; eorum enim quae fiunt a natura, natura est sufficiens principium et causa. Naturaliter enim homo ab homine generatur et equus ab equo, nec oportet illud reducere in principium aliud. Eorum etiam quae fiunt ab intellectu, intellectus est causa seu voluntas. Quare cum omnia quae fiunt per se, fiant hoc modo vel illo, manifestum autem est quod non necesse est ponere aliud principium ab istis. Quare, etc.

12 Cf. ibid. 7-9.
13 Averroes, *In VII Meta.* c. 28, fol. 178 C.
14 Aristotle, *Phy.* VIII, 10, 267 b19-26.
15 Ibid.
16 Averroes, *In VIII Phy.* c. 83, fol. 432 C-D.

[2] Item, per primum principium intelligimus aliquid optimum. Probat enim Philosophus consequenter[1] ipsum esse optimum. Sed impossibile est aliquid optimum esse in natura quia optimum est quod est bonum infinitum; si autem unum contrariorum infinitum esset, corrumperet alterum, ut dicitur tertio *Physicorum.*[2] Quare cum tali bono infinito contrarietur malum, si poneretur esse tale bonum in entibus, tunc malum penitus non esset. Excludere autem malum ab entibus omnino est inconveniens. Quare inconveniens est ponere aliquid quod sit optimum in natura. Principium autem primum est tale quod est optimum. Quare, etc.

Oppositum arguitur: In quocumque genere est ponere magis et minus tale et simpliciter tale, ut dicitur secundo et quarto hujus.[3] Sed in genere entium sunt quaedam magis et minus perfecta. Quare est ponere in entibus aliquid perfectissimum quod simpliciter et primo est tale. Hoc autem est principium primum. Quare, etc.

Item, in quibuscumque est ponere aliqua plura habentia ordinem ad se invicem, in eis est ponere aliquod unum primum. Omnis enim ordinatio ab uno incipit et secundum unitatem terminatur sibi coelementarem, ut probat Proclus.[4] Sed ordo est in entibus. Omnia enim ordinata sunt, ut consequenter probabit Philosophus.[5] Ergo est unum primum ordinans ea. Illud autem non intelligimus esse nisi primum principium. Quare, etc.

Primum principium esse in entibus manifeste declaratur ex motu. Secundum enim Aristotelem in *Physicis*,[6] omne quod movetur, ab alio movetur; quia movens secundum quod movens in actu est, motum autem secundum quod hujusmodi est in potentia. Si ergo impossibile est unum et idem esse in actu et in potentia primo, impossibile erat unum et idem primo habere rationem moventis et moti et respectu ejusdem. Manifestum est autem aliquid moveri in entibus, puta solem; quare ab alio movetur. Aut ergo illud aliud est movens immobile omnino, aut est movens mobile. Si est movens omnino immobile per se et per accidens, tunc illud est simpliciter primum, et ita erit ponere primum simpliciter. Si autem est mobile, tunc ab alio movetur vel per se vel per accidens, (fol. 95v2) et tunc fiet quaestio de illo alio. Aut enim est mobile movens aut movens immobile penitus; si secundo modo, tunc est primum simpliciter, si primo modo tunc fiet quaestio eadem.[7] Quare vel procedetur in infinitum vel erit devenire ad movens penitus immobile. Procedere autem in infinitum in moventibus et motis est impossibile, quia in quibus non est primum, nec aliquod posteriorum, et loquor in essentialiter ordinatis. Si ergo

1 Aristotle, *Meta.* XII, 7, 1072 b14-29.
2 Aristotle, *Phy.* III, 5, 204 b24-29.
3 Cf. *Meta.* II, 1, 993 b19-30; *Meta.* IV, 2.
4 Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica*, prop. XXI; ed. C. Vansteenkiste *Tijdschrift Voor Philosophie* 13 (1951) 273.
5 Aristotle, *Meta.* XII, 10, 1075 a16-19.
6 *Phy.* VIII, 1, 241 b24.
7 This sentence differs markedly from the text of the other manuscripts containing this question. There are two other instances in this question (see n. 9 and n. 12) where the Vienna text goes its own way, usually in the direction of a more concise treatment. In these three places, the other manuscripts contain many variant readings among themselves as well as many scribal errors.

in moventibus et motis procedatur in infinitum, cum in infinitis non sit primum, quare non erit primum movens aliquod, et per consequens nullum; auferetur ergo motus in entibus. Cum ergo videamus entia movere et moveri, manifestum est quod non procedetur in infinitum in moventibus et motis. Erit ergo devenire ad aliquod primum movens immobile per se et per accidens. Hoc autem dicimus esse primum principium. Quare ipsum necesse est ponere in entibus.

Hoc etiam probatur ratione magis universali, quae potest haberi ex dictis Philosophi secundo hujus,[8] ubi probat statum in causis. Nam impossibile est quod aliquid sit causa activa sui ipsius; tunc enim respectu ejusdem primo esset in actu et in potentia. Omne ergo quod est actum, ab alio primo est actum. Sed manifestum est quod aliquid primo est actum, puta quod hoc factum est de novo; quare ipsum est actum ab alio. Et tunc de illo quaeram: aut est [f]actum faciens* aut non est factum faciens eam. †Si est faciens non factum, tunc ipsum de necessitate primum est, et habetur propositum. Si autem est faciens factum, tunc factum est ab alio priori, et de illo fiet eadem quaestio. Et sic vel procedetur in infinitum vel standum erit in aliquo quod est faciens non factum, per se vel per accidens. Procedere autem in infinitum in causis agentibus est impossibile propter[9] eamdem rationem quae prius dicta est, quia tunc non esset agens aliquod, quod est impossibile. Erit ergo dare aliquod agens quod non sit actum, nec per se nec per accidens,[9] sed est agens omnia alia et ipsum non est actum ab alio. Hoc autem omnes intelligunt primum principium; quare necesse est esse tale in entibus.

Sicut autem primum principium probatur esse ex causis agentibus, ita etiam posset probari ex statu in causis finalibus et formalibus. Forma enim prima omnium et terminus ultimus est primum principium, quod secundum se ipsum bonum est, et omnia alia boni rationem et appetibilis habent ex ipso.

Avicenna[10] autem aliam rationem adducit ad probandum primum principium, quae sumitur ex ratione possibilis et necessarii. Et est propria huic scientiae quidquid dicat Commentator[11] contra ipsum. Necessarium enim et possibile consequuntur totum ens secundum quod ens. Arguit autem sic: In entibus est aliquid possibile, quod etiam transmutatio ostendit, puta generatio et corruptio in ipsis entibus. Generatio enim et corruptio, et universaliter omnis transmutatio, inest alicui secundum hoc quod in potentia est, quia motus est actus entis in potentia. Quare in entibus est aliquid quod possibile est esse. Quod autem tantum possibile est esse, ex se non determinat se ad esse, quia nihil quod de se indeterminatum est ad esse et non esse, ex se determinatur ad esse. Quare determinatur a quodam alio. Et illud vel est necessarium ex se vel ex alio. Si sit necessarium ex se, tunc ipsum est primum; hoc enim dicimus primum quod ex se necesse est esse. Si autem determinetur ad esse, vel sit necessarium ex alio, tunc respectu illius est possibile, et tunc fiet quaestio de

* faciens: i.m.
† est factum faciens eam: i.m.
8 Aristotle, *Meta.* II, 2.
9 See above, n. 7.
10 Avicenna, *Meta.* 1, 7, fol. 73rl-vl.
11 Averroes, *In I Phy.* c. 83, fol. 47 F-H; *In VII Phy.* c. 3, fol. 340 E-F.

illo respectu cujus dicitur esse possibile. Et sic vel procedetur in infinitum vel devenietur ad aliquid quod sit necessarium ex se. Illud autem dicimus esse primum principium. Quare, etc.

Rationes autem praetactae, etsi diversificentur in verbis, eaedem tamen sunt secundum se, nisi quod una est communior, altera autem minus communis. Ratio enim quae sumitur ex possibili et necessario communior est, deinde vero illa quae sumitur ex ratione agentis et acti. Minus autem communis est illa quae sumitur ex ratione moventis et moti.

Et omnes istae rationes fundantur super hoc, quod impossibile est idem respectu ejusdem esse primo actu et potentia; super hoc etiam quod manifestum est ad sensum quod aliquid est possibile in entibus, et quod aliquid agit et movetur.

Ad rationem autem, cum arguitur "principium primum non ponitur nisi ut ex ipso possint reddi causae eorum quae fiunt," dico quod verum est. Et cum dicitur quod hoc contingit facere etsi primum non sit, dico quod falsum est. Et ad probationem, cum dicitur "eorum quae fiunt natura, natura est principium et causa," dico quod natura non est tota causa. Est enim natura principium activum in virtute alterius activi primi, quia opus naturae est opus intelligentiae. Non est igitur natura prima causa eorum quae natura fiunt.

Nec est etiam intellectus sufficiens causa eorum quae fiunt ex proposito, cum ex se non habeat quod sic operetur, sed in virtute prioris. Unde est quasi causa media inter ea quae fiunt ab eo et inter causam priorem dantem sibi primum esse et virtutem qua operatur. Sicut igitur nulla causa intermedia est sufficiens causa effectus, sic intellectus non est sufficiens causa eorum quae fiunt ab eo.

Ad aliud, cum dicitur si[12] sit ponere primum tunc et optimum, dico quod verum est. Et cum dicitur non est tale ponere,[12] dico quod immo. Et cum dicitur "si unum contrariorum esset infinitum corrumpere[t] alterum, et sic auferetur totaliter malum in entibus," dico quod si unum contrarium esset infinitum existens in natura corrumperet suum contrarium si ipsum ageret ex necessitate naturae suae, ut ignis agit in aquam et calidum in frigidum. Si tamen agat secundum rationem cognitionis et per intellectum, non oportet quod agat ad corruptionem sui contrarii. Sed sic aget secundum quod accepit agendum esse circa ipsum. Primum autem principium agit per intellectum et cognitionem; ideo non agit excludendo malum nisi secundum praeconceptionem et ordinem suae scientiae. Quia igitur est conceptum non exstirpandum esse omnino malum si universum debeat manere, quia multa sunt bona quae sine malo non eveniunt, ut generatio hujus vel illius est quoddam bonum et tamen generatio hujus est corruptio alterius. Et hoc idem dicit Simplicius, auctoritate Platonis, fine secundi *Caeli et Mundi.*[13] Ideo contingit

12 See above, n. 7.

13 Cf. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis de Caelo Commentaria* I, 12. The latin edition, Venice 1544, was not available to me. However, the latin text of the passage cited by Peter of Auvergne is contained in the greek edition of Simplicius, ed. I. L. Heiberg (Berlin 1894) 364. The editor explains the presence of this latin text in the following note: "finem libri primi, quem omisit editio Venata e cod. Collegii Balliolensis Oxon. 99 sumpsi."

quod primum agens, quamvis fuerit optimum, non tamen agit corrumpendo totaliter malum.

Vel potest dici (fol. 96rl) aliter ad rationem, quod videlicet bonum et malum non sunt contraria sed sunt privativa; malum enim est privatio boni. Et ideo falsum accepit ratio illa.

Alio autem modo potest dici sicut aliqualiter tactum est: cum dicitur "si est aliqualiter optimum in entibus tunc corrumpet malum," dico quod verum est sicut possibile est ipsum corrumpi. Non enim agens agit nisi quod est possibile agi, nec corrumpit nisi quod possibile est corrumpi. Nunc autem, manente ordine universi, impossibile est malum universaliter corrumpi; oportet enim generationem et corruptionem existere in entibus. Non autem existerent si auferetur ratio mali.

Item, in motu primo aliqualiter reperitur ratio mali. Acquisitio enim unius ubi est corruptio alterius. Corruptio autem malum est. Non ergo est possibile malum universaliter excludi ab entibus.

CERTITUDE OF REASON AND FAITH IN ST. BONAVENTURE AND ST. THOMAS

John Francis Quinn C.S.B.

As a doctor and master of theology, Thomas Aquinas taught without interruption from 1256 to 1274, the year of his death. During those years, he produced an extraordinary number of writings in which he treated many problems several times, including the certitude of reason and faith. Although St. Bonaventure also died in 1274, his teaching as a doctor and master of theology lasted only from 1254 to 1257, the year of his election as Minister General of the Franciscan Order. Because the period of his teaching was short, Bonaventure did not produce as many writings as Aquinas, nor did he have the opportunities that Aquinas had to handle repeatedly the critical problems of their day. As Minister General of his Order, however, Bonaventure managed to write some mystical treatises and, from 1267 to 1273, to review some crucial problems, particularly the problem of certitude, in theological conferences at the University of Paris when it was seriously disturbed by the teaching of some unorthodox Christians, notably Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. In view of the historical circumstances differentiating the teaching careers of Bonaventure and Aquinas, we are obliged to approach the certitude of reason and faith in Aquinas on the basis of those texts in Bonaventure that can be used to compare the doctrine of the one with the other. Hence beginning with the doctrine of Bonaventure, we shall compare with it the doctrine of Aquinas inasmuch as his texts deal with the same aspects of the problem in question.

According to Bonaventure, there are four different kinds of certitude. The first kind comes from demonstration and is so compelling that a man, though unwilling, must assent to the truth of the demonstration. When certitude of this sort predominates, faith is made void. The second kind depends on authority and generates faith, as Augustine says: "What we believe we owe to authority."[1] Since the doctrine of

1 *De utilitate credendi*, 11. 5 in Migne, *Patrologia latina* (PL), v. 42, c. 83 (42.83): this collection will be noted as the parentheses indicate.

Scripture is intended to generate faith, therefore, because an end imposes a necessity on the means, Scripture has a certitude of authority. This is why the teaching of Scripture is transmitted by way of narration rather than by means of reason, or demonstration, for faith arises from free assent. Although the certitude of authority has little weight in the human sciences, because men often lie, it has great force in Scripture which comes from the Holy Spirit, who can never lie. The third kind of certitude, perfecting and consummating faith, is due to an interior illumination pertaining to the gift of grace. The fourth kind, following faith, is the certitude of persuasion resulting from the use of suitable and efficacious reasons to bring about an understanding of the objects of belief. Bonaventure is referring here to the certitude of knowledge in the doctors of theology, whose writings contain reasons and arguments both strengthening and nourishing Christian faith while terminating in an understanding of its truth.[2]

The certitude of demonstration has to do with the human sciences, which are formed by the natural power of reason. Thus, our first topic is the certitude of natural reason in general, of human science in particular, and so we are dealing specifically with the certitude of natural knowledge. Both the certitude of authority in Scripture and the certitude of illumination in faith belong to the order of divine revelation, which is given by the power of the Holy Spirit. Since the Christian accepts divine revelation by an infused virtue of faith, our second topic consists in the certitude of infused knowledge obtained through faith and sustained by the doctrine of Scripture. The certitude of persuasion pertaining to theology depends primarily on the articles or principles of faith, presupposing the authority of Scripture, and secondarily on the principles of reason. Consequently, our third topic, completing the first and second, will be the certitude of theological knowledge.[3]

2 *Commentarius in Evangelium sancti Ioannis*, Prooem., n. 10, q. 2, Resp., ad 1-2 (6.243). The numbers in parentheses show the volume and page of Bonaventure's work in *Opera omnia* (Quaracchi 1882-1902), 10 vv. Where two enumerations are shown, the second (*ed. min.*) refers to *Opera theologica selecta* (Quaracchi 1934-64), 5 vv. His *Commentaria in quatuor libros Sententiarium* will be noted by the number of the book, the title, and the numbers of the distinction, part, article, question etc., for instance: 1 *Sent.*, 27.2.2.2, ad 3 (1.661; *ed. min.*, 1.526); similar abbreviations will be used for his other writings, and for those of Aquinas. The works of the latter will be noted with the volume and page numbers (in parentheses) of *Opera omnia*, editio Leonina (Romae 1882-). Works not in that critical edition will be noted (with the name of the edition) and identified as they appear, first with full title, then as shown in a shorter form. An exception is made for the following work: *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum* (Parisiis 1929), vv. 1-2, cura P. Mandonnet (1933, 1947), vv. 3-4, edidit F. Moos; references to this work will be similar to those for the *Commentaria* of Bonaventure.

3 For Bonaventure, as we shall see, theology is subalternated to Scripture and shares at once in the certitude of both reason and faith.

CERTITUDE OF NATURAL KNOWLEDGE

To know any thing with certitude, Bonaventure teaches, the human intellect must see it in the light of its eternal reason in God. This does not mean that His eternal reason is the whole and sole ground of certitude in human knowledge, for otherwise natural knowledge would not differ from infused knowledge nor any knowledge in the present life from the knowledge possessed in beatitude. The men of the Old Academy erred, therefore, in saying that a thing is known with certitude only in the archetypal or intelligible world. Their opinion gave rise to the greater error of the New Academy, which held that nothing at all could be known with certitude, since the human mind could not see the intelligible world. It is not sufficient, on the other hand, to say that the intellect needs only the influence of God's eternal light, so that, in knowing with certitude, it need not arrive at His eternal reason. This is not sufficient for Bonaventure on two accounts. First, because it is contrary to the very clear teaching of Augustine, who demonstrates that the human mind, to know with certitude, must be regulated not by a habitus of the mind itself, but by the immutable and eternal rules above it in the eternal truth. Secondly, because the influence of God is either general with respect to all creatures or special with respect to grace. If the certitude of human knowledge is excluded from His general influence, then it is included in His special influence; but this cannot be true on the ground that all human knowledge would be infused and none would be natural or acquired. Consequently, to have knowledge with certitude, the human intellect of necessity must be moved into act and be regulated in its action by the eternal reason of God, which is attained only in part, or according as it can be reached by the intellect with its own principles.[4]

Explaining the conditions required for certitude, Bonaventure maintains that it necessitates both a nobility of knowledge and a dignity of the knower. The nobility of knowledge entails an immutability on the side of the object and an infallibility on the side of the knower. Because every creature is brought into being from non-being, the truth of a creature taken in itself is not immutable absolutely, and the light of a created intellect according to its own power is not entirely infallible. As

4 *Quaestiones disputatae de scientia Christi* (DSC), q. 4, Resp. "... statum vitae." (5.23). See also *fa.* 1-8 (5.17-18), where Bonaventure cites the texts of Augustine to show that the human mind sees truth in the immutable truth, which is God, and judges things in their eternal reasons that cannot be judged by the mind, to which they are superior and, as the immutable rules of truth, in whose light even an immoral man sees what is right and just.

a consequence, the human intellect cannot know the truth of creatures with the certitude of science if it knows them in its own light alone and only as they have being either in themselves or in a created mind. To obtain the certitude of science, the intellect must know the truth of creatures according to the being that they have in the eternal design or reason of God. It is necessary for the intellect, therefore, to have recourse to His wholly immutable and stable truth, so that this truth confer immutability on the object of science, and to His entirely infallible light in order that it give infallibility to the knower. The second condition for certitude, the dignity of the knower, is said by Bonaventure to consist in the image of God which is found in the superior part of the rational spirit. This is the part of the rational soul by which a man attains the eternal reasons of God and through them defines with certitude whatever he judges and defines in both the speculative and the practical order. To attain His eternal reasons in that manner, a man needs the cooperation of God. Now, as the principle of being and creation, God cooperates in a general way with the natural work of every creature inasmuch as it is a vestige of His essence. As the source of grace and reparation, God cooperates in a special way with the meritorious work of any rational creature which is reformed as a likeness of the Trinity. God cooperates in a particular way, however, as both the moving principle and an object of knowledge, with the intellectual work of every rational creature according to its natural capacity as an image of the Creator. Consequently, for Bonaventure, the certitude of science is due to every man as an image of God who, moving the human intellect into act and cooperating with its action, makes known to each man His eternal reasons of things. Those reasons are not known clearly and distinctly by any man in this life; nor are they known according to their plenitude of truth. They are known only to the extent that the divine truth is known by the natural power of the human intellect, namely, by means of its own principles of knowledge, which are similitudes of the things that it abstracts from phantasms. When the intellect arrives at the eternal reasons of God, it reaches Him so to say as the manifestation of light to every created mind and as the ground of knowing every true thing.[5]

Although Augustine teaches that the human mind knows corporeal things through the senses and spiritual things through itself, or in its own intellectual light, Bonaventure insists that this does not exclude the

5 DSC, q. 4, Resp. "Quod autem ..." (5.23-24); see also *fm.* 34 (5.20-21). Bonaventure's conditions for certitude are influenced to a great degree by Augustine and to some degree by Aristotle: *fa.* 17-33 (5.19-20).

cooperation of God with the human mind. The light and principles of created truth are so included in the light and principles of the uncreated truth that the human mind knows creatures not only in its created light of truth, but also in the uncreated light of God, and so it knows created things in His eternal truth.[6] Aristotle has shown, nevertheless, that the power of the intellect and the principles acquired by it through sensation and experience are sufficient for perfect knowledge, and thus there is no apparent need to know things in the light of their eternal reasons. In Bonaventure's judgment, Aristotle shows only the necessity for the concourse of the light and the principles of created truth in order that the intellect acquire knowledge; nevertheless, this does not exclude the light and principles of the eternal truth by whose influence and cooperation the intellect knows the truth of creatures.[7] Hence, handling the problem of natural certitude in an original manner, Bonaventure reconciles the doctrines of Aristotle and Augustine. Though he accepts the teaching of Augustine that the human soul is in contact with the eternal laws of God, even so, Bonaventure holds as indubitably true the teaching of Aristotle that human science comes to be in the intellect by way of the senses, memory and experience.[8]

Combining Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines, then, Bonaventure synthesizes them in a twofold solution to the problem of natural certitude. On the one side, he maintains that the created light and principles of truth, though they are both necessary for human knowledge, are insufficient to cause certitude without the extrinsic help of the uncreated light and eternal reasons of God. On the other side, he affirms that the intellect is moved both by the eternal truth of its objects and by the created truth of its own principles, so that it sees the eternal reasons of God as they are reflected in its created principles. The intellect attains the certitude of science, therefore, by correlating its abstract similitudes of things with their eternal reasons through the mediation of its first principles.[9]

6 DSC, q. 4, sc 3-4 (5.21), ad 3-4 (5.24). See Augustine, *De Trinitate*, 9.3.3 (PL 42.962-63), 12.15.24 (PL 42.1101).

7 DSC, q. 4, sc 7-9 (5.21), ad 7-9 (5.25). See Aristotle, *De anima*, 3.5-6 (430a10-430b21) ; *Analytica posteriora*, 2.19 (100a4-8).

8 *Sermo IV, Christus unus omnium magister (Sermo IV)*, nn. 17-18 (5.571-72; *ed. min.*, 5.303-04). In this sermon, Bonaventure attributes to Christ as the Word of God the teaching of any truth known by reason, thus appropriating to Him the truth that philosophy can discover about God's action on the intellect. Accepting the truth of philosophy as such, Bonaventure goes beyond it through faith to show that Christ teaches all truth infallibly, so that He is the one illumining the mind with certitude to know the necessity of its objects. See also: *In Ioannis*, 1.4.12 (6.249); *Collationes in Hexaëmeron*, 12.5 (5.385).

9 DSC, q. 4, sc 14-16 (5.22), ad 14-16 (5.25).

The texts of Augustine used by Bonaventure in solving the problem of natural certitude are interpreted somewhat differently by Aquinas. His approach to the problem is one of understanding the way that we see the immutable truth of God, or His eternal reasons, according to which we judge the truth of created things. Augustine himself, Aquinas notes, acknowledges that truth is in the human soul, which he proved to be immortal from the eternity of truth. Now truth is in the soul, according to Aquinas, as God is present by His essence in all things, so that they are true inasmuch as, by their own natures, they are similitudes of God. Wherefore, His truth through its similitude is in all things, including the human soul. Because the soul knows truth, however, the divine truth is also in the soul by a special likeness inasmuch as there exists in the soul, when it knows the truth of other things, a sort of similitude of the divine truth. From the one divine truth, moreover, many truths come to be in the minds of men. Although many men differ with regard to the truth of some things, all men concur in the truth of the first principles, both speculative and practical, for they form in every human mind a kind of image, so to speak, of the divine truth. When any mind knows something with certitude, therefore, it sees the object in those principles according to which it judges all things. Thus, by analyzing the object into the first principles, the human mind is said to see the thing in the divine truth, or in its eternal reasons, according to which the mind is said to judge all things. Aquinas confirms his solution to the problem with the words of Augustine, who says that the truths of the sciences are seen in the divine truth as visible things are seen in the manifestation of light by the sun. It stands to reason, Aquinas comments, that corporeal things are not seen in the body of the sun, but in its manifestation of light; so also the truths of the sciences are not seen in the divine truth itself, but in the manifestation of its light.[10]

In the view of Aquinas, differing evidently from Bonaventure, the certitude of natural knowledge does not necessitate a seeing of the eternal reasons beyond their reflexions in the human mind through its first principles. Because those principles are impressed on the mind by the exemplar causality of the first truth, which they resemble as its similitudes, the intellect knows the truth of its objects in their eternal reasons, or the immutable truth of God, simply by judging them according to its first and self-evident principles.[11] This position is not the

10 *Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra errores Infidelium seu "Summa contra Gentiles"* (SCG), textus Leoninus diligenter recognitus, cura et studio C. Pera (Romae 1961), vv. 2-3; see 3.47 "Difficultatem autem ..." (v. 3, pp. 61-63; nn. 2241-45: the texts of Augustine are well documented here); cf. *Summa theologiae* (ST), prima pars (1a), 8.3 (4.86-87).

11 *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate* (DV), 1.4, arg. 5 (22.13), ad 5 (22.14-15); 10.6, arg. 6 (22.310), ad 6 (22.313-14); 10.11, arg. 12 (22.335), ad 12 (22.338).

one taken by Bonaventure, who holds that the intellect must see the eternal reason of its object, though God himself is not seen, since His eternal law is attained of necessity in conjunction with the first principles, which are its effects. Aquinas insists that the eternal law can be known only in its effect and not in itself: just as the sun is seen only in its irradiation and not in its substance, so the eternal law is seen by a man only according to its irradiation or effect in his mind, and thus all human knowledge of truth is a sort of participation in the eternal or immutable truth.[12]

How then does Aquinas account for the influence and cooperation of God in regard to the natural work of the intellect? He maintains, with Bonaventure, that all human knowledge is caused by the influence of God on the intellect. His influence is such for Aquinas, however, that human knowledge is acquired by the intellect through its self-evident principles of truth. Now the whole certitude of science comes from the certitude of principles, for the conclusions of science are known with certitude when they are understood in accordance with its first principles. When a man knows something with certitude, therefore, he has that certitude from God because the certitude of first principles is made known to him in the natural light of reason that God gives to him and through which God teaches him the truth. As a consequence, the man is said to understand and to judge all things in the light of the first truth according as the natural light of reason is, as it were, an impression on his mind of the uncreated truth. God influences the work of the intellect in acquiring certitude, then, through the similitudes of His light and truth in the natural light and self-evident principles given by Him to human reason. Since it is as a similitude of the first truth that a created thing is knowable to the intellect, Aquinas can say that God is known implicitly in every thing that the intellect knows, and so he comes close to Bonaventure's view that the light and principles of the uncreated truth are included in the light and principles of created truth.[13] Aquinas is also close to Bonaventure in some respects regarding God's cooperation with the work of the intellect. In the judgment of Aquinas, God cooperates with the intellect not only by moving it into act and giving it the similitudes necessary for knowledge, but also by conserving continually in being both the power of the intellect to understand and the similitudes of the things that it understands. As the first cause of intelligence, God moves the intellect into act by giving it the light of in-

12 ST, Ia2ae, 93.2, Resp. (7.163).

13 DV, 11.1, Resp. "Processus autem ..." (22.351-52); ad 13, 17 (22.353-54); 22.2, ad 1. See also: ST, Ia, 88.3, ad 1 (5.368); SCG, 1.11 "Ad quintam..." (Pera, 1.15; n. 71).

telligence, or its power of understanding; so, as a second cause of intelligence, the intellect depends on the cooperation of God in order that it understand. Moreover, all created beings pre-exist in God as the first cause of their being, so that, in the order of intelligence, they exist first in God according to their eternal reasons and, secondly, in the created minds actually understanding them by the similitudes derived from those reasons. Thus, by impressing the similitudes of things on the intellect, God causes and cooperates with its natural act of understanding. Though the intellect cannot operate without the cooperation of God, nevertheless, its natural power of intelligence and the cognitive similitudes of its objects are, under the action of God, a sufficient cause of its knowledge. The perception of truth by the intellect, therefore, is attributed chiefly to God not only as the cause and the conserving principle of its being and light of intelligence, but also as the principal agent directing it to see the truth of its objects.[14]

Approaching the position of Bonaventure to some degree, Aquinas ascribes the certitude of natural knowledge to God on the part of the object, which He presents to the intellect, and on the part of the knower to whom He gives the natural light of intelligence. The certitude of every truth in the human intellect, consequently, is derived from God as the first truth, for the truth of human knowledge has its certitude from the power of the divine truth, just as the conclusions of science have their certitude from the power of the first principles.[15] Both the intellectual light of the mind and its first naturally known principles have the power to manifest truth from their assimilation to the divine truth, which confers an infallibility on the one and an immutability on the other. This assimilation consists in the image of divine truth that God, as exemplar cause, stamps on the human mind, thus giving it the ability to know truth according to the first truth, but without seeing the divine truth in itself.[16] Although Aquinas differs from Bonaventure on the effect produced by God in the human mind, even so, they concur in regarding God as the primary source of the infallibility of the mind and the immutability of its truth, the two conditions required for the certitude of human knowledge. The one notable difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure has to do with the reason why God must

14 ST, Ia, 105.3, Resp., ad 1-3 (5.473); *Expositio super librum Boethii de Trinitate (Expos. de Trin.)*, recensuit Bruno Decker (Leiden 1955), 1.1, ad 2, 6, 8 (pp. 61-62).

15 *Compendium theologiae,* 1.129 "Deus autem ..." in *Opuscula theologica,* cura et studio R. A. Verardo (Taurini 1954), p. 62, n. 258.

16 *Quaestio quodlibetalis (Quodl.)*, 10.4.1 (10.7), Resp. in *Quaestiones quodlibetales,* editio nona, cura et studio R. Spiazzi (Taurini 1956), p. 203. See also DV, 10.8, Resp. "Si vero ..." (22.322).

cooperate with the natural work of human intelligence. In this regard, Bonaventure stands alone, inasmuch as the reason that he assigns is the necessity for God to cooperate with the human mind because of the natural condition of the rational spirit, which is created as an image of God. It is in this context that Bonaventure describes the certitude of natural knowledge as an effect of an illumination from God, and so we must now consider his doctrinē from that point of view.[17]

Natural Illumination of Reason

All human knowledge, according to Bonaventure, begins with the senses. They perceive their objects by way of the species received from them in the bodily organs and causing the sense powers, both exterior and interior, to apprehend the different kinds of bodies and their common properties. In apprehending those things, the exterior senses judge them, as sight distinguishes a white from a black body, and the interior sense judges by its power of estimation whether a thing is salutary or harmful. To judge why a thing has such qualities belongs to the power of reason, which knows the thing in abstraction from every condition of place, time and motion. Since a sense power is confined by nature to a definite object, as hearing is bound by sound, the certitude of sensation depends only on God's general cooperation with creatures. Because the intellect is open to an understanding of all things, it must be fixed in certitude by the cooperation of the light and the reason of eternal truth, for they alone are free from the imperfections of fallibility and mutability. Consequently, turning to the fount of all certitude, the intellect judges corporeal things according to their unchangeable, timeless and endless reasons in God, thus attaining a higher degree of certitude than the senses. The cause of all things, God is the infallible rule and the light by which the intellect judges anything with certitude, and so it must apprehend corporeal things according to their eternal reasons, or their infallible, immutable and indubitable laws in God. Imprinted indelibly on the memory, those laws can neither be violated nor, as Augustine says, be called into account by a judgment of the intellect. It

17 With regard to the immutability of truth, Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in ascribing an absolute immutability to the divine truth alone, because only the divine being (*esse*) is immutable absolutely. For Aquinas, the being of all creatures, and consequently their truth, is mutable on the ground that they would return to nothing unless God conserved them; an additional mutability is found in the truth of contingent things because of the variable condition of their being. Since the truth in the intellect depends on the true condition of its object, the truth of the intellect is immutable provided there is no change in the being of its objects, which are true according as they are related to the divine truth. See the following: 1 *Sent.*, 19.5.3 (1.494-98); DV, 1.6 (22.22-25); ST, 1a, 16.8 (4.216).

is impossible for the intellect to judge anything with certitude, therefore, apart from the necessary, unlimited and eternal reason of God whose exemplar form is the rule directing the production, conservation and distinction of all created things.[18]

Now, as an image of God, the rational creature is directed from its memory toward eternity, from its intelligence toward the immutable truth, and from its will toward the highest goodness. Reflecting God's eternal laws, the perpetual principles and axioms of the sciences are included among the things retained continually by the memory. Those rules of the human sciences recall to the mind the invariable truths made known to it in the immutable light of God. Relying on the memory, the intellect seeks to understand the terms, propositions and inferences of demonstration. The meaning of terms is grasped by the intellect when it comprehends each one by a definition, and this necessitates an analysis of its particular meaning until the term is understood according to its principal meaning. The definition of a particular substance, for instance, is known in full only when it is known as a being through itself (*ens per se*), which cannot be known without the help of God, the absolute and eternal being in whom are the perfect reasons of all created beings. The intellect truly comprehends the meaning of propositions when it knows with the certitude of science that they are true, which is to know that it cannot be deceived in comprehending their meaning. Having an infallible certitude, therefore, the intellect knows that the truth it comprehends cannot be otherwise, and so it knows that this truth is immutable. Since the human mind is mutable, it can see such a truth shining immutably only through the radiance of the altogether immutable light of God. The significance of an inference in a demonstration is rightly perceived by the intellect when it sees that the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises with regard not only to necessary and contingent terms, but also to existing and non-existing things. The necessity of those inferences is not due either to the existence of the thing in itself or to its existence in the human mind, but to the exemplarity of truth in God, who arranges all things in such a way that, reflecting His eternal design, they are adapted and related to one another. It is thus evident to Bonaventure, following Augustine, that the intellect of every man reasoning truly is illumined by the eternal truth through which alone his intellect can grasp any true thing with certitude. Taking counsel with the intellect, the will inquires about the varying degrees of goodness in creatures un-

18 *Itinerarium mentis in Deum (Itiner.)*, 2.3-6, 9-10 (5.300-02; *ed. min.*, 5.188-90, 191-92); DSC, q. 4, ad 11 (5.25). See in Augustine: *De libero arbitrio*, 2.12.34 (PL 32.1259) ; *De vera religione*, 31.58 (PL 34.148).

til it reaches the supreme good, which is attained of necessity from its impression on the memory. The action of counsel ends in a judgment made with certitude according to the divine law as it is seen through the memory and which the mind knows to be both right and beyond its power to judge. As a result of counsel, the will has a desire chiefly for the very best good, or the beatifying good and ultimate end for whose sake every other good is desired, unless a man is deceived and errs by mistaking for the truth an image and likeness of the supreme good. The acts of the memory, the intelligence and the will lead the mind in the order of faith to a consideration of the Trinity with the help of the philosophical sciences, which inform and perfect the human mind as an image of God. But the philosophical sciences have in the order of reason certain and infallible rules descending into the mind, so to speak, as manifestations and rays of truth from the eternal law of God. The brilliance of divine truth so illumines a man's mind that, unless it is blind, he can be drawn toward a contemplation of God.[19]

For Bonaventure, then, the certitude of intellectual knowledge, including both science and wisdom, is caused by an illumination from God. Without His illumination, no man can know any truth with certitude, as Augustine shows. When the Apostle Paul says that we live, are moved and have our being in God (*Acts*, 17.28), he speaks of our intellectual life in the interpretation of Augustine, who sees the Apostle saying that God is the cause of being, the source of intelligence, and the order of living. Commenting on Augustine's interpretation, Bonaventure teaches that God, as the cause of being, is present in the human soul as its productive principle; as the order of living, God dwells in the soul through the gift of grace regulating its actions according to the rule of the Christian life. As the source of intelligence, however, God is the intellectual sun, so to speak, illumining every human mind and conferring certitude on its acts of understanding by raising them above the mutable conditions of the creature.[20]

19 *Itiner.*, cap. 3 (3.303-06; *ed. min.*, 5.193-99); see Augustine, *De vera relig.*, 39.72 (PL 34.154). Note Bonaventure's closing passage: "Huius autem lucis irradiatio et consideratio sapientes suspendit in admirationem et econtra insipientes, qui non credunt, ut intelligant, ducit in perturbationem ..." This does not mean that only the Christian can have wisdom with certitude, even though other texts seem to support such a view, for instance: DSC, q. 4, ad 2 (5.24); *Sermo IV*, n. 15 (5.571; *ed. min.*, 5.302). Bonaventure speaks of natural wisdom in a number of texts, such as: 3 *Sent.*, 35.un.1, Resp. (3.774; *ed. min.*, 3.778-79); 35.dub.1 (3.787; *ed. min.*, 3.793-94). He has some texts on both natural and Christian wisdom, including their certitude, for example: DSC, q. 5, Resp. (5.29-30); 3 *Sent.*, 35.dub.4 (3.788; *ed. min.*, 3.795). Finally, he describes the certitude of natural wisdom as depending, in the same way as human science, on the eternal reasons or the infallible and indubitable norms by which the wise man makes his judgments: *Coll. in Hexaëm.*, 2.9-10 (5.337-38).

20 *Collationes de septem donis Spiritus sancti*, 8.15 (5.496-97). See in Augustine: *De Trin.*, 14.15.21 (PL 42.1052), 14.12.16 (PL 42.1048); *De civitate Dei*, 8.4 (PL 41.228).

The doctrine of Aquinas, no less than Bonaventure's, on the natural illumination of reason is a part of his doctrine on its natural certitude. Now, as Aquinas knows, Augustine says that the human mind cannot judge the truth of corporeal things, because they are mutable and similar in a way to what is false. Augustine also says that the mind, though mutable, sees the immutable rules of truth and judges things according to a light above the mind. Since every human judgment is made according to the agent intellect, it seems that this intellect is God, who illumines the mind.[21] Regarding the problem, Aquinas holds that the human mind judges truth in one way by its own power, which is the agent intellect, and in another way by drawing conclusions from principles, which Augustine indicates, for nothing mutable or seemingly false can be an infallible rule of truth. To understand Augustine properly, Aquinas observes, it is necessary to see the historical reasons for his words. The ancient philosophers, not rising above the senses, said that we could not have certitude of truth because of the instability of being in things and the inability of any man to settle different opinions about them. Augustine referred to those two reasons in saying that the mind cannot know the truth of corporeal things. Moreover, seeking to stabilize the certitude of science, Plato posited immobile species separated from sensible things and, in man, a mind or an intellect illumined by a sort of superior and intellectual sun. Consequently, he put science in the mind as it participated in the truth of the separate species of things. Augustine, following Plato as far as Catholic faith allowed, did not posit the species of things as self-subsistent, but put their eternal reasons in the divine mind, so that the human mind as it is illumined by the divine light judges truth through them, and they are seen only by their impression on the mind. Proceeding differently, Aristotle showed that there was something stable in sensible things and that the judgment of a sense power, though it could be deceived accidentally, was true concerning their proper qualities. He also showed that man had an intellective power which judges truth, not through some intelligible principles existing beyond the mind, but through the light of the agent intellect. It is not going much beyond Aristotle to say, Aquinas remarks, that this light and the truths that it makes known participate in the light and truth of God. Hence, the immutable rules seen by the mind are the first principles made known by the light of the agent intellect as a participation in the

21 *Quaestio disputata de spiritualibus creaturis,* a. 10, arg. 8-9 in *Quaestiones disputatae,* editio nona (Taurini 1953), v. 2, p. 406. See in Augustine: *De diversis quaestionibus,* q. 9 (PL 40.13-14); *De Trin.,* 14.15.21 (PL 42.1052).

divine light, and so God illumines the mind by giving it the natural light of its agent intellect.[22]

Thus, combining Aristotelean and Augustinian doctrines to his own advantage, Aquinas takes a different stand than Bonaventure on the natural illumination of reason. In the position of Aquinas, this illumination falls under the providence of God, who bestows on the human mind an intellectual light sufficient of itself for knowing the truth of corporeal things, provided always that He moves the intellect into act and cooperates with its action. As Aristotle suggests, the agent and possible intellects are sufficient when conjoined in operation to cause a perception of truth, for the power of the agent intellect has a proper efficacy to manifest the natural truth of first principles and the conclusions deduced from them. When Augustine says that God is the intellectual sun illuminating the mind interiorly, he is to be understood to speak about the natural light of the soul, because this light is the illumination by which God enlightens it to know the things pertaining to natural knowledge. In short, for Aquinas, the intellect has no need to receive from God an additional light or illumination to know what it can know sufficiently by its natural power of reason.[23]

In Bonaventure's position, the agent intellect, with the possible intellect, has the power to form a knowledge of corporeal things. Because the operation of reason depends, however, both on the certitude or necessity of corporeal things and on the work of the senses, the human intellect cannot know those things by its own power without the aid of God, whose knowledge of such things does not depend on them. Needing the help of the divine light, therefore, the created light of the intellect is not sufficient of itself to operate, even after God produces it. In conserving the intellect, God conforms its light to His eternal light and causes the created light to act by adding to it the influence of His supreme light.[24] As understood by Bonaventure, then, the natural illumination of reason does not necessitate from God an additional light in the intellect, but requires in addition to His conservation the influence of His light to move into act the created light of the intellect which He conforms to His uncreated light. It is in this way that Bonaventure attributes to God an illumination conferring on the intellect the infallible certitude and the immutable truth with which it

22 *De spirit. creat.*, a. 10, ad 8-9 (Taurini 2.409-10); see also: *arg.* 1 (2.405), ad 1 (2.408). Cf. ST, Ia, 87.1, Resp. (5.355-56).

23 *Expos. de Trin.*, 1.1, sc 1-4, Resp. (Decker pp. 58-61); ST, Ia2ae, 109.1 (7.289-90). See Augustine, *Soliloquia*, 1.6 (PL 32.875); and Aristotle, *De Anima*, 3.5 (430a10-15).

24 *Commentarius in librum Ecclesiastes*, 7.1, q. 3, Resp. (6.54-55); 2 *Sent.*, 17.1.1, ad 6 (2.412; *ed. min.*, 2.242).

knows indubitably the necessity of the things that it sees in the light of their eternal reasons. His position on the problem combines in a different way than that of Aquinas the doctrines of Aristotle and Augustine. When Bonaventure holds that the object of human knowledge is necessary in itself and certain to the knower, he follows Aristotle's teaching on this knowledge as certain whenever a man knows that he knows the cause of a thing, and that the thing cannot be otherwise than it is. When Bonaventure maintains that immutability belongs solely to the eternal truth of God, he follows Augustine's teaching on the necessity of the mind to see the truth of creatures in their eternal reasons, which are the immutable rules or laws guaranteeing the certitude of human knowledge. For his own part, Bonaventure adds that the knower must have an infallibility of truth, as otherwise he could be deceived and would not understand the truth of his objects with certitude. Finally, showing a predominantly Augustinian influence, he affirms that, because the light of every created intellect can be obscured, no created intellect is sufficient of itself to comprehend any truth with certitude apart from the uncreated light of God.[25]

Certitude and Illumination of Infused Knowledge

Because the teaching of Scripture is intended to generate faith, which has a proper certitude from a divine illumination, Bonaventure assigns to the doctrine of Scripture the certitude of authority. Explaining this certitude, he says that particular deeds cannot be proved by human reason, but must be believed, and so Scripture teaches by narrating truth rather than by relying on the certitude of reason. Thus, precluding doubt about the doctrine of Scripture, God provides in place of the certitude of reason the certitude of His authority, which can neither deceive nor be deceived. Hence, resting on the infallible authority of the Holy Spirit, Scripture presents the truth in a perfectly authentic

25 *Sermo IV*, nn. 6-10 (5.568-70; *ed. min.*, 5.297-300). Bonaventure identifies the intellect's natural power of judgment, as Augustine speaks of it, with the agent and possible intellects: "Lumen innatum est lumen naturalis iudicatorii sive rationis ... id est non solum intellectum possibilem, sed etiam intellectum agentem." — *Coll. de donis*, 4.2 (5.474); see Augustine, *De lib. arbit.*, 3.20.56 (PL 32.1298). The Augustinian expression *naturale iudicatorium* is also used by Aquinas: ST, la2ae, 71.6, ad 4 (7.9). He holds, with Bonaventure, the Aristotelean principle that a man knows a thing with certitude by science whenever he knows that it is impossible for it to be otherwise than it is: SCG, 3.39 "Praeterea ... ultima felicitas." (Pera 3.45; n. 2171); see Aristotle, *Anal. poster.*, 1.2 (72b1-4).

manner, not through human investigation, but through divine revelation.[26] Now the believer accepts divine revelation by an act of faith, which looks in a general way to the teaching of Scripture and in a special way to the articles of the Christian creed. When assenting to the creed, the Christian assents to God as the supreme truth, whom he believes most of all while placing himself in the service of Christ. As a consequence, he believes not only things subject to reason, but also other things either above reason or contrary to sense experience, thus assenting to truths that are not apparent or evident to natural reason. To make such an assent, he must have those truths manifested to his mind by an illumination of faith elevating his reason above its nature. To assent to them without doubt, he must also have the testimony of authority supporting Scripture and strengthening his mind in its belief. Both the illumination of faith and the authority of Scripture come from the Father through His Word, Jesus Christ, and through the Holy Spirit, the teacher of truth, who gives the Christian his power to believe divine revelation. According to Bonaventure, therefore, the authority of God upholds Christian faith, which assents to His authority, and this authority resides chiefly in Scripture. Because the whole of Scripture is the work of the Holy Spirit and is ordered to generating Christian faith, the teaching of Scripture and the true faith of the Christian are in perfect harmony.[27]

The object of faith is so true and certain, in Bonaventure's judgment, that it cannot contain anything false or doubtful. The assent of the mind to the truth of faith is made according to an illumination manifesting the foreknowledge of God. Since nothing false can fall under His foreknowledge, no falsehood can fall under faith. The divine foreknowledge, not depending on creatures, is most certain of things that will necessarily come to be and of things that may or may not come to be, so that God cannot be deceived about either necessary or contingent things. The virtue of faith, guided by God's foreknowledge, has such a certitude of both illumination and belief that the believer can neither be deceived nor be in error by his faith concerning future and even contingent things, though they cannot of themselves come to be. In Bonaventure's view, a thing foreknown by God can possibly not come to be through itself and absolutely, because it is impossible that it come to be with His foreseeing of its opposite. God would be deceived if, foreseeing the latter, the former came to be. Likewise, depending on the divine foresight, the virtue of faith is not deceived in assenting to a

26 *Breviloquium*, Prol., n. 5 "Quoniam igitur..." (5.207; *ed. min.*, 5.13).
27 *Brevil.*, 5.7 "... non ficta." (5.260-61; *ed. min.*, 5.114-15).

contingent thing that cannot of itself come to be, because it would not be an object of faith if, at the same time, it could not come to be. Consequently, nothing false can fall under faith, since falsehood in an object of belief cannot stand at the same time with truth in the believer, or in his faith.[28] Bonaventure does not restrict infallible certitude regarding future and contingent events to the virtue of faith. He considers it possible for a man by his natural reason to be infallibly certain about some events of that sort. There are things having a determinate and unfailing (*infallibilis*) cause, such as events determined by the movements of celestial bodies, whose actions cannot be impeded. These things can be known with certitude by the man who knows them in their cause, as he knows, for instance, the time of an eclipse. Terrestrial things have a determinate cause in the ordinary course of nature, but their cause is fallible because of the numerous impediments that can prevent it from producing its proper effects. A field of corn will yield a bountiful harvest, for example, if the soil is rich and the weather is favourable. The true course of such contingent events can be foreseen with some degree of certitude by the man who knows the nature both of terrestrial things and of the causes influencing their actions. Things brought about by the human will have, in one way, an indeterminate cause in the inclination of the will to opposite courses of action and, in another way, a fallible cause owing to the many obstacles that can discourage a man from acting, though he is willing to act. It is the future and contingent events depending on the human will that a man can know with certitude only by divine revelation.[29]

For Bonaventure, then, the assent of faith has an infallible certitude from an illumination manifesting the divine foreknowledge. His understanding of the divine foreknowledge is given in connexion with God's knowledge of predestination. His foreknowledge is harmonious because it is true, for God knows a present event just as it is, and He knows a future event occurring, just as it will. His foreknowledge is also certain because it is independent of the event, which God foresees clearly and indubitably according to His eternal light, so that, knowing with supreme certitude, He is equally certain of all things. Consequently, the divine foreknowledge is infallible because it is the whole power (*totum posse*) comprehending the thing that God foreknows, and so He cannot in any way be deceived or forestalled by His foreknowledge. Although the predestination of a man depends on his freedom of choice, nevertheless, with the certitude of infallibility and

28 3 *Sent.*, 24.1.1, Resp. (3.509; *ed. min.*, 3.500).
29 2 *Sent.*, 7.2.1.3, Resp. (2.194; *ed. min.*, 2.188-89).

the impossibility of being deceived, God so foresees this contingent event that it will come to be as He foresees it. The divine foreknowledge of predestination also has an immutable certitude, since God does not dispose and order things so variably that He now chooses one man and, changing His choice, then another. In short, His foreknowledge of predestination has the certitude of both infallibility and immutability.[30]

Aquinas speaks of the teaching of Scripture in a way similar to Bonaventure, though Aquinas does not say explicitly that Scripture has the certitude of authority. In his consideration, Scripture teaches eternal things by its truth and in words having an authority originating from God. This authority is to be believed infallibly because God is truth, and because of the plenitude of His knowledge and the power of His words. Imposing a necessity to believe, Scripture teaches truth by way of precept, or of instruction, directing the intellect through faith and forming the will through love, thus moving the believer to act according to his faith. The truth of Scripture, having a uniformity of doctrine in all its parts, is both immutable and eternal, so that, disposing us for the life of grace, it guides us to the life of glory. Consequently, originating from God and promising eternal life, the doctrine of Scripture is the divine wisdom transcending all human reason.[31] As seen by Aquinas, Christian faith is fostered by the divine revelation made to the prophets and the apostles. This revelation is set down in Scripture written by human authors as instruments of the Holy Spirit, who has spoken through the prophets and the apostles. Because the Holy Spirit is the principal author of Scripture, it can contain nothing false, and neither can Christian faith, which is taught by Scripture.[32]

All the elements of the certitude of authority assigned to Scripture by Bonaventure are present in Aquinas, even though he does not use the term *certitude* in his consideration of Scripture. Its authority, coming from God, provokes a necessary and infallible belief in an immutable truth made known without falsehood, or deception, through a divine revelation given to us by the Holy Spirit, who is the principal author of Scripture. Showing its harmony with Christian faith, Aquinas indicates

30 1 *Sent.*, 40.2.1, ad 1-3 (1.707-08; *ed. min.*, 1.561-62); 40.2.2, Resp., ad 5 (1.712-13; *ed. min.*, 1.565-66).

31 *De commendatione et partitione sacrae Scripturae*, prima pars (*Opusc. theol.*, pp. 435-36); *De commendatione sacrae Scripturae*, prima pars (*Opusc. theol.*, pp. 441-42). Aquinas says also that Scripture teaches truth by way of narration: 1 *Sent.*, Prol., a. 5, Sol. (1.17-18). Bonaventure holds that the doctrine of Scripture is uniform throughout all its parts: *Brevil.*, Prol., nn. 1-4 (5.202-06; *ed. min.*, 5.5-12).

32 ST, 1a, 1.8, ad 2 (4.22): 1.2, ad 2 (4.9); SCG, 4.17 "Ex sacris ... divinae naturae." (Pera, 3.279-80; nn. 3536-38); *Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei*, 4.1, Resp. "... eius sensus." (Taurini 2.104-05); *Quodl.*, 7.6.1 (7.14), ad 5 (Spiazzi, p. 146); 7.6.3 (7.16), Resp. (p. 148); ST, 1a, 1.10, Resp. "Quia vero..." (4.25).

that the principles of faith are taken from the teaching of Scripture and drawn up in the apostolic creed, which summarizes and proposes for belief the truth diffused in Scripture.[33]

The act of the human intellect is good, according to Aquinas, because it has to do with what is true. For this reason, science is an intellectual virtue, since it is such that, by its means, the intellect is infallibly true. To be a virtue, then, faith must adhere to the sort of testimony in which truth is found infallibly. Now, just as created being (*esse*) is void and wanting in itself apart from its conservation by the uncreated being (*ens*), so also is every created truth apart from its rectification by the uncreated truth. Hence, the testimony of a man or an angel can be accepted infallibly only inasmuch as the creature manifests the testimony of God. The virtue of faith, therefore, moves the intellect to adhere to the truth of God, who is the first truth.[34] Thus, for Aquinas, the virtue of faith depends on the infallible truth of God. His testimony is manifested in the divine revelation received by the men whose minds God illumined to see things beyond the natural light of reason. This divine illumination made their minds so certain of His revelation that those men could propose it with certitude for belief by other men.[35]

Accounting for the act of belief, Aquinas compares it with the natural acts of the intellect, which is related in diverse ways to both sides of a contradiction. Regarding self-evident propositions, or first principles, the intellect adheres totally to the one side whose truth, appearing infallibly, is perceived at once or immediately. When the intellect, knowing the definition of terms, adheres wholly to one of the two sides by the power of first principles, it does not perceive the truth of that side immediately, but by way of a middle term, as a man of science knows the conclusions of a demonstration. If the intellect cannot be fixed in truth either immediately or by a middle term, then, under the influence of the will, provided there is sufficient motivation, the intellect can be made to assent firmly to one of the two sides of a contradiction. Such is the act of Christian faith by which the intellect, moved by the promise of eternal life, assents to the truth of revelation under the influence of the will. The reason inclining the will to move the intellect, however, is the first truth itself, which is infallible, and so the will gives an infallibility of truth to the intellect by causing its assent to the articles of faith.[36] This assent is made by the intellect to

33 ST, 2a2ae, 1.5, ad 2 (8.17); 1.9, ad 1 (8.23). See also 3 *Sent.*, 25.1.1, Sol. 3, ad 1 (3.786-87).
34 DV, 14.8, Resp. (22.459-60); cf. ST, 2a2ae, 1.2 (8.7-8).
35 SCG, 3.154 "Deinde ... sine istis." (Pera 3.229; nn. 3257-58).
36 DV, 14.1, Resp. (22.436-38); 3 *Sent.*, 23.2.4, Sol. 1, ad 2 (3.737). Cf. ST, 2a2ae, 2.1 (8.26-27); 3 *Sent.*, 23.2.3, Sol. 1 (3.731-32).

the revelation that God gave to the men through whom He has spoken. The assent of faith, then, is caused in the believer by the authority of God, who makes the articles of faith known to him by an infused light of faith. The object of faith is beyond natural reason, not because there is no act of reason in believing, but because the ground of faith is such that it cannot provide the evidence for the believer to see what he believes.[37] A man ought to believe the truths of faith, therefore, not because of human reason, but for the sake of divine authority. Assenting to what is unseen, the intellect of the believer is convinced by that authority through a command of the will in obedience to God.[38]

In the judgment of Aquinas, taking a different view from that of Bonaventure, the certitude of faith is found immediately in its principles, which are known self-evidently by the illumination of Christian faith. Just as the habitus of first natural principles gives the intellect an immediate understanding of their truth with complete certitude, so the habitus of faith gives the intellect an immediate and most certain perception of the principles or truths revealed by God. The intellect adheres firmly to those truths under the choice of the will, which is moved by divine authority to command the intellect's assent. Certitude of truth is found also in the intellect from its assent through science to conclusions drawn with the evidence of its objects from indemonstrable principles. It is proper to science that a man have certitude with regard to what he knows through science, for he is certain that he has the science. Likewise, because certitude belongs to the perfection of the intellect, it is proper to faith that the Christian have certitude regarding the things that he believes, since he is certain that he has the virtue of faith.[39] Acting from his faith, the Christian believes in God not only by accepting what He reveals, but also by assenting to it in the light of faith infused by God into his mind. According to Aquinas, the virtue of faith is more sufficient to move the intellect than any demonstration, because men are frequently deceived in thinking that to be a demonstration which is not, though a true demonstration never produces a false conclusion. Moreover, the light of faith is more sufficient for bringing about an assent than the natural light by which the intellect adheres to first principles, for the latter light is often impeded by bodily infirmities. Now the light of faith is, as it were, a sort of seal of the first

37 DV, 14.2, ad 9 (22.443-44); cf. 1 *Sent.*, Prol., a. 3, Sol. 2, ad (1.14).

38 ST, 2a2ae, 2.10, Resp. (8.38-39); 4.1, Resp. "Habitudo autem ...", ad 5 (8.44); 5.2, Resp. (8.56).

39 *Commentarium in Epistolam ad Hebraeos,* 11.1, lect. 1 "Consequenter cum dicit ...", *Opera omnia* (Vivès 1876), v. 21, pp. 687-88; ST, la2ae, 112.5. ad 2 (7.327).

truth in the human mind, and so this light cannot be deceived, just as God cannot be deceived, nor can He lie. Consequently, depending on the infallible truth of God, Christian faith cannot contain anything false.[40] Thus, presenting to the mind always and only what is true, the act of faith so perfects the intellect that it tends infallibly toward the supreme good, which is the first truth. Again, resulting from a command of the will, the act of faith is so formed through charity that the believer is directed infallibly to the ultimate end for whose sake the will adheres to the first truth. Since Christian faith is a virtue, therefore, Aquinas insists that it cannot contain any falsehood, because the act of belief relies on the infallibility of the divine truth.[41]

There are undoubtedly many points of similarity between Bonaventure and Aquinas on the certitude of Christian faith. Both theologians teach that the act of faith, while it looks to the articles of the creed, involves an assent with certitude made principally to God as the supreme or first truth and secondarily to the things that He has revealed as they are written in Scripture. The two theologians also teach in common, but with some differences, that the indubitable assent of faith is caused by the authority of God who, perfecting reason beyond its nature by a divine illumination, convinces the intellect to accept what He has revealed, though it is not evident to natural reason. In this regard, Aquinas explains the rôle of divine authority in the certitude of faith by a comparison with the certitude of the natural acts of the intellect. As a result, applying his understanding of natural certitude to the certitude of faith, he attributes an immediate infallibility to the articles of faith because their truth is perceived at once in the light of faith. By that means and without weakening the dependence of faith on the divine authority, he gives to the light of faith a power similar to and even more efficacious than the one belonging to the natural light of reason. Bonaventure refers to the divine authority without relating the certitude of faith to the natural certitude of reason. Rather, submitting the intellect as illumined by faith to the supreme truth, and subjecting the will as rectified by charity to the supreme good, he speaks of the divine authority taking the place of reason and persuading the heart of the Christian to believe.[42] Although Bonaventure does not handle this question in the same way as Aquinas, nonetheless, they concur in saying

40 *Expos. de Trin.*, 3.2, ad 4 "Unde et ..." (Decker pp. 114-15); 3 *Sent.*, 24.1, Sol. 3 (3.765). See also ST, 2a2ae, 1.3 (8.13-14).

41 ST, 2a2ae, 4.5, Resp., ad 2 (8.48-49).

42 See 3 *Sent.*, 23.1.1, Resp., ad 3 (3.471-72; *ed. min.*, 3.461-63); 23.2.2, ad 2 (3.491-92; *ed. min.*, 3.481-82).

that the assent of faith is made by the intellect at a command of the will.[43]

The two theologians differ greatly in the way of establishing the infallibility of Christian faith, even though they treat it in the same context: no falsehood can fall under faith. Bonaventure finds faith to be infallible by its dependence on the divine foreknowledge, which so safeguards the mind of the Christian that he can never be deceived or be in error because of his faith. Aquinas ascertains the infallibility of faith simply by its dependence on the first truth, which is infallible and cannot deceive the human mind, because God is beyond deception and cannot lie. For his part, then, Aquinas establishes the infallibility of faith without referring to the divine foreknowledge, even in regard to future and contingent things. He holds in the same way as Bonaventure, however, that some of those things are known with certitude by natural reason, while others can be known with certitude only as they fall under God's foreknowledge, which cannot be deceived, and so they are known solely by divine revelation. Thus, revealing future events, God supports our faith in the prophets by His foreknowledge through which He upholds Scripture, the source of instruction for our Christian faith.[44]

It is in the context of the revelation of contingent things that Bonaventure compares the certitude of faith with human science. The latter must be conformed to its object because it depends on the object as this exists, not only in itself, but also in its inferior causes and reasons. Christian faith has to be conformed to its object solely as it exists in its uncreated cause, for the knowledge obtained by faith and revelation depends, not on the thing revealed and believed, but on the infused light illumining the mind in order that it know the truths of faith and revelation. Because this light gives certain knowledge of contingent things, Christian faith, which is conformed to and relies on that

43 "Et quoniam intellectus non habilitatur ad assentiendum ipsi Veritati primae secundum suum iudicium, sed secundum voluntatis imperium ..." — 3 *Sent.*, 23.1.2, in Resp. (3.476; *ed. min.*, 3.466). Bonaventure also teaches, with Aquinas, that the Christian is certain that he has the virtue of faith: 3 *Sent.*, 23.dub.4, Resp. (3.503-05; *ed. min.*, 3.494-96).

44 ST, 3a, 46.2, arg. 4 (11.437), ad 4 (ibid.); cf. 3 *Sent.*, 24.1, Sol. 3, ad 1 (3.765). On the certitude of natural and revealed knowledge concerning future and contingent things see: 1 *Sent.*, 38.5, Sol. (1.909-12); 2 *Sent.*, 7.2.2, Sol., ad 5 (2.189-91): cf. *Quaestiones disputatae de malo,* 16.7, Resp. (Taurini 2.683-84); ST, 1a, 86.4, Resp. (5.353). For the infallibility of the divine foreknowledge see: SCG, 1.67 "... non sint." (Pera 2.78; nn. 556-59); 3.154 "Possunt tamen ... et sanatis." (3.230; nn. 3265-66): cf. ST, 1a, 14.13, Resp. (4.186); *Comp. theol.,* 1.140 (*Opusc. theol.* p. 27). Aquinas, like Bonaventure, speaks of a cause as certain when it never fails to produce its effect: "... tractum est nomen certitudinis ad ordinem causae ad effectum ut dicatur ordo causae ad effectum esse certus quando causa infallibiliter effectum producit." — DV, 6.3, in Resp. (22.185); see also: 2 *Sent.*, 4.1.2, Sol. (2.135-36); ST, 1a, 22.4, ad 1 (4.269).

light, cannot be falsified nor can it waver for the sake of the contingency of a thing believed.[45]

According to Bonaventure, furthermore, when faith and science deal with the same objects, faith is always more certain absolutely than science. No philosopher has ever known by natural reason, for instance, the truth 'God is a creator' with so great a certitude as the Christian knows it by faith. With respect to other objects, science has the greater certitude of speculation, which is in the intellect, but faith has the greater certitude of adhesion, which is in the will. Since the speculation of the intellect looks merely to truth, science can give a man certitude so strong regarding some things, such as first principles, that he can in no way doubt or deny them, nor ever in his heart contradict them. Because the adhesion of the will flows from love, faith moves the believer to cling to what he believes more than science moves a man to cling to what he understands. This is evident to Bonaventure from the martyrs, who suffered torture and death rather than deny their faith, which no man would do for a speculative conclusion of science unless, as faith dictates, he ought not to lie.[46]

The position of Aquinas on this question is also similar in some respects and dissimilar in others to the one taken by Bonaventure. As seen by Aquinas, intellectual certitude is the greater according as its cause is the stronger. Certitude of human knowledge is attained by the natural light that causes the intellect both to assent and to adhere to a thing, because its truth is evident and certain. The certitude of infused faith comes from the first truth, which causes the intellect to assent and, consequently, to adhere firmly to the things it believes, though their truth is not evident, at a command of the will. Since the first truth is a stronger cause than the natural light of the intellect, the certitude of faith, regarding strength of adhesion, is greater than the certitude of human knowledge, but the latter has the greater evidence for the things to which assent is given.[47] Thus, having the more certain cause, the virtue of faith is more certain than any form of human knowledge, including science and wisdom. From the point of view of the intellect, however, the virtues of human knowledge are more certain than the virtue of faith, which looks to things above the intellect. Nonetheless, because a thing is judged absolutely according to its cause, faith is the more certain absolutely, since it rests on the certitude of divine truth.[48]

45 3 *Sent.*, 24.1.1, ad 1-2 (3.509-10; *ed. min.*, 3.500-01).

46 The adhesion of a true Christian to his faith is so great, in Bonaventure's judgment, that he would prefer to lose the whole of philosophy, if he had it, rather than ignore even one article of the creed: 3 *Sent.*, 23.1.4, Resp. (3.481-82; *ed. min.*, 3.471-72).

47 3 *Sent.*, 23.2.2, Sol. 3 (3.728-29); DV, 14.1, ad 7 (22.438).

48 ST, 2a2ae, 4.8, Resp., ad 3 (8.52-53).

CERTITUDE OF THEOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

Laying a foundation for theological knowledge, Bonaventure denies in one respect but grants in another the possibility of an increase in the certitude of faith. No increase is possible in relation to the divine truth, which is most certain and beyond deception, so that, assenting to it, the Christian cannot go any further in certitude. Some increase is possible, however, in relation to the believer. Following Hugh of St. Victor on this point, Bonaventure teaches that faith can grow in the Christian both by a wider knowledge of its principles and, having a clearer illumination, by a deeper knowledge of them. The certitude of faith can grow or increase, then, because of a better knowledge of its truth and, as a consequence, because of a greater devotion toward God. Faith is more certain when, reaching the level of science, it empowers the intellect to know the object of belief more plainly and, strengthening the will steadfastly, moves the Christian to a more devout acquiescence in the truth that he believes. Indeed, for Bonaventure, faith grows fundamentally in certitude according to the devotion with which the Christian adheres to the truth revealed by God. In this respect, as Hugh of St. Victor says, there are three different kinds of believers. Some Christians, choosing to believe from piety alone, do not comprehend by their reason whether or not they should believe. Other Christians approve by their reason what they already accept on faith. A number of Christians not only approve their faith by reason, but also experience what they believe, and so, understanding it with a purity of belief, they apprehend the certitude of faith.[49]

The approbation of faith by reason gives rise to theological knowledge, which brings faith up to the level of science. Since an end imposes necessity on the means, as Aristotle points out, Bonaventure assigns to the science of theology an argumentative procedure for the general purpose of promoting Christian faith. This method is useful in particular regarding three sorts of men kept in view by a theologian. The method has weight, as Augustine teaches, in defending faith against its adversaries. By the use of probable arguments, according to Bonaventure himself, the method of argumentation has force to strengthen Christians weak in their belief, just as God strengthens them in charity by providing temporal benefits. As Richard of St. Victor

49 3 *Sent.*, 25.2.3, Resp. (3.550-51; *ed. min.*, 3.542-44); see Hugh of St. Victor, *De sacramentis*, 1.10.4 (PL 176.332).

shows, this method brings to light hidden though necessary reasons for the things of faith, thus giving delight to perfect Christians in understanding what they believe, as Bernard of Clairvaux says: "We understand nothing more willingly than what we already grasp by faith."[50]

The use of argumentation is proper to theology, in Bonaventure's view, even though the science is rooted in Scripture, which proceeds by way of narration. Theology is related to Scripture as a subalternate to a principal science, for the two sciences consider revealed truth according to different principles. The science of Scripture, resting on divine authority, considers the object of belief as such; adding reason to faith, the science of theology deals with the object of belief as it can be understood. Consequently, theology has a proper mode of procedure, just as it has a proper mode of certitude: whenever the certitude of reason is lacking to theology, this inferior science has recourse to the certitude of authority upholding Scripture and exceeding every certitude of reason.[51] Thus, as seen by Bonaventure, the object of belief belongs to the virtue of faith as that object is grounded in the first truth, to which the Christian assents for its own sake alone. The same object pertains both to Scripture, inasmuch as this science adds to it the principle of divine authority, and to theology, which unites reason to divine authority and the first truth to produce arguments proving the truth of Christian faith.[52] This is not to say that the theologian proves the things of faith by natural reason. On the contrary, assenting from faith to the things narrated in Scripture, the theologian proves them by adding reason to divine authority, so that the whole strength of his arguments rests on the prior assent of faith. Bonaventure illustrates the fact with the truth of the resurrexion, which is proved by the authority of Scripture and the words recorded there from the Apostles. Their words are known to be true because the Apostles were illumined by the Holy Spirit, who gave them their certitude of faith and our guarantee of that certitude is rooted in the faith received by us from God. It is correct to say, therefore, that faith uses reason to prove the truth of the resurrexion, but not to say that faith in the resurrexion is proved by reason.[53] Hence, the certitude of theological knowledge is not due to reason as it is used, for instance, by a philosopher to acquire his science. It is due rather to reason both as elevated by faith to assent to the first truth and as per-

50 1 *Sent.*, Prooem., q. 2, Resp. (1.10-11; *ed. min.*, 1.9-10); cf. sc 2-b (ibid.). See the following: Aristotle, *Physica*, 2.9 (199b34-200a14); Augustine, *De Trin.*, 1.2.4 (PL 42.822); Richard of St. Victor, *De Trinitate*, 1.4 (PL 196.892); Bernard of Clairvaux, *De consideratione*, 5.3.6 (PL 182.1691).

51 1 *Sent.*, Prooem., q. 2, arg. 4 (1.10; *ed. min.*, 1.8-9), ad 4 (1.11; *ed. min.*, 1.10.)

52 1 *Sent.*, Prooem., q. 1, ad 5-6 (1.8; *ed. min.*, 1.8).

53 3 *Sent.*, 23.dub.5 (3.505; *ed. min.*, 3.496-97).

fected by the gifts of science and understanding, which enable the theologian to comprehend what he believes. As long as he assents from faith to the first truth and not to any reason for its own sake, the theologian retains the merit of belief and, moved by charity, desires to have reasons for its truth. Consequently, finding reason a source of solace for Christian faith, he relies principally on the authority of God as the first truth and only secondarily on the reasons used to prove the things accepted on that authority by the assent of faith.[54]

Although Aquinas concurs with Bonaventure in maintaining that faith does not change essentially, or increase substantially, Aquinas does not consider directly the possibility of growth in the certitude of faith. Both theologians hold many things in common on the necessity of Christians to believe explicitly several truths, such as the Incarnation, that were believed implicitly before the time of Christ. They also hold commonly that simple Christians are bound to believe the articles of the creed explicitly only in a general way, though their implicit belief in any particular article must preclude in its regard all dissent from the teaching of the Church. An explicit or distinct belief in each article is required of those Christians, such as prelates, pastors and theologians, who have a duty to teach and to explain the articles of faith to the people, who can advance in knowledge of their faith.[55]

Aquinas subscribes with Bonaventure, then, to the view that the theologian, as a doctor of faith, ought to know with the perfection of science the things that he believes. In the particular view of Aquinas, faith cannot be more or less with respect to its object, which is essential to the virtue and always stays the same. The act of faith, however, following the condition of the believer, can grow in efficacy either because of the intellect or because of the will. With respect to the intellect, faith can grow both by thinking, or knowledge, and by assenting: virtues in the intellect need time and experience to grow, so that faith increases in time according to a greater knowledge of the articles; assent gives constancy to the act of faith, for assent entails the firmness and certitude of belief. Faith grows by devotion with respect to the will, which gives the certitude of belief to the intellect and forms faith by charity. Because the will always has dominion over its acts, an increase of faith according to both constancy and devotion results in some believers from a promptness given to the will by grace, which is infused more plentifully now than before Christ.[56] Thus, in the view of Aquinas,

54 1 *Sent.*, Prooem., q. 2, ad 5-6 (1.11; *ed. min.*, 1.10).

55 See Bonaventure: 3 *Sent.*, 25.1.2.-2.2 (3.539-49; *ed. min.*, 3.530-42). See Aquinas: 3 *Sent.*, 25.2.2, qa. 2-4 (3.801-03, 805-09); 4 *Sent.*, 6.2.2, qa. 1, Resp. (4.251); DV, 14.11, Resp., ad 3, 6 (22.470-72); ST, 2a2ae, 1.7 (8.19-20), 2.7-8 (8.33-35); cf. 3a, 71.1 (12.121).

56 3 *Sent.*, 25.2.2, Sol. 1 (3.803-04); see also: ad 1, 5 (3.804-05).

faith cannot be more or less in different men with regard to its object, which is the one and simple first truth, though men can differ more and less with regard to an understanding of the articles. The act of faith can cause a greater participation in its truth by a believer, so that his faith can increase on the part of his intellect, because of a greater firmness and certitude of belief, and on the part of his will, which moves him to believe with either a greater confidence or a greater devotion, and so more promptly. In short, by subjecting himself more certainly and devoutly to the first truth, which he prefers to all others, one Christian can have a greater faith than another.[57]

Approaching the problem only indirectly, Aquinas does not differ essentially from Bonaventure on the increase of faith and its certitude. He differs profoundly from Bonaventure, however, on the certitude of the understanding of faith that constitutes theological knowledge. As seen by Aquinas, the science of theology, directing man to his ultimate end, takes its reasons immediately from the inspiration of the divine light and not from creatures. Hence, ordering the end of all natural knowledge to its own end, theology commands and uses all the other sciences. In doing so, theology has its certitude from the divine light giving the science its power to know not only the things revealed by God, but also the things of nature falling under human reason.[58] The certitude of theological knowledge, therefore, is due to the efficacy of the divine light. Because of that efficacy, theological knowledge perfects man both in action and in contemplation, but chiefly in contemplation, for the end of theology is contemplation of God in beatitude. As a science, moreover, theological knowledge has to do with necessary things and has a proper certitude from its own principles, namely, the articles of faith as they are known infallibly by the superior science or knowledge of God to which the science of theology is subalternated. Theological knowledge, consequently, is most properly wisdom and he who has it is most certain of what he knows, since a man of faith assents more firmly to what he believes than even to the first principles of reason. Led by faith, reason has a fuller grasp of the objects of belief while advancing toward an understanding of them, for the end of our faith is that we arrive at an understanding of what we believe.[59]

57 ST, 2a2ae, 5.4, Resp., ad 2 (8.59).

58 1 *Sent.*, Prol., aa. 1-2 (1.6-10). Cf. ST, 1a, 1.1 (4.6-7), 1.3 (4.11-12); *Expos. de Trin.*, 3.1 (Decker pp. 107-15).

59 1 *Sent.*, Prol., a. 3, qa. 1-3 (1.11-14); *Expos. de Trin.*, 2.2, ad 5, 7 (Decker pp. 89-90). Cf. ST, 1a, 1.2 (4.8-9); 1.4 (4.14).

The obvious difference between Aquinas and Bonaventure on the certitude of theological knowledge, thus far, is rooted in their individual conceptions of theology as a subalternate science. In Bonaventure's conception, theology is subalternated to Scripture which, in its turn, is subject to the first truth as it is known through faith. As a consequence, assenting first and foremost from faith to God as He is revealed in Scripture, the theologian knows the object of faith with certitude by a theological knowledge resulting from the addition of reason to the authority of Scripture on the ground of the first truth. For Bonaventure, then, certitude of theological knowledge is due primarily to the illumination of faith and the divine authority upholding Scripture; this certitude is due secondarily to the reasons taken from creatures and added to both faith and the divine authority with the assistance of the gifts of science and understanding. In the conception of Aquinas, theology is subalternated to the divine science, or the knowledge of God, so that theological knowledge is formed by reasons taken immediately from the divine light as the one source of both reason and revelation. Consequently, for Aquinas, certitude of theological knowledge is due immediately to the divine light and proximately to the articles or principles of faith as they are known infallibly by God in His science. Following this conception, Aquinas differs also from Bonaventure on the mode of procedure by which theology has certain knowledge of the things of faith. As described by Bonaventure, theology proceeds properly in an argumentative way, though respecting and basing its arguments on the narrative mode of the superior science of Scripture.[60] Aquinas makes room in theology not only for the argumentative method, particularly in regard to defending the faith and to understanding its truth, but also for the narrative mode of Scripture as a means of confirming the faith and imparting moral instruction. Thus, coming close in a way to Bonaventure's position, Aquinas puts in Scripture the roots of theology through its proper mode of procedure. He holds that the theologian, in defending and proving the truths of faith, such as the reality of our resurrexion, must proceed from the superior science of Scripture, or from the principles of divine revelation. In that manner, Aquinas rests the arguments of theology on authority, though he refers to the authority of the authors of Scripture, who received the divine revelation, rather than to the authority of God. Theology uses human reason, therefore, not to prove Christian faith, but to serve it by manifesting truth in accordance with the demands of theological reasoning. Accordingly, arguing principally from faith, theology relies

60 See *Brevil.*, Prol., nn. 5-6 (5.206-08; *ed. min.*, 5.12-16).

necessarily only on the divine revelation made to the authors of Scripture. When a theologian uses reason to serve faith in such a theological way, his arguments neither destroy Christian faith nor take away the merit of his belief.[61]

In saying that theological knowledge perfects man in action and in contemplation, but chiefly in contemplation, Aquinas elevates theology above the philosophical sciences, thus considering it to be nobler than they as both speculative and practial. In the speculative order, theology is nobler because of its certitude and of its matter, or subject. The certitude of theology comes from the light of divine science, which cannot be deceived; the certitude of the other sciences comes from the natural light of reason, which can err. The subject of theology has to do principally with things transcending human reason, whereas the philosophical sciences deal only with things subject to reason. In the practical order, theology directs man to his eternal beatitude, or the ultimate end to which all the ends of the other practical sciences are ordered, and so theology is nobler than those sciences.[62] It is according to this line of thought that Aquinas looks upon theology as most properly wisdom and upon the wise theologian as most certain of the truth that he understands. By comparison with natural wisdom, speculative or practical, theology is wisdom absolutely because it considers God, who is the highest cause of the universe, not only as He is knowable from creatures, but also as He alone knows himself and communicates this knowledge to others through revelation. Consequently, as wisdom, theology orders the philosophical sciences and judges their principles in accordance with divine wisdom, which orders all human knowledge and from which, by revelation and not natural reason, theology receives its own principles.[63]

The position taken by Aquinas on theology both as wisdom and as chiefly speculative marks the deepest difference between him and Bonaventure on the certitude of theological knowledge. This difference does not entail a fundamental departure of Aquinas from Bonaventure regarding the superiority or nobility of theology with respect to philosophy. Bonaventure sees theology alone as the perfect science, since it starts from God as the first principle and ends at God as the ultimate and eternal reward. Theology alone is also perfect wisdom, because it begins where philosophy ends, namely, from the supreme

61 1 *Sent.*, Prol., a. 5 (1.16-19); ST, la, 1.8-10 (4.21-26): cf. 1.5, ad 2 (4.16). See also: *Expos. de Trin.*, 2.1, ad 5 (Decker, p. 84); 2.2, ad 4-6 (pp. 88-89); 2.3 (pp. 90-97).

62 ST, la, 1.5, Resp. (4.16); cf. *Expos. de Trin.*, 2.2, Resp. (Decker, pp. 86-87).

63 ST, la, 1.6, Resp., ad 1-2 (4.17-18); cf. 1 *Sent.*, Prol., a. 3, Sol. 1 (1.12). See also: *Expos. de Trin.*, 2.2, ad 1 (Decker pp. 87-88).

cause as the principle of all caused things, and because it returns to God as the reward of all merit and the end of every desire.[64] In Bonaventure's view, then, philosophy is concerned solely with the being of things in nature and in natural knowledge. Founded on faith and the revelation of Scripture, theology is concerned with the being of things in grace, in glory and in the eternal wisdom of God. Hence, making a substrate of philosophy and taking only what is necessary from natural things, theology constructs a mirror, as it were, reflecting divine things and erects a ladder, so to speak, with its feet on the earth and its peak in heaven thus moving between heaven and earth through Christ, who is both God and man. In every respect, therefore, theology is nobler than philosophy, which theology uses to serve the needs of Christian faith.[65]

The very deep difference between the two theologians flows from the necessity posited by Bonaventure, but not by Aquinas, for the operation of certain gifts of the Holy Spirit to have the knowledge obtained with certitude in theology by subordinating reason to faith. This necessity governs Bonaventure's position that theology is chiefly practical and not speculative. In his judgment, the end of the whole of Scripture is to make men good; this is also the end of theology as the knowledge of Christian faith, which is rooted in Scripture and without which it is impossible to please God or to live rightly (*Heb.*, 11. 6). To achieve that end, the theologian needs the gift of understanding to perfect his speculative thinking and the gift of science to perfect his practical thinking. Moreover, to unite his speculative and practical thought, he needs the higher perfection of the gift of wisdom. Since the latter gift consists at once in knowledge and love, the whole of theology, though it leads to contemplation, is concerned principally with making men good.[66]

Relying on the gift of understanding, the theologian goes beyond the simple assent of faith to reach a comprehension of its truth with the help of human reason. By his theological use of reason, he contemplates the Creator as God is known through faith and, within the order of faith, as He is understood both from His own properties and from the properties of His creatures, especially the rational creature, which is an image of God. This contemplation is not purely speculative, but is intended to move the Christian to believe God more devoutly and to love

64 *Brevil.*, 1.1 (5.210; *ed. min.*, 5.19).

65 *Brevil.*, Prol., n. 3 (5.204-05; *ed. min.*, 5.9-10); cf. n. 1 (5.202-03; *ed. min.*, 5.5-7). For the way that Bonaventure subordinates all the philosophical sciences to the science and wisdom of theology see: *De reductione artium ad theologiam* (5.320-25; *ed. min.*, 5.218-28).

66 1 *Sent.*, Prooem., q. 3 (1.12-13; *ed. min.*, 1.10-11).

Him more ardently.[67] The gift of science gives to every Christian an inclination from faith to know moral truth and inclines his will toward the good of moral action. This gift, taken properly, directs the Christian to act according to the prior demands of the rule of faith, so that, as the law of nature dictates, he returns good for good and, following both the law of grace and the example of Christ, returns good for evil. Taken widely, however, the gift provides the Christian with a knowledge of his faith as the principal foundation of moral actions and, thereafter, with a knowledge of Christ as the model of the true way of life. Thus, inclined by the will under the influence of this gift, the theologian develops the practical science of Scripture from the principles or articles of faith with the aid of the moral science of natural reason. The latter science, inclining the will toward action, is acquired by the virtue of prudence from the principles of natural law, which orders men toward rectitude and probity of life. The theological knowledge obtained through the gift of science, therefore, is intended principally to direct the Christian by his faith and the divine law both to act and to live in a holy manner after the pattern of Christ. To have such a theological knowledge of the Christian life, the theologian must first have an understanding of the revelation of Scripture.[68]

Bonaventure speaks of two sorts of theological wisdom. The first sort is a knowledge of God according to piety and, as Augustine says, is attained in the Christian religion by worshipping God through faith, hope and charity. The second sort is an experiential knowledge of God attained by the gift of the Holy Spirit. The act of the gift of wisdom is begun in knowledge and consummated in love; acting chiefly from the will, the gift involves a tasting or savour of the divine sweetness, thus giving the Christian an experiential knowledge of the divine goodness.[69] The wisdom of Christian piety is the one to which Bonaventure refers, as we have seen, in connexion with an increase in the certitude of faith by a more devout acquiescence in the truth of faith. To possess this wisdom, then, the Christian must live a holy life founded firmly on faith, though he is not required to understand its truth as this is comprehended on the level of science. The gift of wisdom is the one contributing fundamentally to the growth of faith in certitude, a growth stemming from a fervent adherence by the Christian in piety, holiness and love to the truth of faith. The gift of wisdom, moreover, includes

67 3 *Sent.*, 35.un.3, Resp. (3.778; *ed. min.*, 3.783).

68 3 *Sent.*, 35.un.2, Resp., ad 3-4 (3.776-77; *ed. min.*, 3.781-82). See also: 3 *Sent.*, 25.1.1, Resp. "... Symbolo continentur." (3.535; *ed. min.*, 3.526); ad 2 (3.537; *ed. min.*, 3.528).

69 3 *Sent.*, 35.un.1, Resp. "Tertio modo ..." (3.774; *ed. min.*, 3.778-79); see Augustine, *De Trin.*, 14.1.1 (PL 42.1035-37).

and completes the increase in the certitude of faith that the theologian has by his understanding of the object of belief. Perfecting the virtue of faith, the gift of understanding directs the theologian principally to consider spiritual creatures and solely according to their eternal reasons, which are the way to an understanding of the truth of faith. It is by the eternal reasons of God, therefore, as they are reflected in spiritual creatures, that the theologian is guided toward the supreme truth as he assents to it from faith. As a result, he is able to contemplate the Creator through the reflexions of His eternal reasons in spiritual creatures. Take, for instance, the truth of the Trinity. The theologian believes this truth, but he knows, through the gift of understanding, from the ternary condition of a spiritual creature as an image of the Creator why the Trinity ought to be in God: just as a word is generated by a created mind and as a love, binding the two, proceeds from both the mind and its word, so also the Word and Son of God is generated by the Father and, binding the one to the other, the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son. In that way, increasing the certitude of faith in the speculative order, the clearer illumination of the gift of understanding removes some of the obscurity surrounding the object of belief. In a similar way, perfecting the infused virtue of prudence, the gift of science increases the certitude of faith in the practical order. This gift directs the theologian to treat of both spiritual and corporeal creatures; taking account of the natural law, he treats them according to their temporal reasons while thinking about moral action on the principal ground of the truth of faith. The gift of wisdom, acting initially in the order of knowledge, completes the theologian's speculative and practical knowledge of truth by directing that knowledge to the good of the Christian life. This gift guides the theologian toward a contemplation of God from His eternal reasons according as they are the way to an experiential knowledge of His goodness. By drawing the theologian's contemplation of the Creator toward a consummation in love, the gift of wisdom binds his intellect to his will and, acting chiefly from love, perfects his theological knowledge by the virtue of charity, which disposes him to taste the goodness and sweetness of God. Thus, completing the increase in the theological certitude of faith, the gift of wisdom perfects in charity the knowledge obtained by the theologian both of creatures and of their Creator through the gifts of science and understanding. The experiential knowledge of God attained by the gift of wisdom gives a far greater delectation, Bonaventure says, than the intellectual delight flowing from the contemplation of God by the gift of understanding. Because the gift of wisdom unites knowledge and love, the way of knowing God by experiencing His goodness is the best of all

and is much more excellent, noble and delightful than the way of knowing Him by the method of argumentation.[70]

Aquinas limits the action of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to the personal perfection of the Christian. The gift of understanding perfects his perception of the truths of faith and the gift of science perfects his judgment of them; in that way, both gifts assist the Christian to assent with perfect certitude to God as the first truth.[71] The gift of wisdom also contributes to the certitude of faith, particularly by assisting the Christian to judge things rightly according to the divine truth, or their uncreated cause, and so this gift differs from the gift of science, which helps the Christian to judge things with certitude according to their created causes.[72] A Christian whose faith is perfected by the gifts of science and wisdom can use his knowledge to perfect other men by manifesting to them the truths of faith and of moral action. This ability is not due to the gifts, however, but to a special grace given to some Christians by the Holy Spirit according to the disposition of His will (1 *Cor.*, 12. 8).[73] For Aquinas, therefore, the action of the gifts of the Holy Spirit does not pertain to the certitude of theological knowledge. The act of judgment, bringing about certitude, belongs to theology according as it is attained by study or inquiry, even though its principles are received through revelation.[74]

Conclusion

Bonaventure and Aquinas attribute the certitude of natural reason to God as the primary source of truth and the principal agent of intelligence. They consider the human intellect to be a second cause in the formation of knowledge and in judging things with certitude. This judgment is made in the natural light of reason and according to the truth of first principles, but in such a way that the infallibility of the one comes from the eternal light of God, who alone is entirely infallible, while the immutability of the other comes from His supreme truth, which is alone absolutely immutable. The action of God in causing the certitude of human knowledge is seen by the two theologians to consist in an illumination of the intellect. Although they concur in placing this

70 3 *Sent.*, 35.un.3, ad 1-6 (3.778-79; *ed. min.*, 3.783-85); 35.un.1, ad 5 (3.775; *ed. min.*, 3.779-80). The eternal reasons known by faith have to do with things coming to be according to the hidden disposition of God's will and not according to the necessity of nature: DSC, q. 4, ad 21 (5.26).

71 ST, 2a2ae, 8.1-6 (8.66-72); 9.1-3 (8.74-76): cf. 3 *Sent.*, 35.2.2-3 (3.1196-1205).

72 ST, 2a2ae, 45.1-5 (8.339-43); cf. 3 *Sent.*, 35.2.1 (3.1191-96).

73 ST, 2a2ae, 9.1, ad 2 (8.74); 45.5, Resp. (8.343).

74 ST, 1a, 1.6, ad 3 (4.18).

illumination within God's conservation of the intellect, their particular views do not coincide on His action both as influencing and as cooperating with the natural work of the intellect. For Bonaventure, the created light and principles of the intellect are not sufficient of themselves to move it, so that God must add to them, even after their production, the influence of His uncreated light and principles of truth. In cooperating with the intellect, which pertains to the soul as an image of God, He regulates its operations according to its natural capacity to grasp truth. The combined influence and cooperation of God is such that the intellect judges things not only by its own light and principles, but also in His infallible light and eternal reasons. Consequently, the infallible certitude and immutability of truth are not due immediately to the human intellect. For Aquinas, the influence of God on the intellect involves simply the production of its natural light and self-evident principles. God moves the intellect into act by giving it a light of intelligence and by impressing on it similitudes derived from His eternal reasons. Cooperating with the acts of the intellect, He directs it according to its own light and principles, so that they are sufficient of themselves for the intellect to judge things without going beyond the created similitudes of His eternal truth. As a result, an infallible certitude and immutability of truth are due immediately to the light and principles of the intellect. Though Bonaventure and Aquinas, following Aristotle and Augustine in distinctive ways, differ regarding the effect of God's action on the intellect, they hold in common, speaking absolutely, that the light of His immutable truth is the infallible rule of certitude in human knowledge.

Christian faith, to both Bonaventure and Aquinas, is more certain absolutely than human knowledge, which has the greater certitude in relation to what is evident to reason. The two theologians ground Christian faith in Scripture, which teaches truth by the authority of God, who cannot deceive or be deceived. Upheld by His infallible authority, Scripture contains a divine revelation made known by the power of the Holy Spirit. The Christian, as seen by Aquinas and Bonaventure, assents to this revelation by a divine illumination so perfecting his intellect that it adheres with an infallible certitude to God as the first truth. In adhering to God, the intellect responds to a command of the will in accordance with His authority, which causes in the intellect, for Bonaventure, an indubitable assent to truth and, for Aquinas, an infallibility of truth. Bonaventure safeguards the indubitability of faith by a dependence on the divine foreknowledge, which is infallible because it is the whole power comprehending what God foresees. In that way, the infallible certitude of faith rests im-

mediately on the divine authority rather than on the divine illumination conforming the intellect to the light of God. Aquinas protects the infallibility of faith by a simple reliance on the infallibility of divine truth, so that the illumination of faith, in full dependence on the divine authority, gives rise immediately to an infallible certitude from the principles of faith. In the final analysis, however, the two theologians guarantee the infallible certitude of faith by the impossibility of the intellect ever being deceived by God, who can never lie.

Neither Bonaventure nor Aquinas allows the possibility of an increase in the certitude of faith with respect to its principal object, which is the divine and simple truth, the one that is most certain and beyond deceit. Both theologians admit, though in slightly different ways, that the ordinary Christian can grow in his belief not only by obtaining an understanding of his faith, but also and especially by a more steadfast and more devout assent to its truth, thus increasing the certitude of his belief. Bonaventure and Aquinas also acknowledge that the theologian, having the task of teaching Christian faith, ought to obtain an understanding of its truth at the level of science, and so to attain the perfection of theological certitude. Although Bonaventure and Aquinas concur in many respects on the various elements entering into the constitution of theology, particularly regarding its mode of procedure and its superiority over philosophy, they diverge considerably on the certitude of theology as a subalternate science and, as a consequence, very profoundly on the manner in which theological knowledge arrives at its proper certitude. Aquinas sees theology as subalternated directly to the knowledge or science of God. As a result, the certitude of theological knowledge is due immediately to the divine light, as the one source of truth whether natural or revealed, and proximately to the principles of faith as they are known in the divine science. While theology has recourse to human reason for the manifestation of truth, the certitude of theology has no necessary dependence on the reasons taken from creatures; the science uses those reasons only as an extrinsic means to serve the needs of faith. Since theology reaches an understanding of God not only as He is known by revelation, but also from creatures according to their divine truth, theology is most properly wisdom and, as such, most certain to the Christian possessing it. Because theology directs the Christian, even in his actions, to the ultimate contemplation of God in beatitude, theological knowledge is chiefly speculative as both science and wisdom. Bonaventure sees theology as subalternated to the science of Scripture through which it depends on the first truth as this is known by faith. Consequently, theology attains its certitude by adding reason to the authority of Scripture on the ground of the first truth, so

that the certitude of theological knowledge results primarily from the illumination of faith and secondarily from human reason as it is perfected in faith by the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Thus, relying in a necessary but not a subordinate way on human reason, the certitude of theological knowledge is established in the speculative order by the gift of understanding, which directs the theologian from Christian faith to a contemplation of God by way of His spiritual creatures; it is established in the practical order by the gift of science, which inclines the theologian on the foundation of Scripture, though taking due account of the natural law, to consider both spiritual and corporeal creatures while thinking about the good of moral action according to the law of grace and the example of Christ. By uniting the speculative and practical knowledge of theology, the gift of wisdom completes the theological certitude of faith and, binding knowledge to love, directs the theologian toward the good of the Christian life. Predominantly practical, then, theology has complete perfection when its contemplation is consummated in charity, thus giving rise to an experiential knowledge of the goodness of God. Aquinas limits the action of the gifts of the Holy Spirit to the personal perfection of the Christian with regard to the perception and judgment of the truths of faith. The judgment giving certitude to theological knowledge is not due to the gifts of the Holy Spirit, but to the industry and study of the theologian, even though he receives the principles of theology from divine revelation. Their deep-rooted differences regarding theological knowledge notwithstanding, Aquinas and Bonaventure are united fundamentally in grounding the certitude of theology principally in the revelation made in Scripture on the authority of God and accepted by the Christian through the illumination of faith.

Since St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure have each been honoured for many centuries as a Doctor of the Church, it is well to ask in 1974, the seventh centenary of their death: what can they contribute to our understanding of the certitude of the doctrine and faith of the Church? This is no idle question inasmuch as, representing the Christian tradition in the thirteenth century, they contributed in no small measure to the reform of the Church undertaken at the Council of Lyons in 1274. To answer the question, it would be necessary to analyze their positions not only on the faith of the Church and the source of its authority, but also on the sort of authority given by Christ to His Church to secure its faith and to teach the truth.[75]

75 St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure, regarding the magisterium of the Church, do not speak directly about a papal infallibility; rather, appealing to Scripture, they refer to the pope's plenitude

From our short study of their doctrines on certitude, both of natural and of revealed knowledge, it is clear that St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas can show us the way to maintain inviolably the truth of divine revelation while, at the same time and with the help of human reason, developing particular forms of theological knowledge that do not separate Christians from one another.

of power or authority to teach the truth and to decide the things that pertain to faith. For the relevant texts in St. Thomas see: ST, 2a2ae, 1.10 (8.22-23); 5.3 (8.57-58); 11.2, ad 3 (8.99): cf. *De pot. Dei*, 10.4, ad 13 (Taurini 2.268-69). See in St. Bonaventure: 1 *Sent.*, 11.un.1, Resp. "Similiter ..." (1.212; *ed. min.*, 1.172); *Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica*, 2.2, ad 19 (5.147): Replicatio "Qui autem ..." (5.155); *Brevil.*, 6.12 "Postremo ..." (5.278; *ed. min.*, n. 5, 5.150); *Quare Fratres Minores praedicent ...*", nn. 2-3 (8.375); *Apologia pauperum*, 1.1 (8.235): cf. *Commentarius in Evangelium sancti Lucae*, 9.20.34 (7.727), 24.44.56-58 (7.601).

JOHN PECHAM AND THE BACKGROUND OF AQUINAS'S *DE AETERNITATE MUNDI*

Ignatius Brady O.F.M.

NOTWITHSTANDING Saint Thomas's customary calm and quiet mode of procedure, he was sometimes driven by his own inner zeal to the point of exasperation when faced by the faults and defects of his contemporaries. He shows his impatience or surprise when their arguments are slipshod and inconsistent, and reveals his indignation when Christians propose arguments that militate against their faith and their duties as Christian teachers.[1] How this trait reveals itself in attacks on such masters as William of Saint-Amour or Gerard of Abbeville, or against contemporary Radical Aristotelians, is too well-known to need proof here.

The same characteristic of the Angelic Doctor is equally apparent in his short work *De aeternitate mundi*, against a hitherto unknown adversary — to the point that he bluntly addresses to him or them a paraphrase of the words of Job to his would-be counsellors: *Ergo illi qui tam subtiliter eam [repugnantiam] percipiunt, soli sunt homines, et cum eis oritur sapientia*?[2] Nonetheless, to understand Thomas's indignation, his use of this verse, and indeed the whole import of this work, requires, we may truthfully say, more investigation into the background of the argument than has hitherto been undertaken.

I. Contra Murmurantes?

It is rather apparent, first of all, that the title of the work is simply *De aeternitate mundi*; and that in consequence we should abandon the later appendage: *contra murmurantes,* and not build up history (or a story) on a foundation not laid by Saint Thomas. At least, it is the conclusion of Martin Grabmann that in the oldest catalogs of Saint

1 I have but paraphrased here the words of A. Dondaine, O.P., in his *Praefatio* to *S. Thomae de Aquino Expositio super Iob ad litteram*, *Opera omnia* 26 (Romae 1965) 17.

2 Cf. *Iob* 12, 2: *Ergo vos estis soli homines, et vobiscum morietur sapientia?*; and St. Thomas at this verse (ed. cit., 179b).

Thomas's works and in all the manuscripts of the *De aeternitate* save Siena *U.IV.9* (late fourteenth century), the words *contra murmurantes* are not to be found.[3] By contrast, the same criteria lead to the conclusion that Thomas did add the qualification *contra Averroistas* to the title of the *De unitate intellectus*.[4] It is not too much to conjecture that some one later thought it apropos to add a like designation to the *De aeternitate mundi*, at least in the catalogs of Thomas's writings.

Yet such an addition is at variance with the very contents of the work and carries with it an interpretation which has little or no justification in history. Certainly a close examination of Aquinas's thought and the course of his whole argument shows that while he is attacking a specific person or persons, he is not directing his words to some one who has berated his position. Hence the work is not to be regarded as "against the complainers"; that is, it is not a reply to those contemporary theologians who felt his position on the subject was heretical; nor again, a rebuke addressed to some group (apparently headed by Saint Bonaventure) which clung to the doctrine of a temporal creation. Rather, as we shall attempt to show below, it represents what Fr. Dondaine calls Saint Thomas's impatience and surprise, and even his indignation, at the lack of clear thinking (and the use of his *Summa theologiae* against himself) on the part of one young Franciscan master, John Pecham.

Even in such a historical context we might find some justification for the subtitle *contra murmurantes*, if we were to interpret it less in the specific sense of a murmur or complaint (as used frequently in the Vulgate), and more in the generic meaning of an indistinguishable or unintelligible sound. It could then be predicated of one who speaks so low that his arguments are not loud and clear: not a grumbler, but a mumbler! Such an interpretation is possible, though it strains the range of probability.

II. The Position of Saint Thomas

At this juncture we should examine again the text of Saint Thomas, to discover what *his* complaint is. For the moment we must limit ourselves to his own words, leaving the full story to reveal itself after the examination of extraneous texts in the endeavour to discover the object of Aquinas's indignation.[5]

3 M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin*, 3. Ausg., BGPTMA 22, Heft 1-2 (Münster 1949) 341, and description of codices, 155-238.

4 Ibid., 44-118 (ancient catalogs), 138-218 (mss.).

5 We use the text and divisions of J. Perrier, *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula omnia necnon opera minora* I (Paris 1949) 52-61.

We take it for granted, begins Saint Thomas, that according to Catholic belief the world did not exist from eternity, but had a beginning. Yet we may raise the question, as in fact it has already been raised, whether the world could have always existed. If this were to mean that the world or anything else could have existence independently of God because not made by Him, not only faith but philosophy also would reject such a view. On the other hand, if the question means that something (the world as a whole, for example) always has been and nonetheless has been caused by God, we have here a genuine question. If such is not possible, it will be either because God could not make a creature that always has been, or because such a creature is intrinsically impossible, even if God had the power to make it. Since all agree that by reason of His infinite power God could bring into being an eternal creature (n. 1), the question is reduced to the second alternative: whether it is possible that something come to be which has always existed (n. 2).

Only two reasons can be offered against this possibility: either that it would do away with passive potency, or present two mutually exclusive concepts (*intellectus*). The first argument is not very valid: if it is question of a spiritual being, an eternal angel for example, such a being does not and never did possess passive potency, since it is immaterial; and if it is question of an eternal material being, one cannot affirm without heresy that its passive potency has always existed. Hence according to the faith we must concede that something caused by God has not always existed. Yet from this it does not follow that God cannot bring it about that there come into being something that is *semper ens*.

The second reason offered, that the two concepts of a "created something" (*aliquid creatum a Deo*) and "eternal existence" (*semper fuerit*) are mutually opposed and exclusive, deserves more attention (nn. 2-7). If they are incompatible, then it would be false to say that such could be done by God. If there is no repugnance, it would not only not be false, but even possible; otherwise we would do injustice to God's omnipotence.

This is indeed the very heart of the question: whether "to be wholly and substantially created by God" and "to have a duration without beginning" are mutually exclusive. This would be true either if an agent cause, God in this case, had to precede its effect in duration; or if not-being of necessity preceded being in duration (since what is caused by God is said to be made from nothing); or if both alternatives together excluded such a possibility.

There is ample proof that God, had He so willed it, need not exist before His creature: He is a cause that produces His effect immediately

(*subito*), not through a series of steps (*per motum*); therefore the beginning and end of His action are not only simultaneous, but one and the same.[6] This perhaps is not easy to grasp, especially if one's imagination influences his thinking. Men are so used to considering causality *per motum* (with a corresponding time-gap), that they find it hard to accept the concept of an agent which does not precede its effect in time or in duration of some kind. Again, God causes through His will, without discursive deliberation; which again implies there is no need that the will precede the effect in duration (n. 4). Other arguments can be offered that lead to the same conclusion (n. 5).

On the other hand, if there is anything abhorrent to the intellect in stating that something which is made never was not, it would arise from the necessity that its non-being must precede its being, since creation of its very essence means that something is made from nothing. Yet, as Saint Anselm makes clear,[7] the proper understanding of *nihil* reveals that it is pure non-being, in no way a something (*aliquid*); and that in consequence there is no real relationship between what is made and *nihil*, as though the creature had first to be "nothing" and then be "something" (n. 6). Even if we suppose that such an order or relationship exist, and interpret it as meaning that the creature is made from nothing, that is after nothing, it does not follow that "after" must be taken in the order of time or duration. For such order or relation a priority of nature, not of duration, will suffice, namely that "nothing" be prior by nature to "being." The being the creature has is from another; left to itself, taken only in itself, in its nature, it is nothing. This does not signify that it is therefore at once nothing and being, since there is no question of a time-difference. Hence if some creature always has been, this does not imply that at some time it was a nothing; but that its nature is such that left to itself it would be a nothing (n. 7).

Thus far Saint Thomas has argued from reason (even if our paraphrase is all too halting) that there is nothing repellent to our mind in the proposition that something was made by God and yet never was not. He now turns to the great minds of the past as living proof of his position. If there were any such repugnance, it is remarkable that Augustine (a prime authority, we may surmise, for Thomas's opponent or opponents) did not see it (n. 8). This would be the most effective way of overthrowing the thesis of an eternal world; and yet while Augustine offers many arguments against such a teaching in books XI and XII of

6 See also the presentation of this proof in the *Summa theologiae* I, 46, 2, ad 1 (ed. Ottawa 297b 10-20).

7 *Monologion*, c. 8 (PL 158, 156 C; ed. F. Schmitt I, 23).

The City of God, he passes over completely such an approach. Indeed, he hints in the tenth book that there is no such repugnance, and again in book XI, chapter 4.[8] It is equally astounding that the noblest of the physicists (or the philosophers, according to a variant reading), who while they claimed the world to be eternal said at the same time that it was made by God, did not find therein any contradiction or repugnance (n. 9). *Ergo illi qui tam subtiliter eam percipiunt, soli sunt homines; et cum eis oritur sapientia?*

Finally, since *they* cite certain authorities in their favour, it remains for us to show that in reality such arguments are a weak foundation for their position. If two which they offer, from John Damascene and from Hugh of Saint-Victor, both plainly say that no thing can be co-eternal with the First Principle, such statements and others like them should be interpreted in accordance with Boethius's distinction between a continuous or progressive eternity, interminable, without beginning or end, and the *tota simul et perfecta possessio* which is proper to the true eternity of the divine being (n. 10).

If we make this distinction, then what some offer against an eternal creation does not follow, namely that thereby a creature would be equal to God in duration. No creature, certainly, can share the unchangeableness of God who is without beginning or end and without any succession, in the full and simultaneous possession of interminable life. This Augustine makes clear in his *De civitate Dei* XII, 15, where he shows that since even in the immortality of the angels there is a certain past and present, they cannot be co-eternal with God. So too in *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, he writes: "Since the nature of the Trinity is entirely unchangeable, it is thus so eternal that nothing can be co-eternal with It." Almost the same thing is found in book XI of the *Confessions*. But we have no grounds to conclude therefrom that in no manner whatever can any thing be co-eternal with God, since successive and changing eternity is not excluded (n. 11).

Lastly, *they* adduce reasons which the philosophers touched on and solved. Among such the most difficult is that based on an infinity of souls: if the world always has been, then at the present moment the number of souls must be actually infinite. Yet this argument does not touch the heart of the matter, since God could have made the world without men and souls; or He could have created men when He did, even if the physical universe as a whole were eternal. Besides, we have yet to demonstrate that God cannot cause an actually infinite number of

8 Thomas had cited the same authorities earlier, but in reverse order, in *Summa theologiae* I, 46, 2, ad 1 (ed. cit., 297b 1-10).

beings. We pass over their other arguments either because we have already answered them elsewhere[9] or because some of them are so weak that their very weakness suggests that the opposite position is probable (n. 12).

III. *Quidam Dicunt*: Who are They?

The *De aeternitate mundi*, as even our slight synopsis makes manifest, is a historical document directed against a definite historical opponent — not necessarily some one who directly attacked Saint Thomas, but quite apparently some contemporary who, engaged in a dispute on the eternity of the world, had taken an approach or viewpoint different from that held by the Angelic Doctor from the days when he was a bachelor of the *Sentences*: that though by faith one must reject the position favoured by the philosophers of an eternal world, one cannot at the same time offer a genuine demonstration against such a thesis or for the Christian doctrine of creation.

Whoever this opponent might have been, his disputation took place around or shortly before the syllabus of 10 December 1270, whereby Stephen Tempier condemned thirteen articles currently taught or asserted at Paris.[10] One proof of this is the acknowledged fact that the treatise of Aquinas is part of a collection of writings of current interest which Master Godfrey of Fontaines collected during the years 1270-1272.[11] Even apart from this extraneous proof, the text itself shows it must date from the same period; more specifically, from the second regency of Saint Thomas at Paris, from about January 1269 to April/May 1272.

Since the tract plainly enough is directed against a specific person and a specific disputation, it seems in order to institute some slight search among the masters at Paris who either shortly before or precisely during the second regency of Saint Thomas undertook to discuss the question, in hope that we can identify the object of his wrath.

Let us start with one well-known adversary, Gerard of Abbeville,

9 Saint Thomas had already considered the question of an eternal world in his *Scriptum super II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5 (before or about 1256); in *Contra Gentiles* II, cc. 32-38 (about 1261-1264); *De potentia* III, a. 17 (Rome after 1265?); and *Summa theologiae* I, 46, 1-2 (Italy c. 1265-1267). Dates are based on I. T. Eschmann's *A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works*, appendix to E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas* (New York 1956) 385, 387, 391.

10 Cf. H. Denifle-E. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis*, n. 43; tom. I (Paris 1889) 486-487.

11 Cf. P. Glorieux, "Un recueil scolaire de Godefroid de Fontaines (Paris, Nat. Lat. 16297)," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 3 (1931) 37-53.

whose Quodlibet XIV[12] not only contains a short question (X): *Utrum sit ponere mundum eternum* (and questions on at least three other topics touched on in the condemnation of 1270), but begins with a lengthy dispute *de statu diversarum personarum in ecclesia*, which gives the work its place in history, since this opening question is a frontal attack on the twentieth chapter of Aquinas's *De perfectione vitae spiritualis*, to which Thomas replied by adding the last six chapters of his treatise.[13] The Quodlibet is correspondingly dated as of Advent 1269.

There is nothing, however, in the tenth question[14] which shows any relationship to the *De aeternitate mundi*. It opens with two reasons from Aristotle[15] that time and motion neither begin nor end; and then argues against an eternal world on the basis of paschal reckonings, which would have no meaning if the course of the sun and moon were eternal; or again, with the briefest of references to Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XII, c. 4, from the incompatibility of changing time and unchanging eternity; and finally from an interpretation of Scripture according to which all movement of the heavens will cease when the number of the elect is complete. The answer to the argument from Aristotle provides a more philosophic approach, with the conclusion: *Salve tamen pace Augustini, Jeronymi et Bede et aliorum expositorum non probavit Aristoteles motus et temporis eternitatem sed coevitatem...* Though Thomas refuted Gerard on other matters, he does not show any interest in this rather prosaic approach to our question.

Of the secular masters of the period Gerard alone seems to have left any literary remains. Perforce then our next step is to turn to the Franciscan masters between 1265 and 1270: Friar William de Baliona (Baglione, Vaglon, etc.), regent 1266-1267; Walter of Brugge, 1267-1268; Eustace of Arras, 1268 until probably the end of 1269; John Pecham, January 1270-1272 (?).[16] Of these, only de Baglione and Pecham have questions on the eternity of the world. At least, according to our present knowledge neither Walter nor Eustace seems to have

12 Edited by Ph. Grand, "Le Quodlibet XIV de Gérard d'Abbeville. La vie de Gérard d'Abbeville", *Archives d'histoire doctr. et litt. du moyen âge* 31 (1964) 222-269.

13 Cf. P. Glorieux, "Pour qu'on lise le *De perfectione* de saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Vie spirituelle* 23 (1930), suppl. 97-126; id., "Les polémiques *Contra Geraldinos*. Les pièces du dossier," *Rech. de théol. anc. et méd.* 6 (1934) 8-9; and his "*Contra Geraldinos*. L'enchaînement des polémiques," ibid. 7 (1935) 129-155.

14 Ed. cit., 265-268.

15 *Physic.* VIII, c. 1, text 11 and t. 10 (251b 20, and 251b 12); not identified by the editor.

16 Cf. I. Brady, "Questions at Paris c. 1260-1270," *Archivum Franciscanum Historicum* 61 (1968) 447-461; 62 (1969) 681-689. Pecham perhaps left Paris in the spring of 1272, as did Saint Thomas, and went to teach at Oxford.

touched on any of the tendencies or errors then current in the faculty of Arts, perhaps because they judged such problems to have been sufficiently treated by their immediate predecessor.

William of Baglione merits our attention for his concern with problems which were very much to the forefront at Paris in the decade before the condemnation of 1270.[17] In his series of questions *De symbolo* (a name we have elsewhere given them, since they follow the order of the Creed), two are devoted to the problem of an eternal world. The first: *Utrum mundus habuerit sue duracionis inicium vel sit ponere mundum esse ab eterno,* exists in two forms: in the codex Florence, Bibl. Naz. *Conv. soppr. B. 6. 912,* ff. 13d-16d (= F), we possess, it would seem, the script of the original dispute; in the ms. Vatican, *Pal. lat. 612,* ff. 154a-154d (= V), a revised version in a somewhat shorter and more polished form. Since in the Response (in both versions) the author declares: *Credo absque dubio hoc, scilicet quod mundus non est ab eterno per efficacissimas raciones esse demonstrabile* (F 15b; V 154c), he proceeds to ask in a second question: *Quaeritur utrum mundum non esse eternum sit demonstrabile, ita quod per raciones necessarias possit istud probari,* and to claim in answer: *Cum creaturam esse coeternam Deo fides et racio condemnet, sicut dicit B. Augustinus, XII De civitate, c. 15, et eternitas mundi necessario inferat istam coeternitatem, absque dubio mundum non esse nec posse esse eternum certissimis et efficacissimis racionibus potest ostendi.*[18]

Such a position, we need not be reminded, is directly opposed to that taken by Thomas in the *De aeternitate*; and well it may be, since the Questions of Master William are an attack on Aquinas's answer to the same question in his Script on the Sentences.[19] In at least four, if not five, of William's arguments in the F version (of which only one is retained in V) and in several phrases in the latter part of the Response in F (which here differs from V), Thomas's arguments and objections are cited and answered.[20]

17 Cf. I. Brady, "Background to the Condemnation of 1270: Master William of Baglione O.F.M.," *Franciscan Studies* 30 (1970) 5-48.

18 Cf. I. Brady, "The Questions of Master William of Baglione, O.F.M., *De Aeternitate mundi*," *Antonianum* 47 (1972) 362-371, 576-616.

19 Cf. *Scriptum super II Sent.*, d. 1, q. 1, a. 5 (ed. Parma 1856) VI, 390b-395b.

20 Thus, in the Sed contra, arg. 10 (or k), which becomes arg. 12 (or m) in V: "Forte dices [id est Thomas, ad 6 in contrarium]: ad hoc responderent philosophi: primo ille Algazel, quod anime separate non habent dependenciam. Averroes diceret quod omnes anime sunt una anima. Sed ista absurda sunt, et ex hiis mendicare responsiones non videtur nisi fugam querere; et verbo suo convinci dicendo quod non potest demonstrari mundum non esse ab eterno quia ista racio de infinitate animarum valet [ad] demonstracionem saltem huic qui nescivit aliter respondere vel ad minus non ostendit se scire. Nec decet theologum ut recurrat ad errores philosophorum" [F 14d; V 154b]. — Later in F, part of the response would be unintelligible without reference to Thomas:

Nonetheless, the Questions of this almost unknown Friar Minor are not the object of Thomas's *De aeternitate mundi.* A priori, the time-gap between the regency of William and the second regency of Saint Thomas does away with the sense of immediacy and urgency that pervades the opuscule of Aquinas. But a stronger argument is to be found in the questions themselves: while they claim that an eternal world is intrinsically impossible, and make ample use to this effect of Augustine, especially of the *De civitate Dei*, adducing likewise the argument from infinity of souls, they lack the two authorities, of Damascene and Hugh of Saint-Victor, which Thomas says (n. 10) are used by his opponent. Besides, the Questions of John Pecham fit that opponent like a glove.

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* *

In a well-known though often misinterpreted remark[21] Roger Marston testifies that at an inception at Paris under Gerard of Abbeville, Brother Thomas of Aquino and Brother John of Pecham were present with some twenty-four other doctors. The ceremony and concurrent disputations, if one may judge from the chronology of Gerard, Thomas and Pecham, took place in the first months of 1269 (Parisian style), that is 1270.[22] Pecham himself must have incepted shortly before, in late 1269, since he replaced as regent Eustace of Arras, who left Paris on 15 March 1270, in the company of Saint Louis and his crusaders.[23]

Given the agitation that troubled the University at this time and which led to the syllabus of 10 December 1270, it is not at all surprising that Pecham should enter the fray. Besides his questions on the creation and/or eternity of the world edited below, he disputed at least two others related to the errors condemned by Tempier: one on the reality of hell-fire (art. 8), another on the unicity of the intellect (art. 1). In Quodlibet IV, the eighth question reads: *Quaeritur per oppositionem de malicia, utrum anima racionalis damnata paciatur ab igne materiali*

"Unde exemplum de puero nutrito in loco solitario quod ipsi ponunt nihil facit ad propositum" (f. 15b); cf. Saint Thomas, Respond. (392b-393a).

21 See his *Quaest. disp. de emanatione aeterna*, q. 6, in *Fr. Rogeri Marston, O.F.M., Quaestiones disputatae* (Quaracchi 1932) 116f. See the study of the late D. A. Callus, O.P., who shows that no condemnation of Saint Thomas is here implied: "The Problem of the Unity of Form and Richard Knapwell, O.P.," *Mélanges offerts à Etienne Gilson* (Toronto-Paris 1959) 152f.

22 Cf. I. Brady, *Prolegomena* to *Fr. Rogeri Marston, O.F.M. Quodlibeta quatuor* (Quaracchi 1968) 10*; the chronology therein presented needs some slight emendation, since I am now convinced (see the following note) that Pecham did not begin his regency with the Michaelmas term of 1269, but the Hilary term (to use Oxford expressions for Paris) of 1270.

23 Cf. I. Brady, "Questions at Paris...," *Arch. Franc. Hist.* 62 (1969) 687 f.

imaginarie tantum an vere.[24] This is followed[25] by the fourth question *De anima: Quaeritur per oppositum utrum unus est intellectus in omnibus hominibus.*[26] This latter group of questions is, it seems to me, posterior to the questions on the eternity of the world; and more probably the same can be said (on the basis at least of more maturity of treatment) of Quodlibet IV. A partial proof may be found in the opening question *De anima,* which is much more explicit than the Response of Question I (below), on Augustine's rejection of the soul as made from the substance of God[27]; a more substantial proof can be deduced from the fourth question (on the unity of the intellect), wherein argument 30 discourses at length on a proof drawn from an infinity of souls,[28] thus developing what Question II (below), argument i, touches on in passing.

Since the problem of chronology is relatively unimportant at the moment, let us return to the questions on the eternity of the world, to see if they indeed provoked Thomas's reaction in the *De aeternitate mundi.*

There seems little in the first question that might have caused such a reaction. It is true, Thomas would have recognized the *Summa theologiae* I, 25, 4, and several articles of q. 45, as source-material for certain arguments. At the same time, he clearly saw that Pecham remained close to Bonaventure's opening questions on Book II, dist. 1, of the *Sentences,* even to the extent that the Response is hardly more than a paraphrase and expansion of the Seraphic Doctor's position. There is no attempt to demonstrate creation philosophically, but to investigate the problem intellectually and theologically. The only parallel to the *De aeternitate mundi* appears to lie in the citation from Hugh of Saint-Victor,[29] which Thomas states (n. 10) is used by his opponent. Yet Pecham seeks thereby to illustrate the power of God and not the question of an eternal world.

The case is quite other, however, in respect to the second question.

24 In cod. Flor. Bibl. Laurenz. Plut. XVII sin. 8, f. 75c-d; cf. V. Doucet, "Notulae bibliographicae de quibusdam operibus Fr. Ioannis Pecham O.F.M.," *Antonianum* 8 (1933) 317. The major part at least of the Response is reproduced by Roger Marston, Quodl. IV, q. 21 (ed. cit. 410-412).

25 The title *Quodlibet IV* is given by way of convenience (as the last discovered, by Fr. Doucet), and has nothing to do with chronology. That it precedes the *Quaestiones de anima* is shown by Doucet, art. cit., 322f.

26 Edited by H. Spettmann, *Johannis Pechami Quaestiones tractantes de anima*, BGPTMA 19, Heft 5-6 (Münster 1918) 38-59.

27 *Qq. de anima*, q. 1, resp.; ed. cit., 5-6.

28 *Qq. de anima*, q. 4, arg. 30, and resp.; ed. cit., 44f, 58f.

29 See below, Quaestio I, resp., at note 31.

Thomas could not help noting that the *Summa* I, 46, 1: *Utrum universitas creaturarum semper fuit,* furnished material for this question, and that not always to the purpose intended by him. More than once, indeed, his answers to arguments are themselves rebutted.[30] In the Response creation in time is said to be an article of faith, in agreement with Thomas (I, 46, 2); which merits to be investigated by reason helped by faith. Then against the warning of Saint Thomas (ibid.), not to attempt to demonstrate this truth by adducing so-called necessary reasons, which leave the faith open to ridicule, Pecham proceeds to offer five reasons, none of which Thomas would qualify as necessary. Small wonder, if this question is the object of his attack, that the *De aeternitate* opens by emphasizing anew the distinction between faith and reason in respect to the problem at hand.

Yet we can hardly say that the opuscule of Saint Thomas goes on to attack point for point the demonstrations of Pecham. Such a facile proof of identity would be almost too much to expect. Nonetheless, since these five arguments labour under the deficiences Thomas had previously warned against in the *Summa* I, 46, 1-2, and now repeats in the *De aeternitate,* nn. 4-7, especially the failure to see that there is no repugnance between the concept of something created and that of always existing, we have something of a case, at least in respect to the first two proofs of the Franciscan. To this we must add Thomas's rejection of an authority from Damascene (n. 10) as of value in the debate: precisely that authority cited by Pecham in the third proof. Our thesis stumbles a little in respect to his fourth argument. Hugh of Saint-Victor is cited indeed; but what Thomas quotes from him (n. 10) and interprets away is the authority used by Pecham in the first question. Yet it is likely that Thomas is relying on his memory, without the text of Pecham before him, and recalls the use somewhere of the words of Hugh. Both authorities, as we have seen earlier, are offset by the distinction made by Boethius of a successive eternity and the unchanging eternity of God; which distinction leads Thomas to reject (n. 11) as a non-sequitur the objection that a creature would equal God in duration, because God's duration is total, whereas that of the creature is a constant succession. To affirm this Thomas cites at length the words of Augustine in *De civitate* XII, 15. Yet this same authority in shorter form[31] is used by Pecham in the fifth proof, and is followed by the general conclusion: *Dico igitur quod mundus nullo modo capax fuit*

30 See arg. 6; and in the *Contra,* arg. k, l, and o.

31 Perhaps the lacuna of four lines at this point in F (see Quaest. II, note 145) has some significance.

aeternae et interminabilis durationis. The same position is taken by Pecham in answer to the second argument, on the basis of Augustine's words *Super Genesim* VIII, also quoted by Thomas in number 11.

Finally, our opponents, remarks Thomas (n. 12), adduce reasons touched on and solved by the philosophers, including the difficult one based on an infinity of souls. The latter argument appears in almost every scholastic who disputed the question; in Pecham it is used as argument i of the second question.

The cumulative effect of the rather consistent parallels between the Question(s) of Pecham and the *De aeternitate mundi* leads, it seems to me, to only one conclusion: that the opuscule of Aquinas was indeed provoked by the disputation of the Franciscan. Our thesis lacks only one more element: to put it into a historical setting.

IV. Paris, Early 1270

Relations between Pecham and Thomas at Paris are known to have been not overly cordial, even though the Minor later spoke reverently of "Brother Thomas de Aquino of holy memory"[32] and claimed that on one occasion he alone stood by him in a dispute over the unity of form.[33] On the other hand, Bartholomew of Capua was to testify at the Naples inquiry prior to Thomas's canonization that on the occasion of a dispute Iohannes de Pizano answered Thomas in bombastic and pompous language.[34] This may mean that Pecham as a baccalaureus formatus was respondent at some disputation; or, since masters did not attend ordinary disputed questions of other masters, that he participated in the inception of a student of Saint Thomas (or even of another student, when both were present); or that this disagreement happened in connection with Pecham's own inception.

32 In his letter (1 January 1285) to the cardinals of the Curia; ed. C. T. Martin, *Registrum Epistolarum J. Peckham, Archiepiscopi Cantuariensis* III (London 1885) 871.

33 Letter to the Bishop of Lincoln (1 June 1285); ed. cit., III, 899. We pass over Pecham's later reactions as Archbishop to nascent Thomism at Oxford. The matter has been amply discussed by D. A. Callus, art. cit., 126-136, and by Theod. Crowley, O.F.M., "John Peckham, O.F.M., Archbishop of Canterbury, versus the New Aristotelianism," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library* 33 (1951) 242-255.

34 Cf. *Acta Sanctorum Martii* I (Antverpiae 1668) 712a; and *Fontes vitae s. Thomae Aquinatis* IV (Var 1934) 374. The Dominican chronicler Nicholas Trivet (early fourteenth century) also says of Pecham: "erat...gestus afflatusque pompatici, mentis tamen benignae, et animi admodum liberalis," *Annales sex regum Angliae (1126-1307)*, ed. T. Hog (London 1845) 299. It is far and beyond the data of Bartholomew's account to create a story of a "famous debate" when "Aquinas presided at the disputation of the question of the death of Christ, which involved the doctrine of unicity" (cf. F. J. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, Dubuque 1964, 10; and 22, note 35, where Marston's words are twisted once more).

This last alternative seems much more probable in view of an incident related by William of Tocco in his Life of Saint Thomas: as an example of Aquinas's humility he cites the Saint's reaction at the inception of a certain religious.[35] Tocco's details of the acts involved in an inception are faulty; yet the essentials no doubt are trustworthy. At the vesperiae, he says, this unnamed religious upheld an opinion contrary to the truth which the Doctor had previously determined in his schools. Thomas said nothing, lest he harm the reputation of the new master. But on the way back to the friary, when his students upbraided him for such gentleness, he promised to do what he could on the morrow to repair the injury done them and himself. When next morning the faculty and students were gathered in the hall of the Bishop for the aulica, the second part of the ceremony, the same questions and their determinations were repeated. This time Thomas quietly rebuked the new master: "This opinion of yours cannot be held because it is against such and such a Council." A dispute followed between them, until Thomas forced him to confess his error and beg for instruction.

Was this religious John Pecham? Dominic Prümmer, O.P., the editor of Tocco, is of this opinion.[36] On the other hand, the noted Dominican scholar, C. M. J. Vansteenkiste grants the scene was Paris, but considers the chronology uncertain, since it could have taken place during Thomas's first regency (1256-1259), and makes no reference to Pecham.[37] Yet it is not improbable that the religious was a Franciscan, since Orders other than the Preachers and the Minors did not present candidates before 1269 or later. If the incident took place during the first regency, the Minor would have been Eudes de Rosny or Godfrey of Vierzon, of whom we know almost nothing. In the second regency, Pecham would have been the only Franciscan candidate, together with perhaps Dom Albert (of the College of Cluny) and Gilles du Val (of the Fratres Vallis Scholarum).[38] But if we link together the account of Tocco, who may not have known the name of the religious or may (more likely) have left him anonymous out of respect for a prelate (the Life formed part of the first dossier presented to John XXII), and that of Bartholomew, which is later, Pecham appears to be the master in question.

At the same time, from our knowledge of the acts of inception[39] we

35 *Historia b. Thomae de Aquino*, c. 5, n. 27, in the *Acta Ss. Martii*, I, 668D-F; c. 26, in ed. D. Prümmer, *Fontes* II, 99.

36 "Iste Religiosus videtur esse Johannes Peckham"; *Fontes* II, 99, note 1.

37 In his article "Tommaso d'Aquino," in *Bibliotheca Sanctorum* 12 (Roma 1969) col. 556.

38 Cf. P. Glorieux, *Répertoire des maîtres en théologie de Paris au XIIIᵉ siècle*, II (Paris 1934) 269, 278.

39 Cf. P. Glorieux, "L'enseignement au moyen âge. Techniques et méthodes en usage à la

must change some of the details provided by Tocco, who had not been a student at Paris. The candidate (*aulandus*) circulated beforehand four questions on some common topic, two for the vesperiae, two for the aulica.[40] Of these, he was to dispute the second in the first ceremony with two of the oldest masters; and the third in the aulica. The other two were disputed respectively by the bachelors as they awaited the masters for the vesperiae, and by the masters at the end of the aulica. Finally, at the first available opportunity the new master was to hold the *resumptio* in the presence of all the masters and students, at which he repeated the second and third questions, filling in lacunae and presenting in full his determination of each question, which, we may suppose, he had meanwhile put into writing.

Hence, I would suggest, fully conscious of all the probabilities involved, that the two Questions of Pecham on the eternity of the world are his resumption of the dispute at the earlier ceremonies; and that perhaps the two older Masters at the vesperiae may have been Thomas and Gerard of Abbeville. That the texts represent the *resumptio* is somewhat suggested by the frequent use of *respondebatur*, an echo of the actual disputation; and again by Pecham's fairly accurate use of the words of the *Summa theologiae*. Thomas may courteously have spared Pecham on the more formal occasion of the vesperiae and aulica, and then have reacted publicly at the *resumptio*, though one would be hard-pressed to identify any Council he might have cited. He certainly reacted thereafter in his *De aeternitate mundi.*[41]

Faculté de Théologie de Paris, au XIIIe siècle," *Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge* 35 (1969) 141-148.

40 Two (or more likely, three) clear examples have survived: for Nicholas of Pressoir, 1273; cf. V. Doucet, in *Arch. Franc. Hist.* 26 (1933) 214, where another (anonymous) set of four questions follows; and for Durandus of Saint-Pourçain, 1302; see J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano*, BGPTMA 26, Halbbd. I (Münster 1927) 161-168.

41 This article quite unintentionally is an answer to that of Thomas Bukowski, "An Early Dating for Aquinas, *De aeternitate mundi*," *Gregorianum* 51 (1970) 277-304, which came to my notice only after I had sent my contribution to the Editors (1970). If some remarks are in place, one might say that Prof. Bukowski has not made full use of the *De aeternitate* itself, since he fails to locate arguments and authorities advanced by the scholastic Thomas is opposing: it cannot be Bonaventure. Again, if the treatise is supposedly early (1259 or before), and was then given to the public, it is surprising that William of Baglione knows nothing of it, despite his attack (1266-1267) on Thomas's position. I think I have established beyond reasonable doubt that Aquinas is *not* "almost certainly arguing against St. Bonaventure," as the author claims (p. 280) with too many others.

JOHN PECHAM

*QUAESTIONES DE AETERNITATE MUNDI**

* The first Question of Pecham is taken from the only known manuscript, Florence Biblioteca Nazionale, *Conv. soppr. J.I.3*, ff. 59c-61a [=F]. The second Question is based on the same codex, ff. 61c-63a, and on a second, Florence Bibl. Medicea Laurenziana, *Santa Croce PL. XVII sin. 8*, ff. 97a-99c [=L]. I have not found any other manuscript.

F is well-known as devoted wholly to the works of John Pecham, and has been described more than once. Cf. F. Tocco, in *Fratris Johannis Pecham Tractatus tres de paupertate* (British Soc. of Franc. Studies II, Aberdeen 1910) 99-108; H. Spettmann, *Johannis Pechami Quaestiones tractantes de anima* (Beiträge zur Gesch. der Phil. u. Theol. des Mittel. 19, Heft 5-6; Münster 1918), xxii-xxvii. For our Questions the text is very defective, with many lacunae (some of several lines in length), poor readings (as is evident from the text of some authorities cited), few corrections (errors are often marked with a cross in the margin, and sometimes by a cross over a word, but are not corrected; a later reader apparently had no other copy from which to correct the text). At the end, as also in codex L, the second question stops after the response to the eleventh objection.

L contains several works of Pecham; yet the present (second) Question is somehow included in a series of Questions that otherwise are to be attributed, at least in part, to Bartholomew of Bologna. See V. Doucet, "Notulae bibliographicae de quibusdam operibus Fr. Ioannis Pecham O.F.M.," *Antonianum* 8 (1933) 309-328; and M. Mückshoff, *Die Quaestiones disputatae De fide des Bartholomäus von Bologna O.F.M.* (Beiträge 24, Heft 4; Münster 1940), xxxiii-xxxv, and xliv. The text is, as a whole, of greater accuracy than that of F, and thus serves to correct the latter in many difficult passages. It is quite evident, however, that there is no immediate or direct relationship between the two manuscripts. Both are almost assuredly of Parisian provenance; but F seems more likely to be the work of a student close to Pecham's term as magister regens, whereas L is later, at least after the regency of Bartholomew (c. 1275-1277).

We should likewise note that Pecham's question in his commentary on the Sentences I, dist. 44, q. 3: *Quaeritur si potuit creare mundum antiquiorem* (cod. Florent., Bibl. Naz. *Conv. soppr. G.4.854*, f. 121c) is of no help either doctrinally or textually. — I am grateful to Dr. G. Etzkorn for making the original transcription from codex F of the two Questions published here; the text has since been critically compared to the manuscript itself.

I

Quaeritur utrum aliquid factum sit vel fieri potuit de nihilo ordinaliter.[1]

Et ostenditur quod non:

1. Quia teste Hieronymo:[2] "Cum Deus omnia possit, non potest tamen corruptam facere virginem." Sed maior est convenientia entis ad ens quam non-entis ad ens. Si igitur non potest Deus de corrupta facere virginem ordinaliter, multo magis nec de non-ente ens. — Respondebatur quod corruptio transit in praeteritum et non potest esse idem praeteritum et non praeteritum: ideo de corrupta non potest facere virginem.

2. Contra: eodem modo non-esse creaturae transit in praeteritum; ergo eadem ratione ei non potest succedere esse.

3. Item, maior est convenientia Creatoris cum creatura quam non-entis cum creatura, cum inter Creatorem et creaturam sit analogia entis. Sed Deus non potest facere de Creatore creaturam, cum Creator sit immutabilis et creatura mutabilis. Ergo multo magis non potest facere de nihilo esse quod nullo modo convenit cum eo.

4. Item, si potest facere de non-ente ens, ergo cum infinita sit distantia non-entis ad ens, infinita distantia potest pertransiri.[3] Quod est falsum, quia secundum Philosophum:[4] "Infinitum non potest pertransiri nec a finito nec ab infinito."

5. Item, si potest super hanc distantiam quae est infinita, eadem ratione poterit super quamcumque aliam. Ergo potest inter distantiam quae est inter Creatorem et creaturam, cum una distantia infinita sit maior alia.

6. Item, omnis actio est per contactum vel corporalem ut in corporalibus, vel virtualem ut in spiritualibus. Si igitur Deus producit creatum [per] contactum virtutis suae: aut creatum prius est quam tangatur (dico 'prius' naturaliter), aut prius tangitur quam sit. Si primo modo: sed prius non causatur a posteriori; ergo creatura non creatur a contactu divinae virtutis. Si autem prius tangitur quam sit, contra: omne verbum includit in suo intellectu esse et addit super ipsum, secundum grammaticos. Unde sequitur: tangit, ergo est tangens; et tangitur, ergo est tactum. Si igitur prius est simplex quam compositum, et posterius est quod est ex additione ad alterum, prius est esse quam tangi, et ita ut supra: ipsum esse non creatur a contactu divinae virtutis.

7. Item, si creatura incepit esse, accipiamus instans quo incepit esse, et sit A. Item, si creatura prius habuit non-esse, accipiamus aliquod instans in quo non fuit, et sit B. Ergo inter A et B, cum se habeant secundum prius et prius, fuit tempus. Si dicas quod illud 'prius' fuit nunc aeternitatis,

1 de nihilo *apparently deleted*; in the list of questions provided in F [f. 19c], the title reads: *Utrum aliquid sit factum de nichilo ordinabiliter.*

2 *Epist. 22 (ad Eustochium)*, n. 5 (PL 22, 397; CSEL 54, 150). Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, 25, 4, sed contra (ed. Ottawa 175a 43-45).

3 Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 45, 2, arg. 4 (284b 53-285a 2).

4 Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I, 3 (72b 10-11); and more directly, *Metaph.* X (XI), 10 (1066a 35-1066b 1).

8. Contra: ergo inceptio temporis fuit post aeternitatem vel nunc aeternitatis. Sed hoc est falsum, quia nunc aeternitatis omnia complectitur tempora; ergo etc.

9. Item, Deus secundum immensitatem essentiae comparatur ad mundi magnitudinem; secundum comparationem suae aeternitatis vel durationis comparatur ad mundi durationem. Sed, quamvis sit infinitas [= infinitus] magnitudine et mundus finitus, non tamen est extra mundum; ergo quamvis sit [in]finitus[5] aeternitate, non tamen fuit ante mundum.

10. Item, si non-esse praecedit esse: aut prioritate naturae, et hoc non, quia nihil non dicit naturam, ergo nec ordinem naturae; aut prioritate temporis, et hoc non, quia tempus prius non fuit; aut aeternitatis, et hoc non, quia aeternitas Dei est ipse Deus. Sed ipsum nihil non est in Deo, ergo nec in aeternitate Dei.

11. Item, nobilior est affirmatio quam negatio, et habitus quam privatio, et [59d] esse quam non-esse. Sed esse naturae non mensuratur aeternitate, ergo multo magis nec non-esse.

12. Item, simplicius est nunc aeternitatis quam nunc temporis infinitum. Ergo, si propter simplicitatem instantis temporalis non praecessit in eo esse nec non-esse creaturae, ergo multo magis in nunc aeternitatis non possunt stare simul esse et non-esse. Sed si non-esse creaturae fuit in aeternitate, et postea suum esse est in aeternitate, opposita sunt in ipsa aeternitate. Ergo hoc est impossibile, quod hic ponatur aliquod fundamentum, scilicet esse ex nihilo.

13. Item, si aliquid factum est ex nihilo, simul fuit ens et non-ens. Probatio: quod tantum natura praecedit alterum potest simul esse cum illo, sicut natura [sonus] praecedit cantum,[6] et tamen simul tempore generatur. Sed si creatura habuit aliquando non-esse, suum non-esse solum natura praecessit suum esse; ergo etc. Probatio assumptae: quia certum est quod non fuit prius tempore, nec prius aeternitate, quia tunc sequitur quod tempus esset post aeternitatem; quod falsum est, quia simul est cum ipsa.

14. Item, si creatura est et non fuit, si affirmatio et negatio de eodem, ergo idem suppositum est subtractum esse; et quod prius subtractum fuit puro[7] non-esse; et ita esse et purum non-esse aliquid habent commune, quod est falsum. Respondebatur quod idem est commune secundum rationem.

15. Contra: secundum rem vere et proprie quod est non fuit, et quod non fuit est; idem ergo est commune; ergo etc.

16. Item, omne quod fit, possibile erat fieri antequam fieret.[8] Si ergo aliquid est creatum de nihilo, prius potuit creari. Sed potentia non est sine possibili. Ergo quod creatur fuit aliquid antequam crearetur. Respondebatur quod non fuit nisi in potentia Creatoris.

17. Contra: "In aeternis non differt esse et posse,"[9] quia omnipotentia suo actui semper coniunctum est; ergo nullam habet actum ex temporis novitate.

5 A cross is found in the margin, indicating either an error or an omission.

6 [sonus] *lacuna in text*; supplied from St. Augustine, *Sonus cantum (praecedit origine)* in *Confession.* XII, c. 29, n. 40 (PL 32, 842; CSEL 33, 340).

7 puro *corr. marg. for* po *in text.*

8 Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 45, 2, arg. 3 (284b 42-52).

9 Aristotle, *Physic.* III, text 32, c. 4 (203b 29).

18. Item, quia dicebatur quod posse creari non dicit potentiam nisi rationis, contra: posse creare et posse creari sunt diversorum subiectorum, quia posse creare est agentis primi, posse creari est ipsius creabilis. Ergo differunt essentialiter istae duae potentiae. Ergo, sicut vere differunt Creator et creatum, sic vere creare et posse creari.
19. Item, hoc probatur quia differunt, quia potentiae differunt sicut causae. Sed posse creare terminatur ad creationem actionem, posse creari ad creationem passionem. Ergo sicut creatio actio et creatio passio differunt essentialiter, sic istae potentiae. Ergo, si aliquid est creatum, praecessit potentia vera; quod repugnat creationi; ergo etc.
20. Item, creatio est actio. Actio autem requirit non quid agat, sed in quid agat. Ergo praesupponit materiam.
21. Item, Deus est causa creaturae in triplici genere causae: efficientis, formalis et finalis. Ad agendum non indiget alio efficiente, quia ipse est virtus infinita et est ipse sua virtus, nec agit alio[10] a se. Item, nec indiget alio exemplari a se diverso ad producendum, quia ipse [est] essentialiter exemplar. Nec eget alio fine, quia ipse est finis ultimus. Sed si exemplar differret ab esse essentialiter, indigeret alio exemplari a se diverso ad producendum. Similiter de virtute et fine. Ergo cum materia, quae est quarta causa, ab eo sit penitus diversa, non potest agere nisi praesupposita materia.
22. Item, si educitur de non-esse in esse: aut quando est, aut quando non est. Si educitur quando est: sed quod est non eget eductione,[11] et quod non eget, non educitur. Ergo non creatur quando est.
23. Item, si creatura accipit esse vel si fit de non-creante creans, hoc est per mutationem ipsius creantis. Probatio: quia non est per mutationem creaturae, quia Deus creat antequam creatura creetur; creatio enim eius [= est] actio aeterna. — Respondetur quod creatio connotat effectum. — Contra: nihil connotat nisi quod dicitur de creante; connotat ergo [60a] actionem et non passionem. Actio autem non est sine termino actionis. Ergo prius est creatura quam actio. — Item, duplex est creatio: creatio actio et creatio passio. Sed creatio passio est accidens creati. Sed nullum accidens est prius suo subiecto. Ergo impossibile est creationem passionem praecedere creatum. Sed creatum non posset esse nisi praecederet illud ordine naturae creatio passio, cum sit via ad esse. Via autem praecedit terminum; ergo etc.
24. Item, potentia creabilis remotior est ab actu quam potentia numeri, quia potentia creabilis nihil dicit in actu aut potentia reali. Potentia autem numeralis dicit aliquid in actu in quo fundatur realis potentia. Sed potentia numeri ad infinitas species non potest educi in actu; ergo multo magis nec potentia creabilis.
25. Item, materia nullo modo potest esse a Primo. Hoc probatur, quia omne agens agit secundum quod est in actu.
26. Item, agens a proposito educit sibi simile in specie. Sed materia est ens penitus[12] in potentia. Deus autem est ens plene in actu. Ergo non habet aliquam convenientiam materia cum Deo; ergo ab ipso esse non potest.

10 alio] alio id est per aliud *add. marg.* F².
11 eductione] vel eductore *add. marg.* F².
12 penitus] est ens *repeated*; I have placed the words after *autem*, where they evidently belong.

27. Item, in creaturis sunt multi defectus. Aut igitur sunt in creaturis unde ex nihilo, aut ratione materiae. Si primo modo, tunc omnes creaturae aeque plenae sunt defectibus; quod falsum est. Si ratione materiae, ergo materia non est a Deo ex nihilo; vel si ipsa est ex nihilo, adhuc omnia erunt aeque plena defectibus[13] quaecumque ipsam participant.

28. Item, si aliquid creatur, aut materia [est] aut forma aut compositum. Si est compositum, contra: actio indivisibilis non terminatur ad divisibile. Sed creatio est actio indivisibilis; ergo non terminatur ad compositum. Quod est indivisibilis patet, quia est summae simplicitatis et in [ens] indivisibiliter terminatur, quia nihil est medium inter ens et non-ens. Item, nec materia creatur, quia actio nobilissima non terminatur ad summum ignobile. Materia autem est summe ignobilis. Item, nec materia [= forma] creatur, nec [= quia] forma praesupponit materiam; ergo etc.

CONTRA:

a. Avicenna, VI *Meta.*[14]: "Philosophi non intelligunt per agentem principium mutationis [= motionis] tantum, sicut intelligunt naturales, sed principium essendi et creatorem [= datorem] eius, sicut est creator mundi."

b. Item, causa quanto prior, tanto prius [= plus] influit.[15] Ergo prima influit super totum.

c. Item, materia est secundum quam unumquodque potest esse et non esse, secundum Philosophum.[16] Ergo materia multum communicat cum non-esse. Si ergo forma est productibilis, quae dat esse, multo magis materia est productibilis, a qua est non-esse. Sed materia non producitur de materia, quia sic esset ire in infinitum; ergo producitur de nihilo.

d. Item, agens quod agit secundum aliquid sui, per virtutem suam scilicet, potest reproducere secundum partem, ut fit per generationem in qua transit commune subiectum a specie in speciem. Ergo agens quod agit secundum se totum, cuius [= cui?] subest sua actio, producit rem secundum suam totam essentiam, scilicet secundum materiam et formam.[17]

e. Item, duplex est actio Dei, intrinseca et extrinseca. Ergo, sicut intrinseca productio ostendit infinitatem Dei, sic et extrinseca debet[18] manifestare infinitam potentiam Dei. Sed hoc non est nisi....

RESPONSIO:

I. Creatio est articulus fidei et nunquam ad plenum alicui infideli illuxit.[19] Hinc et quod quidam posuerunt mundum omnino a Deo non fuisse

13 A cross in margin would indicate the text is incomplete.

14 VI Meta.] dicenti *ms.* Cf. Avicenna, *Metaph.* VI, c. 1 (ed. Venice 1508, 91b).

15 Cf. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 1; *Opera omnia* II (ed. Quaracchi 1885), 14b; whence we have interpreted *prius* as *plus*. The argument depends on the *Liber de causis* prop. 1; ed. A. Pattin (Louvain s.a.), 46.

16 Aristotle, *Metaph.* VI (VII), c. 1 (1042a 25-28).

17 Cf. St. Bonaventure, loc. cit., 14b-15a.

18 debet] decet (docet?) F. The final word (*nisi*) is followed by a lacuna of some three lines.

19 Cf. St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, resp. (II, 16b); and St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 46, 2, resp. (297a11 ff.). — What follows from Augustine is rather a paraphrase of *De*

productum, sicut recitat Augustinus, *De civitate* XI, cap. 4, dicens contra eos: "Mobilitas et immobilitas partium mundanarum ad idem tendentium clamat totum mundum habere idem principium." Alii peius [60b] errantes, quia non potuerunt intelligere aliquid fieri ex nihilo, mundum istum factum esse de Dei substantia posuerunt. Quod etiam per eandem viam improbatur. In pluribus enim locis probat Augustinus[20] animam non fuisse factam de Dei substantia ideo quod mutabilis est. Et ideo alii, ut Platonici, [posuerunt][21] mundum esse productum [ex materia] praeexistenti aeterna et increata. Unde Ambrosius, in *Hexaëmeron*[22]: "Plato tria posuit increata et sine initio: Deum et exemplar et materiam. Deum vero non tanquam creatorem materiae, sed tanquam artificem." Propter quod Philosophus dicit[23]: "Plato solus generat mundum."

Sed istud primo improbatur, quia unumquodque quanto durabilius est tanto melius est. Si igitur materia omnibus aliis durabilior est, omnibus aliis melior est. — Item, quantitas rei cognoscitur per virtutis mensuram et materialis [?]. Ergo, si materia habet mensuram infinitam, habet et virtutem infinitam, quod est impossibile. — Item, Richardus probat, *De Trinitate* V,[24] quod eo ipso quod persona Patris non est ad aliam, omnis alia persona et natura est ab ipsa. Et probat sic: quoniam si habet esse a se, non habet esse [secundum] participationem essendi; et si non secundum participationem, ergo secundum plenitudinem. Sed ubi est plenitudo essentiae et potentiae, ibi est omnino posse, quia suum posse est omne posse. Ergo ex ipsa est omne posse et omne esse. — Item, negare non potest quin esse a se sit nobilissima conditio et proprietas principii. Ergo si materia est a se, convenit in nobilissima proprietate cum primo principio.

Item, si materia est increata: aut simplex est aut composita. Si simplex est, penitus ergo de ipsa nunquam fiet compositum, nisi pars compositi fiat de nihilo. Si autem sit composita, omnis compositio est a componente simplici. Ergo necesse est aliam esse causam materiae, et ita non est a se. — Item, esse a se dicit proprietatem dignitatis et actum nobilem essendi, ut dictum est.[25]

civitate Dei XI, c. 4, n. 2: "Exceptis enim propheticis vocibus, mundus ipse ordinatissima sua mutabilitate et mobilitate et visibilium omnium pulcherrima specie quodammodo tacitus et factum se esse, et nonnisi a Deo...fieri se potuisse proclamat" (PL 41, 319; CSEL 40-1, 515; CCL 48, 324).

20 Cf. *De Genesi ad litt.*, VII, c. 2, n. 3, and c. 3, n. 5 (PL 42, 356, 357; CSEL 28-1, 202, 203); and especially *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum* I, c. 14, nn. 21-22 (PL 42, 614f); and Peter Lombard, *Sent.* II, d. 17, c. 1, n. 5 (Quaracchi 1970) I, 410f.

21 The text is marked by a cross in the margin; I have essayed to repair it.

22 Book I, c. 1 (PL 14 [1845], 123A; CSEL 32, 3); cf. P. Lombard, *Sent.* II, d. 1, c. 1, n. 2 (ed. cit. 330), where Strabus is quoted to the same effect.

23 Cf. *Physic.* VIII, c. 1 (251b 17-18). More exactly, as used by other scholastics, the authority should perhaps read: *Solus Plato genuit tempus*; cf. Gerard of Abbeville, *Quodl. XIV.* q. 10; ed. Ph. Grand, "Le Quodlibet XIV de Gérard d'Abbeville: La vie de Gérard d'Abbeville," *Archives d'hist. doctr. et litt. du moyen âge* 31 (1964) 267.

24 Ch. 4 (PL 196, 951 D; ed. J. Ribaillier [Paris 1958] 199). Cf. John Pecham, *In I Sent.*, d. 27, q. 1, a. 1: "Igitur primitas Patris innascibilitate significatur; et quia eo ipso quo innascibilis est, a nullo est, sequitur ut omne aliud et omnis alia res quaecumque sit ab ipso, sicut docet Richardus De trin. 5 c. 4...Ergo innascibilitas Patrem distinguit aliquo modo, immo ut supra habetur ex Richardo, rationem dicit communicandi"; cod. Florent., Bibl. Naz. *Conv. soppr. G. 4. 854*, f. 80d; cited by M. Schmaus, *Der Liber propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterschiede zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus*, BGPTMA 29 (Münster 1930) 586, note 57.

25 Cf. some seven lines above.

Ergo convenit rei digniori. Sed dignior est forma quam materia. Ergo si non convenit formae, nec convenit materiae. — Item, quod est alterius causa amittendi esse, ipsum esse non habet ex se. Sed contrariorum contrariae sunt causae. Sed materia est in quolibet quod potest non esse; ergo etc.

De rerum vero principio primo non habet Aristoteles manifestam sententiam, quamvis dicat quod non est virtus nisi a Deo.[26]

II. Hi igitur errores omnes professione fidei excluduntur, dicente Scriptura quia *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram.*[27] Hanc veritatem fidei nullus sapientum mundi intellexit ad plenum, quia aut eam negaverunt aut erronee posuerunt, sicut Avicenna, qui sic eam attribuit Creatori quod etiam eam attribuit creaturae.[28] Et idcirco omnibus his erroribus praeexclusis, sciendum est omnia in primo instanti temporis fuisse producta de nihilo.

Ad cuius intelligentiam sequestranda est imaginatio philosophorum naturalium qui quaerunt commune subiectum, et ad intellectualem indaginem, ut est possibile, ascendendum. Quod igitur omnia sint ex nihilo creata, patet tam considerando conditiones ipsius Creatoris quam etiam ipsius creaturae.

Primo, dico, attendamus quantitatem potentiae [a parte producentis],[29] quoniam quanto potentia est virtuosior, tanto paucioribus indiget adminiculis et dispositioni ad productionem sui effectus.[30] Ergo potentia quae [in]finite excedit omnem alteram potentiam circa aliquid producendum, infinite minus requirit quam alia potentia. Sed infinite minus quocumque ente non est nisi pure non-ens. Ergo inifinita potentia eo quo infinita potest producere quemcumque effectum de pure non-ente. Unde Hugo I *De sacramentis*, parte 1, cap. 1[31]: "Omnipotentiae virtus ineffabilis, sicut non poterat aliud praeter se habere coaeternum quo in faciendo iuvaretur, ita sibi cum voluit suberat ut quod voluit et quando et quantum [60c] voluit de nihilo crearetur."

Secundo, hoc idem patet considerando modum producendi res in esse. Agit enim per intellectum suum, per Verbum suum, quod est ipsa eius operativa potentia, nec differunt in eo cognitio et operativa potentia, sicut in omni creatura differunt. Sicut igitur eadem facilitate intellectus divinus apprehendit entia et non-entia, sic necesse est ut virtus eius eadem facilitate producere possit aliquid sicut de ente, ita de non-ente. Unde Augustinus, *Confessionum* XI[32]: "Verbo tibi coaeterno et sempiterno dicis omnia quae dicis, et sic quidquid dicis ut fiat non aliter quam illo facis."

Item, idem patet tertio considerando perfectionem divini exemplaris, quia perfectiones divinae sunt exemplaria creaturarum exprimendo se in creatura. Sicut igitur omne vivens est a Deo sub ratione vitae, immo vita eius est exem-

26 Cf. *Ethic. Nic.* I, c. 9 (1099b 10), and II, c. 1 (1103a 25).

27 Gen. 1, 1.

28 *Metaph.* IX, c. 4 (f. 104d-105a); cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, 45, 5, resp. (288a 35ff).

29 The manuscript has a lacuna of some ten letters; since the argument follows St. Bonaventure, we have supplied the omission from *In I Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1, fund. 2 (II, 14b).

30 Cf. Aristotle, *De caelo* II, t. 62, c. 12 (292b 4ss); the argument is taken from St. Bonaventure, loc. cit.

31 PL 176, 187 B; quoted by St. Thomas, *De aet. mundi*, n. 10.

32 Chapt. 7 (PL 32, 813; CSEL 33, 287).

plar omnis vitae, ita esse in eo est exemplar omnis esse. — Item, quia esse divinum est omnipotentius[33] in exprimendo quam vivere divinum, immo quodammodo perfectius in causando in quantum generalius se diffundit, quod tamen ut in Deo est nullum dicit gradum, unde Dionysius, V *De divinis nominibus*[34]: "Nihil est exsistens cuius non sit substantia et aevum ipsum esse. Convenientius igitur cunctis aliis principalius." Ergo non habet minus de vi expressiva quam aliae perfectiones divinae, "sicut exsistens Deus laudatur ex digniore donorum aliorum eius." Igitur, cum Deus sit esse purum et perfectum, necesse est ut illud suum esse sit expressivum cuiuslibet alterius esse, ut sicut unum [= una] vita dat vivere non-viventi, sic unum ens dat esse simpliciter non-enti. Unde in eodem capitulo[35]: "Ante alias ipsius participationes esse propositum est, et est[36] ipsum secundum se esse senius eo quod est per se vitam esse," etc.

Et haec est sententia Avicennae in loco auctoritatis allegatae.[37] Item, dicit alibi, eodem libro, quod "creatio est dignior omnibus modis dandi esse."

1. Ad obiectum primum dicendum quod Deus potest quidquid in se est possibile et suae perfectioni non repugnat. Tunc autem illud in quo contradictio implicatur cadit a ratione, sicut ubi est contradictionis implicatio; verbi gratia in omni impossibili per accidens. Tanta enim est impossibilitas ut pransus fieret ieiunus, sicut ut corruptus fieret incorruptus. Quia igitur corruptio transit in praeteritum, non potest non fuisse facta, et ita corruptam fieri virginem implicat contradictionem.[38]

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod non est simile, quia esse creaturae non excludit non fuisse, sicut esse virginem excludit esse corruptam.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod abusiva est comparatio cum dicitur quod 'maior est' etc., quia in comparando creaturam Deo sunt deo extrema; in comparando creaturam nihilo, non est nisi unum extremum, quorum unum caret omni possibilitate pro utroque extremo mutationis. Non sic creatura, quia in nihilo non est possibilitas, sed tantum esse creaturae est possibile.

4. Ad quartum dicendum quod revera non est ibi distantia, quia non est nisi unum extremum; et ideo proprie non pertransitur, quia extrema non concurrunt vel sequuntur se circa idem supremum.

5. Ad quintum dicendum, sicut patet, quod ibi non est distantia. Item, extremum distantiae inter Creatorem et creaturam caret omni possibilitate initiali et finali.

6. Ad sextum dicendum quod hoc est in hac productione singulare, quia contactus est causa huius quod tangitur in tactu suo. Unde, quia ipse tactus dat esse, prius natura est tactus quam sit res ipsa quae tangitur. — Ad obiectum autem quod dicit quod tangi est esse tactum et esse tactum addit supra esse, ergo posterius est eo, respondeo quod illud addit super alterum secundum rem vel sicut tactum ab ipso vel [sicut] cursu rerum naturali posterius est eo quia

33 est omnipotentius] enim est impotentius F.
34 Num. 5 (PG 3, 820 B; *Dionysiaca* I, ed. Chevalier [Solesmii 1937], 338).
35 Num. 5 (PG 3, 820A; *Dionysiaca* I, 337).
36 est] quoniam *add.* F. Then below, for *senius*, the codex reads *se minus* (with cross over it).
37 Cf. note 28 above; then, *Metaph.* VI, c. 2 (f. 92a).
38 Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, 25, 4, resp. (175a 48-175b 18); and *Quodl.* V. q. 2, a. 1.

addit super eum secundum rem. Sed in proposito addit secundum modum loquendi, quia quod additur non causatur a principiis subiecti nec ordine, nec sequitur ipsum, sed naturaliter praecedit sicut creari.

7. Ad septimum breviter respondeo quod omnes negativae concedendae sunt in talibus et nulla affirmativa. Haec enim vera est [60d]: creatura non fuit nisi in instanti [A]. Haec autem falsa: prius fuit suum non-esse, quia per hoc ponitur mensura distincta a tempore secundum prius et posterius; et propter hoc non est dandum aliquod instans prius per modum aeternitatis, sicut nec extra mundum datus est locus, videlicet ubi est. Tamen divina maiestas transcendit mundi capacitatem. Sicut qui de [= quidem?] aeternitatis [sempiternitas?],[39] sic est prius quod est simul cum tempore et semper. Unde inter nunc temporis primum et aeternitatem quae semper fuit, nihil cadit medium. — Concedo ergo quod mundus incepit et non fuit prius. Et nego istam: suum non-esse fuit prius quam suum [esse], quia hoc ponit mensuram distinctam a tempore secundum prius et posterius. Unde concedi potest ista: mundus semper fuit. Unde Augustinus, *De civitate* XII, cap. 15[40]: "Angeli, si semper fuerunt, creati sunt; ac per hoc nec si semper fuerunt ideo Creatori coaeterni sunt. Ille enim semper fuit aeternitate incommutabili, isti autem facti sunt; sed ideo semper fuisse dicuntur, quia omni tempore fuere."

9. Ad nonum dicendum quod sicut [Deus] non est extra mundum, ut 'extra' dicat dimensionem positionis, cum non sit extra mundum per immensitatem virtutis quia continet mundum et mundo non collimitatur, ita fuit ante mundum, non quidem secundum extensionem sed secundum simplicem aeternitatem. Unde etiam [= dicit?] Augustinus, *De civitate* XII, cap. 15[41]: "Si Deus fuit semper dominus, semper habuit creaturam suo dominatui servientem, de nihilo factam nec sibi coaeternam; erat quippe ante illam quamvis nullo tempore sine illa; non eam spatio praecurrens, sed manente perpetuitate praecedens." Haec Augustinus. Igitur praecessit sine dimensionis extensione sicut transcendit mundum cui non collimitatur sine distensione. — Item, Augustinus, *De civitate* XI, cap. 5: "Si dicunt inanes esse cogitationes quibus [infinita] imaginantur loca, cum nullus sit locus praeter mundum, respondetur eis isto modo inaniter cogitare homines praeterita tempora vacationis Dei, cum tempus nullum sit ante mundum."

10. Ad decimum dico quod non-esse non praecessit esse. Concedo enim negativas nihil ponentes, et nego omnes affirmativas ponentes durationem extensionis vel ordinatae secundum prioritatem respectu instantis temporis.

11. Ad undecimum dico quod verum concludit, quia non-esse omni mensura caret.

12. Ad duodecimum respondeo: Haec est falsa: 'non-esse mundi fuit in nunc aeternitatis,' quia puro non-esse nulla est mensura. Esse autem creaturae est in tempore. — Quod si adhuc velles omnino dicere quod non-esse fuisset in nunc aeternitatis, non est [idem] simplicitati instantis, quia simplicitas in-

39 A conjectural reading to fill in a lacuna of 8 letters.

40 Num. 2 (or in modern edd., c. 16); the original text is somewhat varied (PL 41, 364; CSEL 40-1, 593; CCL 48, 372).

41 Num 3, or c. 16 (PL 41, 365; CSEL 40-1, 594; CCL 48, 372). — This is followed by a reference to Book XI, c. 5 (PL 41, 321; CSEL 40-1, 518; CCL 18, 326).

stantis est simplicitatis paucitatis vel arctationis, et ideo plura complecti non potest. Simplicitas autem nunc aeternitatis non est paucitatis sed multiplicitatis immensae, unde omnia tempora complectitur. — Quidam aliter dicunt quod non sequitur, quia non-esse mensuratur immediate ab aeternitate, esse autem mediate. Sed illic nihil est quia nobilius esset non-esse quam esse, quia immediatius aeternitati.

13. Ad decimum tertium dico quod quomodocumque dicatur 'prius', ista est falsa: 'prius fuit non-esse mundi quam esse mundi.' Haec autem vera: 'non prius fuit esse mundi,' quia, ut prius tactum est, dicendo 'prius fuit non-esse mundi' copulatur mensura habens prius et posterius respectu temporis ex necessario, quia omnis mensura habens prius respectu temporis aliquid habet se posterius, quia hic est sermo de prioritate extensionis.

14-15. Ad decimum quartum dicendum quod affirmatio et negatio est de eodem, non ut ente sed ut apprehenso ab intellectu. Res enim ut apprehenditur ab intellectu, apprehenditur absque suo esse vel suo non-esse. Non enim est suum esse. Aliquid ergo est commune utrique, non secundum rem, sed quantum ad intellectum; vel si secundum rationem, non tamen ut entem sed ut intellectu apprehensibilem. — Et sic patet ad decimum quintum.

16. Ad decimum sextum dicendum quod cum dicit 'omne quod fit, possibile erat fieri,' distinguo: quia si sit secundum cursum naturalem possibile est fieri secundum cursum naturalem; si vero sit supra cursum naturalem, possibile erat potentia supernaturali, potentia scilicet Creatoris, quae quantum ad intrinseca semper est actui coniuncta, quantum ad extrinseca minime.

17. Ad decimum septimum iam patet, quia de actu interiori verum est, de actu exteriori falsum est.

18. Ad decimum octavum dicendum quod possibile circa aliquid dicitur proprie secundum potentiam quae est in ipso. Large tamen dicitur aliquid possibile alicui quia aliquis potest super ipsum. Cum ergo dicit quod posse creari est alterius potentiae [61a] contra posse creare, si posse creari proprie dicatur quod sit posse subiecti creabilis, verum est, sed tunc posse creari nihil est. Si autem posse creari dicatur secundum rationem, quia Creator potest super creabile, tunc idem est posse creari et creare. Quod autem dicitur quod posse creari non dicitur de Creatore, verum est quantum ad modum loquendi; secundum rem tamen diceretur de ipso.

19. Ad decimum nonum dicendum quod potentiae differunt sicut termini quando secundum veritatem sunt diversae potentiae. Sed in proposito una est Dei potentia naturae mancipata a qua possunt esse diversi effectus.

20. Ad vigesimum dicendum quod creare non est agere, sed facere. Unde Augustinus, *De Trinitate* V, cap. 11[42]: "Quod autem ad faciendum attinet, de solo Deo verissime dicitur." Facere igitur non [requirit] in quid agat. — Aliter tamen loquitur Philosophus[43] de agere et facere, vocans actilia quorum finis est in ipsa operatione, sicut [in] actu cytharizandi et opere virtutis de quibus nihil relinquitur post factum. Factilia sunt quae post operationem manent, ut

42 More correctly, c. 8, n. 9 (PL 42, 917; CCL 50, 216).
43 Cf. *Ethic. Nic.* VI, c. 4 (1140a 1-24); then below, for the distinction between prudence and art, *Ethic. Nic.* VI, c. 4, and c. 7 (1140a 9-10; 1141b 22).

aedificia et consimilia. Unde dicit Philosophus quod prudentia est habitus vera ratione activus; ars vero habitus vera ratione factivus. — Item, de his aliter loquitur Augustinus, *Contra adversarium legis,* cap. 15,[44] dicens: "Facere est quod omnino non erat; creare autem, ex eo quod iam erat ordinando aliquid constituere; ideoque dictus est Deus creans mala."

21. Ad vigesimum primum dicendum quod aliud est de causa materiali, quae omnino est imperfectionis et in Deum nullo modo cadere non [sic!] potest, aliud de aliis causis.

22. Ad vigesimum secundum dicendum quod eductum educebatur quando erat, quia simul educebatur et eductum est. Et cum dicitur: 'quod erat non indiget Creatore,' verum est de eo quod est post acceptionem esse; sed de eo quod accipit esse simul et creationem,[45] non est verum.

23. Ad vigesimum tertium dicendum est quod creatio actio non dicit actionem Dei intrinsecam tantum, sed coniunctionem eius cum effectu exteriori quem connotat communicatio[46] quae simul est cum creato. — Ad obiectum quod actio non est sine termino actionis, dicendum quod verum est. Tamen aliter est in actione divina quae est tota causa acti, aliter in aliis.

24. Ad vigesimum quartum dicendum quod non est simile de potentia creabilis et de potentia numeri, non ratione subiecti potentiae nec ratione termini, quia potentia creabilis est in creante, iuxta illud Augustini, *Ad Volusianum*[47]: "In rebus mutabilibus tota ratio [facti] est potentia facientis." Item, nec ratione termini, quia creabile ordinatur ad actum purum, potentia autem numeri ad actum mixtum cum potentia, quia unus numerus via est ad alium.

25. Ad vigesimum quintum dicendum...[48]

II

Utrum mundus potuit fieri ab aeterno.[1]

Quaeritur, hoc supposito, si[2] mundus potuit ab aeterno creari.
Et ostenditur quod sic:

1. Quia dicit Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*[3]: "Bonum est sui diffusivum." Et Augustinus, *Contra adversarium legis*[4]: "Istorum producendorum causa sola bonitas Dei fuit." Ergo, sicut simul sunt lux et diffusio lucis, sic bonum et dif-

44 Book I, c. 23, n. 48 (PL 42, 633); cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 45, 1, arg. 1 (283b 29-32). Cf. Isaiah 45.7.

45 Highly conjectural; *cū* in F.

46 communicatio (conject.)] concreatio F (with cross above it).

47 *Epist. 137,* c. 2, n. 8 (PL 33, 519; CSEL 44, 107).

48 Lacuna at this point of some twelve lines.

1 Title taken from the list of questions, F., f. 19c.

2 hoc supposito si] utrum L.

3 Cf. *De divinis nominibus*, c. 4, n. 1 (PG 3, 693; *Dionysiaca* I, 146); the axiom is more derived than direct (*ut ex verbis Dionysii accipitur*, remarks St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, 5, 4, arg. 2; 30a 2). On its use in Scholasticism before St. Thomas, cf. J. G. Bougerol, "Saint Bonaventure et le Pseudo-Denys l'Aréopagite," *Etudes franciscaines* 19 (1969), suppl. annuel, 81-104.

4 Book I, c. 7, n. 10 (PL 42, 609).

fusio bonitatis. Sed bonum fuit ab aeterno, ergo et diffusio eius quae est creatio.

2. Item, Augustinus, *De Trinitate* VI, cap. 1[5]: "Est coaeternus Patri Filius, sicut splendor qui gignitur ab igne atque diffunditur coaevus[6] est illi, et esset aeternus, si ignis[7] esset aeternus." [F 61b] Si igitur ignis a se habet effectum diversum sibi coaevum, ergo et Deus potest. — Respondebatur[8] quod creatura non potest capere aeternitatem.— [3.] Contra: Augustinus, *Ad Volusianum*[9]: "In rebus artificialibus[10] [L 97b] tota ratio facti est potentia facientis." Sed creatio est operatio summe mirabilis; ergo totaliter dependet a potentia Dei. Ergo nulla impotentia repugnat a parte recipientis.

4. Item, quando creatura non est, nihil potest recipere quantum est a parte sui, nec esse nec aeternum esse, quia a pari est impossibilitas ad utrumque. Ergo qua ratione potest recipere unum, et reliquum.

5. Item, plus potest Deus de nihilo quam creatura de aliquo. Sed si ignis fuisset ab aeterno, genuisset splendorem suum ab aeterno, ut dicit Augustinus.[11] Ergo Deus potuit ab aeterno producere mundum[12] de nihilo.

6. Item,[13] posita causa sufficienti, ponitur effectus. Sed Deus est causa mundi solus et sufficiens. Sed haec causa fuit aeterna; ergo et creatum. — Respondebatur[14] ad hoc argumentum quod non sequitur de causa[15] voluntarie agente, quia eius effectus est secundum modum voluntatis suae. — [7.] Contra: ergo si voluisset ab aeterno mundum produxisse, potuisset. — Respondetur quod verum est quantum est ex parte sui. — [8.] Contra: Deus quantum est ex parte sui nihil potest nisi quod posse esse est possibile,[16] cum 'posse' dicat respectum ad obiectum potentiae. Ergo, si Deus potuit ab aeterno mundum producere quantum est ex se, mundus potuit ab aeterno produci.

9. Item, aeque potens Deus est producere finitum sicut infinitum. Sed produxit ab aeterno infinitum, scilicet Filium suum. Ergo et potuit[17] ab aeterno producere finitum.

10. Item, mundus non incepit esse; ergo fuit ab aeterno. Probatio primae: si incepit esse, aut in tempore, aut in instanti. Non in tempore, quia inter ens et non-ens non est medium. Ergo incepit in instanti. Sed hoc est impossibile; ergo non incepit. Quod sit impossibile,[18] probatur: quia eadem est ratio de mundi inceptione et eius desitione. Mundus autem si desineret, non desineret in instanti.

5 PL 42, 923; CCL 50, 228; cf. P. Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 9, c. 2, n. 3 (ed. cit., 103-104).
6 coaevus] coeternus L.
7 ignis...Si *om.* (homoioteleuton) L.
8 Respondebatur F, respondetur L.
9 *Epist. 137*, c. 2, n. 8 (PL 33, 519; CSEL 44, 107).
10 artificialibus F, mirabilibus L, talibus *Aug.*
11 Above, in arg. 2.
12 mundum *trp. after* potuit L.
13 Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 46, 1, arg. 9 (294a 11-20).
14 Respondebatur F, respondetur L. — Cf. St. Thomas, ibid., ad 9 (295b 47-296a 5).
15 de causa *om.* L.
16 est possible L, posuit F (with a cross in margin).
17 potuit F, est possibile L.
18 ergo...impossibile *om.* (*hom.*) L.

11. Hoc probatur sic: quia si mundus verteretur in nihilum, mundus in sua annihilatione non esset, et annihilatio mundi esset terminus sui[19] esse. Sed mensura annihilationis esset cum annihilatione, sicut mensura omnis motus est cum motu et mutationis cum mutatione. Ergo si annihilatio est in instanti, instans est cum annihilatione. Sed annihilatio est[20] post esse mundi; ergo et instans quod est eius mensura. Ergo, si mundus annihilatur in instanti, instans est[21] post esse mundi. Sed hoc est impossibile, cum pars non sit sine toto, nec accidens sine subiecto; ergo etc. — Respondebatur[22] quod annihilatio est in nunc aeternitatis. — Contra: Quidquid est in nunc aeternitatis est aeternum. Sed annihilatio illa, hoc[23] casu posito, non esset aeterna; ergo etc.

12. Item, si mundus non potest esse aeternus, hoc non nisi quia habet esse post non-esse. Quod[24] est falsum; ergo primum. Quod non habeat esse post non-esse probatur: quia nec post secundum[25] naturam, cum non-esse non dicat materiam.[26] — Item, quia prius tantum natura simul est tempore cum posteriori, sicut materia cum forma. Nec prius tempore, quia non prius erat tempus[27]; nec prius aeternitate, quia non-esse mundi non fuit in aeternitate. Sic enim non-esse vel nihil esse esset in perfectissimo esse [L 97c] et negatio in affirmatione purissima; ergo etc.

13. Item, praeteritum et futurum sunt aequalia in suppositis. Quidquid enim est praeteritum, fuit futurum; et quidquid est futurum erit praeteritum. Ergo, qua ratione est unum infinitum, et reliquum est vel esse poterit infinitum.

14. Item, Boethius, *De consolatione* V[28]: "Neque Deus conditis[29] rebus antiquior videri debet. Ergo Deus non est antiquior mundo; ergo si Deus aeternus, et mundus.

15. Item, in habentibus materiam quod est ab agente per artem est secundum modum agentis, quantum patitur conditio materiae. Ergo quod est ab alio[30] sine materia, est totaliter secundum modum agentis. Sed mundus sensibilis exprimitur a mundo architypo sine praeiacente materia; ergo est[31] secundum modum agentis omnino. Ergo, si mundus architypus vel exemplaris est aeternus, et mundus [F 61c] iste sensibilis erit aeternus.

16. Item, Deus[32] est agens naturale et voluntarium. Si igitur produxit de novo[33] mundum: aut in quantum agens naturale vel per principium quod est natura, aut per principium quod est voluntas. Si primo modo: sed natura agit

19 sui *om.* F.
20 est *om.* F.
21 est F, autem L.
22 Respondebatur L, respondetur F.
23 hoc *om.* L.
24 Quod F, sed hoc L.
25 secundum *om.* F.
26 materiam F, naturam L.
27 tempus F, tempore L.
28 Prosa 6 (PL 63, 859 B; CCL 94, 101).
29 conditis] conditor L.
30 alio F, aliquo L.
31 est *om.* F.
32 Deus *om.* F.
33 de novo L. deus F.

uniformiter et determinate unum. Ergo aut ab aeterno produxit, aut nunquam produxit. Si autem produxit in quantum agens voluntarium: sed non est impotentior natura quam voluntas. Ergo ab aeterno potuit producere sicut si[34] ex natura produxisset.

17. Item, quod non repugnet conditio[ni] creaturae produci ab aeterno, probatur: quoniam dicendo mundum creatum fuisse ab aeterno, duo dico: et mundum semper fuisse, et semper ab alio esse habuisse. Sed[35] in hoc si aliquid repugnat rationi creaturae, quaero: aut quia potentia esse ab alio aeternaliter, et hoc non,[36] quia Filius est ab aeterno; aut quia potentia[37] ab aeterno diversitate substantiae, et hoc non, quia si caelum fuisset ab aeterno motus fuisset aeternus, qui tamen essentialiter differt a caelo[38]; aut quia in hoc aequipararetur Deo,[39] et hoc non, quia aeternitas eius esset aeternitati Dei incomparabilis, cum haberet partem post partem; et sicut modo esset duratio mundi successiva cum simplici aeternitate Dei, sic potuisset, ut videtur, si ab aeterno fuisset.

18. Item, si Deus produxit mundum ex tempore proposito aeterno, ergo[40] mutatus est implendo propositum. Probatio consequentiae[41]: quia quod voluit ab aeterno producere, productum actu voluit. Causa autem aut[42] fuit a parte mundi; et hoc non videtur, quia mundus cum produceretur nullam habuit[43] causam suae productionis; aut fuit a parte Dei, et ita Deus implendo ex tempore quod ab aeterno disposuit, mutatus est.

19. Item, res habent comparationem ad causam materialem et efficientem. Sed materiatum potest esse coaevum[44] materiae sicut cantus sono; ergo et efficienti. Probatio: nihil fit[45] de materia nisi cum mutatione materiae. Sed quod fit a Deo, fit sine mutatione Dei vel etiam sine mutatione proprie dicta eius quod est sic, quia creatio non est mutatio proprie dicta.[46] Ergo magis potest aliquid creatum[47] coaeternum esse creanti quam materiae de qua est.

20. Item, Deus dat creaturae aliquid mediantibus principiis suis, aliquid sine concursu alicuius principii, sicut in creatione. [L 97d] Sed dat creaturae perpetuitatem sui esse quia convenit suis principiis a parte post. Ergo potest eidem dare aeternitatem a parte ante quam dat mediantibus principiis.

21. Item, productio creaturae ex tempore causam habet solum Dei voluntatem. Sed quod[48] ex sola causa tali pendet, ipsa sola mutari potest. Ergo si Deus vellet, aliter esse posset vel fuisse potuisset.

34 si *om.* F.‖produxisset L, potuisset F.
35 Sed *om.* F.
36 non] est *add.* F.
37 potentia L, est F.
38 celum eternum implicat opposita *marg. note* F².
39 Deo *om.* F.
40 ergo *om.* L.
41 consequentiae L, consequentis F.
42 Causa autem aut F, tamen causa L.
43 habuit F, haberet L.
44 coaevum] corporeum F (marked by cross).
45 fit F, est L.
46 mutatio proprie dicta L, proprie mutatio F.
47 creatum *om.* F ‖ coaeternum esse *trp.* L.
48 quod *om.* F.

22. Item, si mundus productus est in instanti, hoc non potest esse quia instans est copulatio[49] duorum temporum, et ita ante tempus esset tempus.

23. Item, inter processionem aeternam, quae est in identitate substantiae, et temporalem, quae est in diversitate essentiae, medium est: vel processio in identitate naturae ex tempore, vel processio in diversitate naturae ab aeterno. Primum est impossibile; ergo secundum est necessarium.[50]

24. Item, aut Deus ab aeterno potuit mundum producere, et voluit; aut potuit, sed noluit; aut voluit, sed non potuit. Si primum est verum, ergo produxit. Si secundum est verum,[51] ergo invidus fuit, sicut de generatione Filii arguit Augustinus.[52] Si tertium est verum, impotens fuit. Sed haec duo ultima sunt impossibilia; ergo primum est necessarium.

25. Item, potuit fuisse mundus mille annis antequam[53] fuit, per mille annos et iterum per mille, et sic in infinitum. Ergo potuit ab aeterno.

26. Item, *De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus* X[54]: "In principio creavit Deus omnia, ut non esset otiosa Dei bonitas." Ergo si non creavit ab aeterno, fuit otiosus ab aeterno.

27. Item, Deus est causa rerum in triplici genere causae. Sed ad perfectionem exemplaris pertinet ut sit aeternum. Ergo ad perfectionem efficientis similiter.

28. Item, si mundus incepit in aliquo [F 61d] instanti, verbi gratia in A, ante A mundus non erat. Ante autem A, quando mundus non erat, dicatur B. Sed inter A et B, cum non sint simul, cadit[55] medium, et tempus per consequens. Ergo ante mundum[56] fuit tempus.

29. Item, si fit aliqua prima mutatio, sit A. Ergo cum A incepit, prius fuit verum dicere A non esse actu sed potentia. Sed quidquid exit de potentia in actum, exit per mutationem. Ergo ante primam mutationem[57] fuit mutatio.

30. Item, Augustinus videtur docere quod non sit impossibile mundum fuisse ab aeterno. Unde dicit, *De civitate* XI, cap. 4[58]: "Qui a Deo mundum factum fatentur, non eum temporis volunt habere sed suae creationis initium, ut modo quodam vix intelligibili semper sit factus." Haec Augustinus. Sed mundus iste est vix intelligibilis; ergo non impossibilis. Nullum enim Deo impossibile est intelligibile, cui *non* est[59] *impossibile omne verbum*, dicitur Lucae primo.

31. Item, Deus non creavit mundum nisi quia bonum est mundum esse. Sed

49 copulatio L, copula F.
50 necessarium] quia semper alterum concomitatur (?) *marg. note* F².
51 est verum *om.* F.
52 "Deum quem genuit, quoniam meliorem se generare non potuit (nihil enim Deo melius), generare debuit aequalem. Si enim voluit, et non potuit, infirmus est; si potuit, et non voluit, invidus est. Ex quo conficitur aequalem genuisse Filium"; *De divers. Quaest. 83,* q. 50 (PL 40, 31s); cf. P. Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 44, c. 1, n. 2 (ed. cit., 304).
53 mundus...antequam F, mundura (?) priusquam L.
54 Gennadius, *De eccl. dogm.* (PL 58, 983 C-D); the text is abbreviated.
55 cadit] tempore *add.* L ‖ tempus] tempore L.
56 mundum F, medium L.
57 mutationem] non *add.* F.
58 PL 41, 319; CSEL 40-1, 515; CCL 48, 324; quoted in part by St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 46, 2, ad 1 (297b 1-4). — Below, Luke 1, 37.
59 est F, sit L. ‖ impossibile] apud deum *add.* L.

melius est esse ab aeterno quam non ab aeterno, cum esse ab aeterno conveniat Deo; ergo etc.[60]

CONTRA:

a. Gen. 1, 1: *In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram.*[61] Et loquitur Moyses de principio temporis quod continuatur per dies inferius enumeratos in canone.[62]

b. Item contra:[63] Avicenna. VI *Metaphysicae*[64]: "Postquam res |L 98a| ex seipsa[65] habet non-esse, sequitur tunc ut eius esse sit post non-esse et fiat postquam non fuerat."

c. Item, mensura est per quod[66] cognoscitur quantitas. Ergo quae est actio duarum invicem quantitatum, eadem erit proportio invicem mensurarum suarum. Deus habet quantitatem virtutis, mundus habet quantitatem molis.[67] Sed non est aliqua quantitas creaturae quae posset commensurari[68] quantitati vel magnitudini divinae. Deus enim ita est in hoc mundo quod posset esse in mundo alio[69]; si etiam esset maior in infinitum, nec etiam[70] posset facere mundum sibi conproportionalem. Ergo nec duratio mundi potest ex aliqua parte aequari aeternitati.[71] Sed aequaretur si esset factus ab aeterno. Ergo impossibile est Deum creasse mundum ab aeterno.

d. Item, si mundus creatus est non in tempore, quia inter esse et non-esse purum non est medium, ergo creatus est in instanti; quaero: aut instanti initiali temporis aut mediali[72] aut finali, cum non sit aliud cogitare. Tertium est manifeste falsum; similiter et secundum, quia tunc tempus fuisset ante mundum. Ergo creatus est in instanti temporis[73] initiali. — Quod etiam patet per aliam viam. Cum enim creatio dedit mundo esse, ergo instans creationis fuit terminus essendi ipsi mundo a parte ante. Sed nihil huiusmodi[74] est vel esse potest aeternum; ergo etc.

e. Item, si mundus duraverit per tempus infinitum et duraturus est similiter per tempus infinitum, tantumdem ergo[75] durabit quantum duraverit et non plus. Ergo[76] sicut non impediente infinitate praeteriti temporis[77] totum tempus

60 Lacuna of two lines in F.
61 et terram] etc. L. || Et loquitur Moyses L, loquitur F.
62 Again a lacuna of two lines in F.
63 contra *om.* L.
64 Chapt. 1 (f. 91c).
65 seipsa] se L.
66 quod F, quam L.
67 Cf. Augustine, *De Trin.* VI, 7 (PL 42, 929; CCL 50, 237); in P. Lombard, *Sent.* I, d. 8, c. 4, n. 3 (ed. cit., 99).
68 posset commensurari F, possit mensurari L.
69 alio *om.* F.
70 etiam *om.* F.
71 aeternitati] trinitati F.
72 initiali...mediali *trp.* both FL.
73 temporis *om.* F.
74 huiusmodi F, tale L.
75 tantumdem ergo L, ergo tantum F. || et non plus *om.* L.
76 Ergo] est ut videtur corruptum exemplar *marg. note* F[2].
77 praeteriti temporis *om.* F. || praeteriit sic L, preteritum F.

praeteriit sic ut nihil eius sit futurum, similiter non obstante infinitate temporis futuri aliquando sic erit praeteritum ut nihil eius sit futurum. Sed[78] illud cum aliquando nihil erit futurum, penitus desinet. Ergo tempus est infinitum futurum et tamen aliquando deficiet omnino, quod est impossibile.

f. Item, creatio et versio opponuntur, quia creatio incipit a non-esse sicut versio terminatur in non-esse.[79] Item, versio respicit futurum sicut creatio[80] praeteritum. Ergo sicut impossibile est mundum verti in nihilum et tamen durare in infinitum a parte post, ita impossibile est mundum eductum fuisse de nihilo et[81] tamen durasse per tempus infinitum a parte ante.

g. Item, si mundus duraverit per tempus infinitum et durabit[82] similiter, accipiatur ergo instans [F 62a] mediae diei, quod sit A; dicaturque totum tempus praeteritum A-praeteritum, et omne tempus futurum[83] A-futurum. Similiter sumatur aliud instans mediae diei, quod sit B; dicaturque totum tempus[84] praeteritum B-praeteritum, et totum futurum B-futurum. Item[85] hiis positis supponatur quod duorum aequalium quidquid est maius uno et reliquo, et quocumque unum est maius, et reliquum. Item supponatur quod quidquid sustinet alterum cum alio superaddito sit maius ipso vel totum ad[86] ipsum. Item, quod duo infinita ab eodem[87] indivisibili procedentia[88] sint aequalia. Ex hoc sic: A-praeteritum et A-futurum [L 98b] sunt aequalia, cum unum per impossibile alteri suppositum nec[89] excedat ipsum nec excedatur ab eo. Similiter B-praeteritum et B-futurum sunt aequalia. Sed B-praeteritum est maius quam A-praeteritum, et totum ad ipsum. Ergo est maius quam A-futurum. Sed B-praeteritum et B-futurum sunt aequalia. Ergo B-futurum est maius quam A-futurum; sed A-futurum est totum ad B-futurum. Ergo pars est maior suo toto, posito quod tempus fuerit[90] sine initio.

h. Item, omne esse est aliquod bonum, et duratio maior est[91] melior minore. Ergo infinite maior, infinite melius alio. Ergo impossibile est aliquod creatum infinito tempore durasse.

i. Item, mundus duravit duratione infinita; sed mundus est propter hominem; ergo infiniti homines praecesserunt. Cum[92] ergo animae rationales sint immortales, sunt actu infinitae. Forte hoc non habebit pro inconvenienti qui volet contrarium sustinere. Sed contra: Infinita esse actu est omni philosophiae contrarium.[93] — Aliter docet alius haereticus animas interire

78 Sed *corr. to* Si F². || cum L, tamen F.
79 The whole sentence is omitted in L.
80 creatio] respicit *add.* L.
81 et] tempus *add.* L.
82 duraverit...durabit F, durabit...duravit L. || similiter *om.* L.
83 A-praeteritum...futurum *om.* (*hom.*) L.
84 tempus *om.* F.
85 Item] ex *add.* F. || supponatur F, supponitur L.
86 ad *om.* L.
87 eodem *om.* L.
88 procedentia] precedentia F.
89 nec F, non L. || excedatur ab eo F, ab ipso excedatur L.
90 fuerit L, fuit F.
91 est *om.* F.
92 cum *trp. after* rationales F.
93 Lacuna of three lines in F. — The whole argument is dependent on St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.*, d. 1, p. 1, a. 1, q. 2, fund. 5 (II, 21b); and to a lesser extent on St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I,

cum corpore, quod est contra omnes nobiles philosophos; vel dicit omnium hominum esse animam unam, quod est contra rectissimam philosophiam, quae formam propriam dicit esse propriae materiae et unum esse motorem[94] unius mobilis; vel dicit quod animae successive revolvuntur in corpora diversa, et hoc est a Philosopho improbatum et inter pythagoricas fabulas reputatum.[95]

k. Item, Richardus, I *De Trinitate*, cap. 8,[96] dicit quod id quod est a seipso necessario est aeternum. Ergo per oppositum, quod non est a seipso est ex tempore; et loquor[97] de eo quod est ab alio essentialiter diverso. Haec consequentia sic probatur: quod est a seipso, eo ipso habet esse et esse posse; et quidquid aliud est ab ipso, ab ipso[98] participat esse et posse. Sed nullum participans ab altero aequatur in aliqua conditione illi quod participat. Ergo quod[99] participat recepit esse participatum ab eo quod est aeternum, |sed| non recipit ab aeterno. — Ad hoc respondetur[100] quod si mundus semper fuisset, non tamen Deo parificaretur, quia esse divinum est esse totum simul. — Contra: aequaretur suo modo, quia tantum durasset quantum[101] aeternitas Dei.

l. Item, omne pertransitum et acceptum est finitum. Ergo si omnes revolutiones caeli pertransitae sunt, sunt[102] finitae. — Ad hoc respondetur[103] quod transitus intelligitur a termino in terminum. Quaecumque autem praeterita dies signetur, finiti[104] sunt dies ab illa ad istam, et non oportet quod omnes sunt infiniti. — Contra: caelum pertransit revolutionem diurnam istam et aliam. Ergo si infinitae revolutiones praecesserunt, finitum transiit infinita, quod est contra rationem infiniti, |F 62b| cuius ratio est quod eius quantitatem accipientibus, semper est accipere aliquid extra.

m. Item, omne praeteritum fuit futurum. Totum tempus praeteritum est praeteritum.[105] Ergo totum tempus[106] fuit aliquando futurum. Sed quando totum fuit futurum, fuit in principio sui esse et durationis. Ergo omne tempus habuit initium suae durationis.

n. Item, omne quod factum est, aliquando fuit in fieri. Sed mundus factus est. Ergo aliquando fuit in fieri, hoc est in aliquo instanti. Sed nullum instans

46, 2, arg. 8 and ad 8 (296b 33-39; 298a 44-298b 17). Later in his so-called *Quodlibet Romanum* (that is, disputed at the Roman Curia), Pecham was to argue in Question V: "Item, si mundus fuisset ab aeterno, essent infinita actu, scilicet infinitae animae rationales, nisi ponantur animae interire cum corpore vel revolvi in corpora diversa: quorum quodlibet est impossibile theologiae et philosophiae [more likely: theologice et philosophice]"; ed. F. M. Delorme, *Ioannis de Pecham Quodlibet Romanum* (Romae 1938), 17, 1-4.

94 motorem L, mortem F (with cross in margin).

95 *De anima* I, t. 53, c. 3 (407b 20-26).

96 PL 196, 894 D; ed. J. Ribaillier, 93.

97 loquor L, loquitur F.

98 ab ipso *om.* L.

99 quod F, si L. ‖ participat] deficit *add.* L. ‖ recepit...recipit *om.* L.

100 This is taken literally from St. Thomas, *Summa theologiae* I, 46, 2, ad 5 (298a 3-7).

101 quantum L, sicut F.

102 sunt *om.* F.

103 From the *Summa theol.* I, 46, 2, ad 6 (298a 9-13).

104 finiti F (and Thomas), finitae L. So also below.

105 est praeteritum *om.* L.

106 tempus *om.* L.

[L 98c] distat ab instanti[107] infinite; ergo mundi creatio praecessit finite hoc instans.

o. Item, in causis efficientibus non est abire in infinitum. Ergo si pater est causa filii, non praecesserunt patres infiniti.[108] — Respondetur quod in causis per se ordinatis ad effectum aliquem non est abire in infinitum, sicut quod lapis moveretur a baculo et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed in efficientibus per accidens ordinatis non est impossibile; verbi gratia, accidit huic homini generare in quantum est genitus ab alio, quia generat in quantum homo, non in quantum genitus ab alio. — Contra: infinitas in causis accidentaliter ordinatis non potest esse nisi ab infinita virtute Creatoris. Cum igitur inter effectum istum signatum et Deum, qui est infinitus, simpliciter sint infiniti gradus causarum possibiles, non est ratio quare non possit esse[109] infinitas in causis ordinatis essentialiter sicut in ordinatis accidentaliter. — Item, ratio II *Metaphysicae*[110] videtur esse contra hoc. Et est talis: In agentibus ordinatis primum est causa medii et medium est causa ultimi, sive sit unum sive plura media. Remota autem causa, removetur illud cuius est causa. Remoto ergo primo, medium non potest esse causa. Sed si procedatur in[111] causis efficientibus in infinitum, nulla causarum erit prima; ergo nulla erit secunda. Istud videtur sequi tam in causis essentialiter quam accidentaliter ordinatis.

p. Item, Philosophus, in fine...[112]

RESPONSIO:

Creatio mundi ex tempore quamvis sit articulus fidei,[113] tamen ratione, ut videtur, potest investigari. Nec hoc est in praeiudicium fidei, dum non propter rationem fidei assentitur, sed merito fidei ad eius intelligentiam pervenitur. Unde qui sine fide de creatione locuti sunt, omnes erraverunt vel diminute,[114] non eam attribuendo Deo, vel superflue, attribuendo eam alii a Deo.

Mundum[115] igitur fuisse ex tempore et non ab aeterno creatum patet considerando primo in ipso veram praeteritionem fieri[116]; secundo participationem essendi; tertio modum suae originis; quarto mensuram suae productionis; quinto totum decursum temporis.

Prima ratio.[117] Primo dico, considerando praeteritionem ipsius fieri

107 instanti *om.* F.

108 The argument is based on arg. 7 of the *Summa theol.* I, 46, 2 (296b 26-32). The response is rather literally from ad 7 (298a 16-43), with a mangled use of St. Thomas's own words.

109 esse *om.* L.

110 A-minor, t. 6, c. 2 (994a 11-18). Cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit., arg. 7.

111 in L, a F.

112 Lacuna of five lines in F; whole line omitted in L, which proceeds immediately to the Response.

113 Cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit., sed contra, and resp.

114 diminute L, dimitti (*corr. in* dimitte) sunt (= non?) F, *with* loquti sup. *add. marg.* F². ‖ non eam *trp.* L. ‖ superflue *om.* F. ‖ attribuendo] etiam *add.* F.

115 Mundum F, Quemadmodum L.

116 fieri F, fiendi L.

117 Prima ratio *marg.* L, *om.* F (so also below).

mundi, quoniam suum fieri vere transiit in praeteritum. Omne autem praeteritum aliquando fuit praesens et non praeteritum. Nullum autem tale fuit ab aeterno. Ideo dicit Augustinus, *Super Genesim contra Manichaeum*[118]: "Non coaevum Deo mundum dicimus, quia non eius aeternitatis est mundus, cuius aeternitatis est Deus. Mundum quippe Deus fecit, et cum ipsa creatura quam Deus[119] fecit tempora esse coeperunt." Ergo si fecit, fieri transiit in praeteritum quod est temporis initium.

Secunda ratio. Item secundo, considerando participationem essendi. Eo[120] enim quo participat esse, non habet esse plenum, sed contractum et limitatum et quantum ad essentiam et quantum ad modum.[121] Igitur sicut participat esse finitum, sic et modum essendi finitum.[122] Sed habere esse sine limitatione[123] dicit modum [L 98d] essendi infinitum. Ergo non [F 62c] convenit[124] habenti esse participatum. Quod dicat talem modum essendi multipliciter[125] patet: quia excedit omne esse ex tempore in infinitum. Item,[126] quia secundum hoc, tantum est suum esse vel tam diuturnum extensive sicut esse divinum intensive, et tam longa volubilitas temporis quanta simplicitas aeternitatis; quod est impossibile, sicut invenire mundum tantum quantitate molis sicut Deus est quantitate virtutis. Unde Augustinus, *De civitate* XI, cap. 5[127]: "Si infinita spatia temporis ante mundum cogitant, in quibus non videtur eis Deus ab opere cessare potuisse, similiter cogitent extra mundum infinita spatia locorum," quia idem est iudicium de ante et de extra mundum. — Quod si dicas non esse simile, quia ponere magnitudinem infinitam est ponere infinitum actu; ponere autem[128] tempus infinitum non est ponere aliquid[129] actu infinitum, quia partes temporis non sunt simul; contra: tempus est aliquod ens; ergo tempus infinitum, ens vel essentia infinita creatae durationis aequans aeternitatem Dei; et si non in simplicitate, tamen in durationis immensitate a parte ante.

Item, quod modus sit infinitus, probatio: quia infinitas a parte prima[130] est possibilis quia semper est actu finitum quod acceptum est et infinitum in potentia tantum. Sed in infinitate a parte ante est econtra infinitum in actu et in potentia. In actu inquam,[131] quia tantum habet in actu quantum habet acceptum; et in potentia, ut de futuro dictum est. Haec sententia colligitur ex

118 Book I, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 34, 175).
119 Deus *om.* F.
120 From *Eo enim* to *immensitate a parte ante* (i. e., the end of the paragraph), the text is incorporated by Roger Marston into his *Quodl.* I, q. 1, nn. 9-10; ed. G. F. Etzkorn — I. C. Brady (Quaracchi 1968) 8-9.
121 modum] essendi *add.* Marston.
122 Igitur...finitum *om.* F.
123 limitatione F, initio vel principio L. (this sentence is omitted by Marston).
124 convenit *om.* F.
125 multipliciter *om.* L.
126 Item *om.* L.
127 PL 41, 320; CSEL 40-1, 517; CCL 48, 325.
128 ponere autem] sed ponere L.
129 aliquid *om.* L.
130 prima L, ante primo F. (*post* would seem to be called for).
131 inquam L, nunquam F.

Augustino, *Super Genesim contra Manichaeum*, dicente[132]: "Cum ipsa creatura quam fecit Deus tempora esse coeperunt; et ideo dicuntur aeterna tempora. Non tamen sic sunt aeterna tempora quomodo aeternus est Deus, quia Deus est ante tempora, qui fabricator est temporum, sicut omnia quae fecit Deus bona sunt valde, sed non sic bona sunt quomodo bonus est Deus qui illa fecit." Ergo ex hiis verbis patet quod sicut bonitas est penitus infinite minor bonitate, ita duratio duratione.

Tertia ratio. Item, tertio hoc patet ex modo suae originis, quia est ex nihilo, et ita aliquando non fuit. — Respondetur[133] quod intelligendum est negative: mundus factus est de nihilo, hoc est de non-aliquo, ita quod non-esse non[134] praecessit esse secundum durationem, sed esse mundi nihil praecessit. — Sed istud improbatur per rationem praetactam,[135] quoniam sicut versio in non-esse non potest stare cum infinitate a parte post, ita nec eductio de non-esse cum infinitate a parte ante. Item, accipere esse non de aliquo dicit maiorem novitatem quam accipere esse de aliquo, quia quod accipit esse ab aliquo non totaliter producitur, sed secundum aliquid[136] prius fuit. Sed si mundus factus fuisset de aliquo, habuisset esse novum et ex tempore, ut probat Philosophus.[137] Ergo multo magis si habuit esse non de aliquo, habuit esse novum necessario. Damascenus, cap. 8 [138]: "Creatio ex Dei voluntate opus exsistens, [L 99a] non coaeterna est cum Deo, quia non aptum natum est quod ex non-ente ad esse deducitur coaeternum esse ei, qui sine principio est et semper est." Et haec est etiam ratio Anselmi, *Monologion*, 24 cap.[139]

(IV.) Item, hoc patet ex mensura suae productionis, quae est nunc aevi vel nunc temporis. Nunc autem creationis est terminus sui esse a parte ante. Quod autem habet terminum initialem, non habet essendi infinitatem. Ergo si mundus productus est in tempore, productus est in temporis[140] initio. De instanti productionis dicit Hugo, parte prima, cap. 5 [141]: "Credimus unum et idem prorsus momentum temporis fuisse, ut in tempore creata sit rerum visibilium corporaliumque materia, [et invisibilium in angelica natura essentia]." [F 62d]

132 Book I, c. 2, n. 4 (PL 34, 175).

133 Respondetur] Si respondetur L; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa theol.* I, 46, 2, ad 2 (297b 25-33).

134 non L, rerum F.

135 See arg. f, above; and a parallel text in Pecham's *Quodl. Romanum*, q. V: "Respondeo. Hic implicantur duae difficultates. Una est: An mundus potuit esse vel creari ab aeterno. Et certum est quod non. Probatur sic: quia habuit esse post non-esse, id est creatus est de non-aliquo. Sicut igitur impossibile est mundum durare in infinitum a parte post et tamen verti in nihilum, ita impossibile est quod fuerit ab aeterno ex parte ante et tamen fuerit eductus de nihilo"; ed. cit., 16, 16-22.

136 aliquid F, quid L.

137 *Physic.* VIII, t. 2 and 10, c. 1 (250b 24: 251b 17).

138 *De fide orthodoxa* I, c. 8 (PG 94, 814 A-B); versio Burgundionis, c. 8, n. 4 (ed. E. M. Buytaert, St. Bonaventure, N. Y. 1955, 32). Quoted by R. Marston, *Quodl.* I, q. 1, n. 2 (ed. cit., 4); and in part by St. Thomas, *De aeternitate mundi*, n. 10.

139 Thus St. Anselm writes: "Nam vel hoc solo veram aeternitatem soli illi inesse substantiae, quae sola non facta sed factrix esse inventa est, aperte percipitur; quoniam vera aeternitas principii finisque meta carere intelligitur; quod nulli rerum creatarum convenire, eo ipso quod de nihilo factae sunt, convincitur"; PL 158, 178 A.

140 temporis *om.* F.

141 PL 176, 189 D; at the end of the citation there is a lacuna in F (only) of somewhat over two lines, which we have endeavoured to supply from Hugo's text.

(V.) Item, hoc patet considerando decursum temporis, quoniam[142] revolutio una tardior est quam alia, quia plures praecedunt unam quam aliam, sicut dies crastina[143] tardior est quam hodierna. Igitur revolutio omnis quam infinitae praecedunt vel praecesserunt, est infinitae tarditatis. Sed quod est tale, nunquam eveniet. Ergo si mundus infinito tempore duravit, hodierna vel crastina revolutio nunquam eveniet. Ideo dicit Augustinus, *De civitate* XII, cap. 15 [144]: "Tempus quoniam mutabilitate transcurrit, aeternitati immutabili non potest esse coaeternum. Et ita motus quibus tempora peraguntur Creatori coaeterni esse non possunt."[145]

Dico igitur quod mundus nullo modo capax fuit aeternae vel interminabilis durationis. Qui autem posuerunt mundum Deo coaeternum ex falso fundamento ad hoc moti sunt: vel quia sine mundo Deum credebant esse[146] otiosum; vel quia imaginati sunt temporis spatium praecessisse mundum; vel quia non credebant Deum aliquid facere novum nisi voluntate affectum et per consequens mutatum. Unde Augustinus, XI *De civitate*, cap. 4,[147] loquens de ponentibus mundum aeternum dicit: "Dicunt quidem aliquid unde sibi Deum videntur velut a fortuita temeritate defendere, ne subito illi credatur venisse in mentem quod nunquam ante venisset, facere mundum, et accidisse illi voluntatem novam, cum in nullo omnino sit mutabilis." Quae falsa fundamenta Augustinus refellit, ut patebit respondendo ad argumenta.

1. Ad primum de diffusione boni et lucis, dicendum quod duplex est diffusio illius boni vel lucis: quaedam est diffusio boni[148] interior per aeternas emanationes, quaedam exterior per rerum temporalium[149] productionem. Interior de necessitate est aeterna propter uniformitatem et perfectissimam actualitatem divinae naturae. Secunda autem, quae est temporalium et temporalis,[150] de necessitate est secundum quod congruit creaturae. Unde sicut universum est finitum nec capax infinitatis in magnitudine, ita nec tempus capax erat infinitatis actualis ex aliqua parte, et ideo ipsum, cum sit pars universi, certo termino et mensura est perventum. Aliter finitum esset susceptivum modi infiniti, ut dictum est. Et quod |L 99b| dicit Augustinus[151] quod sola bonitas Dei fuit causa istorum, dico quod verum est, sed non causa defectuum, sicut novitas et vertibilitas et parvitas quae sequuntur creaturam in quantum ex nihilo. Novitas, quia ab alio facta est; vertibilitas, quia ex[152] nihilo facta est; parvitas, quia participative facta est.

2. Ad secundum dicendum quod aeternitas soli Deo convenit, nec potest[153]

142 Marston uses *revolutio...tale nunquam eveniet* in *Quodl.*I, q. 1, n. 4; ed. cit., 4.
143 dies crastina] postcrastina L.
144 Num. 2, or chapter 16 in newer editions (PL 41, 364s; CSEL 40-1, 594, 1-9; CCL 48, 372, 83-92). Augustine's words are cited at greater length by St. Thomas, *De aeternitate mundi*, n. 11.
145 Lacuna of four lines in F only.
146 esse *om.* F.
147 Num. 2 (PL 41, 319; CSEL 40-1, 515; CCL 48, 324).
148 est diffusio boni *om.* F.
149 temporalium F, naturalium L.
150 temporalium et temporalis] temporalium et temporis F, naturalium et temporalis L.
151 See above, in the first arg. of the present question.
152 ex F, de L.
153 potest] fecit F.

alii convenire, sicut dicit Augustinus, *Super Genesim* VIII[154]: "Incommutabilis est natura Trinitatis, et ob hoc ita aeterna ut aliquid ei coaeternum esse non possit." Quod etiam plures non possunt esse aeternitates[155] probat Anselmus, *De incarnatione Verbi*, cap. 14.[156] — Tamen aliquando aeternum dicitur largius: sicut super[157] Gen. 3, 22: *Ne sumat de ligno vitae et comedat et vivat in aeternum*, id est per magnum spatium temporis, sic ubi[158] Apostolus dicit, II ad Timoth. I, 9: *Quae data est nobis ante tempora saecularia*, ibi littera Augustini habet *ante tempora aeterna*. Quod exponit, *Super Genesim contra Manichaeum* I, dicens[159]: "Mundum fecit Deus et cum ipsa creatura quam fecit Deus tempora esse coeperunt; et ideo dicuntur aeterna tempora." Ergo sensus est: si ignis fuisset aeternus,[160] hoc est quantumcumque amplius fuisset quam fuit, vel si fuisset in principio ipso[161] temporis in specie distinctus. Quodsi dicatur aeternum Deo coaevum, implicatio est oppositorum, quia ponit accidens infinitum in subiecto finito, et sequitur ut splendor esset aeternus, sicut posito impossibili sequitur quod impossibili implicatur. Et sic dicendum de vestigio [F 63a] pedis in pulvere rationibus consimilibus.

3. Ad tertium dicendum quod 'tota ratio facti est potentia facientis'. Sed tamen defectibilitas sequitur creaturam in quantum ex nihilo est, cuius causa Deus non est. — Item, cum dico posse rei creabilis, licet nihil dicam positive nisi potentiam Creatoris, dico tamen cum hoc privationem prohibitionis[162] sui esse. Quaedam enim prohibent suum esse, ut omnia in quorum intellectu negatio clauditur. Licet igitur creabile non dicat potentiam aliam a potentia Creatoris, tamen excludit impedimentum, quia termini non repugnant.

4. Ad quartum dicendum quod non est impossibilitas[163] a pari ad utrumque, quia in eo quod est 'creaturam esse aeternam' opposita clauduntur, non autem in eo quod est 'creaturam creari'.

5. Ad quintum dicendum quod plus potest Deus de nihilo in eo quod posse est posse, sed hoc posse non est posse.

6-7. Ad sextum dicendum quod illud argumentum procedit ex falsa imaginatione, quasi Deus spatio mundum praecessit. Amplius, dico quod Deus nihil potest velle nisi secundum leges sapientiae. Ideo non potest velle aliquid infinitum inesse subiecto finito.[164] — Et sic patet ad septimum.[165]

154 *De Genesi ad litteram* VIII, c. 23, n. 44 (PL 34, 389; CSEL 28-1, 262).
155 aeternitates] trinitates F.
156 PL 178, 282 B.
157 super *om.* F.
158 ubi] hic F.
159 Chapt. 2, n. 3 (PL 34, 175).
160 See the words of Augustine in the second argument.
161 in principio ipso F, a principio L.
162 prohibitionis] probationis F.
163 impossibilitas] argumentum L.
164 In the margin of F at this point there is one note deleted and partly covered by another (at third hand?), which is quite illegible; it seems to refer to the lack of a response to the seventh argument.
165 septimum] sextum L.

8. Ad octavum[166] dico quod verum est ex parte sui pro tanto quod non procedit ex impotentia quod non producit; sed tamen non congruit omnino potentiae suae.

9. Ad aliud dicendum quod aequipotens est producere finitum sicut infinitum, sed non simul finitum et infinitum.[167]

11. Ad undecimum dicendum[168] quod non est simile de creatione quae terminatur ad esse, et ideo potest habere mensuram; et de versione quae |L 99c| terminatur ad non-esse, et, quia est defectio, ideo nulla sibi respondet mensura; sed ipsum esse habet ultimum instans sui esse cui nihil succedit nisi non-esse.

166 octavum] vii L.
167 A marginal note in F: Hic autem (?) deest decimi solutio.
168 undecimum dicendum F, aliud L.

UN ADVERSAIRE DE SAINT THOMAS: PETRUS IOHANNIS OLIVI

Marie-Thérèse d'Alverny

1. L'INTERPRÉTATION DE *NOLITE POSSIDERE*

LE 6 août 1325, Dame Prous Boneta, de Montpellier, arrêtée comme suspecte d'hérésie, fit une longue confession devant le tribunal d'inquisition de Carcassonne.[1] La béguine proclamait les révélations dont elle aurait été favorisée, comparait le pape régnant, Jean XXII, à Caïphe, à Hérode, à "Lucibel," à Simon le Magicien et même à l'Antéchrist, car il avait persécuté les béguins fidèles à la pauvreté évangélique, et détruit l'écriture du saint frère "Petrus Ioannis." Elle adjurait Prêcheurs et Mineurs de revenir à la pureté de leur règle primitive, et de ne plus s'occuper d'inquisition. Les réminiscences bibliques fournissant à l'imagination de Dame Prous des similitudes frappantes, elle mit ainsi en cause le frère Thomas d'Aquin, que le mauvais pape venait de mettre sur les autels: De même qu'Adam engendra d'Eve Abel et Caïn, de même, le Seigneur Dieu eut deux fils de cette Eglise moderne, qui peut être appelée Eve par similitude, à savoir Abel et Cain. Le fils de l'Eglise qui ressemble à Abel fut le frère Pierre Jean, et l'autre, Cain, fut ce frère Thomas d'Aquin, de l'ordre des Prêcheurs, qui a été récemment canonisé; de même que Cain a tué son frère Abel corporellement, de même, ce frère Thomas a tué son frère, à savoir le dit frère Pierre Jean, spirituellement, c'est à dire quant à ses écrits.[2]

Cette vue dramatique et un peu sommaire du conflit idéal entre deux théologiens dont Dame Prous n'avait pas lu les ouvrages savants[3] devait être un écho des opinions exprimées par les Franciscains Spirituels avec

1 Cf. W. H. May, "The Confession of Prous Boneta, Heretic and Heresiarch," *Essays in Medieval Life and Thought presented in honor of A. P. Evans* (New York 1955), pp. 3-30. Edition du texte, pp. 7-30, d'après le vol. 27 de la collection Doat à la Bibliothèque Nationale, f. 51-79v. La confession est datée du 6 août 1325. Cette confession est analysée par R. Manselli, *Spirituali e Beghini in Provenza* (Roma 1959), pp. 239 sqq. (Instituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo. Studi storici, 31-34).

2 Ed. cit., p. 24.

3 Des écrits du Spirituel, traduits en langue d'oc, circulaient parmi les Béguins; c'étaient surtout des opuscules pieux, dont certains sont encore conservés; cf. D. Zorzi, *Testi inediti francescani in lingua provenzale*, Miscellanea del Centro di Studi Medievali, ser. I (Milan 1956), pp.

lesquels la béguine avait l'occasion de s'entretenir. La canonisation de saint Thomas,[4] survenue au moment où l'agitation était vive dans le Midi de la France parmi les dévôts qui vénéraient la mémoire du "saint frère Pierre Jean," mort à Narbonne le 14 mars 1298, et où la controverse au sujet de la pauvreté évangélique[5] suscitait la rédaction de nombreux traités ou consultations, pouvait paraître une marque de la politique de Jean XXII, favorisant les Prêcheurs et condamnant les Spirituels, en particulier le culte et les écrits apocalyptiques du plus célèbre d'entre eux.

De fait, si saint Thomas d'Aquin avait eu le dessus dans une lutte imaginaire, c'était bien dans une vision intemporelle, car il avait dû ignorer totalement l'existence d'un jeune franciscain qui faisait des études à Paris au cours de sa vie terrestre. Par contre, "Abel" avait porté à son illustre prédécesseur un certain nombre de pointes, qui risquaient de se retourner contre lui.

Les sentiments de Pierre Jean Olieu,[6] dit communément Olivi par les historiens contemporains, à l'égard du grand maître en théologie qu'il avait peut-être aperçu de loin dans sa jeunesse, ne sont pas aveuglément hostiles, bien que son attitude soit le plus souvent critique et ses propos peu amènes. Dans le dernier quart du XIII[e] siècle, époque de l'activité

249-268; édition du texte latin de quatre opuscules par R. Manselli, op. cit., pp. 274 sqq. Il y avait aussi, d'après Bernard Gui, des traités sur la pauvreté, la mendicité, les dispenses, traduits en langue vulgaire: "ex aliquibus tractatibus quos ipse fecisse Beguini dicunt et credunt, unum videlicet de paupertate et alium de mendicitate et quemdam alium de dispensationibus et quibusdam etiam aliis....que omnia habent in vulgari transposita." *Practica inquisitionis*, ed. G. Mollat, 1 (1926), p. 110. Il s'agit probablement, d'après cette description, d'extraits des questions sur la perfection évangélique. Des extraits du commentaire sur l'Apocalypse ont dû également circuler, mais il n'est pas probable que des ouvrages d'exégèse et de théologie théorique aient été traduits.

4 Le P. Pierre Mandonnet a publié à l'occasion de l'anniversaire de la canonisation une étude historique: "La canonisation de saint Thomas," *Mélanges thomistes* (Paris 1923), pp. 1-48 (Bibliothèque thomiste 3). Il relève dans un récit des faits relatifs à la canonisation fait par un témoin la relation d'un sermon prononcé par le pape: "Et mirabiles commendationes proposuit tam de predicatorum ordine quam de sancto. Inter cetera dixit quod iste sanctus in ordine sancto predicatorum gessit vitam apostolicam, cum ordo nichil habet in proprio et in speciali, licet habeat in communi, addens: et hanc vitam apostolicam reputamus."

5 Il y a une grande quantité de publications sur les Spirituels et la controverse sur la pauvreté évangélique. Nous renvoyons à la bibliographie récente publiée par S. Gieben, "Bibliographia Oliviana" (1885-1967), *Collectanea franciscana* 38 (1968), 167-195, en particulier les nn. 117-154.

6 A. Thomas, "Le vrai nom du frère mineur Petrus Iohannis Olivi," *Annales du Midi*, 1913, 68 sqq., a ainsi interprété le surnom latin du Spirituel, avec des attendus philologiques et historiques qui paraissent valables. Nous nous permettons de suivre l'avis d'un savant amateur d'étymologies pour parler de notre compatriote occitan. Sur la vie et les œuvres d'Olieu, cf. la "Bibliographia Oliviana" que nous venons de citer en ce qui concerne les éditions et études. Le P. D. Pacetti a donné une liste des œuvres connues d'Olieu, en grande partie encore inédites, complétant celle qui a été dressée par Fr. Ehrle dans son étude fondamentale: "Petrus Iohannis Olivi, sein Leben und seine Schriften," *Archiv für Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters* 3 (1887), 402-452. Cette liste est comprise dans l'introduction de l'édition: Petrus Ioannis Olivi, *Quaestiones quatuor de Domina*, 1954, pp. 15*-29*. Il faut compléter cette liste pour les commentaires bibliques par le *Repertorium biblicum* de Fr. Stegmüller, nn. 6679-6725.

littéraire de Pierre Jean, Thomas d'Aquin n'est pas encore une autorité, même parmi ses confrères; la plupart des maîtres séculiers de l'Université de Paris ont des positions différentes des siennes. Quant aux Franciscains, leur attitude est défiante; l'un d'entre eux, Guillaume de la Mare, a rédigé une mise en garde contre une série de thèses thomistes qui paraissent contestables ou périlleuses.[7] Au chapitre général de Strasbourg, tenu à la Pentecôte de l'an 1282,[8] une décision marquait cette réserve de manière officielle; il n'était permis aux Lecteurs de l'Ordre d'utiliser la *Somme théologique* qu'accompagnée du *Correctoire* de frère Guillaume de la Mare:

> Minister generalis imponit ministris provincialibus quod non permittant multiplicari Summam fratris Thome nisi apud Lectores rationabiliter intelligentes, et hoc nonnisi cum declarationibus fratris Guillelmi de Mara, non in marginibus positis, sed in quaternis, et huiusmodi declarationes non scribantur per aliquem secularem.

Ce texte, bien connu, permet de constater que la valeur de la *Somme théologique* était suffisamment admise pour que sa lecture fût autorisée avec restrictions; la première d'interprétation délicate, car tous les Lecteurs devaient, il faut le supposer, être considérés comme "rationabiliter intelligentes."

Olieu n'ignorait pas le *Correctoire* et il s'y réfère à plusieurs reprises dans un écrit polémique rédigé sans doute à une date un peu antérieure à celle du Chapitre: *Impugnatio XXXVIII articulorum* (fratris Ar.).[9] Il discute en termes fort vifs un certain nombre de thèses doctrinales, sur lesquelles il est en désaccord avec son confrère, et son texte est à la fois une riposte et une attaque. Il accuse son adversaire, qui est certainement un Lecteur, étant donné les références à son enseignement,

7 Une bibliographie récente au sujet des Correctoires et des études qui les concernent a été donnée par le P. V. Heynck, "Zur Datierung des 'Correctorium fratris Thomae' Wilhelms de la Mare; ein unbeachtetes Zeugnis des Petrus Iohannis Olivi," *Franziskanische Studien* 49 (1967), 1-2.

8 Cf. G. Fussenegger, "Definitiones Capituli generalis Argentinae celebrati 1282," *Arch. fr. hist.* 26 (1933), 139.

9 L'*Impugnatio* fait partie d'une série d'écrits polémiques d'Olieu contenus dans un volume imprimé à Venise, L. Soardi, sans date. Ce recueil a été analysé par Fr. Ehrle, op. cit.,pp. 467-469; il est fort rare et Ehrle, ibid. pp. 466-467 raconte qu'il l'a vainement cherché à Paris. Il s'y trouve cependant à la Bibliothèque Mazarine, sous la cote: Incunable 1315, avec un ex-libris du XVI[e] s. "Est S. Justine de Padua." L'*Impugnatio XXXVII articulorum adversus opiniones doctorum quorundam quorum ipse supprimere voluit* se trouve f. 42-52v. Le personnage visé est un certain frère *Ar.* qui aurait fait une liste d'erreurs d'Olieu. Ehrle avait suggéré que ce frère *Ar.* pourrait être Arnaud de Roquefeuil, provincial de Provence en 1285, op. cit. pp. 477-479; J. Koch, "Die Verurteilung Olivis auf dem Konzil von Vienne und ihre Vorgeschichte," *Scholastik* 5 (1930), 499 propose le nom de frère Arnaud Galhard, qui eut également maille à partir avec notre Spirituel. C'est de cet écrit qu'il est question dans l'article cité du P. V. Heynck, qui suit J. Koch, et tend à dater ce texte polémique de 1280-1281.

de "suivre Thomas" ainsi qu'Aristote, qui est lui même dans l'erreur![10]

L'intransigeant franciscain n'avait du reste pas besoin d'encouragements de la part des supérieurs de l'Ordre pour formuler des réserves au sujet d'une doctrine qui différait trop souvent de celle de "nos maîtres," c'est à dire surtout de saint Bonaventure.

Dans son ouvrage sur les doctrines philosophiques d'Olivi, d'après les Questions sur les *Sentences* éditées par B. Jansen,[11] le P. E. Bettoni[12] a exposé divers points de divergence ou d'opposition entre les thèses défendues par le franciscain et celles de Thomas d'Aquin (divergences déjà en partie notées par l'éditeur). Il remarque que, conformément à l'usage lorsque les "moderni" sont en cause, Olieu ne nomme pas frère Thomas. Mais l'importance de ce "moderne," est tacitement reconnue, même en cas de dissentiment, car il est placé parmi les "quidam magni."[13] S'il arrive que Thomas se trouve, selon lui, d'accord avec saint Augustin et Bonaventure, il consent plus volontiers encore à le ranger parmi les auteurs de poids, et même, fait surprenant, à s'abriter derrière lui en face de ses censeurs. Le cas est assez remarquable pour être noté.

Dans sa Question XI sur le second livre des *Sentences*: An conseruatio rerum in esse sit aliud quam earum creatio,"[14] Olieu, après avoir énuméré les arguments *contra*, déclare: "Alii autem non mediocribus placet quod conseruatio non differat a creatione seu actione secundum rem, nisi quantum esse vel fieri in sequenti tempore vel nunc differt ab esse vel fieri priori nunc."

Lui-même ajoute un peu plus loin qu'il convient de distinguer les termes: "videtur igitur tenendum quod conseruatio non differat secundum speciem a creatione, sed solum numero, sicut supradictum est, nomen creationis non possit proprie praedicari de conseruatione, pro eo quod non significat absolute et in generali factionem creaturae."

10 Le P. V. Heynck, art. cit., p. 10, a relevé rapidement les pointes d'Olivi contre s. Thomas et plus longuement, pp. 13-16, les citations et références au Correctoire de Guillaume de la Mare, d'après le texte contenu dans l'imprimé et les mss Vat. Borgh. 46 et 54. Cf. aussi au sujet des rapports du Correctoire et des ouvrages d'Olivi, F. M. Delorme, "P. I. Olivi quaestio de voto regulam aliquam profitentis," *Antonianum* 16 (1941), 131 sqq.

11 B. Jansen, Fr. Petrus Iohannis Olivi...*Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum*, I-III (Quaracchi 1922-1926).

12 E. Bettoni, *Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi* (Milan 1959).

13 Cf. Q. 36 sur les *Sentences*, ed. Jansen, I, p. 629. La question concerne l'angélologie, sur laquelle Olieu conteste la position de saint Thomas: "Quaeritur an (angelus) intelligat et videat omnia per species innatas. — Ad quod quidam magni dixerunt et dicunt quod sic..." Dans son *Impugnatio XXXVII articulorum*, Olieu précise que son adversaire "dicit quod per species innatas quicquid est angelis naturaliter cognoscibile est eis cognitum...quod autem eum ad hoc moverit, nescio, nisi forte quia voluit in hoc sequi Thomam cuius est positio ista (il s'agit probablement de l'article 18 de la *Prima pars*, qui est également relevé par Guillaume de la Mare. Cf. P. Glorieux, *Le Correctorium corruptorii Quare*, Kain, Belgium, 1927, p. 79) sequens in hoc philosophos qui de cognitione intelligentiarum tanquam de cognitione deorum loquuntur." Ed. cit., f. 46.

14 Ed. Jansen, I, pp. 197 sqq.

Olieu ne nomme pas alors ces "non mediocres," à l'avis desquels il se range: "Istis autem ad praesens magis consentiendum mihi videtur, quoniam non solum rationi, sed et dictis sanctorum et philosophorum magis conforme videtur." Cet adversaire des philosophes consent, pour une fois, à leur accorder quelque crédit. Ayant été attaqué sur ce point, (car dans une liste de 19 erreurs qui lui sont imputées l'article 9 se rapporte à la question sur la création que nous venons de citer: "quod Deus continue res creat ita quod earum conseruatio est continua eorum creatio,") le franciscain rectifie l'imputation et précise sa position réelle, en spécifiant qu'il est en bonne compagnie:[15]

> De hoc dixi quod faciendo vim in propria significatione nominis, quod conseruatio non debet dici creatio, quia creatio secundum nomen suum proprie significat primam factionem creaturae; dixi tamen quod conseruatio in his quae immediate a Deo conseruantur est quaedam continua factio, non tamen prima factio rerum, et si inspiciatur quaestio fratris Bonauenturae, ubi dicit qualiter aeuum sit successiuum sine innouatione, ubi et dat exemplum radii continue orientis a sole, fortasse videbitis quod hoc idem dicit ibidem, quamuis sub aliis verbis...si tamen pie ac fideliter mihi ostendatur quod in hoc dicto aliquid erroneum contineatur, et quod in hoc Augustinus, Bonauentura et Thomas[16] rem erroneam et periculosam dixerunt, libentissime cedo...

Dans sa seconde réponse aux observations des maîtres parisiens chargés par le Ministre général d'examiner ses écrits, datée de Nîmes en 1285, Olieu donne une explication analogue au sujet de cette imputation: "Ista opinio non est mea, sed fratris Thomae de Aquino

15 Ce texte est contenu dans une lettre apologétique adressée à un certain frère Raymond et à ses très chers compagnons qui doivent être à Paris, d'après le contexte. Elle se trouve dans l'imprimé de Venise, f. 51^2v-53^2 (par suite d'une erreur de foliotation de l'imprimé plusieurs folios portent deux fois le même chiffre). Une autre copie a été découverte par le P. Gratien dans le ms. n. acq. lat. 774 de la Bibliothèque Nationale, et publiée partiellement: "Une lettre inédite de Pierre de Jean Olivi," *Etudes franciscaines* 29 (1913), 414-422.

Le nom du destinataire dans l'imprimé est: fr. R. de Camliaco, qu'il faut probablement lire: Caviliaco; dans le manuscrit il est désigné: frère Raymond *Gaufredi*, qui devint général de l'ordre en 1289. Cette dernière identification a peut-être été trop vite adoptée, car le ton de la lettre paraît un peu familier pour s'adresser à un personnage qui devait être assez important dans l'ordre, même avant son généralat. La date de la lettre est également discutée. Le P. V. Heynck, suivant J. Koch, pense qu'elle est antérieure au chapitre de la Pentecôte 1282, art. cit. p. 12; le P. Pacetti, op. cit. p. 17*, suivant les suggestions de F. Ehrle et du P. Gratien, la situe vers 1286. Notre texte n'est pas cité dans l'éd. Gratien.

16 Olieu se réfère vraisemblablement pour s. Thomas à la *Prima pars*, q. 104, a. 1, car c'est là qu'on trouve une citation de s. Augustin, *De Genesi ad litteram*, IV, 12: "...sicut aer, praesente lumine fit lucidus, sic homo, Deo praesente, illuminatur"; ce que s. Thomas interprète ainsi: "...sic autem se habet omnis creatura ad Deum sicut aer ad solem illuminantem." Cf. aussi *Quaest. de potentia*, q. 5, a. 1: "Utrum res conservantur in esse a Deo." Pour s. Bonaventure, il s'agit d'un passage de son commentaire *In Sent.* II, d. II, p. 1, q. 3, dans lequel il emploie la comparaison du rayon de soleil pour indiquer la continuité de l'action divine. Olieu n'a pas étudié de trop près les textes, car s. Thomas n'est pas d'accord avec s. Bonaventure sur la question de l'*aevum*.

sequentis in hoc sententiam Auicennae, et videtur esse fratris Bonaventurae in quaestione: An aeuum sit successiuum."[17]

En regard de ce cas favorable, pour lequel Olieu a jugé bon de se réclamer de frère Thomas d'Aquin, il faut bien constater que beaucoup plus souvent le fougueux méridional se déclare en désaccord avec le maître dominicain et le traite sans ménagements. Les termes employés par Guillaume de la Mare dans ses critiques des thèses thomistes sont fort modérés en comparaison.

Le motif principal de l'irritation d'Olieu est l'attitude de saint Thomas vis à vis d'Aristote et des philosophes arabes, que celui-ci cite dans les questions théologiques, en prenant leurs arguments en sérieuse considération, et en les adoptant lorsqu'ils lui paraissent valables du point de vue de la raison naturelle. Il arrive à Olieu de citer Aristote, et parfois Avicenne ou même Averroes, mais il considère avec méfiance, voire avec animosité ces corps étrangers à la chrétienté.[18] Aussi sévère que saint Jérôme, comparant les auteurs païens à la captive du Deutéronome qui ne doit être tolérée qu'après avoir été rasée et dépouillée de tout ornement superflu, Olieu déclare qu'il convient de traiter les philosophes païens et arabes comme l'esclave Agar, et non de les vénérer comme des maîtres.[19] Pour lui, Thomas entre dans la catégorie des "philosophantes" qui se détournent de la saine doctrine en suivant Aristote, Platon et leurs disciples musulmans.[20]

Les attaques directes contre saint Thomas se remarquent surtout dans la série d'écrits polémiques et apologétiques rédigés entre 1281 et 1286 environ, à l'époque ou un certain nombre de thèses tirées de son enseignement avaient été attaquées et dénoncées; les expressions vives d'Olieu, ses boutades parfois drôles contre les "philosophantes" sont sans doute provoquées par l'amertume de se voir soupconner d'opinions suspectes par ses propres confrères. Il faut convenir cependant que son attitude vis-à-vis des aristotéliciens est consistante à travers toute son œuvre. Le P. Delorme, dans son introduction à l'édition du petit traité: *De perlegendis philosophorum libris*,[21] dans lequel Olieu expose ses

17 Texte contenu dans l'imprimé de Venise, f. 54-54v, 43²-50²v et réédité par D. Laberge, "Fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi tria scripta sui ipsius apologetica annorum 1283 et 1285," *Arch. fr. hist.* 28 (1935), 130-155, 374-407; cf. 153.

18 Cf. O. Bettini, "Olivi di fronte a Aristotele," *Studi francescani* 55 (1958), 176-197; et surtout la récente étude de D. Burr, "The Apocalyptic Element in Olivi's Critique of Aristotle," *Church History* 40 (1971), 15-29.

19 "Responsio fratris Petri Ioannis ad aliqua dicta per quosdam magistros parisienses de suis quaestionibus excerpta," éd. D. Laberge, art. cit. p. 406.

20 Cf. E. Gilson, "Les *Philosophantes*," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge* 19 (1952), 134-140.

21 F. M. Delorme. "Fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi tractatus 'De perlegendis philosophorum libris'," *Antonianum* 16 (1941), 31-44.

vues sur l'utilisation des philosophes, a essayé de présenter la position de l'auteur comme plus modérée qu'il n'apparaît à la simple lecture; il a rappelé les circonstances historiques qui ont pu provoquer la méfiance du franciscain, qui a étudié au Studium de Paris au moment de l'invasion de l'averroïsme. Ces circonstances étaient les mêmes pour la plupart des contemporains, et nous ne pensons pas qu'aucun d'entre eux se soit insurgé avec autant de vigueur contre Aristote et contre les théologiens qui lui attribuent une autorité.

Ce n'est pas à titre de "philosophans" que Thomas d'Aquin a subi une réfutation en règle de deux passages de la *Somme théologique* de la part d'Olieu, mais parce qu'il y traitait de ce qui tenait le plus au coeur du Spirituel; nous devons même dire qu'il s'agissait de la cause à laquelle il avait voué sa vie et le meilleur de son éloquence; la défense de la règle de vie évangélique instituée par saint François, et plus particulièrement de la pauvreté. La valeur prédominante attribuée à la vertu de pauvreté dans l'ordre franciscain s'appuyait sur des textes scripturaires qui avaient sans doute constitué la première règle. Un verset de l'évangile selon saint Matthieu exprimait les recommandations du Christ aux Apôtres en les envoyant prêcher la Bonne Nouvelle: Ne possédez pas, ni or, ni argent, ni monnaie dans vos ceintures, ni sac pour la route, ni deux tuniques, ni chaussures, ni bâton.[22] Ces paroles indiquaient le chemin de la perfection vers laquelle devaient tendre ceux qui voulaient mener une vie conforme à celle des Apôtres et suivre les traces de celui qui avait imité le dénuement du Christ, François d'Assise. L'interprétation stricte de la règle évangélique impliquait la renonciation à toute propriété, tant en propre qu'en commun. La pauvreté volontaire pratiquée par saint François et laissée en exemple aux Frères Mineurs était un idéal difficile à soutenir pour un ordre religieux, mais si, en fait, il était nécessaire de s'accommoder plus ou moins aux circonstances, les Spirituels intransigeants, tels Olieu, réclament sans défaillir l'application stricte des principes, et ne tolèrent pas de voir atténuer, ou interpréter différemment, les principes eux-mêmes.

Aussi, la position prise par saint Thomas dans la *Somme théologique*, en premier lieu au sujet du sens et de la portée des préceptes évangéliques donnés dans ces versets du chapitre X de saint Matthieu; en second lieu, au sujet de la perfection à rechercher dans les différents états de vie des ordres religieux, et du rôle de la pauvreté, a-t-elle indigné le franciscain, qui a vigoureusement pris à partie le grand Docteur.

22 Mt. X, 9-10.

Cette diatribe a été trouvée par F. Ehrle, à l'état isolé, dans un recueil de questions et de traités d'Olieu conservé à la bibliothèque du Vatican, le manuscrit Vat. lat. 4986. Il l'a présentée et en a publié des extraits dans sa remarquable étude sur la vie et les oeuvres de Pierre Jean Olivi.[23] Le texte ainsi mis en lumière est en réalité partie intégrante de l'une des œuvres les plus importantes d'Olieu, la *Postilla* ou *Lectura in Matthaeum*. Replacée dans son contexte, l'explication du chapitre X et du verset: *Nolite possidere*, la riposte d'Olieu aux passages incriminés de la *Somme*, qu'il cite du reste presque intégralement, prend un sens plus précis, et l'on apprécie mieux sa portée, puisque saint Thomas est accusé d'erreur dans un commentaire biblique qui correspond à un enseignement, et qui paraît avoir eu une assez large diffusion.

Les commentaires scripturaires du frère Pierre Jean datent probablement de l'époque de son enseignement au Studium de Florence, ou il fut envoyé en 1287 par le ministre général Matthieu d'Aquasparta, et au Studium de Montpellier, où le nomma le général Raymond Gaufredi après 1289.[24] La *Postilla in Matthaeum* peut en tous cas être située par rapport à d'autres oeuvres de l'auteur, car celui-ci a coutume de se référer souvent à ses propres écrits. Il cite ses deux premières questions sur la pauvreté rédigées avant la publication de la bulle *Exiit qui seminat*, promulguée par le pape Nicolas III le 14 août 1279 au sujet de l'interprétation de la règle des frères Mineurs; ces questions: "An status altissimae paupertatis sit simpliciter melior omni statu diuitiarum" et: "An usus pauper includatur in consilio seu voto paupertatis euangelicae, ita quod sit de eius substantia et integritate," dans lesquelles Olieu expose pleinement sa conception de l'idéal et de la pratique de la pauvreté évangélique sont respectivement la huitième et la neuvième de la série des questions *De perfectione evangelica* décrite par Ehrle d'après le manuscrit Vat. lat. 4986 et que l'on trouve, en groupe ou isolément, dans quelques autres manuscrits.[25] D'après la référence d'Olivi, il est possible que la collection des questions n'ait pas été encore ordonnée au moment où il rédigeait la *Postilla*. Une question sur la dispense des voeux par le pape, également décrite par Ehrle,[26] est

23 Op. cit. pp. 519-523.

24 Cf. F. Ehrle, *ALKGM* III, 431, qui tire ces renseignements biographiques d'un écrit d'Hubertin de Casale, disciple d'Olivi, le libelle "Sanctitati apostolicae"; sur lequel cf. F. Ehrle, *ALKGM* II, 389.

25 Cf. sur la série des questions et les manuscrits qui les contiennent la liste donnée par D. Pacetti; il faut ajouter, pour la question sur l'*usus pauper* le ms. Paris Nat. lat. 3699, f. 13-26v, de la fin du XIII[e] s. ou début XIV[e] qui contient en marge des annotations qui doivent dater de l'époque du concile de Vienne, car on y relève les points incriminés par la Communauté dans la doctrine d'Olieu. Nous avons nous-même étudié ces questions dans le manuscrit de la Laurentienne, S. Croce, cod. XXXI, sin. 3 et dans des manuscrits du Vatican.

26 "An papa possit in omni voto dispensare et specialiter an in votis evangelicis"; cf. Ehrle, op. cit. pp. 528-530.

aussi citée, au chapitre XIX de saint Matthieu, ainsi que la question sur le voeu d'obéissance, au chapitre X, à la fin de la réfutation de Thomas d'Aquin.[27] Dans le chapitre V de la *Postilla*, Olieu se réfère à l'une de ses questions sur les *Sentences*, sur le péché véniel,[28] et à une "expositiuncula" sur le Pater.[29] D'autre part, la *Postilla in Matthaeum* est antérieure à la *Postilla in Lucam et Marcum*, à la *Postilla in Ioannem*, à la *Postilla super Actus Apostolorum*, à la *Postilla super Isaiam*, à la *Postilla super libros regum*; par contre, il semble, d'après une allusion à la fin du chapitre V que la *Postilla in Epistolas canonicas* ait été rédigée auparavant. Dans son *Expositio regulae fratrum Minorum*, au chapitre 3, Olieu renvoie ses lecteurs à son exposition du chapitre X de saint Matthieu.[30]

La *Lectura in Matthaeum* est l'une des oeuvres les plus intéressantes et les plus élaborées d'Olieu. Tout en commentant la lettre du texte, il traite des questions théologiques qui peuvent se poser à ce propos. Ces digressions sont assez importantes, aussi ne peut-on considérer la réfutation de saint Thomas comme une addition exceptionnelle dans le corps de l'ouvrage. Une liste de questions a été jointe à une partie des manuscrits de la *Postilla*; les premières se rapportent à l'introduction générale sur les Evangiles, qui constitue le prologue, puis dans chaque chapitre sont énumérés les points discutés en particulier. Il nous paraît probable que cette liste a été élaborée, sinon par l'auteur, du moins par des disciples qui ont voulu utiliser le commentaire pour l'enseignement.

Alors que les boutades contre saint Thomas contenues dans les écrits apologétiques n'ont pas dû dépasser un petit cercle de l'ordre franciscain, les critiques longuement développées dans la *Postilla* ont été remarquées et ont suscité des réactions, d'après quelques témoignages dont le moins parlant n'est pas l'examen de la tradition manuscrite. Aussi, après avoir exposé le corps du délit, c'est à dire les points essentiels de l'exposé de saint Thomas et de la réplique d'Olieu, donnerons nous quelques précisions à ce sujet.

27 "De voto obedientiae evangelicae"; cf. Ehrle, op. cit. p. 523, qui donne un abrégé d'après le ms. Vat.4986, f.79-81v. Le dernier point envisagé est la valeur relative des trois vœux de religion, et Olieu, sans le nommer, s'oppose à l'opinion de s. Thomas, *Secunda Secundae*, q. 88, a. 6, ce dont on ne se rend pas compte en lisant Ehrle, car il a transcrit l'argument *contra* en l'attribuant à Olieu: "doctores communiter in hoc consentiunt quod votum obedientie sumptum in suo culmine est perfectius quam alia duo." Olieu réfute cette thèse, et pose la thèse contraire, à savoir que le vœu de pauvreté est le plus parfait, et comprend les deux autres.

28 *Quaest. in Sent.* q. 118; éd. Jansen, III, pp. 375 sqq.

29 Ed. F. M. Delorme, "L'explication littérale du Pater selon Pierre Jean Olivi," *Archivio italiano par la storia della pietà*, 1 (1951), 185-194.

30 Cf. Ehrle, op. cit. au sujet de la *Postilla in Ioannem* et de l'*Expositio Regulae*, éditée dans le *Firmamentum trium ordinum* (Venise 1513), f. 106-124v; V. Doucet, "De operibus mss. Fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi in bibliotheca Universitatis Patavinae asservatis," *Arch. fr. hist.* 28 (1935), 162-168, pour les Postilles "super Actus, super Isaiam, super Lib. Regum," trouvées par lui dans les mss. 1510 et 1540 de Padoue.

Le premier passage incriminé se rencontre dans la *Somme théologique* I-II, q. 108, a. 2, réponse à la troisième objection. Saint Thomas, ayant successivement étudié la loi naturelle, puis la Loi de l'ancien Testament, en vient à la Loi nouvelle, qui est celle de l'Evangile, dans les questions 106 et suivantes. Il envisage quatre points au sujet de la Loi nouvelle dans la question 108; les deux premiers concernant les œuvres ou actes extérieurs: La Loi nouvelle doit-elle prescrire ou interdire des actes extérieurs? A-t-elle suffisamment ordonné les actes extérieurs? Sur le premier point, saint Thomas établit que les œuvres extérieures doivent être rapportées à la grâce, soit qu'elles puissent la conférer, comme les sacrements, soit qu'elles puissent être inspirées par la grâce. Parmi les actes humains, certains peuvent être conformes ou contraires à la grâce; il faut alors qu'ils soient l'objet de préceptes ou d'interdictions. Pour les actes qui ne sont pas nécessairement conformes ou contraires à la grâce, les fidèles sont libres d'agir au mieux. Les mêmes principes sont invoqués dans la discussion de l'article 2; la Loi nouvelle ne considère les œuvres extérieures que par rapport à la grâce; elle n'a ordonné ou prescrit aucun acte extérieur, sinon les sacrements et les préceptes de morale qui appartiennent en soi au fondement de la vertu. Il répond à la troisième objection, dans laquelle était allégué le verset: *Nolite possidere*, en expliquant que les préceptes donnés par le Seigneur aux Apôtres ne sont pas des observances rituelles, mais des recommandations morales. On peut considérer, avec saint Augustin (*De consensu evangelistarum*, II, 30) que ce sont, non des préceptes, mais des concessions accordées aux prédicateurs, ceux-ci devant attendre de recevoir ce qui leur est nécessaire de ceux auxquels ils prêchent l'Evangile, ou considérer que ce sont des statuts temporaires qui ont été abolis au temps de la Passion, temps de la liberté parfaite où désormais les Apôtres devraient user de leur libre arbitre pour agir dans les actes qui n'appartiennent pas en soi et nécessairement à la vertu.[31]

Cette opinion mesurée est en opposition complète avec l'exégèse stricte que Pierre Jean Olieu donne du verset de saint Matthieu, indiquant en outre une interdiction qui lui paraît s'imposer. Selon la lettre, le Christ interdit aux Apôtres la possession de trésors, c'est à dire d'or et d'argent, le port de monnaie, de victuailles ou de nourriture, de chaussures, de plusieurs vêtements et de bâtons, en ajoutant que les ouvriers du Seigneur méritent de recevoir le nécessaire, tant de la part

31 Il convient de signaler que l'attaque d'Olieu contre ce passage de la *Somme* correspond à un article du *Correctoire* de Guillaume de la Mare: "Quod ista verba: Nihil tuleritis in via, etc. non pertinent ad perfectionem"; cf. P. Glorieux, *Le Correctorium corruptorii Quare*, pp. 383 sqq. Mais alors que le *Correctoire* ne donne qu'un résumé, Olieu cite intégralement le texte de saint Thomas.

des hommes que de la part de Dieu. De plus, enlevant aux Apôtres la possession des biens meubles, il sous-entend que la possession des immeubles est interdite; s'il n'en fait pas mention expresse, c'est parce que déjà, de fait, et selon la vie à laquelle ils s'étaient voués, les Apôtres avaient tout abandonné. Il n'est pas question de transformer les préceptes en concessions ou en recommandations provisoires. Olieu récuse l'interprétation d'Augustin telle que l'entend Thomas, en déclarant que quelques paroles d'un saint isolé n'ont pas de valeur en regard des autorités convergentes de tous les autres saints, des souverains pontifes, et surtout de saint François, le parfait imitateur du Christ. Du reste, d'après saint Augustin lui-même, il semble que ce soient les instructions de recevoir le nécessaire des fidèles auxquels les Apôtres prêchent qui soient une simple concession.

C'est à propos de ce passage de la *Postilla in Matthaeum* que l'évêque carme Gui Terré, dans sa *Concordia evangelistarum*, écrite probablement entre 1328 et 1334, prend la défense de saint Thomas contre les sectateurs de la doctrine erronée de Pierre Jean, qui, au chapitre X de sa *Postilla in Matthaeum* prétend que saint Thomas a erré et écrit une erreur au sujet du précepte du Christ de ne pas porter de monnaie. Comment peut-on oser dire que saint Thomas, qui a exposé les paroles évangéliques de si belle et si catholique manière, conformément à la doctrine des saints docteurs catholiques, ait pu écrire de façon erronée, contrairement à l'évangile? Gui Terré réfute point par point l'argumentation d'Olieu; il paraît certain qu'il avait sous les yeux un exemplaire de la *Postilla*. L'ouvrage était donc bien connu des adversaires des Spirituels.[32]

Olieu reproche en second lieu à saint Thomas la position que celui-ci prend au sujet de l'abdication de la propriété, en traitant des états de vie et particulièrement de l'état des religieux dans la *Secunda Secundae*.[33] Saint Thomas déclare en effet que la pauvreté n'étant qu'un moyen de tendre à la perfection (*instrumentum perfectionis*), doit être considérée quant à la fin d'un ordre religieux; par conséquent, pour apprécier les degrés de renoncement souhaitables, il convient d'examiner de quelle manière ils concourent à réaliser l'idéal de l'ordre qui les pratique. Les ordres hospitaliers et militaires ont besoin de posséder quelques biens. Les religieux contemplatifs ne doivent pas être

32 Ed. Cologne 1650, p. 275. Cf. sur cet ouvrage B. M. Xiberta, *De magistro Guidone Terreni* (Rome 1925), p. 174. Gui Terré a fait partie de la commission des huit maitres désignés par Jean XXII en 1318 pour censurer la *Postilla in Apocalypsim*; cf. Ehrle, op. cit. pp. 451-452; texte édité dans Baluze-Mansi, *Miscellanea* II, pp. 258-270, d'après le ms. Paris Nat. lat. 4190.

33 *Secunda Secundae*, q. 188, a. 7. Les citations d'Olieu ne sont qu'en partie littérales. Il a abrégé, omis, et transposé quelques passages.

gênés dans leurs prières par le souci continuel de se procurer le nécessaire. La mendicité est justifiable pour les religieux voués à la prédication et à l'enseignement, mais, pour ceux-ci, conserver en commun les aumônes reçues et les distribuer à chacun selon ses besoins ne diminue pas la perfection de l'Ordre, à la condition de garder une juste modération. Il ajoute que l'abdication totale de la propriété présente de graves inconvénients; posséder en commun les choses nécessaires à la vie n'est pas un obstacle à la perfection; c'est au contraire le meilleur moyen d'éviter une sollicitude exagérée des choses terrestres; il s'appuie en cela sur l'exemple du Christ et des Apôtres.

Olieu avait déjà répondu à une série d'arguments analogues dans sa première question sur la pauvreté. Dans le commentaire de saint Matthieu il réfute point par point les raisons exposées par Thomas d'Aquin. La fin principale d'un ordre religieux, dit-il, doit être dans le domaine des choses spirituelles, même s'il a une fin secondaire temporelle, comme l'assistance des pauvres ou la lutte contre les infidèles; par conséquent, même si ce motif secondaire semble exiger des possessions, celles-ci demeurent toujours un empêchement pour le but supérieur. Les ordres hospitaliers et militaires seraient plus parfaits s'ils se bornaient à vivre d'aumônes et de leur travail. Quant aux provisions, sauf en cas de nécessité évidente — et encore n'est-il pas souhaitable de les posséder comme biens propres ou communs — il est complètement faux de dire qu'elles évitent un souci exagéré de se procurer des choses matérielles. Olieu en donne cinq motifs, énumérés avec grande verve dans une gradation progressive, le dernier inconvénient encouru par les possesseurs étant le risque de s'engager dans des procès. De plus, conserver habituellement des provisions en commun est directement opposé aux préceptes du Christ, qui a dit de ne pas s'inquiéter du lendemain, et qui, permettant l'usage indispensable des biens terrestres, a interdit aux Apôtres le droit de les posséder; ni l'adversaire ni ses sectateurs ne peuvent donner un seul exemple démontrant qu'il s'est servi d'argent, sauf en cas de nécessité extrême.

Ramener l'*altissima paupertas* au rang d'instrument de perfection est le reproche le plus grave que le Spirituel formule à l'égard d'un dominicain infidèle, selon lui, à l'esprit de saint Dominique, et qui prétend que la pauvreté est le moins élevé des trois vœux de religion. Si la pauvreté n'est pas la perfection ultime, titre qui convient à la charité, elle est la première des vertus recommandées par le Christ, car elle est la première des béatitudes. O merveille, s'exclame notre Provençal, le Christ, en paroles et en actes, exalte la pauvreté sur toutes les vertus, et celui-là la rejette presque au dernier rang! Je sais que ce n'est pas ainsi

que se serait comporté saint Dominique, qui a maudit ceux des siens qui accepteraient des possessions![34]

Traiter aussi cavalièrement un grand maître en théologie était impertinent à la fin du XIIIe siècle, mais sans conséquences. Par contre, sous le règne de Jean XXII, et surtout au moment de la canonisation de Thomas d'Aquin, l'existence de ce texte polémique dans lequel étaient énumérées les "erreurs" du pieux et docte Frère Prêcheur pouvait constituer un grief supplémentaire contre Olieu. L'inquisiteur Nicolas Eymerich, écrivant, il est vrai, plus d'un demi-siècle après les évènements, dit que la *Postilla in Matthaeum* a été condamnée par Jean XXII en même temps que la *Postilla in Apocalypsim*.[35] Cette dernière a été examinée par une commission de censeurs désignés par le pape, qui paraît s'être occupé lui-même de près de l'affaire.[36] La condamnation de la Postille en février 1326 est rapportée par Bernard Gui, qui est un témoin contemporain.[37] Mais aucun document ne confirme l'assertion de Nicolas Eymerich, à notre connaissance.

Les dires de Dame Prous Boneta semblent néanmoins indiquer que l'opposition d'Olieu aux doctrines de saint Thomas était notoire dans le milieu des Spirituels, et le fait que la béguine rend ce dernier responsable de la "destruction de l'écriture de frère Pierre Jean" donne à penser que la note d'Eymerich n'est pas dépourvue de tout fondement. Il paraît assez probable qu'il a été question de la *Lectura in Matthaeum* dans les discussions relatives à la *Postilla in Apocalypsim*, sans qu'elle ait été pour autant condamnée de manière expresse.[38] L'auteur anonyme du factum contenu dans le manuscrit lat. 4190 de la Bibliothèque nationale, rédigé probablement en 1325: "Allegationes super articulis tractis per dominum papam de Postilla quam composuit Fr. Petrus Iohannis super Apocalypsim..." cite des passages de la Postille sur s. Matthieu ainsi que des questions sur la pauvreté et du traité *De usu paupere* d'Olieu.[39]

34 "Mira res! Christus verbo et facto paupertatem quasi super omnia extollit; iste vero quasi sub omnibus eam deiecit. Scio quod hoc non fecisset beatus Dominicus, qui maledixit omnibus suis quandocumque possessiones reciperent!" Extrait ed. par Ehrle, op. cit., p. 522.

35 *Directorium inquisitionis*, ed. Pena (Venise 1607), p. 328.

36 Cf. E. Pasztor, "Le polemiche sulla 'Lectura super Apocalypsim' di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi fino alla sua condanna," *Bulletino dell'Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo*, 70 (1958), 365-424.

37 *Flores chronicarum*, cit. par Ehrle, op. cit., p. 456.

38 Cf. au sujet des passages de la *Lectura in Matthaeum* contenant des considérations eschatologiques qui se rapprochent de celles qui sont développées dans la *Lectura in Apocalypsim*, R. Manselli, *La 'Lectura super Apocalypsim' di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi* (Rome 1955), pp. 155-159.

39 Cf. sur ce texte et sur le procès de la *Postilla in Apocalypsim*, J. Koch, "Der Prozess gegen die Postille Olivis zur Apokalypse," *Recherches de théologie anc. et méd.* 5 (1933), 302-315; E. Pasztor, art. cit., p. 387. Cette dernière analyse le texte de plus près.

L'un des manuscrits subsistants de la *Postilla*, le Vat. lat. 1001, témoigne de la double réprobation suscitée par les écrits du Spirituel, car le texte a été expurgé du passage litigieux du chapitre X, et des chapitres eschatologiques dans lesquels l'auteur développait des théories joachimites.[40]

Il est probable que la diatribe de Pierre Jean ne devait pas déplaire à la plupart des Franciscains, car la *Lectura* a été le plus souvent recopiée intégralement, en omettant ou supprimant le nom de l'auteur.[41] Les théologiens étrangers à l'Ordre qui se sont intéressés à l'ouvrage ont encore eu moins de scrupules. Nous allons voir que l'Université de Paris, grâce à la générosité de l'un des maîtres de la Sorbonne, conservait soigneusement un bel exemplaire, orné, par surcroît, d'une caricature de saint Thomas.

2. La Tradition Manuscrite de la Postilla in Matthaeum

Nous avons examiné nous-même une partie des manuscrits contenant la *Postilla in Matthaeum*; d'autres nous sont connus seulement par des catalogues. Nous croyons utile de donner un aperçu de la tradition du texte en indiquant les témoins assez nombreux qui subsistent encore, et en décrivant en détail celui qui nous paraît le plus intéressant, en raison de sa date et de son premier possesseur.

Paris, Bibl. nat. lat. 15588

Il s'agit du manuscrit latin 15588 de la Bibliothèque nationale, légué à la Sorbonne par maître Pierre de Limoges, mort en 1306. Ce remarquable personnage, qui joignait à un intérêt fondamental pour la

40 Cette dernière lacune a été notée par R. Manselli, op. cit., p. 149. Quant à la première, qui était la suppression de l'attaque contre saint Thomas au c. X, elle a empêché Ehrle d'identifier le texte qu'il avait trouvé dans le ms. Vat. lat. 4986, car il s'était servi du Vat. lat. 1001 pour décrire la *Postilla in Matthaeum*. Nous avons jadis identifié l'extrait et constaté la lacune; cf. *Positions de thèses des élèves de l'Ecole des Chartes*, 1928.

41 L'anonymat de la plupart des manuscrits des œuvres de Pierre Jean Olieu a provoqué quelques confusions et attributions inexactes. Certaines ont été publiés sous le nom de saint Bonaventure, comme la *Postilla in Cantica Canticorum* et les *Principia* dans le *Supplementum* de Bonelli. Un destin plus étrange est celui de l'un des commentaires bibliques le plus fortement imprégné de joachimisme, la *Postilla in Genesim*. Elle a été en partie reproduite dans un commentaire de la Genèse imprimé parmi les œuvres de saint Thomas dans les éditions de Rome, 1570, de Parme, et de Paris (Frette-Vives), ainsi que l'a signalé A. Borst, *Der Turmbau von Babel*, II, 2, pp. 819-822. A. Borst remarque que le contraste entre le symbolisme joachimite d'Olivi et le "rationalisme humaniste" de saint Thomas est assez prononcé pour que la confusion paraisse surprenante. Cf. Stegmuller, *Repertorium biblicum*, n. 6684, pour la *Postilla in Genesim* de Pierre Jean Olivi, et n. 8025 pour le pseudo-Thomas d'Aquin; à partir du commentaire de *Gen.* VIII, 1 jusqu'à l'explicit, les deux textes semblent concorder. A. Borst a collationné en partie le ms. Vat. Ottob. lat. 694 avec l'édition. Néanmoins, celle-ci est partiellement expurgée.

théologie théorique et surtout pratique un goût non moins vif pour les sciences, et notamment l'astronomie, a laissé à ses confrères une belle collection de livres. Pierre a annoté de sa main une partie des volumes; certains recueils ont même été transcrits par lui. Soixante-sept manuscrits subsistants du fonds de la Sorbonne ont été recensés par L. Delisle[1]; A. Birkenmajer en a identifié deux autres à la Bibliothèque nationale, d'après les annotations autographes.[2]

Ce pieux savant ne redoutait pas les esprits aventureux, ni les fortes personnalités. Il fut l'un des premiers admirateurs de Raymond Lulle, qu'il dut connaître pendant le séjour que celui-ci fit à Paris à la fin du XIII[e] siècle. Il possédait plusieurs de ses œuvres. Il est possible qu'il ait connu Pierre Jean Olieu, puisque celui-ci a fait des études à Paris et y a peut-être enseigné, mais la curiosité d'esprit et les tendances éclectiques de Pierre de Limoges suffisent à justifier l'acquisition d'un bel exemplaire de la *Postilla in Matthaeum* et d'autres commentaires bibliques du Frère Mineur. Peut-être même le manuscrit a-t-il été exécuté pour lui; l'écriture est méridionale, mais la décoration, d'une richesse exceptionnelle pour ce type de texte, nous paraît plutôt parisienne. Pierre de Limoges a lu avec soin l'ouvrage; la foliotation en chiffres arabes semble de sa main. Il a inscrit en marge du texte des lettres de repère, et il a rédigé un bref index alphabétique des matières transcrit au f. 179. On trouve de plus quelques annotations et corrections de sa main, notamment, au f. 38, la restitution d'un passage omis par le scribe.

Il faut admettre ou que Pierre de Limoges a fait copier le texte, par un scribe originaire d'Italie ou du midi de la France, et a revu l'ouvrage sur l'*exemplar*, ou qu'il s'est procuré un autre manuscrit pour le collationner. Ajoutons que la mention: "Cor." se trouve encore à la fin de plusieurs cahiers; le manuscrit a donc été soigneusement revu et corrigé après son exécution. Ceci, ajouté au fait que le volume a été transcrit peu d'années après la rédaction des commentaires bibliques qui le constituent, et probablement encore du vivant de l'auteur, donne une valeur particulière à cet exemplaire.

Nous ne pensons pas que Pierre de Limoges soit responsable du petit dessin marginal que l'on remarque au f. 68v, en regard des mots:

1 Cf. L. Delisle, *Le Cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Nationale*, II, pp. 167-169, sur Pierre de Limoges et son legs de manuscrits. Il reproduit la notice de l'obituaire de la Sorbonne, à la date du 3 novembre: "Obiit magister Petrus de Lemovicis quondam socius huius domus, canonicus Ebroicensis qui refutavit duos episcopatus et bis prebendam parisiensem, bacalarius in theologia, magnus astronomus, qui legavit domui plus quam VI[xx] volumina."

2 A. Birkenmajer, "Pierre de Limoges, commentateur de Richard de Fournival," *Isis* 40 (1949), 18-31. Il signale également le ms Vat. Regin. lat. 1261 qui contient des gloses de la main de Pierre de Limoges.

"Diligenter adverte. Advertendum autem diligenter quod Thomas in Summa sua..." Ce dessin représente un religieux, la tête couverte d'une capuche, dans une chaire. Il est auréolé, aussi est-il probable que cette esquisse est l'œuvre d'un lecteur facétieux après la canonisation de Thomas d'Aquin en 1323.

Après ces remarques préliminaires, voici comment se présente le recueil. Il est écrit sur parchemin, mesure 350 x 230 mm. et comprend 181 ff. à 2 col. Petites initiales et signes de paragraphes bl. ou rouges; grandes initiales ornées peintes bl. et r. à filigranes et à antennes; f. 15, 135, 163, au début des commentaires, grande lettre peinte sur fonds d'or avec encadrement peint et orné. Il y a quelques dessins marginaux à la plume, sans doute un peu postérieurs. Le début du manuscrit, contenant les cinq "Principia in sacram scripturam" a une apparence plus simple que le corps du manuscrit, et l'écriture est de plus petit module; cette section comprend un cahier de 10 ff. et un cahier de 4 ff. On n'y trouve pas de rubriques ni de titres courants. Le corps du manuscrit est constitué de cahiers de 12 ff. avec réclames et mention contemp.: "Cor." Il n'y a pas de rubriques, mais des titres courants peints en lettres alternativement bl. et r.

F. 1, dans la marge supérieure, inscription à l'encre très pâle, qui paraît du début du XIVᵉ s.: "Pos. fratris Io. Petri (sic) Et huius pos. ponitur tabula questionum...de Lemouicis bancha ad volumen q."

I. Les cinq "principia" transcrits au début du lat. 15588 ont été imprimés dans le *Supplementum ad Opera s. Bonaventurae* de B. Bonelli, t. II et I, d'après un manuscrit conservé au couvent des Frères Mineurs réformés de Venise; l'ensemble était ainsi désigné "S. Bonaventura de intelligentia sacrae scripturae."[3] Ces textes sont très rares. En dehors de notre ms. de Paris, l'on ne connaît plus que le ms. Vat. lat. 918, du XIVᵉ siècle, provenant de la Chartreuse de Saycz en Styrie.[4] F. Ehrle reproduit la notice du catalogue de 1369 de la bibliothèque d'Avignon, n. 381: "Item, principia generalia super sacra scriptura...per fratrem P. Iohannis"; mais cet exemplaire semble perdu.[5]

1. "Vidi in dextera sedentis super thronum...(Apoc. V, 1). Consideranti michi scripturarum sanctarum pelagus infinitum... — ...ad hanc igitur visionem nos introducat ipse Dei Filius Ihesus Christus...", f. 1-4.
2. "Quatuor animalia singula eorum habebant alas senas...qui est et qui erat et qui venturus est (Apoc. V, 8). Superineffabilis altitudo doctrine euangelice in iiii. euangeliis apprehense a secretario Christi Iohanne... — ...de resurrectionis et ascensionis tropheis et preconiis," f. 4-5.

3 Cf. F. Ehrle, op. cit., p. 495; F. Stegmuller, *Repertorium biblicum*, nn. 6679-6683.
4 Cf. A. Pelzer, *Codices vaticani latini*, II, 1, pp. 319-322.
5 Cf. F. Ehrle, op. cit., p. 460.

3. "Cum essem in medio captiuorum...vidi visionem Dei (Ez. I, 1). Conscendere cum Paulo volentibus in tercium celum ad videndas visiones... — ...clauis etiam earum est iubilus caritatis; de istis tamen clauibus et de modo ducendi eas amplior exigeretur tractatus. Explicit tractatus Deo gratias," f. 5-9v.
4. "Ingredere in medio rotarum que sunt subtus cherubin...(Ez. X, 2). Scripturarum sanctarum pelagus et abyssus triformiter se ingerit inuestigatoribus suis... — ...diuinum amorem et dulcorem quem nobis administret Christus Ihesus fons veritatis, equitatis et caritatis in s. s. Amen," f. 9v-12.
5. "Vacate et videte quoniam ego sum Deus (Ps. 45, 10). Sicut inter omnia nichil Deo altius et melius... — ...et videbimus gloriam eius gloriam quasi Unigeniti a Patre, plenum gratie et veritatis in s. s.," f. 12-14v.

II. "Postilla super Matheum." Il n'y a pas de rubrique, mais le titre est peint dans les marges supérieures.

Prol. général à l'exposition des évangiles: "Quatuor facies uni et quatuor penne uni...Ezechiel primo (I, 6). Quemadmodum admirabilis est clausura... — ...qui est fons omnis veri luminis et qui cum Patre et Spiritu sancto perhenniter regnat in s.s.," f. 15-16. — Préambule: "Ad maiorem euidentiam dictorum et dicendorum septem sunt querenda et prenotanda... — ...qui est materia totius libri, scilicet Christum," f. 16-18. — Hiis igitur prelibatis accedendum est ad Matheum qui est in ordine primus... — ...ipse est leo resurgens qui solus meruit et potuit soluere VII signacula libri Dei, cui est honor et gloria in s. s. Amen. Finito libro sit laus et gloria Christo. Amen." f. 18-134v.

III. "Epistola ad Romanos," titre peint dans les marges supérieures. "Ad contemplandam et prelibandam in summa doctrinam epistolarem diuinissimi Pauli menti mee nichil occurere potuit breuius et clarius quam verbum eiusdem II. Cor. iii dicentis: Ubi spiritus Domini, ibi libertas... — ...quidam dicunt quod *le cui* est positum hic superflue more scripture, sicut ibi: cuius participatio eius in idipsum. Et secundum glossam quidam legunt hoc sine *cui*: ei, qui sic potens est, et qui tanta nobis reuelauit sit per Ihesum Christum gloria in s. s. Amen. Explicit tractatus. Deo gratias." f. 135-163.

Ce commentaire de l'épître aux Romains ne se trouve que dans un autre manuscrit, précieux recueil d'œuvres scripturaires d'Olivi, conservé à la Laurentienne de Florence, Conventi soppressi 240. Il se trouvait dans la bibliothèque d'Urbain V en 1369 (n. 656), puis dans celle de Benoît XIII à Peniscola (n. 153).[6]

6 Cf. F. Ehrle, op. cit., p. 462; F. Stegmuller, *Rep. bibl.* n. 6716.

IV. "Postilla in Cantica Canticorum."

"In speculo breui et aperto contueri volentibus continenciam Cantici Canticorum... — ...sponsi pietas sic ad plenum abstergat ut cum electis ceteris ducat eum ad vite fontes aquarum, quas qui bibet non sitiet in eternum. Amen. Explicit liber iste Deo gratias. Amen." f. 153-179.[7]

F. 179v suit une table alphabétique dressée sur 4 colonnes: "Abraham... Ypocrisis." A la suite, une note au premier abord mystérieuse: "Questiones huius libri scilicet super Mat. R<equire> post quodlibet Henr<ici?>." Les ff. 180-181 sont blancs.

F. 181v. "Iste liber est pauperum magistrorum de Sorbona ex legato magistri Petri de Limouicis quondam socii domus huius in quo continentur postille super Matheum et super epistolam ad Romanos et super Cantica." Au dessous: "Precii X librarum. Cathenabitur. 25us inter postillas mixtas." Il nous paraît que la "tabula questionum" mentionnée dans la note que nous avons relevée ci-dessus est sans doute une liste des questions traitées par Olivi dans son commentaire, à partir du prologue général sur les évangiles jusqu'à la fin du texte sacré. La première est: "primo queritur quare Christus per seipsum non scripsit doctrinam euangelicam"; la dernière: "Queritur etiam an Christus apparuerit matri sue." Ces questions se rencontrent dans un certain nombre de manuscrits de la *Postilla*, et justement avec le titre: "Tabula questionum." Or, parmi les livres légués par Pierre de Limoges figurait un recueil contenant les quodlibets d'Henri de Gand, d'après le catalogue de la librairie de Sorbonne au XIVe s., n. 74. "Item, in uno volumine liber in opere spere volubilis...et scripta de quolibet magistri Henrici de Gandauo; item scripta de quolibet magistri G. de Fontibus...Item questiones de quolibet aliorum, de legato magistri Petri de Lemouicis."[8] Malheureusement ce n. 74 de la section: "Summe questionum" semble perdu, ce qui nous empêche de vérifier notre hypothèse.

Florence, Bibl. Laur. Santa Croce Plut. X dextr. 4

Le manuscrit de la Bibliothèque Laurentienne de Florence, provenant du couvent franciscain de Santa Croce: S. Croce Plut. X dextr. 4, paraît aussi dater de la fin du XIIIe siècle.

Parch. 168 ff. à 2 col. Initiales peintes. Le texte est transcrit avec soin.

F. 1-107. "Postilla in Matthaeum," anonyme, A la fin: "Explicit Lec-

7 La *Postilla in Cantica* est imprimée dans le *Supplementum Operum s. Bonaventurae*, par B. Bonelli, I, pp. 50-182. Cf. F. Ehrle, pp. 484-486, et pp. 461, 462 pour les notices des catalogues des papes d'Avignon; Stegmüller, *Rep. bibl.*, n. 6693.

8 Cf. L. Delisle, *Cabinet des manuscrits*, III, p. 31.

tura super euangelium beati Matthaei. Amen." F. 107-108: "Tabula euangeliorum beati Matthei per totum annum." F. 108-109: "Tabula euangeliorum Luce." F. 110-167: "<P. I. Olivi> Lectura super Lucam (et Marcum)." Prol. "Quoniam ex dictis super Matthaei euangelium et Ioannis fere maior pars euangelii Marci et Luce est tacta...—...prout Gregorius in homelia festi Ascensionis exponit."—"Lucas autem primo premittit prologum... — ...Dei unius et trini benedicti et benedicendi in s. s. Amen. Explicit Lectura super Luce euangelium. Deo gratias. Amen." — F. 167-168, table des questions. — F. 168v, notes de la main du frère Thedaldus de Casa, bibliothécaire de Santa Croce vers 1380-1410. Elles ont été reproduites par V. Doucet, "De operibus mss. Petri Iohannis Olivi," *Arch. fr. Hist.* 28 (1935), 164. Thedaldus donne la référence de plusieurs ouvrages de "Petri Ioannis" avec leur incipit. Il savait donc que les deux *Lecturae* contenues dans le manuscrit étaient d'Olivi.—F. 1: "Iste liber fuit ad usum fratris Thedaldi de Casa quem viuens assignauit armario Fratrum Minorum de Florentia anno D. 1406." Sur la reliure, inscription fin XIVe ou XVe s.: "Ista Postilla est ad usum fratris Mathei Guidonis." Sur le f. liminaire qui forme couverture est transcrit le début de la *tabula quaestionum* de la *Lectura in Matthaeum*. Ce volume est-il l'exemplaire de la *Postilla* du couvent de Santa Croce prêté sur sa demande expresse à saint Bernardin de Sienne en 1440? Le P. Doucet ne le pense pas, car saint Bernardin spécifie que le manuscrit de la *Postilla* de Pierre Jean dont il connaît l'existence est mis à tort sous le nom de Nicolas de Lyre. Les deux commentaires, ayant le même incipit scripturaire, une confusion s'explique aisément. La lettre de s. Bernardin est publiée par V. Doucet, art. cit., p. 160. Le point important est l'insistance de s. Bernardin, preuve de la haute estime en laquelle il tenait les écrits du frère Pierre Jean.

Cf. A. M. Bandini, *Catalogus cod. latinorum Bibl. Mediceae Laurentianae, t. IV, continens...recensionem mss. cod...qui olim in Florentino S. Crucis coenobio adseruabantur*, col. 406-407. Nous avons étudié ce manuscrit.

Padoue, Antoniana Scaff. XV. N. 336

Le manuscrit conservé à la Bibliothèque Antoniana de Padoue a, lui aussi, un intérêt historique. Il semble avoir été exécuté, avec un certain luxe, pour l'évêque de Padoue, qui l'a donné au couvent des Frères Mineurs avec des réserves qui montrent la valeur qu'il attachait au texte. En connaissait-t-il l'auteur? Le manuscrit est anonyme. Il contient, après la *Postilla*, le commentaire du *Pater*.

Parch. CCXXII ff. à 2 col. Initiales bl. et r. à filigranes et à antennes; F. 1, encadrement peint; titres courants peints bl. et r. Rubriques.

F. 1-212. <Petrus Ioannis Olivi> "Postilla super Matthaeum." Le passage concernant s. Thomas commence au f. 96.

F. 212v-215v: "Expositio super orationem dominicam ab eodem expositore quam supra edita." "Ad intuendum altitudinem orationis dominice que ponitur Mat. VI... — ...et maxime in mysteriis scripturarum sanctarum."

F. 215: "Iste liber fuit scriptus et completus anno D. I. M°-CCC°XLIIII° de mense Nouembris XIIIe indictionis." — F. 216-221v. Table de la *Postilla*, — F. 221v-222v. Canons des évangiles tirés de s. Mathieu avec référence à la *Postilla*, — F. 223v: "Anno D. M°CCC°LII° die xxvi^a Septembris venerabilis Pater et Dominus Ildebrandinus D. gr. episcopus Paduanus nomine donationis inter nos dedit et donauit hunc librum fratri Iohanni de Mont. ss. tunc sacri conuentus beati Antonii guardiano recipienti, nomine et vice dicti conuentus, hiis conditionibus appositis, videlicet quod usum dicti libri sibi retinuit in vita sua tantum, ita quod quandocumque predictus dominus vellet dictum librum, guardianus et fratres dicti conuentus ipsum concedere teneantur, et quod predictum librum non possunt ipsi fratres vendere, impignorare, alicui obligare vel appropriare, sed semper remaneat in supradicto sacro loco ad comodum et utilitatem fratrum in hibi (sic) comorantium et quod secus factum fuerit ex nunc prout ex tunc ipsos fratres priuat et priuatos esse vult, et mandat, ac ipsum donat et dat capitulo canonicorum Ecclesie Maioris de Padua. Actum in Palatio sepedicti domini in camera sua, presentibus domino Nicolao abbate Sancte Iustine de Padua, (...) priore Cruciferorum et fratre Antonio de Cortarodulo et al. etc."

Le manuscrit est soigneusement corrigé. On y trouve des notes marginales en cursive du XIVe s.

Cf. *I codici manoscritti della Biblioteca Antoniana di Padova descritti...dal P. M. Antonio Maria Iosa* (Padova 1886). Nous l'avons étudié sur place.

Trois manuscrits de la *Postilla in Matthaeum* sont conservés à la Bibliothèque Vaticane:

Vatican. lat. 10900.

Parch. 207 ff. à 2 col. Ecriture méridionale qui nous paraît du début du XIVe siècle; le manuscrit est probablement d'origine italienne. Initiales peintes en bleu-violet et rouge. La première initiale, historiée, représente un franciscain; petites initiales rehaussées de jaune. Le manuscrit est constitué de quinternions; un cahier arraché après le f. 40; il manque la fin du c. 4 et le début du c. 5. — Titre, en partie gratté, capitula et titres courants rubriqués; notes marginales du XVe et du XVIe-XVIIe s.

F. 1-210. “Postilla in Matthaeum,” précédée d’une rubrique presque entièrement cancellée: “Postilla fratris P<etri Ioannis Ord. Minor.> super Mattheum.” — A la fin, “Explicit Postilla optima *super euangelium Matthei* edita ab egregio sacre theologie professore fratre *Petro Ioannis de Biteris* de custodia Narbone et de provincia Prouincie sacri ordinis fratrum Minorum” (les mots soulignés ont été grattés). — F. 201v-207. Table des questions de la *Postilla*: “Et primo queritur quare Christus per seipsum non scripsit doctrinam euangelicam... — ...Queritur etiam an primo apparuerit matri sue.” Inscription du XVIIe s.: “Petrus Ioannis in Mattheum manuscript. 1652.” Sur la reliure, nom d’un possesseur: “card. Segna.”

Cf. *Codices vaticani latini. Codices 10876-11000*, recensuit J. B. Borino (Roma-Vaticano 1955), p. 117. Nous avons étudié le ms.

Vatican. lat. 1001.

Parch. 165 ff. à 2 col. Ecriture méridionale, première moitié du XIVe s. Initiales peintes en rouge et bleu, ou violet. Notes marginales. Cahiers de 12 ff. sauf un quinion ff. 133-142.

F. 1-162v. *Postilla*, avec le prologue habituel.

F. 163-165. Table des questions de la *Postilla*. A la fin: “Explicit tabula questionum que sunt in Postilla super Matheum secundum Petrum Iohannis de ordine Minorum fratrum et est ad ussum (...) eiusdem ordinis. Precii floren...”

F. 165v. “Die XX Decembris MDLXXVII sanctus Dominus noster Gregorius XIII dedit hunc librum Bibliothecae Vaticanae. Ce manuscrit présente des lacunes volontaires et non apparentes, puisque le scribe s’est simplement abstenu de transcrire les passages litigieux: c. X, passage contre s. Thomas, et c. XXIII, XXIV, XXV, eschatologie. Cette dernière lacune est signalée par R. Manselli, *La “Lectura super Apocalipsim” di Pietro di Giovanni Olivi* (Roma 1955), p. 149.

Il nous paraît probable que le manuscrit a été copié vers l’époque du procès contre la *Lectura in Apocalypsim*, et après la canonisation de s. Thomas.

Cf. *Codices vaticani latini, t. II, pars I. Codices 679-1134*, recensuit A. Pelzer (1931), p. 484. Nous avons étudié ce ms.

Vatican. lat. 8670.

Papier; filigranes italiens de la première moitié du XVe s. 204 ff. à 2 col.

F. 1-196v. “Postilla super Matthaeum,” sans titre ni nom d’auteur. A la fin: “Benedictus sit dulcissimus Iesus et humilissima mater eius et totus celestis exercitus. Amen.”

F. 197-199v. "Expositio super Pater Noster," sans rubrique ni nom d'auteur: "Ad intuendum altitudinem orationis dominice... — ... et maxime in misteriis scripturarum sanctarum."

F. 200-204v. Tabula questionum. "Primo ad euidenciam totius euangelii... — ...V° queritur etiam an primo apparuerit matri sue. Explicit tabula questionum que sunt in postilla super Matheum. Benedictus Deus."

F. 1, inscription d'une main italienne XVI[e]-XVII[e] s. "Postilla Petri Ioannis super Mattheum."

Ce manuscrit, qui ne porte aucune indication de provenance, a très probablement été transcrit dans un couvent franciscain d'Italie au début du XV[e] s. Nous l'avons étudié nous même; M. Duval-Arnould, Scriptor à la Bibliothèque Vaticane et M[lle] D. Jacquart ont bien voulu nous donner des indications complémentaires.

Un manuscrit est conservé à Rome dans le collège des Franciscains irlandais:

Rome, Collegio S. Isidoro 1/56.

Parch. 160x115 mm., 176 ff. à 2 col. plus deux ff. de garde parch. au début, avec textes en italien, d'une main cursive du XIV[e] s.
Grandes initiales bl. et r. avec dessins filigranés; autres initiales bl. à filigranes r. ou rouges à filigr. violets; petites initiales bl. ou r. sans ornements. Cahiers de 10 ff. Réclames encadrées. De petits ff. de parchemin ou languettes ont été insérées, soit pour combler des lacunes, avec renvoi au texte, soit contenant des additions postérieures. Le manuscrit a été écrit par des mains italiennes circa 1300; l'encre est pâle et l'écriture de tout petit module, très soignée.

F. 1-176. "Lectura in Matthaeum." "Incipit expositio evangelii super Math<eum> O. mitairanni (sic?)" (rubr.) Avec le prologue habituel. "Quatuor facies uni... Quemadmodum admirabilis est clausura... Ad maiorem autem evidentiam dictorum et dicendorum septem sunt querenda...Hiis igitur prelibatis, accedendum est ad Matheum... — ...ipse est Leo resurgens qui solus meruit...in secula seculorum. Amen. Amen." — A la suite, f. 176: "Laus, honor, virtus, gloria, divinitas, imperium et benedictio sit crucifixo Domino Ihesu Dei filio qui me suo preciosissimo sanguine dignatus est redimere. Ad cuius laudem honorem et gloriam sint que facta sunt in secula seculorum. Amen."

F. 174-176. Tabula quaestionum, de la même main que ce qui précède: "Iste questiones sunt per ordinem in postilla super Mat. Et primo ad evidenciam tocius evangelii queritur quare Christus per seipsum non scripsit doctrinam evangelicam... — ...Queritur an primo apparuit matri sue. Explicit."

F. 176v. De la même main, début de l'*expositio super Pater Noster*, sans titre; incomplète par lacune matérielle, car le cahier suivant manque.

Le passage concernant s. Thomas au ch. X se trouve f. 72-78; il a été signalé par un lecteur du XIVe-XVe s. avec un index tendu dessiné en marge et des notes; cf. f. 73v "nota 7m errorem contra sanctum Thomam."

Cf. F. M. Delorme, "L'Explication littérale du Pater selon Pierre Jean Olivi," *Arch. ital. per la storia della pietà*, I (1951), p. 181. Nous avons pu nous-même examiner et décrire ce ms., qui paraît l'un des plus anciens.

Trois autres manuscrits, entiers ou fragmentaires, sont conservés dans diverses bibliothèques d'Italie.

Castiglione Fiorentino, Biblioteca del Collegio Cosimo Serristori ms. 5.

Nous ne connaissons ce manuscrit que d'après la description très sommaire du Catalogue de Mazzatinti, vol. XXVI, p. 221.

Ce manuscrit, papier et parchemin, de petites dimensions: 15 x 22 cm., 271 ff. date probablement du XVe s. Le titre indiqué au début a peut-être été ajouté: "Postilla optima super euangeliis Mathei aedita a fratre Petro Iohanne de Biterris."

Assise, Bibl. Comunale 361.

Papier, 79 ff. à 2 col. Plusieurs mains du XIVe s.

Ce manuscrit ne contient pas le prologue général sur les Evangiles; il est mutilé de la fin et s'arrête au début du c. VII. "In nomine Domini. Amen. Hec est postilla super Matheum edita a venerabile doctore M. Petro Iohannis sacre theologie magistro" (rubr.). "Ad maiorem autem euidentiam dictorum et dicendorum V. sunt querenda et prenotanda... — ...(c. VII). Nolite iudicare...unde et Augustinus in libro de predestinatione sanctorum dicit: cum res vera...dicentibus."

Le manuscrit est décrit très sommairement dans le Catalogue de Mazzatinti, vol IV, p. 8. Nous l'avons examiné nous même.

Florence, Bibl. Naz. Conventi Soppressi G. I. 671, f. 132-132v.

Ce manuscrit ne contient que le début de la *Postilla in Mattheum* transcrit à la suite de la *Postilla super Genesim* d'Olivi.

Parch. 166 ff. à 2 col.

Ce manuscrit a été étudié et décrit par le P. V. Doucet: "De operibus mss. Fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi..." *Arch. fr. hist.* 28 (1935), 51 et 414.

Les ff. 6-24v contiennent la "Lectura" de Pierre Olivi "super 4um librum Sententiarum"; les ff. 27-132 la "Postilla super Genesim Pe. Io." Titre rubriqué. A la suite, f. 132-132v, sans titre: "Quatuor facies uni. Quemadmodum admirabilis... — ...videlicet pastorum seu prelatorum, martyrum, doctorum." Le reste du texte a disparu de ce ms.

Deux manuscrits proviennent du Midi de la France, et l'un d'entre eux s'y trouve encore.

Toulouse, Bibl. mun. 48.

Parch. 264 ff. à 2 col. (Foliotation médiévale jusqu'au f. 110). Ecriture méridionale du début du XIVe s. Initiales bl. et r.

Le texte est complet. A la fin, f. 264v: "Explicit lectura super euangelium beati Mathei. Amen. Finito libro sit laus et gloria Christo in perpetuum. Amen. Dexteram scribentis benedicat Filius Dei omnipotentis. Amen. Benedictus sit Ihesus dulcissimus et sanctissima Maria mater eius regina celi et terre. Amen." Il y a des notes marginales de plusieurs mains, les unes admiratives, les autres réprobatives. En regard du c. 1: "Nota quod hec est generalis distinctio siue quadriformis diuisio tocius radiosissimi libri huius." En regard du passage contre s. Thomas, au début de l'énumeration des "erreurs," f. 111: "reprobatio positionis et opinionis Thome" d'une main contemporaine. Mais un peu plus loin, en marge du passage: "auctoritates...quarum aliquas supra in sermone Domini demonstraui," on trouve cette remarque, d'une main plus récente: "caue hanc positionem quia condemnata est." Le manuscrit provient des Dominicains de Toulouse; il est probable qu'il a été copié plutôt par des Franciscains.

Cf. *Catalogue général des manuscrits des bibliothèques publiques de France.* Série in-4., VII, p. 23. Nous avons étudié ce manuscrit.

Escorial Q. III. 2.

Parch. 117 ff. à 2 col. Ecriture méridionale du XIVe s. Initiales bl. et r.

Le texte est complet. Le nom de l'auteur a été ajouté d'une autre main dans la marge supérieure du f. 1: "Hec Postilla est super euangelium Mathei euangeliste per venerabilem Petrum Iohannis compilata." — A la fin: "Hic liber est Michaelis Rubei canonici et sacriste Sancte Marie Maioris civitatis Cesarauguste quem emit Tho<lose> pretio quinque francorum anno <M>CCCC octauo."

Cf. G. Antolin, *Catalogo de los codices latinos de la...bibl. del Escorial,* III, pp. 408-409.

Deux manuscrits sont conservés en Angleterre.

Cambridge, Corpus Christi Coll. 321 (K. 13).

Parch. 3+281 ff. à 2 col.

Transcrit vers le milieu du XIVe s. par un scribe probablement anglais. Initiales peintes bl. avec filigr. r.

F. 1-210. "Lectura in Matthaeum." Texte complet avec prol. A la fin: "explicit lectura super evangelium b. Mathei."

F. 210v-214v. Tabula quaestionum.: "Et primo ad evidentiam tocius evangelii queritur quare Christus per seipsum non scripsit doctrinam evangelicam... — ...quinto etiam an primo apparuerit matri sue."

F. 215-218. Expositio super Pater noster, sans titre: "Ad intuendam altitudinem oracionis dominice... — ...in ultima etiam scilicet in *libera nos a malo* omnes sunt, quia nunquam perfecte a malo liberabimur...in re saltem et in fine Et huius Lucas (sic)."

F. Iv, titre inscrit au XVe.: "Postill. super Mt." et mot gratté: "R...ye." Un f. contenant un fragment de texte anglo-saxon a été inséré après le f. 139.

Cf. M. R. James, *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Library of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge*, II, pp. 137-138; N. Ker, *Catalogue of Manuscripts containing Anglo-Saxon*, 1957, p. 106; le ms. a été donné au Collège par l'archevêque Parker en 1575.

Oxford, New Coll. 49.

Parch. 158 ff. à 2 col. Ecriture de la seconde moitié du XIVe s.

Ce manuscrit de grandes dimensions, a des initiales peintes en bl. et r. La première page a un encadrement peint et historié avec les symboles des évangélistes.

Il contient le texte complet de la *Postilla in Matthaeum*, avec le nom de l'auteur à la fin: "Explicit opus Petri Iohannis super euangelium Mathei." Une main plus récente a ajouté une mise en garde: "Erat quidam Petrus Ioannis hereticus unus ex complicibus Ioachimi abbatis heresiarche; cum ergo non constat cuius Petri Ioannis hoc opus sit, non alienum putaui ab officio meo imprudentem lectorem admonere."

Cf. H. O. Coxe, *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum qui in collegiis aulisque Oxoniensibus adseruantur*, I, p. 14.

Trois manuscrits se trouvent actuellement dans des régions plus lointaines.

Klosterneuburg, Bibl. du Monastère 769.

Parch. 120 ff. à 2 col. XIVe s.

F. 1, note d'une main de la fin du XIVe s. "Lectura magistri Alexandri doctoris Parisius de Hallis de ordine fratrum minorum."

F. 1v-120. Texte de la *Postilla in Matthaeum*, qui semble complet. A la suite, table des évangiles selon l'année liturgique; à la fin: "Explicit postilla super euangelia Matthei. Qui scripsit scribat, semper cum Domino viuat."

La description de ce manuscrit est contenue dans les carnets de voyage du P. Fedele da Fanna, volume 5, p. 92. Elle est conservée au Collège Saint-Bonaventure qui vient de se transporter de Quaracchi près Florence à Grotta Ferrata, et nous a été généreusement communiquée par le P. I. Brady. Celui-ci ajoute que cette description a dû être rédigée au printemps 1876, le P. Fedele ayant séjourné à Vienne et visité les bibliothèques d'Autriche à cette époque, avec deux compagnons, Giovanni Maraspini et Hyacinthe Deimel.

Budapest, Bibl. Univ. 49.

Parch. 259 ff. à 2 col. Ecriture de la deuxième moitié du XIVe s., de type parisien, d'après le catalogue. Initiales peintes bl. ou r. Deux grandes initiales peintes et ornées avec encadrement peint au début des deux œuvres contenues dans le ms., f. 1 et 152.

F. 1-15v. "Postilla in Matthaeum," sans titre ni nom d'auteur.

F. 152-259v. (Vitalis de Furno, Commentarium in Apocalypsim).

Cf. *Codices latini Medii Aevi Bibl. Universitatis Budapestinensis quos recensuit Ladislaus Mazey. Accedunt tabulae...quas posteriores collegit et notis auxit Agnes Bolgar* (Budapest 1961), pp. 75-76.

Wroclaw (Breslau), Bibl. de l'Université I F 61m.

Parch. 152 ff. à 2 col. Seconde moitié du XIVe s.

Initiales rubr. Le texte, anonyme, débute avec le prologue, f. 1 et se termine, incomplet, f. 152, avec le commentaire de Mt. xxvii, 55: "erant ibi mulieres." Au dessous, le rubricateur a inscrit: "non est plus in exemplar." La provenance est inconnue, mais il subiste deux cotes anciennes: "B. 22" et au dessous: "85".

Cf. H. A. Krüss, *Die Handschriften der Staats- und Univers. bibl. Breslau* I (Berlin 1938), p. 66. Dr. Sophie Wlodek a bien voulu nous indiquer que le nom de l'auteur ne figurait pas dans le ms.

Deux manuscrits contiennent des extraits du chapitre X de la "Postilla in Matthaeum."

Vat. Lat. 4986.

Le premier, dont nous avons déjà parlé, le manuscrit Vat. lat. 4986, du premier quart du XIVe siècle, est un recueil de questions théologiques et de traités sur la pauvreté évangélique de Pierre Jean Olieu. C'est une compilation assez mal ordonnée, mais précieuse en raison du grand

nombre de textes importants qu'elle renferme. Elle a été décrite par F. Ehrle, qui l'a utilisée dans son étude sur la vie et les œuvres d'Olivi. Ce volume a fait partie dès le XIVe siècle de la bibliothèque des papes d'Avignon et a été noté dans les inventaires de 1369 et de 1411. L'extrait concernant saint Thomas est transcrit, sans titre, à la suite de la question 10 des *Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica*, sur la mendicité, f. 75-78. Le compilateur a copié également les attaques d'Olivi contre d'autres détracteurs de la pauvreté évangélique, qui suivent la réfutation de saint Thomas dans la Postille.

Cf. Fr. Ehrle, "Olivis Leben und Schriften," *ALKGM* III (1887), 473, 461 et 463, 497 sqq. pour les passages des écrits d'Olieu décrits d'après ce manuscrit, et pp. 519-522 pour les extraits de l'attaque contre saint Thomas. Le P. V. Doucet a complété en partie la description dans son article, "De operibus mss. fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi in bibliotheca Universitatis Patavinae asservatis," *Arch fr. hist.* 28 (1935), 413-414.

Vat. Ottob. lat. 522.

Un autre extrait du chapitre X, comportant le commentaire du *Nolite possidere*, est contenu dans le manuscrit Vat. Ottobon. lat. 522, f. 88-97v. Ce manuscrit, sur parchemin, comprend deux parties distinctes, la seconde, plus tardive, f. 142-321 étant le *Liber exemplorum fratrum Minorum*. La première partie, de la première moitié du XIVe s., présente des textes divers, dont trois fragments ou extraits relatifs à la règle franciscaine: F. 76-87, une "expositio regulae," anonyme, qui est celle d'Angelo Clareno, avec de nombreuses lacunes.

F. 87v, extraits de l'exposition de la règle de saint Bonaventure. C'est à la suite de ce fragment que se trouve l'extrait de la *Postilla*, qui est en réalité une paraphrase du texte d'Olieu. Les expressions vives et spontanées de notre auteur ont été atténuées, et les allusions à ses autres ouvrages ont disparu. Le texte est, naturellement, anonyme: "Nolite possidere aurum neque argentum, Mt. 6 (sic). Postquam informauit predicatores euangelicos in abdicatione temporalis prosperitatis..." Le texte suit le commentaire au delà des passages polémiques contre saint Thomas, puis contre d'autres objections; il continue, après la reprise de l'explication de la lettre: "Nunc ad litteram redeamus..." f. 97-97v. Il s'arrête brusquement, au milieu d'une page, sur les mots: "Et ibant <Apostoli> velut principales magistri omnis perfectionis a Christo corporaliter separati..."

Cf. sur ce ms. L. Oliger, "Fr. Bonagratia de Bergamo et eius tractatus de Christi et apostolorum paupertate," *Ach. fr. hist.* 22 (1929), 317-319.

L'on peut tirer avec prudence quelques conclusions de cet examen de la tradition manuscrite de la *Lectura in Matthaeum* de Pierre Jean Olieu.

En premier lieu, malgré la suspicion qui s'attachait aux écrits d'un auteur réprouvé et condamné par les autorités de son ordre, il faut constater que les témoins de l'ouvrage sont relativement nombreux, et peut-être quelques uns se cachent-ils encore dans des fonds incomplètement catalogués.

Il est vrai que l'ordre donné par le ministre général Jean de Murrovalle de brûler les livres du Spirituel est surtout adressé aux ministres des provinces de Provence et d'Aragon,[9] et que les couvents d'Italie n'ont sans doute pas tenu compte de ces instructions. Le nom de "Petrus Ioannis" a été gratté ou omis, dans une bonne partie des exemplaires, mais les frères ont continué à recopier l'ouvrage, le trouvant bon et utile. La présence de la table des questions et de la table des péricopes semble en effet indiquer que la *Lectura* a été, au moins quelque temps, utilisée pour l'enseignement et la prédication. C'est en Italie, d'après notre recension, que l'œuvre d'Olieu semble avoir été le plus longtemps appréciée. Elle a même eu des admirateurs vénérables, tels saint Jean de Capistran[10] et saint Bernardin de Sienne.[11]

En second lieu, bien que la majorité des manuscrits paraisse de provenance franciscaine, le texte a intéressé d'autres théologiens, tels Pierre de Limoges, l'évêque de Padoue qui a confié avec méfiance son beau volume au monastère du *Santo*, et le chanoine de Saragosse, qui a acheté le livre à Toulouse en 1408. Enfin, nous constatons que l'aire de diffusion est étendue, puisque l'on retrouve des exemplaires jusqu'en Autriche, en Hongrie et en Pologne. C'est bien peu en comparaison de la masse des manuscrits de saint Thomas, mais notre franciscain occitan a tout de même réussi à survivre.

Addendum. Pierre de Limoges a acquis, et probablement fait exécuter pour lui une copie de la *Lectura in Genesim* de Pierre Jean Olieu; c'est aujourd'hui le manuscrit Lat. 15559 de la Bibliothèque Nationale. Comme dans le manuscrit Lat. 15588, il a mis une foliotation en chiffres arabes, et a rédigé une table des matières après avoir inscrit des lettres de repère dans les marges; il a également indiqué par des traits en marge les passages qui lui paraissaient intéressants, et parmi ceux-ci, des digressions d'inspiration joachimite. — Nous devons, d'autre part, citer une étude récente sur l'écriture de Pierre de Limoges: M. Mabille, "Pierre de Limoges copiste de manuscrits," *Scriptorium* 24 (1970), pp. 45-47 et pl. 10.

9 Cf. F. Ehrle, op. cit., pp. 444-445, et textes publiés dans son article: "Zur Vorgeschichte des Concils von Vienne," *ALKGM* III, pp. 15, 16, 157.

10 Sur les mss. de Pierre Jean conservés au couvent de Capistran, cf. L. Oliger, "Descriptio codicis Capistranensis continens aliqua opuscula Fr. Petri Johannis Olivi" (Capistr, xxvi), *Arch fr. hist.* 1 (1908), 617-622; A. Chiappini, *Reliquie letterarie Capistranesi* (Aquila 1927).

11 Cf. D. Pacetti, *De s. Bernardini Senensis vita et operibus*; *ratio criticae editionis* (Quaracchi-Florence 1947), pp. 74-80.

TEXT

PETRUS IOHANNIS OLIVI. *LECTURA IN MATTHAEUM* EXTRAITS DU COMMENTAIRE DE MT. X, 9-10.[1]

Nolite possidere. Hic quatuor inhibet: primo scilicet possessionem thesaurorum; secundo, deportationem nummorum; tertio, deportationem victualium seu ciborum; quarto, deportationem calciamentorum et plurium indumentorum et baculorum. Quinto, quia possent dicere: de quo viuemus? aut: qualiter nobis dabitur victus? subdit quod tanquam operarii agri Dominici digni sunt sustentari tam ab hominibus quam a Deo. Pro primo ergo dicit: *Nolite possidere aurum et argentum.* Et nota quod auferendo possessionem mobilium subponit interdictam esse possessionem immobilium, quia irrationalis esset abdicatio mobilium, retenta possessione immobilium; de hac autem hic expresse mentionem non fecit, quia iam de facto et ex professione votiua omnia reliquerant. Facit autem specialius mentionem de auro et argento, tum quia sunt illecebrosiora et cupiditatem fortius intendentia, tum quia facilius poterant[2] ab eis recipi et occulte conseruari quam alia, tum quia facilius possent credere quod pro suis necessitatibus liceret eis saltem aliquantulum thesaurum congregare...

Neque pecuniam, id est nummos, *in zonis vestris*, id est in bursis ad zonam pendentibus; ex hac autem additione patet quod per primum intellexit et inhibuit[3] congregationem auri domi seruari et pro tempore longiori; hic vero agit de deportatione que fit pro continuis expensis...*Non peram in via* pera est cassidile in quo pastores portant panem suum...Si per peram intelligitur portatio ciborum, ut quid in Marc. (VI, 8) et Luc. (IX, 3) additur: *neque panem*? Dicendum quod pera posset portari a principio vacua sub spe acquirendi cibos qui postmodum per viam portentur.

Neque duas tunicas, id est: nec duo indumenta...*Neque calciamenta...Neque virgam.* Contra,[4] Marc. 6° (8) dicitur: *Nisi virgam tantum.* Dicendum quod portare virgam in auxilium sue defensionis seu defensiue percussionis fuit eis

1 Nous avons établi le texte de ces extraits d'après le ms. lat. 15588 de la Bibl. nationale de Paris, probablement contemporain de l'auteur, en le corrigeant, en particulier les fréquentes omissions par homoioteleuton, à l'aide du ms. 48 de la Bibl. mun. de Toulouse. N'ayant l'intention que d'offrir un texte lisible, nous n'avons pas tenu compte des variantes des mss. de Florence, Laurent. Plut. 10 dextr. 4, Vat. lat. 8670 et 10900 de la Bibl. Vaticane, ni du ms. Vat. lat. 4986, contenant le passage utilisé et partiellement édité par Fr. Ehrle, que nous avions collationnés.
Ms. Paris lat. 15588, f. 68-71v = P.
Ms. Toulouse 48 = T.

2 poterant/potest aut P.

3 intellexit et inhibuit T/intellexerat P.

4 contra *om.* P.

prohibitum; portare vero eam in sustentaculum proprie inbecillitatis fuit eis concessum. Potest etiam dici quod virgam defensionis prohibuit, sed virgam correctionis concessit, de qua Apostolus I. Cor. 4° (21) dicit: *in virga veniam ad vos, aut in caritate*? etc. Potest etiam dici quod ad litteram extra casum necessitatis interdixit eis virgam seu baculum quo communiter utuntur peregrini et viatores, quia tamen hoc non ita interdixit eis[5] quin aliquo modo liceret; ideo Marc. hoc excepit ut innueret quod, licet de communi forma euangelice regule fuerit eis inhibitum, sicut referunt Matt. et Luc., et ex condescensione tamen[6] fuit eis concessum, quia hoc non tantum continet perfectionem sicut reliqua.

Aduertendum[7] autem hic diligenter quod Thomas, in Summa sua, questione: "An lex noua sufficienter se habeat circa actus exteriores precipiendos vel prohibendos,"[8] dicit "quod licet ista precepta non dederit Dominus Apostolis tanquam cerimoniales obseruantias, sed tanquam moralia instituta, possunt intelligi dupliciter; uno modo secundum Augustinum,[9] ut non sint precepta, sed concessiones; concessit enim eis ut possent pergere ad predicationis officium sine pera et baculo, et aliis huiusmodi, tanquam habentes potestatem accipiendi necessaria vite ab illis quibus predicabant; unde subdit: *dignus est enim operarius cibo suo.*[10] Non autem peccat sed[11] supererogat qui sua portat ex quibus viuat in predicationis officio, non accipiens sumptus a quibus predicat, sicut Paulus fecit.[12] Alio modo possunt intelligi secundum expositionem aliorum sanctorum ut sint quedam statuta temporalia Apostolis data illo tempore quo ante Christi passionem mittebantur ad predicandum in Iudea. Indigebant enim discipuli, quasi adhuc paruuli accipere a Christo aliqua[13] specialia instituta, sicut et quilibet subditi a suis prelatis, et precipue quia erant paulatim exercitandi, ut temporalium sollicitudinem abdicarent, per quod reddebantur idonei ad predicandum per uniuersum orbem. Nec est mirum, si durante adhuc statu veteris Legis, et ipsis nondum perfectam libertatem Spiritus consecutis, quosdam determinatos modos viuendi instituit, que quidem statuta, imminente passione, remoueret,[14] tanquam discipulis iam pro ea sufficienter exercitatis; unde Luc. XXII° (35) dixit: *quando misi vos sine sacculo*, etc. et post: *sed qui nunc habet sacculum tollat, similiter et peram.*[15] Iam enim imminebat tempus perfecte libertatis, ut totaliter suo demitterentur arbitrio in hiis que secundum se non pertinent ad necessitatem virtutis." Hec prefatus doctor.

5 seu baculum...interdixit eis *om.* P.
6 tamenT/n P.
7 Le ms. P porte ici: Diligenter adverte, avant: aduertendum...Le copiste a dû inclure dans le texte une note marginale de son modèle. C'est ici que commence l'extrait contenu dans le ms. Vat. lat. 4986.
8 *Prima Secundae*, q. 108, a. 2, ad 3. La citation est presque littérale.
9 *De consensu Euangelist.* II, 30.
10 *Mt.* X, 10.
11 si superer. P.
12 *I Cor.* IX, 4 sqq.
13 aliq. alia *add.* T.
14 remoueret P/remouit T.
15 *Lc.* XXII, 36.

Et aduertendum etiam illud quod in altera parte Summe sue[16] dicit, questione: "An habere aliquid in communi diminuat de perfectione religionis."[17] Licet enim ibi dicat quod "habere superhabundantes diuicias in communi, siue in rebus mobilibus, siue immobilibus, est impedimentum perfectionis, licet totaliter non excludat eam," plura tamen subdit valde cauenda. Subdit enim quod "habere de exterioribus rebus in communi, siue mobilibus, siue[18] immobilibus quantum [19] sufficit ad simplicem victum non impedit perfectionem religionis, si consideretur paupertas in comparatione ad communem finem religionum, qui est vacare diuinis obsequiis; per[20] comparationem vero ad speciales fines, tanto erit unaqueque religio perfectior quanto habet paupertatem magis proportionatam suo fini." Ex quo infert quod "religio que ordinatur ad militandum et[21] ad hospitalitatem sectandam vel ad alias corporales actiones actiue (vite) esset imperfecta si omnibus diuitiis communibus[22] careret." Deinde subdit quod "religiones que ad contemplationem ordinantur tanto perfectiores sunt quanto earum paupertas minorem sollicitudinem temporalium eis ingerit." Deinde subdit: "Manifestum est autem quod minimam sollicitudinem ingerit conseruare res usui hominum[23] necessarias tempore congruo procuratas. Et ideo tribus gradibus religionum, triplex ratio[24] paupertatis competit; nam illis religionibus que ordinantur ad corporales actiones actiue vite, competit habere habundantiam diuitiarum communium; illis autem[25] que sunt ordinate ad contemplandum magis competit habere possessiones moderatas, nisi ubi oportet tales[26] per se vel per alios hospitalitatem tenere; illis autem que ordinantur ad contemplata aliis tradendum, competit vitam habere valde[27] expeditam ab exterioribus sollicitudinibus, quod quidem fit dum modica que sunt necessaria vite congruo tempore procurata conseruantur." Deinde ostendit quod "Christus, institutor paupertatis hoc suo exemplo docuit, quia habebat loculos...ex quo patet quod conseruare pecuniam aut quascumque alias res communes ad sustentationem religiosorum congregationis eiusdem vel quorumcumque aliorum pauperum est conforme perfectioni quam Christus docuit suo exemplo" ...Deinde subdit quod "paupertas non est perfectio, sed perfectionis instrumentum et minimum inter tria principalia instrumenta perfectionis" ...Subdit etiam quod "non oportet quod religio tanto sit perfectior quanto maiorem habet paupertatem, sed quanto eius paupertas est magis proportionata communi fini et speciali..."

Ut autem pateat que in hiis precipue sunt cauenda, reduco illa ad septem. Primum est quod verba Christi: *Nolite possidere*, etc., non sunt precepta, sed

16 Summe sue T. (et cet. cod.)/sic P.
17 *Secunda Secundae*, q. 188, a. 7.
18 s. etiam *add.* T.
19 Quantum *om.* P.
20 per *om.* P.
21 et P/vel T.
22 communibus T/communiter P.
23 hominum P/hominis T.
24 ratio P/gradus T.
25 illis autem T/aut illis P.
26 tal. vel *add.* T.
27 valde P/maxime T.

concessiones. Secundum est quod: qui portat sua in predicando supererogat. Tercium est, quod secundum alios sanctos ab Augustino predicta a Christo fuerunt quedam statuta temporalia secundum se non spectantia ad perfectionem seu ad necessitatem perfecte virtutis, et ideo euacuata sunt tempore passionis a Christo dicente: *et nunc qui habet sacculum tollat, similiter et peram.* Quartum est quod religio ordinata ad militiam vel hospitalitatem vel ad quamcumque actiuam est imperfecta nisi habeat in communi habundantiam diuitiarum, et quod religionem ordinatam ad contemplandum decet et competit habere possessiones moderatas, et si ultra hoc vacat hospitalitati, debet habere habundantes. Quintum est quod habere in communi mobilia et immobilia quantum expedit necessario victui religionis tam pro se quam pro aliis pauperibus in nullo impedit perfectionem religionis ordinate ad contemplandum et ad predicandum vel docendum, et quod conseruare res usui necessarias congruo tempore procuratas minimam sollicitudinem temporalium ingerit et facit habere vitam ab exterioribus sollicitudinibus maxime expeditam, et quod non differt seruare pecuniam aut seruare res alias necessarias, et quod est eadem ratio uti hiis que pertinent ad necessaria vite aut quod communiter conseruentur. Sextum est quod hec probantur Christi exemplo et Apostolorum, quia ipsi ita fecerunt, et quia aliter facere est periculosum, secundum[28] Antonium et Augustinum.[29] Septimum est quod paupertas non est perfectio, sed instrumentum perfectionis, minimum inter vota euangelica; et quod non quanto maior tanto perfectior, sed potius quanto est magis proportionata communi et speciali fini religionis.

Primum igitur est erroneum[30]; primo quia est contra expressa verba Scripture...secundo, quia est contra expressissima[31] et[32] plurima verba[33] sanctorum tam grecorum quam latinorum, quorum adminus XVII auctoritates expressas posui in prima questione de paupertate[34]; et ultra hoc sunt plures auctoritates Basilii in regula sua et sanctorum Patrum in collationibus suis, quarum aliquas supra[35] in Sermone Domini recitaui,[36] et aliquas etiam in hac parte[37]; tertio quia eneruat totam veritatem perfectionis euangelice,[38] sicut ibidem est per

28 sec. beatum Ant. *add.* T.

29 Saint Thomas cite, pour s. Antoine, les *Collationes Patrum* II, 2, et pour s. Augustin, le traité *De operibus monachorum* c. 23-24 (2a2ae, q. 188, a. 7, ad 2).

30 En marge de ce passage, le ms. T porte une note: "reprobatio positionis et opinionis Thome."

31 expressiua P.

32 quam *add.* P.

33 verb. multorum s. *add.* T.

34 A la fin de la question: "An status altissime paupertatis sit simpliciter melior omni statu diuitiarum"; cette première question sur la pauvreté évangélique est la huitième question dans la série ordonnée des "Quaestiones de perfectione euangelica"; cf. Ehrle, op. cit., pp. 505-506. Nous avons étudié cette question d'après le ms. Flor. Laurent. Santa Croce XXXI, sin. 3, f. 121-138v. Ehrle en donne quelques extraits d'après le ms. Vat. lat. 4986, f. 23-39v., dans son étude cit., pp. 505-506, mais ne mentionne pas cette série d'autorités.

35 supr. et *add.* P.

36 au chap. 6 de la *Lectura in Mt.*, ms. 15588, f. 57-59.

37 Olivi a cité la règle de saint Basile un peu plus haut, f. 68v du ms. lat. 15588.

38 T porte en marge de ce passage: "Cave hanc positionem, quia condemnata est."

plures vias ostensum.[39] Quod autem pro se Augustinum inducit, miror prudentem virum pauca verba unius sancti velle reducere contra expressissima verba Scripture sacre et omnium aliorum sanctorum, et contra expressa dicta Romanorum pontificum, et contra sententiam, vitam et regulam tanti viri quantus fuit sanctus Franciscus, Christi plagis insignitus, et[40] contra alia verba ipsiusmet Augustini et contra lumen irrefragabilium rationum. Ergo potius debuit vel exponere verba Augustini, vel negare; sicut enim optime dicit frater Bonauentura Apologie sue 7° c°,[41] predicta verba Christi possunt intelligi esse dicta apostolis in persona omnium christianorum qui secundum litteram ad tantam artitudinem non tenentur...possunt etiam secundo intelligi prout dicta sunt Apostolis generaliter in persona omnium doctorum et prelatorum, quibus de iure euangelico competit recipere necessaria a subditis suis; et tunc, si verba Christi predicta referantur solum ad huiusmodi receptionem, dicit Augustinus in libro De concordia Euangelistarum et alibi[42] quod non sunt precepta, sed concessa siue permissa, quod est dicere quod non fuit eis preceptum recipere necessaria ab hiis quibus predicabant, nec etiam fuit eis preceptum[43] quod ut reciperent ab illis non deberent aliunde necessaria accipere, sed solum fuit eis permissum...quamuis autem sub hoc respectu non sunt Apostolis precepta, nichilominus prout perfectionem paupertatis aperte includunt, sunt eis precepta tanquam professoribus altissime paupertatis ad quam non astringuntur hii qui non vouerunt eam. Unde, nec ratio Augustini de Paulo operante manibus[44] aliquo modo vadit contra hoc, sed solum contra primum, sicut patet etiam cecis et surdis...

Secundum etiam, scilicet quod qui in predicando portat sua supererogat, simpliciter loquendo, est falsum et erroneum, quia tunc predicator habens proprium de quo viuit est perfectior paupere euangelico, qui predicando viuit de elemosinis aut stipendiis illorum quibus predicat...Constat autem quod desistere ab opere supererogationis non est sacrilegium neque peccatum, nisi vouisset illud; igitur illud non est simpliciter verum, nisi in facientibus illud instar Pauli, secundum quod tamen supererogat omnis qui stipendium sibi licitum et debitum propter Dei amorem non recipit.

Tercium etiam est erroneum, falsoque ascribitur hoc sanctis, quia non solum hoc non dicunt, immo expressissime contrarium docent, omnium enim auctoritates expresse dicunt eos ista semper obseruasse et obseruare debuisse, et quod ista simpliciter sunt perfectionis et perfecte virtutis et perfectissime exemplaritatis...Ex quibus tamen verbis eius premissis aperte patet quod Christus debuit discipulis suis dare aliquam formam vestitus condecentem statui suo; debuit ergo esse forma mire paupertatis, vilitatis, humilitatis, simplicitatis, austeritatis, nuditatis, et recte[45] talis est forma data eis a

39 vias P/rationes T.
40 et P/est etiam T.
41 *Apologia Pauperum*, c. 7; *S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia* VIII, opusc. XI, p. 279.
42 *Contra Adimantium*, c. 20, 1, cité d'après Bonaventure, loc. cit.
43 recipere...preceptum *om.* P.
44 Cf. *Act.* XVIII, 3.
45 recte T/ratione P.

Christo...nemo sane mentis debet dicere hanc in[46] passione euacuatam esse tanquam imperfectam, aut tanquam perfectioni virtutis non multam accomodam, et precipue cum non solum innumera verba[47] sanctorum, sed etiam omnes antique imagines Apostolorum oculata fide nos docent eos sic per orbem uniuersum semper incessisse.

Quartum etiam quod scilicet religio ordinata ad actiuam, utpote ad militiam vel ad hospitalitatem est imperfecta nisi habeat habundantes diuicias est noua et inaudita doctrina. Quis enim usque nunc audiuit in noua Lege sic diuicias commendari ut dicatur aliqua religio esse imperfecta, non solum si non habeat diuicias, sed etiam nisi habeat diuicias habundantes? Quero autem an, dato quod aliqui milites pro cultu Dei sic exponant se religiose militie quod penitus nichil querant nisi sumptus sibi gratis a Christianis dandos, an isti sint in cultu et religione Dei imperfectiores quam si sibi ad hoc coaceruent castra et regna et certe nullus sane mentis dicet quin illud sit maioris virtutis.

Preterea in statu et actu militie religiose principaliter debet intendi spiritualis salus eorum qui sunt in statu illo et spiritualis cultus Dei. Constat enim quod si absque omni[48] dominio temporalium, solis stipendiis officio suo competentibus sunt contenti, et ubi desunt sunt prompti ferre patienter propter Deum, quod tanto sunt elongatiores a superbia et auaricia et luxuria eneruante militare studium et a seditione dissipante exercitum et totum militare negocium, essentque promptiores ad obediendum suis ducibus et fidentiores in Deo et eius auxilio; essetque Deo et suo populo honorificentius per tales vincere quam per diuiciis affluentes, maiusque exemplum darent[49] mundo, contempnandi mundum et colendi Deum, et pure bellandi propter Dei amorem; et huiusmodi exemplum de facto probamus in pluribus, qui, dum[50] essent pauperiores pro Deo suo optime militarunt, facti autem diciores, superbiis, opulentiis et luxuriis atque rixis, inuidiis et seditionibus vacant, orbemque totum malo exemplo replent et ideo nec Deus curat eis auxiliari.

Preterea, secundum hoc, decrescentibus diuiciis, semper decrescit regularis eorum perfectio, et cum crescentibus crescit, acsi in ipsis diuiciis formaliter consistat perfectio religionis illius, quod non solum est erroneum, sed etiam ridiculosum et tantum quod apud Romanos nundum christianos exercicio tam morum quam armorum[51] affluentia diuiciarum, que est mater gule et luxurie et litigiorum domesticorum reputaretur valde nociua, et e contra pauperies dilecta reputata sit prodesse predictis. Preterea, esto quod in militia haberet hoc locum, quis dicet quod religio que cum summa paupertate de solo opere ac labore proprio vacat hospitalitati non sit perfectior illa que de sola superfluitate suarum diuiciarum elargitur pauperibus; et certe dixit Christus quod paupercula vidua mittens duo minuta in gazophilacium Dei misit plus quam omnes diuites;[52] cuius ratio secundum Christum est quod ista misit totum victum suum, illi vero de superfluo suo.

46 in Christi pass. *add.* T.
47 verba *om.* P.
48 omni T/.n. P.
49 darent T/daret P.
50 qui dum T/quidem P.
51 quam armorum *om.* P.
52 *Mc.* XII, 42-44; *Lc.* XXI, 2-4.

Rursus, dato quod in hiis qui nesciunt orare nec ferre pauperiem, hoc locum haberet, quis dicet quod religio dedicata contemplationi et non doctrine sit perfectior cum moderata sufficientia possessionum et aliarum rerum quam si instar anachoritarum et monachorum existentium tempore magni Antonii, nichil habentes, viuerent de solo labore? Sed quis ferat quod subditur, scilicet quod si vacat hospitalitati debeat ultra predictum moderamen[53] habere habundantes diuicias? Estne hec doctrina Christi vel Pauli? Dixit hoc unquam aliquis sanctus? Absit!

Sed arguit quod proprius finis predictarum religionum hoc exigit; et nos dicimus quod proprius finis[54] talis religionis potest sumi tripliciter, aut secundum quod est complementum perfectionis sui status, aut secundum quod est[55] remedium infirmitatis eorum, aut secundum quod est solatium carnalitatis eorum.

Primo modo diuitie aut possessiones terrene non iuuant, immo potius obsunt, nisi per magnum contemptum animi virtualiter conculcentur et a mentis affectibus[56] totaliter sequestrentur, quod facere habendo eas est valde difficile, non solum in[57] imperfectis, sed etiam et perfectis. Secundo modo iuuant quidem eo modo quo coniugium est remedium concupiscentie per adulteria et meretricia effluentis;[58] sed iste finis semper presupponit imperfectionem ut sibi annexam. Tertio vero modo semper est culpa et crebro mortale peccatum.

Sciendum etiam quod aliquis[59] dicitur esse specialis finis religionis qui tamen non est semper finis principalis, sed annexus principali. Dilectio enim Dei et proximi et spiritualis salus anime sue ac deinde aliorum est principalis finis religionis; temporalis vero et corporalis impugnatio infidelium et corporalis defensio ac redemptio vel nutritio fidelium non est proprie finis religionis, nisi forte sit finis annexus. In proportionando autem statum suum ad talem finem, non est virtutis perfectio, nisi solum pro quanto illa proportionatio magis vel minus dirigitur ad caritatem et ad perfectionem spiritualem anime sue.

Dato ergo quod habundantia diuiciarum absolute plus prodesset corporalibus commodis fidelium, si tamen ex hoc modo[60] impedimentum maius[61] prestetur spirituali saluti anime sue vel aliorum, non erit[62] perfectio religionis, sed imperfectio.

Quintum autem quantum ad primam sui partem est aperte contrarium doctrine Christi, sicut habunde et diffuse alibi[63] est probatum; et certe secundum

53 predictum moderamen T/predictam moderationem P.
54 predictarum...finis *om.* P.
55 est quoddam rem. *add.* T.
56 affectibus T/effectibus P.
57 in *om.* T.
58 effluentis P./affluentis T.
59 aliquis T/aliquid P.
60 modo P/aliquid T.
61 maius P/magis T.
62 erit P/esset hoc T.
63 L'auteur se réfère à ses questions sur la pauvreté qui portent les n° 8 et 9 de la série des "Quaestiones de perfectione euangelica"; cf. Ehrle, op. cit., pp. 505-514, et peut être aussi à son traité "de usu paupere"; cf. Ehrle, pp. 514-517.

hoc debuit dicere Christus: *Vade et vende quod habes, et da pauperibus* vel adiunge ea collegio nostro. Quero etiam quare non fecit apportare ad collegium suum retia Apostolorum, sed potius pro magna laude dicitur quod *relictis retibus secuti sunt eum.*[64] Secundum istam doctrinam nescio ad quid, nisi solum quia parum valebant et ideo collegium Christi paruam ex eis pecuniam habuisset. Quare etiam non dixit eis: *Nolite possidere aurum vel argentum*[65] in proprio, sed in communi collegio prouidete et habete satis, quia hoc non impedit perfectionem, immo potius iuuat? Quantumvero ad secundam partem in qua dicitur quod conseruare res usui necessarias minimam sollicitudinem ingerit, immo et facit habere vitam maxime expeditam a sollicitudinibus, si[66] solum intelligit hoc de conseruatione absque omni iure proprio vel communi, et hoc pro solo tempore in quo est euidens necessitas talia[67] conseruandi, verum dicit, et[68] utinam iste fuerit intellectus! Si vero conseruacionem accipit cum dominio, et necessitatem rerum accipit[69] pro tota vita aut pro magno tempore cuius nondum imminet necessitas, nisi forte apud hominem imperfectum qui non plene se committit dispositioni aut consilio Dei, est falsum et erroneum.

Falsum quidem est; primo, quia talis de pluribus et pro maiori tempore sollicitatur; secundo, quia cum maiori affectu sollicitatur, quia vult eas[70] procurare et conseruare cum pleno dominio in communi, alius non; tertio, quia cum maiori timore amittendi eas conseruat quam alter, quia quanto maiori affectu fertur ad eas tanquam ad res suas et in quibus vult habere dominium et tanquam ad res maioris precii et ad multum tempus utiles et[71] tanto utique plus timet amissionem earum; quarto, quia quanto minus committit se consilio Dei, tanto cum maiori diffidentia Dei eas procurat et conseruat, ac per consequens cum minori cordis quiete ac securitate; quinto, quia in eo quod ipse[72] vult habere ius repetitorium[73] contra quemcumque tollentem, utique non solum maiorem habet affectum ad eas, sed etiam magnam dat ei[74] occasionem distrahendi se contra proximum per causas litigiosas et contenciosas a quibus utique est liber ille qui nullo modo vult ista sibi licere. Verum est autem quod in homine diffidente aut imperfecte confidente de auxilio Dei et molestissime ferente quamcumque penuriam et in omnem euentum volentem habere rerum affluentiam est expedientius, seu minus inexpediens esse in statu inferiori in quo licet thesaurizare, quam esse in statu ita perfecto, iuxta illud Apostoli: *Si se non continent, nubant; melius est enim nubere quam uri.*[75]

64 eum *om.* P. *Mt.* IV, 20; *Mc.* I, 18.
65 *Mt.* X, 9.
66 si T/.i. P.
67 talia T/talium P.
68 et quod utin. *add.* P.
69 cum dominio...accipit *om.* P.
70 eas T/eos P.
71 et *om.* T.
72 ipse P/iste T.
73 repetitorium P/petitorium T.
74 ei P/sibi T.
75 *I Cor.* VII, 9.

Erroneum vero est, quia est expresse contra consilia Christi, sicut in precedentibus et etiam alibi[76] est ostensum; nec aduertisse videtur quod radix distractiue sollicitudinis, que scilicet est cupiditas rerum et nimia cura sui et modica fiducia Dei, non ita aufertur per modum quem ponit sicut fit[77] per alterum; non etiam videtur aduertisse quod motus corporis exterior non est formaliter ipsa sollicitudo que distrahit mentem. Unde et sepe videmus quod seruus missus hinc inde ad procuranda debita domini sui modicum anxiatur de habendo vel non habendo; dominus vero domi sedens quam plurimum anxiatur et sollicitatur; licet igitur pauperes euangelici qui[78] non congregant aliquando exteriori motu corporis plus laborent et in hoc[79] plus macerent corpus, non tamen plus sollicitantur quamdiu in sua paupertate et penuria complacentiam habent; immo vadunt et petunt elemosinam sine omni sollicitudine cordis.

Quantum vero ad terciam partem qua dicitur quod non differt seruare pecuniam et res alias necessarias, non est sane dictum, quia non solum sacer textus et omnes sancti, sed etiam multiplicia experimenta clamant quod[80] pecunia super res alias se ingerit amabilem, tractabilem, conseruabilem, multiplicabilem et ad omnem contractum et commutationem[81] valde ductibilem et ad omnia appetibilia gule et luxurie et consimilium procuranda nimium aptam et circa eam facilius[82] interuenit furtum et fraus et thesaurizatio occulta et ypocritalis et ex ea de facili fiunt symonie et lucra inepta. Preterea constat quod usus pecunie non est secundum se ita[83] necessarius victui nostro sicut sunt cibi et vestes.

Quintum etiam quod subditur, scilicet quod eadem est ratio uti hiis que sunt necessaria vite aut quod communiter conseruentur, si[84] de conseruatione que est cum dominio et que est pro usu longi temporis hoc intelligat, falsum est et erroneum. Falsum quidem quia constat quod iurisdictio est longe alterius rationis quam sit solus simplex usus rei; constat etiam quod conseruare res pro futuris temporibus est alterius rationis quam sit solum uti re necessaria de presenti et pro presenti. Erroneum vero est quia est expresse contra consilia Christi qui necessarium quidem usum rerum concedit, immo et precepit, dominium vero rerum et congregationem earum pro futuro tempore cuius necessitas de presenti non iminet, consulit et viris apostolicis interdicit.

Sextum autem sic est erroneum, quod est Christo et apostolis nimis contumeliosum et non est aliud quam scripturam repugnantem violenter intorquere ad suum affectum et ad operculum imperfectionum nostrarum. Expono autem caput meum si ipse cum omnibus sectatoribus suis vel potest

76 autre allusion aux Questions sur la pauvreté.
77 fit T/facit P.
78 qui P/quia T.
79 in h. ipso *add.* T.
80 quod P/quia T.
81 commutationem T/communicationem P (mais il s'agit plutôt d'une abréviation mal interprétée par le scribe).
82 facilius P/facillime T.
83 ita *om.* T.
84 si P/scilicet T.

unicum exemplum dare quod unquam Christus vel eius apostoli seruauerint pro[85] se pecuniam, nisi in casu tante necessitatis in quo liceret hoc cuicumque, quantumcumque vouisset abdicationem illius;[86] vel tamen de illismet casibus non legitur multum expresse nec inde potest extrahi, nisi per satis simplicem coniecturam. Quando enim dicitur quod *discipuli iuerant in ciuitatem,*[87] *ut cibos emerent,* certum est quod ibi non dicitur quod ipsi pro hac re pecuniam portarent. Constat autem quod de facultatibus mulierum ministrantium sibi aut de rebus aliquorum credentium, qui ad Christi consilia non erant astricti poterunt emi, aut de elemosinis[88] tunc quesitis vel oblatis. Constat etiam quod hoc fuit in terra Samarie de qua ibidem dicitur quod *non coutuntur Iudei Samaritanis*[89] et ideo presumi poterat quod eis[90] essent inhospitabiles; ista vero et alia satis alibi sunt[91] ostensa, quia pecunia que ponebatur ad pedes apostolorum non dicitur esse posita pro usu vel necessitate eorum, sed potius pro aliis; quia si Petrus habebat pecuniam in communi, falso dixit petenti elemosinam: *argentum et aurum non est michi*[92]; si enim voluit dicere: non habeo in proprio, licet habeam in communi, sermo esset duplicitate et immisericordia plenus... Preterea, esto quod esset, constat quod tanta persecutio omnium Iudeorum contra eos tunc temporis feruebat quod merito poterat censeri esse necessarium uti ea in tali casu quantumcumque usus eius ex voto alias non liceret...

Quia tamen Augustinus dicit quod in loculis Christi ecclesiastice pecunie forma tradita est;[93] sciendum quod in hoc casu et consimilibus aliud est dare formam condescensionis, aliud formam euitande periclitationis, aliud formam cure pastoralis, aliud formam mediocris religionis, aliud formam vitandi erroris. Christus autem usus est, licet raro, loculis, partim condescensiue tam pro infirmis quam pro forma mediocris religionis, partim pietate cure pastoralis, ut ostenderet quod prelatus ecclesiasticas oblationes in usus pauperum potius debet conuertere quam in suos, et ut ostenderet quod sic debet inopias pauperum subleuare et eorum curam habere quod tamen congregationi[94] magnorum thesaurorum non debet etiam pro hac re insistere; usus est etiam partim ad docendum quod in casu periculose seu ineuitabilis necessitatis licitum, immo et debitum est quantumcumque perfectis uti loculis aut aliquo equiualenti...Usus est Christus in condempnationem futurarum heresum dicentium quod nulli christiano, precipue clerico vel prelato, licet habere aurum vel argentum. Docuit etiam per hoc formidandam esse prouisionem et conseruationem temporalium, quia unus ex XII. apostolis ex hoc cecidit in latrocinantem cupiditatem, et in hoc ipso docuit quan-

85 pro se/per se P.
86 illius P/ipsius T.
87 *Ioh.* IV, 8.
88 de el. aut t. *add.* P.
89 *Ioh.* IV, 9.
90 eis T/eas P.
91 sunt T/essent P.
92 *Act.* III, 6.
93 *Homel. 62 super Ioh.* (XIII, 29) cité par Bonaventure, *Apologia pauperum*, c. 7, ed. cit., p. 284.
94 congregationi P/congregationem T.

tumcumque[95] fugiendum sit malum cupiditatis ecclesiasticorum bonorum, quia Iudas ex hoc factus est proditor Christi. Docuit etiam in hoc quoscumque prelatos ut dispensationem temporalium etiam necessariorum alteri relinquant, ipsi vero soli orationi et predicationi instent, sicut[96] et apostoli postmodum fecerunt prout habetur Actus 6 (2-4). Docuit etiam ne in hoc nimis curiose timerent de infidelitate dispensantium, anne pro tali timore dispensationem huiusmodi ad se reuocarent cum tollerabilius sit temporalia perdi quam a spiritualibus officiis retrahi.

Septimum autem scilicet quod paupertas non est perfectio, sed instrumentum perfectionis, si intendit dicere quod non est illa finalis perfectio que soli competit caritati, verum dicit; sed tunc ita posset hoc dicere de aliis virtutibus. Si vero intendit quod[97] nullo modo sit virtualis perfectio, contrarium dicit Christo, qui dicit: *Si vis perfectus esse, vade et vende*,[98] etc. et qui primam beatitudinem ponit in paupertate[99]...Quod etiam subditur, scilicet quod paupertas est minimum inter tria vota,[1] falsum est, sicut in questione de hoc specialiter facta alibi est ostensum.[2] Mira res! Christus verbo et facto paupertatem quasi super omnia extollit; iste vero quasi sub omnibus eam deicit. Scio quod hoc non fecisset beatus Dominicus, qui maledixit omnibus suis[3] quandocumque possessiones reciperent.[4]

Quod etiam subdit[5] quod paupertas non quanto maior tanto perfectior, sed quanto[6] est fini suo proportionalior, est mira falsigraphia, quia de omni habente[7] super se finem ulteriorem est universaliter verum quod[8] quanto est fini[9] proportionalius, tanto est melius; sed non ex hoc sequitur quod paupertas, quanto maior, non sit perfectior, nisi probetur quod quanto est maior,[10] non est fini suo proportionalior, sicut nec de castitate hoc sequitur, que utique tanto est maior, quanto[11] est melior. Quod autem paupertas altissima sit proportionalior et utilior perfectioni castitatis et contemplationis omniumque sublimium virtutum, alibi est ita copiose ostensum quod nisi cecus vel maliuolus negare non possunt. Et dato quod nullam aliam rationem haberemus, nisi Christi consilium et exemplum, qui ait se *non habere ubi*

95 quantumcumque P/quantum T.
96 sicut *om.* P.
97 quod *om.* P.
98 *Mt.* XIX, 21.
99 Cf. *Mt* V, 3; *Lc.* VI, 20.
1 vota T/votata P.
2 Référence à la question "de voto obedientie euangelice," que contient, entre autres, le ms. Vat. lat. 4986, f. 79-81v.
3 suis *om.* P.
4 Cité par Olivi d'après s. Bonaventure, *Quaestiones disputatae de perfectione evangelica*, q. II, art. II, ed. *Opera omnia* V, p. 138: "Item, exemplum de sancto Dominico qui in morte sua imprecatus est maledictionem omnibus qui in ordinem suum possessiones conerentur inducere."
5 subdit P/subditur T.
6 quanto T/quantum P.
7 habenti P.
8 quod P/quia T.
9 fini *om.* P.
10 perfectior...maior *om.* P.
11 tanto...quanto P/quanto...tanto T.

caput reclinet,[12] sufficere deberet omni fideli. Fateor tamen quod ubi non habetur maior paupertas in voto, sed solum in obseruantia simplici, sicut quidam abdicationem possessionum non habent in voto, licet de facto ita obseruent, in talibus fortasse verum est quod castitas habita cum voto sollempni maior est tali obseruantia paupertatis,[13] et si hoc dicere prefatus doctor voluit, habeat sibi!

12 *Lc.* IX, 58.
13 paupertatis *om.* P.

BROTHER THOMAS, THE MASTER, AND THE MASTERS

Edward A. Synan

GREAT men, as experience led the Duke of Wellington to observe, are "much exposed to authors" and Thomas Aquinas has not escaped that exposure. The blameless Brother Thomas, to be sure, had no occasion to anticipate the "Publish and be damned!" which one brush with an author is said to have wrung from the Duke;[1] in compensation, he has been at the mercy of authors for half a millennium longer and in ways the Duke was spared.

One major source of this exposure has been the interest of Thomists in issues to which Aquinas adverted only in passing. To determine his position on such issues, an obvious strategy is to collect his random remarks and then, if courage does not fail, to follow the precedent Albert set when he noted gaps in the Aristotelian canon. Since Aristotle, or time, had failed to hand down every treatise required for an integral presentation of peripatetic philosophy, Albert promised to supply what might be missing from the tradition.[2] Thus references to 'analogy' are not uncommon in the works of Aquinas, but systematic treatises on analogy are the work of Thomists, not of Thomas.[3]

1 "...in his situation as Chancellor of the University of Oxford, he had been much exposed to authors" are the words with which Wellington refused to accept the dedication of a song; see G. W. E. Russell, *Collections* and *Recollections* (London 1898) 23; "Publish and be damned!" is ascribed to Wellington by tradition, but the letter in which he must have written either these or equivalent words is not extant; see E. Longford, *Wellington, The Years of the Sword* (London 1969) 166-169.

2 "Et addemus etiam alicubi partes librorum imperfectorum, et alicubi libros intermissos vel omissos, quos Aristoteles non fecit, et forte si fecit, ad nos non pervenerunt...", St. Albert, *In VIII Physicorum* initio; *B. Alberti Magni... Opera Omnia*, ed. A. Borgnet (Paris 1890-1899) III, 1-2.

3 An impression of the breadth of this production, inaugurated by the classic treatises of Thomas de Vio (Cajetan, 1469-1534) *De Nominum Analogia, De Conceptu Entis*, edd. P. N. Zammit and P. H. Hering (Rome 1952), can be derived from a rapid sampling: H. Chavannes, *L'analogie entre Dieu et le monde selon saint Thomas d'Aquin et selon Karl Barth* (Paris 1969), T. W. Guzie, *The Analogy of Learning; An Essay toward a Thomistic Psychology of Learning* (New York 1960), G. P. Klubertanz, *St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy; a Textual Analysis and Systematic Synthesis* (Chicago 1960), H. Lyttkens, *The Analogy between God and the World; an Investigation of its Background and Interpretation of its Use by Thomas of Aquino* (Uppsala 1952). E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy; a Sequel to "He Who Is"* (London, New York 1949), R. M.

Platonism in various guises was never far from his thoughts, as an extensive documentation proves, but Aquinas made his subtly discriminating responses to challenges posed by Plato only as the course of argument demanded; their painstaking assembly, organization, and exposition have been the work of a modern author.[4]

I

Like analogy and Platonism, the value of 'authority' and of 'magistral opinion' in theology is a theme on which an essay from the pen of Aquinas would have been welcome, but it is one he did not feel compelled to write. This does not mean that he was insensitive to the virtualities of the university world in which he worked. With all his contemporaries, Aquinas was accustomed to garnish his writings with authoritative texts,[5] to take them as points of departure, to reckon with them in the sword-play of his dialectic, to 'interpret' them with a freedom and ingenuity that would be inexplicable apart from a fundamental respect for those venerable formulations. On occasion, he would reject an authority and give his reasons for so doing. Thomists have often busied themselves with searching out and weighing his explicit comments on the subject. Although another approach is set out in this paper, Peter of Bergamo, Melchior Cano, and M.-D. Chenu must be present at all points, thanks to their classic contributions to our understanding of the Common Doctor's 'procedures of documentation,' both *authentica* and *magistralia*.[6]

Isolated comments on authority and magistral decisions by theologians later than Peter Lombard can be supplemented with evidence of exceptional interest and solidity. A series of questions on which the views of Peter Lombard and those of the Parisian Masters were at odds shows how each commentator on the *Sentences* came to

McInerny, *Studies in Analogy* (The Hague 1968), B. Mondin, *The Principle of Analogy in Protestant and Catholic Theology* (The Hague 1963), B. Montagnes, *La doctrine de l'analogie de l'être d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain, Paris 1963), M. T. L. Penido, *Le rôle de l'analogie en théologie dogmatique* (Paris 1931), G. B. Phelan, *Saint Thomas and Analogy* (Milwaukee 1941), H. G. Pohlmann, *Analogia entis oder Analogia fidei? Die Frage der Analogia bei Karl Barth* (Göttingen 1965).

4 R. J. Henle, *Saint Thomas and Platonism; a Study of the Plato and Platonic Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas* (The Hague 1956).

5 M.-D. Chenu, "*Authentica* et *magistralia*, deux lieux théologiques aux XII-XIII siècles," *Divus Thomas* (Piacenza) 28 (1925) 257-285 and, by the same author, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, tr. A. M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago 1964) 126-149; M. Riquet, "Thomas et les *auctoritates* en philosophie," *Archives de philosophie* 3.2 (1925) 117-155.

6 "Procedures of documentation" is the phrase of M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas*, Chapter IV. 126-155.

terms with opposition between the Master and the Masters acting *communiter*. Bonaventure is the first man who is known to have listed explicitly those propositions of the Master that the Parisian theologians had rejected with moral unanimity.[7] At the moment he wrote, these numbered eight, distributed symmetrically, two from each of the *Four Books of Sentences*; the list was destined to lengthen.[8] When Peter of Bergamo drew up his Thomistic indices in the fifteenth century, the positions Aquinas had taken on nine issues, (which coincide only in part with Bonaventure's eight), persuaded him that it was his duty to warn the reader. "The Master of *Sentences* is not endowed with authority, *non est authenticus*; therefore, on many points he is not upheld..."[9]

With this mention of Peter of Bergamo it must be remarked first, that by using the term *authenticus* with respect to Peter Lombard, he has adopted a usage which Chenu would characterize as "a transition in application that was almost abusive."[10] Second, of the nine pericopes adduced by Peter of Bergamo to show that Aquinas did not grant the Master of *Sentences* status as an *auctor*, six are reducible to the first one listed by Bonaventure, that is, the proposition that charity is the Holy Spirit. Two are reducible to Peter Lombard's view that there is a human 'truth,' constituted for babies by what they receive from their parents in conception and for Eve by Adam's rib; these may be related to the fourth opinion in Bonaventure's list. The remaining text invoked by Peter of Bergamo is remarkable in that it correctly reports Aquinas himself writing in the "almost abusive" way: *non est necessarium auctoritatem Magistri Sententiarum sequi in hac parte.* The issue relates to views on grace and nature at stake in the third of Bonaventure's eight controverted questions.

Thomist investigators are understandably fond of noting that Aquinas thought the authoritative Boethius correct in his claim that

7 St. Bonaventure, *In II Sent.* d. 44, dubium 3; *Opera theologica selecta*, editio minor (Quaracchi 1934-1949) II, 1058; see also, ibid., Praelocutio II, 2.

8 F. Stegmüller, *Repertorium Commentariorum in Sententias Petri Lombardi* (Würzburg 1947) I, x; also *Petri Lombardi Libri IV Sententiarum* (Quaracchi 1916) I, lxxvii, n. 1, where the editors have printed a list of twenty-six such questions, dated by Du Plessis d'Argentré at A.D. 1300.

9 *Tabula Aurea... Petri de Bergomo... in Omnia Opera Divi Thomae Aquinatis...* (Rome 1570), a work first printed at Bologna in 1475 and many times since, in part or in whole; the entry cited here is from the *index generalis, s.v.* Magister, where Peter adduced nine passages to support his judgment that, for Aquinas, "Magister Sententiarum non est authenticus:" 1) *Summa theologiae* i, q. 94, a. 4, ad 2; 2) *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 2; 3) *In I Sent.* d. 17, q. 1, a. 1; 4) *In II Sent.* d. 18, q. 1, a. 1; 5) *In II Sent.* d. 30, q. 2, a. 1; 6) *In III Sent.* d. 27, q. 2, a. 4; 7) *In III Sent.* q. 2, a. 4; 8) *Quaestio disputata de virtutibus* q. 1, a. 11; 9) *Quaestio disputata de virtutibus* q. 2, a. 1, ad 12.

10 M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* 136.

human authority is the most wretched of the resources at the disposal of a philosopher.[11] We shall hardly be unfaithful to his intent if we extend this judgment to all specifically human disciplines, for Aquinas was notably reserved on the scope of human rationality.[12] Aristotle has given mild scandal by dropping his habitual empiric caution to advise his readers that it is sufficient to state the universal attributes of the human species 'once, for all,'[13] whereas Brother Thomas had small confidence in our capacity to know the 'differences' and 'essences' of even the material singulars we are best equipped to know.[14] He would do Aristotle the courtesy of expounding at length upon the Philosopher's *De caelo*, but this consummate exegete of philosophical texts remarked in the course of so doing that philosophy is more than a record of 'what men may have thought,' for the best of authors have achieved — will achieve? — no irreformable conceptual scheme to account for astronomical data. A different and better hypothesis 'to save the appearances' always remains a possibility and nothing less than 'the truth of things,' *qualiter se habeat veritas rerum*, can preside over the work of intelligence as Aquinas understood it.[15]

Although there is massive evidence of his life-long interest in contributing to the work of his philosophical colleagues in the faculty of arts,[16] where the scope of authority is so narrow, Aquinas recognized that, in his own faculty of theology, authority must play a different role.

11 *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2 is the response of Aquinas to an argument based upon the authority of Boethius (*In topica Ciceronis commentaria* IV, PL 64, 1166 and *De differentiis topicis* III, PL 64, 1199); see comment by D. Mosher that the appeal to the authority of Boethius against the value of authority seems to be "some kind of weird variation on the so-called Liar's Paradox." *Crux* 8.1 (1970) 8, n. 4.

12 J. Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas*, tr. J. Murray and D. O'Connor (New York 1957) 64-71, 89-91, 94-95.

13 E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* (Toronto 1949) 50.

14 "... differentiae essentiales sunt nobis ignotae..." *De veritate* q. 4, a. 1, ad 8; *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis... Quaestiones disputatae*, ed. P. Mandonnet (Paris 1925) I, 103; "... principia essentialia rerum sunt nobis ignota..." *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis in Aristotelis librum de anima commentarium* 1, 1, 15; ed. A. M. Pirotta (Turin 1936) 7.

15 "Illorum tamen suppositiones quas adinvenerunt, non est necessarium esse veras: licet enim, talibus suppositionibus factis, apparentia salvarentur, non tamen oportet dicere has suppositiones esse veras; quia forte secundum aliquem alium modum, nondum ab hominibus comprehensum, apparentia circa stellas salvantur." *De coelo et mundo* 2, 12, 17, 2; *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera omnia*, ed. Leonina (Rome 1886) III, 186, 187; "Quidquid autem horum sit, non est nobis multum curandum: quia studium philosophiae non est ad hoc quod sciatur quid homines senserint, sed qualiter se habeat veritas rerum." ibid. 1, 10, 22, 8; III, 91.

16 Of the authentic works listed by I. T. Eschmann, "A Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works," in E. Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, tr. L. K. Shook (New York 1956) 379-437, numbers 28-39, 49-52, 54-55, 65-68, 70-71, and 74 are of a nature to interest the faculty of arts; to these ought to be added the works referred to by the Rector and Regent Masters in arts at Paris when they requested both these and the body of Aquinas. See A. Birkenmajer, "Der Brief der Pariser Artistenfakultät über den Tod des hl. Thomas von Aquino," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 20.5 (1922) 1-35.

Authority is an essential characteristic, a *proprium*, of sacred doctrine. This in no way entails the conclusion that theologians are in a less dignified posture than are the philosophers who bow only before 'the truth of things'; quite the contrary: *nec derogat dignitati huius doctrinae.*[17] Nothing could be more theological than the tentatives by Job's friends to explain the humanly inexplicable disasters that afflicted him. Indeed, Brother Thomas went so far as to interpret Job's dialogue with the Holy One in terms of a disputed question, of a theological debate in which truth is sought through the stylized moves of thirteenth century dialectic.[18] Neither Job nor his friends wished to diminish the authority of the Lord, yet Job could speak out boldly even to Him, for Job was conscious that he was speaking the truth and that the Holy One cannot fail to sustain created reflections of Himself: Truth is a divine Name. Aquinas was sure that Job was right.[19]

Theologians, however, do their work under a sobering rubric: Truth properly so-called, *quae antonomastice est veritas*, is divine Truth and is strictly incomprehensible by a human intellect. Hilary, the *auctor* Aquinas cited in support of this theological reserve, was right to have said: "Even though I know you will not arrive, still I rejoice that you strive, for the man who seeks infinite goals with piety, even though he sometimes does not attain them, nonetheless will profit always by advancing."[20] If the articles of faith are to sacred doctrine what first principles are to philosophy, then authorities rooted in divine Wisdom are

17 *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2; see above, note 11.

18 "Postquam ergo auditores reddidit attentos, modum disputationis suae determinat: vult enim disputare quasi cum alio contendens, et hoc est quod subdit *Quis est qui iudicetur mecum*, idest cum quo de veritate disputem?" *Expositio super Iob*, cap. 13, vv. 17-18, ed. Leonina (Rome 1965) XXVI, 87; "Est autem disputatio inter duas personas, scilicet opponentem et respondentem; ingrediens ergo disputationem cum Deo, dat ei optionem utramlibet personam eligendi vel opponentis vel respondentis... Primo autem Deo dat partes opponentis..." ibid. v. 22; "Deinde quasi tacente eo cui partes opponentis dederat, ipse partes obicientis assumit et inquirit de causis suae punitionis..." ibid. v. 24; it must be noted that the editors feel Aquinas has been more discreet than Albert was to be in assimilating the Book of Job to a disputed question, ed. cit. p. 28*.

19 "Sed ulterius considerandum est quod ille qui ad ostendendam Dei iustitiam vel bonitatem mendacio utitur non solum rem agit qua Deus non indiget, sed etiam hoc ipso contra Deum vadit: cum enim Deus veritas sit, omne autem mendacium veritati contrarietur, quicumque mendacio utitur ad Dei magnificentiam ostendendam hoc ipso contra Deum agit." Ibid. vv. 7-9, 85; "Videbatur autem disputatio hominis ad Deum esse indebita propter excellentiam qua Deus hominem excellit; sed considerandum est quod veritas ex diversitate personarum non variatur, unde cum aliquis veritatem loquitur vinci non potest cum quocumque disputet; certus autem erat Iob quod veritatem loquebatur sibi a Deo per donum fidei et sapientiae inspiratam, unde de veritate non diffidens..." Ibid. v. 19, 87.

20 "... etsi non perventurum sciam, gratulabor tamen profecturum. Qui enim pie infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, semper tamen proficiet prodeundo..." Hilary, *De trinitate* 2, 10, PL 10, 58 C-59 A, cited by Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* 1, 8; ed. Leonina manualis (Rome 1934) 7.

the strongest conceivable sources of conviction.[21] The Word of God, first, the Lord Jesus whose decision not to write his teaching can be defended with good reasons,[22] and in the second place, the inspired writings of the Bible, possesses an authority which is absolute.[23] This authority is echoed by the teaching Church; the authority of the greatest Fathers and Doctors stands far below that of her perennial practice. Her traditional recognition, for example, of the right Jewish parents retain to refuse baptism for their children, cannot be shaken by any human protest, no matter how eminent its author may be: 'Not Jerome, not Augustine, not any Doctor whosoever' can enter the lists against her practice.[24] Church authority is expressed especially by the Bishop of Rome[25] and this prestige, participated in varying degrees, is not absent from more modest levels in the teaching Church; if the opinions of the Masters of Theology do not enjoy 'authority' in its most technical sense, they do carry weight.[26]

The scattered remarks by Aquinas persuade us that he can have had no quarrel with Bonaventure's census of the sources available to the student who wishes to 'add reason to faith.'[27]

First, the Word of God, transmitted in the canonical Scriptures; then, in a decrescendo of value, the personal writings, the *originalia*, of the Fathers, the derivative *summae* of the Masters (which are not always free from error) and, last of all, those 'waters of deception,' the gentile philosophers: Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Plotinus.[28] Despite his reservations, Bonaventure was generous in accounting for deficiencies he ob-

21 "... haec doctrina non argumentatur ad sua principia probanda, quae sunt articuli fidei; sed ex eis procedit ad aliquid ostendendum..." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 8; ed. Commissio Piana (Ottawa 1948) I, 7b.

22 See *Summa theologiae* III, q. 42, a. 4.

23 "Auctoritatibus autem canonicae Scripturae utitur proprie, ex necessitate argumentando. Auctoritatibus autem aliorum doctorum ecclesiae, quasi arguendo ex propriis, sed probabiliter. Innititur enim fides nostra revelationi Apostolis et Prophetis factae, qui canonicos libros scripserunt..." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2; ed. cit. I, 8b.

24 "... maximam habet auctoritatem Ecclesiae consuetudo, quae semper est in omnibus aemulanda. Quia et ipsa doctrina Catholicorum Doctorum ab Ecclesia auctoritatem habet; unde magis standum est auctoritati Ecclesiae quam auctoritati vel Augustini vel Hieronymi vel cuiuscumque Doctoris. Hoc autem Ecclesiae usus nunquam habuit quod Iudaeorum filii invitis parentibus baptizarentur..." *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 10, a. 12, ad 3; ed. cit. III, 1466b.

25 "Quae quidem auctoritas principaliter residet in Summo Pontifice..." *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 11, a. 2, ad 3; ed. cit. III, 1469b.

26 M.-D. Chenu, *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* 135-136.

27 "... et sic est credibile, prout tamen credibile transit in rationem intelligibilis, et hoc per additionem rationis; et hoc modo, proprie loquendo, est subiectum in hoc libro." *In I Sent.* Proemii q. 1; ed. cit. I, 7.

28 *Collationes in Hexaemeron* 19, 7-15; *Sancti Bonaventurae Opera omnia* (Quaracchi 1882-1902) V, 421-422; for pagan philosophers, see ibid. 7, 3, ed. cit. V, 365 and *Sermo* IV, 18: ed. cit. V, 572.

served in Aristotle. If the Stagirite has proclaimed the eternity of the world, he might be excused because he spoke precisely as a philosopher of nature and intended to say no more than that the world could not have come to be by nature.[29] Aquinas was equally gentle with Aristotle on the point, but for another reason. Echoing Rabbi Moyses Aegyptius, he reminded his readers that, according to the *Topics*, the eternity of the world belongs among the "dialectical problems on which we do not have reasons,"[30] that is, reasonings of a compelling, demonstrative sort. Bonaventure thought that if Aristotle had missed the awesome realities of punishment and glory in the world to come, this too may have stemmed from his rigor in remaining within the limits of his discipline, this time Ethics; he may have thought that life is eternal despite a silence prompted by the formal focus of his classification of the sciences. Ethics, after all, deals with human living in this world. On the tortuous question as to whether a single and separate Intellect functions for all men, Bonaventure ascribed the affirmative solution, and not without reason, to the Commentator rather than to the Philosopher.[31]

Finally, owing to the fallibility of the Masters, caused in part by their poor understanding of the Fathers: *credunt se intelligere originalia, et non intelligunt*, Bonaventure's advice was to adhere to 'the more common path.'[32]

What stance did Aquinas adopt toward his theological colleagues, that elite corps, the *magistri Parisienses?*

The question resists a summary answer. True enough, the university world, despite occasional verbal lapses, distinguished sharply between the weight given to an *auctor* and the prestige granted to a living university professor. Roger Bacon's celebrated complaint that the practice of citing Alexander of Hales and Albert, the second still living, as *auctores* was a scandalous vagary[33] and Bonaventure's disclaimer that

29 *In Hexaemeron* 7, 1-2; ed. cit. V, 365.

30 "... expresse dicit in I libro *Top.*, quod quaedam sunt problemata dialectica, de quibus rationes non habemus, ut 'utrum mundus sit aeternus'." *Summa theologiae* I, q. 46, a. 1, c.; ed. cit. I, 294b; Moses ben Maimon: "Volo in hoc capitulo ostendere quod Aristoteles non inducit demonstrationem super antiquitate mundi secundum sententiam ipsius... Dicit enim in eo cuius non habemus rationem, vel est difficile ostendere nobis. Scito quod si dixerimus cur ita fuit, defectus est sicut si dixerimus, est mundus antiquus, an non. Haec sunt verba ipsius." *Rabi Mossei Aegyptii, Dux seu Director dubitantium aut perplexorum...* Augustini Iustiniani... recognitus (Paris 1520) 2, 16; fol. 48r-48v; the text of Aristotle is *Topica* 1, 11; 104b 16.

31 "... dicit Commentator quod ipse hoc sensit." *In Hexaemeron* 7, 2; ed. cit. V. 365; the text of Averroes is *In III de anima*, t.c. 5.

32 *In Hexaemeron* 19, 11; ed. cit. V, 422; see also *In II Sent.* Praelocutio, ed. cit. II, 1, for Bonaventure's pledge of allegiance to Alexander above all others.

33 Philosophy, Roger complained, was thought to have come to the Latins and" ... pro auctore allegatur compositor ejus. Nam sicut Aristoteles, Avicenna, Averroes allegantur in scholis, sic et ipse; et adhuc vivit, et habuit in vita sua auctoritatem, quam numquam homo habuit in doctrina."

in writing his imposing *Commentary on the Sentences* he aspired to be no more than a humble *compilator*, not an *auctor*,[34] are intelligible only in the presence of that distinction. Still, the whole body of Masters, above all the Masters of Paris, enjoyed immense prestige when they spoke with substantial unanimity; the day would come when Melchior Cano would systematize the sources of theological doctrine and one of his 'places,' *topoi*, would be the common teaching of the theologians and canonists of the School.[35] Descartes was far from shy in setting out the originality and the value of his *Meditations*, but he did not think support from the Doctors of the Sorbonne nugatory.[36]

Certainly Brother Thomas spoke of them with respect. Did some propagandist for 'heterodox Aristotelianism,' to borrow the felicitous phrase of F. Van Steenberghen,[37] teach nonsense in corners to teenagers? 'He will find, not only me, the least of them, but many others who are zealous for truth; through those others either his error will be brought to a halt or something will be done for his ignorance!'[38] Those 'others' were, of course, the Masters of Paris.

Against this testimonial to teamwork is the well-known report by Bernardus Lombardi, a few years after the canonization of Saint

Fratris Rogeri Bacon Opera quaedam hactenus inedita, ed. J. S. Brewer in: *Rerum Britannicarum medii aevi scriptores* (London 1859) XV, 30; this remark from the *Opus tertium* bears on the then living Albert, but there were two such: "Duos enim noto ibi, sed ipse est principalis in re; sed alius majus nomen habet, qui tamen mortuus est, Ibid., 31 and: "Unus autem illorum duorum est mortuus, alius vivit; qui mortuus est fuit bonus homo... nam quum intravit ordinem Fratrum Minorum fuit Deo maximus Minor..." *Opus minus*, 325, "Alter qui vivit intravit ordinem Fratrum puerulus... Et vere laudo eum plus quam omnes de vulgo studentium..." ibid., 327; despite his reservations, Roger thought Albert better than most Parisian theologians.

34 *In II Sent.* Praelocutio, ed. cit. II, 1.

35 "Septimus est auctoritas Theologorum scholasticorum, quibus adjungamus Juris pontificij peritos. Nam Iuris hujus doctrina, quasi ex altera parte, scholasticae Theologiae respondet..." Melchior Cano, *De locis theologicis* 1, 3, *Opera* (Lyon and Paris 1704) 3; like Aquinas, Cano set limits on the weight to be granted to theological opinion: "Theologorum scholasticorum etiam multorum testimonium, si alij contra pugnant viri docti, non plus valet ad faciendam fidem quam vel ratio ipsorum, vel gravior etiam auctoritas comprobavit... Nec enim si quid aut Scoticis aut Thomisticis pronunciatis contrarium est, error illico est." ibid. VIII, 4; 317.

36 "Atque ideo, qualescunque meae rationes esse possint, quia tamen ad Philosophiam spectant, non spero me illarum ope magnum operae pretium esse facturum, nisi me patrocinio vestro adjuvetis. Sed cum tanta inhaereat omnium mentibus de vestra Facultae opinio, tantaeque sit authoritatis SORBONAE nomen, ut non modo in rebus fidei nulli unquam Societati post sacra Concilia tantum creditum sit quam vestrae, sed etiam in humana Philosophia nullibi major perspicacia et soliditas, nec ad ferenda judicia major integritas et sapientia esse existimetur..." *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, Epistola, *Œuvres de Descartes* edd. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris 1897-1909) VII, 5.

37 F. Van Steenberghen, *Siger de Brabant d'après ses œuvres inédites* in: *Les philosophes Belges XII and XIII, Siger dans l'histoire de l'Aristotélisme* (Louvain 1942) II.

38 "... et inveniet non solum me, qui aliorum sum minimus, sed multos alios veritatis zelatores, per quos ejus errori resistetur, vel ignorantiae consuletur." *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis opuscula omnia*, ed. J. Perrier (Paris 1949), *De unitate intellectus* I, 120.

Thomas, that his view on the distinction between created *esse* and *essentia* was in opposition to that of all the Parisian Masters.[39] He and they were 'zealous for truth' , but this had not resulted in unanimity on a fundamental, if metaphysical, issue. The great Masters who had preceded him, of whom Peter Lombard and the Victorines are the most notable, often inspired serious reservations on the part of Aquinas. As for his own contemporaries, he advised students faced with magistral dissent that each one ought to feel free to follow the solution that pleased him best, provided always that the controverted question remained unresolved by the teaching Church.[40] Neither a single Master nor all Masters in concert could generate 'authority' as such; still, it is clear that Aquinas thought their solutions worth weighing. The question remains: How and on what criteria did Brother Thomas nuance the air of *stare decisis* that magistral determinations enjoyed? In the absence of a systematic theoretical treatment by Aquinas on what degree of deference might be due to the Master of the *Sentences*, or to the Masters of Paris when they spoke with one voice, the eight controverted questions listed by Bonaventure make possible an appeal to the practice of Aquinas within limits that match, in their order, the controlled conditions of laboratory experiment.

II

1. In the first of the eight questions the Masters were to reject the view of Peter Lombard that 'The Holy Spirit is the love or charity by which we love God and neighbor,' the 'very same Holy Spirit by which the Father and the Son love each Other and love us.'[41] Had not Saint John asserted unequivocally that 'God is love' (1 Jo 4:16)? Augustine's exposition of that saying proceeds from his profound conviction that nothing is more intimate to the soul than is God: Nothing can be more known to us than is God because nothing is 'more present, more in-

39 "In ista questione erunt duo articuli: primus de hoc, quod queritur, an in creaturis differat esse et essencia; secundus, an in Deo sint idem. Quantum ad primum in genere est duplex modus dicendi: Primus est doctoris Sancti Thome, qui ponit, quod in omnibus citra Deum differt esse ab essencia; secundus est omnium aliorum concorditer Parisyensium, qui dicunt oppositum; et isti distinguuntur tripliciter secundum quod ponunt diversas declarationes." Cited by J. Koch, "Durandus de s. Porciano," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters* 26.1 (1927) 330, note 60; see use made of this by E. Gilson, *Being and Some Philosophers* 213, note 28.

40 *Quodlibeta* III, a. 10, c.

41 *Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber I, d. 17, capp. 1-3, (Quaracchi 1916) I, 106-109; for the commentary by Aquinas *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Scriptum super libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi Episcopi Parisiensis*, ed. P. Mandonnet and M. F. Moos (Paris 1929-1947) *In I Sent*. d. 17, q. 1, a. 1; I. 391-397.

terior, more certainly grasped.' To be holy is to be emptied of pride and to brim with love; that sanctifying love is God.[42]

Bonaventure noted that Lombard himself had faced 'many opponents' of this authoritatively supported thesis: 'Of old' there had been two opinions on the matter.[43] Aquinas formulated his personal opposition in a *sed contra* which, far from adducing theological authority, invokes three metaphysical arguments.

First, Thomas echoed the Boethian insight[44] that 'whatever is received is received according to the measure of what receives.' The Holy Spirit is 'received' by creatures but as 'participated'; He is received in a finite measure, which is as much as to say that our participation in the divine is finite and, in consequence, creaturely. Second, it is a function of charity as sanctifying love to restore the likeness to God in which our race was created and from which our race has fallen. If Genesis established these facts, a metaphysical conceptual scheme must be ready to assign the ground for this, as for any other, likeness.[45] Every ground of likeness is a determined, finite, and therefore created structuring, that is to say, every ground of likeness must be created form. Third, God is present to those who have been sanctified in a way that transcends His inevitable presence to all and to any of His works. There is a real diversity between the mode in which

42 Peter was anxious that his readers recognize the authoritative basis for his opinion, "Ne autem in re tanta aliquid de nostro influere videamur, sacris auctoritatibus quod dictum est corroboremus" loc. cit. I, 106, § 144, chief among them the exegesis of 1 Jo. 4, 16 by Augustine, *De trinitate* VIII, 7-8; PL 42, 957 ff.

43 *In I Sent.* d. 17, pars 1, a. unicus, q. 1; I, 238; the division of learned opinion that Bonaventure noted "ab antiquo" persisted; Albert complained that although "communiter fere omnes meliores concordant," and that "contradicendum est Magistro in ista parte," not all saw it that way: "Hic sunt quaedam absurditates dictae a quibusdam." Duns Scotus was to deal with the issue very briefly in his *Commentarii Oxonienses, Opera omnia* (Paris 1891-1895) X, 39-40, but more at length in his *Reportata Parisiensia*, ed. cit. XXII, 206; his effort to provide Peter Lombard with a pious interpretation involved him in one exchange on devotional experience that was to prompt a harsh comment by Denis the Carthusian: "Introducit demum Scotus... multas difficultates (ut apparet) supervacuas, curiosas, quibus immorari, magis videtur fractio capitis et impedimentum devotionis quam occupatio fructuosa." *In I Sent.* d. 17, q. 1, a. 1; *Doctoris Ecstatici D. Dionysii Cartusiani Opera Omnia* (Tournai 1896-1906) XX, 16 A-B; both Albert, ed. cit. XXV 462, § 3 and 463 ad 3, and Richard of Middleton, *Svper Qvatvor Libros Sententiarvm* (Brixiae 1591) loc. cit.; I, 156, felt that the Master of Sentences had given aid and comfort to the Pelagians, whereas Bonaventure had only the mildest of censures for the Master on this point: "Et in his omnibus verum dixit nec erravit, sed defecit..." ed. cit. I, 238.

44 "Omne enim quod cognoscitur non secundum sui uim sed secundum cognoscentium potius comprehenditur facultatem." *Boethii Philosophiae Consolationis* liber V, prosa 4; edd. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (London and Cambridge, Mass. 1946) 388; "... omne quod scitur non ex sua sed ex conprehendentium natura cognoscitur..." ibid. prosa 6; 398.

45 Is it necessary tor remark that Aquinas was conscious of the enigmas provoked by attempts to account for likeness on any plane? See, for instance, his discussion of Aristotle's rejection of Plato's Ideas, *Metaphysica* I, 9; 990a34 - 991a8, in *Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, ed. M.-R. Cathala (Turin 1935) Liber I, lectio 14, 73-76, § 208-216.

God is present to any and to all creatures and the mode in which He is present to His saints. But no diversity within God can be adduced as ground for that diversity; God remains supremely One and free from all inner division: 'With respect to all the real, He possesses Himself in an identical fashion.'[46] Hence, that diversity of the divine Presence to the just, as distinguished from His Presence to all that He has made, must be rooted within creatures, diversely related to Him.[47]

Given these metaphysically based negations, nothing remains but that the just are justified by a finite, created form, an effect of divine Goodness, without which nothing is good,[48] patterned by exemplarity on the Holy Spirit, but effected by the total Trinity. Thanks to this form, which is 'charity,' the justified man is pleasing to God; thanks to the same gift, he can act in meritorious fashion. As God has communicated true being to creatures in His creative act, for He is the efficient Cause of all and has caused the world to be according to exemplarity, so in the order of the New Creation, our being is dependent and participated, but, for all that, autonomous and responsible. The result of creation is no pantheistic extension of the Creator into His creation; each creature exists and acts with an autonomy that is totally contingent and dependent, but also genuinely and incommunicatively its own. In the order of being, the act of existing argues the presence of a corresponding form, and here once more Boethian wisdom is just beneath the Thomistic surface: 'All being is from form.'[49] In the parallel order of grace, meritorious acting discloses the form that is disinterested love or 'charity.'

Against this, as Aquinas read him, Peter Lombard had held that 'charity' is not a habit created within the soul. In his view, created 'charity' could be no more than the act that proceeds from a free choice moved by the Holy Spirit, *ex libero arbitrio moto per Spiritum sanctum*, and it is only Uncreated Love, the Holy Spirit Himself, whom Peter named 'charity' *tout court.*[50]

46 Loc. cit. "Sed ista diversitas non potest poni ex parte ipsius Dei, qui eodem modo se habet ad omnia." ed. cit. I, 393.

47 Ibid.; see also *Summa theologiae* I, q. 4, a. 3, especially ad 2 and ad 3, ed. cit. I, 26a-26b; finally, the asymmetrical aspect of our similarity to God is set out in the same place, ad 4; I, 26b, with the support of an authoritative text from the *Divine Names* of Denis.

48 Ibid. I, 394.

49 "Omne namque esse ex forma est." *De Trinitate* II; ed. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand (London, Cambridge, Mass. 1946) 8.

50 Aquinas has expressed the Master's opinion more lucidly than he had found it in the *Sentences*: "Magister tamen vult quod charitas non sit aliquis habitus creatus in anima, sed quod sit tantum actus, qui est ex libero arbitrio moto per Spiritum sanctum — quem (that is, the Holy Spirit) "charitatem' dicit" is the line, loc. cit. I, 394; I have adjusted the punctuation of the edition in this citation.

Both Bonaventure and Aquinas rejected an inept comparison made by some theologians between visible light and the Holy Spirit. In itself, those theologians had reasoned, light is but light, whereas, embodied in lightsome material, the same light is a color. Thus, the third Person of the Trinity, in Himself, is styled 'the Holy Spirit' and 'God'; as dwelling within the soul which He moves to loving acts, the same Holy Spirit is styled 'charity.' This uniting of the Holy Spirit with souls was conceived to be the doing of the Trinity of Persons, although 'terminating' with the third Person alone. Aquinas was careful to preclude this bizarre suggestion of what would amount to a kind of incarnation of the Holy Spirit in each of the redeemed on the ground that such an explanation fails to give due weight to the proximate, causal condition of creaturely activity, that is, to created, habitual form.[51] Bonaventure, we may note, argued by exclusion to the same result. If that solution be conceded, then justification is either by nature or by grace; surely not by nature, for redemption is gratuitous; if by grace, then his opponent has been compelled to grant precisely the contrary of what his argument purported to establish, namely, that redeeming charity is a created gift and not the Creator Himself.[52]

When Aquinas came to deal with this issue many years later in the *Summa theologiae* he added the observation that Lombard's exposition tended to diminish rather than to elevate charity. The view proposed by the Master would reduce the human person to the status of a passive object of exterior compulsion in violation of our voluntary structuring as free agents, for such a status is appropriate to merely corporeal beings, bereft of freedom. At best we should be mere instruments for whom 'the voluntary' and 'the meritorious' could have no authentic meaning. Last, the *Summa* discussion is one of the places where Aquinas thought it right to advert to the Platonism with which Augustine had been imbued and to the misleading language this entailed.[53]

2. The second commonly rejected thesis from the *First Book of Sentences* is that the numerical predications used in trinitarian statements

51 Loc. cit. I, 394: "ad cujus explanationem..."; Albert, it may be noted, was particularly exercised by the misunderstanding of the nature of light evinced by this analogy ("quoddam valde grossum falsum..." ed. cit. XXV, 464) whereas Bonaventure, like Aquinas, confined himself to a theologically grounded denial: "Sed haec positio non potest stare, quia Spiritus sanctus non est unibilis..." ed. cit. I, 238.

52 Ibid.: "... si esset unibilis, aut per naturam aut per gratiam..."

53 "Hic enim modus loquendi consuetus est apud Platonicos, quorum doctrinis imbutus fuit Augustinus. Quod quidam non advertentes, ex verbis eius sumpserunt occasionem errandi." *Summa theologiae* II-II, q. 23, a. 2, c.; ed. cit. III, 1522b.

have but negative force.[54] Aquinas surveyed speculation on the notion of unity and found a discrepancy between 'philosophers' and 'masters.' Avicenna, for instance, identified the 'one' convertible with being with the 'one' that functions as the principle of number; hence, he could not deny that predications of the numerical 'one' make a positive addition to the subjects of which that 'one' is asserted. Avicenna counted as a philosopher, but there were theologians, that is, masters to follow his lead. Still, if not all masters opposed the opinion associated with the Arabian philosopher, not all philosophers had agreed with the position of Avicenna: Aristotle before him and Averroes after him denied that the 'one' convertible with being can be identified with the 'one' that grounds our counting. This, wrote Aquinas, is a rational decision. The Philosopher and the Commentator held that the numerical 'one' posits an addition in the order of being, to be precise, in the order of the 'being of measure,' and thus is intelligible in itself and renders intelligible both succeeding numbers and continuous quantities. Aquinas also reported that some held a middle position: With Avicenna they demanded only a rational distinction between the 'one' convertible with being and the 'one' of number, whereas, with Aristotle, they agreed that the 'one' convertible with being makes no positive addition to the subject of which it is predicated.

As for Aquinas, the 'one' and the 'unity' that belong to quantity can have no place in divine predication; only the 'one' convertible with

54 *Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber I, d. 24, cap. unic., ed. cit. I, 153-156; Aquinas, *In I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, ed. cit. I, 579-585; Peter was persuaded that, should the authoritative texts be examined carefully, "magis videtur horum verborum usus introductus ratione removendi atque excludendi a simplicitate deitatis que ibi non sunt, quam ponendi aliqua," loc. cit. 154. Albert agreed with the Master to a point: "Est enim *numerus* discretae quantitatis... Et ex illa ratione videtur procedere Magister in *Littera*: quia sine dubio nulla talis discretio separans unum ab alio est vel potest in divinis..." However, Albert claimed that the Master had failed to notice another meaning of "number": "Quarto modo dicitur *numerus* ex parte rei numeratae secundum quid et non simpliciter, scilicet causata pluralitas a distinguente quocumque modo... et hoc modo solo numerus positive cadit in divinis: et in hac numeri consideratione diminutus est Magister..." Albert, *In I Sent.* d. 24, A, a. 1; ed. cit. XXV, 606-607. Scotus, like Aquinas, was to side with the Master. "Ad quaestionem vero secundum ultimam opinionem est dicendum, sicut Magister dicit, quod numero in divinis magis utimur ad removendum quam ad ponendum aliquid...," *In I Sent.* d. 24, q. unica; ed. cit. XXII, 281, as did Richard of Middleton, "... unitas in Deo ponit divinam essentiam, et nihil aliud positiuum dicit..." *In I Sent.* d. 24, a. 1; ed. cit. I, 218; finally, Durandus drew the fire of Denis the Carthusian, "Durandus quoque circa haec multa scribit, in quibus praeallegatis contradicit doctoribus in nonnullis, sed inepte: quod prolixitatem vitans, non prosequor." *In I Sent.* d. 24, q. 2; ed. cit. XX, 178; in fact, Durandus contradicted all parties: "... Nec potest dicere solum idipsum quod ens et sub eadem ratione, quia esset negatio dicendo ens unum quod non est verum. Necesse est ergo, quod dicat aliquam rationem circa ens. Et illa est ratio indivisionis quae est ratio privativa... multitudo quae est de transeuntibus et reperitur in divinis ut et esse unum quod convertitur cum ente, et de hac dicunt quidam quod eius formalis ratio est privativa... Istud autem non videtur bene dictum... unius sit privativa oportet quod ratio multitudinis sit positiva." *In I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1; *D. Dvrandi a sancto Porciano... in Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum Libri IIII* (Venice 1571) I, 71v-72r.

being can be said of the Lord and these terms add no connotation to their denotation. They remain exclusively negative: *nihil addunt...nisi rationem negationis tantum.*[55] Nor was the more mature theologian of the *Summa theologiae* to unsay what he had said in the *Scriptum in Sententias*: 'As far as this is concerned, the Master has expressed the truth in the *Sentences*.'[56] If Aquinas was right, the Masters were wrong *communiter*.

3. The first of the two generally rejected theses from the *Second Book of Sentences* asserted that reward preceded merit in the case of the angels.[57] Genuine merit, in an economy of grace, entails for its theologians the twin perils of Pelagianism and unintelligibility.[58] Aquinas had met the first by his affirmative determination of the question immediately preceding the one here at stake: 'Whether angels needed grace in order that they might be converted to God?'[59] He met the second peril by conceding with candor the incoherence of positing a 'reward' apart from genuine merit,[60] and by distinguishing the order of time from the order of nature. In the prior question, he had made use of the natural parallelism between the 'instant' in which a substantial form

55 Loc. cit. 583.

56 *Summa theologiae* I, q. 30, a. 3, c.; ed. cit. I, 201b.

57 *Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber II, d. 5, cap. 6; ed. cit. I, 328-329; Aquinas, *In II Sent.* d. 5, q. 2, a. 2; ed. cit. II, 152-155; it ought to be noted that Peter introduced a cluster of theological opinions in addition to the one rejected by the Parisian Masters: "Aliis autem videtur, quod beatitudinem, quam receperunt in confirmationem per gratiam tunc appositam, non meruerint, dicentes, tunc non fuisse eis gratiam collatam ad merendum, sed ad beate vivendum; nec tunc eius datum esse bonum, quo mererentur, sed quo feliciter fruerentur. Quod autem tunc in praemium acceperunt, per obsequia nobis exhibita ex Deo obedientia et reverentia, mereri dicunt; et ita praemium praecessit merita..." *loc. cit.* 329. Bonaventure was willing to concede that the view proposed by the Master and his followers was "probabilis," but he thought the opposing one "rationabilior... et melius habet fundamentum." He concluded with a turn of phrase Aquinas would not have used: "Hanc communiter tenent moderni doctores; ideo huic adhaerendum est." *In I Sent.* d. 5, a. 3, q. 2; ed. cit. II, 151.

58 Although Aquinas has not mentioned the Pelagian peril here, he had done so in his presentation of the first of the eight controverted questions, ed. cit. I, 392, 397. See also his *Disputed Question, De caritate*, q. unica, a. 1; *Opera omnia* (Parma 1852-1873) VIII, 581, 583; against this background he wrote in the present question: "...facile intelligi potest ex his quae supra dicta sunt. Sicut enim actus liberi arbitrii est dispositio ad gratiam, ita actus informatus est meritum gloriae. Unde unus et idem conversionis motus est praeparatio ad gratiam secundum quod est ex libero arbitrio, et meritorius gloriae, secundum quod est gratia informatus: et iterum fruitionis actus, secundum quod completur per habitum gloriae." loc. cit. 154.

59 Ed. cit. II, 150-152.

60 In rejecting one proposed solution, an important aspect of Peter Lombard's total position, that grace had been given to the angels, not in order that they might merit, but that they might live well (see above, note 57), Aquinas wrote: "Hoc autem non videtur conveniens, quia beatitudo habet rationem praemii: praemium autem sine merito esse non potest, sicut nec poena sine culpa." loc. cit. 153; Durandus, once more, provides an idiosyncratic view: "Argumentum etiam in oppositum deficit, quia contra iustitiam esset infligere poenam sine demerito, sed gratiae est dare praemium sine merito." *In II Sent.* d. 5, q. 3; ed. cit. I, 143v.

is induced and the non-continuous motion of voluntary decision.[61] In the present question, he has used a comparable philosophical distinction between truly causal and merely chronological sequences. Thus the pious interpretation suggested by Brother Thomas hinges upon a distinction well-grounded in Aristotle[62] and it is one he proposed 'in company with others,' *videtur cum aliis dicendum...*[63]

Thanks to this distinction, Aquinas could conclude that the Master was not wrong, even though the Masters who had rejected Lombard's thesis were right. Had the angels been created 'in grace,' the priority of their merit with respect to their reward would have been beyond doubting; Peter Lombard, however, seemed to have been of the contrary opinion, that is, that the angels had not been created 'in grace.' This had led him to state the thesis that the Masters found disturbing, namely, that the reward of the angels had preceded their merit. Aquinas acknowledged that their misgivings were not empty ones: For him as for them, 'reward' where genuine merit is lacking was as intolerable as 'punishment' without guilt. Still, even had the angels not been created 'in grace,' and if the grace that makes creaturely activity meritorious had been given to them, chronologically speaking, 'with' their reward of glory, it must be said (with the Parisian Masters) that the reward preceded merit for, in the order of nature, this would have been the case. In the chronological order, however, reward would not have preceded their merit (as the Master of the *Sentences* had claimed).

Here, too, the *Summa theologiae* is, if anything, more clearly sensitive to the truth Peter Lombard wished to defend than is the *Scriptum*. The activity of the angels was meritorious in the order of salvation only because it was suffused with grace. That grace stood in an authentically causal relationship to the reward which is beatitude only because it was, in a significant way, prior to that reward: 'They are said to have

61 "In eodem enim instanti quod primo est dispositio necessitans in materia, forma substantialis inducitur... Motus autem voluntatis qui disponit ad gratiam est simplex et non continuus; ideo vel primus tantum est sufficiens dispositio ad gratiam, vel ultimus inter plures, qui agit in virtute omnium praecedentium: et ideo cum illo gratia infunditur." loc. cit. 151-152; Durandus would not allow chronological simultaneity and causal priority as a means for easing the difficulty: "... non solum natura, imo tempore meritum praecessit praemium... actus qui includunt oppositionem circa statum operantis non possunt esse simul... mereri est illius qui est in statu acquirentis et tendentis ad terminum. Praemium autem respicit statum non acquirentis sed possidentis, nec tendentis ad terminum, sed iam existentis in termino...", ed. cit. I, 143v.

62 V.g. *Metaphysica* 5, 11; 1018b 9-1019a 14.

63 "Et ideo videtur cum aliis dicendum quod meritum in eis non praecessit praemium tempore, sed natura..." loc. cit. 154; Scotus handled the issue with his accustomed precision: "... aliter dicitur, quod prius natura est meritum quam praemium... Sed an meritum praecedit praemium prioritate durationis? Teneo igitur de bonis, quod prius merentur quam percipiant beatitudinem. Sed de malis angelis dicitur quod non prius duratione peccant quam sint obstinati... fuerunt in termino in primo instanti in quo peccaverunt." *In II Sent.* d. 5, q. unica; ed. cit. XXII, 612.

merited and so, merit preceded reward. And this, I avow, pleases me more,' Peter had written.[64] Aquinas was to echo this in the *Summa* text: 'And, therefore, it is better said that the angel possessed grace before he was rendered blessed — through which grace he merited beatitude.'[65]

4. Next, Aquinas knew that there were those to say, and the Master seems to have shared their opinion, that the 'truth' of the child consists exclusively of what has come to him from his parents. The growth of that parental contribution, therefore, to the quantity that marks the adult, entails no real addition; the food the child eats does not enter into his 'true' being.[66] A cognate view has found expression in our time and it is not without significance that a great novelist has put on the lips of a Cabbalistic mystagogue the jibe that a man is no more than 'a pipe of flesh.'[67] Some mediaeval exegetes, Peter Lombard the most influential among them, thought this a helpful way to understand the saying of Matthew 15:17 — what ends in the drain was never 'truly' man and so will never see resurrection![68]

Brother Thomas arraigned this opinion in his *Scriptum* as 'irrational' for it does justice neither to the man who grows nor to the sustaining food, thanks to which he grows. If Peter Lombard and his followers were right, growth could come to pass only by rarefaction or by the creation of new material; neither alternative is a rational explanation. Nothing remains but to allow that what had been the matter of another corporeal entity has been transmuted by digestion into the body that grows. Much as respect for the coherence of natural sequences had impelled Aquinas to insist that there can be no 'reward' where there has been no genuine merit, so respect for the coherence of biological reality has led him to defend the totality of the human; man is what he eats; what he eats becomes truly man.

How serene the good sense of Aquinas here! Alas, he would not always succeed so well in his efforts to solve scatological dubeities in an eschatological perspective. One contemporary of ours, who rides to the prestige of Aquinas with a loose rein, has mentioned some *topoi* where

64 Loc. cit. 329.

65 "Et ideo melius dicendum est quod gratiam habuit angelus antequam esset beatus, per quam beatitudinem meruit," *Summa theologiae* I, q. 62, a. 4, c.; ed. cit. I, 374b.

66 *Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber II, d. 30, cap. 15; ed. cit. I, 467-468; Aquinas, *In II Sent.* d. 30, q. 2, a. 1; ed. cit. II, 776-787.

67 "... what can we say we really know about man? That he is, when all is said and done, just a passage for liquids and solids, a pipe of flesh..." words ascribed to Balthasar by L. Durrell, *Justine*, Part II, (London 1961) 93.

68 Peter and Brother Thomas cite only Matthew 15:17 in this connection, Brother Bonaventure added Mark 7:18-19 as well as the *Glossa ordinaria* on this pericope.

he holds Aquinas guilty of 'nonsense and superstition' worthy of commendation to 'connoisseurs of the absurd.'[69] Prominent among them is the assertion that the whole man, intestines and all, will rise from the grave, but that 'noble fluids rather than base superfluities will fill them...'[70] Was it not a tactical blunder for Aquinas to have dealt with a syllogism that impugned total resurrection by claiming that full intestines would be too base for the world to come, apart from a certain amelioration, and empty ones impossible in a Nature that abhors a vacuum?

5. In his *Third Book of Sentences* Peter Lombard faced, in company with all Christian theologians, some perplexing questions posed for the philosophy of man by the theology of Incarnation. Peter's way of accounting for the persistent denial by the Church that what the divine Person of the Word assumed in the Incarnation of the Lord is a human person was to claim that a soul is not a person while it is united to some other reality in such a way as to constitute a person with that other reality, a mode of union he designated by the adverb *personaliter*. This entails a conclusion he did not fail to draw: A human soul, separated from the body by death, is a person as is an angel, by nature bereft of body.[71] Since the human soul of Jesus was at no point not united to another Reality, its assumption by the second Person is not the assumption of a person by a Person. Needless to insist, it was not the fact that Jesus is not a human person which was rejected by the theologians who disclaimed Peter's explanation of that fact.

Aquinas noted that many among the 'ancients' had held just a view of man as did Peter Lombard: Gregory of Nyssa (Nemesius), Plato, and Hugh of Saint Victor are the 'ancients' he named, opposed by only one ancient, Aristotle, 'whom all the moderns follow.' The Philosopher's generally accepted conviction that soul is 'united to body as is form to

69 D. J. O'Connor, *Aquinas and Natural Law* (London, Melbourne, Toronto 1967) 1, 89; the text is cited from *Summa theologiae*, Supplementum, q. 80, a. 1, ad 2; ed. cit. V, 373*b; as is well known, a fourteenth century editor, whose identity has not been established, continued the *Summa theologiae* of Aquinas beyond III, q. 90, the point at which Thomas had died (see ed. cit. V, v); the material for the argument against total resurrection was borrowed from *In IV Sent.* d. 44, q. 1, a. 2 and the response of Aquinas from *In IV Sent.* d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, quaestiuncula 5, ad 2; the Mandonnet-Moos edition cited hithertofore does not extend this far so the reader is referred to the *Opera omnia* (Parma 1852-1873) VII-II, 1075 ff.

70 "Dicendum quod intestina resurgent in corpore, sicut et alia membra. Et plena erunt, non quidem turpibus superfluitatibus, sed nobilibus humiditatibus." loc. cit.

71 *Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber III, d. 5, cap. 3; ed. cit. II, 571-573; Aquinas, *In III Sent.* d. 5, q. 3, a. 2; ed. cit.III, 206-207; Peter's opinion is expressed in a line: "... anima non est persona, quando alii rei est unita personaliter, sed quando per se est: absoluta enim a corpore persona est, sicuti Angelus..." loc. cit. 1772.

matter' entails the conclusion that a separated soul is neither an instance of human nature, since a part is not a whole, nor a person, for the notion of 'part' is opposed by contrariety to that of 'person.' For as long as a soul is separated from the body it once informed, that soul is not actually a part of the former composite, but it continues to retain a structure, thanks to which it is 'born,' adapted by nature, to be such a part.[72]

Beyond all merely technical philosophical concerns is the dignity and integrity of the human person. The soul, separated at death from what it had rendered a human body, cannot be a 'person' in isolation from that body without demeaning the role of the material in constituting our reality. If only the name of Aristotle could be invoked against the ranked 'ancients,' saints included, Brother Thomas and his colleagues thought reason on the side of the beleaguered Philosopher.

6. The second controverted position from the *Third Book* is closely related to the preceding one. Lombard argued that Jesus was still truly a man during the three day period after crucifixion and before resurrection.[73] Hugh of Saint Victor[74] and Peter had reached an identical conclusion by diverse roads. For Hugh, the totality of human personality is constituted by the soul and thus, the separated soul can be called 'man,' not only in the case of Jesus, but in the case of Everyman as well. Peter restricted this state of affairs to Christ alone on the ground that even in death His human soul and human body remained in some way united with each other because each remained united with the eternal Word.[75]

Not even this limited claim, Brother Thomas held, can be admitted: Only when soul informs body is man present. Dead flesh is called

72 That of Aquinas is expressed with equal economy: "Unde anima est pars humanae naturae, et non natura quaedam per se. Et quia ratio partis contrariatur rationi personae... quamvis separata non sit pars actu, tamen habet naturam ut sit pars." loc. cit. 207, § 111.

73 *Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber III, d. 22, cap. 1; ed. cit. II, 650-651; Aquinas, *In III Sent.* d. 22, cap. 1; ed. cit. II, 650-651; Aquinas, *In III Sent.* d. 22, q. 1, a. 1; ed. cit. III, 662-664.

74 The significance of this is that Peter's departure from Hugh's more simplistic explanation was both noticed by Aquinas ("... opinio fuit Magistri et etiam Hugonis de Sancto Victore quod Christus in illo triduo fuerit homo; sed ad hoc movebantur *diversis viis*.") and used by him to contrive a pious interpretation, see below, note 76; for the Master claimed that the case of the Incarnate Lord was a special one, not to be accounted for by a theory that would make every human soul after death a "man": "... Magister non voluit quod alii post mortem essent homines, sed solum hoc voluit de Christo..."; loc. cit. p. 663, § 12 and § 14.

75 Peter's explanation, far from depending upon an over-arching philosophy of man, invoked the independence of the mysteries of faith from philosophical restrictions: "... fidei sacramentum a philosophicis argumentis est liberum... Dicimus ergo, in morte Christi Deum vere fuisse hominem, et tamen mortuum; et hominem quidem nec mortalem nec immortalem, quia unitus erat animae et carni seiunctis..." loc. cit. 650.

'flesh' by equivocation only and here, of course, Aquinas is at one with Aristotle: The dead eye is an 'eye' only by equivocation, the dead man a 'man' by equivocation only.[76]

But here Aquinas unexpectedly offered a benign interpretation based precisely upon the Aristotelian pronouncement. Peter had indeed spoken equivocally, but he had intended to do just that. Had not the Master remarked that Christ was termed 'man' between cross and resurrection on grounds other than those that had justified the same predication before His death? Christ was truly named 'man' but not on the same basis as are other men. Aquinas thus departed from the strict letter of Peter's solution, but did not accept to the letter the sweeping condemnation of the Master on this point by the Parisian Masters of Theology.

7. Was the baptism of John such that for some it precluded the necessity of receiving the 'baptism of Jesus' later?[77] Some thought that this had been the case and Aquinas noted that 'it seems this was the opinion of the Master in the text.' The Acts of the Apostles, 19:1-7, speaks of Ephesian believers who had been given the 'baptism of John,' but who had not so much as heard whether there be a Holy Spirit; the Apostles baptized them 'in the name of Jesus,' laid hands upon them, and they received the Holy Spirit. Did this imply, the theologians asked, another set of converts, men baptized by John, but baptized in view of the Lord whose coming he proclaimed and equipped with trinitarian conceptions, for whom baptism by the Apostles had not been necessary? A text from Jerome encouraged Peter Lombard to think that this had been the case: 'Those who were not aware of the Holy Spirit when they received baptism from John were baptized again,' Jerome had written.[78] Ambrose reinforced this impression: 'Some denied that

76 Aquinas here has cited Aristotle simply "in IV Metaphysicorum" and the editor has expanded this citation to book *gamma*, chapter 4; by an evident misprint, the Bekker number 1106b, 13, has been substituted for 1006b, 13; but Aquinas seems to have had in mind rather the characterization of man as a "besouled biped" given at *Metaphysica* IV, 4; 1006a 32, see his *In Metaphysicam Aristotelis Commentaria*, Liber IV, lectio 7, ed. M.-R. Cathala (Turin 1935) 206-207, § 613; finally, no reader of Aristotle, and least of all Aquinas, can have failed to remember *De anima* II, 1; 412b 18-25, *De interpretatione* 11; 21a 17-29, especially 23; *Metaphysica* I, 9; 991a 5-8, in all of which equivocal uses of such terms are at stake and the Philosopher cautions us on their use; Aquinas credits the Master with having been fully aware of this and of having legitimately employed a consciously chosen equivocal turn of speech. loc. cit. 664, § 17.

77 *Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber IV, d. 2, cap. 6; ed. cit. II, 753-754; Aquinas, *In IV Sent.* d. 2, q. 2, a. 4; ed. cit. IV, 100-103.

78 Peter also cited another text from Jerome, ed. cit. 753, note 3, to the same effect; taken to the letter neither pericope supports the inference that, since there were believers baptized by John to whom the Holy Spirit was unknown and who were therefore baptized by the Apostles with a trinitarian formula, there must have been another group whose situation required no more than the laying on of hands.

they knew a Holy Spirit when they said that they had been baptized with the baptism of John — who had baptized, not in his own name, but in that of the approaching Jesus. These, therefore, who had been baptized neither in the name of Christ, nor with faith in the Holy Spirit, could not have received the sacrament of baptism. They, therefore, were baptized in the name of Christ; in the case of these men, baptism was not "repeated" but "newly bestowed," *novatum.*'[79] Peter was moved to complete what seemed to him the implication of the biblical anecdote: 'Those, however, who had not put their hope in the baptism of John and who believed in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, were not baptized afterwards...'[80]

Thomas Aquinas rejected the opinion of the Master, not on the questionable logic of the exegesis he had adopted, but on two generally applicable principles of sacramental theology. First, the subjective dispositions of hope and faith are irrelevant to the efficacy of sacraments as such; their effectiveness is rooted exclusively in the 'very doing of what is done.'[81] Second, if something pertains to the substance of a sacrament — here the trinitarian formula of baptism and not the trinitarian faith of the baptized — should have been omitted, then the defective 'sacrament' is to be repeated.[82] Of all the eight controverted questions, this one alone has drawn from Aquinas a discussion from which all specifically 'philosophical' considerations are absent.

8. Peter was anxious to defend the claim of Church and priesthood that the Lord has communicated to men the power to forgive sin. Since some theologians has assimilated the power to forgive sin to the power to create in order to deny the first by an *a pari* argument, the Master

79 The text cited from Ambrose is notable for the precision that the rite of the Apostles was not a re-baptism but a baptism conferred for the first time.

80 Loc. cit. 754; Scotus is one of those who tried to save the Lombard thesis: "... dico quod Baptisma Joannis potest intelligi uno modo, quod baptizavit tantum in nomine venturi, et sic remanebant obligati ab eo ad suscipiendum Baptisma Christi... Alio modo potest intelligi Joannes baptizasse Baptismo Christi, potuit enim audisse discipulos Christi baptizasse, et formam quam tenerent... Et sic dico quod... non erant iterum baptizandi, et ita potest salvari dictum Magistri..." *In IV Sent.* d. 2, q. 2; ed. cit. XXIII, 573-574; Dionysius the Carthusian stood on firmer exegetical ground: "Verum non reor Joannem baptizasse Baptismo Christi, quia praecursoris habebat officium, et Scritptura apertissime protestatur eum usum baptismo distincto ac differenti a Baptismate Christi. Nec ulla auctoritas videtur hoc edocere, quod Joannes baptizaverit in forma baptismatis quam tradidit Christus..." *In IV Sent.* d. 2, q. 5; ed. cit. XXIV, 95; but the Masters in general, Brother Thomas among them, seem to have avoided the exegetical question and to have used the debate as an occasion for setting out the conditions for a valid baptism.

81 "Sed quia sacramenta novae legis ex ipso opere operato efficaciam habent..." loc. cit. 101, § 128.

82 "Hoc est generale in omnibus sacramentis, quod si omittatur aliquid quod est de substantia sacramenti, oportet illud sacramentum iterari. Unde cum non esset forma debita in baptismo Joannis, oportebat quod iteraretur baptismus. Et hoc habet communior opinio..." loc. cit. 101, § 129.

argued in his *Fourth Book of Sentences* that the Creator can communicate both powers.[83] Peter qualified both communications of power by holding that they can be but ministerial: The creature so acting would not be the 'author' of the new 'creation,' whether in the order of grace or that of nature, but rather the delegate through whom and in whom the Creator would act as, in fact, He does in all our good works.[84]

Aquinas noted that the common opinion of the Masters was against this solution by the Master of the *Sentences*, a point to which he has not habitually adverted. Still, in presenting the debate, Brother Thomas adduced four reasons that might be urged in favor of Peter's position, three more under the rubric *sed contra* against his position, and ended by 'responding' to all seven. For the three against Peter he considered simplistic in their use of the metaphysical notions of non-being, of the First Agent as religiously acknowledged through worship, *latria*, and finally, of act and potency correlations.[85]

Brother Thomas rejected the view that creation bridges an infinite 'distance' between being and 'pure non-being'; for him, pure non-being is only incidentally a term of the creative act, the other term of which is some being. The truth of the matter is rather that 'after non-being' something has come to be; it has come, not from non-being as from some positive antecedent, and so creation can be quantified only on the basis of the resultant being, not on the basis of the 'distance' between nothing and something. All the argument precludes, Aquinas held, is the creation of what is infinite.[86] Put another way, if there is an infinite distance between non-being and being, then the being at stake must be Infinite Being.[87] Still, it is true that 'nothing can be more distant from being than is non-being,' and so it is also true that this enigmatic 'distance' is in one way infinite and in another finite — this last because, if that were not the case, one being could not be less or more removed from God than is any other. Aquinas had remembered and cited Augustine's angel, *prope deum*, and his matter, *prope nihil.*[88]

The argument that *latria*, worship in the supreme degree, belongs to

83 *Petri Lombardi, Libri IV Sententiarum*, Liber IV, d. 5, cap. 3; ed. cit. II, 775-776; Aquinas, *In IV Sent.* d. 5, q. 1, a. 3; ed. cit. IV, 206-211.

84 "Ad quod dici potest... Ita etiam posset Deus per aliquem creare aliqua, non per eum tanquam auctorem, sed ministrum, cum quo et in quo operaretur; sicut in bonis operibus nostris ipse operatur, et nos: nec ipse tantum, nec nos tantum..." loc. cit. 776.

85 Loc. cit. 206, § 39 for the first four arguments; the fifth and sixth are § 40 and § 41 on the same page, the seventh § 42, 207; that Aquinas considered this to be a series is incontrovertible since he responds to them formally "Ad primum, Ad secundum," and so forth, 209-211, § 58 - § 72.

86 Loc. cit. 210-211, § 67, § 68.

87 Loc. cit. 211, § 69.

88 Ibid.; the text of Augustine is *Confessionum* 12, 7.

the Creator exclusively and that therefore the creative power that evokes it cannot be communicated to a creature, he rejected as missing the point. *Latria* is due to the Creator precisely as to the First Agent and what is under discussion is whether a secondary agent might participate in creative power as a secondary agent.[89]

Brother Thomas dismissed the third argument *contra* by arguing that, although it is true that no creature can be 'pure act,' there are creatures, creatures, angels, in whom there 'remains nothing of potency that has not been brought to full realization through act.'[90] Aquinas was with his colleagues in rejecting the position that creativity is communicable to creatures, but his dialectical rigor excluded some of the usual arguments given to support that rejection.

Furthermore, he was willing to extend to Peter Lombard the benefit of benign interpretation here as elsewhere. One might say 'improperly,' that is, imprecisely, that there is 'creation' where something comes to be, not from nothing at all, but from nothing of what comes to be, provided always that it be understood that some Agent, prior to the one who thus acts, has not been excluded. Any production is 'creative' in this less exact sense, because every production is the emergence into being of what had not been and thus from the 'nothing' of what emerges. This was the intent of those philosophers, Avicenna for one, who held for a mediated production of the world.[91] If anyone should wish to 'sustain him on this point,' this is the way Aquinas thought the thing might be done. In any case, the Master had not joined the philosophers who had ascribed a deputed creativity to incorporeal and immaterial substances: Although, in Lombard's perspective, the thing could have been done, he did not think it had occurred.[92]

III

What conclusions impose themselves upon a witness to the way Aquinas has comported himself when obliged to reach his decisions either against the Master of *Sentences* or against the corporate prestige of the Masters of Paris?

The thrust of his conclusions is so varied as to preclude any possibility that he approached his duties with a preliminary bias in favor of either side. In company with his peers, he rejected four out of

89 Loc. cit. 211, § 71.
90 Loc. cit. 211, § 72.
91 Loc. cit. 210, § 64, § 65, § 66.
92 "Et sic Magister dicit quod potuit communicari potentia creandi, non est autem alicui communicata." loc. cit. § 66.

eight positions of Peter Lombard (1, 4, 5, 7), a proportion that hardly suggests subservience to the men with whom he was obliged to work. That he agreed unreservedly with Peter on one out of eight impugned solutions (2) will not convince us that his esteem for traditional wisdom went beyond due limits. On the remaining three controverted questions (3, 6, 8), Aquinas held that the Parisian Masters were right to dissent from the Master, but that the Master's solutions were not wholly indefensible. Given the appropriate qualifications and distinctions, pious interpretations did not seem impossible and since Brother Thomas provided them, we must conclude he thought them desirable. The impression is inescapable that the very real respect Aquinas felt for Master and for Masters in no way limited his own freedom of manœuvre. He has matched the virility and discretion of his doctrine on *correptio fraterna* in the presence of moral vagaries with a discriminating independence in matters of intellect.

Second, Brother Thomas found reasons for his personal solutions on seven out of eight questions in philosophical rather than in explicitly theological sources; like the Platonizing Fathers of the Church, whose orientation he had diagnosed correctly, he has shown in his theologizing what his philosophical antecedents had been.[93]

His debts to Aristotle are heavy indeed, but he was no more a doctrinaire Aristotelian than he was a conformist to Parisian theological opinion or an armor-bearer for the Master of *Sentences*. An account of causes straight from the *Physics* combined in his perspective with the eminently non-Aristotelian notions of exemplarism and participation in order to justify an exegesis of 'God is love' more urbane than the blunt assertion: 'Charity is the Holy Ghost.' He counted Peter Lombard right on the exclusively negative import of numerical names as yhese are predicated of God and did so with the observation that there was dissent on the issue between 'philosophers' and 'masters.' In fact, he

93 "Similiter etiam expositores sacrae Scripturae in hoc (the question at issue was whether the firmament is of the same nature as are the inferior bodies; with Aristotle, Denis the pseudo-Areopagite, and "nunc omnes," Aquinas held that it is not) diversificati sunt, secundum quod diversorum philosophorum sectatores fuerunt, a quibus in philosophicis eruditi sunt. Basilius enim et Augustinus et plures sanctorum sequuntur in philosophicis quae ad fidem non spectant opiniones Platonis:... Dionysius autem fere ubique sequitur Aristotelem ut patet diligenter inspicienti libros ejus..." *In II Sent.* d. 14, q. 1, a. 2; ed. cit. II, 350; this text has been adduced by M.-D. Chenu in his 1925 article, cited above in note 5, 277, note 47, and also in his *Toward Understanding St. Thomas* 143, note 30; in this early mention of Dionysius, the diagnosis of his philosophical antecedents is, of course, incorrect, but a more diligent inspection of his books would permit Aquinas to write later: "Est autem considerandum quod beatus Dionysius in omnibus libris suis obscuro utitur stilo... Accidit etiam difficultas in praedictis libris, ex multis: a) Primo, quidem, quia plerumque utitur stilo et modo loquendi quo utebantur platonici, qui apud modernos est inconsuetus..." *Sancti Thomae Aquinatis In Librum Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, ed. C. Pera (Turin 1950) Prooemium, 1.

showed that the dissent was more complex: Philosophers could be found on both sides. Aristotle and his Commentator held what Peter held; Aquinas supported them against the Parisian Masters, but his reasons owe nothing to 'authority' or to the prestige that attaches to the experts.

The practice of Aquinas, as exhibited in the way he handled these eight questions, is seen to have been as flexible with respect to magistral opinion as his random remarks on the *auctores* and their views might have prepared us to expect. He neither ignored nor despised the achievements of his great predecessors and his eminent colleagues. Thomist assent, however, is compelled neither by the prestige of other Masters nor by the authority of a Church Father. In the Thomist perspective, not even the absolute divine authority is an exception to the rule that truth alone commands the assent of intellect. Divine authority is unconditioned because Truth is a divine Name and, like all biblical names, Truth is an epiphany of What it denotes. Whatever else may be required to make a 'Thomist,' unreserved allegiance to truth as perceived, rather than to an author or to the consensus of experts, cannot be absent.

Was Peter of Bergamo correct in his claim that, for Aquinas, Peter Lombard *non est authenticus*?

Passing over the mild impropriety of using the term *authenticus* with respect to the Master, and we have seen Aquinas indulge in the same impropriety, the contrary seems to have been the case. Peter Lombard embodied in a pre-eminent way human, scientific prestige as Brother Thomas conceived it: A point of departure, endowed with a value that summons a reader to benign interpretation in emergencies, but always in subordination to his best judgement as to where truth might lie. For Brother Thomas granted the Master of *Sentences* a status no worse than the one he assigned to those best of 'authors,' the Fathers of the Church. His views and theirs were sustained, and with extreme ingenuity, except where they were seen to be indefensible. Brother Thomas responded in an identical way to Peter Lombard, to Augustine, to Jerome, to any doctor — or to any doctors, even to the formidable *magistri Parisienses* marching in phalanx, *communiter.*

VI

ST. THOMAS IN HISTORY: 14TH TO 19TH CENTURIES

THE *SUMMA CONFESSORUM* OF JOHN OF FREIBURG AND THE POPULARIZATION OF THE MORAL TEACHING OF ST. THOMAS AND OF SOME OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES

Leonard E. Boyle O.P.

JUST as in the wake of the theological and legal advances of the twelfth century there was a demand for popularization at the beginning of the thirteenth that produced, for example, the *summae* of Robert of Flamborough, Thomas Chobham or Raymund of Peñafort, so in the years that followed the age of Aquinas, Bonaventure and Hostiensis, there was another, and possibly more spectacular, wave of popular treatises that was, for the most part, to endure until about 1500.

Summaries of Bonaventure's commentary on the *Sentences* were numerous by 1300;[1] while as early as 1273, material from the commentary of Aquinas on the *Sentences* was incorporated into a popular *Dialogus de quaestionibus animae et spiritus*[2] by the Dominican, James of Genoa ("Januensis", the author of the influential *Catholicon*, in which there is also much of the moral theology of Aquinas). Later, between 1280 and 1288, the General of the Dominicans, John of Vercelli, commissioned Galienus Ozto to make an abbreviated version of the *Secunda secundae*.[3]

Lesser works of Bonaventure and Aquinas also had their share of popularity, in particular Bonaventure's *Breviloquium* and the *De articulis fidei et de sacramentis* of Aquinas.[4] The most popular work of all, however, was a product of neither Aquinas nor Bonaventure,

1 S. Alzeghy, "Abbreviationes Bonaventurae. Handschrifliche Auszüge aus dem Sentenzenkommentar des hl. Bonaventure im Mittelalter," *Gregorianum* 18 (1947) 474-510. See also K. Ruh, *Franziskanisches Schrifttum im deutschen Mittelalter*, (Munich 1965), pp. 192-197, 214-221.

2 M. Grabmann, *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, I (Munich 1926), pp. 369-373, and "Die Weiterleben und Weiterwerken des moraltheologischen Schrifttums des hl. Thomas von Aquin im Mittelalter," *Divus Thomas* (Freiburg in d. Schweiz) 25 (1947) 10.

3 Grabmann, art. cit., pp. 5-6.

4 J. Hartzheim, *Concilia Germaniae*, V (Cologne 1763), pp. 401, 414, 423. See also F. W. Oediger, *Ueber die Bildung der Geistlichen im späten Mittelalter* (Leiden-Cologne 1953), p. 123.

although it often circulated under their names: the *Compendium theologicae veritatis* of Hugh of Strasbourg. Written between 1265 and 1270 on a basis of Albert the Great's *Summa de creaturis* and Bonaventure's *Breviloquium*,[5] it had a remarkable influence on popular theology in the 14th and 15th centuries, in England, for example, where it is prominent in William of Pagula's *Speculum praelatorum* (c. 1320), and in the anonymous *Regimen animarum* (1343) and *Speculum christiani* (1360-1370).[6] And if the *De instructione sacerdotum* which Albert of Brescia compiled about 1300 "ex libris et quaestionibus et tractatibus fratris Thomae de Aquino" had no great success,[7] the *Dialogus de administratione sacramentorum* which William of Paris put together between 1300 and 1313 "de scriptis fratris Thomae...ac Petri Tarentoize", proved so useful that it survives in very many manuscripts and in numerous printed editions.[8]

I

Aquinas and Peter of Tarentaise are also at the centre of the subject of the present essay, the *Summa confessorum* of John of Freiburg. Its author was a contemporary of William of Paris, and died a year or so after William. Like William, who also produced several compilations of canon law, he was an indefatigable compiler.

Born at Freiburg-im-Breisgau towards the middle of the 13th century, John was to spend most of his life there as Lector in the Dominican priory. Even when he was unwillingly elected prior of the house about 1290 he was allowed to retain his lectorship by Hermann of Minden, the provincial of Germany, "ne conventus vestrae doctrinae salutaris interim accipiat detrimentum."[9] Until his death in 1314, John continued

5 G. Boner, "Ueber den Dominikanertheologen Hugo von Strassburg," *Divus Thomas* (Fr.) 25 (1954) 268-286. In the middle ages the *Compendium* was variously attributed to Albert, Bonaventure, Thomas, Giles of Rome, Peter of Tarentaise, etc. Some of the medieval uncertainty about authorship is reflected in a 15th-century English treatise on the seven deadly sins (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawlinson C. 288, f. 5r): 2 "To this answereth a grete clerk (et est sanctus Thomas secundum quosdam, et sanctus Albertus secundum alios) in Compendio theologiae, lib. 3, cap. de avarita."

6 *Speculum praelatorum*: Oxford, Merton College, MS. 217, f. 5r-v; *Regimen animarum*: Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Hatton 11, f. 4r; *Speculum christiani*, ed. G. Holmstedt (London 1933), p. 182.

7 M. Grabmann, "Albert von Brescia O.P. (ob. 1314) und sein Werk *De officio sacerdotis*," *Mittelalterliches Geistesleben*, III (Munich 1956), pp. 323-351.

8 A. Teetaert, "Un compendium de théologie pastorale du XIIIe-XIVe siècle," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 26 (1930) 66-102.

9 H. Finke, *Ungedruckte Dominikanerbriefe des 13. Jahrhunderts* (Paderborn 1891), p. 165.

to combine these offices of "prior per se" and "lector per accidens", as Hermann of Minden nicely put it.[10]

A pupil of Ulrich Engelbrecht, under whom he had studied at Strasbourg before 1272,[11] John the Lector (as he was often known) had accompanied Albert the Great to Mecklenburg in 1269,[12] and may have studied for a time at Paris, perhaps while Aquinas and Peter of Tarentaise were lecturing there.[13] When he entered about 1280 on his function as Lector at Freiburg (which was mainly to hold public lectures which his own brethren and those of the local clergy who so desired would attend),[14] John soon found that Raymund of Peñafort's *Summa de casibus*, the standard work of confessional practice, and other similar compilations, were badly in need of revision.[15] Raymund had written his *Summa* at Barcelona about 1225,[16] and although it had been revised by Raymund himself some ten years later and had been glossed extensively by William of Rennes about 1241,[17] it was, inevitably, very much out of date by 1280. Given his background, it is not surprising to find that when John of Freiburg came to the conclusion after some years of teaching that the *Summa de casibus* would have to be revised, he turned at once to the writings of Ulrich Engelbrecht, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Peter of Tarentaise, for material which would bring the *Summa* up to date.

As we know from John himself (first prologue to his *Summa confessorum*), the earliest form of his revision of Raymund's *Summa* was a

10 See H. Flamm, "Die Grabstätte des Dominikaners Johannes von Freiburg," in *Zeitschrift der Gesellschaft für Beförderung der Geschichts-, Altertums- und Volkskunde von Freiburg* 31 (1916) 272.

11 A. Fries, "Johannes von Freiburg, Schüler Ulrichs von Strassburg," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 18 (1951) 332-340.

12 H.-C. Scheeben, "Albert der Grosse. Zur Chronologie seines Lebens," *Quellen und Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland* 27 (1931) 53.

13 A. Walz, "Hat Johann von Freiburg in Paris studiert?," *Angelicum* 11 (1934) 245-249.

14 See H.-M. Feret, "Vie intellectuelle et vie scolaire dans l'ordre des Prêcheurs," *Archives d'histoire dominicaine* 1 (1948) 11, 20-24.

15 "Quoniam dubiorum nova quotidie difficultas emergit casuum, doctores moderni tam theologi quam iuristae plures casus et legendo et scribendo determinaverunt qui in antiquioribus compilationibus non habentur,...": John of Freiburg, first prologue to the *Summa confessorum*. — The edition of the *Summa confessorum* (here cited, where convenient, as *SC*) used in the present essay is that of Nuremberg 1517. Since John of Freiburg has arranged his work very carefully, and it is very easy to locate a given reference in any of the editions of the *SC*, it will not be cited here by the page of the Nuremberg edition, but simply by book, *titulus* and *quaestio*, thus: 1.7,1 (Book One, title 7, question 1).

16 S. Kuttner, "Zur Entstehungsgeschichte der *Summa de casibus poenitentiae* des hl. Raymund von Pennafort," *Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte*, kan. Abt., 83 (1953) 419-448. The edition of the *Summa de casibus* (cited on occasion as *SdC*) used in this essay is that of Paris 1603, but the work is cited only by book and title, e.g. *SdC* 3.24.

17 A. Walz, "Sanctus Raymundus auctor Summae casuum," in *Acta Congressus iuridici internationalis, Romae 1934*, III (Rome 1936) 25-34.

Registrum: an alphabetical index that combined the matter in the *Summa de casibus* with that in the *Apparatus* of William of Rennes. Then, spreading his net a little, he began to collect *casus* which were not covered by the *Summa* and the *Apparatus*, the result being a *Libellus quaestionum casualium* that followed the order of Raymund's *Summa* but contained much more material. Finally, he embarked on a full-blown *Summa confessorum* of his own, the first *summa*, in fact, to be so called.[18]

The date usually assigned to this *Summa confessorum* by bibliographers and others is 1280 x 1298, the *terminus ante quem* being determined by the fact that John added a supplement to the *Summa* when the *Liber sextus* of Boniface VIII was issued in 1298.[19] This span of years may now be narrowed considerably. For example, John (*SC* 3.13, 12, etc.) quotes Garsias Hispanus on the second Council of Lyons, a commentary written in 1282;[20] he also refers (*SC* 3.35, 5) to the *Summula* of "frater Burchardus", a work that is probably to be dated 1290 x 1295;[21] further, he speaks of a treatise on excommunication by "Hermannus, ordinis praedicatorum, *quondam* provincialis Teutoniae" (*SC* 3.22, 219, etc.), who can only be Hermann of Minden, the provincial who confirmed John as prior about 1290 and who was in office from 1286 to 1290.[22]

If these references take us much nearer to 1298 than to 1280, a further important reference enables the *Summa* to be dated even closer to 1298. In that year Boniface VIII published the *Liber sextus*, and John therefore appended a section correlating his *Summa* with the *Sext*, "ne *libri qui* de Summa confessorum *iam scripti erant* appositione statutorum domini Bonifatii nuper in suo sexto libro decretalium de novo editorum destruerentur." This, I take it, means that when the *Sext* came to John's attention, a large part of his *Summa* ("libri qui de Summa confessorum iam scripti erant") had already been completed and he was loth to tamper with it, preferring to add "utiles indices in fine ipsius summae sub titulis eiusdem summae." Certainly John was in

18 The use of this title in editions of pre-1300 works for confessors is anachronistic, as in F. Broomfield, *Thomae de Chobham Summa confessorum* (Louvain 1968).

19 For example, in H. Finke, "Die Freiburg Dominikaner und der Münsterbau," (Freiburg in Breisgau 1901), pp. 163-171; J. Dietterle, "Die Summa confessorum," *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* 25 (1904) 257-260; M.-D. Chenu in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* VIII.1 (1924), cols. 701-702; A. Teetaert, *La confession aux laïques* (Louvain 1926), pp. 440-444; P. Michaud-Quantin, *Sommes de casuistique et manuels de confession au moyen âge* (Louvain 1962), p. 44 ("vers 1290").

20 London, British Museum, MS. Royal 9 C 1.

21 Dietterle, art. cit., p. 208.

22 P. von Loë, "Statistisches über die Ordensprovinz Teutonia," *Quellen und Forschungen...Dominikanerordens* 1 (1907) 13.

a position fully to analyze the *Sext* before he compiled the index to his *Summa*, since he states expressly in his preamble to the index that he is including there "additiones quas de sexto libro decretalium collectas in fine summae in speciali tractatu addidi." Given that the *Sext* was published in March 1298, a date 1297/1298 may therefore be suggested for the composition of the *Summa confessorum*.

II

In character, the *Summa confessorum* is a mixture of practical theology and canon law. Like the *Summa copiosa* of the canonist Hostiensis (d. 1271), upon which John draws extensively, the *Summa* is in question and answer form, each question being answered "according to" one or other of several of John's main authorities: Raymund, William of Rennes' *Apparatus*, Hostiensis, Geoffrey of Trani, William Durandus the Elder (*Speculum* and *Reportorium*), the *glossa ordinaria* on the Decretals, Albert, Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise, Ulrich of Strasbourg.

Following the plan of Raymund's *Summa de casibus*, John's *Summa* is divided into four books, each of which reproduces the chapter-headings in Raymund, from *De symonia* in Book One to *De donationibus* in Book Four. Like Raymund, John also breaks each chapter into numbered *quaestiones*, but John's *quaestiones* do not always coincide with those of Raymund. And where Raymund often discusses several subjects under a single heading, John gives each new subject a special *rubricella*, without, however, disturbing the consecutive numeration of the *quaestiones*.[23] Thus in *SC* 1.1 (= *Summa confessorum, libro* 1, *titulo* 1), where there are 92 *quaestiones* in all, the full *titulus* (from Raymund, *SdC* 1,1), is *De symonia et de iure patronatus*, but qq. 1-79 are entitled *De symonia*, and qq. 80-92 are given a *rubricella, De iure patronatus*. Again, where Raymund (*SdC* 3.24) has 70 paragraphs for *De poenitentia et de remissionibus*, John of Freiburg (*SC* 3.34) has a large number of *rubricellae* embracing some 288 *quaestiones*. On occasion, as in *SC* 3.33, q. 34, John sets up special but unnumbered *quaestiones* within a single numbered *quaestio*. The overall impression of the *Summa* as a well-planned and carefully-executed piece of work is heightened by the author's numerous and very

23 John often cites Raymund by paragraph, e.g. *SC* 3.34, 6: "Post haec quaero quot et quae sunt actiones poenitentiae. Respondeo secundum Raymundum, par. 5."

explicit cross-references, for example, in *SC* 1.4,3, where the reader is referred from the beginning of the First Book to the middle of the Third: "vide de hoc infra libro 3, titulo 38, *De transitu clericorum*, 'utrum aliquis'."

Since much of the method and material of the *Summa confessorum* derives from his earlier compilation, the *Libellus quaestionum casualium*, John of Freiburg included the preface to the *Libellus* in the *SC*, immediately before the preface to the *SC* itself. His purpose, he explains in the first (*Libellus*) preface, was to aid his own Dominican brethren in the pastoral care:

> Cum igitur quamplurimae quaestiones ad consilia animarum perutiles diversorum doctorum per volumina sint dispersae, ego frater Iohannes lector de ordine praedicatorum minimus, aliquas ex illis quas magis utiles iudicavi in unum decrevi colligere ad meum et aliorum fratrum profectum, ut si qui forte librorum copiam non habuerint, vel ad tot summas et scripta transcurrenda non vacaverint, hic collecta sub compendio multa de his inveniant quae requirunt...

To that end he had written his earlier *Registrum* of the *Summa* of Raymund and of the *Apparatus* of William of Rennes. Now in the *Libellus* he has put together *quaestiones casuales* which elaborate upon Raymund's or are not to be found in Raymund, and which he has taken from certain canonists and from four theologians of his own Order:

> ...in isto libello quaestiones casuales quae vel non continentur vel minus plene continentur in ipsa praedicta summa fratris Raymundi et apparatu eius, quas in pluribus doctorum libris et scriptis invenire potui, in unum collegi easque sub titulis eiusdem summae et eorumdem librorum et titulorum ordine disposui, aliquas insuper rubricellas de specialibus materiis quibusdam titulis supponendo. Sunt autem haec collecta maxime de libris horum doctorum memorati ordinis, videlicet, fratris Alberti quondam Ratisponensis episcopi, fratris Thomae de Aquino, et fratris Petri de Tharantasia, postmodum summi pontificis Innocentii quinti, magistrorum solemnium in theologia. Item, fratris Ulrici, quondam lectoris Argentinensis eiusdem ordinis, qui quamvis magister in theologia non fuerit, tamen magistris inferior non extitit, ut in libro suo quem tam de theologia quam de philosophia conscripsit evidenter innotescit, et famosorum lectorum de scholis ipsius egressorum numerus protestatur: unde et postea provincialatus Theutoniae laudabiliter administrato officio, Parisius ad legendum directus, ante lectionis inceptionem ibidem a domino est assumptus. Item ponuntur hic aliqua de summa Goffredi et plura de summa domini Ebrudunensis quae dicitur Copiosa, qui postmodum fuit cardinalis Hostiensis: unde et a quibusdam nominatur summa domini Hostiensis. Adduntur quoque hic aliqua de novis statutis summorum pontificum sive in modernis conciliis editis sive in curia publicatis. Sed et hic considerandum est quod cum secunda pars secundae

de summa fratris Thomae praedicti quasi pro maiori parte sit moralis et casualis, plurima de illa sumpta in hoc opusculo posui: et ideo ubicumque solum dicitur "Respondeo secundum Thomam in summa" vel simile, nullo addito, semper intelligendum est de secunda secundae nisi alia pars specialiter exprimatur.

The preface to the *Summa confessorum* itself presumes that one has read the above preface to the *Libellus,* although there is a slight variation on the warning about references to the *Summa* of Aquinas: "quod cum nominatur hic 'in summa Thomae', semper intelligitur de secunda parte secundae nisi alia pars specialiter exprimatur." John is also careful to point out that when he states at the beginning of a reply that he is following a given author, then all of that reply is to be understood as coming from that author:

Nota etiam quod cum cuiuscumque doctoris nomen vel liber ponitur in principio responsionis ad quaestionem, puta cum dicitur "Respondeo secundum Raymundum vel Thomam" aut similia, ab illo accepta est tota solutio quaestionis usque in finem nisi alius doctor interponatur. Cum vero duo vel plures doctores simul ponuntur in principio quaestionis, ut cum dicitur "Respondeo secundum talem et talem," solutio totius quaestionis communis est illis doctoribus, licet aliqua verba ponat unus ad explanationem quae non ponit alius, sed in sententia non discordant.

John explains, too, what precisely he means when he adds (typically, as it happens) at the end of a citation from an author that several other authors (e. g. Thomas and Albert and Peter) support this position:

Verum cum in fine alicuius quaestionis sic dicitur "Concordat" vel "Idem dicit talis et talis", et nullus alius doctor interpositus est, concordia intelligitur totius solutionis vel in sententia et quasi in verbis vel saltem in sententia, nisi solutio plura membra et plures articulos habeat; tunc enim respondet illi versui vel sententiae cui immediate adiungitur, nisi per aliquid additum designetur ad omnia praecedentia vel ad aliqua plura de praedictis esse referendum...

Again, as in the *Libellus*, the audience to which the *Summa* is directed is the "animarum medici". John now hopes that in this present work "multa de his quae requirunt inveniant, et ex diversorum concordia doctorum sciant quid sit probabilius et securius iudicandum."

Now, although John does not claim to be doing anything more than bringing Raymund up to date ("... de summa fratris Raymundi quam quasi totam huic operi includo...": *SC* 3.34,84), his *Summa* is, in fact, a much different work from that of Raymund. For one thing, his range of canonical authorities naturally goes far beyond that of the *Summa de casibus* to include the chief legal writers between 1234 and 1298: Innocent IV, Peter Sampson, Geoffrey of Trani, Garsias Hispanus,

Hostiensis, William Durandus. For another, the tone of the *Summa* is much more theological than that of Raymund. This is largely because of John's adroit use of theological authorities, and in particular of his four Dominican sources. John claims that he is simply filling out Raymund's *summa* with "casus morales", but in fact he presents the reader with quotation after quotation from his "doctores moderni", and thus places some of Raymund's legal solutions in a wider, theological framework.

A good example is Raymund's chapter *De sacramentis iterandis et de consecrationibus ecclesiarum* (*SdC* 3. 24). Raymund is entirely preoccupied with irregularities in this chapter, and only a few lines are allowed to the sacraments as such: "Quoniam quorundam sacramentorum iteratio irregularitates inducit, merito post praedicta impedimenta (sexus, etc.) de hoc aliqua sunt tangenda, pauca sacramentorum generatim praemittendo." As usual, John repeats the opening words of Raymund, "Quoniam...tangenda", but then adds, "et quia de aliquibus sacramentis non ponuntur—puta de baptismo, confirmatione, eucharistia et extrema unctione—quarum notitia non modicae est utilitatis, de his in hoc titulo aliquantulum latius prosequamur, maxime secundum theologos a quibus haec materia perfectius determinatur" (*SC* 3. 24, prologue). As a result, John now devotes 149 elaborate *quaestiones*, with replies mostly from Aquinas, to the four sacraments in question, and a further 14 to a separate *rubricella De consecratione.*

Of course, John never forgets that his primary text is that of Raymund. It was, in its way, sacred in the Dominican Order. For Raymund, who had been a General of the Dominicans for a brief period, was the known compiler of the *Decretales* promulgated by Gregory IX in 1234; besides, his *Summa* was one of the few books to be singled out for mention in the *Ratio studiorum* which a committee composed of Albert, Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise and two others had drawn up for the Order in 1259.[24] This reverence is reflected in the care with which John of Freiburg quotes the *Summa* at length at the beginning of each chapter and keeps to the order of Raymund's paragraphs. Here and there it restrains him when he is tempted to jettison parts of Raymund: "...praetermissa vero hic posui, ne de summa fratris Raymundi...viderer partem notabilem detruncasse" (*SC* 3. 34, 84).

Yet John was quite aware of Raymund's limitations. For example, Raymund has nothing at all on the sacrament of Orders. In fact, under the title *De aetate ordinandorum et de temporibus ordinationum*, he plunges into impediments, without as much as a glance at the nature of

24 *Acta capitulorum generalium*, I, ed. B. M. Reichert (Monumenta ordinis praedicatorum historica 3), (Rome 1898), p. 99; see pp. 110,174.

the sacrament: "Repellitur quis ab ordinatione et electione propter defectum aetatis, dist, 77" (*SdC* 3. 22). John, on the other hand, will have none of this too legalistic approach: "De hoc titulo circa ordines, ordinantes et ordinatos magis specialia exequens, primo quaero...quid sit ordo...."; and proceeds in some 54 *quaestiones* to give long quotations from Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise and others, on the meaning of order, character, etc. Again, in the title *De bigamis (SC* 3. 3), John is content to repeat Raymund almost word for word for the first three *quaestiones*, but then breaks away with the question (q. 4): "Sed quare ad perfectionem sacramenti (matrimonii) non requiritur virginitas in viro sicut in muliere?" And his reply possibly has a sting in its tail: "Respondeo secundum Thomam in scripto (4 D. 27, cited earlier by John), quia defectus in ipso sacramento causat irregularitatem....Juristae tamen diversas rationes alias assignaverunt quae stare non possunt...."

By and large, there is scarcely one place where John is satisfied to repeat Raymund without some comment or addition. Sometimes it is simply a question of filling out a casual reference in Raymund, as when in *SC* 3. 34, 6 he adds a *Decretum* reference ("ab Augustino: De pe. dist. 1") where Raymund has a vague, "ut ait Augustinus". At other times, and especially on purely legal matters, there is an unexpected display (for a theologian) of legal learning. Thus, in the title *De negotiis saecularibus, et utrum de illicite acquisitis possit fieri elemosina* (*SC* 2. 81), John devotes four *quaestiones* (qq. 39-42) to *De iure emphiteosis* where Raymund has only a few desultory sentences.

Of course, John's command of legal sources was not entirely at first-hand. Most of his acquaintance with the finer points of law, and with the major Decretists and Decretalists, was due, as he admits in his prologues, to the *Summa copiosa* of Hostiensis, the *Apparatus* of William of Rennes on Raymund, and the *Summa* of Geoffrey of Trani (not to speak of the *Speculum iudiciale* of William Durandus, which he does not mention there). Thus, in *SC* 3. 33, 245, after what appears to be an uncommon familiarity with some of the Decretists, John admits disarmingly: "Haec omnia in glossa". All the same, John appears to have made a fair attempt to keep abreast of legal scholarship. If it is not unexpected to find him using the *Speculum* (1287) of Durandus, or the *Manuale* of his fellow-Dominican, Burchard of Strasbourg (*SC* 3. 33, 105, 135, etc.) and the *De interdicto* of his former superior, Hermann of Minden (*SC* 3. 33, 219, 226, 251, etc.), it is a little surprising at first glance to note the presence of the commentary (1282) of Garsias Hispanus on the legislation of the Second Council of Lyons (*SC* 3. 13, 12; 3. 34, 221, 227, etc.). But, then, as befitted an assiduous teacher of

practical theology, John had more than a passing interest in the constitutions issued by that Council, for he quotes them often (*SC* 1. 7, 29; 2. 7, 71, 72; 4. 24, 149, etc.).

Since Raymund of Peñafort has many chapters of purely legal content in his *Summa de casibus*, there are, inevitably, some quite long stretches of almost unrelieved quotations from legal authorities in John of Freiburg's *Summa confessorum*. Otherwise, John never lets slip an opportunity of drawing extensively on the "doctores moderni" of theology. As John states in both his prologues, these theological sources are generally limited to the writings of Albert, Ulrich of Strasbourg, Peter of Tarentaise and Thomas Aquinas. Albert and Ulrich, however, are much less in evidence than Peter and Thomas.

The *Liber de missa* of Albert is quoted extensively on many occasions (e. g. *SC* 3. 24, 56, 60, 75, 85, 105, 110), but his *Summa de creaturis* is used sparingly (*SC* 1. 8, 47, 48; 4. 1, 21, etc.), though it is often cited in support of an opinion of one of the other theologians. One of the more notable instances of dependence upon it occurs in the *rubricella De consecratione et velatione virginum (SC* 3. 3, 14-24), where in q. 17 John shows that he is well aware of the relationship between Albert and Thomas: "Quid de virginibus occultis, si sine scandalo earum consecratio intermitti non potest? Respondeo secundum Albertum in Summa de quatuor coaequaevis, in tractatu de virtutibus cardinalibus, di. 58. Et quasi eadem verba sunt Thomae et Alberti, quia Thomas sumpsit de Alberto, qui doctor eius fuerat in studio Coloniensi." Although the "Summa de bono" of Ulrich of Strasbourg is cited more frequently than Albert's *Summa*, it ceases to be prominent after Books One and Two (e. g. *SC* 1. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 12: 2. 5, 64-99), and appears only fitfully in Book Three (where, as it happens, there is a citation from Ulrich "in quadam quaestione de quolibet": *SC* 3. 34, 272).

The two theological mainstays of the *Summa confessorum* are, in fact, Peter of Tarentaise and Thomas Aquinas. The *Quodlibets* of Peter are quoted only twice,[25] but his commentary on the *Sentences* is almost as frequently invoked as the *Summa* or the commentary on the *Sentences* of Thomas. Sometimes there are long runs of citations from Thomas, but just as often there are passages of equal length from Peter,

25 "Utrum religiosus teneatur obedire praelato suo praecipienti sibi aliquid contra regulam. Respondeo secundum Petrum in quadam quaestione de quolibet" (*SC* 3.33, 8). This is Qdl. 1.34 in P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibetique*, II, (Paris 1935), p. 227, and is printed in Glorieux, "Le Quodlibet de Pierre de Tarentaise," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale* 9 (1937) 270. A second reference, "Respondeo secundum Petrum in quaestionibus de quolibet" (*SC* 3.34, 254), may really be to Peter's *Quaestiones de peccato*, on which see Glorieux, "Questions nouvelles de Pierre de Tarentaise," ibid., 14 (1947) 98-103.

one after the other. Thus, in *SC* 3. 34, qq. 144-148 (*Pro quibus peccatis requiratur poenitentia?*), all five replies are from Peter; and this block of questions is followed by *De remissione venialium* (qq. 149-158), where Peter is the source called on for qq. 149-152, Thomas for q. 153, Peter again for q. 154, Thomas for qq. 155-156, Peter for 157, and so on. Unless one were to count, and then add up the lines of explicit borrowings from these two authors, it would be difficult to state with any exactitude which one of them is relied upon more than the other in John's *Summa*. But in view of John's own remarks in his prologues, it is not unfair to suggest that Thomas would possibly prove the winner.

Of the works of Thomas quoted in the *Summa confessorum,* the least expected is that known as *De regimine Iudaeorum ad ducissam Brabantiae.* It first occurs in *SC* 1. 4, 9 ("Utrum liceat dominis terrarum aliquam exactionem facere in Iudaeos? Respondeo secundum Thomam in quadam epistola ad ducissam Lotharingiae et Brabantiae..."), and is cited at length on at least 10 occasions — practically all of the letter, in fact (*SC* 1. 4, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14; 2. 5, 34, 36, 40, 41).

John's use of the *Quodlibets* of Thomas is even more striking, for he cites Thomas "in quadam quaestione de quolibet" on at least 33 occasions, and generally in full. Obviously he had searched through the *Quodlibets* and had utilized as much as possible of those with a "pastoral" bearing,[26] e. g., "Utrum clericus praebendatus in duabus ecclesiis, in die quo diversum est officium in utraque ecclesia, debeat utrumque officium dicere...Respondeo secundum Thomam in quadam quaestione de quolibet..." (*SC* 1. 7, 19 = Thomas, *Qdl.* I. 7, 1: all of corpus); "Utrum executor debeat tardare distributionem elemosinarum...Respondeo secundum Thomam..." (*SC* 2. 5, 114 = *Qdl.* VI. 8, 2: all of corpus): "Utrumque aliquis teneatur dimittere studium theologiae, etiam si aptus ad docendum alios, ad hoc quod intendat saluti animarum. Respondeo..." (*SC*. 3. 5. 4 = *Qdl.* I. 7, 2: all of corpus).

Curiously, not all of the *Quodlibets* which John attributes to Thomas prove to be really his. Here and there one's suspicions are aroused by passages which do not have the ring of Thomas, as in *SC* 3. 28, 23: "Utrum periculum sit claustralibus monachis si cura ecclesiarum spectantium ad claustrum negligatur a monachis officialibus? Respondeo secundum Thomam in quadam quaestione de quolibet....Et si esset mihi notum aliquid tale monasterium, non auderem consulere quod aliquis in tali collegio eligeret monachatum." As it happens, this quotation comes

26 See L. E. Boyle, "The Quodlibets of St. Thomas and the Pastoral Care," *The Thomist* 38 (1974).

from q. 24 of the first *Quodlibet* (1270) of John Peckham.[27] This is quite interesting, when one remembers that, beginning from 1279, this *Quodlibet* of Peckham occurs in at least 23 MSS of the *Quodlibets* of Thomas, but that only one of these MSS explicitly attributes it to Thomas. This is a late 13th-century MS (Paris, BN, lat. 15351), and it seems reasonable to suppose that the manuscript of the *Quodlibets* of Thomas to which John of Freiburg had access, belonged to that same tradition.[28] At all events, in 11 of the following 33 instances, John of Freiburg turns out to be quoting from Peckham's first *Quodlibet* and not at all from Thomas "in quadam quaestione de quolibet":

	S. confessorum	*St. Thomas*	*Peckham*
* 1.	1: 1,66		I.20a
2.	4,4	II.4, 2	
3.	7,19	I.7, 1	
4.	20	V.13, 3	
5.	21	VI.5, 2	
6.	8,62	IV.7, 2	
* 7.	78		I.26
* 8.	79		I.26
9.	9,23	I.9, 2	
10.	10,5	VI.9, 3	
11.	11,23	III.9, 2	
*12.	2: 5,93		I.17
13.	113	VI.8, 1	
14.	114	2	
15.	3: 5,4	I.7, 2	
16.	5	III.4, 1	
*17.	24,23		I.22
*18.	28,23		I.24
19.	32,18	III.4, 2	
*20.	33,6		I.19
*21.	10		I.25
22.	194	IV.8, 3	
23.	34,26	I.5	
24.	48	6, 3	
25.	69	2	
*26.	73		I.23
*27.	74		I.23a
28.	110	III.13, 1	
29.	192	V.7, 2	
30.	236	VI.5, 3	
31.	237	V.11, 3	
32.	249	III.6, 2	
*33.	289		I.18

27 For the quodlibets of Peckham see P. Glorieux, *La littérature quodlibétique* I (1925), pp. 220-222, II (1935), pp. 174-175.

28 See J. Destrez, "Les disputes quodlibétiques de Saint Thomas d'après la tradition manuscrite", *Mélanges Thomistes*, (Paris, 1923), pp. 49-108, at pp. 59-61. The MS. is Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, MS. lat. 15351 (n. 69 in Destrez).

Needless to say, the work of Thomas that is used most of all in the *Summa confessorum* is the *Secunda secundae* of his *Summa*. Other parts of the *Summa*, of course, are cited: the *Prima secundae* occasionally; the *Tertia pars* (with the commentary on 4 *Sentences*) frequently in *SC* 3. 33, qq. 24-167, on Baptism, Confirmation, Eucharist and Extreme Unction. But pride of place is given to the *Secunda secundae*, "cum (as John states in his first prologue) secunda pars secundae de summa fratris Thomae praedicti pro maiori parte sit moralis et casualis..." And in both of his prologues he warns the reader, "quod cum nominatur hic in summa Thomae, semper intelligitur de secunda parte secundae, nisi alia pars specialiter exprimatur."

The *Secunda secundae* is present right from the opening title of the *Summa* (*De symonia*) and it is invoked on every occasion that some moral point is being considered, even in the midst of long legal passages. If it is very notable in sections on the *De lege et consuetudine* (*SC* 2. 5, 203-208), or *De emptione et venditione* (*SC* 2. 8, 7-19), or *De sententia praecepti* (*SC* 3. 33, 5-26, etc.), it is at its most evident in the *rubricella De iudiciis peccatorum* (qq. 196-288) of *SC* 3. 34 (*De poenitentiis et remissionibus*). After some quotations from Raymund, and one from the *Prima secundae*, John introduces a long selection from the *Secunda secundae* with the words, "Post haec descendendo ad spiritualia, de fide primo quaero..." (q. 202). There now follow the essentials of the teaching of Thomas on most of the theological and moral virtues:

S. confessorum	*St. Thomas*	*Subject*
q. 202	2.2 2. 6, 7	explicit faith
203	8	"
204	3, 2	confession of faith
205	10, 6	infidelity
206	7	infidels
207	13, 1	blasphemy
208	2	"
209	15, 1	torpor
210	2	despair
211	20, 1	"
212	21, 2	presumption
213	25, 8	charity
214	9	"
215	10	"
216	12	"
217	26, 2	"
218	7	"
219	34, 2	hate
220	35, 1	sloth
221	2	"

222	36, 1	envy
223	2	"
224	3	"
.	.	"
.	.	"
.	.	"
288	168, 2	games

In all of the *Summa confessorum*, however, there is very little to be seen of John of Freiburg himself, apart, that is, from a few asides such as "in hoc tamen casu credo quod..." (*SC* 3. 33, 61), "Ego sine praeiudicio credo" (3. 33, 86), "Fateor dictum fratris Thomae, cum ex ratione procedat, mihi magis placere" (2. 8, 25), "Prima opinio benignior et communior" (3. 30, 12), and from a possibly autobiographical glimpse when he speaks of John de Varzy, a Dominican who taught at Paris in 1266: "Et hanc formam (absolutionis) exposuit magister Iohannes de Verziaco in scholis..." (3. 34, 89).

For all that, it would be a mistake to dismiss the *Summa* as a mere, if gifted, compilation. Rather, it may prove not to be an exaggeration to state that the *Summa confessorum* was the most influential work of pastoral theology in the two hundred years before the Reformation. Certainly it was endowed by its author with a doctrinal character which few manuals before it had possessed — and one which would be imitated but rarely improved upon by the manuals and manualists of the next two centuries.[29]

III

Whatever its originality, the *Summa confessorum* was an immediate success. It attracted followers from professional theologians such as Rainerius of Pisa (*Pantheologia*, c. 1330)[30] and legists such as Albericus de Rosate (*Repertorium iuris*, c. 1338)[31] to humble manuals such as the *Fasciculus morum* (1320 x 1340),[32] the *Cilium oculi* (1330 x 1340),[33] the *Speculum christiani* (1370 x 1400),[34] the *Lucerna conscientiae* (c.

29 For a slightly different opinion, see P. Michaud-Quantin, *Les Sommes de casuistique*, p. 50. While allowing that the *SC* has a theological character, he feels that it is so faithful to Raymund that there is no new direction there.

30 *Pantheologia* (Louvain 1570), I, p. 384a; II, p. 896b, etc. The *SC* is not cited as such.

31 See R. Abbondanza in *Dizionario biografico italiano* 4 (Rome 1962), cols. 463-465.

32 Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Bodley 332, f. 142vb, etc. The *SC* is not cited by name.

33 Oxford, Balliol College, MS. 86, f. 233rb, etc. Again, there is no explicit reference to the *SC*.

34 Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Rawl. C.19, ff. 7v, 8r, etc., but again not by name. This MS. contains a larger, if not an original, version of the *Speculum* as printed by G. Holmstedt (London 1933).

1400),[35] the ethico-medical *Florarium Bartholomaei* (1395 x 1407) of John Mirfield,[36] and the *Speculum iuratorum* (c. 1450) of Thomas Wygenhale.[37] And if we are to believe the *Summa rudium* (c. 1338), Pope John XXII held the *Summa confessorum* in such high esteem that he remarked on one occasion of its author, "Qui istam summam collegit, reputo unam esse de melioribus personis totius ecclesiae."[38] There may be some truth in this report, for, as we know from an inventory of 1327, the *Summa* was indeed among the books in John XXII's study.[39]

Not unexpectedly the Dominicans of the 14th and 15th centuries responded with enthusiasm to the new, up-to-date, pattern of confessional manual set by John of Freiburg. From the earliest days of their Order there had been a sturdy tradition of manuals for confessors, mainly because Honorius III had commissioned them in 1221 to hear confessions and had commended them as confessors to the bishop of Christendom. As a result, the Dominicans had entered the field of theology for the very first time, when manuals of practical theology were hurriedly put together at various points of the expanding Order. At Bologna, a *Summa* by Conrad Höxter was possibly ready by May 1221; in 1222 the Dominicans at St. Jacques combined to produce a handy vademecum for the Paris area; another handbook appeared at Cologne in 1224; and in 1225 a first version of a *Summa de casibus* was composed at Barcelona for the Dominicans of Spain by Raymund of Peñafort.[40] It was in this way that a tradition began which Raymund was to dominate in the thirteenth century, and John of Freiburg from 1300 onwards. Raymund, of course, was a great name all through the middle ages,[41] but it is not unlikely that some of the fame attached to Raymund and the *Summa de casibus* is to a large extent due in the later middle ages to the fact that John of Freiburg's ubiquitous *Summa*, with its superficial likeness to that of Raymund, was sometimes mistaken

35 Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Bodley 801, *passim*, but not by name.

36 Cambridge University Library, MS. Dd. xi. 83, f. 82v, etc., but not explicitly. There is a general study of the *Florarium* in P. Hartley and H. R. Aldridge, *Johannes de Mirfield* (Cambridge 1936).

37 Cambridge University Library, MS. Ii. vi. 39, ff. 3v, 4r, etc., but not by name.

38 *Summa rudium*, (Reutlingen 1487), prologue. The 15th-century chronicler Johann Meyer also reports this eulogy, but his source is probably the *Summa rudium*. See H.-C. Scheeben, "Johannes Meyer O.P., *Chronica brevis ordinis praedicatorum*," in *Quellen und Forschungen...Dominikanerordens* 29 (1933) 53.

39 A. Maier, "Annotazioni autografe di Giovanni XXII in codici vaticani," *Ausgehendes Mittelalter* II (Rome 1967), pp. 81-96, at p. 94, n. 28.

40 See P. Mandonnet, *Saint Dominique*, ed. M.-H. Vicaire and R. Ladner (Paris 1938), I, pp. 249-269.

41 A. Walz, "S. Raymundi de Penyafort auctoritas in re paenitentiali," *Angelicum* 12 (1935) 346-396.

(especially by library catalogues) for the *Summa de casibus*, and cited as "Raymundi *Summa confessorum*", through ignorance of its real author.[42]

The readiness with which the Dominicans abbreviated, translated or simply used the *Summa confessorum* leaves little doubt that John had taken over the field from Raymund. The *Summa rudium*, with its eulogy of John, is largely a simplified version of the *Summa* by an anonymous Dominican;[43] another Dominican, William of Cayeux, published an abridgement about 1340;[44] in 1338, Bartholomew of S. Concordia composed at Pisa an influential *Summa de casibus* (often called *Pisanella* or *Magistruccia*) that is basically an alphabetical arrangement of the *Summa confessorum*;[45] about a hundred years later a small Dominican *Tractatus de sacramento altaris* is described by its author as "ex Summa confessorum quasi totaliter extractus."[46]

Dominicans, too, contributed to vernacular versions of the *Summa*. Berthold of Freiburg, John's successor as superior, made a German translation which was to find its way into print at least four times before 1500.[47] In the middle of the 14th century the *Summa* is used, if not directly translated at times, by the *Tugenden Buch*, a work which translates selections from the *Secunda secundae* of Thomas, and with which John of Freiburg himself is credited in some three manuscripts.[48] At the end of the 15th century a French translation was printed of a *Regula mercatorum* which Guy of Evreux had pulled together about 1320 from John of Freiburg's chapters on usury and just price in the *Summa*.[49]

42 Thus the *Regimen animarum* (1343): "Compilavi enim hoc opusculum ex quibusdam libris, videlicet, Summa summarum, Raymundi Summa confessorum,...." (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Hatton 11, f. 4r). John of Freiburg himself is partly to blame for any mistake of identity. Shorn of its two prologues, the *SC* could easily have been taken for the *Summa de casibus*. The incipits of both works are largely identical, as are the prologues to each *titulus*.

43 J. F. von Schulte, *Geschichte der Quellen und Literatur des canonischen Rechts*, II (Stuttgart 1877), pp. 528-529; R. Stintzing, *Geschichte der populären Literatur des römisch-kanonischen Rechts in Deutschland* (Leipzig 1867), p. 514; J. Dietterle, "Die *Summae*....," in *ZKG* 27 (1906) 78-80. Since this article of Dietterle, "Die *Summae confessorum*...von ihren Anfängen an bis zu Silvester Prierias....," is cited often in the following notes, it may be useful to note here that the whole article runs through five volumes of the *Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte* (*ZKG*), as follows: 24 (1903) 353-374, 520-548; 25 (1904) 248-272; 26 (1905) 59-81, 350-362; 27 (1906) 70-83, 166-188, 296-310, 431-442; 28 (1907) 401-431.

44 Schulte, II, p. 423; Dietterle, *ZKG* 26 (1905) 59-63.

45 Schulte, II, pp. 428-429; Dietterle *ZKG* 27 (1906) 166-171.

46 Cambridge University Library, MS. Ee. iii. 58, ff. 80r-88r.

47 Dietterle, *ZKG* 26 (1905) 67-77; R. Stanka, *Die Summa des Berthold von Freiburg* (Vienna 1937).

48 K. Berg, *Der tugenden Buch. Untersuchungen zu mittelhochdeutschen Prosatexten nach Werken des Thomas von Aquin* (Munich 1964), pp. 77-78, 97-100, 109-112. The *Summa confessorum* is also present in German works of Nicholas of Dinkelsbühl (ob. 1433), one of the great 15th-century popularizers of scholasticism (ibid., pp. 30-32, 41-52).

49 P. Michaud-Quantin, "Guy d'Evreux, technicien du sermonnaire médiéval," *Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum* 20 (1950) 216-217.

Finally, if the influence of the *Summa confessorum* is to be seen in the two great Franciscan *Summae* of the end of the 15th century, the *Rosella casuum* of Baptista de Salis[50] and the *Summa angelica* of Angelo Carletti,[51] it is even more present in the last, and perhaps the most ambitious, of the medieval Dominican manuals, the *Summa summarum Sylvestrina* (1516) of Sylvester Mazzolini de Prierio.[52] A man of formidable learning, Sylvester nevertheless draws, as so many others had done for over 200 years, on the *Summa* of John of Freiburg for quotations from the *Quodlibets* and the *Secunda secundae* of Thomas, from the *Summa* of Raymund, from the *Apparatus* of William of Rennes and, need it be said, from the writings of Albert the Great and Peter of Tarentaise. At the end of the *Sylvestrina* there is a long catalogue of the main "summistae" of the preceding centuries. It is surely not inappropriate that the *Summa confessorum* of John of Freiburg should appear there simply and anonymously as "Summa confessorum ordinis praedicatorum".[53] If anything, the impact of the *Summa confessorum* on the manualist tradition at large was as pronounced as that on the Dominican manualists. As early as 1303 it was used (but without acknowledgement) by the Franciscan, John of Erfurt, in the second edition of his *Summa de poenitentia*.[54] About the same time there also appeared the first Franciscan counterpart to the *Summa*, an anonymous *Labia sacerdotis*. While this leans heavily on the pre-1300 manualists, and on Bonaventure, it also cites Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise and Raymund. The *Summa confessorum*, however, is never mentioned. Yet it is clear from the whole layout of the *Labia*, and from its citations from these Dominican sources, that the author had John of Freiburg's work before him.[55]

The most successful attempt to do for Franciscan moralists what John of Freiburg had done for Ulrich, Albert, Peter and Thomas, comes some ten years later with the *Summa Astesana* of Astesanus of Asti.[56]

50 Schulte, II, pp. 448-450; Dietterle, *ZKG* 27 (1906) 431-442.

51 Schulte, II, pp. 452-453; Dietterle, *ZKG* 27 (1906) 296-310; Michaud-Quantin, *Sommes*, pp. 99-101.

52 Schulte, II, pp. 455-456; Dietterle, *ZKG* 28 (1907) 416-431; Michaud-Quantin, *Sommes*, pp. 101-104.

53 *Summa summarum quae Sylvestrina dicitur* (Cologne 1518), ff. xxxvv, clxvr, etc.

54 A first edition of this *Summa* was written c. 1296 (see F. Doelle, "Johann von Erfurt," in *ZKG* 31 (1910) 225-238). A second edition in 1302 (e.g. Oxford, Oriel College, MS. 38) uses the *Summa confessorum*, for example at f. 150r, where, citing Aquinas on the Eucharist through the *SC*, John of Erfurt says, "Ego tamen credo cum Bonaventura...".

55 For example, Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Hamilton 34, f. 279r: "Numquid participans excommunicato in casibus non concessis peccat mortaliter? Respondetur. Quidam dicunt sic, ut Ray. et Gau., et istud durum est dicere. Sed Bon., Thomas et Petrus dicunt..." (= *Summa confessorum*, 3.33, 165, without, of course, the reference to Bonaventure).

56 For an account of Astesanus see G. Giorgino, *Sponsalium institutum in fr. Astesani de Ast Summa de casibus* (Caiazzo 1942), pp. 4-17. See also Schulte, II, 425-427; Dietterle, *ZKG* 26 (1905) 35-62; Michaud-Quantin, *Sommes*, pp. 57-60.

Written in 1317, and dedicated to cardinal Giovanni Caetani, it was probably as influential as John's *Summa* over the next two centuries. The preface, which is not unlike that of John of Freiburg,[57] carries a massive list of authorities, mostly Franciscan moralists and theologians such as Bonaventure, William de la Mare, Alexander of Hales and John Scotus ("Famosissimus et subtilissimus"). If there are also the *Quodlibets* of Henry of Ghent, the commentary on the *Sentences* of Richard of Middleton, and the recently-published *Apparatus* of Iohannes Andreae on the *Sext*, the *Astesana,* nevertheless, has a batch of authorities in common with John of Freiburg: Thomas ("famosissimus"), Raymund, William of Rennes, Peter of Tarentaise, Hostiensis, Garsias Hispanus and William Durandus. There is no sign, however, of the *Summa confessorum* among the sources cited, whether in the prologue or the text. This is a little strange. For although the *Astesana* does appear to show some independent knowledge of Raymund, Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise, there are sections where quotations from these authors are undoubtedly through John of Freiburg's work.[58]

The unacknowledged use of John of Freiburg's *Summa* was, in fact, widespread. One of the most striking instances is that of the Berkshire vicar, William of Pagula. In three of his works, and particularly in his very popular *Oculus sacerdotis* (1320-1327), Pagula quietly uses the *Summa confessorum*, without once mentioning it by name, for matter from various canonists and, on many occasions, for quotations from Albert, Thomas, Raymund and Peter of Tarentaise.[59] One small example will suffice to illustrate the point:

Oculus[60]	*Summa* (3. 34, 28)
Tanta potest esse contritio quod tota poena remittitur absque confessione. Nichilominus tamen confessio et poenitentia iniuncta ex-	Utrum contritio possit tollere totum reatum poenae? *Respondeo secundum Petrum*:... Tantum potest incendi contritio

57 "...exhortatione ven. patris et domini supra memorati, et etiam plurium fratrum, summam de casibus deo auxiliante compilavi," prologue.

58 Compare, for example, *Summa astesana* (Regensburg 1480), 4.3, 4, with *SC* 3.24, 13. Often, as in *Astesana* 4.3, 4 and 4.3, 5, the author gives a precise reference to Aquinas and Peter of Tarentaise where the *SC* has only a general reference. Anonymous borrowings from John of Freiburg are also to be found in the *Summa de casibus* (c. 1315) of the Franciscan Durandus de Campania: see Dietterle, *ZKG* 27 (1906) 70-78.

59 On the *Oculus* see L. E. Boyle, "The *Oculus sacerdotis*... of William of Pagula," in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th series, 5 (1955) 81-110.

60 Oxford, New College, MS. 292, f. 76r.

pleri debent non propter remedium sed propter praeceptum.

quod tota poena remittitur. Nichilominus tamen confessio et poenitentiae iniunctae expletio requiritur etiam, non propter remedium sed propter praeceptum.

Et non solum propter praeceptum tenetur quis confiteri et satisfacere, sed etiam propter incertitudinem, quia non est certus quod sua contritio fuit sufficiens ad totum reatum tollendum, *secundum Thomam et Petrum.*

Concordat his Thomas, et addit quod non solum propter praeceptum tenetur confiteri et satisfacere sed etiam propter incertitudinem, quia, scilicet, non est certus quod sua contritio fuerit sufficiens ad totum reatum tollendum.

The same unacknowledged dependence on John of Freiburg is again to be noted in William of Pagula's *Summa summarum*, a massive and not unsuccessful compilation of law and theology which was put together between 1319 and 1322. The same is true of his *Speculum praelatorum* of much the same period.[61] And when Pagula's *Oculus sacerdotis* was revised, and in part re-written, some sixty years later by John de Burgo, chancellor of Cambridge, there is an even greater exploitation of the *Summa confessorum.* But there is a difference. Like William of Pagula, the *Pupilla oculi* (1384) of de Burgo cites Albert, Aquinas, Peter, Raymund, etc. through the *Summa confessorum,* but unlike Pagula, de Burgo explicitly admits that the *Summa* of John of Freiburg is his source, as when he states in his tract on the Eucharist, after a series of quotations from Aquinas: "Haec omnia notat Iohannes in Summa confessorum, lib. 3, tit. xxiiii, c. xxix."[62] Again, his debt to the *Summa confessorum* is obvious, even though he does not explicitly acknowledge it, when he says that his exposition of the Peckham "Syllabus of pastoral instruction" (1281) comes "ex dictis sancti Thomae in secunda secundae, diversis articulis."[63]

Borrowings from the *Summa confessorum,* whether explicit or implicit, were not at all confined to popular manuals. Thus, John Bacon-

61 Thus, at the end of the *Summa summarum* (Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Bodley 293, f. 83r): "Quare requiritur maior numerus testium contra episcopos et superiores quam contra alios simplices homines? Dic quod triplex est ratio...secundum Thomam in Summa" (= *SC* 2.5, 183); "Quid si testis producatur super re de qua non est omnino certus? Dic secundum Thomam in Summa...." (= *SC* 2.5, 183), etc. See L. E. Boyle, "The *Summa summarum*...," in *Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law, Boston 1963*, ed. S. Kuttner and J. J. Ryan, (Vatican City 1965), pp. 415-456, at p. 423.

62 *Pupilla oculi*, 4.10 (Strasbourg 1518), f. xxxiii.

63 Ibid., 10.5 (Strasbourg 1518), f. clxxvr.

thorpe, the English Carmelite theologian, whom one would have expected to have known his Thomas at first-hand, is content in his Postill on St. Matthew (1336-1337) and *Quaestiones canonicae* on the 4th book of the *Sentences* (c. 1344) to draw on the *Summa confessorum* for many passages from Aquinas.[64] What is more interesting, perhaps, is the fact that although Baconthorpe possessed John of Freiburg's *Summa*, he often quotes Thomas, Peter, etc., not through the *Summa confessorum* but through William of Pagula's *Summa summarum* which, in turn, was totally dependent upon the *Summa confessorum*. There are occasions, indeed, when he prefers to quote Thomas from the *Summa summarum* rather than from Thomas himself, or, for that matter, from the *Summa confessorum*, the source of the *Summa summarum*. Thus when he writes, "In Summa summarum et Summa confessorum habes multos casus expressos necessitatis excusantes (a ieiunio)....Primo quid de laborantibus in vineis....Respondetur ibidem (i. e. Summa summarum) ....Sic tenet Thomas in secunda secundae q. 174, art. iv," the wording of the passage from Thomas is that of the *Summa summarum* and not of the *Summa confessorum* or Thomas himself. Yet John Baconthorpe clearly had the *Summa confessorum* of John of Freiburg open before him at the same time. For where Pagula's treatment of fasting ends simply "secundum Thomam in Summa",[65] Baconthorpe proceeds to give a more precise reference to Thomas, taking it straight from the *Summa confessorum*.[66]

While one can understand that a canonist such as William of Pagula (or, a hundred years later, William Lyndwood in his *Provinciale*)[67] would have found the *Summa confessorum* convenient for quotations from the great theologians, it is otherwise in the case of John Baconthorpe or of equally professional theologians such as Antoninus of Florence (d. 1459) and Robert Holcot (d. 1349). If, for example, the *Confessionale* of Antoninus is based mainly on the *Pisanella* of Bartholomew of Pisa, a derivative of the *Summa confessorum*, there are numerous instances when Antoninus turns (sometimes without acknowledgement) to the *Summa confessorum* itself for references to Thomas, Peter of Tarentaise, etc., thus: "Duplex est contritionis dolor secundum Thomam et Petrum in 4 d. xvii.... Item secundum Petrum in 4 d. xvii, dolor maior intellectualis debet esse de maiori peccato

64 See B. Smalley, "John Baconthorpe's Postill on St. Matthew," *Medieval and Renaissance Studies* 4 (1958) 99-110, 119, 143.

65 *Summa summarum*, MS. Bodley 293, f. 149v.

66 Baconthorpe, Commentary on 4 *Sent.* 20.2, 2 (Cremona 1616, II, p. 446). The same passage is also to be found in the *Postilla in Matthaeum*, Trinity College, Cambridge, MS. 348, f. 120v.

67 *Provinciale* 3.23 (Oxford 1679), pp. 227-235, on Penance, etc. Thus at p. 229, note 1: "In hac materia dicunt beatus Thomas et Petrus in scriptis, et idem recitat Jo. in Summa confessorum, tit.

habitualiter et non actualiter si considerentur peccata in communi.... Item secundum Thomam in quolibet et Innocentium, contritus debet magis diligere Deum quam seipsum" (= *Summa confessorum* 3. 34, 22-26).[68] Robert Holcot, in his commentary on the fourth book of the *Sentences*, also uses the *Summa confessorum* extensively, but with a certain amount of caution. Citing the *Summa confessorum* for a *Quodlibet* of Aquinas which is, in fact, one of John Peckham's, Holcot voices his suspicions as follows, "Numquid debet baptizari (monstrum) ut unus homo an ut duo? Dicendum est...sicut dicitur in Summa confessorum et imponitur sancto Thomae in quadam quaestione de quolibet. Sed puto quod non est dictum suum. Tamen satis bene dicit...."[69]

Holcot's fellow Dominican and exact contemporary, John Bromyard, probably makes the greatest use of the *Summa confessorum* of all the writers of the 14th and 15th centuries who borrowed from John of Freiburg. Both in Bromyard's *Opus trivium* (c. 1330)[70] and the massive *Summa praedicantium* (1330-1348), there are passages through the *Summa confessorum* "ex responsione sancti Thomae ad ducissam Lotharingiae" (*Summa praedicantium* M. 8, 36; U. 12, 27), from Raymund and the canonists, as well as from Albert, Ulrich of Strasbourg and Peter of Tarentaise. At times Bromyard acknowledges his source, thus "Contrariae vero opinionis sunt sanctus Thomas et Petrus et Ulricus, qui volunt .... Nota s. Thomam ad hoc, prima secundae, q. 64, art. 4. Vide in Summa confessorum, lib. 3, tit. 34, q. 321" (*Summa praedicantium* D. 5, 5). But there are other moments when there is no reference to the *Summa confessorum*, and an unwary reader might be led to conclude that Bromyard had consulted all the numerous sources which he lists, as when he states, "Ad omnia namque haec secundum Hostiensem, Raymundum,...Tancredum, Ulricum, tenentur..." (*Summa praedicantium* R. 6, 2 = *Summa confessorum* 2. 5, 91), or again, "Quibus concordat sanctus Thomas de Aquino in scripto super 4 sent. d. 25.... His etiam concordat idem in Summa q. 100, art. 4. Et Petrus et Albertus in scripto super 4 dist. 25..." (ibid., S. 9, 1 = *Summa confessorum* 1. 1, 1).[71]

de penitentiis et remissionibus, rubrica de suffragiis, q. 163...;" p. 232n.: "Sed numquid contritus, non tamen confessus, recipiendo corpus Christi, peccat? Dic secundum Petrum....Et his concordat Albertus d. 16...Notantur haec secundum Jo. in Summa confessorum, lib. 3, c. 24, q. 78."

68 *Confessionale* (Paris 1516), f. 186v.

69 *In quattuor libros Sententiarum* (Lyons 1518), 1.7, casus XVI.

70 *Opus trivium*, R 7 B-C, S 1 C, etc.; London, British Museum, MS. Royal 10 C X, ff. 123v, 125v, etc.

71 *Summa praedicantium* (Venice 1586). On Bromyard see L. E. Boyle, "The Date of the *Summa praedicantium* of John Bromyard," *Speculum* 48 (1973) 533-537.

IV

If the general influence of the *Summa confessorum* of John of Freiburg on canonists, theologians and manualists is impressive, there is, in respect of the works of Aquinas and Peter of Tarentaise, a further point that has not been fully appreciated by scholars. This is the fact that much of the knowledge of the moral teaching of Aquinas and Peter (not to speak of Albert, Ulrich of Strasbourg, Raymund and the others) in the 14th and 15th centuries is due to a great extent to the *Summa confessorum*.[72] So ubiquitous, indeed, was the *Summa* that it is not surprising to find references to Albert or Aquinas or Peter in places as unlikely as the jottings of a confessor's notebook in St. John's College, Cambridge,[73] or the notes scribbled at the end of a Canterbury copy of the *Summa de casibus* of Thomas Chobham,[74] or in the interlinear gloss of the *Manuale confessorum metricum* of a Cologne Dominican towards the end of the 15th century.[75] And if the name of one of John of Freiburg's teachers, John de Varzy, was known to John Gerson in the early 15th century, this is precisely because, as he himself tells us, he possessed a copy of the *Summa confessorum*:

> Petis primo, si apud aliquem doctorem reperiatur forma authentica absolutionis sacramentalis. Respondeo quod sic. Et de hoc videatur Summa confessorum....Tenor quaestionis de qua fit superius mentio in Summa confessorum, lib. 3, tit. 34, q. 91, *secundum quotationem libri mei* sic se habet: ... Respondeo secundum Albertum....Et hanc formam exposuit magister Iohannes de Varziaco....Thomas etiam in ultima parte summae..."[76]

Leaving John de Varzy aside, there is no doubt that Albert, Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise were known in their own right by many scholastics. But where their moral teaching is concerned, and particularly in non-professional circles, the evidence seems to point to the

72 Thus, many of the works cited by Grabmann, "Das Weiterleben und Weiterwerken des moraltheologischen Schrifttums des hl. Thomas von Aquin im Mittelalter," in *Divus Thomas* (Fr.) 25 (1947) 3-28, as evidence of the influence of the moral theology of Aquinas in the middle ages, in fact derive much of their knowledge of Aquinas from John of Freiburg, e.g. the *Summa astesana*, the *Summa rudium*, the *Consolatorium* of John Nider (ob. 1438).

73 Cambridge, St. John's College, MS. 355, f. 84r. 15th c.

74 For example, "Utrum satisfactio possit fieri per opera extra caritatem facta? Respondeo secundum Petrum in scriptis d. 15, et Iohannem in Summa, lib. 3, c. de satisfactione...Dicit Thomas...:" Canterbury, Dean and Chapter Library, MS. B.10, f. 23r. 14th century.

75 (Cologne 1498), f. cxxxvii, etc.

76 J. Gerson, *De absolutione sacramentali*, in *Opera omnia*, ed. E. du Pin (Antwerp 1706), II, cols. 406-407.

Summa confessorum and its many derivatives. In the case of Peter and Thomas one has to allow, of course, for the influence of the very popular *Dialogus de administratione sacramentorum* which the Dominican William of Paris compiled between 1300 and 1314 "de scriptis fratris Thomae principaliter...ac Petri Tarentoize."[77] In practice, however, one can rule it out, since, unlike John of Freiburg, William of Paris rarely identifies his quotations.

But even when the *Summa confessorum* is not mentioned by name, it is fairly easy to recognize its presence where there are citations from Albert, Aquinas, Peter of Tarentaise, Ulrich of Strasbourg or Raymund of Peñafort. The juxtaposition of two or more of these names is usually a good indication. The phrase, "ut dicit Thomas in quadam quaestione de quolibet", also provides a strong hint, as in the *Summa summarum* of William of Pagula (1319-1322),[78] the *Manipulus curatorum* of the Spaniard Guido de Monte Rocherii (c. 1330),[79] or the *Speculum curatorum* of the Benedictine Ranulph Higden (c. 1340).[80]

The key, however, is in the formula by which John of Freiburg cites his authorities. He drew attention to it in his second prologue ("Verum cum in fine alicuius quaestionis sic dicitur *Concordat*..."), and he is unfailingly true to it from the very opening chapter of the *Summa*, thus:

> Quaestio prima. Quaero quid sit symonia. Respondeo. Symonia est studiosa voluntas emendi vel vendendi aliquid spirituale vel annexum spirituali. Sic diffinitur communiter a theologis et iuristis. Communiter enim addunt "vel spirituali annexum", ut Thomas in scripto super 4 sent.. dist. xxv, et Petrus de Tarentasia, etiam Albertus, eadem distinctione, et Thomas in Summa q. 100, art. 1....Quare etiam symonia dicitur haeresis? ....Respondeo secundum Thomam in Summa art. i et art. x. Ideo symonia dicitur haeresis quia sicut protestatio fidei exterior quaedam religio est....*Concordat* his Petrus in scripto et Ulricus par. ii....Quare symoniaci dicuntur a Symone...quam Giezite?....Respondeo secundum Ulricum, par. Dicuntur autem, quod completior huius ratio peccati fuit in actu Symonis quam in facto Giezi, nam ille solum vendidit donum Dei....*Concordant* his Thomas et Petrus..."

77 A. Teetaert, "Un compendium de théologie pastorale," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique* 26 (1930) 66-102.

78 For example (MS. Bodley 293, f. 140v): "An clericus praebendatus in duabus ecclesiis in die quo diversum est officium in ecclesia debeat dicere utrumque officium vel unius ecclesiae officium dicere debet? Dic...*secundum Thomam in quadam quaestione de quolibet*" (= *SC* 1.7, 19); "An clericus praebendatus in scholis existens tenetur dicere officium mortuorum?... Sciendum...*secundum Thomam in quadam quaestione de quolibet*" (= *SC* 1.7, 21).

79. *Manipulus curatorum (*Louvain 1552), e. g. at f. 128r : "Sanctus Thomas *quadam quaestione de quolibet* ponit aliquos casus in quibus tenetur existens in peccato mortali statim confiteri" (= *SC* 3. 34, 69).

80. Cambridge University Library, MS. Mm. i. 20, f. 188v : "Sanctus Thomas *in quadam quaestione de quolibet* dicit quod in foro contentioso creditur homini pro se et contra se et sine probationibus" (= *SC* 3. 34, 48).

Armed with this key, and remembering in particular John of Freiburg's variations on the "Concordat" theme, it is not too difficult to suggest what must be the source, directly or at a remove, of, for example, a gloss that begins, "Declarantur praefati versus quoad restitutionem secundum beatum Thomam, Albertum et Ulricum, sic...."[81] Above all, it allows us to estimate just how widespread was the direct influence of Thomas or Albert in certain areas of scholasticism, and to cut down to size some of the supposed influence of Peter of Tarentaise and Ulrich of Strasbourg.[82] And if an author claims rather plausibly, as a certain Henricus de Belle of Löwenich does in a fifteenth-century treatise, that he has compiled his work from notes taken "dum studueram in 4 lib. sententiarum", and, further, goes on to urge his readers to study "in libris Thomae et Alberti", this seeming evidence for the availability of certain works of Albert and Thomas to the common clergy of the Rhineland crumbles away when one discovers the said Henricus using phrases such as "et concordant Albertus et Thomas."[83]

As for Raymund and his well-known, if not axiomatic, domination of the penitential theory and practice of the middle ages, much of this was just as vicarious from 1300 onwards as the reputed influence of Albert and Thomas and Peter of Tarentaise on popular (and some non-popular) theology. Sylvester de Prierio was not far from the truth in 1516 when he gave the label "Summa confessorum *ordinis praedicatorum*" to John of Freiburg's work. For although it never had the blessing of official approval in the Dominican Order that Raymund's *Summa* had had, the *Summa confessorum* was *the* Dominican manual in as much as it had distilled the moral teaching of the greatest of the Dominican theologians, and had placed it at the disposal of a vast audience. From 1300 onwards, Raymund was, in fact, obsolete. It is surely not without some significance that whereas John of Freiburg's *Summa confessorum* was printed twice before 1500[84] and repeatedly in the following century, the *Summa de casibus* of Raymund did not appear in print until 1603.

81 *Manuale confessorum metricum* (Cologne 1498), f. cxxxviiv. For the *Manuale* see Dietterle, *ZKG* 27 (1906) 177-183.

82 J. Daguillon, *Ulrich de Strasbourg, O.P., 'Summa de bono'* (Paris 1930), pp. 3*-5*, and H.-D. Simonin, "Les écrits de Pierre de Tarentaise," in *Beatus Innocentius Papa V* (Rome 1943), pp. 163-335, make no allowance whatever for the *Summa confessorum* when discussing the influence of their respective authors in the later middle ages.

83. Cambridge University Library, MS. Kk. i. 9, ff. 54r-65v, at ff. 54r, 58r. Henricus de Belle was pastor of Löwenich, and his treatise is addressed to his curate, John. Another copy, dated 1470, is in Brussels, Bibliothèque Royale, MS. 2070 (2434-52), ff. 64r-81v.

84. L. Hain, *Repertorium bibliographicum* (Stuttgart-Paris 1826-1838), nn. 7365 (1476) and 7366 (1498). Incunabula of the German translation by Berthold of Freiburg are at nn. 7367-7377.

THE UNITY OF A SCIENCE: ST. THOMAS AND THE NOMINALISTS

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IT is a commonplace to speak of science as a body or system of knowledge. Contemporary philosophers of conflicting and even contradictory persuasions are alike in using this language. That science is a body of knowledge flows as easily from the pen of a Thomist as from that of a logical positivist, however different their understanding of the words may be. There is general agreement that science is composed of many items, whether they be thought of as propositions, truths, phenomena, or simply data, and that these items are unified in a science so as to constitute a whole. So common is this notion that it has been enshrined in our dictionaries. The *Oxford Dictionary* calls science an "organized body of the knowledge that has been accumulated on a subject,"[1] and *Webster's Dictionary* gives as one meaning of science "any department of systematized knowledge."[2]

It is not difficult to trace the notion of science as a unified body of knowledge to the dawn of modern philosophy. In various guises it is found in the works of Francis Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, Condillac, Auguste Comte, the French encyclopedists Diderot and d'Alembert, and Kant.[3] It was Kant who gave this notion its classic expression. Science, in his view, is not just any doctrine, but one that forms a system, by which he means "a totality of knowledge arranged according to principles."[4] Kant writes: "... systematic unity is what first raises ordinary knowledge to the rank of science, that is, makes a system out of a mere aggregate of knowledge."[5] Science is no mere aggregate (*coacervatio*) but an organized unity (*articulatio*). Each science is an organic

1 *The Concise Oxford Dictionary,* 3rd ed. (Oxford 1934) p. 1065.
2 *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Toronto 1961) p. 757.
3 See R. McRae, *The Problem of the Unity of the Sciences: Bacon to Kant* (Toronto 1961).
4 "Eine jede Lehre, wenn sie ein *System,* d.i. ein nach Prinzipien geordnetes Ganze der Erkenntnis, sein soll, heisst Wissenschaft..." Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft,* Vorrede, *Sämtliche Werke* (Leipzig 1921) IV, p. 547.
5 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. N. K. Smith (London 1950) A 832, B 860.

unity built around an a priori idea, that is to say one that is not derived from experience but is furnished by reason itself. In order to illustrate the organic character of the unity of a science Kant compares a science to an animal body: like a living body it is a self-sufficient whole that grows from within and not by the addition of external parts.[6]

Leibniz was just as certain as Kant that a science is a logically ordered system of truths, though he conceived its unity in a different manner. In his view, an individual science is not a self-sufficient whole with an organic unity but an arbitrary and conventional combination or synthesis of concepts. Strictly speaking, there is but one science — the logical synthesis of all truths. Leibniz granted some value to the ancient division of science into physics, ethics, and logic, but he thought that ultimately the division broke down because each of these sciences could contain the others. Physics, for example, can embrace all the truths of logic and ethics; for physics treats of beings endowed with intelligence and will, and a complete explanation of intelligence requires the whole of logic, and a full account of the will embraces the whole of ethics. Leibniz remarks that the encyclopedists have encountered this difficulty in arranging their dictionaries of science and philosophy. "It is usually found," he says, "that one and the same truth may be put in different places according to the terms it contains, and also according to the mediate terms or causes upon which it depends, and according to the inferences and results it may have."[7] In this connection he praises the nominalists, who (he writes) "believed that there were as many particular sciences as truths, which they composed after the manner of wholes, according as they arranged them."[8]

Who were these nominalists who shattered science into myriad fragments and then arranged them in arbitrary combinations? Unfortunately Leibniz does not name them; but he gives us a clue to their background, and possible identity, when, in a treatise on the contemporary nominalist Mario Nizolius, he gives a brief account of the rise of nominalism in the Middle Ages.

The nominalists, Leibniz writes, were the most profound scholastic sect and the one most in harmony with the spirit of modern philosophy. Almost all the modern reformers of philosophy, he goes on to say, are nominalists, maintaining that individuals alone are real and rejecting the reality of universals, which they consider to be simply names

6 *Ibid.* A 833, B 861. For Kant's conception of science, see R. McRae, *ibid.* pp. 123-143.
7 Leibniz, *New Essays concerning Human Understanding,* IV, xxi, 4; trans. A. G. Langley (La Salle 1949) p. 623.
8 Leibniz, *ibid.* See R. McRae, *ibid.* pp. 7-8.

(*nomina*). The sect of the nominalists is said to have begun with Roscelin, and after suffering eclipse for many years it was suddenly revived by William Ockham, a man of the highest genius and of outstanding erudition for his time. In agreement with him were Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel, and the majority of the Augustinian Order. Thus it is that the early writings of Martin Luther reveal an affection for nominalism; and with the passage of time it began to influence all the monks.[9]

Thus Leibniz leads us to medieval nominalism for the origin of the notion of science as a unified body of knowledge. In this paper I should like to suggest that this notion of science indeed began with the nominalist and conceptualist theologians of the late 13th and early 14th centuries, and that its chief theoretician and popularizer was William of Ockham. I am not arguing that the medieval nominalists were Leibnizians or Kantians, but only that in the late Middle Ages there grew up a common notion of science as a collection of truths or propositions unified by principles, and that this notion was passed on by them to early modern philosophers, each of whom interpreted it in his own way. I should also like to suggest that this notion of science was conceived in opposition to St. Thomas' doctrine of science, according to which an individual science is not in essence or primarily a system or body of knowledge but a single and simple *habitus* of the intellect. The story of the development of the notion of science as a body of knowledge is another chapter in the eclipse (and sometimes misunderstanding) of Thomism during the late Middle Ages.

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St. Thomas inherited from Aristotle the notion of science as a stable disposition or *habitus* (ἕξις) of the intellect. As such it is an intellectual virtue, a perfection of the mind acquired by repeated acts enabling its possessor to demonstrate truths through their causes or principles.[10]

In this view, each of the sciences is a distinct mental facility of demonstration and insight. Ontologically, St. Thomas regards a scientific *habitus* as a simple form or quality: one *habitus* is not composed of many *habitus* (*habitus est qualitas simplex non constituta ex pluribus*

9 Leibniz, *Dissertatio de Stilo Philosophico Nizolii*, 28. *Opera Philosophica*, ed. J. E. Erdmann (Berlin 1840) pp. 68-69.

10 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, VI, 3, 1139 b 14-35. St. Thomas, *In VI Ethicorum*, lect. 3 (Rome 1969) 47, pp. 340-341.

habitibus).[11] He grants that it involves a multiplicity, in the sense that it extends to many objects. Materially considered, its objects are many, but the scientific *habitus* regards all of them from one formal perspective (*ratio*). In other words, each science has its own formal object, whose unity gives unity to the science.[12] For instance, the unity of the science of theology is based on the unity of its formal object, which is divine revelation. The theologian considers many truths, but all insofar as they have been divinely revealed, or at least insofar as they are related to divine revelation.[13] Similarly, the science of arithmetic treats of all its objects from the formal perspective of number, and geometry considers its many objects from the formal perspective of continuous quantity. Each science has thus a formal unity owing to the formal unity of its object, and in virtue of this unity it is formally distinct from the other sciences. As the habit of an intellect, it also enjoys numerical unity: it is an individual ability or facility of insight and demonstration perfecting the individual intellect of its possessor.

St. Thomas was aware of the serious objection his opponents raised against this conception of the unity of a scientific habit. Following Aristotle, he defines science as the knowledge of conclusions: it is the mental habit that enables us to demonstrate conclusions in the light of their principles.[14] Now there are many conclusions in a whole science such as geometry or arithmetic, and we can have scientific knowledge, both actual and habitual, about any one of them independent of the others. So it would seem that a science is not one single habit but a complex of many.[15]

In replying to this difficulty St. Thomas in no way compromises the unity of a scientific habit. Suppose, he says, that we acquire the knowledge of one conclusion in a science by learning its appropriate demonstration. We then possess the habit of the science, though imperfectly. If we go on to master the knowledge of another conclusion in the science, we do not gain an additional habit; our previous habit simply becomes more perfect by extending to more demonstrations and conclusions, all of which are mutually related and ordered. So there is no need to think that a scientific habit is a complex of many partial

11 *Summa Theol.* I-II, 54, 4. On the notion of a habit as a quality disposing one to act well or badly, see *ibid.* I-II, 49, 1.

12 For the distinction of cognitive habits according to their formal objects, see *ibid.* I-II, 54, 2.

13 *Ibid.* I, 1, 3.

14 *In VI Eth.* lect. 3, p. 341, lines 101-116. See Aristotle, *Nic. Ethics* VI, 3, 1139 b 14-35; 6, 1140 b 31-33.

15 *Summa Theol.* I-II, 54, 4, obj. 3.

habits: it is a single quality or form, capable of indefinite increase in perfection by extending to a greater number of objects.[16]

It will be noticed that while St. Thomas is making his main point concerning the unity of a scientific habit, he adds another: that this habit is related to a multitude of mutually related demonstrations and conclusions. From the latter point of view a science appears as having a complex structure. "The conclusions and demonstrations of one science," he writes, "have an order, and one flows from another."[17] Adopting this perspective, a science is seen to have a systematic structure that can be studied for its own sake, for example by the logician. From this point of view St. Thomas analyzes science in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics,* showing that a science has its own subject and principles, from which it draws its conclusions.[18] In a sense, then, a science is a systematic whole according to St. Thomas. Its demonstrations and conclusions are mutually related and form an ordered whole. But the unity of the system is based on the unity of the single mental habit which is the principle of the whole science. The habit is the principle by which (*principium quo*) the scientist demonstrates all his conclusions and establishes an order among them. Without this one *habitus* there would be no systematic unity in the activities and conclusions of the scientist.

As we shall see, many scholastics of the later Middle Ages lost sight of the unity of the mental habit that essentially constitutes a science. They describe a science simply as an orderly collection of many mental habits or concepts or propositions. In their view, the unity of a science is that of an ordered or systematic whole, and not that of a single mental habit.

Even some Thomists, in their concern to be "modern," interpreted their master in this sense. Cajetan, writing shortly after 1500, refers to certain Thomists who thought St. Thomas vacillated between the opinions that a science is one *habitus* of the intellect and that it is an orderly collection of intelligible species in the mind.[19] They believed that he inclined to the second view. They based this interpretation on statements of St. Thomas describing science as a totality and ordered

16 "Dicendum quod ille qui in aliqua scientia acquirit per demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis unius, habet quidem habitum, sed imperfecte. Cum vero acquirit per aliquam demonstrationem scientiam conclusionis alterius, non aggeneratur in eo alius habitus; sed habitus qui prius inerat fit perfectior, utpote ad plura se extendens, eo quod conclusiones et demonstrationes unius scientiae ordinatae sunt, et una derivatur ex alia." *Summa Theol.* I-II, 54, 4, ad 3.

17 *Ibid.*

18 *In I Post. Anal.* lect. 17 (Rome 1882) I, pp. 204-207; lect. 41, p. 305, n. 7.

19 Cajetan, *Comm. in Summa Theol.* I-II, 54, 4 (Rome 1891) VI, p. 345, n. 2-5.

aggregate. For example, in the *Summa contra Gentiles* he speaks of the *habitus* of knowledge in two senses: 1) as an ability (*habilitatio*) of the intellect to receive intelligible species by which it becomes actually understanding, and 2) as "the ordered aggregate of the species themselves existing in the intellect, not in complete actuality but in a way between potency and act."[20] From this and similar texts, these Thomists concluded that a scientific habit is composed of intelligible species and hence that it is an ordered whole or totality.

But as Cajetan rightly remarks, these Thomists (one of whom was Capreolus) misinterpret their master. St. Thomas' constant teaching is that a science is essentially a simple quality or *habitus* of the mind. This *habitus* is produced by repeated acts and by intelligible species, but neither the acts nor the species constitute the *habitus* itself. A text from St. Thomas' *De Veritate* clearly states the relation of intelligible species to a scientific *habitus*: "... an ordering of [intelligible] species produces a *habitus*."[21] Cajetan comments that St. Thomas does not say that the species *are* the *habitus*, but that they *produce* it. He also points out that, according to St. Thomas, we use an orderly group of intelligible species when we think scientifically by means of the *habitus*.[22]

Why, then, does St. Thomas sometimes call an ordered aggregate of intelligible species a scientific habit? The answer would seem to be that he applies the term *habitus* to these species because of their special relation to it. They are the habit in the sense that the habit derives from them and in turn uses them; but properly speaking they do not constitute it. Hence, only in a derived and secondary sense can they be called the habit.

St. Thomas often uses terms in primary and secondary senses in order

20 "Omnis autem intellectus in habitu per aliquas species intelligit: nam habitus vel est habilitatio quaedam intellectus ad recipiendum species intelligibiles quibus actu fiat intelligens; vel est ordinata aggregatio ipsarum specierum existentium in intellectu non secundum completum actum, sed medio modo inter potentiam et actum." *Summa contra Gentiles* I, 56, § 6.

St. Thomas holds, contrary to Avicenna, that intelligible species remain in the intellect in a state of incomplete actuality even when they are not actually being employed by the intellect. *Ibid.* II, 74. Hence their orderly arrangement in the intellect constitutes a kind of habitual body of knowledge.

21 *De Veritate* 24, 4, ad 9.

22 Cajetan, *ibid.* p. 347, n. 12. According to Cajetan, the species are the beginnings of the habit and its potential parts. *Ibid.* Likely he has Capreolus in mind as one of the Thomists who misinterpreted St. Thomas on this point. See Capreolus, *Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis,* Prol. q. 3, a. 1, concl. 1 (Turin 1900) I, p. 34. Soncinas (d. 1494) also held that a science is not a simple quality but a related grouping of intelligible species: "... tamen magis videtur quod scientia sit aggregatio specierum, vel ut melius dicam quod sit ipsae species aggregatae; et consequenter quod una totalis scientia sit constituta ex multis notitiis partialibus, ita quod per quamlibet demonstrationem acquiratur nova notitia." Soncinas, *Quaestiones Metaphysicales* VI, q. 9 (Venice 1505) fol. 59v.

to express the nuances of his thought. He does not always speak *formalissime*. His use of the term *habitus* seems to be a case in point. Another instance is his extension of the term to the propositions that are held to be true by means of the habit. In his *Summa Theologiae* he distinguishes between two meanings of the term *habitus*.[23] Essentially and properly it means the habitual inclination or disposition to act in a certain way; but in a secondary and derived sense it means that which is produced or held by the habit. In this latter sense the term can be extended to mean the propositions held to be true by means of the habit. St. Thomas illustrates this distinction by the habit of faith. In the proper sense, faith is the habit by which we believe certain truths; in a derived sense, however, we can speak of "the faith" as that which we hold on faith. In this extended and analogous use of the term it is legitimate to speak of science objectively as a synthesis or system of truths or propositions; but for St. Thomas this is not the primary or proper meaning of the term. Properly, a science is a habit of the intellect, and this habit is radically one and simple.

In later scholasticism the secondary and extended senses of the term "science" gradually came to the fore, supplanting its primary and essential meaning. A science was then conceived as an orderly arrangement of many partial habits of the intellect, or of terms and propositions.

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This shift in the meaning of a science was not long in coming. Shortly after the death of St. Thomas a lively debate began whether a science is properly speaking a simple habit of the mind or a synthesis of many habits or acts or propositions. Henry of Ghent was no Thomist, but on this question he held firmly to the Thomistic view of the unity of a scientific habit. In the proper sense, he says, *scientia* has three meanings: 1) the intellectual habit hidden in the intellectual memory, 2) the concept elicited from this habit, 3) the act of understanding by which the concept is conceived.[24] The scientific habit contains within its

23 "Dicendum quod aliquid potest dici esse habitus dupliciter. Uno modo, proprie et essentialiter; et sic lex naturalis non est habitus. Dictum est enim supra quod lex naturalis est aliquid per rationem constitutum, sicut etiam propositio est quoddam opus rationis. Non est autem idem quod quis agit, et quo quis agit; aliquis enim per habitum grammaticae agit orationem congruam. Cum igitur habitus sit quo quis agit, non potest esse quod lex aliqua sit habitus proprie et essentialiter. Alio modo potest dici habitus id quod habitu tenetur, sicut dicitur fides id quod fide tenetur." *Summa Theol.* I-II, 94, 1.

24 "... sunt alii tres modi notitiae quae proprie dicenda est scientia. Unus enim modus notitiae quae est scientia, est habitus intellectualis latens in memoria intellectuali. Alio modo verbum con-

power (*virtualiter*) the whole science, with all its concepts, principles, and conclusions; and it is not really composed of parts, but is a simple form or quality acquired by repeated acts, like the moral virtue of temperance. The habit is not a synthesis (*collatio*) of many propositions — principles and conclusions — but the intellectual facility inclining one to elicit all the acts proper to the science.[25]

For Henry of Ghent, if the word "science" is taken not in a generic but a most specific sense (for example, if it means a specific science like metaphysics), it is not really composed of many items, but it is as simple and incomplex as a moral virtue or the quality of whiteness. Like them, it is a form, simple in itself, but capable of greater or less perfection. The whole reality of the habit is present through the first act that generates it, as the whole reality of whiteness exists as a result of the first act that produces it. At first it exists most imperfectly, but it can increase later to its perfect degree.[26]

A Dominican by the name of Bernard of Auvergne (also called Bernard of Gannat from his birthplace), who lectured at Paris between 1294 and 1297, wrote a long defense of St. Thomas against Henry of Ghent, but ironically he adopted a stand on the unity of a science opposed to his master. On this point Henry was closer to St. Thomas than Bernard. Bernard was not at all pleased with Henry of Ghent's likening the simplicity of a scientific habit to that of a moral virtue. To Henry's conclusion that "science is not a composite," he retorted that if we speak of science as an intellectual habit it is indeed something composite, for it is a suitable arrangement of intelligible species in the intellect (*debita ordinatio specierum intelligibilium*). The habit of science, which enables us to understand promptly and at will, is comprised of many such species, and hence it is really composed of parts.[27] Bernard

ceptum ex illo in intelligentia. Et tertio modo ipse actus intelligendi quo concipitur, qui non potest dici verbum nisi ea ratione qua verbo conceptus informatur, ut iam amplius dicetur." Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IV, q. 8 (Paris 1518) fol. 98r.

25 *Ibid.*

26 "Et est dicendum quod quaelibet scientia quae est habitus in specialissimo scientiae consistens, unicus est et simplex in re, carens omni compositione reali ex diversis secundum rem ut partibus existentibus et manentibus in ipso, et hoc aequali simplicitate illi quam habet quilibet habitus affectivus, et universaliter quaelibet forma una recipiens intensionem et remissionem, et hoc secundum modum iam supra tactum. Unde non est minor simplicitas in habitu scientiae Metaphysicae in quocumque gradu habeat eam aliquis quam in habitu temperantiae et quam in albedine. Ita quod per primum actum generativum habitus habetur tota realitas habitus, quemadmodum ex primo actu generativo albedinis habetur tota realitas albedinis, licet in gradu imperfectissimo, a quo habet procedere per intensionis motum ad gradum perfectum." Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibet* IX, q. 4, fol. 355rv.

27 "Ergo habitus scientiae non est habilitas intellectus ad intelligendum sicut sunt habitus qui sunt in viribus appetitivis, sed est ordinatio specierum secundum quam intellectus prompte intelligit cum voluit. Ergo cum ad habitum scientiae requirantur species multae, ex quibus iste

was clearly relying on St. Thomas' statements about science and intelligible species which were quoted above; but, as Cajetan has pointed out, these statements cannot be used to deny the simplicity of a scientific habit. On this question, Bernard, whom B. Hauréau called "one of the most intelligent students of St. Thomas and one of the most zealous defenders of his master,"[28] proves to be less Thomistic than Henry of Ghent.

Few scholastics in the years that followed failed to take up the problem of the unity of a science, generally (because they were theologians) in connection with the science of theology. It would be impossible here to do justice to this debate, which is of considerable importance for the development of the notion of science as a body of knowledge. All that can be done is to touch upon some of its most salient moments.

The Franciscan Peter Auriol, commenting on the *Sentences* between 1316 and 1318, devoted considerable attention to the present problem. He dismisses the opinion of Bernard of Auvergne, that a scientific habit is an orderly collection of intelligible species, and also that of St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent, that a science is a simple and indivisible form or quality of the intellect.[29] After a lengthy discussion of the subject, in which he weighs the opinions of many of his predecessors and contemporaries, he concludes that a science is not one simple individual habit of the mind but a composite of many incomplete and imperfect habits, united to form one whole. What decides the issue for him is the fact that we can acquire the mental facility of demonstrating one conclusion in a science without the facilities of demonstrating others. To him, this proves conclusively that these facilities or habits are really distinct, and that many of them go to make up a total science.[30]

As for the kind of unity these habits have within a science, Auriol denies that they are a mere aggregate (*acervus*), like many stones in a

habitus intεgratur, videtur quod scientia habet talem materiam ex qua fit et per consequens quod sit composita. Bernard of Auvergne, *Contra Dicta Henrici de Gandava quibus Impugnat Thomam, Quodlibet* IX, q. 4, Ms Troyes 662, fol. 123rab. "Praeterea, scientia ut est habitus non est nisi debita ordinatio specierum intelligibilium." *Ibid.* fol. 123ra. On Bernard of Auvergne, see F. J. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School* (Dubuque Iowa, 1964) pp. 104-106.

28 B. Hauréau, *Histoire de la philosophie scolastique* (Paris 1872-1880) II, p. 206.

29 For Auriol's criticism of Bernard of Auvergne, see his *Scriptum super primum Sententiarum*, prooemium, sect. 4, n. 34-39 (St. Bonaventure, New York 1952) I, pp. 260-261. For his criticism of Henry of Ghent, see *ibid.* n. 25-28, pp. 256-258; for his criticism of St. Thomas, see *ibid.* n. 58-62, pp. 270-271. For a more complete account of Auriol's doctrine of the unity of a science, see P. Spade, "The Unity of a Science according to Peter Auriol," *Franciscan Studies* 32 (1972) 203-217.

30 See *ibid.* n. 26-28, pp. 257-258. For Auriol's notion of a scientific habit, see *ibid.* pp. 262-267.

heap. Neither are they linked together like potential parts of a continuous whole, as one whiteness has potentially many parts. Rather, they are parts of one totality, having an inner structure or form. A science has the same kind of unity as a house, which is one because of the unity of its form, or as a geometrical figure, which is one because of the total form resulting from its lines.[31]

Auriol contends that a formal unity of this sort suffices for a scientific habit and is consistent with the way we ordinarily talk about a science. We say that one acquires a science little by little; that one is in error regarding the twentieth conclusion of a science while knowing the first; that there are not as many natural sciences as there are conclusions in the science, and so on. Clearly there is formal unity in a specific science along with a multiplicity of acts and mental habits disposing towards them.[32] As for the ground of this formal unity, Auriol refuses to place it in the formal object of the science. If a science were one because it had one formal object, he contends, this formal object would have the unity of an *infima species*, a subalternate genus, or a most general genus. In the first case, there would be as many sciences as there are *infimae species*; in the second, sciences would be multiplied according to subalternate genera; in the third, there would be only ten sciences corresponding to the ten categories. If being were the formal object of science, there would be only one science, especially if there were only one concept of being. Consequently, the formal unity of a science cannot be based on the unity of its formal object. The unity of a science comes from its unique mode of knowing, of understanding its premises and deducing its conclusions, of abstracting its objects and relating them to the senses, imagination, and the external world. In short, each science has its own logic which distinguishes it from every other science and confers on it its formal unity.[33]

31 *Ibid.* n. 54, p. 267. "Haec autem scientia unitatem habet, non simplicitatis et indivisibilitatis omnimodae, sed cuiusdam totalitatis et unius formae. Est autem illa forma connexio omnium partialium habituum, vel secundum longum, vel secundum [latum]; sicut enim dicit Philosophus I Posteriorum, demonstrationes densantur dupliciter, uno modo in post assumendo, ut cum ex una conclusione infertur alia demonstrative; et istarum conclusionum connexio est secundum longum; quae quidem connexio locum habet in passionibus ordinatis, secundum mediationem et immediationem ad primum subiectum. Alio modo densatur secundum latum, ut cum ex eodem medio plures passiones concluduntur de subiecto non ad invicem ordinatae." *Ibid.* n. 56, p. 268.

32 "Quod autem haec unitas sufficiat pro habitu scientiali, patet ex duobus. Primo quidem quia est unitas formalis; sicut enim ratione unionis maioris extremitatis et minoris in medio, syllogismus est unus unitate formali, sic, ratione istius ordinis perfectivi et unionis cognoscitivae, scientia una erit unitate formali. Secundo vero, quia tali posita unitate, salvantur omnia quae de scientia dicuntur..." *Ibid.* n. 57, p. 269.

33 "... unaquaeque scientia habet propriam logicam et proprium modum sciendi... Ex quibus colligitur evidenter quod scientiae habent unitatem specificam ex modo sciendi eiusdem rationis; qui quidem consistit in uniformi acceptione principiorum, et uniformi modo demonstrandi, et

Auriol's commentary on the *Sentences* had been published only a few years when Ockham made his own commentary on Peter Lombard. Ockham acknowledges reading Auriol's work, but for no longer than twenty-four hours.[34] Certainly some of this time was spent on Auriol's Prologue, which contains his lengthy treatment of the unity of a science.

Like Auriol, Ockham refuses all attempts to place the unity of a whole science, such as physics or metaphysics, in one simple habit of the intellect. Each of these sciences, he maintains, is made up of many intellectual habits or propositions arranged in a definite order. If one wishes, he can call a science a single habit or quality, but then he is talking about the facility of demonstrating only one conclusion in a whole science. As the term is generally used, it denotes

> a collection of many items belonging to the knowledge of one or many objects having a definite order. In this sense, science contains both the incomplex knowledge of terms and the knowledge of propositions, both principles and conclusions. It also comprises the refutations of errors and the solutions of sophisms. It also frequently contains necessary divisions and definitions... Science in this meaning of the term is taken as the compilations and treatises of authors and philosophers... This is the meaning of science when the book of [Aristotle's] *Metaphysics* or *Physics* is said to be one science. Science in this sense is not one in number but contains many habits distinct not only in species but frequently also in genus. But they are mutually ordered, and owing to this special order, which other objects of science or knowledge do not have, they can be called, and are called, in common usage, one science.[35]

Ockham appeals to experience to show that science is a stable disposition or habit of the mind. We are aware, he says, that as a result

deducendi conclusiones ex ipsis, et uniformem modum se habendi intellectus penes abstractionem et extensionem ad extra; et quod omnis res, quae exigit ista propria et distincta, habet propriam scientiam." *Ibid.* n. 87, p. 279. See n. 101, p. 282.

34 "... quia tamen pauca vidi de dictis illius doctoris, si enim omnes vices quibus respexi dicta sua simul congregarentur, non complerent spatium unius diei naturalis." Ockham, *In I Sent.* d. 27, q. 3, H (Lyons 1495). See P. Vignaux, "Occam," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* XI, 886.

35 "Ad primum istorum dico quod scientia, ad praesens, dupliciter accipitur. Uno modo pro collectione multorum pertinentium ad notitiam unius vel multorum determinatum ordinem habentium. Et scientia isto modo dicta continet tam notitiam incomplexam terminorum quam notitiam complexorum, et hoc principiorum et conclusionum; continet etiam reprobationes errorum et solutiones falsorum argumentorum; continet etiam divisiones necessarias et definitiones, ut frequenter... Et isto modo accipitur scientia pro compilationibus et tractatibus auctorum et philosophorum... Sic etiam accipitur scientia quando dicitur liber *Metaphysicae* vel liber *Physicorum* esse una scientia. Et scientia ista non est una numero, sed continet multos habitus non tantum specie sed etiam frequenter genere distinctos, ordinem tamen aliquem inter se habentes, propter quem ordinem specialem, qualem non habent aliqua alia scibilia vel cognoscibilia, possunt dici et dicuntur, secundum usum loquentium, una scientia." Ockham, *In I Sent.* Prol. q. 1 (St. Bonaventure, New York 1967) I, pp. 8-9. For Ockham's doctrine of the unity of a science, see A. Maurer, "Ockham's Conception of the Unity of Science," *Mediaeval Studies* 20 (1958) 98-112.

of repeatedly knowing some object we are more ready and able to know it than before. Repeated acts of knowing produce in us a new promptness or facility of knowing called *scientia*. The habit may be simply one of apprehending a certain term or proposition; or it may be one of demonstrating a conclusion from principles. In the latter case it is science in the strict sense. It is also a matter of experience that distinct acts of demonstrating conclusions engender in us distinct habits of knowing, or sciences. There are, in other words, as many scientific habits in us as there are distinct acts of demonstrating conclusions.[36]

Both St. Thomas and Henry of Ghent come under Ockham's criticism for making a whole science consist of one indivisible intellectual habit. Their position rests on the presupposition that every scientific habit has one formal object (as St. Thomas claims) or one formal mode of knowing (as Henry of Ghent says).[37] Just as a power of the soul has one formal object (as color, for example, is the formal object of sight), which gives unity to the power and distinguishes it from every other power, so a science has a formal object which gives unity to the science and differentiates it from all others. But Ockham contends that the unity of neither a power nor a habit can be established on the basis of the unity of its formal object; nor can the distinction of powers or habits be based on the distinction of their formal objects. He strikes at the foundation of St. Thomas' doctrine of the unity and distinction of habits and powers by denying the distinction between a material and formal object, for reasons that take us to the heart of his nominalism.

If St. Thomas is correct, Ockham argues, many materially different items share in a common nature (*ratio*). For example, a man and a stone would have in common the nature of being colored. Accordingly, they would fall under the sense of sight, whose formal object is color. Similarly, the objects studied in theology, according to St. Thomas, share in the common *ratio* of being revealed, and so they can be considered by the one science of theology, whose formal object is "the divinely revealable." But in the perspective of Ockham's nominalism, no two items have anything in common. In his view, it is absurd to speak of a number of things presenting to the mind a common intelligible or formal object. Every reality or thing is individual and one in number and it shares nothing in common with anything else. Only terms or concepts are common or universal, in the sense that they are predicable of many things. But *things* themselves are not common or

36 Ockham, *Expositio super libros Physicorum,* Prol.; ed. P. Boehner, *Ockham: Philosophical Writings* (Edinburgh, London 1957) 4-7. (Henceforth referred to as *Physics*).
37 Ockham, *In I Sent.* Prol. q. 8, pp. 208-217.

universal. St. Thomas' doctrine of the unity and distinction of sciences based on their formal objects contradicts this basic tenet of Ockham's nominalism. It also compromises the unity of an individual thing as conceived by Ockham. St. Thomas imagines that within one reality there are many distinct *rationes*, which can be the formal objects of distinct powers and habits. But if this were so, Ockham argues, these *rationes* would be distinct realities, and the unity of the original reality would be destroyed. Thus, in Ockham's view the Thomistic distinction between the material and formal objects of sciences breaks down, and along with it the notion that faculties and sciences are distinguished by formal objects.[38]

Ockham's conception of reality as radically individual led to a new interpretation of the object of science. With Aristotle he held that science concerns universals and not individuals as such.[39] But where is the universal to be found? It was generally agreed by his scholastic predecessors that individuals in some way contain natures or essences which are the foundations of our universal concepts and which serve as the objects of science. Ockham was uncompromisingly opposed to this view. It was axiomatic for him that reality is individual and in no way common or universal. He was aware that he was going further than any of his predecessors in adopting an absolute position on this point. He writes:

> All those whom I have seen agree that there is really in the individual a nature that is in some way universal, at least potentially and incompletely; though some say that [this nature] is really distinct [from the individual], some that it is only formally distinct, some that the distinction is in no sense real but only conceptual and a result of the consideration of the intellect.[40]

Having proved to his own satisfaction that universality is a property of terms (whether spoken, written or mental), which are found in propositions, he drew the inevitable conclusion: Propositions alone are the objects of science. "Every science," he writes, "whether real or rational, is concerned only with propositions as with objects known, for only propositions are known."[41] In saying this he does not mean that

38 *Ibid.* pp. 208-211. For Ockham's doctrine of universals, see *In I Sent.* d. 2, q. 8 (St. Bonaventure, New York 1970) II, pp. 266-292.

39 Ockham, *Physics*, Prol. p. 11. See Aristotle, *Metaph.* XI, 1, 1059 b 26.

40 "In conclusione istius quaestionis omnes quos vidi concordant, dicentes quod natura, quae est aliquo modo universalis, saltem in potentia et incomplete, est realiter in individuo, quamvis aliqui dicant quod distinguitur realiter, aliqui quod tantum formaliter, aliqui quod nullo modo ex natura rei sed secundum rationem tantum vel per considerationem intellectus." Ockham, *In I Sent.* d. 2, q. 7; II, pp. 225-226.

41 "... est sciendum quod scientia quaelibet sive sit realis sive rationalis est tantum de

science in no way concerns reality. The terms of the propositions in some sciences stand for real things; for example those of natural science and metaphysics. Ockham calls these "real sciences" or sciences of reality. The terms of the propositions of logic, on the contrary, stand for concepts in the mind; so logic is called "rational science." The terms of the propositions of grammar stand for written or spoken words. Thus science does treat of individuals, but only in an improper sense, inasmuch as the terms of its propositions stand for them. Properly speaking, science deals with universals, which are terms of propositions.[42]

As for the subject of a science, it is simply the subject term in the proposition which is the object of the science. For example, when we know that every man is capable of learning, the object of this knowledge is the whole proposition: "Every man is capable of learning"; the subject is the term "man."[43]

In a total science whose unity is that of a collection or group there need not be one object or subject. The science derives its unity from the arrangement of its parts and not from the unity of its object or subject. Ockham criticizes Duns Scotus for failing to see this point. According to Scotus, a science has a primary subject which gives unity to the science because it virtually contains all the truths belonging to the science. For example, theology is one science because its primary subject is God, who virtually contains all theological truths.[44]

Ockham opposes the Scotistic explanation of the unity of a science for several reasons. To begin with, he does not think it true that a science has only one subject. He insists that a science has different parts, each of which, being a proposition, has its own subject. So it is meaningless to ask what is the subject of logic, physics, metaphysics, or mathematics. There is no one subject of the entire science; its different parts have different subjects. To ask what is the subject of these sciences is like asking who is the king of the world. There is no one man who is king of the world; one person is king of one part and another of another part. It is the same with the subjects of the various parts of a science. Each part has its own subject.[45] Ockham's comparison of a science to

propositionibus tamquam de illis quae sciuntur, quia solae propositiones sciuntur." Ockham, *In I Sent.* d. 2, q. 4; II, p. 134. See *Physics,* Prol. p. 11.

42 Ockham, *In I Sent. ibid.* pp. 134-138; *Physics,* p. 12.

43 Ockham, *Physics,* p. 9.

44 Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio,* Prol. 3, q. 1-3 (Vatican 1950) I, p. 102, n. 151; *Reportata Paris.,* Prol. 3, q. 2, n. 12 (Paris 1894) 22, p. 51.

45 Ockham, *Physics,* pp. 9-10.

the world is an accurate analogy for both have a unity of order. He writes:

> Hence we have to say that metaphysics is not a piece of knowledge that is numerically one. The same is true of the philosophy of nature, which is a collection of many habits... It is one in the same sense that a city or a nation, or an army, which includes men and horses and other necessary things, or a kingdom, or a university, or the world, is said to be one.[46]

Secondly, Ockham denies — again in opposition to Scotus — that a science has one primary subject. He insists that absolutely speaking there is no primary subject of a whole science. From one point of view one subject may be primary and from another point of view another may be primary. Thus, being is the primary subject of metaphysics in the order of predication, for the metaphysician primarily draws conclusions about being. But in the order of perfection God is the primary subject of metaphysics, for he is the most perfect being known in it. Natural substance is the primary subject of the philosophy of nature as regards priority of predication; but as regards priority of perfection its first subject is man or the heavenly bodies.[47]

Thus the attempt to establish the unity of a science on the unity of a formal object or primary subject fails. Ockham's problem is to find a principle of unity for science, conceived not as a single habit of the mind but as a collection of many items of knowledge: habits of the mind primarily, but secondarily propositions (mental, spoken, and written) which are the objects of these habits. These "partial sciences" do not by their nature belong to the whole science. An item of knowledge may be integrated into a total science, but it does not by nature belong to that science to the exclusion of another science. For example, Ockham says that the truth that God is one, or the habit of demonstrating it, is neither theological nor metaphysical in itself. It does not in itself belong to theology or metaphysics, any more than a man by himself is part of a nation or an army. Just as he can be included in either or both, so a truth can be integrated into one science or many.[48]

46 "Ideo dicendum est, quod metaphysica non est una scientia numero, nec similiter philosophia naturalis. Sed philosophia naturalis est collectio multorum habituum, sicut dictum est. Nec est aliter una nisi sicut civitas dicitur una vel populus dicitur unus vel exercitus comprehendens homines et equos et caetera necessaria dicitur unus, vel sicut regnum dicitur unum, vel sicut universitas dicitur una, vel sicut mundus dicitur unus." Ockham, *Physics*, p. 7.

47 *Ibid.* pp. 9-10. See Scotus, *Ordinatio*, Prol. 3, q. 3; pp. 94ff.

48 "Si dicatur quod tunc idem habitus numero esset metaphysicus et theologicus, dico, secundum praedicta, quod accipiendo habitum metaphysicum et theologicum sicut communiter accipitur et quomodo loquimur modo, neuter est unus numero sed continet multos, numero, specie et genere distinctos. Et ideo habitus ille quo cognoscitur ista veritas 'Deus est unus', qui pertinet ad metaphysicam et ad theologiam, nec est habitus metaphysicus nec theologicus, sicut nec est

Ockham is not saying that every truth will fit into every science. He points out that theology considers many subjects and attributes of subjects that are not the concern of metaphysics or any other natural science. Sciences are distinguished by both their subjects and the attributes demonstrated of them. But what determines the exact range of subjects to be treated by any one science? What marks off one body of knowledge from another as a distinct science? What is the "special relation" between the parts of a science that unifies it and makes it one science?

We have seen Peter Auriol place the unity of a science in the form of the science. He conceives a science on the analogy of a house or geometrical figure, whose parts are unified by their supervening form. But this solution of the problem is not acceptable to Ockham, for he does not think the notions of matter and form apply in this case. A science, he says, has no formal cause but only efficient and final causes.[49] Since he believes that theology is a practical science, leading to eternal beatitude, he can appeal to its end as the source of its unity: all truths necessary for salvation are theological and can be integrated into the science of theology.[50] But what is the source of unity of a speculative science like metaphysics? This science, he maintains, has only the unity of an aggregate.[51] At best it has the unity of order, like an army or city. It is made up of many partial sciences (*scientiae partiales*), some of which are still to be discovered. What gives the science its unifying order which distinguishes it from, say, mathematics?

Ockham suggests three possibilities: the order may be found in the predicates of the science, or in its subjects, or in both. In the first case, the science may demonstrate of the same subject many attributes which are logically related as superior and inferior (that is, of greater and less extension). Ockham's example is taken from geometry. This science demonstrates of the subject "figure" the attributes of magnitude, and also its own proper attributes and those of its logical inferiors (for in-

metaphysica nec theologia. Unde sicut non est concedendum quod homo est populus vel exercitus, nec domus est civitas vel villa, ita habitus ille nec est metaphysica nec theologia. Si tamen per habitum esse metaphysicum vel theologicum intelligatur istum habitum pertinere ad metaphysicam vel theologiam, sic potest concedi quod idem habitus est metaphysicus et theologicus. Concedo tamen quod idem habitus numero est pars habitus metaphysici et etiam theologici, sicut idem homo est pars populi vel exercitus." Ockham, *In I Sent.* Prol. q. 1, pp. 13-14.

49 "Ideo dicendum est quod, loquendo de virtute sermonis, nulla scientia habet nisi tantum duas causas essentiales, scilicet efficientem et finalem." Ockham, *Physics*, p. 7.

50 Ockham, *In I Sent.* Prol. q. 1; I, p. 7. For the practical nature of theology, see *ibid.* q. 12, pp. 324-370.

51 "Et ita accipiendo unitatem aggregationis pro omni unitate quae non est alicuius unius numero, concedo quod talis scientia (scil. metaphysica) est una unitate aggregationis." Ockham, *ibid.* p. 224.

stance, circle and triangle). Secondly, the order that unifies a science may be found in the subjects of the science, as when general attributes are demonstrated of their primary subjects and also of their logical inferiors. Thus in the science of animals the attributes of animal in general are demonstrated not only of animal but also of the various genera and species of animals. Thirdly, the unifying order of a science may reside in both its subjects and predicates, as, for example, the attributes of animal are predicated of animal, and the attributes of the various species of animal contained under the genus are predicated of these species. Because the terms of a science have a logical relation of this sort, or some similar logical order, it is called one science. Ockham assures us that this is the sense in which Aristotle and the other philosophers and masters understand the unity of a science.[52]

Ockham knew well enough that Aristotle locates the unity of a science in the unity of its generic subject. "A single science is one whose domain is a single genus," writes the Philosopher in his *Posterior Analytics*.[53] This Aristotelian dictum is quoted in one of the objections to Ockham's position. In reply, he does not deny it, but qualifies it in such a way that it no longer applies to a whole science. One science, he says, has one generic subject, but only if the attribute predicated of it is one; otherwise the science will have a unity of order.[54] But Ockham has already said that in a total science, like metaphysics, many attributes are predicated of many subjects. Hence, a whole science can only have a unity of order.[55] Ockham's nominalism prevents him from accepting in its full meaning the Aristotelian doctrine of the unity of a science based on the unity of its generic subject.

Closer to Aristotle in this respect was Gregory of Rimini, a master of theology at Paris and General of the Augustinian Order, who died shortly after Ockham in 1358. We have seen Leibniz list him among the leading nominalists; and indeed according to a tradition going back to about 1500 he was the standard bearer of the nominalists (*Antesignanus nominalistarum*).[56] This does not mean that he was always in agreement

52 Ockham, *ibid.* pp. 219-220. See *ibid.* q. 1, p. 14. Natural philosophy is distinguished from the other sciences either by its subjects or predicates; but this does not prevent one and the same truth from belonging to it and to other sciences. Ockham says that he intends to explain how sciences are distinguished by their subjects and predicates in his commentary on the *Metaphysics*, which he does not seem to have written. See *Physics*, p. 15.

53 Aristotle, *Post. Anal.* I, 28, 87 a 38-39.

54 "Ad secundum patet, quod unius generis subiecti est una scientia si passio sit una, vel erit una unitate ordinis." Ockham, *In I Sent.* Prol. q. 8, p. 225.

55 "Ad tertium etiam patet, quod metaphysica, prout dicit totum librum *Metaphysicae*, non est una nisi tali unitate ordinis." Ockham, *ibid.*

56 This title was given to him by Aventinus (1477-1517), according to D. Trapp. See G. Leff, *Gregory of Rimini: Tradition and Innovation in Fourteenth Century Thought* (Manchester 1961) p. 1.

with Ockham, as is clear from his notion of the unity of a science. Like Auriol and Ockham, he denies that its unity consists of a single intellectual habit. If such were the case, he argues, we would know all the principles and conclusions of a science through the one habit. Knowing one conclusion of geometry, we would know all the conclusions of the science, which is contrary to experience.[57]

For this and other reasons Gregory rejects the view that there is one all-embracing habit for one science. What, then, is the source of its identity? Gregory concludes with Aristotle that a science like geometry or medicine has its own generic subject and premises which give unity to the whole science. For example, the subject of geometry is magnitude. Because all the conclusions of the science concern this subject, they form a unity. The conclusions belong to the same science, as do the habits by which they are demonstrated. Gregory specifies that the common genus constituting the subject of a science cannot be one of the widest genera, like "quality" (that is, it is not one of Aristotle's ten categories). Gregory considers this far too universal to unify a science. Neither is the subject of a science a particular species like "man"; this would be too restrictive a subject for one science. At best this could only be the subject of a "partial" or "special" science included within a total science. The subject of a whole science has the unity of a subalternate genus; that is to say, a genus subalternated to one of the widest genera. The example Gregory gives is "magnitude," which is a genus subalternated to the more general genus "quantity." Magnitude is the generic subject of geometry, giving unity to that science. Gregory adds — again following Aristotle — that a science is said to have one subject genus not only if the items known in it are conceived univocally with one common *ratio* or notion, but also if they are conceived analogically, or having a common focus of reference. Gregory makes this qualification in order to include metaphysics among the sciences, for its subject "being" is not a genus.

More is required to unify a science than a common subject according to Gregory of Rimini. If this were sufficient, how would geometry differ from physics, since both concern magnitude? Besides a subject, a science has common premises or principles, and it regards its objects from a formal point of view different from that of the other sciences. For example, both physics and mathematics draw conclusions regarding magnitude, but mathematics has to do with magnitude as such, while

57 "Prima [conclusio] est quod non omnium conclusionum talium est habitus unus numero. Secunda est nec unius conclusionis et suorum principiorum est habitus unus numero. Tertia est nec ipsorum principiorum est habitus unus numero." Gregory of Rimini, *Sent.* Prol. q. 3, a. 1 (Venice 1522) fol. 11Q-12A.

physics regards magnitude in the external world. Each of these sciences, accordingly, has not only its generic subject but also its own principles and formal perspective, all of which give the science its identity and distinguish it from the other sciences.[58]

Gregory of Rimini's doctrine of science deserves more detailed attention than can be given here. What has been said makes it clear that his conception of the unity of a science, while in some respects similar to Ockham's, differs significantly from his. In appealing to a common generic subject and a unique formal perspective for each science as the ground of its unity, Gregory parts company with his nominalist contemporary. This is but one indication that what goes by the name of fourteenth century nominalism was really a complex of many doctrines which, though they have common features, were really quite different.

Ockham's theology and philosophy were widely disseminated in the universities of the later Middle Ages, especially through the works of his commentator Gabriel Biel, who died in 1495. Among the many Ockhamist doctrines taught by Biel was that a science is not a single habit of the intellect but a unified collection of habits. The word "science," he says, is as it were a collective name: *quasi nomen collectivum.*[59]

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If one wishes to appreciate how widely the unity of a science was discussed by the late scholastics and how diverse their views on this subject were, he has only to read Suarez' popular *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* published in 1597. In his usual thorough manner, Suarez recounts the views of many of his predecessors and contemporaries before giving his own. He cannot agree that a science is a simple and indivisible quality of the mind, as Henry of Ghent, St. Thomas, and many Thomists hold. Neither is it an ordered collection of intelligible species, as Soncinas thought. Suarez is also opposed to the nominalist view that a science is not a habit with an essential unity, but only a collection or coordination of many qualities: the opinion, he says, held by Auriol, Scotus, Gregory of Rimini, Ockham, and Biel. He opts for what he calls a "middle way" between the Thomistic and nominalist opinions, maintaining that a science is a collection or coordination of many qualities, but that these qualities comprise one scientific habit

58 *Ibid.* a. 2, fol. 14L-O.
59 G. Biel, *In I Sent.* Prol. q. 1, E (Tübingen 1501).

with an essential unity owing to the unity of the formal object of the science.[60]

Suarez likens the unity of a science to that of a quality of the body, like health or beauty. We speak of health or beauty as though it were one quality, but in fact it is the result of the relation of many bodily qualities. The same is true of a quality of the mind such as a scientific habit. It is the product of the coordination of many simple mental qualities. Every time we learn a new demonstration or principle in a science the mind acquires a real perfection which is not simply an increase in intensity of a previous quality but a new quality of the mind. Each of these simple qualities is a "partial habit" which is integrated into the total habit of the science. Suarez does not favor the nominalist way of speaking, that there are as many sciences as there are simple habits of the mind. Even nominalists like Ockham and Gregory of Rimini, he says, agree that a science such as geometry or theology is *one* science.[61] Suarez wants to keep the usual language when speaking of the sciences, and above all to avoid extreme positions on this subject. Both the Thomists and the nominalists err in this regard: the Thomists because they fail to see that a science is comprised of many mental qualities, the nominalists because they do not realize that these qualities are so closely coordinated that they compose an essential unity. Suarez goes to great lengths to justify his assertion, against the nominalists, that a science has not simply an artificial or accidental unity but constitutes something essentially one. The partial habits that comprise a science, he contends, are linked together by an "effective subordination," because they dispose the mind to demonstrate conclusions one of which is derived from the other. The scientific habits also refer to one total object or essence, such as man, from a knowledge of which many conclusions can be drawn.[62] In the final analysis, then, it is the unity of the formal object of the science, based on the essence of things, that accounts for the unity of the science.

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When non-scholastic philosophers took up the question of the unity of a science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries they were continuing a discussion that already had a long history, conveniently sum-

60 Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae,* 44, sect. 11 (Paris 1877) 26, pp. 697-700, n. 12-19. Suarez here presents the four opinions concerning the unity of a science and adopts the fourth or middle way. On p. 711, n. 55 he asserts that a science is a collection of many simple mental qualities. For the nature of the connection between them, see p. 713, n. 62-63.

61 *Ibid.* p. 713, n. 60.

62 *Ibid.* p. 713, n. 63. The mind, however, also has a role in the unity of a science, so that its unity is not exact or perfect but, in a way, artificial. *Ibid.* p. 715, n. 69.

marized for them in Suarez' *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. Nor were they ignorant of Suarez' work. Descartes had firsthand knowledge of it, and Leibniz boasted that he could read it as easily as most people read novels.[63] To many, the *Disputationes* were, in Schopenhauer's words, "an authentic compendium of the whole scholastic wisdom."[64]

Christian Wolff, professor of mathematics and physics at Halle and Marburg from 1706 to 1754, read Suarez with admiration and praised him as the Jesuit "who among scholastics pondered metaphysical realities with particular penetration."[65] After imbibing scholasticism at the font of Suarez, Wolff could hardly fail to describe a science as a unified whole. Indeed, in his view a science constitutes a system, comparable to an organized animal body.

While treating of natural laws in his *Philosophia Practica Universalis* Wolff says that they constitute a system, by which he means "the close union (*compactio*) by which all of them are interconnected." In general, he defines a system of doctrines as "a close union of mutually connected truths or universal propositions." This is the sense, he adds, in which he often called the first part of his *Theologia Naturalis* a system, even putting in the title of this work that it embraces a whole system, for the truths that it demonstrates about the nature of God are interconnected. In the widest possible sense a system is the close union of interconnected realities. As an example of this use of the word "system" Wolff points out that medical men speak of the nerves, arteries, and veins in the human body as a system when they describe them as diffused throughout the whole body and connected to each other so that they compose as it were one entity. Similarly, there is a system of natural laws if all the laws of nature are interconnected.[66] On this

63 *Vita Leibnitii a Seipso*, in Foucher de Careil, *Nouvelles Lettres et Opuscules Inédits de Leibniz* (Paris 1857) p. 382.

64 *Fragmente zur Geschichte der Philosophie* § 6 (Berlin 1847) 6, p. 57.

65 "Sane Franciscus Suarez e Societate Jesu, quem inter Scholasticos res metaphysicas profundius meditatum esse constat..." C. Wolff, *Philosophia Prima sive Ontologia* I, 2, 3 (Hildesheim 1962) p. 138.

66 "Per systema legum naturalium intelligo eam ipsarum compactionem, qua omnes inter se connectuntur. In genere nimirum systema doctrinarum est compactio veritatum seu propositionum universalium inter se connexarum. Immo generalissime systema appellari suevit compactio rerum inter se connexarum. Monuimus enim veritates universales, seu propositiones universales inter se connexas systema doctrinarum constituere... Et in hoc etiam sensu partem primam Theologiae naturalis in parte altera saepius diximus systema et in ipso titulo illius posuimus, quod integrum systema complectatur, quia scilicet veritates de Dei natura notae inter se connectuntur. In sensu generalissimo Medici systema nervorum, arteriarum, venarum vocant, si nervos, arterias, venas eo ordine describunt, quo per totum humanum corpus diffusi diffusaeque inter se connectuntur, ut unum quoddam quasi ens constituant nervi inter se juncti, unum ab eo diversum arteriae, et diversum ab utroque venae. Quamobrem systema legum naturalium habebis, si leges naturae omnes inter se connectantur." C. Wolff, *Philosophia Practica Universalis, Methodo Scientifica Pertractata*, II, c. 1 (Frankfurt, Leipzig, 1789) 2, pp. 65-66, n. 81.

model, too, there can be a system of doctrines, but only if the demonstrative method is used, for only then will all its propositions be mutually connected, one term being contained in the definition of another, and one proposition being the premise from which another is deduced.[67]

Wolff was not the first to use the word "body" (*corpus*) of a doctrinal system. Traditionally, the word was applied to a complete collection of writings on a subject arranged systematically. Thus the Justinian Code of law was called the *Corpus Juris*. The works of Homer were referred to as the *Corpus Homeri*. Cicero and Seneca speak of the book of an author as a *corpus*.[68] In the fourteenth century the bibliophile Richard of Bury reflects this usage when he writes of "the mighty bodies of the sciences."[69] In his *Logic*, Isaac Watts (1725) writes that "The word science is usually applied to the whole body of regular or methodical observations or propositions... concerning any subject of speculation."[70] What appears to be new in Wolff is the analogy between a system of doctrines or laws and a living human body. He sees a science as having a unity on the model of that of a living organism — an appropriate paradigm indeed for a rationalist like Wolff who attempted "to build up a philosophy in which all terms would be unequivocally defined and disposed according to an order as strict as that of mathematical demonstrations."[71]

The analogy of science to a living body was no less appealing to Kant. Wolff appeared to him as the living embodiment of metaphysics. Kant rejected that metaphysics and along with it the Wolffian notion of a scientific system; but he was too strongly influenced by Wolff to deny that science is an organic system of doctrines. As we have seen, Kant makes systematic unity the essential note of scientific knowledge. But for him a scientific system is no mere concatenation and interlinking of

67 "Systema doctrinarum condi nequit nisi methodo demonstrativa. Etenim in systemate veritates universales, quae dogmatum seu doctrinarum nomine veniunt, inter se connectuntur. Enimvero veritates inter se connectuntur, si definitum unum ingreditur definitionem alterius, et propositio una demonstrationem alterius tanquàm praemissa." *Ibid.* p. 66, n. 82.

Wolff also describes a science in the scholastic manner as a mental *habitus* of demonstrating truths: "Per scientiam hic intelligo habitum asserta demonstrandi, hoc est ex principiis certis et immotis per legitimam consequentiam inferendi." C. Wolff, *Philosophia Rationalis sive Logica*, discursus praelim. c. 2, n. 30 (Verona 1735) p. 9.

68 See references under "corpus" in A. Forcellini, *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon* (Prati 1839) I, p. 778b.

69 "Sed per plurimorum investigationes sollicitas, quasi datis symbolis singillatim, scientiarum ingentia corpora ad immensas, quas cernimus, quantitates successivis augmentationibus succreverunt." Richard of Bury, *Philobiblion* 10 (Oxford 1960) p. 108.

70 Isaac Watts, *Logic* II, 2, n. 9; cited by *The Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford 1933) 9, p. 221.

71 E. Gilson, T. Langan, *Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant* (New York 1963) p. 178.

terms and propositions in the Wolffian manner. "By a system," he writes, "I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea."[72] Every scientific system for Kant is regulated and constituted by an a priori idea, furnished by reason itself. Empirical knowledge by itself is not scientific unless it is regulated and systematized by a priori principles of reason.

With Kant we come full circle and return to the point where we began this inquiry into the history of the notion of the unity of a science. Standing between Kant and his predecessors is his Copernican Revolution in philosophy, which assumes that instead of our knowledge conforming to objects, objects must conform to our knowledge.[73] Thomas Aquinas lived in an age that believed that through sense experience the mind can gain an insight — however superficial and precarious — into the nature of reality and achieve truth by conforming to it. Being a realist, he was also convinced that the individuals encountered in sense experience are bearers of intelligible characters or natures which, when conceived, are the contents of our general notions. His solution to the problem of the unity of a science depends upon this metaphysical view of reality and human knowledge. For him, each of the speculative sciences has its own generic subject, or formal object, conceived through its unique mode of abstraction. Each science also has its own principles and mode of procedure, which produce in the intellect a *habitus* distinct from that of every other science.[74]

Once the nominalists eliminated intelligible natures or essences from reality a new explanation of the unity of a science had to be found. For Ockham, the object of science is no longer the real world but the propositions we form about it. Corresponding to each demonstrated proposition there is a scientific habit in the intellect. These are "partial sciences" which can be integrated into a "total science," such as physics or metaphysics, by the logical interconnection of the terms of the scientific propositions.

The mediaeval nominalists set the stage for the new notions of the unity of a science in early modern philosophy. Like them, Leibniz locates the unity of a science in the logical synthesis of the truths contained in the science. Not content with this rather loose unity, Kant bases the unity of a science on an a priori idea in the understanding. Between Aquinas and Kant, accordingly, stand the mediaeval nominalists.

72 Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* A 832, B 860, trans. N. K. Smith (London 1950) p. 653.
73 *Ibid.* Preface to second edition, B xvi, p. 22.
74 For St. Thomas' doctrine of the subject of science and its modes of abstraction, see *Expositio super Librum Boethii de Trinitate* Q. V-VI (Leiden 1955) pp. 161-218; trans. A. Maurer, *The Division and Methods of the Sciences* (Toronto 1968).

GALILEO AND THE THOMISTS

William A. Wallace O.P.

WHEN Antonio Favaro, the otherwise careful editor of Galileo's *Opere*, came across the name "Caietanus" in Galileo's student notebooks, he assumed that the reference was to Caietanus Thienensis,[1] the Paduan *calculator*; apparently it did not occur to him that the young Galileo would be acquainted with the writings of the Italian Thomist, Thomas de Vio Caietanus.[2] Yet a check of Galileo's citations shows that six of the eight references ascribed by Favaro to Caietanus Thienensis in reality are references to Thomas de Vio Caietanus.[3] Favaro's error here, of course, is more excusable than his failure to identify correctly the more mature Galileo's reliance on the authority of the celebrated Dominican in his letter to the Grand Duchess Christina.[4] There it was a question of the place of the sun in the heavens when Joshua gave his famous command, "Sun, stand thou still," and Thomas de Vio had long been recognized as a competent Scriptural commentator.[5] But De Vio also held distinctive views on matters relating to physical science, as did many of the Thomists of his day, and such views were known and discussed by Galileo in his early writings. Most of these writings, contained in Vol. I of Favaro's National Edition of Galileo's works, show a preoccupation with Aristotle and the problems raised by his philosophy then being discussed in the schools, particularly at Pisa and other Italian universities. Of the 419 pages that go to make up this first volume, in fact, Aristotle is mentioned on 194 pages; the author cited with next greatest frequency is St. Thomas Aquinas, who gets mentioned on 32 pages, followed in order by the Aristotelian commentators Averroës and Simplicius, who are men-

1 Gaetano da Thiene (1387-1465), professor at Padua from 1422 to his death, and author of important commentaries on William Heytesbury and on the *Physics* of Aristotle.

2 Tommaso de Vio, of Gaeta (1469-1534), cardinal, commonly known as Gaetanus or Caietanus from his birthplace; master general of the Dominican Order and principal commentator on the *Summa theologiae* of St. Thomas.

3 See A. Favaro, ed., *Le Opere di Galileo Galilei*, Edizione Nazionale, 20 vols., (Florence 1890-1909), Vol. I, 422; Caietanus Thienensis is cited only on pp. 72 and 172, whereas Thomas de Vio Caietanus is cited on pp. 76, 96, 101, 133, 146, and 153. Favaro ascribed all these references to Thienensis.

4 See Vol. V, p. 347, and index for the entire work, Vol. XX, p. 339.

5 The letter, written in 1615, has been translated into English by Stillman Drake, *Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo* (New York 1957). For the reference to Thomas de Vio and its context, see p. 214; Drake correctly identifies the Italian Dominican.

tioned on 30 and 28 pages respectively.[6] Apart from this recognition of Aquinas as a foremost interpreter of Aristotle, Galileo's early writings reveal also a surprising knowledge of the Thomistic school. On four different pages of the same volume Galileo refers to "the Thomists," and in one of these references he identifies four members of the school. Then, in various individual references, he cites Joannes Capreolus[7] (7 places), Thomas de Vio Caietanus (6 places), Paulus Soncinas[8] (4 places), Ferrariensis[9] (3 places), Hervaeus Natalis[10] (2 places), Dominicus Soto[11] (2 places), and Chrysostomus Javellus[12] (1 place).

This little known acquaintance of the young Galileo with Thomism is worthy of study in its own right, particularly on the part of anyone tracing the impact of the thought of a thirteenth-century scholar like Aquinas on subsequent centuries. From the viewpoint of the history of science, however, there are additional reasons for examining closely Galileo's relationship to the Thomistic school. Although much is known about Galileo, there is a definite *lacuna* in Galilean scholarship in the

6 These data are taken from a simple count of Favaro's entries in the "Indice degli autori citati," Vol. I, 421-423. Other authors who are frequently cited include Ptolemy (on 20 pages), Alexander of Aphrodisias (on 19 pages), Plato (on 18 pages), John Philoponus (on 17 pages), Albertus Magnus (on 15 pages), Giles of Rome (on 14 pages), and Archimedes (on 10 pages). Omitted from the index entirely are the Calculator, Richard Swineshead, cited on p. 172, and the Conciliator, Pietro d'Abano, cited on p. 36. It should be noted, moreover, that the citations are distributed selectively throughout the volume; the *Juvenilia*, for example, end on p. 177, and 15 of the Plato citations are given prior to this page and only 3 after, whereas Archimedes makes no appearance before p. 177 and 10 after. Again, in all, 19 writers are cited in both the *Juvenilia* and the unquestionably Galilean works in the volume; 10 writers are cited in the latter but are not mentioned in the former; and 133 writers, including 14 who are mentioned at least half a dozen times each, appear in the *Juvenilia* but nowhere else.

7 John Capreolus, (*c.* 1380-1444), French Dominican and principal expounder and defender of Thomistic doctrine in the century before Cajetan; known especially for his *Defensiones*, cast in the form of a commentary on the *Sentences*, and directed against Duns Scotus and Henry of Ghent, among others.

8 Paul Soncinas (d. 1494), Italian Dominican and admirer of Capreolus, who published a compendium of the latter's work as well as a lengthy Thomistic exposition of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle.

9 Francesco Silvestri of Ferrara (*c.* 1474-1528), Italian Dominican noted for his commentary on the *Summa contra gentiles* of St. Thomas; among his works is a commentary on the *Physics* of Aristotle.

10 Harvey or Hervé Nedellec (*c.* 1255-1323), master general of the Dominican Order and author of numerous *Quaestiones* and *Quodlibets*; his polemics were frequently directed against Henry of Ghent.

11 Domingo de Soto (1494-1560), Spanish Dominican, theologian and political theorist, but also a commentator on Aristotle's logic and physics; he was regarded by Pierre Duhem as a precursor of Galileo on the basis of his adumbration of the law of falling bodies *c.* 1545. For details, see my articles, "The Enigma of Domingo de Soto: *Uniformiter difformis* and Falling Bodies in Late Medieval Physics," *Isis* 59 (1968), 384-401; "The 'Calculatores' in Early Sixteenth-Century Physics," *The British Journal for the History of Science* 4 (1969), 221-232; and "Mechanics from Bradwardine to Galileo," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 32 (1971), 15-28.

12 Giovanni Crisostomo Javelli (*c.* 1470-*c.* 1538), Italian Dominican, student of Cajetan and colleague of Ferrariensis, who commented on the works of Aristotle and defended a Thomistic interpretation against the Averroists of his day.

area of the *Juvenilia,* which are commonly regarded as notes written down or copied by Galileo during his student days at the University of Pisa, most probably during the year 1584.[13] The notes themselves cover a wide range of topics discussed with a fairly high degree of sophistication, and with a citation of sources that range from classical antiquity through the middle and late scholastic periods to the latter part of the sixteenth century. This mass of material is so refractory to simple analysis that it is not surprising that scholars have contented themselves with rather vague generalities about the early sources of Galileo's ideas.[14] What is needed, as E. A. Moody has already urged,[15] is a detailed study of these early writings, and for this it is necessary to start some place. The present paper is offered as a beginning in this important but hitherto neglected area of scholarship in the hope that it may shed light not only on the development of the Thomistic school but also on its relationships with this celebrated "father of modern science." In structure it will first describe in general Galileo's citations of St. Thomas and the Thomists, then it will narrow the field of discussion to examine in detail Galileo's understanding of the Thomistic positions he cites on the intension and remission of forms and various teachings on the elements, and finally it will conclude with some observations on the possible sources of these sections of Galileo's early writings.

I. Galileo's Citations of St. Thomas and Thomists

Galileo shows little interest in the metaphysical problems that have consistently attracted the attention of Thomistic historians of philosophy, but concentrates instead on the physical problems relating to the heavens and the earth that were to remain a constant concern throughout his life. His citations of St. Thomas in the first volume of the *Opere* are confined to three important references in the treatise *De motu,* with the remaining 29 all occurring in the notes, written in

13 See Favaro's introduction to the *Juvenilia,* I, 12; the argument is based on Galileo's discussion of the origin of the universe, which he attempts to date. In measuring the various epochs he holds that 74 years elapsed from the birth of Christ to the destruction of Jerusalem, and "from thence to the present time 1510 [years]." — *ibid.,* 27.

14 For a general indictment of the lack of specific scholarship in this area, see C. B. Schmitt's essay review, "A Fresh Look at Mechanics in 16th-Century Italy," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 1 (1970), 161-171.

15 Treating of the sources of Galileo's ideas in "Galileo's Precursors," *Galileo Reappraised,* ed. C. L. Golino (Berkeley 1966), 41, Moody writes: "In what form, or through what books, these ideas were conveyed to Galileo, are questions that, if answerable in whole or in part, would cast a good deal of light on the way Galileo's thinking developed. If historians of science had given more time to historical research on this problem, instead of engaging in a priori debates over the validity or invalidity of Duhem's thesis, better insight into the nature of Galileo's scientific achievements might well have been gained."

Galileo's hand, that go to make up the *Juvenilia*. In general these notes treat of two types of problem, the first relating to Aristotle's treatise *De caelo et mundo* and the second to the subject of alteration and the way in which alteration is related to the forms of the elements and their qualities. In the second category there are only eight citations of Aquinas, so that the remaining majority (21 citations) are concerned with the matter of *De caelo et mundo*. Apart from these references in the first volume of the *Opere*, Aquinas is cited seven times in Vol. III, twice each in Vols. IV and V, and once in Vol. XIX, for a grand total of 44 citations, while he is also named, in passing, in at least five other places.[16] Compared to this rather liberal use of Aquinas himself, Galileo's attention to the members of Aquinas's school, "the Thomists," is relatively restricted. Aside from the one citation of Thomas de Vio Cajetan in Vol. V, to which reference has already been made, all of the references to Thomists are to be found in the *Juvenilia* section of Vol. I. Cumulatively these amount to 29 references, of which 12 pertain to the matter of *De caelo* and 17 to that of alteration and the elements. The content of all of these citations will now be sketched in a general way, outlining first Galileo's rather extensive use of Aquinas's teaching and then his sparser references to the Thomistic school. This survey will provide the background information necessary for the detailed examination, to be undertaken in Section II of this paper, of the specific understanding and evaluation of the Thomistic tradition revealed in the *Juvenilia*.

A. *Citations of St. Thomas*

The *Juvenilia* is a composite treatise that purposes to present, in more or less systematic fashion, the essential content of Aristotle's four books *De caelo* and his two books *De generatione*. The treatise is prefaced by two brief questions where the author[17] inquires first concerning the subject of Aristotle's *De caelo* and second concerning the order, connection, and titling of these books. St. Thomas is mentioned in both questions, first for his view that this subject is the universe according to all its integral parts[18] and secondly for his insisting on the

16 The references in passing occur in Vols. IV, 421; XII, 265; XIV, 260; and XIX, 298 and 319. The remaining citations are located, verified and in most cases explained in detail in what follows.

17 Although the writer of the *Juvenilia* was certainly Galileo, it is not known whether the notes are his own composition or whether they are copied from another source (or sources); hence, reference will be made simply to the "author" throughout the remainder of this section.

18 15.15. In this method of citation, which will be employed throughout, the first number is the page on which the citation occurs and the second is the line number; all such references are to Vol.

title *De caelo et mundo,* along with Albertus Magnus and other "Latins," against the Greek tradition represented by Alexander and Simplicius, who would name the books simply *De caelo* from their "more noble part."[19] Thereupon the work is divided into two tractates, the first concerned with *De mundo* and consisting of four questions and the second concerned with *De caelo* and consisting of six questions.

The tractate *De mundo,* whose title the author seems to understand broadly enough to encompass the world or universe as well as the earth, has two preliminary questions which discuss the origins of the universe first as understood by ancient philosophers and second according to the Catholic faith, but in neither of these is St. Thomas mentioned. In the third question, however, which treats of the unity and perfection of the universe, Aquinas is discussed at some length. He is first invoked in support of the author's contention that the universe is one, based on his argument from the order existing in things created by God.[20] The author's next conclusion is that the unity of the universe cannot be demonstrated by reason, although it is certain from faith that only one universe exists. Here he raises five queries and offers his own interpretation of St. Thomas to resolve the first three of them. One of Aquinas's arguments seems to maintain that earth's natural motion to a center would preclude there being any other earth than this one, but this is to be understood only of what happens according to nature from God's ordinary power.[21] The second query is whether God can add any species to this universe, or make other worlds that have more perfect species that are essentially different from those found here. Both Scotus and Durandus deny this possibility, but Aquinas and practically everyone else hold that God's infinite power would enable Him to make more perfect universes to infinity.[22] The third query is whether God could make creatures more perfect than those He has made in this world, to which the author replies that He could make them accidentally more perfect but not essentially so, and here he adduces Aquinas's example of the number four, whose essence cannot be varied, and argues that other essences are like this also.[23]

I of Favaro's National Edition. To save space, and in view of the general availability of the National Edition, the Latin text will not be given in these notes.

19 21.36.

20 27.31, citing *Summa theologiae,* la, q. 46 (given erroneously as q. 43), a. 3.

21 29.13, citing ibid., ad 3, and 29.16-17. Galileo writes "de potentia naturali vel de ordinaria"; St. Thomas speaks only of God's "potentia ordinata" (see la, q. 25, a. 5, ad 1), but in his school the expression "potentia ordinaria" became quite common. (Here and henceforth references to the *Summa theologiae* are made by citing only the part, the question, and the article numbers).

22 29.29, citing la, q. 25 (given erroneously as q. 21), a. 6.

23 30.7, citing ibid.

The fourth question is whether the world could have existed from eternity, and here the author presents three conclusions: (1) that the world did not exist from eternity since it is of faith that it was created in time; (2) that on God's part there is no repugnance that the world could have existed from eternity; and (3) that there is a repugnance, however, on the part of creatures, whether these be corruptible or incorruptible.[24] These conclusions and their proofs are preceded by four opinions, and Aquinas is mentioned in the discussion of three of them. The first opinion is that of Gregory of Rimini and other nominalists, who maintain that the world could have existed from eternity whether it be made up of successive or permanent entities or corruptible and incorruptible ones. This seems to gain some support from St. Thomas, the author notes, when he proves that the creation of the universe cannot be demonstrated from reason.[25] Also, Aquinas's maintaining that creation does not involve any action going forth from God to creatures[26] is used in a quite complex argument in support of the same conclusion. The second opinion is that of Durandus and "many moderns," which holds that there is no repugnance to eternal existence on the part of incorruptible things, whereas there is of corruptible things, and St. Thomas seems also to support this.[27] The fourth opinion, arguing from other *loci* in St. Thomas, the author identifies as that of Aquinas himself, which is in agreement with the teachings of Scotus, Ockham, the "Parisian doctors," and Pererius.[28] This would maintain that the world could have existed from eternity on the part of incorruptible things, but that there are problems associated with corruptible things; Durandus points out the absurdities that follow from allowing corruptible things an eternal existence, but these can be solved by admitting infinites in

24 The more common Thomistic opinion would agree with the first two conclusions but would disagree with the third, maintaining that there is no repugnance on the part either of the act of production or of the thing produced (whether corruptible or incorruptible) that creatures with a stable nature should have existed from eternity. Apart from St. Thomas, this was held by Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Soncinas, Javelli, Soto, and Banez. St. Bonaventure, on the other hand, held the third conclusion as stated by the author; so did Philoponus, Henry of Ghent and, among the late sixteenth-century authors, Toletus and Vallesius. Giles of Rome, Scotus, and Pererius argued dialectically on both sides of the question and came to no firm conclusion. The author of the *Juvenilia*, surprisingly enough, identifies the opinion of St. Thomas with that of Scotus and Pererius (see fns. 28 and 29, infra).

25 32.10-11, citing *De potentia*, q. 3 (given erroneously as q. 13), [a. 17], and la, [q. 46, a. 2]. Identifications in square brackets are not made in the text but are supplied by myself.

26 33.28, citing la, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2.

27 34.11, citing la, q. 46, a. 2.

28 35.26-29, citing *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 14; *De aeternitate mundi; Contra gentiles*, Bk. 2, c. 38; la, q. 46. The reference to "doctores Parisienses" is at 35.29 and it occurs again at 138.5, without further identification. Duhem interprets these citations as showing Galileo's dependence on his "Parisian precursors"; see *Etudes sur Léonard de Vinci*. Troisième série: Les Précurseurs parisiens de Galilée (Paris 1913), 582-583. On Pererius, see fn. 82 below.

act, or infinites that can be actually traversed, or one infinite that is larger than another.[29]

The second tractate *De caelo* begins with two rather technical questions, the first on the unity of the heavens and the second on the order of the celestial spheres, which draw heavily from medieval writers on astronomy but make no mention of Aquinas. In the third question, which inquires whether the heavens are composed of simple bodies, the author argues that the heavens are a body distinct from the four elements and are not composed from these elements. In discussing the opinion of ancient philosophers before Aristotle, who attributed the same nature to the heavens as to the elements, the author documents Aquinas's interpretation of Empedocles's and Plato's teachings on this matter.[30] Again, in reply to various objections that are brought against Aristotle's teaching, the author culls responses from Aristotelian commentators and among these he cites in some detail Alexander, Simplicius, and Aquinas.[31] The fourth question is whether the heavens are corruptible, and here the author's main difficulties stem from whether one is to consider the heavens from their intrinsic principles or in relation to the absolute power of God, who can annihilate anything regardless of its natural potencies, provided only that it has an obediential potency to His command.[32] In explaining his solution and the arguments against it, the author mentions Aquinas along with Simplicius and Averroës as holding for a twofold alteration, one corruptive and the other perfective.[33] He cites also Aquinas's opinion that, on the day of judgment, the heavens will not be corrupted substantially but

29 St. Thomas does not state the conclusion in this way in any of the foregoing references nor would most Thomists say that it is his conclusion (see fn. 24). In *De aeternitate mundi* he does allude to the question of infinites in act, but this is merely to state that the question has not yet been solved (Marietti ed., n. 310, p. 108). The terminology used by the author is to be found, however, in later scholastics and particularly in Soto's *Questiones* on the *Physics* of Aristotle, Bk. 3, qq. 3-4, and Bk. 8, qq. 1-2.

30 56.19 and 27, citing 1a, q. 68, a. 1, where the author is critical of Aquinas's statement: "This was the opinion of Plato, who regarded heavenly matter as made of the element fire." He writes: "Plato videtur consensisse cum Aegyptiis: verum noluit caelum esse tantum igneum, ut male illi adscripsit D. Thomas ubi supra, sed maxime constare tamen ex caeteris elementis sive ex summitatibus illorum et, ut ait Proclus, ex delitiis, maxime vero ex terra et igne." (56.26-30).

31 60.27, citing Aquinas's commentary on the *De caelo*, Bk. 3 [lect. 8] and the *Metaphysics*, Bk. 7 [lect. 1]. The author here appears to be quoting Aquinas, whereas in actuality he is summarizing and interpreting his argument.

32 Ratio huius est, quia divinae potentiae non est necesse ut respondeat potentia naturalis, qua res ex sua natura sit corruptibilis, sed satis est potentia quaedam quam obedientialem appellant theologi, qua omnia creata subiciuntur Deo" — 65.22-26. The expression "potentia obedientialis" derives from Aquinas (*De virtutibus in communi*, q. un., a. 10 ad 13) and gained acceptance among theologians in later centuries; other medievals, such as Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure, used the related expression "potentia obedientiae."

33 69.13.

only with respect to certain of their accidents.[34] The fifth question is a rather lengthy disquisition on whether or not the heavens are composed of matter and form, and here Aquinas is given more attention than in any other part of the *Juvenilia.* The author first identifies St. Thomas's position as being that the heavens are composed of matter and form,[35] but then notes that Aquinas differs from many other Aristotelians in holding that the matter of the heavens is different in kind from the matter here below.[36] Later he cites approvingly an argument taken from Aquinas to prove that the heavens are composed of matter and form and replies to a whole series of objections that have been raised against the Thomistic arguments.[37] Again, he quotes the proofs given by Thomas in the commentary on the *Physics* to show that there can be a potency in the heavens, and then gives further arguments to show that this implies that matter is also there, while using the general dichotomy between potency and act as a principle throughout.[38] The author is convinced that the heavens are not composed of a matter that is of the same kind as that here below. Here his principal adversary seems to be Giles of Rome, who in turn is arguing against Aquinas,[39] but whose arguments the author is at pains to refute. The sixth and final question of this tractate is concerned with the animation of the heavens, and here the author cites Aquinas as interpreting Aristotle differently in various works. In the *Summa contra gentiles,* as he reads it, Aquinas seems to state that Aristotle held that the intelligences are actually forms of the heavenly bodies,[40] whereas in the *Summa theologiae* and in the question *De spiritualibus creaturis* Aquinas seems to hold that the intelligences merely assist the heavens and are otherwise not their souls.[41] The author's conclusion is that, although it might be true that Aristotle regarded the intelligences as actually informing the heavenly bodies, more probably his opinion is that they are merely forms that assist such bodies in their motions, and for this he again invokes the authority of St. Thomas and other scholastics.[42]

34 69.22, citing *In 4 sent.,* d. 48, [q. 2, aa. 2-5].

35 76.24 and 29, citing 1a, q. 66, a. 2; *In 8 phys.,* lect. 21; *In 1 de caelo,* lect. 6; *In 2 sent.,* d. 13, q. 1, a. 1 [ad 3].

36 77.5. The best exposition and analysis of Aquinas's teaching on this subject is Thomas Litt, *Les Corps célestes dans l'univers de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Louvain 1963), 54-90.

37 82.21.

38 85.11, citing *In 8 phys.,* lect. 21; also 86.4.

39 93.22-24; "Aegidium...dum arguit contra D. Thomam..."

40 105.27, citing *Contra gentiles,* Bk. 2, c. 70.

41 107.20, citing 1a, q. 70, a. 3 (given erroneously as a. 6); *De spiritualibus creaturis* [q. un., a. 6]. This inconsistency is discussed at length by Ferrariensis in his commentary on the *Contra gentiles,* Bk. 2, c. 70, n. 3, where he offers reasons why St. Thomas may have wished to leave his interpretation of Averroës open on this point.

42 108.19, mentioning "Scotus, Durandus, et alii scholastici."

The second broad division of the *Juvenilia* is not so well organized as the first and contains a number of ellipses or omissions that make for difficulty in recognizing its intended structure. It is probable, however, that this was planned to embrace two tractates, the first on alteration in matter (*De alteratione in materia*) and the second on the elements (*De elementis*). The tractate on alteration is the shorter of the two and seemingly was made up of only three questions. The first question is missing except for the last few lines of the text, which state a conclusion suggesting that the question was concerned with the nature of alteration, its subject, and its terminus. The second question treats of intension and remission as a species of alteration, and here St. Thomas is mentioned at the beginning as one of the authorities in this matter.[43] Otherwise he is not cited, although the members of his school are given close attention, as will become apparent below. The last question discusses the parts or degrees of qualities (*De partibus sive gradibus qualitatis*) and consists only of a series of six *praenotamina* relating to the latitudes and degrees of qualities. In the fifth of these the author notes that intensification does not come about through addition alone, but in some way requires a greater intensification in the subject, and this is how he thinks St. Thomas can be understood when he holds that intensification results from the eduction of a form in such a way that it becomes more radicated in the subject.[44]

The second tractate is devoted entirely to the elements, and apparently was to consist of four parts, of which only portions of the first two are extant. After a brief introduction on the nominal definition of an element, where Aquinas is cited,[45] the first part is devoted to the nature of the elements (*De quidditate et substantia elementorum*), and four questions are allotted to this. St. Thomas is not mentioned in the first two questions, treating respectively of the definitions of the elements and their material, efficient, and final causes. He *is* cited, however, in the third question, which inquires into the forms of the elements, for his opinion that these are substantial forms, with which the author himself agrees.[46] The fourth question is whether the forms of the elements undergo intension and remission, and here again St.

43 111.23; see p. 307, infra.

44 121.19. St. Thomas speaks of a greater participation of the form by the subject (1a2ae, q. 52, a. 2; 2a2ae, q. 24, a. 5), but within his school it became common to speak of the form being more "radicated" in the subject.

45 124.2, citing *In 1 phys.*, [lect. 1].

46 130.33, citing *In 2 de gen.*, [text] 16 [actually lect. 2, n. 1]; *In 3 meta.*, [text] 27 [actually lect. 8].

Thomas is cited as an authority along with various members of his school, as will be noted below.[47]

The second part of the tractate on the elements is seemingly concerned with their qualities and accidents in general, and is apparently made up of four questions. These discuss: (1) the number of primary qualities; (2) whether these are all positive or whether some are privative; (3) whether all four qualities are active; and (4) what the role of the primary qualities is in activity and resistance. St. Thomas is mentioned only in the third question, where his opinion on what constitutes the passivity of a quality is listed among the notes at the beginning of the question.[48] Finally, in a question which seems to be interpolated between the first two parts of this tractate and probably belongs to the first part, although it is not numbered in the proper sequence for this, St. Thomas and his school are given significant notice. The question discussed is whether elements and natural things have termini of largeness and smallness, and here, among the authorities, St. Thomas is cited for holding that the elements have an intrinsic terminus of smallness but that they have no terminus of largeness.[49] In the author's solution to this question he holds that in relation to God, no natural things have maxima and minima, and this despite the fact that some authorities have taught that a quality such as grace cannot be increased intensively to infinity. Other authorities, he says, including some interpreters of St. Thomas, are able to hold the contrary, by distinguishing what can be done by ordinary power and what by the absolute power of God.[50]

This completes the citations of St. Thomas in the *Juvenilia,* which is intended to provide the framework for our subsequent analysis. For reasons of completeness we will now mention more summarily the contexts in which Galileo mentions Aquinas in writings that proceeded not merely from his pen but leave no doubt about their being his own composition. The first of these is the group of manuscripts assembled by Favaro in Vol. I of the *Opere* under the general title *De motu,* parts of which have been translated into English and annotated by I. E. Drabkin.[51] In this material there are two direct citations of Aquinas and

47 133.30; see p. 312, infra.

48 167.29.

49 144.18, citing *In I phys.*, t. 36, 38 [lect. 9, nn. 10, 13]; *In* [1] *de gen.*, t. 41 [lect. 17, n. 6]; 1a, q. 7, a. 3; p. 313, infra. Note here and in fn. 46 supra that the author's method of citing Aquinas's commentary on Aristotle is not the usual one, and may indicate that he took the citations from a secondary source.

50 146.14; for a fuller discussion, see pp. 313-316, infra.

51 Galileo Galilei, *On Motion* and *On Mechanics.* Comprising *De Motu* (c. 1590), translated with Introduction and Notes by I. E. Drabkin, and *Le Meccaniche* (c. 1600), translated with Introduction and Notes by Stillman Drake (Madison 1960); see pp. 1-12.

one marginal notation, associating him with an opinion being discussed in the text. The two direct citations both relate to St. Thomas's distinctive teaching that motion through a vacuum would not take place instantaneously;[52] Galileo is in agreement with the conclusion, but apparently not with the reasoning Aquinas and others use to support it. The marginal note occurs in a chapter where Galileo is discussing the cause of the increased acceleration at the end of a body's fall, and refers the reader to St. Thomas's exposition of Aristotle's reason, namely, "because the weight of the body is more concentrated and strengthened as the body approaches its proper place."[53] Although these are the only explicit mentions of Aquinas, it should be noted that many of the matters discussed in these manuscripts relating to motion bear on distinctive views of St. Thomas and his school. Even a cursory examination, however, would enlarge this paper beyond reasonable limits, and thus the material relating to motion must be left for further exploration elsewhere.

Of the remaining citations of Aquinas a goodly number occur in Vol. III of the National Edition, where Galileo is discussing mainly astronomical matters. One citation is St. Thomas's elucidation of Aristotle's statement that there is no goodness in mathematics, because mathematicians "abstract from matter, motion, and final causality."[54] Two other references are to Aquinas's teaching on the movement of the heavens,[55] and two more to his views on the plurality of worlds as contained in his commentary on the first book of Aristotle's *De caelo.*[56] Yet another reference is to the *Summa contra gentiles,* where Aquinas's authority is invoked to show that it is "ex fide" that the heavens will stop moving at the end of the world.[57] These last three citations, it may be noted, refer to matters already discussed in the *Juvenilia* and show Galileo's continued preoccupation with topics about which he wrote in his early notebooks. Four other citations invoke St. Thomas's assistance in the interpretation of Sacred Scripture, two of these occurring in Galileo's letter to the Grand Duchess Christina already mentioned in connection with Cajetan.[58] Finally, in Vol. IV, Aquinas is mentioned twice, along with others, for his opinion that shape is not the cause of

52 284.8 and 410.21; see Galileo, *On Motion,* p. 49 and p. 50, fn. 24. This distinctive teaching of St. Thomas is discussed at length in another article in these Commemorative Studies by J. A. Weisheipl, "Motion in a Void: Aquinas and Averroës," Vol. I, pp. 469-490.

53 316, fn. 1; see Galileo, *On Motion,* p. 85, fn. 1.

54 III, 255, citing 1a, q. 5, a. 3 ad 4.

55 III, 284 and 346.

56 III, 353 and 354, citing *In 1 de caelo* [lect. 16, nn. 6-7].

57 III, 364, citing *Contra gentiles,* Bk. 1, c. 20.

58 III, 290; V, 333-334 (for the English of this, see Drake, *Discoveries,* 210); XIX, 359.

motion, but of its being slower or faster.[59] These particular references are worthy of detailed examination in the context of fuller discussions of the manuscripts *De motu,* as has already been observed.

B. *Citations of Thomists*

With this general overview established it is now possible to deal at greater depth with points in St. Thomas's teaching that were taken up and developed by his followers. Although there are fewer references in the *Juvenilia* to Thomists than there are to St. Thomas, the former occur where points of doctrine are being subjected to closer scrutiny and thus shed as much light on the author's knowledge of Thomism as do the more extensive references to Aquinas.

That the author was aware of the existence of a Thomistic school seems incontestable in the light of his reference to "Thomists" (*Thomistae*). In the first place where he uses this term he identifies four members of the school, all Dominicans and easily recognized for their professed loyalty to St. Thomas. The context is in a discussion whether the heavens are a composed body, understanding this in the sense of composed of matter and form. The author writes:

> All of the Arabs also, with the single exception of Averroës, assign a composition to the heavens; as Avicembron in the book *Fons Vitae,* from Albert and from St. Thomas in the first part [of the *Summa theologiae*], q. 66, a. 2; Avempace, from the first book of *De caelo,* tract. 1, c. 3; Avicenna, in the first [book] of *Sufficientia,* c. 3; and a large number of Latins also, as Albertus Magnus in the first [book] of the *Physics,* as above, the eighth [book] of the *Physics,* tract. 1, c. 13, and in the book *De quatuor coaequaevis,* q. 4, a. 3, where he says also that this was the opinion of Rabbi Moses; St. Thomas, in the first part as above, and in the eighth [book] of the *Physics,* lesson 21, [n. 3], and in the first [book] of *De caelo,* lesson 6, [n. 6], although in the second [book] of *Sentences,* d. 13, q. 1, a. 1 [ad 3], he does not differ from Averroës; similarly all Thomists, as Capreolus in the second [book] of *Sentences,* d. 12; Cajetan in the first part, as above; Soncinas in the twelfth [book] of the *Metaphysics,* q. 7 [given erroneously as q. 3]; Ferrariensis, in the second [given erroneously as the third book] *Contra gentes,* c. 30; ...[60]

59 IV, 424 and 738.

60 76.22-33. In this and other texts quoted in this section, unless otherwise indicated I have verified all citations of St. Thomas and Thomists and noted any errors of the author; I have not done this, however, for other authorities cited. For St. Thomas I have used the standard Leonine and Marietti editions, together with the Mandonnet-Moos edition of the commentary on the *Sentences,* while for the Thomists I have used the following: Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis,* ed. C. Paban and T. Pègues, 7 vols., (Tours 1900-1907); Cajetanus, *Commentaria in Summam Theologiae Sancti Thomae* as printed in the Leonine edition of the *Summa,*

Before and after this text there is a fairly comprehensive citation of authors ranging from Plato and the Stoics to sixteenth century philosophers. Following a rather extensive discussion of the matter-form composition of the heavens and the kind of matter found in them, the author raises the question how the various matters might be said to differ. He writes: "You may ask here, what is it that differentiates these matters? Capreolus thinks that they differ by diverse forms, whereas Cajetan [that they differ] in themselves."[61] In his answer the author seems to side more with Cajetan than with Capreolus, although allowing that "the matters differ also in their order to the forms."[62] Then, following a disquisition on the implications of this for the corruptibility of the heavens, the author raises another question:

> You may ask here, what is to be said concerning the matter of the celestial spheres? Is it one or many, just as the spheres are many? It is to be said that if the heavenly spheres differ specifically among themselves, the matter of each sphere is different from the matter of the other, as Albert thinks in *De quatuor coaequaevis*, q. 2, a. 6, and Cajetan in the first part, q. 66, a. 2, [n. 7]. Yet the contrary is held by Capreolus in the second [book] of *Sentences*, d. 12, q. 1, a. 3, Soncinas in the twelfth [given erroneously as the tenth book] of the *Metaphysics*, q. 10, and others.[63]

Here again the author sides with Cajetan, as against Capreolus and Soncinas, that a different matter is to be found in each of the heavenly spheres. The reason he gives is that if there were a single matter in the heavenly bodies and their forms were to differ specifically, that matter would be in potency to several forms, and then, when it exists under one form it would be deprived of another and be in potency to it; therefore there would be an intrinsic principle of corruption in the heavens. Having stated this, he notes the reply of "Capreolus and others" that this would not happen, because heavenly matter is not an apt subject of privation and the form of the heavenly body so informs the matter that it exhausts the matter's potency entirely.[64] The author responds to this,

and *Commentaria in De anima Aristotelis*, ed. P. I. Coquelle (Rome 1938); Soncinas, *Acutissime questiones metaphysicales* (Venice 1505); and Ferrariensis, *Commentaria in Summam Contra Gentiles*, as printed in the Leonine edition of the *Contra Gentiles*.

61 96.30-32. The reference to Capreolus is *In 2 sent.*, d. 12, concl. 2a; Cajetan's argument is in *In Iam*, q. 66, a. 2, n. 7, and is directed against Giles of Rome and Scotus.

62 97.2-3.

63 100.34-101.4. The "others" possibly refers to Javelli, *In 10 meta.*, q. 22. For Javelli I have used *Totius rationalis, naturalis, divinae ac moralis philosophiae compendium... his adjecimus in libros physicorum, de anima, metaphysicorum ejusdem questiones...*, 2 vols. (Lyons 1568).

64 101.17-19. In the place cited (see fn. 61), Capreolus is arguing against Durandus, Aureoli, and Giles of Rome. The "others" probably refers to Soncinas, *In 12 meta.*, q. 7, and Javelli, *In 10 meta.*, q. 22.

in turn, that it is open to all the objections that he has made against the arguments of Giles [of Rome], which connect the sameness of the matter with the sameness of its potency. Here again he answers an objection of Capreolus that this argument cannot be applied to the matter of the heavenly bodies, because although sublunary matter can admit privation, celestial matter cannot.[65] "On the contrary," writes the author, "for if the matter of the heavens is in potency to several heavenly forms, it can be the subject of privation, and secondly, if this is not the reason why matter is the subject of privation, Giles could say that matter that is not of the same definition as an inferior [type] is not the subject of privation from its nature but from the fact that it receives a form with [its] contrary."[66] After further extended discussion, the author concludes that since the matters and the forms of the heavenly spheres are different, one planet is essentially different from any other, since the planets are to be identified with their spheres, whereas all of the stars of the firmament have the same species.

Of the various Thomists mentioned in the *Juvenilia*, Ferrariensis receives the least detailed consideration, being mentioned only for the three opinions: (1) that the world could have existed from eternity, where he is said to agree with John Canonicus and "many moderns";[67] (2) that the heavens are composed, as in the text cited above; and (3) that it is the teaching of Aristotle that the intelligences are forms actually informing the heavens, where he is listed for his commentary on the text of St. Thomas.[68]

From what has been said up to now, the author of the notes recorded in the *Juvenilia* can be regarded as being quite sympathetic to the teachings of St. Thomas and his school, while being cognizant in the cases mentioned of differences between Cajetan and Capreolus, and generally siding with Cajetan. When, however, we come to the next series of topics relating to the intension and remission of forms and special problems pertaining to the elements, we find that the attitude towards the Thomistic school becomes more critical, and that the Thomistic conclusions and the arguments in their support are generally contested.

65 101.29-232. Here the reference is to *In 2 sent.*, d. 12, a. 3, in reply to Giles's third and fifth arguments and *passim*.

66 101.32-102.2.

67 32.6, citing *In 8 phys.*, q. 15. I have perused Ferrariensis's *Quaestiones luculentissimae in octo libros physicorum Aristotelis* (Venice 1619) in the Dominican library at Salamanca, but do not have it at hand to verify this citation; there is also an earlier edition (Rome 1577) which I have not seen. John Canonicus, or Juan Marbres, was a Spanish Scotist of the first half of the fourteenth century. The "plerique recentiores" probably refers to nominalists such as Durandus, Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel, and William Ockham as well as to contemporary Thomists.

68 105.27, citing *In 2 contra gentiles*, c. 70.

The author begins his treatment of intension and remission by stating generally that this is the process by which a quality is varied according to more or less, and by noting the importance of the topic, namely, that, since it is found in almost every alteration, one cannot understand how alteration comes about if he does not understand intension and remission; and, since every action comes about through intension and remission, this process must be understood if one is to understand how any body acts on another. Immediately following this he lists the authorities from which he will draw his arguments, as follows:

> Authors who have treated of this matter are: St. Thomas in the first [book] of *Sentences*, d. 17 [given erroneously as d. 16] q. 2, a. 2, and in the first part of the second part [of the *Summa theologiae*], q. 52, a. 2, and in the second part of the second part, q. 24, a. 5; Capreolus, in the first [book] of *Sentences*, d. 17, q. 2; Herveus in *Quodlibet* 6, q. 11; Gandavensis [Henry of Ghent] in *Quodlibet* 5, q. 19; Soncinas in the eighth [book] of the *Metaphysics*, [q. 21]; Giles [of Rome] in the first [book] of *De generatione*, q. 19, and *Quodlibet* 5, q. 13, and *Quodlibet* 2, q. 14; Burley in the tract *De intensione et remissione*; Durandus in the first [book] of *Sentences*, d. 17, q. 7; Gregory [of Rimini], same place, q. 4, a. 1; Scotus, same, q. 4; Ockham and Gabriel [Biel], same, q. 7.[69]

The author then begins with three *praenotamina*, in the second of which he observes that both alteration and intension are successive, although he notes that it is possible that some alterations take place instantaneously. His reasoning is as follows:

> Alteration is successive, not only from the fact that the subject is altered in one part and then in another, but also by reason of form, insofar as the remiss comes to be intense, and the other way around, in the same part of the subject. And that such a successive intension exists may be proved [as follows]: because, even when the whole subject has been altered, there will yet follow an alteration that comes to be successively. Moreover: certain alterations exist that do not happen successively on the part of the subject, since all of its parts are altered together, as is apparent from the first book of the *Physics*, [comm.] 23, an example of which, according to Aristotle, is freezing; and nevertheless it is certain that some of these take place successively; therefore by reason of form, as Alexander [of Aphrodisias] rightly notes from Simplicius, fourth book of the *Physics*, comm. 23 in t. 22. Nor can you object that Aristotle sometimes states that alteration is only continuous on the part of the subject; from which it seems to follow that there is no succession on the part of the form, and hence no intension either. For, from those things that have been said on the continuity of motion the reply should be obvious: for they cannot be

69 111.23-112.2. In verifying citations from Herveus I have used his *Quodlibeta undecim cum octo... tractatibus* (Venice 1513), which includes the treatise *De unitate formarum*.

intrinsically continuous on the part of the form, but they can be on the part of the subject and of time; beyond which, since Aristotle manifestly concedes that there is intension in quality, he necessarily also admits succession in alteration, beyond that which takes place on the part of the subject.[70]

The third of the *praenotamina* also includes some interesting material that pertains to our later analysis and should therefore be cited at this point. This is the author's classification of the various ways in which intension can take place in qualities:

Indeed intension can be in quality in two ways: first, consecutively; in which way, for example, health is intensified and diminished with the intension and remission of the qualities in which temperament consists; and in this way also relation is said to undergo intension and remission by reason of its foundation; secondly, per se and properly. This again takes place in two ways: first, through mixture with a contrary, in which way, for example, the less hot always has some cold mixed with it; secondly, without the admixture of a contrary, as happens in light, in which there is a more or less either on the part of the agent, as it is more or less a light source, or on the part of the subject: for a subject that is less disposed receives less light and, if it is more disposed successively, it is also more illuminated. For intension properly speaking is that which is found in true alteration, and which is with the admixture of a contrary: concerning which there arises a difficulty as to how intension takes place in alteration. It should be noted that we can estimate an intension to have taken place in an alteration in two ways: first, extrinsically, when no change has taken place in the quality but only in something else: which can take place in two ways: for either the quality can be intensified from a greater disposition of the subject or from the expulsion of the contrary: secondly, intrinsically, when some change has been made in the quality that is intensified; which also can take place in two ways, either through a new production of the quality, or in some other way.[71]

Immediately following this preliminary material, the author states his own conclusions and proceeds to argue in their favor. The first of these conclusions reads as follows:

70 112.36-113.18. Most of the distinctions on which this discussion is based are to be found in Soncinas, *In 8 meta.*, q. 22, where he is inquiring whether the intensification of forms is a continuous motion. The discussion of freezing (*congelatio*) is quite similar to that in Toletus, or Francisco de Toledo (1533-1596), *Commentaria in libros de generatione et corruptione Aristotelis* (Venice 1575), Bk. 1, q. 6, 4ª concl. The reading of the Venice 1602 edition is as follows: "Nec in hoc est id universaliter verum: sunt enim alterationes quae secundum subiecti partes simul fiunt, ut patet de coagulatione et congelatione, de quibus multoties diximus." — fol. 17va.

71 113.21-114.6. This particular mode of classification is not found in any of the Thomistic authors cited, although it is consistent with Soncinas's discussion in *In 8 meta.* q. 22, and with Capreolus's sixth conclusion in *In 1 sent.*, d. 17, q. 2, a. 1, "quod aliquae formae intensibiles intenduntur non solum secundum majorem participationem subjecti, sed etiam per additionem alicujus."

I say that first, intension does not take place through an extrinsic change alone: that is, because, granted the extrinsic change, an intension would follow in the quality itself; for then the intension would take place not from the disposition of the subject nor from the expulsion of the contrary, but from an increase on its own part; or, secondly, [it takes place] through the expulsion of the contrary or the disposition of the subject, with the quality remaining the same indivisibly in itself.[72]

Five different arguments are given in support of this position, in the third of which the interesting statement is made that "motion is nothing more than a *forma fluens*."[73] Then space is left for a second conclusion, which, however, is missing from the manuscript. Following this the author states his third conclusion, which reads: "I say, third, that in intension the prior part of the quality does not perish."[74] Five major arguments are again given in support of this, the last of which has many supporting syllogisms and distinctions. At the conclusion of all these the author makes a summary statement that, as it turns out, is transitional to the next conclusion he wishes to draw. He writes:

It therefore must be concluded that intension comes about through the production of a new quality in such a way that, when the latter part comes, the prior remains. Indeed this also can take place in two ways: first, that those later degrees that are added be produced in single instants; and in this way the intension would be discrete, as the Thomists prefer: secondly, in such a way that it come about successively, by a certain continued action.[75]

72 114.7-12: "Dico, iam primo, intensionem non fieri per solam mutationem extrinsecam: idest, vel quia, facta mutatione extrinseca, sequatur intensio in ipsa qualitate; nam tunc intensio non fieret; vel ex dispositione subiecti, vel ex expulsione contrarii: sed ex sui ipsius augumento [sic]; vel, 2°, per expulsionem contrarii, aut subiecti dispositionem [MS: dispositione], manente eadem qualitate indivisibili secundum se." I have retained Favaro's punctuation, despite the difficulty it makes for translation. The two alternatives seemingly contained in this conclusion are consistent, nonetheless, with Capreolus's sixth conclusion as given in fn. 71.

73 114.25.26. This statement would seem to align the author with the nominalist view of motion, rather than with the realist view which identified motion as a "fluxus formae." For a discussion of the distinction between "forma fluens" and "fluxus formae," see E. J. Dijksterhuis, *The Mechanization of the World Picture*, tr. C. Dikshoorn (Oxford 1961), 174-175. It is noteworthy, however, that Herveus Natalis speaks of motion in the same manner: "... illud non potest esse aliud nisi forma fluens que communiter ponitur esse ipse motus..." *Quodlibet* 2, q. 13 (Venice 1513), fol. 59ra. Herveus's arguments in this locus are similar to those discussed in the *Juvenilia*.

74 115.32. The position that the prior part of the quality perishes in intensification is identified by Javelli (*In 8 meta.*, q. 6) as that of Walter Burley [in his *De intensione et remissione*] and of Gregory of Rimini, *In 1 sent.*, d. 17, q. 4, a. 2. Gregory, in this locus, attributes the position to Burley and to Godfrey of Fontaines.

75 117.26-31. The Thomists to whom the author refers seem to be Herveus, *Quodlibet* 2, q. 13, and Soncinas, *In 8 meta.*, q. 22. According to Soncinas, the intensification of forms can be continuous in three senses: (1) in the Heraclitean sense of continually going on; (2) in the sense of deriving continuity from the parts of the subject being altered, either without the corruption of a previous part as in heating or with corruption of a previous part as in illuminating; and (3) in the sense of being continuous on the part of the form being intensified. Soncinas holds that St. Thomas

Note here that "the Thomists" are referred to as a group and that the author merely lists their opinion without commenting on it in one way or another.

The fourth conclusion, however, addresses this point directly and sides against the Thomistic school. The author's conclusion and the arguments in its support read as follows:

> I say, fourthly, that intension comes about continuously. [This] is proved, first: because otherwise it would follow that alteration is not one motion, because instants are not continuous but time intervenes, nor would it be motion, because it would not be the act of a being in potency, as has been proved in the *Physics*. [It] is proved, secondly; because, if a form or quality is produced through instants, either the agent does nothing in the time intermediate between the instants, or it does something. If it does nothing, this is absurd: because the agent then has been applied and has a sufficient active power, and the patient is indeed disposed; therefore it acts maximally, since no reason can be assigned why it should have acted a little previously and no longer acts. If, on the other hand, it does not act maximally, [this is] because some time must elapse between the first and the second action lest there be continuity; but for discontinuity any time at all is sufficient and, however much be assigned, it is enough to have less, and less to infinity; therefore a determinate time should never have been assigned: [and] therefore there should never be action. And if the agent does act, either it produces something of that quality, and thus successively; or it merely disposes. But, leaving out that it cannot always be shown that the agent disposes or how it disposes, if it disposes it induces some quality in the thing: either therefore this disposition and quality is induced successively, and so a successive quality is given; or through instants, and then the same question returns.[76]

denies that the intension of forms is continuous in the third of these senses. He writes: "St. Thomas holds the contrary opinion, namely, that the intension of forms is not a motion that is strictly and completely continuous; in fact, an intermediate rest intervenes, since the altering body, if it is sufficiently close to the patient, begins to act on the patient causing in it as perfect a form as it can; and afterwards the body acted upon rests for some time under that form, and is uniformly disposed according to it until, either because of a greater disposition of the subject or because of more power in the agent or from some other cause, it can make that form more perfect" (fol. 109rb). The Latin reads as follows: "Sed sanctus Thomas tenet opinionem contrariam, scilicet quod intensio formarum non sit motus simpliciter et omnino continuus; immo incidit quies media, quoniam corpus alterans si sit sufficiens et non impeditum in primo instanti quo est sufficienter approximatum passo incipit agere in passum causando in ipsum tam perfectam formam quam potest; et postea mobile per aliquod tempus quiescit sub illa forma, et secundum eam uniformiter se habet; donec aut propter maiorem dispositionem subiecti, aut propter maiorem virtutem agentis, vel ex aliqua alia causa possit magis perficere illam formam..." This teaching, it should be noted, was not accepted by Spanish writers under the influence of Domingo de Soto, being rejected as not authentically Thomistic by Toletus and then, in more definite fashion, by Domingo Banez in his *Commentaria et Quaestiones in duos Aristotelis de generatione et corruptione libros* (Salamanca 1585), a work almost exactly contemporaneous with the writing of the *Juvenilia*. See fn. 98, infra.

76 117.32-118.15. These arguments are given by Javelli, *In 8 phys.*, q. 7, as objections to the Thomistic position, although he connects no names with the objections, speaking only of "via

Up to this point there has been no discussion of the Thomistic opinion, but now the author proceeds:

> Nor do you say with the Thomists that heat having been produced, at the same instant it is then extended to the other parts of the subject, for that first part in which heat is already produced is closer to the agent; therefore the agent, having left that, will not act on the more remote parts. Add [to this] that it would follow that the agent does not act any less in the closer part than in the most remote, nor does it first induce the first degree in the closest part [any more] than in the most remote. [The argument] is confirmed: because a form is produced successively because it resists a contrary; therefore it cannot be produced through instants alone: because it would otherwise follow that each part would be produced in an instant, and, therefore, without resistance and all at once. Therefore it must be concluded with Simplicius on the eighth [book] of the *Physics*, 12 in t. 23, Giles in the first [book] of *De generatione* on t. 20, Jandun in the eighth [book] of the *Physics*, q. 8, and others, that intension and remission come about continuously.[77]

Here, then, is the first explicit rejection of a teaching of the Thomistic school, although it is noteworthy that the particular Thomists are not mentioned *nominatim*, nor is there any indication of differences of opinion that might exist within Thomism on this particular conclusion.

Having finished this exposition of the intension and remission of qualities, the author next turns his attention to special questions relating to the elements, among which are found the question "Whether the forms of elements undergo intension and remission?" Here he divides the authorities into two groups, the first including the Averroists and the Scotists, among others, and the second including Avicenna, St. Thomas and the Thomistic school, nominalists, and others. The two groupings are of interest for the diversity of the thinkers enumerated within them, and for this reason are translated here in their entirety:

nostra" and the "multi" who are opposed to it (ed. cit., pp. 602-604). Diego de Astudillo, O.P., in his *Questiones super libros de generatione et corruptione* (Valladolid 1532), Bk. 1, q. 10, traces the opposition back to Burley and "all the nominalists," who hold that the motion of intensification is "simpliciter continuus"; his own position he states as follows: "motus intensionis et remissionis non est continuus sed successivus ... multae mutationes instantanee sibi succedentes" (fol. 21ra). Toletus, while arguing in the same vein as the author of the *Juvenilia*, does not identify the source of his arguments, except to mention a special teaching of Giles of Rome, that alteration is discrete with respect to the parts of the subject but continuous with respect to intensification, and to note that John of Jandun seems to follow Giles. The position that alteration is continuous in both of Giles's respects is identified by Toletus as "fere communis" (ed. cit., fol. 16vb).

77 118.-27. The arguments here are drawn from Soncinas, *In 8 meta.*, q. 22, fol. 110rb; the author's mention of Giles and Jandun, together with the form of his arguments, suggests some dependence on Toletus, *In 1 de gen.*, q. 6, 1a concl., as mentioned in the previous note. Immediately following the text cited, in 118.27-119.4 the author goes on to answer an objection; this too is taken from Soncinas, loc. cit., fol. 109va.

The first opinion is that of Averroës, in the third [book] of *De caelo*, comm. 67; Nifo and Paul of Venice at the end of the first [book] of *De generatione*; Zimara, proposition 20; Taiapetra, second book, tract. 4; Jandun in the eighth [book] of the *Metaphysics*, q. 5; Achillini, book two of *De elementis*, a. 3; Contarenus, book three; Alexander, in the eighth [book] of the *Metaphysics*, t. 10; all of whom say that the substantial forms of the elements undergo intension and remission, to which can be added Scotus, in the eighth [book] of the *Metaphysics*, q. 3, whom Antonius Andreas follows, eleventh [book] of the *Metaphysics*, q. 1; Pavesius, in the book *De accretione;* John Canonicus, in the fifth [book] of the *Physics*, q. 1; who affirm the same thing of any substantial form that is educed from the potency of matter, so as to exclude the rational soul ...[78]

The second opinion is that of others who deny that forms undergo intension and remission. This is that of Avicenna in the first [book] of *Sufficientia*, chapters 10 and 11, and in the first part of the first [book] of doctrine, third [part], chapter 1; whom Averroës opposes. The same is the opinion of St. Thomas in the opusculum *De mixtione*, and in the second [book] of *Sentences*, d. 15, [q. 2, a. 1], and in the first [part of the *Summa theologiae*], q. 76, a. 4 [ad 4], and there also Cajetan; Capreolus, in the second [book] of *Sentences*, d. 15, a. 1, concl. 2, and in the solutions to arguments against that; Soncinas, in the eighth [book] of the *Metaphysics*, qq. 25 and 26, and in the tenth [book] of the *Metaphysics*, q. 27, and elsewhere; Gregory, in the second [book] of *Sentences*, d. 15, q. 1; Ockham, *Quodlibet* 3, q. 4; Marsilius, in the first [book] of *De generatione*, q. 22; Themistius, in the second [book] of *De anima*, t. 4; Philoponus, in the second [book] of *De generatione*, comm. 33: who, however, teach only this, that the forms of the elements do not remain actual in the compound; but from this the other follows. Moreover, the same opinion is defended by Durandus in the first [book] of *Sentences*, d. 17, q. 6; Henry, *Quodlibet* 3, q. 5; Nobilius, q. 3 in chap. 3; Buccaferrus in t. 18; many of the commentators in the first [book] of *Microtecni*, comm. 15; Herveus in the tract *De unitate formarum* [qq. 15-18]; Giles, in the first [book] of *De generatione*, q. 18; Albert, in the first [book] of *Techni*, chap. 25; and Javellus, in the eighth [book] of the *Metaphysics*, q. 6 [given erroneously as q. 5].[79]

78 133.8-16.

79 133.28-134.9. The *De mixtione* of St. Thomas has the fuller title, *De mixtione elementorum ad magistrum Philippum*, and is printed in the Marietti ed. of the *Opuscula philosophica* (Rome 1954), pp. 155-156; see especially n. 433, p. 155, and nn. 436-437, p. 156. The author's reference to Aquinas's *In 2 Sent.*, d. 15, may be based on conjecture, since Capreolus has a long discussion of the subject in this *locus*; St. Thomas has only a tangential reference to it in q. 2, a. 1. Cajetan's arguments are directed against Scotus, Henry of Ghent, and the Averroists; see Vol. 5 of the Leonine ed., n. 19, p. 227. Javelli discusses the intension and remission of substantial forms in both q. 4 and q. 6, but not in q. 5, although he does state in q. 6, "hanc opinionem pertractavimus in q[uaestione] praecedenti," whereas the treatment is actually to be found in q. 4; perhaps this is the source of the author's miscitation.

Note that in this listing of the second group the Thomists are put in different places; first there is St. Thomas, with whom is mentioned Cajetan, Capreolus, and Soncinas, and then, after an enumeration of eight other thinkers, Herveus, followed three names later by Javelli. From the one enumeration of *Thomistae* in the *Juvenilia,* it is obvious that the author recognized Cajetan, Capreolus, and Soncinas as Thomists, and from the authorities listed at the beginning of the section *De intensione et remissione,* Herveus is grouped with Capreolus and Soncinas; with regard to Javelli, this is the only explicit mention of him in the *Juvenilia,* but there is indirect evidence that the author used him for summaries of Thomistic teaching.

After this presentation of the various opinions, the author appears to side with those in the second grouping, for he states immediately after the text just cited: "This second opinion is proved true from these arguments."[80] He then goes on to list four different arguments in some detail, proving that the forms of the elements do not undergo intension and remission. Following this, however, he lists a number of arguments *sed contra* that have been held by proponents of the first opinion. Unfortunately the question is not complete, and does not proceed beyond the listing of four objections. These are not answered, but it is probable that had the question been completed the resolutions of their arguments would have been given in a way that would safeguard the proofs offered in favor of the second opinion.

The last question wherein the opinion of Thomists are referenced is that devoted to the problem, "Whether elements and other natural things have termini of largeness and smallness?" As in some previous questions, the preliminaries include the various definitions and distinctions that will be employed in the discussion, and these make up eight *praenotamina.* These are followed by a listing of four opinions, of which the first is of some interest:

> The first opinion is [that] of those saying that all natural things, elements excepted, have intrinsic termini of largeness and smallness; elements, on the other hand, have an intrinsic terminus of smallness, but none of largeness: so St. Thomas in the first [book] of the *Physics,* t. 36, 38, *De generatione,* t. 41, and the first part [of the *Summa theologiae*], q. 7, a. 3; Capreolus, in the second [book] of *Sentences,* d. 19, [q. un.]; Soto, in the first [book] of the *Physics,* q. 4; and all Thomists.[81]

80 134.9-10.

81 144.15-20. For the identification of the references to St. Thomas, see fn. 49 supra. To verify the reference to Soto I have used the 2d ed. of his *Quaestiones super octo libro physicorum Aristotelis* (Salamanca 1555) and have checked this against the Venice 1582 edition, which may have been available to the author. Among "all Thomists" one would have to include Cajetan,

Note the significant inclusion of Soto's name after that of Capreolus, with the implicit acknowledgement that he is to be enumerated in the Thomistic school. Soto is the only Spanish Dominican mentioned by the author, although he is aware of other Spanish writers such as Pererius[82] and Vallesius.[83] Spanish Dominicans differed from Italian Dominicans in their treatment of some questions discussed in the *Juvenilia*, and thus this supplies an interesting point of comparison for judging the author's knowledge of variations within the Thomism of his day.

Following the foregoing enumeration, five arguments are offered in support of the first opinion, and these will be discussed later. The remaining three opinions that are listed, immediately following these arguments, are those of Averroës and the Averroists, the opinion of Paul of Venice, and finally the opinion of Scotus, Ockham, and Pererius. Then the author lists ten assertions or conclusions which he wishes to establish, and in the first and seventh of these he makes mention of individual Thomists. The first conclusion and its proof read as follows:

> I say, first: it seems certain, whatever others may think, that no things have maxima and minima in relation to God: not indeed that they can go to infinity, for concerning this elsewhere; but only God can, by absolute power, increase and diminish any created thing forever and ever. And this indeed is proved of living things [as follows]: for they require quantity, as something extrinsic, for their operation and conservation; but God can supply the concursus of any extrinsic cause; therefore [etc.]. Concerning qualities, however, Scotus and Durandus in the third [book of *Sentences*], d. 13; Richard and Giles in the first [book of *Sentences*], d. 17; Henry, *Quodlibet* 5, q. 22; Cajetan, in the third part [of the *Summa theologiae*], q. 7, a. 3 [given erroneously as a. 4], and q. 10, and in the

Ferrariensis, and Javelli; other Thomists who taught this doctrine but are not mentioned in the *Juvenilia* include Gratiadei (John of Ascoli), Peter Crokart of Brussels, and Diego de Astudillo; Toletus also followed the Thomistic teaching on this subject.

82 Benedictus Pererius, or Benito Pereyra (*c.* 1535-1610), Spanish Jesuit philosopher and Scriptural exegete who spent most of his teaching life in Rome. His *De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus* (Rome 1562) is cited five times in Vol. I of Galileo's *Opere*, approvingly for its treatment of questions relating to the eternity of the universe and critically for its discussion of falling bodies. Pererius is somewhat eclectic but in his preface accords St. Thomas a place of honor among the philosophers, while favoring at times Scotistic or nominalist teachings himself. The Thomists he cites include Herveus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and Soncinas (see pp. 173, 197, 223, 227, 265).

83 Francisco Vallés (1524-1592), Spanish philosopher and physician who composed an exposition and Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics* (Alcala 1562), to which he appended his *Controversiarum naturalium ad tyrones pars prima, continens eas quae spectant ad octo libros Aristotelis de physica doctrina* (Alcala 1563); the latter is cited in the *Juvenilia*, p. 170. Vallés taught at Alcala, where he was a friend of Gaspar Cardillo de Villalpando (1527-1581), a classical Aristotelian who also commented on the *Physics* (Alcala 1566), but whose texts were soon replaced at Alcala by Soto's more scholastic commentaries. Vallés mentions Soto in his *Controversiae* but is generally opposed to his teaching.

> second [part] of the second [part], q. 24, a. 7, speaking of the quality of grace, deny that a quality can be increased to infinity intensively; because, since some qualities might have been created and limited by grace, the properties of the essence must have a certain limit, granted intrinsic, of intensification. But on the other hand Capreolus, in the third [book of *Sentences*], d. 13, q. 1, and in the first [book of *Sentences*], d. 17, q. 2, a. 2 [given erroneously as q. 4]; Almainus and Gregory, same place; Ockham, same place, and in the third [book of *Sentences*], d. 13, q. 7; Soto, in the first [book] of the *Physics*, q. 4, a. 2, where he shows that this is the opinion of St. Thomas in *De Veritate*, q. 29, a. 3; and that if, in the third [given in text as 13] part [of the *Summa theologiae*], q. 7, a. 12, he seems to say the contrary, this should be understood of ordinary law; they say: although quality of itself has a certain terminus in intensification, nevertheless by [God's] absolute power it can be increased. And this reason can be assigned: because qualities are not so intrinsically the instruments of forms that they essentially include the latitude owed to the form....
>
> And so I say, first, that no quality of itself, abstracting from an order to the subject or the agent, has a certain terminus in intensification; but it does not tend to infinity simply, because perhaps this is repugnant to a created nature, but to infinity syncategorematically. For which reason I say, secondly, the same quality, of itself, abstracting from the subject, does not require for itself a certain terminus. Add [to this] also, that the opinion of Capreolus is very probable.[84]

The text goes on to enumerate various objections and the replies that may be given to them, and the exposition reveals the author's respectable knowledge of the discussions current among nominalists and late scholastics generally.

The seventh conclusion is obviously directed against the Thomistic opinion, for it reads: "I say, seventhly, that elements and homogeneous compounds of themselves have no termini either extrinsic or intrinsic of largeness or smallness."[85] The proof is divided into two parts, the first consisting of four arguments to show that the elements have no termini of smallness, or *minima*. After this, the author continues:

> And these reasons prove that there is no minimum. It is much more easily proved that there is no maximum, especially since this is denied by

84 145.32-146.28. Cajetan is aware that he is disagreeing with the majority Thomistic opinion on this matter; mentioning the *Thomistae*, he adds "inter quos forte ego aliquando fui" [*In 2am 2ae*, q. 24, a. 7, n. 3 (Leonine ed., Vol. 8, p. 183)]. Capreolus's arguments are directed against Aureolus, Durandus, Ockham, and Scotus, among others. Soto is aware of Cajetan's arguments, cites two of the three *loci* given in the *Juvenilia*, and gives a fairly lengthy refutation of Cajetan's teaching.

85 152.11-12. This is the thesis of Vallesius, Villalpandus, and Pererius (see fns. 82 and 83); it is opposed to the teaching of Soto, Javelli, Astudillo, and Toletus, among others, including the Averroist John of Jandun.

> no one, except by Cajetan, in the first part [of the *Summa theologiae*], q. 7, a. 3. For Aristotle says in the second [book] of *De anima*, [text] 41, that fire can be increased to infinity. And this is obvious: for, if straw be added to the maximum, it will certainly be increased; for to say that the straw is not going to be burned, or, if it is burned, that in that event fire would be turned into air, this seems plainly ridiculous.[86]

This refutation of Cajetan is the only argument against *maxima*, and the author then turns to his remaining conclusions.

As to the rest of the question, there is no indication by Favaro that the treatment is incomplete, but one may suspect that it is from the fact that the solutions of the arguments that relate to the conclusions are limited to a refutation of the five arguments that have been given in support of the first opinion, that, namely, of the Thomistic school. It may be, however, that the author felt that the variations introduced in the second, third, and fourth opinions had been sufficiently accounted for in his own conclusions and in the arguments given in their support. If such is the case, then it would seem that the point of the entire question is to refute this particular Thomistic teaching.

Since the author's understanding of the arguments given by Thomists in support of their conclusions, and also his arguments against them, are of critical importance in judging his knowledge of Thomism, these arguments and the author's reasons for rejecting them are presented here in their entirety.

> PROPOSITION: All natural things, elements excepted, have intrinsic termini of largeness and smallness; elements, on the other hand, have an intrinsic terminus of smallness, but none of largeness.[87]
>
> FIRST ARGUMENT:
>
> [Proof]
>
> [This] is proved, first, from the authority of Aristotle, in the first [book] of the *Physics*, 36, where he says this; and in t. 38 he offers an argument against the ancients that, if there is no maximum and minimum, is worthless. For so he concludes against Anaxagoras: if anything can be separated from anything else, there is no minimum; but all natural things have a minimum; therefore, etc. Nor can you say that Aristotle supposes this contrary to Anaxagoras: for here Simplicius notes, in his comment 34, that Anaxagoras denied a minimum; and this seems probable, since he thought that anything could be separated from anything else. Moreover,

86 153.8-14. Cajetan's arguments are directed against Scotus [Leonine ed., Vol. IV, pp. 76-79, esp. n. 8 (p. 77) and n. 12 (p. 77)]. These arguments are discussed at length by Soto, *In I phys.*, q. 4, a. 2.

87 144.15-17.

Aristotle, in the second [book] of *De anima*, 41, teaches that everything constituted by nature has a definite terminus of largeness and smallness.[88]

[Reply]

Therefore, to the first argument of the first opinion I reply that Aristotle says that similar things have a minimum [when he is arguing] *ad hominem* against Anaxagoras. For, although, as I said, it seems probable from Simplicius that Anaxagoras denied a minimum, nevertheless Anaxagoras was defending two repugnant assertions. In the first he said that the first principles of all things are certain similar parts, and because of this, minimal; and from their mixing each thing is thought to be, and is named from, that species of which it contains the greater number of parts: for Simplicius attributes this to him, in the first [book] of the *Physics*, comm. 34. In the second [assertion] he was saying that anything can be separated out of anything: nor did he advert to the fact that this second [assertion] is repugnant to the first; for, if anything can be separated out of anything, one will never arrive at a minimum. Therefore Aristotle, so that he might use the second assertion to argue against Anaxagoras, supposes the first *ad hominem*. For in the locus of the second [book] of *De anima* he speaks of living things, and indeed there he says that fire does not have a terminus of largeness.[89]

SECOND ARGUMENT:

[Proof]

Secondly, by reason of Aristotle in the first [book] of the *Physics*, 36, if the homogeneous parts of an animal have no terminus of largeness and smallness, the animal also will have none; but this is false; therefore, [etc.]. The minor [premise] is obvious. The inference is proved [as follows]: for, if there can be flesh of any size and bone of any size and nerves and arteries, there can also be a head of any size. [The argument] is confirmed: if there can be homogeneous parts of any size whatsoever, there is no reason why, if God put them all together, there cannot be a man of any quantity whatsoever.[90]

88 144.20-29. The argumentation seems to be drawn from Soto, *In 1 phys.*, q. 4, aa. 2 and 3.

89 156.12-25. I have not been able to locate the source of these arguments; they are somewhat similar to the exegesis of Aristotle offered by Vallesius in his *Controversiae*, nn. 4 and 5, and are possibly based on Pererius or Villalpandus, both of whose works I have studied in the university library at Salamanca but do not have at hand for a precise verification.

90 144.29-145.1. The argumentation is probably drawn from Soto, *In 1 phys.*, q. 4, a. 2, and from Javelli, *In 1 phys.*, q. 19, who gives essentially the same reasoning as Soto. Others who earlier argued in similar terms include Astudillo, *In 1 phys.*, q. 8, and Peter Crokart of Brussels, *In 1 phys.*, q. 2, a. 5. These last-named little known Dominicans were influential in the formation of Francisco Vittoria and Soto and thus indirectly influenced the rise of "second scholasticism." Astudillo's commentary and questions on the *Physics* was finished on July 4, 1530, at five o'clock in the morning, as he states in the colophon, and is bound with his questions on the *De generatione* (Valladolid 1532); Peter Crokart's arguments are to be found in *Argutissime, subtiles et fecunde questiones phisicales magistri Petri de Bruxellis, alias Crokart* (Paris 1521).

[Reply]

To the second, I deny the inference: for, although the parts can be as large as one likes, nevertheless the living thing cannot be as large as one likes. The reason for the disparity is that similar parts need no determinate quantity for their operation; but living things do require [this]. For this argument concludes demonstratively against the ancients who denied a substantial form, for which reason they could not formally distinguish a whole from its part; and, moreover, they could not say that the whole required anything except by reason of parts. If therefore the parts do not require a determinate quantity they could not say why the whole requires [it]. But those who posit a substantial form can assign a reason for the disparity.[91]

THIRD ARGUMENT:

[Proof]

Thirdly, those things that are from nature are determinate.[92]

[Reply]

To the third [argument] I reply: if this proposition has this meaning, that all accidents and all conditions in each natural thing are determinate from the nature of that thing, the proposition is completely false. For matter is a natural thing; and nonetheless it is indeterminate; and the same for the elements. And [this] is confirmed [as follows]: for, according to almost everyone homogeneous things, such as the elements, do not have a determinate maximum terminus of largeness. If on the other hand the sense is, that which naturally belongs to a thing always belongs to it in the same determinate manner; this is true. For, since nature does not change, whatever it does once it does always. Moreover, since the elements of their nature have an indeterminate quantity, they will always have [it] indeterminate.[93]

FOURTH ARGUMENT:

[Proof]

Fourthly, we see that things are corrupted by attrition, by breaking, and so forth; but this would not be so, unless there were a minimum; therefore [etc.].[94]

91 156.26-35, reading *requirat* for *requirant* in line 34. The line of reasoning here seems to be Scotistic and is similar but not identical to that discussed and refuted by Javelli, *In 1 phys.*, q. 19. It is also stated and answered by Peter Crokart, *In 1 phys.*, q. 2, a. 5.

92 145.1-2. This brief argument is expanded at considerable length by Soto, Javelli and Crokart in the *loci* cited, and by Cajetan in his commentary on the *De anima*, chap. 4, q. 4, and *In Iam.*, q. 7, a. 3, nn. 5, 6, and 9.

93 157.1-11. I have not been able to locate this argument in precise form, although it is somewhat similar to that offered by Vallesius, *Controversiae*, n. 5 (fol. 7r) and may be based on Pererius or Villalpandus. An intimation of the argument is also to be found in Crokart, loc. cit.

94 145.2-3. This is based on Soto, *In 1 phys.*, q. 4, a. 3. The argument is also implicit in Javelli, *In 1 phys.*, q. 19, in his refutation of the Scotistic position.

[Reply]

To the fourth [argument] I reply that the thing cut is corrupted by the violence [or force] of the ambient [medium]; things that are crushed, however, [are corrupted] either because they rarefy or because they are cut: for we are speaking of elements within their proper nature, according as they can subsist and operate with any quantity no matter how small.[95]

FIFTH ARGUMENT:

[Proof]

Fifthly: if there were no minimum even in homogeneous things, it would follow that there is no minimum in sight; but this is absurd; therefore [etc.]. The major [premise] is apparent: if there is not a minimum fire, for example, when it conserves light, there would not be a minimum visible object; therefore, not sight either. The minor [premise] is Aristotle's, in the book *De sensu et sensibili,* chap. 6; and it is proved by reason: for, the smaller the visible [thing] is, the stronger must be the power that perceives it; therefore, if there would be no visible minimum, there would be no maximum seeing power; therefore, it would increase to infinity.[96]

[Reply]

To the fifth [argument] I reply by denying that it follows that if there be no minimum there would be no sensible minimum. For a greater power is required for perceiving a smaller thing: therefore, although, if we divide fire, it would remain lucid of its nature, nonetheless this cannot be perceived by any sense; because no sense is so intense that it can perceive such an object.[97]

This, then, completes the exposition of the teachings of St. Thomas and the various Thomists that are contained in the *Juvenilia.* The matter that they provide would seem to be sufficient to form some judgment of the knowledge of Thomism that is manifested in the *Juvenilia* and the sources from which it may be drawn, to which topics we now turn.

95 157.12-15. A Scotistic argument, similar to those refuted by Javelli, loc. cit.

96 145.3-10. This type of argument is to be found in Peter Crokart, *In 1 phys.*, q. 2, a. 5, but otherwise is not to be found in the Thomists mentioned in the *Juvenilia,* apart from a passing remark in Soto, *In 1 phys.*, q. 4, a. 3, which might be interpreted in this fashion.

97 157.16-20. This line of reasoning is found as early as the mid-fourteenth century in Albert of Saxony's questions on the *Physics* (Venice 1516), Bk. 1, q. 9, "Utrum cognitio totius dependeat ex cognitione suarum partium?" It is repeated by authors in the nominalist tradition and by those arguing against them, such as Crokart, *In 1 phys.*, q. 2, a. 5.

II. The Thomism and the Sources of the *Juvenilia*

As can be seen from the foregoing, the *Juvenilia* contain a wealth of information that sheds light on Galileo's intellectual formation at Pisa and his general sympathies regarding philosophical issues that were being debated at the time. Here we shall have to restrict ourselves to those few points where his notes bear directly on St. Thomas and the Thomistic school, leaving for later study his relationships to classical and other positions. From the texts that have been given, however, and the annotations of their likely sources contained in the footnotes up to this point, it is possible to draw some tentative conclusions regarding the general milieu of Galileo's instruction at Pisa and the sources from which either he or his professors drew their inspiration.

A. *The Thomism of the* Juvenilia

In general, it seems fairly safe to conclude that the author of the *Juvenilia* is correctly informed on the teachings of St. Thomas and the Thomists whom he cites, and is sympathetic to their conclusions and the main lines of argument in their support. He is somewhat eclectic, however, and is not always accurate in his citation of the *loci* he purports to use. In one instance, while disagreeing with those whom he identifies as "the Thomists," he actually defends a position that was to be urged by Domingo Banez, writing only a year later, as the authentic Thomistic position.[98] The argumentation on this particular point was current at the time of composition of the *Juvenilia* and shows an up-to-date knowledge of the literature that had recently appeared and debates going on in Spanish and Italian universities.

These general conclusions will now be substantiated, first from the viewpoint of the author's knowledge of, and agreement with, the teachings of St. Thomas and, second, with his comparable relationship to the Thomistic school.

Not unexpectedly, considering the atmosphere in sixteenth century Pisa, St. Thomas is held in great respect by the author as the foremost

98 See fn. 75, supra. Banez devotes seven questions in his commentary on Bk. 1 of *De generatione* to the subject of alteration (ed. cit., pp. 50-82); of these, q. 6 is entitled "Utrum alteratio sive intensio sit motus continuus?" (pp. 73-77). In the first article of this question Banez analyzes the teachings of Thomists, including Capreolus, Soncinas, Javelli, Ferrariensis, and Astudillo, and concludes that their view is erroneous and not consonant with St. Thomas's teaching. His second article is devoted to the question "Utrum detur minimum in accidentibus que intenduntur?", and here he analyzes the roots of his teaching in Soto's questions on the first book of the *Physics*, q. 4, a. 3, and refutes the interpretation of "quidam novus philosophus" whom I have been able to identify as Toletus.

among Catholic Doctors and is treated with deference; this extends even to points on which he disagrees with St. Thomas but utilizes his argumentation benignly in support of his own position. The opinion or argumentation of St. Thomas is cited in ten of the questions discussed in the *Juvenilia,* and in eight of these the author sides with Aquinas's conclusions; in the remaining two, while disagreeing with one teaching or another, he does not directly oppose any of Aquinas's statements but prefers rather to argue against the positions of his commentators. The following is a listing of these questions, with a comment on the extent of the author's agreement or disagreement with St. Thomas:

1. *The unity and perfection of the universe.*[99] The author agrees with St. Thomas that there is only one universe, and urges Aquinas's support for his teaching that God could have made the universe more perfect in an accidental way, but not essentially so.

2. *Whether the world could have existed from eternity?*[100] The author here presents three conclusions, all of which he attributes to St. Thomas, although the third is rejected by Thomists as not being the authentic teaching of Aquinas.

3. *Whether the heavens are a union of simple bodies, or composed from them?*[101] The author's conclusion is that the heavens are a body distinct from the four elements and not a compound formed from them; this he recognizes as also the teaching of St. Thomas.

4. *Whether the heavens are corruptible?*[102] The author proposes a twofold conclusion: that they are probably incorruptible by nature, but not incorruptible in such a strict sense as to limit God's power in corrupting them if He so wished, since He alone is *ens necessarium.* The author invokes St. Thomas and other theologians in support of this double conclusion.

5. *Whether the heavens are composed of matter and form?*[103] The author again proposes a twofold conclusion: that they are so composed, but that the matter of the heavens is not the same as the matter here below. He adduces St. Thomas's support for both elements of this teaching.

6. *Whether the heavens are animated?*[104] Here the author concludes that the heavens are not animated by a vegetative or by a sensitive soul,

99 27.21.
100 32.2.
101 55.2.
102 63.13.
103 70.4.
104 103.11.

and that the problem of their being animated by an intellective soul can best be solved by holding that the intelligences are merely the movers of the heavens; in thus functioning they assist the heavenly bodies rather than inform them the way in which a soul informs a body. This he again presents as the teaching of St. Thomas.

7. *On intension and remission.*[105] Here the author concludes that the intensification of a quality requires more than an extrinsic change in the quality, that in such intensification the prior part of the quality does not perish, and that such intensification takes place in continuous fashion. St. Thomas is mentioned only as an authority on this topic, and is not otherwise discussed, although the opinion of "the Thomists" that intensification is not continuous is rejected. (Thomists after Banez, as has been noted, could agree with all three of the author's conclusions).[106]

8. *What are the forms of the elements?*[107] Here the author offers a threefold conclusion: that the forms of the elements are not proper alterative qualities and that they are not motive qualities, but that each element has its proper substantial form distinct from all others. This he proposes as the teaching of St. Thomas.

9. *Whether the forms of the elements undergo intension and remission?*[108] Here the author answers in the negative, giving the arguments of St. Thomas and the Thomistic school in support of his conclusion.

10. *Whether elements and other natural things have termini of largeness and smallness?*[109] Here the author offers ten conclusions, most of which resolve arguments raised in the nominalist schools that flourished after St. Thomas's death. Of the three conclusions that relate to Aquinas's thought, the author is in agreement with two (one regarding God's power with respect to maxima and minima, and the other regarding the termini of living things and heterogeneous compounds) and rejects the third (regarding the termini of elements and homogeneous compounds).

Of the 24 sub-conclusions that go to make up the answers to these ten questions relating to Aquinas's teaching, therefore, only two or three conclusions, depending on how one views the continuity of in-

105 111.13.

106 See fns. 75 and 98, supra.

107 129.23.

108 133.2.

109 138.29-30. It may be noted here that the question of *minima naturalia* comes up again in Galileo's *Discourse on Floating Bodies* and *The Assayer*, but in these places Galileo betrays no influences of the Thomist position. See William R. Shea, "Galileo's Atomic Hypothesis," *Ambix* 17 (1970), 13-27.

tensification as Thomas's teaching, imply a rejection of the Angelic Doctor. These two or three are basically Scotistic conclusions; and all three, perhaps by coincidence but noteworthy nonetheless, were taught by Vallesius, whereas the two less arguable ones were taught also by Pererius.[110]

The situation with respect to the Thomists falls into the same general pattern as that with respect to St. Thomas, except that in the former case the author is less restrained in expressing his disagreement with one or other member of the school. As we have seen, he cites seven Thomists: Herveus, Capreolus, Soncinas, Cajetan, Ferrariensis, Javelli, and Soto. Among these, there is little evidence of any serious study of Herveus or Ferrariensis, whereas for the remaining five it appears that the author read one or another of their texts with some degree of care. On one question he prefers Cajetan's teaching to that of Capreolus, on another, Capreolus's over that of Cajetan; he is definitely opposed to Soncinas's teaching on intensification; he uses Soto extensively for Thomistic views on maxima and minima, while disagreeing with some of his conclusions; Javelli he seems to find useful as a compendium of Thomistic teachings, particularly as a guide to the thought of Capreolus and Soncinas.

A more detailed characterization of the author's agreements and disagreements with the Thomistic school will become apparent from the following listing of the topics in relation to which their teachings are discussed:

1. *The nature of celestial matter.*[111] The author agrees with the Thomistic teaching that the heavens are composed of matter and form and that their matter differs from the earthly matter of the sublunary region. He prefers Cajetan's explanation to Capreolus's as to the nature of this heavenly matter, and also sides with Cajetan (against Capreolus and Soncinas) in holding that there is a different type of matter in each of the heavenly spheres.

2. *The continuity of intensification.*[112] Here the author is directly at variance with the teaching of Herveus, Capreolus, Soncinas, and Javelli. Soto has nothing explicit on this thesis, although he does lay the groundwork for a different interpretation of intensification in his tract

110 See fns. 24, 70, 76, 77, 82, 85, 89, and 93. Valesius teaches that creatures could not have been produced from eternity in his commentary on the eighth book of the *Physics*, and that intensification is continuous and that elements have no natural intrinsic terminus of largeness or smallness in n. 5 of his *Controversiae*. Pererius holds that one cannot demonstrate, one way or another, that corruptible creatures could have existed from eternity in Bk. 15, c. 13 of his *De communibus*, and that elements have no natural minima in Bk. 10, c. 23, of the same.

111 76.7-103.9.

112 111.14-119.4.

on natural minima, from which Banez was to draw his inspiration for what was later to become the accepted Thomistic teaching.[113] The author was acquainted with this section of Soto's questionary on Aristotle's *Physics*, but apparently did not grasp its connection with the problem of the intensification of qualities.

3. *The intensification of elemental forms.*[114] Here the author's solution is identical with that of the Thomistic school, among whom he enumerates the teaching of Herveus, Capreolus, Soncinas, Cajetan, and Javelli on this point. His own arguments are directed against Averroës and his followers, and also against Scotus and his school.

4. *Problems associated with maxima and minima.*[115] Among the ten conclusions reached by the author in his attempt to resolve these problems, only two bear on the teachings of the Thomistic school. The first is that, in relation to God, things do not have maxima and minima in the sense that God can always make them larger and smaller, but not in the sense that they will become actually infinite in a categorematic sense.[116] In stating this conclusion, he opposes himself to Cajetan and aligns himself with Capreolus, while using Soto's citation of a text of Aquinas in support of Capreolus's interpretation. The second conclusion relates to the termini of largeness and smallness as found in elements and homogeneous compounds, and here the author rejects Cajetan's opinion that elements have an intrinsic terminus of largeness — an opinion that is rejected as unintelligible by Soto[117] and is not common to the school. The author rejects also the teaching of Thomists generally that elements have an intrinsic terminus of smallness, using mainly Soto's arguments in his rejection of this conclusion, and opting rather for the Scotistic solution.

To summarize, then, on two of the four topics (n. 1 and n. 3), the author is in complete agreement with the Thomistic school, and on one topic (n. 1) engages in an intra-mural dispute wherein he favors the more recent opinion (Cajetan's) over an earlier teaching (Capreolus's). On a third topic (n. 4), he agrees with the more theological conclusion

113 On Banez, see his *In 1 de gen.*, q. 6, a. 2 (ed. cit., pp. 74-77). For a brief sketch of the history of this thesis in Thomism, see A. M. Pirotta, O.P., *Summa philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* (Turin 1936), II, pp. 315-329, esp. n. 456, pp. 317-318.

114 133.1-136.22.

115 138.29-157.20.

116 Cf. 146.24, 148.25-28, where the author allows the possibility of an infinite in a syncategorematic sense. The terms categorematic and syncategorematic derive from the nominalist controversies over infinity in the fourteenth century.

117 Soto states: "Caietanus adducens illic auctoritatem Aristotelis contra S. Thomam effingit nescio quam distinctionem, certe, ut pace doctissimi authoris dixerim, parum physicam." *In 1 phys.*, q. 4, a. 2 (ed. cit., fol. 14rb).

of the Thomistic school (God's power), while disagreeing with its thesis bearing directly on natural philosophy (elemental minima); his intramural arguments here favor Capreolus over Cajetan. On a fourth topic (n. 2), while disagreeing with the accepted Thomistic teaching of his time, he himself argues for a position that was later to be recognized as the authentic teaching of Aquinas. When these results are taken together with the author's attitude towards St. Thomas himself, they support the conclusion that the author is well acquainted with Thomistic teaching, and, if not a Thomist in the strict sense, is generally sympathetic to this school.

As a final point relating to the author's knowledge of Thomism, a comment should be made on the accuracy of his citations. He refers to St. Thomas 29 times in the *Juvenilia,* ten times with no identification of *loci* and 19 times with a total identification of 31 *loci.* Of these 31, 25 are correctly given in the manuscript and 6 are incorrectly given (accepting Favaro's reading of the MS), although they are verifiable on correction. Similarly, with respect to the various Thomists, these are mentioned 25 times in the *Juvenilia,* three without any identification of *loci* and the remaining 22 with an identification of 26 *loci.* Of these, 20 are identified correctly and six are given incorrectly, although verifiable upon correction. The close to 25% occurrence of errors, all of which have been identified in the citations of the texts or in their accompanying footnotes, may turn out to be significant for further research on the sources of the *Juvenilia.* Should similar errors be located in any of the printed texts that were available to the author, they would provide a key to his use of secondary sources. The twelve errors, it should be mentioned, are all understandable in terms of the difficulty of locating and citing texts, and may be an indication that the *Juvenilia* are Galileo's own composition, when, as a university student, he was still learning the techniques of accurate scholarship while working with primary sources.

B. *The Sources of the* Juvenilia

This brings us to our final consideration, namely, that of the implications of this study for a better understanding of the sources of the *Juvenilia.* Here only a brief indication will be given with respect to four different hypotheses: (1) that the *Juvenilia* are original with Galileo, representing his own work with primary sources: (2) that they were copied by Galileo from one or more secondary sources; (3) that they were Galileo's class notes based on the lectures of one or more of his professors at the University of Pisa; and (4) that they were a summary

Galileo prepared for himself with an ulterior motive in mind by borrowing or cribbing from the notes of others,[118] possibly students who attended lectures he himself had missed.[119]

The first hypothesis, as has been pointed out by Favaro,[120] is quite unlikely considering the neatness of the autograph and clues of its having been transcribed from another manuscript. These include several spaces left vacant in the original writing and then filled in later either with cramped lettering or with sentences flowing over into the margins. There are also expressions that are written down, then crossed out as not making sense in the context, only to appear a line or two below in their proper place. Yet the transcription, if such it is, was not made slavishly, as there are also evidences of words being changed and expressions being altered to convey a clearer and more consistent sense. Moreover, it could be that Galileo was actually recopying his own poorly written notes; in this connection, there is certainly no a priori reason for excluding the possibility that such notes were the composition of a twenty-year old university student. The work on Thomistic theses that we have analyzed is not appreciably superior to what a bright twenty-year old Italian or Spanish seminarian might do even in our own day. In the century before Galileo, Giovanni Pica della Mirandola had, at the age of 23, challenged all comers to debate 900 selected theses in philosophy, theology, and science, and it should be remembered that Galileo was as much a genius as Pico in his own right. The question as to what primary sources might have been available to Galileo for such a composition poses no serious problem. Among the authors we have discussed the most recent would be the works of Pererius (Rome 1562), Vallesius (Alcala 1563), Javellus (Lyons 1568), and Ferrariensis's commentary on the *Physics* (Rome 1577). Although Soto's commentary and questionary on the *Physics* was not published in Italy until the Venice 1582 edition, at least six Spanish editions had appeared before this date, beginning *c.* 1545.[121] I have found copies of Spanish editions of Soto's

118 This possibility has been suggested to me by Prof. Stillman Drake, of the University of Toronto, in a private communication dated July 22, 1971, after having read this paper. He also suggested a number of clarifications and information that enabled me to eliminate an error of fact in the original draft. I wish to take this opportunity to thank him publicly for his interest and assistance.

119 Following a suggestion of Prof. William R. Shea, of the University of Ottawa, in a private communication from Cambridge, England, dated July 28, 1971, who also read the paper and, independently of Prof. Drake, came up with a similar proposal; to him I also acknowledge my debt with thanks.

120 *Opere*, I, 10-12.

121 See V. Beltran de Heredia, *Domingo de Soto, O.P., Estudio biografico documentado,* (Salamanca 1960), 527-528.

works in Italian libraries, and suspect that Vallesius's work was similarly available in Italy shortly after its publication. Thus there is nothing to exclude the possibility that Galileo could have worked with these sources and made his own synthesis from them. The strongest argument against this hypothesis, of course, is that the notes contain too many references. Galileo was notorious for having read *very* little, and although a bright young man of those days could have controlled a hundred books of the kind cited, it is extremely unlikely that Galileo really did so.

The hypothesis that the *Juvenilia* were copied by Galileo from one or more secondary sources is still tenable in the light of our study. Here the sources either could have existed in manuscript form, or they could have been printed sources. Regarding the latter possibility, there is no evidence of direct copying from any of the Thomistic authors mentioned in this study. Should Galileo have copied from a manuscript source, the consistency of the treatment of topics relating to Thomism suggests that this was the work of one man, or at least work done under the direction of one teacher.

The third hypothesis, that the *Juvenilia* are Galileo's class notes based on lectures at the University of Pisa, is similar to the last possibility. Here, again, the consistency of the treatment suggests that the notes are based on the lectures of one professor. By way of general characteristics, this man would be an eclectic Aristotelian with scholastic leanings, quite well acquainted with and sympathetic to the teachings of the Thomistic school, but accepting nonetheless some Scotistic theses and a few interpretations deriving from Averroës. He would be knowledgeable with respect to the classical Greek commentaries, and would also know and appreciate the nominalist arguments that were common among the "Latins." He would be acquainted with developments at both Spanish and Italian universities, and would appear to be sympathetic to the writings of two members of the newly-formed Society of Jesus, Pererius and Toletus.[122]

Who this professor might be is a question that is not easily answered. To my knowledge only two candidates have been proposed to date,

122 The Society was officially confirmed in 1540. Toletus became the first Jesuit cardinal; shortly after being received into the Society, he was called to Rome from Spain in 1559 to teach philosophy and later theology at the Roman College. He himself had studied theology at Salamanca under Soto, who regarded him as a favored disciple. Pererius entered the Society as a youth in 1552 and likewise taught philosophy and theology, including Scripture, at the Roman College.

Francesco Buonamici and Flaminio Nobili.[123] With regard to Buonamici, the results of this study would be adverse to his identification as the professor who formed Galileo's youthful mind. A perusal of Buonamici's *De motu* shows a quite different citation of authors from that in the *Juvenilia,* with strong emphasis placed on Averroës and classical commentators such as Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simplicius.[124] Buonamici cites St. Thomas with about half the frequency of Averroës, and occasionally mentions "Thomistae," but he does not identify any Thomists nor does he discuss their teachings in any detail. He accepts the Averroist teaching on the forms of the elements, and has not progressed beyond Walter Burley and James of Forli in his discussion of the intension and remission of qualities.[125] Thus the general tenor of his thought is quite different from that contained in the *Juvenilia.* Certainly Buonamici would not be identified as a Thomist or as one sympathetic to the teachings of this school.

Because of the difficulty of tracing any correspondence between the thought patterns of Buonamici and the young Galileo, Eugenio Garin has recently called attention to Galileo's "quotations from the lectures of Flaminio Nobili."[126] From the viewpoint of this study, however, there are difficulties with this suggestion also. Whereas Buonamici is not cited in the *Juvenilia,* Nobili is cited three times, and in two of these the author is quite harsh in his rejection of Nobili's teaching. The first rejection is with regard to the question, "What are the forms of the elements?" Nobili's teaching is listed as the first opinion, "that the forms of the elements are something made up of primary qualities and some substantial form."[127] The author goes on: "But this is unintelligible, nor does he [Nobili] seem to sufficiently understand the nature of a substantial form."[128] The second rejection occurs in the context of a discussion as to how the primary qualities are related to resistance. After giving his own conclusions, the author writes: "And from this is apparent the error of Nobili, who, in the first [book] of *De*

123 For details concerning Buonamici's life and works, see my article on him in the *Dictionary of Scientific Biography* (New York 1970), II, 590-591. I have not been able to locate any biographical information on Nobili, but see fn. 126 infra.

124 I have used the Florence 1591 folio edition of Buonamici's *De motu* and have counted the number of citations of authors in Bks. 4, 5, and 8 of this work; these contain the chapters that most relate to the elements, local motion, and alteration.

125 On the forms of the elements, see ed. cit., pp. 745-753; on intension and remission, see pp. 759-763.

126 Eugenio Garin, *Science and Civic Life in the Italian Renaissance*, translated by Peter Munz (New York 1969), 140; see also 97-113.

127 129.27-29.

128 129.29-30.

generatione, doubt 11 on chap. 7, has distinguished a twofold resistance: one of animals, which would consist in a certain endeavor, itself a kind of action; another in other things, which he has reduced to an impotency for receiving; where, as you can see, he has accepted the extrinsic cause of resistance for resistance [taken] formally, when these should be distinguished."[129] The third citation is merely an enumeration of Nobili along with St. Thomas and others as holding that the forms of the elements do not undergo intension and remission.[130] All three citations of Nobili refer to his *De generatione,* which I have not seen. But from even these three indications of its contents, one may doubt seriously whether Nobili could be the professor hidden behind the *Juvenilia.*

This leaves the fourth hypothesis, which gains its plausibility mainly from the exclusion of the other three. As Professor Drake has pointed out in his private communication,[131] Galileo was a medical student at Pisa from 1581 to 1583; in the latter year he became fascinated with mathematics, and in 1585 he left the university to devote himself to that discipline. In the intermediate year, 1584, seeing that he was not going to pursue medicine, he may have started to compile lectures on natural philosophy with a view to obtaining a better paying job than a mathematician could then hope for. This could have led him to make his own synthesis of extant materials, depending largely on secondary sources. Such an explanation is rendered even more plausible by the suggestion of Professor Shea, in his private communication,[132] to the effect that Galileo might have gotten hold of the notes of students who went to lectures he himself had not attended, and made a summary for himself, perhaps as a primer to undergo an eventual examination. This would explain elements of Galileo's personal style that are recognizable in the *Juvenilia,* while it would also serve to account for the atypical, non-Galilean citation of so many sources.

From these largely negative results, and from the tentative nature of the reasoning leading to them, it would be premature to attempt to draw any conclusions as to the identity of the author of the *Juvenilia.* It should be stressed, of course, that this study has been based on only one aspect of the contents of this work, namely, its relation to St. Thomas and to Thomism generally. Viewed from this perspective, when attempting to identify anyone known to be at Pisa in 1584 as either the

129 172.1-6.
130 134.6.
131 See fn. 118, *supra.*
132 See fn. 119, *supra.*

author of, or the inspiration behind, the *Juvenilia,* one would almost find as much support for the candidacy of Galileo himself as for anyone who has thus far been proposed as his teacher.[133]

133 The first draft of this article was completed on May 20, 1971, and some revisions were made on December 11, 1971, at which time the manuscript was submitted for publication. Since the latter date, a considerable amount of work has been done on Galileo's early writings both by the author and by Professors A. C. Crombie and Adriano Carugo, who are publishing their findings under the auspices of the Domus Galileiana in Pisa in a book to be entitled *Galileo's Natural Philosophy.* In general all of this work confirms the thesis only tentatively advanced in this study, namely, that the *Juvenilia* were probably composed by Galileo himself, with little or no direct use of primary sources but with a recognizable dependence on the writings of Pererius and Toletus, and also with some borrowings from Christopher Clavius's commentary on the *Sphaera* of Sacrobosco. The author has also had the opportunity meanwhile to consult the Galileo manuscripts in Florence, and has found that some of the mis-citations of sources attributed to Galileo in this article are actually Favaro's mis-readings of Galileo's handwritten numerals. Again, a study of the thus far unedited logical writings of the young Galileo, entitled *De precognitionibus et precognitis in particulari* and *De demonstratione*, transcriptions of which have been generously loaned to the author by Carugo, show a similar interest in Thomism. Of the 24 authors cited in addition to Aristotle, Cajetan and Aquinas rank among the first five on the basis of frequency of citation; also, two or three references are made to another Dominican, Franciscus [N]eritonensis, who was a professor at Padua and was probably one of Cajetan's teachers. — Note added by the author in galley proof on November 20, 1972.

DOCUMENTS SUR LES ORIGINES ET LES PREMIÈRES ANNÉES DE LA COMMISSION LÉONINE

Pierre M. de Contenson O.P.

Données Historiques et Problèmes

La décision de Léon XIII et ses suites.

LE pape Léon XIII annonca sa décision que soit publiée une nouvelle édition des œuvres de S. Thomas dans la lettre *Iampridem considerando* adressée au cardinal Antonin de Luca, Préfet de la Congrégation des études, datée du 15 octobre 1879.[1] Le motu proprio *Placere nobis* du 18 janvier 1880 définit les caractéristiques de l'édition nouvelle et confie sa réalisation à trois cardinaux: Antonin de Luca, Jean Simeoni, Préfet de la Congrégation pour la Propagation de la Foi, et Thomas Zigliara, des Frères Prêcheurs.[2]

1 Il ne peut être question de reproduire ici in-extenso les actes pontificaux que nous mentionnons. Dans l'Edition léonine, tome I, on trouvera reproduits: l'encyclique *Aeterni Patris*... du 4 août 1879, "De philosophia christiana ad mentem sancti Thomae Aquinatis Doctoris angelici in scholis catholicis instauranda", voir pp. iii-xvi; la lettre au cardinal A. de Luca, préfet de la Congrégation des études, *Iampridem considerando* du 15 octobre 1879, "De Academia S. Thomae Aquinatis Romae instituenda deque nova omnium operum eius editione curanda", pp. xix-xxi; le motu proprio *Placere nobis* du 18 janvier 1880, "De operibus S. Thomae Aquinatis ex integro edendis", pp. xxv-xxvi. Ces mêmes textes se trouvent aussi dans A. S. S. 12 (1879) 97-115, 225-228, 337-338. Ci-dessous nous citons partiellement certains actes de Léon XIII: ainsi *Iampridem*...n. 4; *Placere nobis*... n. 5, *Volumen tertium*... pp. 379-380, *Quum certa*... n. 140.

2 Il sera souvent question ci-dessous du cardinal Zigliara. A son sujet nous ne pouvons que renvoyer aux notices de dictionnaires et autres recueils, voir par ex. ASOP 1 (1893) 258-253; également *Memorie Domenicane* 45 (1928) 265-275 et 78 (1961) 86-100. Né le 20 octobre 1832 à Bonifacio (Corse), Tommaso Maria Zigliara (Francesco) fut étudiant dominicain à Rome et Pérouse, il est prêtre en 1856. Ses liens avec l'évêque de Pérouse Vincenzo Gioacchino Pecci, futur Léon XIII, sont bien connus: le père Carbó, promoteur du thomisme, était l'ami de Mgr Pecci, qui partageait son élan thomiste; il devint le professeur du jeune Zigliara qui fut ordonné prêtre par Mgr Pecci, lequel proclamait son admiration pour la qualité de la pensée thomiste de Zigliara. Lecteur à Corbara puis à Viterbe, Zigliara fut pro-régent du collège St. Thomas de Rome de 1873 à 1879 (il eut pour successeur dans cette charge le père Frati dont il est question ci-dessous, pp. 370-382 et nn. 104, 115). Le nouveau pape, Léon XIII, s'empressa de créer cardinal, le 12 mai 1879, T. Zigliara, qui devint préfet de la Congrégation des études en 1888 et mourut le 10 mai 1893. Concernant le cardinal T. Zigliara, A. Baudrillart cite un mot de Mgr d'Hulst à l'abbé Pisani le 23 janvier 1887: "...toujours le plus bienveillant et le plus fermé des hommes...," *Vie de Mgr d'Hulst* (Paris 1912), t. I, p. 536.

Sur Paolo Carbó, de nationalité espagnole et qui vint en Italie en 1835 pour être Lecteur à Viterbe en 1844, à Pérouse en 1849, régent du Collège Saint-Thomas à Rome en 1852, voir par exemple I. P. Grossi, "Un'Accademia Tomistica alla Minerva. Note d'Archivio", *Memorie Domenicane* 75 (1958) 226-248; voir également A. Walz "Sguardo sul movimento tomista..." cité ci-dessous n. 14.

La préparation de l'édition commence immédiatement sous la direction effective du cardinal Zigliara qui s'entoure de collaborateurs dominicains. Le 11 décembre 1882, ce groupe de collaborateurs est organisé en collège doté d'un président. Par la lettre *Volumen tertium* du 2 octobre 1886, Léon XIII impose un bouleversement du plan de l'édition et des consignes concomitantes obligent à renoncer aux méthodes de travail suivies jusqu'alors pour se contenter de faire un travail sommaire. Enfin en 1892-1893, le statut de l'entreprise d'édition de S. Thomas est radicalement modifié: la direction et la responsabilité du travail sont confiés au Général des Dominicains. A chaque fois, ces décisions sont accompagnées des mesures administratives et financières correspondantes.

Ainsi l'édition de S. Thomas d'Aquin dite "Edition léonine" a été décidée il y a plus de quatre-vingt-dix ans et, après des avatars successifs, la responsabilité de mener à bien ce projet a été remise directement au Maître de l'Ordre dominicain il y a au moins quatre-vingts ans. Cette relative ancienneté place donc les débuts et les premières mutations de l'entreprise que l'on appelle maintenant "Commission léonine"[3] sous le regard de l'historien. Ce dernier ne peut manquer de s'y intéresser car cette Commission constitue à son origine un élément notable et original du mouvement thomiste dans la deuxième moitié du XIX[e] siècle.

Questions et problèmes.

Il se trouve que les Actes de l'autorité et les documents plus ou moins officiels déjà publiés concernant les débuts de la Commission léonine attirent l'attention de celui qui les lit même candidement par certaines particularités: on y relève parfois des formules un peu étranges, à qui il arrive même d'être apparemment contradictoires entre elles, soit quand on passe d'un document à l'autre, soit à l'intérieur d'un même document. En voici deux exemples parmi d'autres:

a) Dans *Iampridem considerando* du 15 octobre 1879[4] et *Placere*

3 Sur le titre officiel de l'édition décidée par Léon XIII, "Edition léonine", voir ci-dessous n. 66. Nous n'avons trouvé aucun texte qualifiant de "Commission..." le groupe des trois cardinaux. Il semble que pour désigner l'équipe des éditeurs le titre de "Commission léonine" ne devint courant que très tardivement; on le trouve dans un tract de propagande pour l'édition manuelle de *Summa contra Gentiles* édité en 1934, dans une circulaire officielle de M. S. Gillet, Maître de l'Ordre, du 15 juin 1935 à l'occasion du décès du père P. P. Mackey, enfin en 1946 dans les *Actes* du chapitre général O.P. de Rome, c. III, n. 76. Le premier nom officiel du groupe de Dominicains travaillant en équipe à l'Edition léonine est celui de "Collège des éditeurs de S. Thomas", voir ci-dessous n. 115.

4 "Iampridem considerando...Demum quo latius spargatur ac disseminetur Angelici Doctoris sapientia, constituimus omnia eius opera de integro in lucem edere, exemplo s. Pii V. Decessoris Nostri, rerum gestarum gloria et vitae sanctitate praeclari; cui quidem in ea re tam felix contigit exitus, ut Thomae exemplaria, iussu illius evulgata, permagni sint apud viros doctos, summoque

nobis du 18 janvier 1880,[5] le pape Léon XIII insiste sur le nécessaire recours aux manuscrits et sur la qualité scientifique qui doit caractériser l'édition projetée; alors que, dans *Volumen tertium* du 2 octobre 1886, l'accent est mis presque exclusivement par Léon XIII sur une publication la plus rapide possible[6] cependant que dans *Quum certa* du 4 octobre 1893 le même pontife rappelle qu'il faut suivre les normes précisées dans *Placere nobis.*[7]

b) Plus radicalement, comment expliquer l'intervention personnelle du pape par *Volumen tertium* du 2 octobre 1886 pour que la *Summa theologiae* soit mise en chantier immédiatement et les commentaires d'Aristote remis à plus tard, ainsi que les consignes draconiennes, ruineuses de toute velléité de travail vraiment critique? Quelle explication donner alors que, dans *Placere nobis* du 18 janvier 1880 et même dans *Volumen tertium*, le même Léon XIII insiste sur la pleine liberté donnée et maintenue aux cardinaux pour organiser la publication, particulièrement l'ordre et les délais de parution, comme ils le jugeront le meilleur pour satisfaire les exigences initiales du projet?

studio requirantur. Verum quanto plus editio illa est rara, tanto magis alia desiderari coepta, quae nobilitate ac praestantia cum Piana comparari possit. Ceterae enim cum veteres tum recentiores, partim quod non omnia s. Thomae scripta exhibeant, partim quod optimorum eius interpretum atque explanatorum careant commentariis, partim quod minus diligenter adornatae sint, non omne tulisse punctum videntur. Certa autem spes est, huiusmodi necessitati consultum iri per novam editionem quae cuncta omnino sancti Doctoris scripta complectatur, optimis quoad fieri poterit, formis litterarum expressa, accurateque emendata; iis etiam adhibitis codicum manuscriptorum subsidiis, quae aetate hac nostra in lucem et usum prolata sunt... Observantur quidem animo rei gerendae cum magnitudo, tum difficultas; nec tamen deterrent quominus ad eam magna cum alacritate quamprimum aggrediantur. Confidimus enim in re tam gravi, quae ad commune Ecclesiae bonum magnopere pertinet, adfore Nobis divinam opem et ..."

5 "Placere Nobis, omnia sancti Thomae Aquinatis Opera de integro publicari, superiore anno significavimus...

Primum itaque, ne almae Urbi Nostrae haec pereat laus, editionem, quam supra diximus, reservatam esse volumus Officinae librariae Sacri Consilii Christiano nomini propagando, clarae iam ob alia magnae molis et laudati operis edita volumina.

Editioni autem curandae destinamus ac praecipua auctoritate praeesse volumus tres sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae Cardinales; scilicet Antoninum de Luca..., Ioannem Simeoni..., Thomam Zigliara ex Familia Dominicana, ad disciplinam s. Thomae apprime institutum atque eruditum. His autem ius et potestas esto statuendi ac decernendi Nostro nomine quidquid ad rem pertinere intellexerint. Quare prospiciant ut omnia ac singula Angelici Doctoris Opera integra prodeant... Similiter curent et provideant ne literarum optima forma, ne accurata emendatio, ne intelligens in rerum singularum delectu iudicium desideretur; ac demum constituant quo ordine, quo tempore singula volumina in lucem oporteat proferri.

Quod vero ad expensas attinet, argenteorum italicorum CCC millia Nos ultro damus atque addicimus suppeditandis sumptibus in praesenti necessariis. Reliquo autem tempore necessarios suppeditari volumus ex eiusdem Sacri Consilio Fidei propagandae aerario: cui tamen quidquid erit vendendis exemplaribus redactum pecuniae, tamdiu in rem cedat, quoad par ratio fuerit acceptorum et expensorum. Si quidquam eidem accrevisse contingat, accrescentem pecuniam omnem insumi iubemus in lucubrationes eorum Scriptorum edendas, qui s. Thomae Aquinatis illustrandis operibus maxime excellant..."

6 Voir ci-dessous pp. 379-381.

7 Voir ci-dessous n. 140.

Le recours aux études et même aux polémiques déjà publiées, et elles sont nombreuses touchant aux premières années de la Commission léonine, ne permettent pas d'éclairer totalement les difficultés.[8] Bien au contraire, elles font souvent surgir dans l'esprit des gerbes nouvelles d'interrogations. Ces interrogations, nous semble-t-il, peuvent être regroupées en trois problèmes fondamentaux:

1. Pourquoi, comment et sous quelles influences, Léon XIII a-t-il mûri si rapidement après son élévation au pontificat suprême son projet d'une édition nouvelle des *Opera omnia* de S. Thomas, alors qu'il existait déjà ou que se publiaient alors des éditions très satisfaisantes et en tout cas bien suffisantes pour l'usage scolaire?[9]

2. Quels sont les principes de travail suivis par les premiers éditeurs et grâce auxquels ils ont pu sortir les trois premiers tomes de l'édition dans les six années qui ont suivi la fondation?

3. Comment expliquer la mutation du plan d'édition par voie d'autorité et l'imposition d'une méthode de travail qui semble bien avoir nui gravement à la qualité de l'œuvre produite, méthode dont les éditeurs n'ont pu pleinement se dégager que de longues années après?

Notre projet.

Il ne peut être question de présenter une histoire synthétique de la Commission léonine qui soit satisfaisante, même si on la limite à une période très déterminée des origines. En effet l'histoire générale du néo-thomisme est encore à élaborer, bien que diverses études et de multiples documents sur ce sujet aient été récemment publiés.[10] Or, comme nous l'avons déjà dit plus haut, la Commission léonine dans ses débuts est une des composantes du mouvement néo-thomiste.

Puisque, pour cette période, on en est encore aux monographies, nous avons cru pouvoir apporter une modeste contribution en ce domaine en signalant ou en exploitant certains documents inédits contenus dans les archives romaines des éditeurs de S. Thomas; pour ce faire, nous les rapprochons à l'occasion de faits bien connus par ailleurs, de documents officiels ou encore d'autres informations sur la même époque

8 On trouvera des renseignements sur la majeure partie de ces publications diverses dans les études de Cl. Suermondt, "Kort overzicht en lijst van S. Thomas' werken", ETL 2 (1925) 236-244, "De principiis recensionis operum S. Thomae Aquinatis in editione Leonina", *Angelicum* 3 (1926) 418-465, voir également *Bulletin thomiste* 2 (1927) [35]-[50], "Le texte léonin de la 1a Pars de S. Thomas. Sa révision future et la critique de Baeumker", *Mélanges Mandonnet*, Tome I (Paris 1930) 19-50, "Il contributo dell'edizione leonina per la conoscenza di S. Tommaso", *Scholastica ratione historico-instauranda* (Acta congressus scholastici internationalis, Roma 1951) 233-283; de G. F. Rossi, "L'Autografo di San Tommaso dal Commento al III° libro delle Sentenze", *Divus Thomas* (Piac.) 35 (1932) 532-585, "Il quarto pionere della commissione leonina P. Clemente Suermondt", *Divus Thomas* (Piac.) 57 (1954) 90-119.

9 Voir ci-dessous n. 14.

10 Voir ci-dessous n. 11.

qui ont été publiées en ordre dispersé. Telle ou telle publication ayant déjà jeté quelque lumière sur les faits et les problèmes mentionnés ci-dessus, nous serions pleinement satisfait si les compléments de documentation que nous tentons d'apporter ajoutaient encore un peu de clarté. Nous savons cependant que bien des aspects ou des faits isolés resteront encore dans l'ombre.

Les documents présentés ici se sont trouvés tout naturellement groupés en trois dossiers correspondant à autant d'étapes distinctes du processus qui a finalement abouti à la production de l'Edition léonine. Cette édition est encore en cours de réalisation, mais il se trouve que les plus récents tomes parus, qui sont publiés plus d'un siècle après les plus anciens des documents ici présentés, se trouvent directement inclus dans les perspectives déjà ouvertes par la première de ces étapes dont nous parlons.

On trouvera proposés ci-dessous à l'attention:

1. Un ensemble de lettres et documents concernant un projet d'édition scientifique des *Opera omnia* de S. Thomas antérieur de plus de dix ans au projet léonin.
2. Une série de lettres et d'autres pièces donnant des informations concrètes sur la recherche de manuscrits et leurs premiers collationnements éxécutés dans divers pays d'Europe à la demande et sous la direction du cardinal Zigliara.
3. Divers documents et renseignements sur les dix premières années de travail de la Commission léonine et sur les avatars de son statut tant au plan scientifique, que juridique et financier.

Le projet Uccelli-Dallet d'une édition scientifique de S. Thomas en 1869

Les documents.

Pour expliquer la décision de Léon XIII de mettre en route, sous la direction du cardinal Tommaso Zigliara, une nouvelle édition de S. Thomas, on se réfère tout naturellement au mouvement néo-thomiste qui se développe dans la seconde moitié du XIXᵉ siècle.[11] L'édition

11 Le mouvement néo-thomiste au XIXᵉ s. et plus largement la renaissance thomiste au siècle dernier ont bénéficié dans les dernières années d'un nombre considérable d'études, engendrant d'ailleurs parfois des polémiques sources de nouvelles publications. On voit revenir assez souvent, par exemple dans la revue *Divus Thomas* de Plaisance ou dans *Aquinas*, des articles sur le néo-thomisme, particulièrement en Italie, ces études sont signées de noms tels que ceux de F. Duranti, C. Fabro, A. Fermi, R. Masi, I. Narciso, F. Olgiati, A. Pelzer, G. F. Rossi, G. Stella, C. Vasoli, A. Walz, A. C. Zangrandi, etc. Nous ne pouvons citer ici tous les auteurs et tous les travaux que nous avons personnellement consultés; renvoyons donc une fois pour toutes à ce qui est signalé ou recensé dans le *Bulletin thomiste*: X, nn. 2081-2133; XI, nn. 2109-2133; XII, nn. 2497-2552; XIII, nn.400, 409-412; XIV, nn. 688-699. Nous citerons plus explicitement ci-dessous l'une ou l'autre de

léonine constitue manifestement, en effet, une expression importante de ce mouvement néo-thomiste, et tout d'abord dans l'esprit du pape lui-même.[12] On évoque aussi l'émulation suscitée chez les dominicains, la jalousie même peut-être, par les solides travaux du père Fedele da Fanna préparant une nouvelle édition des œuvres de S. Bonaventure.[13] Enfin, outre les nombreuses autres entreprises d'éditions complètes ou partielles d'œuvres de S. Thomas élaborées avec plus ou moins de bonheur au cours du XIXe s.,[14] on mentionne tout particulièrement la stimulation résultant des travaux de l'abbé Paul Antoine Uccelli sur les autographes de S. Thomas et ses inédits ou supposés tels.[15] Ces travaux révélaient qu'il y avait peut-être encore bien des découvertes à faire en ce domaine et que toutes les éditions de S. Thomas déjà publiées risquaient d'être beaucoup plus imparfaites encore qu'on ne le supposait.

ces publications, mais nous renonçons à redire ici ce qui a déjà été dit ailleurs. Il reviendra à un historien de regrouper un jour toutes ces études et de les concilier en une synthèse. Remarquons simplement que, contrairement à ce qui est suggéré dans le *Bulletin thomiste*, X, p. 929, nous pensons conclure de tout ce que nous disent les études récentes sur Léon XIII et ses activités ou engagements intellectuels, que c'est bien le thomisme que le pape entend restaurer et non pas seulement une philosophie chrétienne éclectique; les allusions à S. Bonaventure ou à S. Anselme que l'on relève sous la plume pontificale ne peuvent être invoquées pour minimiser les fortes convictions spécifiquement thomistes du cardinal Pecci, même si dans sa première encyclique de souverain pontife il ne parle de S. Thomas d'Aquin que de façon allusive: lettre encyclique *Inscrutabili* du 21 avril 1878, voir *A.S.S.* 10 (1877-1878) 585-592, où S. Thomas est mentionné p. 590 à propos de la bonne philosophie propre à bien former la jeunesse "quemadmodum nos exemplo scriptisque suis Magnus Augustinus et Angelicus Doctor, caeterique christianae sapientiae Magistri docuerunt."

12 C'est bien ce qui ressort de tous les actes de Léon XIII qui traitent de l'Edition léonine, voir par exemple le passage de *Iampridem considerando* cité ci-dessus n. 4.

13 C'est en 1874 qu'avait paru l'ouvrage du père Fidelis a Fanna, *Ratio novae collectionis operum omnium sive editorum sive anecdotorum S. Bonaventurae proxime in lucem edendae manusriptorum bibliothecis totius Europae perlustratis* (Torino 1874). Sur l'auteur voir V. Meneghin O.F.M., *Il P. Fedele a Fanna dei Fratri Minori 1838-1881* (Vicenza 1940). En fait, l'énorme travail codicologique et paléographique de Fedele da Fanna n'a pas été exploité autant qu'il aurait pu l'être par les éditeurs franciscains de S. Bonaventure. Le père Fedele étant mort à 43 ans le 12 août 1881, le premier volume sortira quinze mois après ce décès alors que les franciscains avaient décidé en 1870 de mettre en chantier cette édition.

14 Sur les nombreuses éditions d'œuvres de S. Thomas entreprises depuis le projet avorté de Tommaso Soldati à la fin du XVIIIe s., voir par ex. J. J. Berthier, *Sanctus Thomas Aquinas "Doctor Communis" Ecclesiae* (Roma 1914); mais surtout M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des Hl. Thomas von Aquin* (BZGPTM, XXII (Münster i.W. 1949) passim; voir aussi A. Walz, "Sguardo sul movimento tomista in Europa nel secolo XIX fino all'enciclica Aeterni Patris", *Aquinas* 8 (1965) 351-379, concernant Migne voir p. 357, pour les éditions italiennes p. 367. On retrouve cette même étude p. 139-167 du volume collectif *Gaetano Sanseverino*, qui n'est qu'une reprise du fascicule 3 d'*Aquinas* 8 (1965) sous une nouvelle couverture et avec une pagination autonome.

A la même époque, il y eut des projets multiples d'éditions des œuvres de S. Bonaventure, voir Fedele da Fanna, *Ratio novae...*, pp. 21-23, et aussi *S. Bonaventurae Opera omnia*, I (Quaracchi 1882) pp. VII-VIII.

15 Sur P. A. Uccelli, voir S. Merkle, "Antonio Uccelli und Thomas Contra errores Graecorum", *Römische Quartalschrift* 35 (1927) 209-246, mais également la liste des œuvres dans M. Grabmann, op. cit. note précédente, pp. 38-39 n. 59, à condition d'y ajouter au moins l'édition, à tirage très limité et actuellement introuvable, de la partie autographe du *Super Isaiam* faite à Milan en 1847.

Toute une série de documents inédits conservés dans les archives de la Commission léonine manifeste l'existence et la consistance d'un projet d'édition antérieur de dix années à la décision de Léon XIII. Ces documents fourmillent de détails qui conduisent à penser que ce projet, qui d'ailleurs avorta très vite, a très probablement exercé une influence notable sur la genèse et la maturation de l'idée qui est à l'origine de l'Edition léonine.

Voici la liste des documents concernant le projet Uccelli-Dallet qui se trouvent dans les archives de la Commission léonine:[16]

[1] P. A. Uccelli à A. V. Jandel, Naples 14 mars 1869.
[2] A. V. Jandel à P. A. Uccelli, réponse à [1], main de R. Bianchi, 17 mars.
[3] P. A. Uccelli à A. V. Jandel, réponse à [2*].
[4] Conditions pour un traité avec un éditeur, main de V. Ligiez.
[5*] V. Ligiez à P. M. Rouard de Card, brouillon, 5 mai; voir ici n. 29.
[6] P. A. Uccelli à A. V. Jandel, mai 1869.
[7*] A. V. Jandel à P. A. Uccelli, réponse à [6], brouillon main de V. Ligiez, Marino 20 mai; voir ici pp. 347-349.
[8*] J. Dallet à A. V. Jandel, Langres 21 mai; voir ici n. 56.
[9*] A. V. Jandel à J. Dallet, réponse à [8], brouillon main de A. V. Jandel, juin; voir ici p. 349.
[10] P. A. Uccelli à J. Dallet, brouillon main de V. Ligiez, Rome 15 juin.
[11*] J. Dallet à A. V. Jandel, Langres 24 juin; voir ici p. 349.
[12*] A. V. Jandel à J. Dallet, réponse à [11*], brouillon main de V. Ligiez, Rome 3 juillet; voir ici pp. 349-350.
[13] T. M. Thiriet à V. Ligiez, Flavigny.
[14] T. M. Thiriet à J. Dallet, projet de contrat Uccelli-Dallet, Flavigny 2 août.
[15] J. Dallet à V. Ligiez, Langres 4 août.
[16] V. Ligiez à J. Dallet, réponse à [15], brouillon, Paris 6 août.
[17] J. Dallet à V. Ligiez, Langres 7 août.
[18] V. Ligiez à J. Dallet, brouillon, Paris 8 août.
[19] P. A. Uccelli à V. Ligiez, Rome 8 août.
[20*] R. Bianchi à V. Ligiez, Rome 10 août; voir ici n. 57.

16 A chaque fois nous indiquons pour les lettres l'auteur et le destinataire puis le lieu de rédaction et la date, mais quand nous n'avons eu en mains qu'une copie ou un brouillon ou encore un simple schéma de réponse, nous le signalons car nous ne pouvons pas être certain que la lettre réellement envoyée a comporté un texte identique en tout point à celui que nous avons eu sous la main.

Pour pouvoir le désigner plus commodément par la suite, nous donnons à chaque document un numéro d'ordre entre crochets. La numérotation a suivi dans la mesure du possible l'ordre chronologique; parmi les pièces non datées, certaines n'ont pu être situées que de façon approximative, mais on n'a retenu que les documents appartenant manifestement à cette période et à cette affaire.

L'astérisque qui affecte certains numéros indique que le document correspondant est cité ici soit intégralement, soit pour la partie concernant notre objet, ou bien, dans le cas de la pièce [39], qu'elle est fidèlement résumée.

[21] A. V. Jandel à V. Ligiez, télégramme, Jaroslav 12 août.
[22*] A. V. Jandel à V. Ligiez, Lemberg 14 août; voir ici p. 351.
[23] J. Dallet à V. Ligiez, Langres 13 août.
[24] V. Ligiez à J. Dallet, brouillon, Paris 16 août.
[25] P. A. Uccelli à V. Ligiez, doublet de [19], Rome 18 août.
[26] J. Dallet à V. Ligiez, Langres 18 août.
[27] Projet de contrat P. A. Uccelli-J. Dallet, main de V. Ligiez.
[28] Projet de contrat P. A. Uccelli-J. Dallet, main de V. Ligiez.
[29] Projet de contrat V. Ligiez-J. Dallet, main de V. Ligiez.
[30] P. A. Uccelli à V. Ligiez, 20 août.
[31] V. Ligiez à J. Dallet, réponse à [26], brouillon, Paris 23 août.
[32*] M. Chéry à V. Ligiez, Rome 27 août; voir ici n. 58.
[33] P. A. Uccelli à V. Ligiez, Rome 27 août.
[34] P. A. Uccelli à V. Ligiez, Rome 31 août.
[35] J. Dallet à V. Ligiez, Langres 3 septembre.
[36*] P. Monvoisin à V. Ligiez, Paris 4 septembre; voir ici n. 52.
[37*] T. Bourard à V. Ligiez, voir [24], Dijon 11 septembre; voir ici p. 343-344.
[38] C. Bayonne à V. Ligiez (?).
[39*] P. A. Uccelli, présentation du projet d'édition; voir ici n. 34.
[40*] P. A. Uccelli, à V. Ligiez, Rome avant la fin de 1869; voir ici n. 60.

Les principaux protagonistes de l'entreprise sont J. Dallet, libraire-éditeur à Langres (France), l'abbé P. A. Uccelli[17] et les dominicains V. Ligiez[18] et T. M. Thiriet.[19] Les autres correspondants impliqués sont tous dominicains: A. V. Jandel, Maître de l'Ordre; R. Bianchi, procureur général; Marcolin Chéry, français à Rome;[20] P. Monvoisin, Th. Bourard et C. Bayonne, de couvents français; enfin le père Rouard de Card, provincial de Belgique.

17 Nous nous contentons ici de signaler à l'attention et d'exploiter sommairement des pièces des archives de la Commission léonine; mais il est bien évident que, pour achever de préciser les rôles respectifs de P. A. Uccelli et de ses correspondants, il faudrait chercher ailleurs des pièces complémentaires particulièrement à la Bibliothèque vaticane dans les dossiers Ms. lat. 10139 à 10150.

18 Sur le père V. Ligiez voir par exemple I. P. Grossi, "Un' accademia tomistica alla Minerva. Note d'archivio", *Memorie Domenicane* 75 (1958) 226-248, voir p. 229 n. 7. Sur sa collaboration avec P. A. Uccelli et son rôle comme éditeur du volume posthume d'Uccelli, voir S. Merkle, art. cité ci-dessus n. 15, p. 226. Ligiez fut socius du Maître de l'Ordre à partir de 1866 et jusqu'à la fin de 1879.

19 Le père Th. M. Mannès Thiriet, de la Province de France, a été lecteur à Flavigny de 1867 à 1875. Ses liens avec certains religieux romains promoteurs du thomisme apparaissent dans la lettre [13] où il mentionne les pères Gugliemotti et Carbó; on sait le rôle important joué par ce dernier et ses relations avec le futur Léon XIII et T. Zigliara, voir I. P. Grossi, art. cité ci-dessus n. 2, passim.

20 Sur le père Marcolin Chéry, qui vint à Rome en février 1868 avec le cardinal Bonaparte et fut nommé consulteur de la Congrégation de l'Index en janvier 1870, voir I. P. Grossi, art. cité ci-dessus, p. 231 n. 12, mais surtout les renseignements biographiques des pp. 218-222 de l'article de P. Vallin, "La collégialité épiscopale selon le P. Marcolin Chéry", *Rev. Sc. ph. th.* 51 (1967) 217-226.

Origines, grandes lignes et motifs du projet.

Nous n'avons aucun renseignement direct sur les premières origines du projet. Il est clair qu'au début il y a, d'une part, J. Dallet[21] et sans doute des dominicains français, et P. A. Uccelli,[22] d'autre part; la liaison entre les deux étant faite par les autorités dominicaines de Rome.[23] Les pères Ligiez et Thiriet deviennent alors les intermédiaires permanents et les plus actifs soutiens de l'entreprise.[24]

Au moment de son élaboration la plus achevée dans l'esprit de Dallet,[25] d'Uccelli[26] et des pères Ligiez[27] et Thiriet, c'est-à-dire vers mai-juin 1869, le projet se présente ainsi dans ses grandes lignes:

Faire une édition des œuvres complètes du Docteur angélique qui soit directement fondée sur les manuscrits les plus authentiques exploités de la manière la plus scientifique possible;[28] quand il y en aura, ce seront les autographes ou les originaux qui seront collationnés. On commencera d'ailleurs cette édition par deux volumes qui seront l'œuvre d'Uccelli lui-même et qui seront précisément consacrés aux œuvres de S. Thomas dont nous avons une partie autographe.[29] Pour les

21 Au moment où l'affaire commence à mal tourner, on saura rappeler à J. Dallet que c'est lui qui a pris l'initiative première de tout le projet [24], voir [2].

22 En mars 1869, P. A. Uccelli présente déjà des projets au Maître de l'Ordre [1] [2].

23 C'est le Père Général qui oriente Uccelli vers Dallet avec qui la curie généralice est déjà en correspondance à la suite de propositions faites par Dallet [2].

24 Il ressort des documents que V. Ligiez agit en France en tant que représentant autorisé d'Uccelli pour traiter avec Dallet [10][16][35], mais comme il est en même temps 'socius' du Maître de l'Ordre il engage en fait plus que ne l'avait prévu le père Jandel, d'où des échanges difficiles, par ex. [20*][21][22*][32*] etc. Par ailleurs le rôle actif du père Thiriet est éclatant dans ses propres lettres, Uccelli lui rend hommage plusieurs fois, par ex. [19][34].

25 Ainsi les lettres [8*][15][17].

26 Il faudrait citer toutes les lettres d'Uccelli qui insiste généralement sur les deux premiers volumes mais dans d'autres documents il envisage toute l'édition, voir [10] et surtout [39*] que nous résumons ci-dessous n. 34.

27 Voir par exemple [5*][29].

28 Dans les documents le titre de l'édition est "édition des Œuvres de St. Thomas d'après les mss orginaux ou contemporains" voir par ex. [10] mais aussi [33][34] et aussi [39*] résumé ci-dessous n. 34.

29 Cela est redit dans tous les projets de contrat et dans les présentations de l'œuvre, ainsi [14][27][28] etc. Il est à noter qu'Uccelli semble considérer comme étant de S. Thomas les textes qui se trouvent dans son autographe de Naples alors qu'il s'agit en réalité d'œuvres de S. Albert copiées par S. Thomas. Voir par exemple ce qu'écrit V. Ligiez au père Rouard de Card au moment où il lui demande d'obtenir l'envoi à Rome d'un ms. de Bruges [5].

"Peut-être connaissez-vous D. Uccelli, le paléographe qui semble nous être envoyé providentiellement pour dénicher de partout où ils gisent dans la poussière et l'oubli, et surtout pour déchiffrer les écrits autographes de St. Thomas d'Aquin. L'une de ses plus précieuses trouvailles en ce genre est l'autographe des commentaires que notre Docteur Angélique a écrit (sic) sur *tous les* ouvrages de St. Denys l'Aréopagite, et qui sont inédits en grande partie. Cet autographe qui est à Naples, a fourni la preuve que ce qui a été imprimé de ces commentaires parmi les œuvres du B. Albert le Grand, est bien réellement de son disciple; et qu'en outre des livres *De caelesti hierarchia, De ecclesiastica hierarchia* et *De mystica theologia*, notre grand Docteur a encore commenté

autres volumes, éventuellement pour contrôler le travail d'Uccelli dans les deux premiers,[30] le travail sera accompli par les soins "d'une commission romaine chargée de la collation des textes... ainsi que de la correction des épreuves",[31] mais "les pères dominicains de France et de Belgique devront aussi contribuer..."[32] et d'ailleurs on prendra des collaborateurs "partout où le besoin s'en fera sentir".[33]

Les raisons d'entreprendre une telle édition sont très explicitement exposées par les promoteurs:[34] P. A. Uccelli met en avant l'actualité de

le livre *De divinis nominibus* et les *lettres de St. Denys*. Seulement le précieux autographe a été lacéré et mutilé par une dévotion indiscrète, et pour suppléer aux lacunes qu'elle y a ouvertes, il faut nécessairement recourir aux rares copies qui en ont été faites. D. Uccelli en a trouvé une au Vatican, mais fort défectueuse. On sait qu'il en existe une autre au Séminaire de Bruges, et ce serait un grand service à nous rendre que de nous la prêter pour quelque temps. Il est grandement question d'imprimer cet ouvrage de St. Thomas. Le S. Père qui a eu connaissance de la découverte qui en a été faite, désirerait qu'il soit publié avant le Concile, et l'Ordre aurait lui-même à cette publication un grand intérêt, car ce serait le commencement de la réédition des œuvres complètes de notre Docteur Angélique revues et collationnées sur les textes originaux ou les copies les plus authentiques, réédition qu'il est grand temps que l'Ordre entreprenne pour arracher ces précieux écrits à la spéculation mercantile qui en compromet de plus en plus la doctrine et l'intégrité..."

30 Uccelli lui-même avait proposé le père Gatti [33]; sur cette question de censure par l'Ordre dominicain, question qui préoccupe beaucoup les autorités romaines de l'Ordre, voir [7*] et [32*], ici pp. 347-349 et n. 58.

31 Cette commission, dont il est question plusieurs fois par ex. [15][29], n'existe que dans l'imagination anticipatrice des promoteurs et en particulier de V. Ligiez qui propose un projet de contrat à Dallet, commençant ainsi [29]: "Le R. P. Ligiez de l'Ordre de St. Dominique agissant en son nom et au nom d'une commission de P. dominicains constituée à Rome par ses soins, et Mr Dallet...forment le présent traité..."

32 Voir par exemple [12*][13][16].

33 Ainsi dans [16], ce recrutement de collaborateurs est présenté comme la raison d'être de la venue du père Ligiez en France en juillet-août.

34 Il faudrait citer trop de documents [5*][8*][10][15][17][29], nous nous contentons de résumer ici une présentation de l'entreprise rédigée par Uccelli lui-même et qui est malheureusement trop longue pour être citée *ad litteram*[39]:

— Uccelli part de l'actualité du thomisme et de la nécessité de fonder le renouveau thomiste sur une édition de valeur. Il parle des mérites de la Piana mais souligne ses défectuosités et les critiques dont elle a été l'objet par des hommes compétents. Les éditions postérieures, étant des reprises, ne font que reproduire les mêmes imperfections. Le rôle précurseur de T. Soldati à la fin du XVIII s. est présenté surtout à cause de ses idées en matière de recherche des mss.; Uccelli a lui-même bénéficié du très important fichier de Soldati.

— Le véritable problème, c'est de faire un bon usage de l'information codicologique et paléographique rassemblée, à cause du très grand nombre de mss qu'il faudra considérer.

— L'édition devra débuter par des documents sur la vie de S. Thomas, les catalogues de ses œuvres, les approbations pontificales de sa doctrine, une dissertation expliquant la valeur de ces approbations au plan théologique, mais cette introduction doit permettre aussi de situer historiquement chaque œuvre de S. Thomas et cela donnera à l'édition une valeur sans pareille par comparaison aux autres éditions de S. Thomas.

— Il faut rechercher les autographes, aucune autre édition ne l'a fait, et pour ces textes autographes on fera une édition diplomatique avec quelques fac-similés.

— On devra à chaque fois indiquer les mss collationnés pour l'édition, ceux qui auront été consultés et enfin ceux que l'on aura éliminés, de telle façon que les explications de ces choix permettent aux spécialistes de contrôler et éventuellement corriger le travail.

— Là où il y a des autographes,on s'en tiendra strictement à eux; en leur absence,on aura recours aux meilleurs mss et pour juger de l'authenticité d'un ms. on tiendra compte de son lieu de con-

la pensée de S. Thomas et ce qu'elle peut apporter au monde moderne, la nécessité de fonder le renouveau thomiste sur une bonne édition du texte même de S. Thomas et, par suite des défauts des éditions disponibles, l'obligation de faire cette bonne édition en suivant les normes scientifiques les plus rigoureuses en matière d'édition de textes.[35] Il arrive que dans les motifs invoqués se mêlent assez maladroitement des soucis doctrinaux élevés et des considérations mercantiles, le mélange produisant un effet cocasse.[36] On insiste sur le fait que les raisons d'agir sans retard ne manquent pas: il y a d'une part la concurrence résultant de la publicité commençante pour un projet analogue et il ne s'agit pas de se faire prendre de vitesse;[37] mais d'autre part le concile est imminent et le pape désire que les inédits de S. Thomas soient publiés avant l'ouverture de ce grand rassemblement écclésiastique, qui pourrait offrir par ailleurs des possibilités exceptionnelles de diffusion de l'édition.[38]

servation, de ses détenteurs successifs, des dates qu'il peut porter et de l'écriture du texte, de telle façon qu'on retienne les mss les plus anciens mais en prenant garde qu'un ms. récent peut être une copie d'un ms. très proche de l'origine. Il faudra déterminer les filiations des mss et établir leurs familles généalogiques. Les variantes seront indiquées en bas de page, avec référence au texte, "col metodo Maurino". Mais on utilisera aussi les éditions valables en particulier les éditions princeps et celles qui furent plus soignées.
— Les textes bibliques et patristiques seront conservés tels qu'ils se trouvent et on ne les retouchera pas à la moderne. On pourra justifier les formulations citées par S. Thomas en recourant pour la Bible à l'édition Sabatier, etc.; en effet, précise Uccelli, S. Thomas ne lit pas avec la Vulgate moderne et de son temps les études textuelles sur la Bible se développent particulièrement à Saint-Jacques. U. souligne que les façons de procéder de Nicolai sont erronées.
— Chaque œuvre sera précédée de l'excellente dissertation que De Rubeis lui a consacrée mais avec des ajouts et les compléments nécessaires.
— Chaque ouvrage aura son index propre. A la fin de l'œuvre totale on publiera un index général et la *Tabula aurea* de Pierre de Bergame mais corrigée et augmentée.

35 [39*] résumé dans la note précédente est un document assez éloquent en lui-même pour qu'il n'y ait pas lieu de citer les nombreux autres allant dans le même sens.

36 [5*] cité ci-dessous n. 29, voir aussi [8*] cité n. 56.

37 Le problème de la concurrence que pourrait faire le projet Vivès au projet Uccelli-Dallet d'édition des *Opera omnia* de S. Thomas revient sans cesse dans les documents, voir [5*][8*][13][17][18][22*][23][24][34][37][38]. On notera en particulier que Vivès avait fait des offres à Uccelli mais repoussées par ce dernier [13]. La participation de l'ex-dominicain Fretté au projet Vivès aggrave les choses au plan psychologique: on le considère comme un transfuge qui aurait eu connaissance du projet Dallet quand il était dominicain et qui serait passé à l'ennemi avec l'idée de ce projet [23][24]. Enfin cette rivalité se complique d'une polémique dans l'*Univers* [17][18][24][37*]. Tout cela d'ailleurs ne fait que stimuler le projet Uccelli-Dallet et en particulier le désir des maîtres d'œuvre de publier dès que possible un manifeste publicitaire [6][8*][17][22*][23][25][26][34][37] et particulièrement un article qu'aurait préparé T. M. Thiriet [26] etc. Louis Veuillot ayant refusé de couvrir le développement de publicités concurrentes dans son journal, [24][37*] etc. On sait que l'édition Vivès (Paris) sera publiée dans les années 1871-1880.

38 [5*][6][19][25][30].

Atouts et handicaps du projet.

Ce projet Uccelli-Dallet était sans doute intéressant et par bien des aspects assez solide. Un des meilleurs atouts de l'entreprise venait de la part qu'Uccelli devait prendre au travail mais aussi aux principes même de l'édition. Quelles que soient les critiques que l'on a pu faire très justement à certains de ses travaux,[39] Uccelli apportait avec lui un souci scientifique et une expérience concrète de l'édition de textes tout à fait hors du commun.[40] En outre, il semble bien, à l'en croire, qu'il avait ses petites entrées au Vatican et qu'il avait déjà réussi à intéresser le pape Pie IX, ainsi que son entourage peut-être, à cette entreprise en projet.[41] Il est clair que, du côté des Dominicains français, l'idée trouvait des encouragements; elle correspondait d'ailleurs à certaines aspirations du temps pour un renouveau tout à la fois thomiste et scientifique. Quant à la concurrence, elle contribuait en fait à stimuler l'ardeur des promoteurs.[42]

La correspondance relative au projet montre que l'entreprise se développe assez rapidement et peu à peu se précise: on échange des textes de contrats commerciaux,[43] on cherche à recruter des collaborateurs,[44] on pense à la publicité à faire,[45] etc.

Pourtant, dès l'automne 1869 donc à peine plus de six ou sept mois après sa mise sur pied, l'affaire est liquidée, du moins sous sa forme d'entreprise d'édition des *Opera omnia S. Thomae*. Les raisons de cet échec sont évidemment complexes et l'essentiel ne se trouve sans doute pas dans les écrits qui nous restent, mais on peut essayer de cerner quelque peu le processus.

On est d'abord frappé de voir combien les discussions se développent sur des points secondaires et s'y enlisent.[46] En outre, toutes les

39 Voir par ex. S. Merkle, art. cité ici n. 15.

40 Sur le souci scientifique qui anime U. voir le document exemplaire [39*] résumé ci-dessus note 34. Quant à son expérience concrète, nous pensons bien évidemment à ses travaux en codicologie et en paléographie, mais aussi au fait qu'il avait déjà été publié et qu'il avait par exemple traité avec Migne (Paris) pour l'édition du *Contra Gentiles* (il revient très souvent sur ce contrat qui semble lui avoir laissé des souvenirs amers. Par comparaison à J. Dallet et aux dominicains français, Uccelli est très lucide sur le temps et le nombre d'hommes qu'il faudra pour élaborer l'édition complète [19][25]; il sait qu'on ne peut fixer exactement tout cela à l'avance, il faut commencer et on verra bien, en conséquence le contrat d'édition doit rester ouvert à des développements.

41 Voir en particulier [6][19][25][33] et [7] cité ci-dessous pp. 347-349.

42 Voir ci-dessus n. 37.

43 [4][14][27][28][29] etc., voir note ci-dessous n. 37.

44 Ainsi par ex. [11*][12][13][16].

45 Voir [8*][22*], ici n. 56 et p. 351.

46 Alors que des points très importants restent totalement dans le vague: ainsi le temps nécessaire et le nombre d'hommes indispensable pour faire le travail, la méthode heuristique à adopter dans la quête codiocologique, etc., le dossier est encombré de projets multiples de contrats à peu près identiques, de discussion sur tel ou tel point de détail qui étaient alors encore loin de se poser concrètement. Il faudrait citer ici toutes les lettres d'Uccelli et bien d'autres encore, voir

correspondances témoignent des nombreux malentendus qui séparent les divers interlocuteurs.[47] J. Dallet voit les choses du point de vue d'un éditeur commercial, il entre difficilement dans certaines requêtes d'Uccelli tenant pour une part pourtant au caractère très particulier d'une édition diplomatique. De leur côté, les Dominicains français sont enthousiastes, mais eux-mêmes ne perçoivent pas toujours non plus les raisons techniques de toutes les exigences d'Uccelli. En outre, ils ne précisent guère jusqu'à quel point leurs propos engagent les autorités religieuses dont ils dépendent pourtant et qu'ils représentent même d'une certaine façon.[48]

Les difficultés qui surgissent tiennent aussi pour une part non négligeable à certains traits de caractère d'Uccelli: sa susceptibilité d'auteur[49] et d'inventeur, ses revendications au plan des redevances financières ou en nature,[50] son esprit quelque peu minutieux et compliqué, son impatience d'être publié,[51] peut-être aussi son intérêt trop exclusif pour le secteur qui lui revient en propre dans le projet: les autographes et inédits, ou supposés tels par lui, etc.

Du côté des dominicains français, des difficultés ont certainement surgi également. Il y avait un gros pas à franchir entre l'élaboration imaginative de projets enthousiastes et la mise sur pied concrète d'une entreprise dont les dimensions réelles n'avaient sans doute pas été perçues par des Dominicains trop néophytes dans le domaine de l'édition de textes. Le recrutement de collaborateurs, en particulier, n'a pas été aussi facile qu'on ne l'imaginait, et ceci pour des raisons diverses mais qui finalement se renforçaient mutuellement: voici par exemple cette lettre du père Bourard de Dijon, elle est du mois de septembre[37]:

> Nos affaires ne vont pas vite, vous avez pu voir, si vous suivez l'*Univers*, que ma lettre n'y brille que par son absence. J'ai vu Lafon, j'ai vu L. Veuillot, rien n'a servi. De dernier m'a dit, avec quelque apparence

par ex. [4][13][14][19][27][28][29][31][35]. Les démêlés financiers qu'Uccelli a déjà eus avec Migne encombrent l'horizon des discussions [3][19][33], on ergote sur le nombre des services de presse [19][25][30][33], les modalités des corrections d'épreuves [19][30][34], des détails typographiques [19][26], les droits d'auteur en cas de réédition [33], le choix d'un arbitre si un litige survient [34], etc.

47 Ainsi entre J. Dallet et V. Ligiez [15][16]. Uccelli est très lucide sur l'inévitable tension entre l'éditeur commercial et l'érudit [33].

48 Voir [16]: la double personnalité de V. Ligiez, représentant légal d'Uccelli en Fance d'une part et "socius" du Père Général d'autre part, ne clarifie pas les choses, voir ci-dessus n. 24 et le paragraphe suivant ici pp. 346-351.

49 Nous avons cité [7*], ici pp. 347-349, qui est assez éclairant à ce point de vue.

50 Voir ci-dessus n. 46 et par ex. [3][19][33] etc.

51 En août, Uccelli s'étonne de n'avoir pas encore reçu les premières épreuves alors qu'aucun contrat n'a encore été conclu [19][25]; voir aussi [12*] cité ici pp. 349-350.

de raison, que pour une entreprise encore en voie de conception, il ne se sentait pas le courage de travailler à la démolition d'une œuvre déjà née. Si bien que voilà notre protestation à plat.

Quant à notre édition, les éléments n'en sont pas encore assez sortis du chaos, je crois, pour que vous traitiez avec un éditeur quelconque. Je dois vous dire aussi que vous n'avez peut-être pas tous les droits pour compter sur les collaborateurs de votre choix. Le petit T., que vous avez fait aller de Flavigny à Paris, dit à qui veut l'entendre, et cela m'a déjà été répété deux fois, que tout son amour pour St Thomas et la doctrine ne saurait le déterminer à passer dix ans pour *collationner des points et des virgules.* Comprenez-vous que ce petit trouve la besogne au-dessous de lui? Notre Docteur Uccelli lui-même n'est pas à l'abri de tout reproche. On ne lui croit pas assez de théologie, assez de connaissance des principes, pour s'en rapporter à lui dans la correction des textes traditionnels.

Si bien que nous en sommes toujours à peu près au point de départ.

Ici, j'ai trouvé le vieux Père Bissey. Cet homme de cœur se mettait à ma disposition pour l'œuvre, et il me vient l'idée que si, nous trois, vous, lui et moi, nous nous attelions à Paris à cette œuvre, nous la pourrions faire mais comment nous mettre tous les trois à Paris. Voilà... Adieu, bien cher Père, je ne vous demande pas de prier Dieu pour cette œuvre qui est ma vie, je sais que vous y mettez votre cœur, mais priez pour moi qui suis toujours un misérable pécheur et votre dévoué ami en Notre Seigneur.

Cette lettre témoigne bien des difficultés rencontrées pour recruter des collaborateurs.[52] Elle manifeste aussi quelle ignorance du travail im-

52 Malgré sa longueur, nous pensons devoir citer ici la lettre du père P. Monvoisin: même si elle représente une opinion qui n'était peut-être pas majoritaire, elle nous paraît très intéressante pour l'époque [36]:

"Le jour de votre départ, vous vous le rappelez, je me présentais chez vous au moment où vous fermiez votre valise; ma pensée était de vous demander un quart d'heure d'entretien et de vous exposer les idées qu'avaient fait naître en moi deux jours de réflexion sur l'entreprise dont vous m'avez parlé. La proximité de votre départ et la crainte de vous déranger me fermèrent la bouche, et je n'entamais pas la question: vous me permettrez de le faire aujourd'hui. Ce sera avec d'autant plus de maturité que j'ai reçu les réponses de plusieurs Pères graves et sérieux à qui j'avais cru devoir m'en rapporter.

Mon avis, et c'est le leur aussi, est que je ne puis accepter le travail que vous m'offrez. Certainement c'est une œuvre très belle, digne des veilles d'un Frère Prêcheur; je ne puis qu'y applaudir, et tous mes vœux, s'il est permis à un jeune Père de parler ce langage, sont de voir cette entreprise, œuvre colossale, aboutir. Heureux encore et dignes d'admiration, sont ceux qui s'y dévouent. Mais je le répète, il m'est impossible d'apporter à cette œuvre ma part de travail laquelle d'ailleurs aurait été bien faible, et au-dessous de ce que vous êtes en droit d'exiger.

Si vous voulez connaître quelques-unes des raisons qui m'arrêtent, je n'en fais pas un secret. Avant tout, et ce n'est pas fausse modestie de ma part, je ne crois pas être l'homme qu'il vous faut. Sans doute le travail et l'étude me plaisent, et beaucoup, mais c'est une étude qui parle au cœur et à l'esprit, un travail où l'on profite, où l'on ne sème pas en vain. Mais quant à ces recherches laborieuses, pour ces collations longues et pénibles de manuscrits et de mots, je n'ai ni l'attrait qu'elles supposent pour les commencer, ni la patience qu'elles demandent pour les poursuivre, ni l'aptitude qui les mène à bonne fin.

Ensuite, je suis effrayé par la longueur du travail, et par le rôle auquel je serais réduit, ce temps écoulé. Vous savez que j'ai peu d'aptitude pour la prédication et que ce genre de travail exige de

pliquée par le projet et plus largement quelles illusions nourrissaient l'espérance des partisans de l'édition. Elle montre en tout cas combien, en septembre 1869, l'affaire était peu élaborée.

Ceci bien souligné, il nous semble pourtant qu'en l'occurrence c'est l'attitude des autorités dominicaines de Rome qui a été déterminante et qui a ruiné le projet.

moi une sérieuse préparation. Or dans huit ou dix ans — car l'édition de St. Thomas ne peut s'achever à moins — que ferai-je? à quoi serai-je bon, ayant consacré mon temps et mes forces à un travail aride, desséchant. Comment pouvoir aborder la chaire qui exige une imagination jeune, une intelligence vive? Impossible. Entrerai-je dans le lectorat? Vous savez que deux fois les portes m'en ont été fermées. On ne me les ouvrira pas alors car les raisons qui m'en ont fait exclure aujourd'hui dureront encore demain.

Je ne veux pas vous parler ici, et peut-être pourtant en aurai-je le droit, d'une raison d'amour-propre. Comment veut-on que je me consacre à pâlir, pour les éditer, sur les œuvres et les idées d'un auteur pour lequel on me repousse coup sur coup d'une carrière que je croyais être la mienne, celle de l'enseignement. Que ceux-là qui sont les défenseurs d'office de St. Thomas, qui ont charge de l'expliquer, prennent à cœur la charge de le mettre au jour, pur de toute faute. Je le comprends et je leur laisse ce soin.

J'ajouterai encore une réflexion qui à mes yeux a son poids.

Il est téméraire et ambitieux à un jeune homme de dire qu'il a ses idées, surtout lorsque ces idées sont opposées à celles d'un docteur comme St. Thomas. Cependant, pardonnez-moi ici cette témérité. Et quand je dis opposées à St. Thomas, c'est plutôt à la scolastique, ou à la philosophie, à la science subie et acceptée par St. Thomas, comme par tous les hommes de son temps. D'autres partagent complètement les mêmes vues. Souvent nous avons causé ensemble de travaux sur St. Thomas et toujours nous sommes tombés d'accord pour repousser toute édition complète et nouvelle. A quoi bon? Celles qui existent suffisent, disions-nous. Et d'ailleurs, ce n'est pas là notre fait. Il faut pour ces sortes d'œuvres une dépense d'hommes et de temps que nous trouvions devoir être mieux employés ailleurs, à supposer toutefois que nous ayons jamais trouvé les hommes et le temps nécessaires. Mais voici quel projet nous aimions à caresser. Choisir dans St. Thomas les œuvres principales, celles que vous appelez si élégamment genuina, écarter tous les commentaires, toutes les œuvres supposées. Ainsi au fond nous borner à ses deux sommes, à ses questions disputées et à quelques opuscules. Puis éditer ces ouvrages avec des notes donnant, chose indispensable de nos jours, la clef de la scolastique, mettant la science thomiste en regard des idées et des sciences plus nouvelles; portant notre jugement, et au besoin rejetant ce qui a vieilli, ce qui est hors de saison, pour ne conserver de la doctrine de St. Thomas que ce qu'elle a de solide, de beau, d'éternel, et la part est grande encore... Projet chimérique, disais-je à quelqu'un, contre lequel il n'y aura jamais assez d'obstacles ni d'anathèmes, mais projet que nous considérons comme le plus nécessaire et le plus fructueux dans l'état actuel des esprits. Avec de pareilles idées, abusé si vous le voulez par la préférence des conceptions modernes, devenu par la force des choses adversaire de St. Thomas dont je reste pourtant un admirateur enthousiasmé et que j'étudie tous les jours, comment voulez-vous que je me mette au service d'une œuvre que j'admire, que j'apprécie, que je voudrais voir heureusement terminée! mais qui sort du cadre de mes études et du champ dans lequel seul j'ai résolu de travailler.

Inutile de poursuivre plus loin cet exposé de mes sentiments. Il n'a rien d'intéressant pour vous. C'est, pour conclure, c'est avec regret que je me vois obligé de me retirer de vos côtés. En toute autre rencontre j'aurais aimé, jeune soldat dans les camps de la science et de la vérité, à faire mes premières armes sous les auspices d'un chef aussi expérimenté, d'un guide aussi savant. C'eut été pour moi tout bonheur et tout profit; mais puisque le ciel m'a refusé l'armure nécessaire, et que la providence m'a laissé me ranger sous un autre drapeau, agréez mes regrets. Permettez-moi de rester ce que je suis et croyez moi à jamais.

Votre très respectueux serviteur et votre frère."

L'attitude des autorités dominicaines de Rome.

Les documents paraissent bien montrer que la cause principale de l'échec du projet Uccelli-Dallet provient du comportement des autorités dominicaines centrales. Ce comportement est d'ailleurs complexe; il convient de ne pas le caricaturer, car il pouvait se réclamer de raisons que l'on ne peut toutes considérer comme négligeables.[53] On peut cependant résumer l'analyse en une phrase et dire que c'est surtout la prudence temporisatrice du père A. V. Jandel qui a fait échouer l'entreprise.

Dans le cadre général d'une répugnance pour toute hâte ou précipitation en matière de responsabilités à endosser ou de réalisations à promouvoir, une telle répugnance étant sans doute bien romaine dans son inspiration, la prudence de l'autorité dominicaine suprême a pour fondement en l'occurrence:[54]

— une certaine suspicion pour un travail d'édition de textes qui serait purement paléographique et critique, une réserve à l'égard de tout travail de ce genre qui ne serait pas vérifié et donc authentifié par des théologiens "spéculatifs";

— une très grande méfiance à l'égard des travaux d'Uccelli, dont on suspecte la valeur au plan de la critique textuelle en même temps que l'on doute fortement de la solidité doctrinale et de l'orthodoxie thomiste de la pensée personnelle de l'auteur;

— un pressentiment des exigences très poussées que devrait satisfaire une telle entreprise au plan scientifique et technique, pressentiment conjugué avec la conviction que l'Ordre ne dispose pas alors des hommes capables de mener le travail, c'est-à-dire tout à la fois de le diriger et de le contrôler;

— un refus de courir le risque de produire un travail inférieur à ce qu'il devrait être; ce refus est d'ailleurs inspiré plus par des motifs de prestige à ne pas compromettre que par un véritable souci de valeur scientifique a promouvoir.

Cette prudence du père A. V. Jandel s'exprime dès les premiers documents émanant de lui, mais on voit qu'elle n'est d'abord ni comprise, ni même entendue, par les interlocuteurs du Maître de l'Ordre. Il en résulte un malentendu qui va se développant et qui finalement conduit à la fermeture du dossier.

53 Nous ne savons pas si la situation politique en Italie en ce temps et son incidence possible même en matière de recherche de mss a pesé sur les décisions ou la psychologie du Maître de l'Ordre, mais l'œuvre déjà publiée d'Uccelli n'était pas sans défauts, voir S. Merkle, art. cité ci-dessus n. 15. Quant aux ressources de l'Ordre dominicain de cet époque en hommes capables de comprendre les exigences scientifiques d'une telle édition et disponible un temps suffisant pour l'accomplir, elles étaient plutôt faibles.

54 Voir par exemple [7*][12*][37*], documents cités ici respectivement pp. 342-350, 343.

Certes les tout premiers documents témoignent d'excellentes relations entre Uccelli et le Maître de l'Ordre, A. V. Jandel.[55] Uccelli travaille en quelque sorte pour le compte de l'Ordre à Naples, il est d'ailleurs reçu dans un couvent dominicain et, au moins pour une part, ses frais divers sont couverts par le Père Général; mais ce dernier n'engage pas pour autant sa responsabilité personnelle ni celle de son Ordre, il encourage seulement une recherche menée par un érudit.

Dès le 20 mai, il apparaît qu'un malentendu commence à poindre entre le père A. V. Jandel et l'abbé Uccelli, ce malentendu étant d'ailleurs amplifié par leur grande différence de conceptions et de mentalité. A Uccelli qui lui écrit, avec bien des lamentations d'auteur incompris, pour insister sur l'urgence de certaines décisions, le Maître de l'Ordre répond en des termes qui nous dispensent de citer la lettre d'Uccelli |6|, il la reprend en effet point par point |7*|:

> Je regrette que la conversation que nous avons eue la semaine dernière vous ait causé quelque peine, et afin de prévenir de nouveaux malentendus, je me détermine à répondre par écrit à la note que vous m'avez remise avant mon départ pour Marino. Je ne dirai rien des plaintes que vous me faites au sujet du silence gardé vis-à-vis de vous par nos Pères sur vos précédentes publications: je puis en être peiné, mais je ne peux intervenir pour les obliger à lire vos ouvrages et à vous en faire l'éloge, si mérité qu'il soit, et je ne pense pas que vous ayez cette intention. Je ne vois donc dans cette plainte que le signe d'une susceptibilité plus ou moins motivée, que je respecte, tout en la regrettant.
>
> Ce qui m'a vraiment surpris, c'est que vous étendiez cette plainte au silence gardé sur votre dernier opuscule *de puchro*, et cela en répondant à la conversation dans laquelle précisément je vous avais prévenu que ce travail était soumis à un commission d'examen, je vous avais même nommé les 4 examinateurs, et vous aviez paru pleinement satisfait. Il me semble que dès lors vous auriez dû comprendre que le retard que vous accusez, loin de provenir d'indifférence ou de *non curanza*, était au contraire le résultat et la preuve de l'importance que nous attachions à votre publication et au grand travail dont elle n'était qu'un 1er morceau détaché.
>
> Il est probable qu'au moment où je vous écris, la commission aura assez avancé son travail pour avoir pu déjà vous communiquer ses observations, et que celles-ci vous auront démontré l'étude sérieuse dont votre opuscule avait été l'objet, et l'étude bien plus sérieuse encore que réclamera tout votre manuscrit, avant de pouvoir songer à mettre la main à l'impression comme vous le désireriez.
>
> Ici les rôles semblent intervertis puisque c'est moi qui suis obligé de vous mettre en garde contre la *furia francese*. Si votre travail peut atteindre le degré de correction et d'exactitude nécessaires pour arriver à la publicité dans des conditions satisfaisantes, ce sera sans contredit une

55 Ainsi |1||2||3|.

grande gloire pour vous d'avoir ajouté un nouveau fleuron à la couronne du St. Docteur dont vous aurez reproduit une œuvre inédite et jusqu'alors inconnue. Mais il faut pour cela que l'œuvre soit vraiment et de touts points digne du nom et du génie de St Thomas: une publication incorrecte, parce qu'elle serait trop hâtive, vous ferait peu d'honneur, et exposerait à une juste et sévère critique ceux qui l'auraient patronnée.

Aussi, quand même votre empressement d'auteur vous porterait à passer par dessus les intérêts de votre propre réputation, je vous déclare sans hésiter que je ne consentirai jamais à accepter la solidarité de la publication d'un écrit attribué à St Thomas et dédié à Pie IX, tant qu'elle n'offrira pas toutes les garanties que l'ouvrage est vraiment digne du génie de St. Thomas, et de l'auguste personne du Souverain Pontife.

Si ces retards vous déterminaient (comme vous en avez déjà manifesté la pensée) à vous adresser aux PP.Jésuites pour commencer sans délai la publication de votre manuscrit, ce serait à vous de voir si vous n'auriez pas lieu de regretter plus tard, dans l'intérêt du manuscrit lui-même, qu'il n'eut pas été soumis à de nouvelles corrections, et à une révision plus sévère éxécutée par l'Ordre dépositaire des traditions thomistes: mais je vous laisserai faire, plutôt que de m'associer à une œuvre imparfaite; et si cela arrive, je suis sûr que les hommes impartiaux apprécieront ma réserve et comprendront qu'elle ne peut être trop scrupuleuse, puisqu'elle est inspirée par mon respect et ma vénération pour St Thomas et pour Pie IX. Vous pouvez donc dès à présent vous décider en pleine liberté et connaissance de cause, car rien ne me fera changer.

Je n'ai nullement la prétention d'être initié aux communications que vous avez reçues *ab altissimo*; mais je crois bon de vous faire part d'une observation qui m'est seulement venue *ab alto*. On s'étonnait de la légèreté avec laquelle vous parliez au dehors des éditions *actuelles* et de l'enseignement *actuel* de St Thomas, comme si le manuscrit que vous aviez découvert pût être de nature à opérer une révolution dans la doctrine Thomiste, et à rendre douteuse ou suspecte l'autorité de cette doctrine, telle que notre Ecole en a transmis au monde la tradition depuis 6 siècles. Une pareille imagination serait trop puérile pour que je puisse songer à vous l'attribuer. Je suppose bien plutôt que votre enthousiasme fort naturel pour la précieuse découverte que vous avez eu le mérite de faire, aura empreint vos paroles d'une teinte d'exagération *praeter intentionem*; mais il me semble utile de vous mettre en garde contre elle, puisqu'on me l'a signalée.

Enfin, quant aux conditions matérielles et financières sur lesquelles vous désirez que je prenne l'initiative, il me paraît trop juste que vous avez tout le bénéfice d'une publication dont vous aurez eu presque tout le travail, et si vous la faites avec notre collaboration, et que vous tombiez d'accord avec l'éditeur dont je vous ai communiqué les offres, c'est vous qui recevrez toute la somme, déduction faite seulement des avances que nous aurons faites pendant tout ce temps pour concourir à votre travail, et dont il sera tout naturel que l'Ordre rentre en possession. Je tiendrai du reste à ce que ce soit vous même qui traitiez avec l'éditeur et qui signiez le contrat; car ne prétendant aucune part aux bénéfices en faveur de l'Ordre, je ne veux pas non plus assumer une part de responsabilité.

Dans l'espoir que vous serez satisfait de la franchise et la loyauté de ces explications nettes et précises, je vous renouvelle, Mr l'abbé, la sincère expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

Presque au même moment, J. Dallet écrit au Maître de l'Ordre avant tout pour obtenir son autorisation de commencer la publicité, il fait valoir la concurrence qui résulte de la propagande pour l'édition Vivès.[56] Voici la décision du père Jandel [9]:

Répondre que n'acceptant plus la solidarité de l'édition projetée dans les conditions actuelles, on ne peut que l'engager à s'entendre avec les Pères de la Province pour le cas où ils veuillent s'en charger et assurent leur collaboration.

Mais J. Dallet écrit à nouveau au Père Général pour l'informer de l'accueil favorable reçu par lui à Flavigny en vue d'une collaboration des dominicains de cette maison d'études. Il lui pose alors la question suivante [11]:

Il me tarde, Révérendissime Père Général, de mettre la main à l'œuvre promptement et de connaître les bases principales sur lesquelles doit reposer cette grande entreprise, ainsi que la part de responsabilité que veut y prendre l'ordre de St Dominique, sous sa direction et patronage. Je serai heureux, Révérendissime Père Général, si dans une lettre prochaine vous voulez bien fixer et arrêter les conditions définitives et me donner l'autorisation de commencer immédiatement.

Voici la réponse du père Jandel [12]:

Votre lettre du 24 Juin me prouve que je ne me suis pas bien fait comprendre dans ma précédente réponse, et je m'empresse de bien préciser la situation afin de rendre pour l'avenir toute erreur impossible.

56 C'est le document [8]: "J'avais espéré commencer presque immédiatement la publication des œuvres complètes de Saint Thomas par le manuscrit inédit de D. Uccelli; mais ce travail n'étant pas encore arrivé à toute la perfection désirable, j'attendrai malgré mon impatience et me soumettant à votre décision, puisque de nouveaux délais vous paraissent indispensables pour assurer à cette grande œuvre une parfaite exécution.

Néanmoins, Révérendissime Père Général, permettez-moi d'insister sur l'urgence d'une annonce immédiate, sinon positive, au moins évidente, qui me donnera le titre de votre éditeur et qui portera à la connaissance du public théologique la grande publication qui se préparera sous votre direction et sous votre patronage.

Cette annonce, pour me servir des expressions contenues dans votre lettre du 15 avril dernier, indiquerait les avantages et le mérite de cette grande œuvre, de manière à faire taire toute concurrence; et il y a urgence à agir promptement pour arrêter les entreprises des concurrents *qui exploitent aujourd'hui* le nom du S. Docteur.

M. Vivès a déjà fait plusieurs annonces concernant cette publication *avec manuscrits inédits*; ces annonces souvent répétées depuis quelques mois ont déjà procuré des souscriptions à cet éditeur et chaque jour de retard lui en apporte de nouvelles.

Je ne crois pas exagérer en disant qu'il y a urgence et j'ose espérer que vous voudrez bien cette fois, dans l'intérêt de l'œuvre et du succès de la publication, et pour mon intérêt particulier qui y est engagé, partager mes craintes et m'autoriser à faire immédiatement toutes les annonces nécessaires et possibles.

J'ai le projet d'aller à Rome pour le prochain concile et de profiter de l'occasion unique qui me sera présentée d'assister à cette grande réunion de tous nos prélats et de leur faire connaître cette importante publication..."

D. Uccelli est persuadé que, pendant qu'on réimprimera les Commentaires déjà publiés sur S. Denys l'Aréopagite, il aura mis la partie inédite du manuscrit en état d'être livrée à l'impression. Je crois, au contraire, qu'il ne faudrait pas moins d'un an ou deux, d'un travail très sérieux pour préparer, *comme il faut*, cette publication (et je ne sais même pas encore si l'on y réussirait). Dans cet état de choses, je n'ai rien voulu entreprendre avant que le travail de correction préparatoire du manuscrit fut assez satisfaisant et assez avancé pour nous garantir le succès. D. Uccelli et d'autres avec lui ne goûtent pas cette lenteur Romaine, et veulent presser l'exécution; je n'ai ni le droit, ni l'envie, de m'y opposer ou de l'entraver; je fais même les vœux les plus sincères pour que l'entreprise soit couronnée d'un plein succès; mais je n'y prends aucune part, et je n'en accepte ni pour moi, ni pour notre Ordre, la responsabilité. Si nos Pères de France veulent individuellement aider D. Uccelli de leur concours, ils sont parfaitement libres de le faire, mais à leurs risques et périls, comme D. Uccelli lui-même. Je n'ai donc plus à m'occuper des conditions d'exécution d'un travail auquel je demeurerai étranger, et dont je décline formellement toute solidarité tant en mon nom qu'en celui de notre Ordre.

Veuillez prendre acte de cette déclaration, qui est pour moi tout à la fois un acte de loyauté et une garantie, et recevez de nouveau, Monsieur, l'expression de mes sentiments dévoués.

Fr. A. V. Jandel, M. Gén. des Fr. prêch.

P.S. — Je m'aperçois que je n'ai pas répondu *explicitement* à votre proposition relative à l'édition des œuvres complètes de S. Thomas: cependant cette réponse est, au fond, contenue dans ce qui précéde; car les commentaires sur S. Denys devant être comme le *prodrome* de cette nouvelle édition, je ne puis entreprendre celle-ci tant que je ne suis pas sûr du succès de ceux-là. Et puis, bien que je sois convaincu que l'on peut dès à présent, à l'aide des études faites et des matériaux déjà recueillis, entreprendre une édition de S. Thomas bien supérieure aux précédentes, je ne crois pas toutefois le travail suffisamment complet pour que notre Ordre en accepte la responsabilité; parce que quand un grand Ordre assume l'initiative d'une œuvre aussi importante, il ne lui suffit pas de faire mieux que les autres, on est en droit d'exiger qu'il fasse *très bien*; or, pour faire *très bien*, nous ne sommes pas prêts, et nous aimons mieux laisser à d'autres plus pressés que nous, et à l'égard desquels on n'a pas le droit d'être aussi exigeants, le mérite d'un progrès incontestable, bien qu'incomplet.

Confirmée par ailleurs,[57] cette position du Maître de l'Ordre s'exprime à nouveau dans un télégramme [21] suivi d'une lettre [22]

57 Voici ce qu'écrit le procureur général des Dominicains [20]: "Per la *réédition des œuvres de St. Thomas* voi conoscete le intenzioni del P. Generale a cui sono conformi le mie. — L'Ordine non può prendervi alcuna parte finchè non sono le cose al punto da riescire et con onore — Ora credo, che siamo troppo lontani da questo punto; e qualunque programma sarebbe un fuor d'Opera. Non divido con voi il timore, che altri ci rubino le mosse." Voir aussi [32*] cité note suivante.

adressés respectivement de Jaroslav et de Lemberg, Pologne. Voici l'essentiel de la lettre:

> Au reçu de votre lettre du 31/7, je vous ai télégraphié en toute hâte à Paris, pour prévenir les complications qu'aurait entraînées votre signature apposée au prospectus Dallet. Il est clair, en effet, que le motif qu'on avait de désirer votre signature était précisement celui qui devait vous empêcher de la donner; c'était me rendre et rendre l'Ordre évidemment solidaires d'un acte provenant de mon socius et par là m'engager et engager notre Ordre vis à vis du public. Or, cet engagement et *cette solidarité, je n'en veux à aucun prix*, pas même pour la réédition des œuvres complètes, et je crois avoir de bonnes raisons d'en agir ainsi. Si vous aviez signé le prospectus, je me serais trouvé dans une très pénible alternative, obligé ou de vous désavouer publiquement dans les journaux, ou de renoncer à vous conserver à Rome, afin de constater par le fait que votre prospectus n'était que l'œuvre d'un religieux individuel de la province de France.
>
> Per carità, défiez-vous de la furia francese, et ne me créez pas sans nécessité de nouveaux embarras et de nouveaux ennuis; j'en suis déjà bien assez abreuvé en ce moment!

Cette phobie de A. V. Jandel pour la *furia francese*, qui s'exprime dans la lettre |22*| mais également ailleurs |7*|, citées ci-dessus pp. 347-349, doit sans doute être référée à un horizon beaucoup plus vaste et plus ancien que cette affaire d'édition, mais elle caractérise bien une des composantes de l'attitude des autorités dominicaines de Rome en l'occurrence.[58] Il convient de le signaler puisque de juillet 1869 aux dif-

58 Une lettre du père Marcolin Chéry, voir ci-dessus n. 20, nous paraît très explicite sur de nombreux aspects de toute l'affaire et sur les conceptions des dominicains romains |32|: "Si le Père Mauffroy (sic) était de ce monde, il vous dirait: N'alleumes si vite! Vous voulez lancer un prospectus pour l'édition des œuvres de S. Thomas et vous ne savez par encore sur qui compter! Si vous faites fond sur D. Uccelli, vous comptez sans votre hâte. Il n'est pas capable d'avoir la direction théologique d'une œuvre: le pauvre cher homme est capable de palir sur un manuscrit, d'en déchiffrer plus ou moins heureusement les caractères, mais de l'entendre, c'est autre chose! Aussi le P. Procureur Général regarde comme une grande légèreté de vouloir à tout prix exalter le travail de cet homme, quand une commission composée d'éminents théologiens (Gatti, Nardini, Pierrotti, Bianchi) l'a trouvé défectueux en mille endroits. Il en sera ainsi de toute la publication, et l'on peut juger de l'œuvre entière par le fragment sur le beau. Du reste, tout ce qu'a fait Uccelli en est là. Son édition du Contra Gentes fourmille de bévues des plus grossières et ce qu'il appelle des variantes ne sont souvent que des erreurs de copiste. Nous ne pouvons accepter de travailler avec Uccelli, qu'autant qu'il sera un simple manœuvre, nous apportant un texte qui sera revu consciencieusement par nous. C'est toute la part qu'il peut avoir dans une publication théologique. Voici ce qu'hier nous avons décidé avec le Procureur Général: l'Académie se chargera de la publication des Œuvres de St. Thomas, elle employera D. Uccelli à la révision des manuscrits et prendra seule la direction théologique. Quand son travail sera avancé, elle enverra en France deux ou trois de ses membres qui surveilleront l'impression et qui n'auront pas autre chose à faire. Car, pour une œuvre capitale comme celle-là, on ne peut se contenter d'envoyer les épreuves à Rome, il faut que les correcteurs soient sur les lieux. De plus il faut des hommes versés dans l'étude de S. Thomas et n'ayant aucune charge qui les contraigne de s'adonner à un autre travail. La publication ne peut se faire que dans ces conditions et le Révérendissime Père Vicaire est disposé à désavouer publiquement tout prospectus lancé en dehors d'elles. Vous n'avez encore aucun élément, vous ne pouvez pas même soupçonner si votre œuvre est viable et vous voulez lancer un prospectus: encore

ficultés que connaîtra la Commission léonine en juin 1882 et avril-octobre 1886, il se sera écoulé bien peu d'années et pourtant on verra alors les autorités dominicaines les plus élevées, sous la pression du Saint-Siège il est vrai, faire tout pour accélérer le rythme de publication de l'édition léonine, sans hésiter à risquer de sacrifier la qualité scientifique en vue d'accélérer la productivité.[59]

Epilogue: Projet Uccelli-Dallet et Edition léonine.

Avant la fin de 1869, il y a rupture définitive entre P. A. Uccelli et J. Dallet.[60] Uccelli réalisera à Rome son projet de publication des autographes.[61] Quoi qu'il en soit du faisceau de causes qui provoquent

une fois: *n'alleumes si vite* L'édition préparée par ceux que vous nommez les transfuges n'est pas capable de nuire à celle que nous pourrons faire, mais au contraire, elle assurera le succès de la nôtre. Car ceux qui veulent s'en mêler n'ont aucune valeur théologique, excepté Fretté et encore je ne sais s'il est de taille à soutenir pareille besogne. Ne nous payons pas de mots: nous ne sommes pas en mesure de commencer cette publication: le moment n'est donc pas venu de parler, mais d'agir en silence. Laissons la grosse caisse et les chapeaux-chinois à qui en a le goût. C'est d'ailleurs la pensée du Père Général, et si vous ne voulez pas vous attirer une déconvenue et jeter l'éditeur dans une impasse, vous attendrez que les choses soient plus mûres. Vous ne paraissez pas vous douter de ce que serait une réimpression des œuvres de S. Thomas; vous en parlez, comme s'il s'agissait de l'*epitome historiae sacrae* ou du *De viris*. Il faut pour cela des hommes et du temps et vous n'avez guère plus de l'un que de l'autre." Cette lettre explique certains détails du document [7*] cité ci-dessus. Les membres de la Commission à laquelle il est fait allusion sont bien connus de ceux qui ont étudié le renouveau thomiste, voir par exemple I. P. Grossi, art. cité ci-dessus n. 30 à propos du P. Gatti, passim.

59 Voir ci-dessous pp. 369-386.

60 Cette lettre d'Uccelli à V. Ligiez, écrite de la Minerve, est la dernière du dossier [40]: "Caro e stimabile Padre e amico. Il mio dovere è di avvertirvi come io vedendo tante lungagini e difficoltà da parte dello stampatore avrei accettato l'offerta che mi fa la Propaganda di stampare le mie cose. Quindi la prima lettera che scriverò sarà probabilmente di licenziare il Signor Dallet. Tanto vi serva di regola. Il contratto non è ancora firmato ma la cosa è stabilita e spero tra poco si darà principio alla stampa. Intanto voi non fate sembianza o parola di nulla collo stampatore; a luogo e tempo poi lo diremo. Intanto è bene che voi lo sappiate e posciate prepararvi a riportare in Italia il mio manoscritto. La Propaganda potrà facilmente far venire da Bruges anche il ms. del Seminario. In ogni modo all'occasione del Concilio potremo parlare al Vescovo di quella città. Il Marietti stampatore e socio di Propaganda sarebbe molto favorevole anch' all'edizione di tutte le opere di S. Tomaso. Ora pensiamo a tirarci di questo laborinto come dite voi. Io sono mal contento di Dallet. A me non sembra il vedere in lui che un uomo avido di danaro, senza nessun impegno e idea per superare le difficoltà pronto ad invogermi in una lite se gli torna a conto; mi sembra bruttissimo anche il capitolo di far io dei compensi se le correzioni superano l'ordinato. Parola elastica, ignobile, e indegna. Obbligare un povero studioso a misurare le correzioni! — Impaziente di rivedervi al vostro ritorno mi segno tutto vostro obbligatissimo devotissimo Pietro Antonio Uccelli."

61 En 1878, imprimé par la Polyglotte de la Propagande, paraît de P. A. Uccelli l'ouvrage suivant: *S. Thomae Aquinatis...: Summae de veritate catholicae fidei contra gentiles quae supersunt ex codice autographo qui in bibliotheca Vaticana adservatur.*

En 1880, édité grâce au père Ligiez, paraît *S. Thomae Aquinatis... In Isaïam prophetam, In tres Psalmos David, In Boetium de hebdomadibus et de Trinitate expositiones, accedit anonymi Liber de fide Sanctae Trinitatis a S. Thoma examinatus in opusculo contra errores Graecorum una cum ipso opusculo et altero contra Graecos, Armenos et Saracenos. Omnia quae supersunt ex autographis cetera vero ex optimis codicibus et editionibus*, cura et studio Petri Antonii Uccellii, imprimé par les mêmes presses. Sur le rôle du père V. Ligiez voir S. Merkle, art. cité ici n. 19.

cet épilogue, de l'ensemble des documents concernant l'affaire se dégage clairement un certain ensemble de faits. Dès 1869, avec des encouragements venant du pape et de son entourage, l'idée d'une édition de S. Thomas fondée sur une exploitation la plus scientifique possible des autographes et des manuscrits les meilleurs avait été étudiée assez sérieusement par les autorités domincaines. Il n'est aucunement question de faire pièce aux franciscains futurs éditeurs de S. Bonaventure,[62] mais sous l'influence des travaux d'Uccelli on veut publier un texte de haute valeur qui déclassera définitivement les éditions antérieures et les entreprises contemporaines d'exploitation commerciale de l'œuvre du Docteur angélique. Cette édition nouvelle donnera un fondement textuel solide à l'essor d'une philosophie et d'une théologie thomistes qui permettront au monde moderne de sortir de ses impasses idéologiques. L'idée d'une commission de dominicains rassemblés à Rome pour élaborer l'édition est explicitement au centre du projet, mais avec cette idée complémentaire que la commission romaine bénéficiera des informations recueillies ailleurs par d'autres collaborateurs eux aussi dominicains. Si l'on remarque en outre que l'échec du projet résulte pour une large part de la haute idée que l'on se fait de l'œuvre à entreprendre et des grandes dimensions de l'investissement en hommes, en années de travail et aussi en argent, que suppose un tel projet, mais que toute l'affaire aboutit en un certain sens à l'hypothèse de mener à bien un jour, mais à Rome même, une entreprise de cet ordre, comment ne pas penser que le projet du pape Léon XIII d'une édition Léonine, projet lancé dix ans plus tard, a pour une large part pris ses racines dans la tentative de 1869, restée pourtant sans grande suite immédiate?[63]

Dans ce volume ne se trouvent éditées que des œuvres authentiques de S. Thomas, à l'exception naturellement du *Libellus*. Parmi les facteurs qui ont incité Uccelli à limiter prudemment son programme par rapport aux projets qu'il formait dix années plus tôt, on doit sans doute compter le jugement émis par la commission de théologiens dominicains appelés à se prononcer sur l'authenticité du *De pulchro*, voir ci-dessus p. 347 document [7*]. Ce jugement a été certainement négatif car les membres de la commission n'étaient ni codicologues, ni paléographes, mais ils connaissaient assez la pensée et la langue de S. Thomas pour porter un jugement correct sur un texte extrait d'un Commentaire sur les Noms Divins par Albert le Grand.

62 Voir ci-dessus n. 13.

63 Certains passages du document [39*] d'Uccelli, résumé ci-dessus n. 34, préfigurent de très certains passages des Actes de Léon XIII, voir ci-dessus n. 4. Par ailleurs, il est bien évident que quelques dominicains romains ou français qui avaient été mêlés au projet de 1869 étaient encore en situation de dire leur mot en 1870-1880. On notera en particulier que le père V. Ligiez est encore socius du supérieur général des Dominicains en 1879 et qu'il restera à Rome auprès du Maître Général comme archiviste de l'Ordre jusqu'à sa mort en 1898.

L'ENQUÊTE HEURISTIQUE DU CARDINAL TOMMASO ZIGLIARA.

Les documents.

Dans une lettre circulaire du 9 novembre 1879 le père Joseph-Marie Sanvito, vicaire général de l'Ordre dominicain,[64] invite les religieux qui dépendent de lui à répondre à l'invitation du pape Léon XIII de prendre S. Thomas comme maître à penser. Il annonce, parmi d'autres, la décision du pape de faire procéder à une nouvelle édition des œuvres de S. Thomas[65] et il précise alors que des hommes compétents sont déjà au travail.[66] En février 1880, une chronique de la publication française l'*Année dominicaine* fournit d'ailleurs quelques précisions supplémentaires qui donnent une idée assez nette de l'enquête déjà commencée:[67]

> Le projet relatif à une nouvelle édition complète des Œuvres de saint Thomas d'Aquin continue à être l'objet de la sollicitude du Souverain Pontife. Des commissions nommées à cet effet à Rome et à l'étranger sont chargées de collationner les meilleures éditions parues jusqu'ici avec les manuscrits originaux renfermés dans les bibliothèques. La commission nommée à Rome est présidée par Son Eminence le cardinal Zigliara qui s'est mis en relation avec un certain nombre de religieux des différentes provinces de notre Ordre pour mener activement les recherches et le collationnement des manuscrits. Les RR. PP. Chapotin et Beaudouin s'en occupent particulièrement pour ce qui regarde notre province de France; ils ont devant eux tous les trésors de notre Bibliothèque nationale à explorer, sans parler de ce qui se trouve encore dans les bibliothèques de province. On espère qu'un premier volume pourra être publié dans le cours de cette année.

64 Après la mort du père Jandel le 11 décembre 1872 et à cause de l'impossibilité de réunir un chapitre général à Rome pour lui élire un successeur, l'Ordre dominicain fut gouverné par un vicaire général, le père J. M. Sanvito. Finalement en 1879, grâce à une élection par correspondance, un nouveau Maître de l'Ordre fut élu, le père J. M. Larroca; cette élection fut confirmée le 30 septembre par le pape; le nouveau Maître fut institué par la Congrégation des évêques et réguliers le 7 janvier 1880 et finalement installé comme Général de l'Ordre le 1er février à 18h30; il avait 66 ans et était dominicain depuis l'âge de 17 ans. Le lancement de l'Edition léonine coïncide donc avec un changement dans les dirigeants de l'Ordre dominicain. La circulaire du père Sanvito ne paraît pas avoir été publiée de façon accessible.

65 "...Cum laetitia annunciamus providissimum Leonem XIII ex eo quo flagrat studiorum amore excelso disposuisse consilio, ut omnia S. Thomae aurea Opera iterum typis subiiciantur, sicuti olim a S. Pio V, accitis ex Ordine doctissimis Viris, fuerunt edita, una cum Commentariis Card. de Vio et Franc. Silvestri Ferrariensis, quae editio omnium princeps XVIII grandioribus voluminibus continetur..."

66 "...Iam viri eruditi desudant, ut eiusmodi editio Piana quoque correctior, et auctior in lucem prodeat. Ita Leonis nomen in horum operum editione, sicut antea illud Pii, ad posteros cum gloria transibit..."

67 *Année dominicaine* 1880 (février), Chronique, p. 73.

Cette chronique de l'*Année dominicaine* se poursuit par la présentation du texte du motu proprio *Placere nobis* du 18 janvier 1880.[68] D'autres informations du même genre ont sans doute été publiées à la même époque, nous n'avons pas cherché à les collecter. Il y a dans les archives de la Commission léonine toute une collection de lettres qui éclairent et précisent les assertions du père J. M. Sanvito et de l'*Année dominicaine*. Il nous a paru intéressant de signaler ici ces lettres à l'attention des historiens; bien que certaines d'entre elles aient déjà été utilisées en diverses études,[69] la série en tant que telle est inédite, en tout cas nous nous efforçons ici de les exploiter sommairement en les rapprochant de quelques autres documents contemporains déjà publiés mais qui en reçoivent une lumière nouvelle en même temps qu'ils contribuent à donner consistance à l'interprétation de la série.[70]

Voici la liste des pièces auxquelles nous nous référons dans les présentes pages:[71]

[41] C. Reynen à C. Bianchi, v. [42], Huissen 4 novembre 1879.
[42] C. Bianchi à T. Zigliara, Amiens 14 novembre 1879.
[43] H. Guillermin à J. M. Larroca, Toulouse 1 décembre 1879.
[44] H. Guillermin à J. M. Larroca, fin 1879.
[45] M. D. Chapotin à T. Zigliara, Paris 18 décembre 1879.
[46] E. P. Balme à T. Zigliara, Lyon 19 décembre 1879.
[47] X. Fauchet à T. Zigliara, Poitiers 29 décembre 1879.
[48] C. Reynen à T. Zigliara, Huissen 11 janvier 1880.
[49] H. Denifle à T. Zigliara, Graz 11 janvier 1880.
[50] R. M. Biolley à T. Zigliara, Tirlemont 12 janvier 1880.
[51*] F. P. Balme à T. Zigliara, Lyon 27 janvier 1880; voir ici pp. 364-365.
[52] F. P. Balme, relevé de mss, 27 janvier 1880.
[53*] M. D. Chapotin à V. Ligiez, Paris 2 février 1880; ici n. 89.
[54] T. Bonora à T. Zigliara, Bologna 4 mars 1880.
[55] C. Reynen à T. Zigliara, Huissen 6 mars 1880.
[56] A. Hoogland, "Manuscriptum in Biblioteca Ultrajecti in Hollandia".
[57*] R. M. Biolley à T. Zigliara, Tirlemont 2 avril 1880; voir ici n. 86.

68 Voir ci-dessus n. 5.

69 Ainsi par exemple par A. Walz, voir article "Denifle" dans GHGE p. 222; mais également P. A. Redigonda, "Il P. Enrico Denifle O. P. 1844-1905. Cenni bibliografici e alcune lettere", *Memorie Domenicane* 69 (1952) 101-136 et 70 (1953) pp. 65-99.

70 Redigonda, op. cit. ci-dessus, ne cite aucun des documents de notre série mais il donne le texte d'autres lettres qui complètent notre ensemble. Nous nous rérérerons ici à Redigonda XII (Denifle à Larroca, Lyon 13 novembre 1882; R. p. 95), et à Redigonda XIII (Denifle à Larroca, Barcelone 24 novembre 1882; R. p. 96). Nous citons ci-dessous in extenso un brouillon de lettre de Denifle à Larroca publié par D. M. Planzer dans *Divus Thomas* (Frib.) 8 (1930) 447-448, voir ici n. 99.

71 Comme ci-dessus pp. 337-338 les pièces sont classées et numérotées selon l'ordre chronologique certain ou supposé et on indique par l'astérisque accolé au numéro d'ordre que la pièce correspondante est citée *ad litteram*, voir ci-dessus n. 16.

[58] P. Tovani à T. Zigliara, Foligno 19 mai 1880.
[59] P. Tovani, relevé de mss de Pérouse d'après Vermiglioli.
[60] F. Rivas à T. Zigliara, Ocana 15 juin 1880.
[61] F. Rivas à J. M. Larroca, Ocana 22 juin 1880.
[62] T. Bonora à T. Zigliara, Bologna 23 juin 1880.
[63] L. Galea à T. Zigliara, Valetta (Malta) 2 août 1880.
[64] M. D. Chapotin à V. Ligiez, 23 novembre 1880, résumé de la main de V. Ligiez.
[65*] M. D. Chapotin à T. Zigliara, Paris 22 décembre 1880; voir ici n. 88.
[66*] T. Esser à T. Zigliara, Vienna 4 mars 1881; voir ici p. 366.
[67] E. Sicardi à T. Zigliara, Modena 30 novembre 1881.
[68] M. P. Manovel à T. Zigliara, Salamanca 25 mars 1882.
[69] P. Tovani à T. Zigliara, mss de Pérouse, juin 1882.
[70*] H. Denifle à T. Zigliara, Orihuela 8 décembre 1882; voir ici n. 92.
[71] H. Denifle à J. M. Larroca, Valladolid 19 décembre 1882.
[72*] H. Denifle à C. Bianchi, Madrid 2 janvier 1883; voir ici n. 91.
[73] H. Denifle à C. Bianchi, Madrid 5 janvier 1883.
[74] H. Denifle à T. Zigliara, Madrid 9 janvier 1883.
[75*] H. Denifle à C. Bianchi, Madrid 19 janvier 1883, voir ici n. 91.
[76) H. Denifle à T. Zigliara, Barcelona 3 mars 1883.
[77] L. Di Maggio à A. Frühwirth (?), Palermo 2 mars 1895.

De ces documents,[72] nous avons essayé de dégager tous les renseignements qu'ils contiennent sur la méthode suivie par le cardinal Zigliara en vue de recueillir les informations codicologiques, et même paléographiques, destinées à être utilisées par lui-même et ses collaborateurs pour élaborer l'édition léonine. Nous précisons d'abord cette méthode telle que les documents exploités ici permettent de la connaître,[73] puis à partir de ces mêmes documents nous proposons quelques réflexions sur la portée et les limites d'une telle tentative, réflexions qui permettront peut-être de mieux comprendre certains problèmes ou évènements ultérieurs de la Commission léonine.

72 A part [52][56][59] qui sont purement et simplement des relevés ou descriptions de mss, les autres pièces sont les lettres adressées au cardinal Zigliara, au Maître de l'Ordre: J. M. Larroca puis A. Frühwirth, au procureur général des Dominicains: C. Bianchi, au "socius" français du père général: V. Ligiez. Outre un prêtre séculier: L. Galea [63], et le père Bianchi [42], les auteurs de ces documents sont les dominicains C. Reynén, prieur provincial des Pays-Bas [41][48][55], et A. Hoogland [56] de la même province; R. M. Biolley [50][57*] de Belgique; H. Guillermin [43][44], M. D. Chapotin [45][53*][64][65*], X. Faucher [47], de provinces françaises; les italiens T. Bonora [54][62], P. Tovani [58][59][69], E. Sicardi [67], L. Di Maggio [77]; deux espagnols: F. Rivas [60][61], M. P. Manovel [68]; enfin deux autrichiens: T. Esser [66*] et, le plus important de tous, H. Denifle [49][70*] à [76].

73 Ici encore, notre documentation est très incomplète. Nous n'avons pas essayé de rechercher d'autres documents complémentaires soit dans d'autres archives parallèles, soit même dans d'autres sections des archives de la Commission léonine elle-même. Nous nous contentons ici de présenter un dossier d'archives en le commentant.

La méthode heuristique du cardinal.

Les documents manifestent que le processus d'enquête mis en route par le cardinal Zigliara au début du dernier trimestre de 1879 est très simple dans son principe. Il comporte les phases suivantes:

a) recherche de collaborateurs, ou plutôt de correspondants, pour les divers pays susceptibles de posséder des manuscrits d'œuvres de S. Thomas dans leurs bibliothèques.

b) recherche, repérage et relevé descriptif de tous ces manuscrits par les correspondants recrutés à cet effet.

c) par ces mêmes correspondants, collationnement des manuscrits donnant le texte des commentaires de S. Thomas sur le *Perihermeneias* et les *Postérieurs Analytiques* d'Aristote.

Pour le recrutement des collaborateurs (phase a), le cardinal s'adresse à l'Ordre dominicain afin d'obtenir dans chaque pays des religieux compétents et disponibles pour le travail. Les autorités dominicaines de Rome se mettent à son service: en même temps que sa circulaire du 9 novembre 1879 ou un peu auparavant, le père Sanvito semble avoir envoyé à tous les prieurs provinciaux et conventuels une lettre demandant que l'on signale les noms de religieux experts en paléographie susceptibles de collaborer avec le cardinal ainsi que les manuscrits et œuvres inédites de S. Thomas dont ils pourraient avoir connaissance;[74] le procureur général de l'Ordre rencontre au nom du cardinal les prieurs provinciaux de Belgique, Paris, Lyon et Toulouse; il écrit également au prieur provincial des Pays-Bas[42]. De son côté le socius pour l'Italie, le père Frati, écrit pour procurer des collaborateurs [62].

C'est de cette façon que se trouveront recrutés les pères suivants: deux pères de la province des Pays-Bas, dont le père A. Hoogland [42][49][55]; de Belgique, le père R. M. Biolley [41][42][50][57]; de la province de France (Paris), les pères M.D.Chapotin [42][53][64][65] et probablement R. Beaudouin [53];[75] de la province de Lyon, les pères F. P. Balme [46][51*][52] et X. Faucher [47]; de la province de Toulouse, le père H. Guillermin [43][44]; de la province d'Autriche-Hongrie, les pères H. Denifle [49][76] et T. Esser [66*]; d'Espagne, le père

74 C'est ce qu'affirme Redigonda, op. cit. p. 122. Cette affirmation semble confirmée par [41][43][44] si du moins ces trois lettres sont adressées au vicaire général ou au procureur général en réponse à cette invitation du père Sanvito.

75 Plus tard le père Larroca essaiera d'obtenir le père Beaudouin comme socius et collaborateur de T. Zigliara, voir ci-dessous p. 370. Certains documents écrivent "Beaudoin" et non Beaudouin, mais le père lui-même dans tous les actes officiels écrit et signe Beaudouin (archives Prov. de France, III-F-2 p. 291 et p. 302), de même dans ses lettres personnelles.

76 Sur la façon dont H. Denifle a été recruté pour la Léonine, voir Redigonda, op. cit. pp. 122-123. L'auteur, p. 122, cite une lettre du père Anselmi, prieur de Graz, déclarant en 1879 que depuis plus de dix ans le père Denifle parlait de la nécessité de faire une édition des œuvres de S. Thomas

F. Rivas [60][61]; d'Italie enfin, les pères P. Tovani [58][61], E. Sicard [67] et L. Di Maggio [77]. Nous ne citons ici que les cas signalés par les lettres que nous exploitons.[77] Nous savons qu'il faudrait ajouter beaucoup d'autres noms pour avoir une liste complète,[78] mais les noms mentionnés ci-dessus ont valeur d'exemple. Au contraire, d'autres correspondants de notre dossier répondent peut-être tout simplement à la circulaire de Sanvito et ne paraissent pas recrutés comme correspondants attitrés.

Le repérage et le relevé descriptif des manuscrits contenus dans les bibliothèques des divers pays (phase b) a commencé aussitôt que les religieux correspondants ont été désignés et ont reçu les instructions du cardinal. Voici les seules enquêtes dont quelque témoignage ait été noté par nous:[79]

Les bibliothèques des Pays-Bas ont été prospectées par A. Hoogland et son compagnon, mais aussi par d'autres pères appelés en renfort [48], le prieur provincial paraissant avoir pris lui-même la direction effective des opération [42][55].

En Belgique, le travail a été entrepris par R. M. Biolley avec l'aide d'autres dominicains [57].

En France, les bibliothèques de Paris ont été prises en charge par M. D. Chapotin [45]. X. Faucher a dû prospecter l'Ouest du pays [47]. Pour Lyon, c'est F. P. Balme [46] qui a vu également Grenoble, Chambéry, Annecy et, en Suisse, Genève [51*][52]. Pour le Sud de la France, on peut noter les enquêtes successives: Avignon, Aix et Toulouse [43][44] par H. Guillermin; Avignon [46][51*], Carpentras, Nîmes, Tarascon et Montpellier [51*] par F. P. Balme; Avignon, Nîmes, Narbonne, Perpignan par H. Denifle.[80] Ce même H. Denifle a d'ailleurs dépouillé en outre tous les catalogues départementaux de France.[81]

à l'exemple du travail entrepris par les franciscains pour S. Bonaventure, mais ajoutait qu'il serait tout à fait insuffisant de se contenter d'une édition analogue à celle de la Somme par Uccelli. Voir ci-dessous, p. 369, les circonstances de la nomination de Denifle comme socius pour qu'il puisse travailler comme collaborateur de T. Zigliara à Rome. Sur H. Denifle, voir P. A. Redigonda, art. cité ci-dessus n. 69: Heinrich Seuse Denifle (Joseph) né le 16 janvier 1844 a fait ses études comme dominicain entre 1866 et 1870 successivement à Graz, Rome et Saint-Maximin; à Rome il fut élève de T. Zigliara. Il devint ensuite Lecteur à Graz avant de venir à Rome en 1880. Voir ci-dessous p. 369 et n. 94.

77 Se référant à une lettre du père Bianchi, proc. gén., du 14 novembre 1879 (Arch. gén. O. P. XIII 176), Redigonda, op. cit. p. 119 n. 62, mentionne le nom du père Chapotin, mais ajoute celui du père Bayonne.

78 Dans ses notes inédites qui fourmillent sur les débuts du travail léonin, le père Mackey, voir ci-dessous n. 107, mentionne les noms de pères qui ont pris part au travail soit par correspondance, soit autrement, dès 1880: Denifle, Chapotin; Gaudenzi, Puebla Beaudouin, Balme. Chatillon, Poli, Costello, Berthier, Ligiez, etc. Comme on peut le constater, il y a des rencontres entre la liste du père Mackey et la nôtre, mais chacune donne des noms qui ne figure pas sur l'autre.

79 Voir ci-dessous n. 85.

80 Redigonda XIII.

81 Voir ci-dessous n. 99.

Dans les pays de langue allemande, H. Denifle a vu plus de 24 bibliothèques[82] et T. Esser au moins celle de Klosterneubourg [66*].

En Italie, on peut relever: Bologna, T. Bonora [54][62]; Todi, H. Denifle;[83] Perugia, P. Tovani [58][69]; Modena, E. Sicardi [67]; sans doute Palermo, L. Di Maggio [67][77].

Enfin dans la péninsule ibérique, le travail entrepris en Espagne par F. Rivas [60][61] a été repris[84] et étendu par H. Denifle avec ses visites à Madrid, l'Escorial, Salamanque, Valladolid, Osma, Ségovie, Avila, Gérone, Barcelone, Vich, Lérida, Saragosse, Tarragone, Valence, Tolède, Cordoue et enfin Lisbonne et le Portugal [70*] à [76].[85]

Certaines informations, concernant l'Ile de Malte [63] et Salamanque [68], voir [72*] par exemple, ne semblent pas venir de correspondants réguliers.

Le collationnement des manuscrits donnant les Commentaires de S. Thomas sur le *Perihermeneias* et les *Postérieurs Analytiques* d'Aristote (phase c) est conçu par le cardinal de la façon suivante: on comparera le texte fourni par chaque manuscrit au texte de l'édition Piana, on notera toutes les variantes du manuscrit par rapport à la Piana, on enregistrera en outre toutes les notes marginales du manuscrit [45][53*][55][57*][61][65*]. Il est manifeste que ce travail était présenté comme prioritaire et comme devant être accompli dans les délais les plus courts possibles.

Limites et défauts de la méthode d'enquête.

Considérée dans ses principes essentiels la méthode mise en œuvre par le cardinal Zigliara ne peut qu'être chaleureusement approuvé. Pour mener à bien une édition critique et particulièrement celle de S. Thomas, ne faut-il pas en effet chercher à recruter en nombre suffisant des collaborateurs capables et, avec leur aide, tout d'abord constituer un répertoire descriptif le plus exhaustif possible de tous les manuscrits d'œuvres de S. Thomas puis ensuite pour chaque œuvre collationner, par comparaison à un texte pris comme texte de référence, tous les manuscrits de cette œuvre, en notant soigneusement les particularités adjacentes qui pourraient éclairer le travail?

Ceci dit, on peut se demander si le cardinal avait par avance bien perçu l'étendue exceptionnelle et les exigences scientifiques de la tâche

82 Comptant au total au moins 560 mss de S. Thomas, voir ci-dessous n. 99.

83 Redigonda XII.

84 Sur le P. Rivas voir ci-dessous p. 362 et n. 92.

85 Nous savons par ailleurs que le père H. Denifle a profité de son poste de socius du Maître de l'Ordre, et des voyages qui en résultaient, pour compléter son étude déjà entreprise des catalogues de mss de Grande Bretagne et des pays adjacents par des visites sur place. Voir DHGE et LTK "Denifle", et Redigonda p. 131.

qu'il promettait d'accomplir avec son équipe. Les difficultés inhérentes à une telle entreprise étaient-elles en permanence suffisamment présentes à son esprit? On a un peu l'impression qu'il s'est lancé en ignorant presque tout des dimensions réelles et des problèmes concrets impliqués par le travail qu'il pensait pouvoir obtenir de ses correspondants, à tel point que la question se pose de savoir si c'est véritablement lui qui a imaginé la méthode ou bien si celle-ci n'aurait pas été conçue par quelqu'un d'autre, quelque spécialiste, et mise en œuvre avec maladresse, précipitation, et simplisme par le cardinal? Quoi qu'il en soit, les faits sont là pour montrer que les moyens et le temps prévus étaient tout à fait insuffisants eu égard au but poursuivi et aux données qu'il s'agissait d'exploiter.

A cette époque, il était en effet impossible de trouver dans chaque pays un nombre suffisant de Dominicains suffisamment confirmés en paléographie et disponibles pour le travail. Certains des collaborateurs du cardinal étaient sans aucun doute médiocres au plan technique, ou physiquement incapables, ou encore trop occupés par ailleurs.

C'est ainsi que, avec le père Réginald van der Venne missionnaire à Curaçao, le P. Hoogland de la Province de Hollande est proposé par son provincial, parce qu'il est archiviste de sa province et "bien versé à lire des manuscrits ou documents anciens"; il sera effectivement collaborateur du cardinal, mais en outre les pères Hyacinthe Derksen et Constant Suermondt sont également proposés à cause de leur "science philosophique et théologique" et parce qu'ils "ont bien de goût de ces choses et pourront bien se rendre habiles en ces arts" |41|, c'est dire nettement qu'ils n'ont alors aucune formation paléographique.

Quant au Père Biolley, présenté comme bon paléographe |41||42|, il se révèle totalement ignorant des principes mêmes qui devraient présider au collationnement de manuscrits en vue d'établir un texte critique.[86] A en juger par les autres lettres, il n'est d'ailleurs pas le seul

86 |57| "Eminence, Les prédications continuelles dont j'ai été chargé depuis le temps où le T.R.P. Provincial me communiqua votre lettre du 5 Janvier, m'ont empêché jusqu'ici de voir les manuscrits des œuvres de S. Thomas. Je n'ai pu que parcourir les catalogues des grandes bibliothèques, et dresser la liste ci-jointe de tout ce que contient la Belgique à ce sujet. Parcourir tous ces manuscrits d'un bout à l'autre me serait un travail impossible: il faudrait y consacrer des mois, sinon des années, et le petit nombre de religieux, les autres occupations fort multipliées, le bon ordre et l'intérêt de la communauté s'opposent à des absences prolongées, votre Eminence le comprend aisément. De plus, je viens de lire dans la revue *la Scienza e la fede* (fasc. 692) que M. Uccelli a déjà vu ces manuscrits: peut-être pourrait-on profiter de ses recherches, et ne pas recommencer un travail qu'il a déjà fait mieux, sans nul doute, que je ne pourrai le faire.

Une autre difficulté encore s'est présentée, Eminentissime Père. Je n'ai pu me procurer le texte sur lequel j'aurais voulu noter les variantes. Le couvent que j'habite ne possède qu'une faible partie des Œuvres de S. Thomas. Les deux couvents de notre province qui les possèdent, tiennent à les conserver et ne consentent nullement à les dépareiller. Que faire dès lors?

Il y aurait, je crois, un moyen facile de tout concilier et de ne pas perdre le temps à un travail

collaborateur du cardinal à tout ignorer des rudiments d'une méthode qui n'était guère familière à Zigliara lui-même, à en juger par les consignes beaucoup trop sommaires données par lui à ses correspondants précisément pour ce qui est des collations à faire, à en juger aussi par sa décision de faire imprimer dès septembre 1880 le premier tome de l'Edition léonine;[87] sur ces deux points voir [61]. Un autre collaborateur de l'entreprise et qui semble bien avoir intensément et sérieusement travaillé pour le cardinal, le père Chapotin, manifeste lui aussi une certaine méconnaissance des lois élémentaires du travail critique.[88] D'ailleurs, en dépit de l'intérêt des travaux qu'il a effectivement produit dans le domaine historique, le père Chapotin avait été présenté au père Bianchi par son prieur provincial comme très habitué aux bibliothèques et habile dans la lecture des textes anciens, ce qui était certainement vrai, mais aussi comme bon paléographe, ce qui est moins assuré. Le

inutile. Oserais-je le proposer à votre Eminence?... Ce serait de me faire envoyer au fur et à mesure qu'on avance dans le travail quelques pages d'un exemplaire type, en y soulignant les passages sur lesquels on désire connaître les variantes. Il va sans dire qu'il serait inutile d'envoyer les parties desquelles nous ne possédons en Belgique aucun manuscrit. Ainsi l'examen serait plus court, plus aisé, et aboutirait à des résultats beaucoup plus pratiques pour ceux qui sont chargés de rédiger le texte définitif.

Je prie instamment votre Eminence de vouloir bien me faire donner la solution de ces difficultés: je serais heureux de pouvoir au plus tôt, lui prouver par mon travail les sentiments de respect et de dévouement que lui porte son très humble et très obéissant serviteur Fr. Raymond M. Biolley."

87 Voir ci-dessous n. 109.

88 Voir par ex. [53*][65*], voici [65]

"La lettre que Votre Eminence m'a fait l'honneur de m'écrire en date du 13, m'est arrivée au milieu de prédications qui ne m'ont pas permis d'aller immédiatement à la Bibliothèque Nationale. Je me hâte de réparer ce retard, et de répondre successivement aux questions de Votre Eminence.

1° Des deux manuscrits 16101 et 16154 le second seulement provient de la Bibliothèque de l'ancienne Sorbonne. J'en ai transmis l'ancien N° à Votre Eminence par le P. Ligiez il y a quelques semaines, en réponse à l'unique question qui m'était posée. Quant au manuscrit 16101, il ne porte pas de N° ancien et j'en ignore la provenance.

2° Nous avions d'abord préféré le manuscrit 16101, parce que l'exécution en est plus soignée. Mais parvenus à peine au quart du travail, nous avons reconnu que le texte du 16154 était beaucoup plus parfait, et nous ne recourions plus guère au 16101 que dans les cas où le texte du 16154 nous paraissait imparfait ou la lecture trop difficile.

3° Il n'y a aucune note au texte; seulement quelques corrections dans le 16154, et nous en avons tenu compte. En général ces corrections consistent simplement en quelques mots ajoutés après coup et par une autre main pour réparer des omissions faites par le premier copiste.

Les deux manuscrits me paraissent être à peu près de la même époque, c'est à dire fin XIIIe ou commencement du XIVe siècle...

Quant au second volume, quand pourrai-je m'en occuper? Mes aides sont partis en Angleterre et au Tyrol, et Votre Eminence sait que je n'ai ni assez d'intelligence ni d'assez bons yeux pour travailler seul. J'en ai demandé d'autres au T.R.P. Provincial qui n'a encore désigné personne.

D'ailleurs, nous ne sommes pas encore fixés dans nos asiles même provisoires, et d'un autre côté, nous sommes trop heureux d'être demandés pour les prédications d'avent, de carême, de Mois de Marie, puisqu'aujourd'hui plus que jamais la question du pain quotidien se pose la première, et non sans de cruelles anxiétés pour les Supérieurs..."

père Chapotin lui-même proteste de son incompétence et de son besoin d'être aidé au plan paléographique [45][53*][65*]; il propose qu'un autre religieux lui soit adjoint pour la collation des mss.[89]

De son côté le père Rivas proteste de son ignorance absolue en paléographie: lui-même ne peut lire la cursive médiévale; d'ailleurs, selon lui, personne en Espagne ne peut la lire [60][61]. Il suggère donc de transférer les manuscrits espagnols à Rome où ils pourront être étudiés sérieusement [61].

Aux limites tenant au peu de compétence, viennent s'ajouter celles provenant d'états de santé déficients: Balme [51*], Chapotin [65], Denifle [49], ou encore de l'indisponibilité résultant par exemple de la prédication: Biolley [57*], Chapotin [53*][65*]; ce dernier précise bien qu'il s'agit là d'une nécessité pour que les couvents puissent financièrement survivre.[90]

Les conditions de l'époque aggravaient singulièrement les choses pour les plus fragiles: les pères Denifle et Balme semblent avoir particulièrement soufferts des fatigues des voyages, des changements d'alimentation, du froid.[91] Quand il n'y avait pas des inondations empêchant tout déplacement [61].

89 [53] "J'ai l'honneur de vous adresser par une occasion, qui me semble plus sûre que la poste, notre travail sur le *Perihermenias*, en vous priant de vouloir bien le présenter à S. E. Mgre le Cardinal Zigliara. Vous voyez que nous avons eu beaucoup de choses à noter; au commencement, nous avons signalé des différences minimes, mais à mesure que nous avons vu se multiplier les variantes, nous nous sommes restreints à ce qui a paru au P. Beaudoin avoir une réelle utilité pour la correction du texte et pour l'intelligence de l'œuvre de notre Saint Docteur.

Nous avons comparé le texte de l'édition de S. Pie V à deux manuscrits de l'ancienne Sorbonne, aujourd'hui de la Bibliothèque Nationale, tous deux du XIII[e] siècle, les seuls d'ailleurs que l'on possède ici du *Perihermenias*. L'un, exécuté avec grand soin, est souvent inexact; l'autre, extrêmement difficile, est plus exact. Quand un changement important nous a paru devoir être introduit et qu'il appartenait à la fois aux deux manuscrits, nous l'avons généralement signalé afin de donner plus de valeur à la correction proposée.

Avant d'aller plus loin, nous voudrions savoir si ce travail répond à la pensée et au désir de Son Eminence et, s'il y a lieu, recevoir ses observations.

Le R.P. Beaudoin va repartir jeudi, et il reste encore les deux *Postérieurs Analytiques*. Est-ce qu'on est pressé à Rome de les avoir? S'il était nécessaire de terminer ce travail promptement, peut-être y aurait-il lieu de me faire rester, par un échange, à Paris pendant le Carême: nous pourrions travailler avec le T. R. P. Villard, qui parait désireux de mettre le nez dans ces vénérables vieilleries, ou avec le R. P. Delorme, que l'on dit très versé dans ces matières; vous savez, mon Très Révérend Père, que je ferai ce que vous voudrez. Mais je désire bien vivement que mon voyage de Rome, déjà retardé du commencement de l'hiver jusqu'à Pâques à cause des grandes prédications de la saison, ne le soit pas encore et indéfiniment: les travaux qui m'y attirent, et qui me permettront enfin de voir Rome, ont aussi bien leur intérêt et leur importance..."

90 Voir en particulier [65][53] cités ci-dessus. Nous n'avons aucune information sur la façon dont étaient couvertes les dépenses effectuées pour la préparation de l'Edition léonine par les correspondants et spécialement les itinérants, à l'exception d'une allusion de Cl. Suermondt à propos des voyages de H. Denifle, dans "Le texte léonin de la prima Pars", p. 46 n. 1, mais cette allusion est trop vague et aussi trop passionnelle pour qu'on puisse faire fonds sur elle.

91 Ainsi [46][70][71], voir aussi Redigonda XII. Citons ici partiellement [72] où le père

D'autres difficultés ou obstacles ont retardé ou restreint le travail des collaborateurs, mais, plus directement liées à la technicité même de l'entreprise, elles auraient pu être soupçonnées à l'avance. Il y eut ainsi la difficulté ou l'impossibilité de pouvoir disposer d'exemplaires de la Piana comme texte de base pour les collations [57*][61]. Mais tout d'abord, les enquêteurs se sont heurtés aux horaires peu pratiques de certaines bibliothèques soi-disant publiques, à la multiplicité des démarches à faire pour accéder aux collections privées, et très souvent aux catalogues insuffisants, à l'absence de catalogue et même au manque de classement rationnel de certaines bibliothèques, particulièrement en Espagne.[92] Mais la difficulté principale est venue du

Denifle nous donne un témoignage direct, et combien savoureux, de certaines épreuves et difficultés que H. Denifle et F. P. Balme ont dû affronter:

"J'ai reçu hier votre lettre, et je remercie beaucoup. Excuser que je ne écrirait pas avant, comme j'ai promis. A Salamanque j'étais incapable pour faire quelque chose en cause de mon estomac. Les français ont une cuisine inexplicable, et pour cela tous sont malades, aussi le P. Vicaire général du Perpignan.

Je crois que l'Eminenz après quelques jours Platon doit recevoir. Pour S. Thomas je trouvais rien à Valladolid, Salamanque (dans la bibliothèque il y a rien d'autre que les disputes sur la grâce) et Segovie. Mais à Segovie le P. Gregoire Revilla m'a donné une belle relique du N. S. Père Dominique — je porterai au P. Général. Le P. Manuel à Salamanque m'a donné le manuscrit du Vitoria sur 1. part. du St. Thomas. Sur la predestination et reprobation il a les preuves tout à fait come Bauer. Ici j'aspette toujours encore une billet pour la bibliothèque privé du Roi, et pour Escorial. Les Espagnols modernes ne se pressent pas. Sono iomadoni! J'ai fini à Madrid et demain l'Eminence recevra la liste. Le P. Balme est encore avec moi. Avec Votre lettre est venue une autre de son P. Provincial, dans quelle il exprime votre intention. Le P. Balme *est content*. Il me quittera après 2 semaines — il est trop fatigué. Les rotis oiseaux ne volent pas aussi en Espagne dans la bouche. Mais pour la paléographie il est bien capable quoique tardif. A Avila j'ai trouvé une charmante communauté. C'est un vrai plaisir! J'étais seul là. Le couvent est immense comme à Salamanque, et les Espagnols le remplissent parfaitement. J'assistais à la fonction du 1er soir. Le P. Général ou le P. Pueblo doivent raconter les détails de cette fonction. Semel in anno ridet Apollo.

Une fois Vous, Revme Père, dever aller en Espagne. Ce un pays magnifique. Malheureusement ont les français et la révolution beaucoup des bibliothèques et des manuscrits détruits...

Le P. Balme écrira après quelques jours. La partie de 'La fé' est content pour encyclique du Pape. La partie du 'Siglo futuro' moins. Cette division est un malheur."

H. Denifle et F. P. Balme ne réagissaient d'ailleurs par toujours à l'unisson, les difficultés pouvaient s'en trouver aggravées. Voici, parmi d'autres que l'on pourrait citer en ce sens, le document [75]: "Bona festa et ad multos annos! Aujourd'hui, je pars pour Cordova. Pour Lisboa j'ai reçu d'Autriche une recommandation pour l'ambassadeur autrichien. Je suis content. Les manuscrits philosophiques sont rares, mais plus rares encore les commentaires sur la Bible. Les manuscrits théologiques sont abondantes et pour la plus grande partie plus anciens que dans les autres pays. Maintenant Andalousie et Portugal! Hélas, j'oublie toutes les fatigues. Le P. Balme a pris mal du pays. La persévérance n'est une plante, qui croît en France. Mi pare... Fr. Enrique Denifle O.P."

92 Voir par exemple les lettres du père Denifle, en particulier [61][70*][72*]; voici le texte de [70]:

"Je mande ici ce que j'ai trouvé jusque présent. Le P. Rivas n'a pas bien travaillé. Souvent il a pris seulement les notes des catalogues, qui sont très imparfaits. Quelques bibliothèques il n'a pas connue. Les fatigues du voyage sont très grandes. Une grande difficulté offre le chapitre de Barcelone. Ils ne veulent pas qu'on garde la riche bibliothèque. Peut-être que j'ai plus fortune retour-

très grand nombre de manuscrits d'œuvres de S. Thomas, le plus souvent dispersés à travers le monde entier et, comme nous venons de le dire, dans des locaux souvent inabordables et dans des ensembles sans inventaire ou classement acceptable. A une époque où les moyens techniques étaient sommaires et les possibilités humaines limitées, ce très grand nombre de manuscrits intéressant l'Edition léonine rendait impossible la réalisation rapide d'une édition scientifique véritablement sérieuse des œuvres de S. Thomas d'Aquin. Or le personnel a été recruté, les consignes données et les délais d'achèvement des volumes determinés à l'avance comme si aucune difficulté importante ne risquait d'intervenir.

Certes, bien que des travaux antérieurs de même nature, telles que les entreprises précédentes d'éditions d'*Opera omnia* de S. Thomas et surtout la préparation de l'édition de S. Bonaventure par le père Fidelis a Fanna, eussent pu éveiller leur attention, le cardinal Tommaso Zigliara ne doit peut-être pas être critiqué trop sévèrement non plus que Léon XIII pour n'avoir pas soupçonné à l'avance toutes les difficultés que nous avons évoquées ci-dessus, ou du moins leurs dimensions véritables qui étaient en l'occurrence colossales, le cas de S. Thomas débordant très largement par exemple celui de S. Bonaventure. Mais il se trouve que le cardinal a été très vite et très clairement prévenu par certains de ses collaborateurs plus perspicaces. Il est bien certain qu'il a eu un écho des sentiments développés par H. Denifle dans la lettre que ce dernier a sans doute envoyée au Maître de l'Ordre et qui a déjà été publiée.[93] Mais à cette lettre, il faut ajouter deux lettres inédites adressées au cardinal lui-même, par le père Balme d'une part, par le père Esser d'autre part. Dès janvier 1880, le père Balme écrit ceci au cardinal |51|:

> ...J'ose vous prier, Eminence Révérendissime, de vouloir bien me permettre de vous soumettre, pour le meilleur succès de l'entreprise, quelques réflexions qui me paraissent aussi urgentes que dignes d'être prises en considération. C'est autorisé parce ce que, depuis plusieurs années, j'ai vu pratiquer par le P. Fidèle de Fanna Récollet pour l'édition des œuvres de St. Bonaventure, et aussi par ma propre expérience en pareille matière, que je me crois suffisamment en mesure de vous soumettre ces réflexions.
>
> S'il ne s'agit, Eminence, que de publier une édition des œuvres de St.

nant à Barcelone. Demain je pars pour Madrid, où spécialement la bibliothèque nationale est très grande.

On ne trouve pas un manuscrit trop moderne ou sur carte; presque tous sont anciennes. Mais beaucoup des manuscrits furent brullés par les français et pendant la révolution."

Quand on compare de tels témoignages, qui datent d'un siècle, aux comptes rendus de voyage de ceux qui aujourd'hui font encore le même travail de recherche pour conduire jusqu'à son achèvement l'Edition léonine, on se prend à penser que les choses n'ont guère changé depuis l'enquête Zigliara.

93 Nous citons cette lettre plus loin, voir ci-dessous n. 99, afin de la mettre dans ce qui nous paraît être son véritable contexte.

Thomas plus correcte et plus complète que les précédentes en tenant compte des travaux antérieurs, ce sera chose facile et il n'est guère besoin de se livrer à de grandes et pénibles recherches; mais si on veut faire un travail exceptionnel, qui donne le dernier mot de la question, qui réponde aux intentions solennellement exprimées de Sa Sainteté Léon XIII et soit digne de la dévotion de l'Ordre et de votre Eminence à Notre Saint Docteur, il devient indispensable de faire pour cette édition ce que, pour les Œuvres de St. Bonaventure, fait l'Ordre des frères Mineurs par l'impulsion de son Général et sous la direction du P. Fidèle de Fanna! L'ouvrage que ce dernier a publié à Turin chez Marietti intitulé "Ratio novae collectionis operum omnium S. Bonaventurae" en donne une idée, et le petit travail que je viens de faire moi-même à Avignon m'a montré jusqu'à l'évidence que c'est une nécessité qui s'impose si on tient à réussir. Il faudrait donc en premier lieu faire vérifier par des hommes compétents dans toutes les bibliothèques, tous les manuscrits des œuvres de St. Thomas des 13°, 14°, 15° siècles jusqu'à la découverte de l'imprimerie; car souvent les manuscrits les plus précieux et les plus authentiques se découvrent là où on s'y attendrait le moins et où personne n'en soupçonnerait l'existence. De plus il y a souvent autant de variantes que de feuillets dans un manuscrit et comment faire un choix judicieux si l'on n'a pas toutes les pièces en main?

2° Ce premier travail fait en Italie, en France, en Espagne, en Allemagne, en Angleterre, etc. etc., et le compte rendu vous en étant fait et soumis, il faudra que l'on copie intégralement les textes les plus anciens, ceux que vous indiquerez en suivant l'ordre de publication qui sera adopté — plus on aura, sur un texte, de copies, plus la critique s'exercera avec profit. On assure que le P. Fidèle a sur un seul texte jusqu'à 20 et 30 copies: il est impossible de songer à ce que la même personne déchiffre un manuscrit et, séance tenante, compare et fasse le choix des variantes à adopter.

3° Quand donc toutes les copies que l'on aura pu obtenir d'un manuscrit seront réunies à Rome, il y aura lieu, ce me semble, pour une commission nommée par Votre Eminence, de les collationner entre elles et de faire aussi avec une critique mûrie et en connaissance de cause, choix du meilleur texte et des variantes les plus autorisées.

4° Ce sera alors le moment d'imprimer sûrement et avantageusement... Il serait aussi très utile que les différentes pères qui collaborent à cette œuvre, au moins en France, se connaissent, puissent se voir, s'entendre, échanger leurs vues, afin d'adopter la même méthode d'investigation et le même plan et en même temps, afin de se faire réciproquement part des résultats de leur expérience dans ce travail tout nouveau pour la plupart.

Pardonnez-moi, Eminence, ma témérité! C'est votre bienveillance d'un côté et le désir de l'autre de voir mener à bonne fin une si belle entreprise qui m'ont déterminé à vous écrire cette lettre.

Qu'aurait écrit le père Balme si, comme nous le savons maintenant, il avait soupçonné que pour certaines œuvres de S. Thomas il n'est pas question de 20 ou 30 copies mais plutôt de 150 à 200? En mars de l'année suivante, c'est le père Esser qui, à son tour, met en garde le car-

dinal contre trop de précipitation en des termes eux-aussi très explicites [66]:

> Et qui non posso tacerle una mia osservazione, la quale propongo però con tutti i respetti alla mia ignoranza, al savio e prudentissimo parere di Vostra Eminenza: Se si commincia a lavorare prima di cognoscere *tutti* i manoscritti delle diverse opere di S. Tommaso, dispersi nelle diverse bibliotheche di tutto l'orbe cattolico, ben facile potrebbe capitare il caso che, dopo finito un volume, si troverebbe ancora uno o più codici migliori di questi, di cui si è adoperato per quel volume, di modo che tutto questo lavoro sarebbe inutile, o almeno dovrebbe comminciarci da capo. Percio secondo il mio parere — ma forse secundum insipientiam loquor — anzi tutto dovrebbe farsi un Catalogo o cosidetto *Clavis Codicum*, nel quale tutti i codici trovabili sarebbero registrati, numerati; distinti secondo il loro valore, etc. Allora si avrebbe un fondamento certo e firmissimo, si saprebbe, dove si trovano i migliori codici per le diverse opere, ed il lavorare del resto sarebbe ben facile e spedito. — Mi perdoni la Vostra Eminenza, questa mia libertà, e mi creda, che non ho detto, quanto dissi, per una certa criticandi cacoethes, ma si per il solo e puro interesse, che prendo di un lavoro tanto glorioso non solamente per la di lei persona Eminentissima, ma ancora, per mezzo di essa, per tutta quanta la nostra santa religione.

Ces deux lettres des pères Balme et Esser au cardinal, également celle du père Denifle, témoignent de la lucidité de leurs auteurs respectifs sur les véritables dimensions et les exigences scientifiques de l'entreprise.[94] Nous ne savons si le cardinal a reçu d'autres avertissements allant dans

94 On notera que leur franchise à l'égard du cardinal n'a pas empêché les pères Balme et Denifle de continuer à travailler pour la préparation de l'édition léonine, voir [70*] à [76] et également Redigonda XII, XIII. En septembre 1882, le père Denifle avoue qu'il a plus de courage qu'auparavant, Redigonda XII.

Pour ce qui est tout particulièrement du père Denifle, les documents signalés ici, [49][70*] à [76] et Redigonda XII et XIII, permettent de situer à sa vraie place la lettre de Denifle que nous citons ci-dessous n. 99 à la suite de D. M. Planzer. Il semble que la publication de ce brouillon isolément de son contexte ait incité à majorer le prétendu découragement de certains des premiers collaborateurs du cardinal qui auraient abandonné parce que le travail n'était pas mené avec assez de rigueur scientifique. Le cas du père Denifle est alors toujours cité avec comme exemple la lettre révélée dans *Divus Thomas*, voir par ex. R. Aubert, "Aspects divers...", p. 197 n. 105 où R. A. renvoie d'ailleurs à "Denifle" du DHGE. Or le cas du père Denifle nous montre précisément qu'aprés sa lettre très négative pour le projet, sans doute de 1880, il fait sur ordre un voyage très long et fatigant, faisant des recherches dans le sud de la France et dans toute la péninsule ibérique, voir ci-dessus p. 359. C'est sa nomination comme sous-archiviste du Saint Siège, en décembre 1883, qui mit un terme à sa coopération à l'édition léonine et non son désaccord, sans doute très réel, sur la méthode ou plutôt l'absence de vraie méthode du cardinal Zigliara. Voir ci-dessous n. 99. Une lecture cursive des documents mentionnés ici et concernant Denifle permet de lire avec une certaine philosophie les appréciations si divergentes portées autrefois sur l'apport du père Denifle à l'édition critique des œuvres de S. Thomas: voir par ex. card. Ehrle, *Franziskanische Studien* 11 (1924) p. 32; Cl. Suermondt, "Le texte léonin..." n. 1 de p. 46; les notices "Denifle" de DHGE et de LTK. Comme collaborateur du cardinal Zigliara à l'étape heuristique du travail, H. Denifle a accompli un travail considérable, voir par ex. Redigonda pp. 126-132, et s'il n'a sans doute pas collaboré au collationnement proprement dit, ses idées méthodiques appuyées par une forte personnalité ont certainement eu elles-aussi une certaine influence sur le groupe romain.

le même sens, en tout cas on ne relève aucun indice permettant de faire croire que ces lettres ont eu un effet quelconque. Faut-il s'en étonner? En la personne du cardinal Zigliara et a travers lui, les trois érudits s'adressaient à un milieu ecclésiastique beaucoup trop replié sur lui-même et beaucoup trop ignorant du développement de la recherche historique et de ses développements techniques à cette époque pour pouvoir comprendre la portée d'avertissements donnés pourtant très clairement mais par des hommes qui eux étaient plutôt en avance sur leur temps par leur conception de ce que devrait être un véritable travail de critique textuelle.

Bilan sommaire.

Au terme de cette présentation et de ces réflexions sur la méthode heuristique du cardinal Zigliara et sa mise en œuvre concrète, on ne peut que souligner la justesse des intentions fondamentales[95] et en souligner les fruits.[96] Mais en même temps, on est amené à constater que dès les débuts de la Léonine se constitue un malentendu entre les autorités qui veulent une édition scientifiquement excellente mais réalisée dans les délais les plus brefs et les techniciens qui déclarent in-

95 Il faut rendre au cardinal cette justice que l'on ne peut relever dans les documents des allusions de sa part à des critères d'orthodoxie doctrinale, philosophique ou théologique, ou encore à des capacités spéculatives particulières qu'il faudrait exiger des éventuels collaborateurs, alors que certaines remarques auraient pu lui en donner l'idée [41][43] et que sa relative ignorance du travail critique et ses antécédents intellectuels personnels auraient bien pu le conduire à partager le souci typiquement romain de sécurité conceptuelle en tout domaine, comme si en l'occurrence elle pouvait avoir une incidence bénéfique sur la valeur scientifique du travail d'un éditeur critique. On a vu combien ce facteur a été influent dix années auparavant, ci-dessus p. 347. Il est tout à l'honneur du cardinal qu'il semble donc avoir admis, au moins implicitement, que pour mener à bien une telle tâche il fallait avant tout une équipe de bons codicologues et surtout de bons paléographes pour la premières étape du travail; la seconde étape étant conduite par de bons techniciens de la critique textuelle, ayant donc un esprit assez méthodique mais également formés par une longue expérience dans ce domaine, leur tâche consistant précisément à exploiter le plus objectivement possible le donné paléographique rassemblé au cours de la première étape. Il est vrai qu'il ne faut peut-être pas attribuer au cardinal Zigliara plus d'idées précises qu'il n'en avait en réalité: au fond le recrutement de collaborateurs ne dépendait pas tellement de lui, il prenait ceux qu'on voulait bien mettre à sa disposition; d'autre part, ceux qui précisément lui proposaient des sujets avaient peut-être eux quelques principes de sélection: ce qui dispensait précisément le cardinal d'en avoir. On a vu plus haut que ce sont collaborateurs directs du Maître de l'Ordre qui recrutaient pour le cardinal, voir ci-dessus p. 357. Il n'en reste pas moins que dans le cas d'œuvres comme celles de S. Thomas, à cause de l'état du donné manuscrit, la critique interne n'a pratiquement que très peu à intervenir: des préoccupations prématurées d'orthodoxie théorique et de rectitude doctrinale ne pourraient que risquer de compromettre la rigueur scientifique du travail d'établissement du texte.

96 L'équipe des "collaborateurs du cardinal Zigliara" qui deviendra ensuite le "collège des éditeurs" voir ci-dessous pp. 371-377, ne semble pas avoir toujours apprécié de façon assez objective le travail des "correspondants", témoin cette remarque du père Mackey pour les mois de janvier à juin 1880 "Le misure prese in questo tempo non hanno avuto felice esito, e non ne rimane nessuno risultato se non il conoscimento di gran' numero di codici". Le but même d'une enquête heuristique n'est-il pas précisément d'apporter d'abord une information codicologique?

conciliables ces deux exigences et s'orientent résolument vers la réalisation d'une publication encore plus rigoureuse au plan scientifique que ne l'imaginaient ceux qui l'ordonnaient, mais repoussent alors dans le futur non défini le terme de l'œuvre. Certains fruits assez amers de ce malentendu verront très rapidement le jour dans les années immédiatement suivantes. Il est bien évident qu'un tel malentendu est toujours sur le point de poindre à nouveau, si tant est qu'il ait jamais été totalement dissipé.[97]

Les Editeurs de S. Thomas de 1879 à 1894

Il est bien certain que dans l'esprit même du cardinal Zigliara l'établissement de répertoires descriptifs de manuscrits d'œuvres de S. Thomas et la collation des manuscrits d'une œuvre en se référant à un texte de base et en notant les éventuelles notes marginales ne pouvaient représenter qu'un travail préparatoire à l'élaboration proprement dite de l'édition. Une fois cette première étape accomplie, comme nous l'avons vu grâce au travail de correspondants, une étape nouvelle devait nécessairement suivre, consistant en une étude critique du donné paléographique fourni par les collations pour aboutir à l'établissement d'un texte proposé à l'impression typographique, avec les préfaces et les apparats correspondants.

Pour mener à bien cette seconde étape, capitale, le cardinal avait évidemment besoin de l'aide de collaborateurs résidant à Rome et travaillant à ses côtés. L'histoire du groupe de ces collaborateurs, que l'on appelle aujourd'hui Commission léonine, est jalonnée par des crises et des transformations dont l'étude n'est peut-être pas sans intérêt pour tous ceux qui s'intéressent à la technique de l'édition de textes. Ici encore, nous n'avons pas la prétention d'écrire une histoire complète de la Commission léonine mais simplement de présenter certaines pièces, pour une part inédites, que nous avons crues intéressantes et d'en dégager quelques conclusions qui ont peut-être encore quelque intérêt et même une certaine actualité.[98]

97 Comment expliquer autrement que, sans consulter les spécialistes, on ait encore récemment pu faire dire que l'Edition léonine serait terminée d'ici quelques années, alors que les exigences scientifiques en matière d'édition critique sont plus rigoureuses que jamais et que les moyens d'investigation et de consultation ont fait des pas de géant, accroissant par là même très lourdement les délais incompressibles nécessaires pour mener à bien ce genre de travail.

98 Les documents exploités ci-dessous ne constituant pas comme précédemment un dossier, nous n'en donnons pas ici une liste récapitulative. A chaque fois que nous nous référons à un document, nous en donnons le texte d'après l'authentique ou la minute officielle, ou encore d'après la copie qu'en a faite le père Mackey, v. ci-dessous n. 107.

Pour être comprises, ces pièces doivent être insérées dans la trame historique où elles s'insèrent naturellement et dont le découpage est imposé par les faits eux-mêmes, d'où les paragraphes successifs de cette dernière partie.

Les collaborateurs du cardinal Zigliara, éditeur de S. Thomas, 1880-1882.

C'est le cardinal lui-même qui avait reçu mission de mener à bien l'édition léonine. Pour ce faire il lui fallait nécessairement recruter à nouveau des collaborateurs, mais alors des collaborateurs qui travailleraient sur place à ses côtés. H. Denifle, en dépit de sa résistance,[99] est nommé "socius" du Maître de l'Ordre afin qu'il soit en situation d'aider le cardinal: il est déjà à Rome avant le 28 octobre 1880.[100] Le nouveau Général, le père J. M. Larroca, avait d'ailleurs essayé d'appliquer le même processus au père Beaudouin pour assurer au cardinal l'aide de ce religieux français considéré comme bon

99 N'est-ce pas pour préparer sa réponse au Maître de l'Ordre qui l'invitait à venir à Rome comme socius, que Denifle rédigea le brouillon publié par D. M. Planzer dans *Divus Thomas* (Frib.), 8 (1930) 447-448? Sa réticence s'expliquerait peut-être alors, pour une part par son peu d'inclination à devenir socius du Père Général, car il lui était plus facile d'essayer d'esquiver cette charge en arguant de difficultés pour lui à collaborer avec le cardinal. Si notre hypothèse est exacte, comme le suggère la première phrase de la lettre, il faudrait dater le document d'avant le 28 octobre 1880, date d'arrivée de Denifle à Rome, après une nouvelle instance du Père Général. Voici en tout cas le texte:

"Romae verosimiliter adiuvare deberem Em. Cardinal. <Zigliara> in editione operum S.Thomae; et hoc ex causis infra referendis intimo meo contradicit. Viginti quatuor bibliothecas in Germania perlustravi, in quibus 560 manuscripta librorum Thomae inveni; adhuc manent circa viginti bibliothecae perlustrandae. Em. Cardinali quantocius catalogum mittam saltem illorum manuscriptorum saec. 13 et 14. Perlustravi etiam catalogos impressos, in quantum sunt publicati bibliothecarum des départements, ut dicunt, Galliae, et inveni manuscripta "non" minoris numeri. In Italia, ut mihi Fid. a Fanna dixit, eodem numero inveniuntur. Quid faciendum? Si centum homines insimul laborarent, non perficerent opus tam brevi tempore, ut Summus Pontifex vult. Debent manuscripta comparari, eligi, in classes dividi. V. gr. ex commentariis super Metaphysicam inveni 12 manuscripta quae deberent adhiberi; et eodem numero sunt in Physicam, in Ethicam et in Animam. Et sic est in Gallia, in Italia, in Hispania forsan. Quis hoc praestabit? Duo anni solummodo teruntur, ut bibliothecae in Europa perlustrentur et quisque sciat, quot manuscripta sunt in illis. Sex annis non sufficiunt ad comparationem manuscriptorum. Peto, quisnam praestabit per dimidium vel unum annum? Est physica impossibilitas. Et ideo omnes docti in Germania et aliqui Galli, quibuscum conveni, mihi dixerunt, quod si Summus Pontifex consilium suum non mutabit, Em. Card. solummodo codices Vaticanos vel etiam Parisienses adhibeat et dicat in fronte editionis: "correcta iuxta codices Vaticanos et Parisienses"; aliter ordo noster et ipse Summus Pontifex in detrimentum veniret, quia critici, ut iam audivi, primo contra Card. et nostrum ordinem insurgent et deinde etiam contra Summum Pontificem. Altera difficultas est: multae bibliothecae in Germania post combustionem bibliothecae docti Mommsen non sunt tam faciles ad manuscripta transmittenda, sicut fuit prius. Quomodo nunc comparare? Bibliothecae iacent in regionibus protestantium, ubi deberent fratres morari per plures annos! Dicat hoc Em. Cardinali et credat experto et referat Summo Pontifici. Pulchritudo in editio <ne> est accidens: essentia est editio iuxta rectas regulas criticorum."

100 Voir Redigonda, p. 118. En fait, nous l'avons vu, H. Denifle continue à rechercher des mss dans toute l'Europe, mais il ne travaille pas aux côtés du cardinal.

théologien et professeur, mais le Maître de l'Ordre s'est trouvé contraint de renoncer à ce dernier projet.[101]

D'après les notes du père Mackey, on peut reconstituer ainsi les étapes successives de la constitution du groupe de ceux qui seront les vrais collaborateurs du cardinal: juin 1880, arrivée à Rome du père Constant Suermondt qui commence à travailler à peu près seul:[102] le 1er avril 1881, arrivée du père Hoogland et, le 25 juin, du père Lyttleton.[103] A la même époque, le père Frati est recruté mais pour travailler directement avec le cardinal et il n'est pas considéré comme "adetto al lavoro".[104] D'autres viennent s'adjoindre au groupe puisqu'en septembre 1881, sans compter le père Pierotti chargé des finances en tant que "sin-

101 Au début de septembre 1880, le père Larroca, Maître de l'Ordre, écrit au père Chocarne, provincial de France, qu'il choisit le père Beaudouin, lecteur et maître des étudiants à Flavigny, comme "socius". Le 15 du même mois, le père Chocarne écrit au Père Général qu'il ne peut lui donner le père Beaudouin, indispensable à Flavigny, etc. Le père général étant absent de Rome, c'est le père Bianchi qui reçoit cette lettre à Rome, il écrit au père Chocarne le 27 septembre qu'il transmet immédiatement la lettre du 15 septembre au père Larroca et intervient dans le même sens. Le 4 octobre, de Mazères (France), le père Larroca écrit au père Chocarne: "Je regrette moi aussi de priver votre Province du bien qu'y fait le Père Beaudoin (sic) et je le laisserez (sic) tranquille s'il ne s'agissait que d'un simple socius, mais je dois penser à aider notre cardinal dans l'édition des œuvres de St. Thomas. Veuillez donc lui communiquer ma détermination à ce qu'il se prépare à partir pour Rome dès qu'il le pourra...". En fait, dès le 7 octobre, le père Larroca, tenant compte encore d'autres interventions, écrit au père Chocarne qu'il lui laisse le père Beaudouin (Archives de la Prov. de France, III-C-6). Dans la notice nécrologique du père Beaudouin, signée par le père Ambroise Gardeil et publiée dans l'*Année dominicaine* de 1907, on lit que le père Beaudouin alla passer à Rome, en septembre 1877, l'examen "ad gradus" et que "à l'occasion de cet examen, le P. Zigliara le présenta au cardinal Pecci..." p. 198; on y lit également que le père Beaudouin "ami du cardinal Zigliara" p. 201, fut un des premiers membres de l'Académie S. Thomas d'Aquin, voir I. P. Grassi, op. cité ci-dessus.

102 On a vu plus haut que le père Suermondt avait été signalé au cardinal Zigliara quand celui-ci recherchait des correspondants, voir ci-dessus [41].

Le père Constant Suermondt, né en Hollande le 3 novembre 1850, profès dominicain le 23 octobre 1870, arrive à Rome pour la Léonine en 1880 à l'âge de trente ans; il sera frappé de paralysie définitive à 75 ans le 26 janvier 1925, alors qu'il corrigeait les épreuves du tome XIV de l'Edition; il meurt le 31 janvier 1925, après avoir travaillé 44 ans pour la Léonine. Notices dans Edition léonine, t. XIV, p. vi, dans *Memorie Domenicane* 70 (1953) 273-274.

103 Comme on le verra ci-dessous, p. 377, le père Hoogland ne restera pas longtemps à la Léonine. Quant au père James Lyttleton, né en Irlande le 14 novembre 1851, profès dominicain le 3 mai 1869, il arrive à la Léonine le 25 juin 1881 et meurt le 28 janvier 1909 après 27 ans de travail pour l'Edition. Notices dans Edition léonine, t. XVI, pp. v-vi, dans ASOP 11 (1913-1914) 150-151.

104 Cette formule est du père Mackey. Voici le texte de la lettre par laquelle Mgr. Boccali, secrétaire privé de Léon XIII, sollicite du Maître de l'Ordre l'affectation du père Frati:

"Rmo Padre Generale. Il S. Padre, per l'importanza grandissima che annette alla nuova edizione di tutte le Opere di S. Tommaso d'Aquino, desidera che l'Emo Cardinal Zigliara, il quale ne ha la cura, abbia l'aiuto di persone capaci sulle quali possa riporre intera fiducia. Una di queste è il Rmo P. Frati Reggente del Collegio di S. Tommaso alla Minerva; di cui peraltro l'Emo Card. Zigliara non potrebbe ulteriormente valersi, a motivo della Scuola di Teologia al medesimo affidata. Quindi ho l'onore di significare alla P. V. Rma essere desiderio del S. Padre che il lodato P. Frati sia messo a disposizione dell'Emo Card. Zigliara; e che l'insegnamento di S. Tommaso, finche non siasi potuto trovare un altro soggetto pienamente idoneo, sia provisoriamente affidato al P. Gaudenzi, chiamato recentemente a Roma e destinato ad assistere la P.V. Rma nell' Officio Generale.

Godo di poter confermare alla P.V. Rma i sensi della mia venerazione, con cui mi è grato professarmi della P.V. Rma. Vaticano, 3 nov. 1880, Devmo Servitore."

daco" de la Minerve,[105] l'équipe de travail se trouve constituée des religieux suivants: Suermondt, Lyttleton, Palmer,[106] Cuschieri et Carruana, enfin Mackey.[107] Sauf le père Lyttleton qui réside à San Clemente, ils vivent ensemble à la Minerve, maison généralice, et travaillent près des appartements du cardinal.

Cette équipe travaille "sur les variantes des manuscrits", le père Suermondt dirigeant la partie paléographique, alors que le cardinal avec l'aide du père Frati s'occupe personnellement de l'élaboration du tome I dont l'impression commence à la Propagande en juin 1881. Là, un prêtre assure jusqu'au 28 décembre 1881 le travail de correction typographique, après cette date ce travail retombera sur le groupe qui est malheureusement atteint au même moment par des départs notables. En effet, le 13 février 1881, le père Palmer retourne en Angleterre; le 27 février, ce sont les pères Cuschieri et Carruana qui rentrent à Malte. Il ne reste donc plus que les pères Constant Suermondt, Albert Hoogland, Jacques Lyttleton et Pierre-Paul Mackey comme "collaborateurs du cardinal Zigliara".[108] Un premier fruit du travail, le tome I de l'édition léonine, est terminée le 30 juillet 1881.[109]

La première crise et la mutation qui en résulte, 1882-1886.

Selon le père Mackey, la période qui s'étend de juin 1882 à décembre de la même année est marquée par de nombreuses difficultés tenant à la diversité des conceptions qui s'affrontent. Mais ces difficultés nous sem-

105 Il s'agit seulement des finances pour la vie quotidienne. En effet, l'administration de l'édition et les problèmes financiers y afférant relèvent des cardinaux et de la Propagande. A ce plan, on devance les développements du travail d'édition, puisque dès juin 1880 plus de 50.000,00 L sont dépensés en matériel typographique et que le premier contrat pour le papier est passé avec la Propagande le 5 mai 1880.

106 Dans une lettre du père Larroca au père Bianchi, de Gande (sic) et du 30 septembre 1881, on relève le passage suivant: "Sono contento assai che il P. Palmer sia utile e che il Cardinale ne sia contento. Se riesce a avere contento il P. Fratti (sic) puo andare avanti l'edizione."

107 Le père Peter Paul Mackey est né en Angleterre le 4 décembre 1851, profès dominicain le 10 octobre 1872, il arrive à Rome pour la Léonine le 22 septembre 1881, en 1929 devenu à peu près aveugle, il cesse de travailler à l'édition à laquelle il a donné 48 années de sa vie, il meurt le 23 avril 1935 à Rome. Notices dans Edition léonine, t. XVI, pp. v-vi, dans ASOP 22 (1935-1936) 140-142 et 449-456.

C'est aux notes inédites du père Mackey et au registre où il copiait toutes les pièces intéressant l'histoire de la Commission léonine que nous avons emprunté tous les détails et les textes qui figurent dans ces pages sans indication d'origine.

108 C'est ainsi qu'ils sont désignés dans la demande présentée à la Sacrée Congrégation pour l'interprétation du concile de Trente et satisfaite par elle le 28 mars 1882: désormais les pères A. Hogland (sic), J. Lyttleton, C. Suermondt et M. P. Mackey, "collaboratores Eminentissimi Domini Cardinalis Zigliara", pourront être autorisés par le Maître de l'Ordre à réciter Matines et Laudes du lendemain à partir de deux heures de l'après-midi, mais "durante munere, per modum tamen actus et non habitus, pro suo arbitrio et conscientia". Le père Raymond Bianchi accorde la permission demandée le 7 avril 1882.

109 L'impression d'une partie importante du volume avait commencé en juin 1881.

blent toutes dominées par l'espèce de crise que déclanche une lettre du cardinal Zigliara au Maître de l'Ordre en date du 12 juin 1882:

Reverendissimo Padre Maestro Generale:
Nell'udienza del 3 corrente Giugno ebbi l'onore di parlare col. S. Padre sulla sistemazione definitiva del personale necessario a proseguire la nuova Edizione delle Opere di S. Tommaso. Dopo l'udienza credetti mio dovere d'informare la Paternità vostra Reverendissima che Sua Santità metteva a disposizione de' religiosi collaboratori un quartiere dell'Accademia Ecclesiastica, assumendosi in pari tempo le spese di vitto, vestito, viaggi, ecc.Aggiungevo che sarebbe desiderabile di portare a 12 il numero de' religiosi per poterli distribuire a gruppi, e sollecitare cosi la stampa, affidando a ciascuno gruppo la preparazione di un' opera. Qualora un tal numero d'individui capaci non si poterre avere subito in pronto, si lasciava alla saviezza di V. P. Reverendissima di prendere tempo e di limitarsi per ora al personale necessario per preparare il secondo volume.

In passato la Paternità Vostra Reverendissima mi si mostrò molto soddisfatta di vedere questa nuova Edizione affidata dal S. Padre al nostro Ordine, il quale veniva cosi a continuare la gloriosa opera de' nostri maggiori, e mi aggiungeva che a cio occorendo parecchi religiosi, avrebbe preso le opportune disposizioni per chiamare in Roma questi religiosi medesimi. E ricordo pure ch'Ella mi manifesto l'intenzione di scegliere a suoi soci i padri Gaudenzi, Denifle e Beaudouin, acciocchè anch 'essi prestassero la loro opera. Riferii, come era dovere, il tutto a Sua Santità, la Quale accolse queste notizie con visibile compiacenza; e però rifiutò il concorso premurosamente e con insitenza offertole da persone estranee all' Ordine nostro. E nell' ultima udienza mi ripetè: Ai mezzi provvederò io; l'Ordine Domenicano, non ne dubito, si metterà con zelo, a curare une Edizione che ridonda a tanto suo onore. Dopo ciò fui non poco sorpreso e addolorato nel sentire le P.V. Reverendissima affaciare delle difficoltà intorno al personale necessario a preparare il secondo volume, quasi che non si possa disporre di un individuo senza compromettere, sono sue espressioni, l'avvenire di una provincia. Per conseguenza non che aumentare il numero, già scarso, de' collaboratori, c'è forse pericolo di perdere alcuno di quelli che hanno lavorato per il primo volume. Confesso che non so persuadarsi che l'Ordine nostro sià ridotto a questi estremi; ma comunque sia, è al tutto necessario che sieno manifeste al Santo Padre le precise intenzioni della Paternità Vostra Reverendissima. E siccome il medesimo S. Padre si è degnato servirsi di me per communicare le sue Sovrane intenzioni al Capo del nostro Ordine, mi sento in dovere di dare a Sua Santità discarico della missione affidatami.

A questo fine prego la Paternità Vostra Reverendissima a volermi dire Se Ella può e vuole accettare dal S. Padre il compito di far proseguire l'Edizione delle Opere di S. Tommaso da' nostri religiosi domenicani. Deporrò subito nelle mani del Sommo Pontifice la risposta che la P. V. Reverendissima vorrà darmi. La quale risposta mi pare debba essere sollecita, accioche, qualora ella creda esse di non poter secondare le sapienti mire di Sua Santità. Questa abbia tempo di trovare fuori dell' Or-

dine personne capaci di proseguire l'Edizione, della quale sta per pubblicarsi il primo Volume.

A scanso poi di malintesi mi preme di aggiungere che qualora la risposta al quesito proposto sia affermativa, sarà in piena facoltà della P.V. Reverendissima ordinare personale, lavoro e direzione in quel modo che ella crederà opportune. In tal caso, come appunti fu fatto per l'Edizione Piana, il Santo Padre fornisce i mezzi, l'Ordine fa l'Edizione. Che se il mio concorso sarà giudicato di qualche utilità, lo presterò volentieri in quel modo che posso migliore, ponendomi sin d'ora a disposizione della P.V. Reverendissima.

Con distintissima stima ho il bene di professarmi Della Paternità Vostra Revma Devotissimo Servo vero, fr. Tommaso Ma Card. Zigliara, de' Pred.

Comme on le voit, il ne s'agit pas d'un différent entre le cardinal et le Père Général,[110] mais c'est le pape qui s'adresse aux Dominicains par l'intermédiaire du cardinal: il met à la disposition du groupe d'éditeurs un quartier de l'Académie des nobles ecclésiastiques et s'engage à payer les frais de séjour et autres, mais il demande qu'il y ait douze religieux appliqués au travail. La lettre menace de chercher des éditeurs en dehors de l'Ordre des Prêcheurs si les Dominicains ne peuvent faire face à la tâche.[111]

Le 17 juin 1882, le conseil généralice des Dominicains décide que l'Ordre accepte la responsabilité d'assurer l'édition mais à condition que tous les problèmes financiers soient réglés aux dépens du pape.[112]

110 Si l'affaire éclate ouvertement en 1882, une certaine tension existait déjà entre le père Larroca et le cardinal l'année précédente comme paraît en témoigner une lettre du Maître de l'Ordre au père Bianchi datée de Galway (Irlande) 8 août 1881; cette lettre n'a certainement pas été antidatée d'un an par inadvertance puisque les archives de la Province de France contiennent une lettre du Père Général datée du 8 août 1882 montrant que la Maître de l'Ordre est à cette date à Rome et non à Galway. Voici un extrait de la lettre de Galway du 8 août 1881:

"Amo servare silenzio su quanto si riferisce al Cardinal piutosto che scrivere. Egli dirà quanto gli piace, sta bene. Vedo che anche in questa facenda si vuol fare ricadere tutta la colpa sopra di me. Sta bene. Tutto questo non mi disturba affato, perche il peggio che potrebbe succedermi, sarebbe il meglio per me. Che l'Ordine possa pensare da se all'edizione delle Opere di san Tommaso, potrebbe dirlo uno che non fosse Domenicano. Se il Cardinale si ritira ci penserà il S. Padre. Il male per noi si è che, come io temei fin dal principio, questa facenda fa nota a tutti la miseria nostra..."

111 La lettre du cardinal manifeste que des propositions pressantes et insistantes furent effectivement faites au pape en vue d'une reprise de l'Edition par d'autres éditeurs non dominicains.

112 "In Consilio habito coram iisdem (i.e. Rmo P. Mtro generale cui assidebant Rmus Proc. Generalis, Adm. Rdi PP. Fr. Thomas Gaudenzi Prov. Dacie, Fr. Josephus Carbery Prov. Scotiae et Fr. Henricus Chatillon Prov. Terrae Sanctae), perlectis litteris, quibus, nomine Summi Pontificis Leonis XIII fel. reg. Emus Cardinalis Zigliara Rmo Magistro Generali proponebat ut operum D. Thomae typis noviter edendorum curam et directionem, ipsius Summi Pontificis expensis, Ordo noster assumeret: Patres a Consiliis per quatuor suffragia, uno sese abstinente, propositum acceptandum esse decreverunt, ea tamen lege, ut certas conditiones ad rem pecuniariam spectantes atque per aliquot Patres ad hoc specialiter a Magistro Ordinis nominatos determinandae Smo. Dno. Ntro. suppliciter exponerentur, quibus videlicet operis incepti prosequtio certa tutaque in posterum fieret..."

Le 18 juin 1882, le Maître de l'Ordre rend compte de cette délibération au cardinal dans les termes suivants:

> Eminenza Reverendissima:
>
> Prima di dare una risposta definitiva alla pregiatissima lettera dell' Eminenza Vostra in data del 12 corrente mese, ho creduto conveniente convocare i PP. del mio consiglio, giacchè trattandosi di cosa assai grave, e che impegna per molti anni l'Ordine intero, non ho giudicato di potermi assumerne totalmente la responsabilità.
>
> I Padri sono stati unanimi nell' accettare in massimo l'offerta fatta con tanta degnazione e con tanta bontà dal S. Padre all' Ordine nostro, cui sarebbe disdoro grandissimo per noi il non accogliere con ossequiosa e riconoscente alacrità. Credono per altro di dover subordinare une tale accettazione ad un progetto, che valga ad assicurare la Nobilità, e continuazione dell' Opera importantissima, progetto affidato ad una speciale commissione, che sarà quanto prima sottoposto all' approvazione della Santità Sua.
>
> Prego pertanto la E.V. Revma di assicurare il S. Padre che l'Ordine, a cui indegnamente e non solo ma eziandio poco utilmente presiedo, fidando nell' aiuto di Dio, nella benedizione di S. Santità, e nella cooperazione efficacissima dell'E.V.R. che vorrà, come per l'addietro, continuare nella direzione dell'opera, è pronto a intraprendere il difficile compito, appena la Santità Sua si degnerà di accogliere benignamente il progetto, che Le verrà umiliato....

Après ces échanges de documents et la présentation au pape du tome I le 18 août 1882,[113] présentation dont on peut penser qu'elle a quelque peu détendu l'atmosphère, on commence l'année scolaire 1882-1883 en travaillant à la préparation du tome II. Mais, en application des décisions précédentes, les éditeurs sont transférés le 11 décembre dans une partie des bâtiments de l'Académie pontificale des nobles ecclésiastiques.[114] Ce regroupement en une communauté spéciale visait

113 C'était la fête de S. Joachim, dimanche dans l'Octave de l'Assomption et par là la fête patronymique du pape.

Ce premier volume porte le titre suivant: "Commentaria in Aristotelis libros Peri Hermeneias et Posteriorum Analyticorum cum synopsibus et annotationibus Fr. Thomae Mariae Zigliara O.P., S.R.E. Cardinalis". Comme on le voit, la paternité du travail est reconnue au cardinal Zigliara et on ne présente pas l'édition comme fondée sur une étude critique des manuscrits; il est intéressant de comparer ce titre à ceux des tomes II et III d'une part, voir ici n. 123 et n. 129, et d'autre part à celui du tome IV, voir ici n. 135.

En fait ce premier tome témoigne d'un certain souci d'utilisation des manuscrits accessibles, il se réfère à la Piana mais garde sa liberté à l'égard de cette édition: pour le *Perihermeneias*, il est renvoyé à 5 mss et à trois éditions outre la Piana; pour les *Postérieurs Analytiques*, toujours en plus de la Piana, 3 éditions et 18 mss sont mentionnés. Actuellement nous connaissons 21 mss de l'*In Perihermeneias* et 55 mss de l'*In Post. Analyt.*

114 Le pape savait ce qu'il offrait comme résidence puisqu'il avait lui-même séjourné pendant un an à l'Académie en 1832. La partie des bâtiments qui devait servir de résidence au groupe de la Léonine avait l'avantage d'être contigu à l'appartement du cardinal De Luca, l'un des membres de la commission cardinalice. Mais en fait, le 12 juin 1883, l'équipe déménagera pour s'installer dans

sans aucun doute à éliminer les difficultés internes évoquées ci-dessus et qui provenaient peut-être d'une part de ce que tous les membres de l'équipe ne logeaient pas ensemble et d'autre part de l'insertion de l'équipe dans une communauté de religieux dominicains plus vaste et qui acceptait sans doute difficilement la présence d'un groupe voué à une activité très spéciale, menant donc un genre de vie singulier, et ayant en tout cas un régime financier qui lui était propre. Nous ne savons si ce dernier point a eu de fait une grande importance, mais nous croyons utile de le souligner, car les composantes financières de toutes ces crises et évolutions semblent avoir généralement pesé de façon notable sur les psychologies et c'est au fond bien normal.

Enfin, comme conséquence inéluctable du transfert mais aussi comme son complément au plan des hommes, le père Hyacinthe Frati est promu par le Maître de l'Ordre à la charge de "praeses" du *Collège des éditeurs*. Cette nomination du 11 décembre est acceptée par l'intéressé le 13 du même mois.[115] Une telle nomination n'implique pas une modification substantielle du statut des éditeurs; à un groupe isolé, il fallait de toute nécessité donner une tête.[116] En fait, si le cardinal garde nominalement la présidence scientifique jusqu'à sa mort, sa participation effective décroît par degrés et il en arrive assez vite à ne plus participer du tout au travail d'une équipe qui n'est d'ailleurs plus logée à proximité immédiate de ses propres appartements. Selon le père Mackey, dès que le transfert est accompli, le père Frati se comporte comme le vrai chef du travail scientifique, mais cette équipe de religieux dominicains est logée dans les bâtiments du Saint-Siège et voit toutes ses dépenses assurées directement par l'administration vaticane.

une autre partie de l'Académie "all ultimo piano dell'Accademia, coll'entrata S. Chiara 33" précise le père Mackey.

115 "...Collegio Fratrum Ordinis nostri operibus D. Thomae denuo edendis addictorum, ac in aedibus Pontificiae Academiae Ecclesiasticae, jussu et magnificentia SS. D.N. Leonis PP. XIII fel. regn. adunatorum, de idoneo praeside, qui eorumdem Fratrum bono et incremento incumbat, providere volentes, te Adm. Rdum Patrem Magistrum Fr. Hyacinthum Frati, de cuius doctrina, zelo, prudentia ac regendi dexteritate notitiam plenam habemus, matura consideratione delegimus, cui praefatum munus in dicti Collegii profectum et in tuae obedientiae meritum demandemus. Quapropter harum serie nostrique auctoritate Officii te memoratum Adm, R.P. Mag. Fr. Hyacinthum Frati; absolventes prius ab omni vinculo excommunicationis aut quovis alio Ecclesiastico impedimento, si quo forte innodatus existas, ad effectum dumtaxat Praesentium consequendum, instituimus et facimus, teque institutum et factum declaramus praedicti Collegii Praesidem, cum omnibus juribus, gratiis et privilegiis, quibus huiusmodi Praesides in Ordini nostro gaudere solent et debent: Mandantes tibi in virtute Spiritus Sancti et sanctae obedientiae, sub formali praecepto, ut hoc munus et onus incunctanter accipias. Porro omnibus Patribus et Fratribus quomodolibet ad praefatum Collegium pertinentibus sub eodem formali praecepto mandamus, ut te tanquam verum et legitimum Praesidem suscipiant, habeant et venerentur tibique in omnibus et per omnia religiose pareant et incunctanter obediant. In nomine Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti..."

116 Du point de vue de la structure religieuse dominicaine, le Collège et son "praeses" sont placés sous l'autorité du père Bianchi, procureur général, délégué par le Maître de l'Ordre pour régir la Léonine.

Sur les nouvelles bases posées ainsi en fin de 1882, la vie de la Léonine se continuera jusqu'en 1885 sans bouleversements révolutionnaires. L'intelligence des évènements subséquents suppose, nous semble-t-il, que soient rappelés brièvement et selon leur ordre chronologique les faits les plus importants qui jalonnent le travail des éditeurs de S. Thomas.[117]

Pendant l'année scolaire 1882-1883 on "collecte les variantes pour le second volume." Le pape reçoit en audience les pères Larroca et Bianchi puis tous les collaborateurs,[118] il témoigne aussi de sa bienveillance en accordant aux éditeurs de S. Thomas certains privilèges touchant à leur vie religieuse en communauté dominicaine, privilèges qui étaient à l'époque assez recherchés[119] mais surtout réservés aux professeurs; le 20 mars 1883, Léon XIII assigne aux collaborateurs une somme totale annuelle de 10.000,00 L[120] et le 19 mai 1883 ils reçoivent l'autorisation exceptionnelle de pouvoir sortir les manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Vaticane.[121]

En septembre 1883, arrivent les pères Van Dyck et Weiss mais ce dernier repart pour l'Allemagne le 17 juin[122]; alors que le 13 de ce

117 Ici encore nous exploitons les notes du père Mackey.

118 "Questa è l'unica volta che i collaboratori sono stato ricevuto dal Sto Padre" écrit le père Mackey.

119 "Die 27 Ianuarii 1883 Sanctissimus Dominus Noster Leo PP. XIII, preces benigne excipiens infrascripti Patris Magistri Generalis Ordinis Praedicatorum, concedere dignatus est, ut Patres eiusdem Ordinis, qui operam suam praestant pro nova Editione Operum Doctoris Angelici Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, tamquam Lectorem in actu habeantur, adeoque juribus ac privilegiis Lectoribus actu legentibus a Legibus Ordinis concessis, gaudere possint et valeant. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque. Datum Romae in Conv. Nostro S. Mariae s. Minervam die et anno ut supra. Fr. Josephus Maria Larroca, Mag. Ordinis."

Il est clair que l'enjeu de telles faveurs était le recrutement de futurs éditeurs et la persévérance de ceux qui étaient déjà appliqués au travail. Il ne convenait pas que cette affectation spéciale les prive de privilèges dont ils auraient automatiquement bénéficié s'ils avaient suivis la carrière à laquelle les destinaient normalement leurs aptitudes.

120 Cette somme doit être versée par le procureur de la Propagande. En septembre 1883, pour la seule résidence à S. Chiara 33 sera conclu un contrat de 5.000,00 L par an mais dont seulement 4.000,00 seront à payer.

121 Note de Mgr Ciccolini, "Primo Custode della Bibl. Vaticana",du 19 mai 1883 au père Bianchi. Il transmet le texte d'une note qu'il a reçue de Mgr Boccali et dont voici la teneur: "Vaticano 17 maggio 1883. Nell'interesse dell'edizione che tanto Gli sta a cuore, il S. Padre permette che si estraggono dalla Biblioteca Vaticana i codici e libri di rara edizione che occorreranno ai Collaboratori Religiosi Dominicani per la ristampa delle Opere di S. Tommaso. Dispone però che si prendano tutte le necessarie cautele per la conservazione e restituzione dei codici e volumi estratti e principalmente quella che se ne renda garante il Rmo Proc. Generale P. Bianchi. — G. Boccali, Cam. Segr. Parta. di S.S."

122 D'après certaines lettres du père Albert Marie Weiss, de 1883 et 1884, il semble qu'il ait reçu l'ordre d'arriver à Rome avant l'été 1883, mais qu'à cause de publications en cours il ait reçu l'autorisation de n'arriver qu'au milieu d'octobre; en avril 1884, sa santé laisse à désirer. En tout cas, il paraît beaucoup plus préoccupé de ses publications personnelles que de tout autre travail. Notice du père A. M. Weiss, ASOP 17 (1925-1926) 603-614.

même mois, le tome II était terminé,[123] il sera présenté le 22 juin au pape par les cardinaux Simeoni, Zigliara, les pères Larroca et Bianchi, le cavaliere Melandri.[124] Le travail pour préparer le troisième volume commence immédiatement tandis que l'attention du pape ne faiblit pas: en août-septembre 1884, il forme le projet de transférer le collège des éditeurs à S.-Nicolas de Tolentino près du Collège arménien, mais ce projet n'aboutira pas; et le 13 septembre, Léon XIII témoigne à nouveau de sa faveur aux membres de la Léonine, toujours en leur reconnaissant au sein de leur Ordre des privilèges particuliers.[125] Enfin, le père Bianchi étant mort le 25 juin, il avait fallu lui nommer un remplaçant provisoire pour que soit assurée la continuité de la gestion financière[126] jusqu'à ce qu'il soit remplacé en septembre 1885 dans ses fonctions de délégué du Père Général sur la Léonine par le père Marcolin Cicognani, nouveau procureur général de l'Ordre dominicain.

Si la condition matérielle du collège des éditeurs semble alors satisfaisante, c'est leur petit nombre qui va, au moins pour une part, se trouver à l'origine de nouvelles et graves difficultés: en effet, si le père Huysman était venu rejoindre le groupe en septembre 1884, les pères Hoogland et Van Dyck étaient retournés en Hollande le 27 juillet 1885, et le groupe se trouve alors réduit, sous la présidence du père Frati, aux pères Suermondt, Lyttleton, Mackey et Huysman.

Le changement de programme et de méthode, 1886-1892.

La crise survenue en 1882 ne devait pas être la dernière qui affecterait la Commission léonine. Une nouvelle crise, extrêmement grave dans ses conséquences sur la qualité du travail, se déroula pendant une

123 "Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis ad codices manuscriptos exacta cura et studio Fratrum Ordinis Praedicatorum". L'édition utilise 23 mss, nous en connaissons maintenant 64, mais cette édition de 1883 a une réelle valeur critique.

124 Le cavaliere Melandri était chargé de la conduite de l'impression typographique des volumes à l'imprimerie de la Congrégation pour la Propagation de la Foi.

125 "In audientia diei 13 Sept. anni 1884 SS. D. N. Leo PP. XIII benigne annuens precibus infrascripti Magistri Ordinis PP. Praedicatorum, indulgere dignatus est ut anni quibus Religiosi sui Ordinis, qui tunc in praesenti tum in posterum adlaborabunt ad novam editionem Omnium Operum S. Doctoris Thomae Aquinatis ab Ipso SS. D. N. Leone PP. XIII injunctam Ejusdemque sumptibus munificentissime exaratam, iisdem computentur ac si in Ordine legissent, pro gradibus in eodem Ordine consequendis ad Magisterium inclusive dispensatis tum examine ad gradus, tum aliis conditionibus a Legibus Ordinis praescriptis. Contrariis non obstantibus quibuscumque. In quorum fidem etc. Romae die et anno ut supra. Fr. Josephus Maria Larroca, Mag. Ordinis."

126 Lettre du cardinal Zigliara au cardinal Simeoni du 28 juillet 1885: "Il Padre Pierotti, Parocco della Chiesa di S. Maria sopra Minerva, in Rome, continua a tenere, sotto la dipendenza del Padre Generale de' domenicani, l'amministrazione del danaro necessario ai collaboratori per la nuova edizione delle Opere di S. Tommaso, già affidatagli dall'ora defunto P. Bianchi. Quindi egli rimane autorizzato a riscuotere da Propaganda le solite quote semestrali. Bacio umilissimamente le mani all'E.V. Reverendissima, e con distintissima stima mi onoro di professarmi dell'Em. V. Revma Umilissimo Devotissimo Obedientissimo Servo suo fr. Tommaso Maria Zigliara."

bonne partie de l'année 1886. Les raisons de cette nouvelle crise sont en somme de même nature que celles qui sont à l'origine de la précédente: il s'agit encore de l'impatience des autorités devant la lenteur du travail accompli eu égard au coût très lourd de l'entreprise.

Les documents concernant cette crise de 1886 sont tout à fait explicites sur l'enjeu qui est mis en cause. Nous avons d'abord deux lettres du cardinal dominicain A. Bausa, maître du Sacré Palais. Elles visent à obtenir une accélération de la fabrication du tome III:[127]

> Vaticano. 4 Aprile 86. Padre Reverendissimo. Come le dici a voce, le ripeto che il Santo Padre m'incaricò di parlare energicamente, e efficacemente per la pronta consegna del volume di San Tommaso. Inutilmente ho parlato, e non so quello che io debba dire Martedì prossimo. Chiedere danaro, e non dare il lavoro è l'eccesso della follia. Ecciti I frati al lavoro, o rinunzino all'opera. Mi creda suo Devoto servo.
> Fr. A. Bausa.
>
> Vaticano, 6 Apr. 86. Molto Rdo Padre Maestro. Il Santo Padre mi ha interrogato sull'esito della missione affidatami. L'ho assicurato che la pubblicazione del volume di San Tommaso sarà accelerata. Ho parlato delle difficoltà incontrate, e della importanza accezionale di questo lavoro. Ho chiesto il suo consiglio, e mi ha esternato essere anche sua opinione che debbasi pubblicare la parte apocrifa. Io l'ho lasciato pienamente calmo, e benevolo. Vegga ella, Padre Maestro, di accelerare il lavoro, e mi tenga informato perchè io posso riferire a suo tempe al santo Padre, e impedirne i lamenti. Stia bene e mi creda suo Devoto Servo.
> Fr. A. Bausa.

Le 9 mai de la même année, Monsignore G. Boccali, secrétaire privé de Léon XIII, écrit à son tour au Maître de l'Ordre afin d'obtenir une accélération de la publication:[128]

> Reverendissimo Padre Generale. E' per espresso incarico ricevuto da Sua Santità che debbo rivolgermi alla Paternità Vostra Reverendissima e rinuovarle le piu vive premure affinchè tutta l'edizione abbia da procedere d'ora in poi senza troppo lunghi ritardi. Il S. Padre è dispiacente che nei vari anni gia trascorsi siasi pubblicato solo il 1° e il 2° tomo. Anche dall' estero sono giunte a Sua Santità lettere di personaggi che s'interessano dell' edizione e che ne hanno cominciato l'acquisto; nelle quale lettere unitamente al dispiacere del ritardo si esprime il

127 Bien que le père Mackey les suppose adressées toutes deux au père Frati, les en-tête semblent suggérer que la première est adressée au Maître de l'Ordre, le père Larroca, ou au procureur général, le père Cicognani; alors que la seconde est directement destinée au père Frati.

128 En bas de cette lettre, on peut lire une note du père Frati ainsi libellée: "Io non ho encora parlato della sospensione nè coi frati nè colle stamperia. fr. G. Frati. Verrò dimatina." Le père Frati aurait donc eu connaissance avec sept mois d'avance de la décision notifiée officiellement le 3 octobre.

Une annotation nous apprend que cette lettre a été reçue le 17 mai par le père Larroca.

desiderio di vedere pubblicati più sollecitemente gli altri volumi. In vista de tutto ciò voglia le Paternità Vostra Reverendissima dare le più efficaci disposizioni affinchè l'edizione sia condotta con quella maggiore speditezza che è compatibile colle diligente preparazione richiesta da publicazione di tal natura.

Conpinto l'incarico, non mi resta che presentare alla Paternità Vostra i sensi di distintissimo ossequio con cui mi è grato da professarmi, Della Paternità Vostra Reverendissima, Devotissimo servo.

Vaticano, 9 Maggio 1886 G. Boccali.

Le tome III dont il est question dans ces trois lettres sera terminé le 18 juin 1886[129] et le 28 juin l'équipe commence le travail pour préparer l'édition du Commentaire de S. Thomas sur le *De anima* d'Aristote. Mais la crise, déjà bien révélée par les documents cités ci-dessus, éclate de façon fracassante: Une lettre de Léon XIII est adressée aux cardinaux I. Simeoni et T. Zigliara, les deux survivants de la triade originelle. Portant officiellement la date du 3 octobre 1886, elle ordonne de renoncer au plan d'édition établi dès l'origine[130] et de s'attaquer immédiatement à la publication du texte des deux Sommes:[131]

Dilectis Filiis Nostris Joanni Simeoni, Thomae Zigliara, S.R.E. Cardinalibus

Leo PP. XIII

Dilecti Filii Nostri, salutem et apostolicam benedictionem. — Volumen tertium ex operibus sancti Thomae Aquinatis, quod novissimo tempore prodiit curis vestris in lucem, perspeximus laboriosa adornatum industria et exquisito iudicio, prorsus ut non minoris esse pretii quam duo illa priora videatur. Qua de re meritas debitasque laudes libenti animo tribuimus tum vobis, tum iis ex Ordine Dominicano sodalibus, qui in eodem incepto constanter non minus quam scienter vobiscum elaborant: ac simul confidimus, non de futurum vobis illud vehementer optabile maximeque dignum doctis laboribus praemium, sapientum approbationem. Porro accurandae editionis rationem, quam instituistis, institutam intelligenter esse, res loquitur ipsa: conficiendoque operi, quod habetis in manibus, consentaneum est tantum vos sumere temporis, quantum necesse intellexeritis esse.

129 "Commentaria in libros Aristotelis De caelo et mundo, De generatione et corruptione et Meteorologicorum ad codices manuscriptos exacta cura et studio Fratrum Ordinis Praedicatorum." Le regret du pape que ne soient pas publiées les parties des commentaires qui ne sont pas de S. Thomas (voir la lettre du 6 avril 1886) explique sans doute que l'édition de ces parties apocryphes figure dans le tome III comme un ajout raccroché après coup et insérées après les index, voir tome III, pp. i-cxlviii. Pour le *In De Caelo*, 11 mss sont utilisés, nous en connaissons 38; pour le *In De generatione*..., 3 mss utilisés, 4 sont connus maintenant. Pour le *In Meteor.*, 2 mss seulement sont utilisés, nous en connaissons maintenant 11, dont 6 donnent 3 leçons inédites, voir A. Dondaine et L. J. Bataillon dans AFP 36 (1966) 81-152. Cependant ce troisième tome, comme le précédent, a lui aussi une bonne tenue critique.

130 Ce plan avait été exposé par le cardinal Zigliara dans le premier volume, voir Edition léonine, t. I, p. xxxviii.

131 Cette lettre "Volumen tertium" a été publiée en tête du tome IV, pp. vii-viii.

Verumtamen inter ceterorum voluminum apparatum, cui longior est opera necessaria, valde cupimus ut utriusque Summae editio maturetur. Quod fieri celerius videtur posse, quia sunt illa quidem ex operibus sancti Thomae maxime cognita et saepenumero formis litterarum impressa, et multis eruditorum virorum laboribus explanata. Ex altera parte cogitatione permovemur assidui usus: nam quicumque in philosophia theologiaque serio versantur et aliquid volunt dignum iis disciplinis attingere, nihil habere solent utraque Summa familiarius. Itaque quanto citius illas nitide et emendate, quod est diligentiae facultatisque vestrae, publicaveritis, tanto magis utilitatem properabitis iis omnibus qui eiusmodi studiorum dediti sunt generi. Nobis autem tam gratum feceritis, quam quod maxime: neque enim estis nescii quam vehementer et quibus de causis optemus ut sapienter Angelici Doctoris late propagetur. Quamobrem voluntati ingenioque vestro rem omnem commendamus: interea que auspicem caelestium donorum et paternae benevolentiae Nostrae testem vobis et adiutoribus vestris apostolicam benedictionem peramanter in Domino impertimus.

Datum Romae apud S. Petrum die III Octobris An. MDCCCLXXXVI. Pontificatus Nostri Nono

Leo P. P. XIII

On remarquera que, dans cette lettre, comme dans la lettre de Mgr Boccali, la dernière phrase du premier paragraphe laisse les artisans de l'édition juges des délais d'élaboration, mais leur interdit d'aller au-delà du minimum indispensable.

La portée de la décision pontificale révèle ses véritables dimensions avec une note du 3 septembre 1886 remise au père Frati par le père Marcolin Cicognani, procureur général des Dominicains. Cette note oblige les éditeurs à renoncer à tout souci proprement critique puisqu'ils doivent reproduire le texte de la Piana, tout en tenant compte éventuellement de quatre éditions plus récentes, et se contenter d'indiquer en note et sans explication critique les variantes contenues dans les seuls manuscrits du Vatican. En outre, c'est le cardinal Zigliara et lui seul qui pourra en cas d'absolue nécessité décider de s'écarter du texte de la Piana. De telles directives contredisent radicalement les vues initiales du pape Léon XIII. Elles ruinent avec tant d'évidence tout espoir de faire une édition ayant quelque valeur au plan de la critique textuelle qu'il n'y a pas lieu d'y insister.[132] Mais il nous fallait donner la

132 "Metodo da tenersi nello stampare la Somma teologica di S. Tommaso ed i commenti del Gaetano.

1°. Per la Somma di S. Tommaso servirà da testo la Piana, tenerdo conto dell'edizioni del Donato, de' Teologi di Lovanio et dell'edizione di Padova, ossia dell'edizione del De Rubeis, che riassume le tre predette.

2°. Le varianti de' codici vaticani si metteranno tutte quante *ut jacent*, cioè senza osservazioni alcune, in nota a piè dell'articolo di S. Tommaso prima de'commentarii del Gaetano. Quivi pure si noterà la lezione Piana, quando questa sarà evidentemente erronea. Questi cambiamenti però della Piana saranno fatti esclusivamente da S. E. il Cardinal Zigliara.

teneur exacte de cette note pour expliquer la facture des tomes qui allaient être publiés après une telle crise. Ajoutons que la mutation imposée par l'autorité s'accompagne de nouvelles dispositions financières mais leur détail ne nous est pas connu.[133]

Après l'intervention du pape que nous venons de rappeler et pour plus de cinq années, aucun évènement capital ne vint bouleverser la structure de la Commission léonine, ni le travail engagé par décision supérieure sur un nouvel objet et en suivant de nouvelles méthodes, elles aussi imposées d'en haut. On ne reviendra pas ici sur le dommage qui en résulta pour l'édition au point de vue de la qualité scientifique des volumes produits. On sait que le responsable technique avec la ténacité qui caractérise les hommes de sa race, s'efforcera de faire peu à peu éclater le carcan dans lequel l'autorité avait cru pouvoir contenir l'effort de recherche et de réflexion critiques.[134]

Il faut bien reconnaître que l'intervention pontificale fut extrêmement efficace au plan qui intéressait par dessus tout le Souverain Pontife: la rapidité de la production. Dès décembre 1886, c'est-à-dire moins de trois mois après la décision du pape, on commence à imprimer les premières pages du tome IV, le premier de la *Somme de théologie.*[135] Le 21 juillet 1887, le travail pour préparer l'édition des 43 premières

3°. Quanto a citazioni di autori si starà a quelle di S. Tommaso *ut jacent* nell'articolo; le citazioni poi particolareggiate degli editori saranno quelle della Piana *ut jacent*; e cosi pure quanto ai dubbii di Pietro da Bergamo. — Si numereranno gli' articoli progressivamente come nella prima Parte della Piana.

4°. Riguardo al Commentario del Gaetano, se si potrà trovare un'edizione più antica e più corretta della Piana, si stamperà quella; altrimenti si stamperà la Piana *ut iacet*, passando oltre in ogni caso e non fermandosi punto sopra errori anche manifesti; e cosi anche per le divisioni de' Paragrafi.

5°. L'indice della Somma si stamperà in fine di tutta la stessa Somma. L'indice del Gaetano si stamperà come sta nella Piana, alla fine però di ciascuna parte."

On notera la multiplication de la formule "ut jacet" ou de ses équivalents. On pourrait penser que le vrai problème est totalement absent de l'horizon intellectuel des autorités, puisque le titre même de cette note indique que l'on envisage l'impression (typographique) de la Somme de théologie et non l'édition au sens de travail pour établir le texte; mais il est à remarquer que d'autres documents antérieurs parlent aussi d'impression des œuvres de S. Thomas au lieu de parler d'édition au sens complet du mot, il ne faut donc pas trop serrer de près les significations.

133 Le père Mackey mentionne le fait sans l'expliquer, mais la première lettre du cardinal Baussa, du 4 avril 1886, montre bien l'incidence des questions financières sur l'affaire.

134 Bien avant les commentaires donnés par son neveu, voir articles du père Clément Suermondt signalés ci-dessus n. 8, le père Constant Suermondt, avec une discrétion adaptée à chaque fois aux circonstances du moment, s'est lui-même expliqué très clairement à plusieurs reprises: tout d'abord dès le t. IV, Préface p. xiii; puis dans le t. VIII, p. xi; enfin dans le t. XI, p. xii b *in situ* mais dont les phrases essentielles ont été récemment citées par A. Brounts, "Nouvelles précisions sur 'pecia'. A propos de l'édition léonine du commentaire de Thomas d'Aquin sur l'*Ethique* d'Aristote", *Scriptorium* 24 (1970) 343-359, voir les notes 7 et 10 des pp. 344-345 où il est précisément question de la crise de 1886.

135 "Pars Prima Summae Theologiae a Quaestione I ad Quaestionem XLIX ad codices manuscriptos vaticanos exacta cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani Ord. Praed. S. R. E. cura et studio fratrum eiusdem Ordinis."

questions de la Somme (*De Deo uno*) était achevé, c'est-à-dire presque tout le texte de ce tome IV dont la préparation fût pleinement terminée le 22 décembre 1887, l'impression finie et la présentation au pape faite en 1888. Commencé au début de 1888, le travail sur le tome V est achevé le 10 juillet 1889. On commence à travailleur sur le tome VI en septembre 1889, à l'imprimer en février 1890, il est achevé le 9 janvier 1891. Quant au tome VII, on commence à l'imprimer en mars 1889 et il sera achevé en 1892, c'est le quatrième de la *Somme de théologie.*

Pendant ce temps au plan des personnes, à part la promotion du père Lyttleton comme maître en théologie le 31 décembre 1888, il n'y a à signaler que la nomination du père Frati, le premier président du Collège des éditeurs, au poste de Secrétaire de l'Index en mai 1889.[136] Il restera nominalement président jusqu'à sa mort survenue le 6 juillet 1894 mais sa collaboration au travail cesse avant la fin de 1889 et d'ailleurs il partira définitivement du groupe en mai 1893. A partir de mai 1889, il n'y a donc plus que quatre religieux: Suermondt, Lyttleton, Mackey et Huysman, travaillant sous la responsabilité théorique du cardinal Zigliara.

Le transfert à l'Ordre, 1892-1894.

C'est en 1892-1893 que l'entreprise d'édition des œuvres de S. Thomas d'Aquin connut sa mutation administrative la plus importante depuis sa fondation par Léon XIII en 1879-1880. Cette mutation consista en un transfert de la responsabilité totale de l'entreprise: officiellement dirigée depuis 1880 par une commission cardinalice de trois membres mais pratiquement sous la responsabilité du seul cardinal Thomas Zigliara, qui en 1892 était d'ailleurs l'unique survivant de la triade initiale, l'édition léonine fut totalement prise en charge par l'Ordre dominicain et passa donc sous la responsabilité du Maître de l'Ordre. L'initiative de cette mutation administrative semble avoir été prise par le cardinal Zigliara. En effet, sous la présidence du père André Frühwirth, nouveau Maître de l'Ordre ayant pris possession de sa charge le 31 octobre 1891, le conseil géneralice des Dominicains délibère le 4 avril 1892 sur une proposition du cardinal Zigliara au Maître de l'Ordre. Voici le compte-rendu de cette délibération:

> Praeside Rmo Ordinis Magistro, adstantibus Rmo P. Fr. Marcolino Cicognani, Procuratore Generali, et A A. RR. PP. Magistris et Sociis, Alberto Lepidi, Josepho Dominico Martinez, Dominico Maria Scheer et Ceslao Ruby exposita et discussa sunt sequentia: En tribus Emis S. R.

136 On peut noter également le décès du Maître de l'Ordre, le père Larroca, le 8 juin 1891.

Ecclesiae Cardinalibus, quos SS. D. N. Leo Papa XIII, per motum proprium die 18. Januarii 1880 praefecerat curandae novae editioni operum D. Thomae Aquinatis, defunctis jam duobus, unus superstes est Emus Cardinalis Thomas Zigliara, qui pluribus ex causis in hoc consilium devenit, ut, cum venia et assensu Romani Pontificis, incepta editio curis Alumnorum Ordinis Praedicatorum, sub ductu Rmi Magistri Generalis, deinceps continuaretur, ac Deo dante, perficeretur. Hujus tamen consilii, priusquam ad SS. D. N. Leonem XIII. deferretur, Emus Cardinalis participem fecit Rmum Ordinis Magistrum, ab eo inquirens, utrum, quatenus Sanctitas Sua hanc propositionem ratam haberet, ipse Rmus Magister Generalis, nomine Ordinis, onus et officium illam exequendi vellet acceptare.

Censuit autem Rmus Ordinis Magister, in negotio tanti momenti, priusquam firmum responsum daret, exquirenda esse vota graviorum Patrum. Praemissa igitur matura deliberatione, unanimi voto, per secreta suffragia, statuerunt:

Licet res, de qua agitur, ardua nobis futura sit et laboribus plena, operam Ordinis non esse in casu denegandam, dummodo opportunis mediis et provisionibus postea determinandis, Ordo eximatur et immunis maneat ab expensis et sumptibus occasione susceptae editionis faciendis.

Ita est.

Dès le lendemain, le 5 avril 1892, le Maître de l'Ordre informe le cardinal Zigliara en lui communiquant copie du compte rendu de la décision prise par le conseil généralice "intorno alla continuazione della stampa delle opere di S. Tommaso". Comme on le voit par cette dernière formule et par le texte même du compte rendu reproduit plus haut, l'attention est encore surtout portée sur l'impression des volumes et les frais ou dépenses occasionnées par le travail typographique. Les questions de paléographie et de critique textuelle ne sont même pas envisagées, donc a fortiori sont passées sous silence les exigences scientifiques minimales pour que l'entreprise puisse se poursuivre dans des conditions acceptables. Or, à cette date, il n'y a plus que quatre religieux pour constituer l'équipe de travail. On peut s'étonner de ce silence sur ce que l'on juge peut-être essentiel, mais on trouvera normal que les incidences financières du projet de transfert administratif n'aient pas été négligées[137] et que les Dominicains n'aient pas voulu

137 A titre de compléments des renseignements donnés ici dans d'autres notes, voir ci-dessous n. 143, mais aussi afin de dissiper certains racontars sur un prétendu "trésor de la Léonine", il paraît bon de donner quelques indications sur les aspects financiers de l'entreprise léonine. Les documents manquent pour reconstruire une comptabilité détaillée qui serait d'ailleurs fastidieuse. Voici quelques exemples empruntés aux notes du père Mackey, ils révèlent des ordres de grandeur:

Considérons d'abord les dépenses. L'impression des sept premiers tomes de l'Edition a coûté 142.009,41 L (I: 32.732,89; II: 17.193,31; III: 23.088,81; IV: 18.840,90; V: 25.531,08; VI: 16.164,85; VII: 12.907,40). Pendant ce même laps de temps, il a fallu dépenser au moins 150.000,00 L en

s'engager sans recevoir à ce plan de sérieuses assurances.[138]

En fait, l'opération de transfert des responsabilités et l'opération corrélative de transmission des fonds destinés à assurer le fonctionnement de l'entreprise se sont effectuées par des étapes successives dont voici les stades essentiels: En juillet 1892, se déroule une première opération complexe de liquidation de comptabilités diverses et de transmission de fonds.[139]

dépenses techniques complémentaires des frais d'impression proprement dits, il est vrai qu'il faut inclure dans ce dernier chiffre les dépenses faites en 1880 pour l'achat d'une machine typo et de caractères d'imprimerie, soit 50.000,00 L dont on peut penser qu'il n'y aurait pas lieu de les renouveler de sitôt. A ces dépenses touchant de près ou de loin l'impression, se sont naturellement ajoutés les frais d'entretien des membres du collège des éditeurs, car leur travail à plein temps pour l'Edition ne leur permettait pas des activités apostoliques rapportant des honoraires, à l'exception naturellement des messes quotidiennes célébrées par chacun d'eux. Nous savons par exemple que les dépenses de pension et de vie courante pour les membres du collège des éditeurs se sont élevées à 72.258,78 L de février 1880 à juillet 1886 (pour cette période on compte 10.884,54 L de "vestiaire, blanchissage, poste, café, sucre et tabac", mais nous ne savons si cette somme est incluse ou non dans celle indiquée précédemment).

Comme le pape s'y était engagé, voir ci-dessus n. 5, toutes ces dépenses ont été pour l'essentiel couvertes par le Saint-Siège. Ainsi, pour l'entretien des religieux entre février 1880 et juillet 1886, le pape donne 19.000,00 L et la Congrégation pour la Propagation de la Foi 43.000,00 L, cette dernière somme représentant sans doute le total de versements successifs effectués en application de la décision pontificale du 20 mars 1883 assignant chaque année pour les collaborateurs de la Léonine un total de 10.000,00 L que devait verser le procureur de la dite Congrégation, voir ici n. 120. Dans la même période de février 1880 à juillet, il y a une rentrée totale de 11.227,04 L en intentions de messes, etc. De leur côté, les dépenses typographiques et annexes devaient être assurées par le revenu d'un capital de 300.000,00 L versé par le pape en 1880, voir ci-dessus n. 5, et géré par le cardinal Simeoni et Mgr Jacobini. Nous savons que ce capital était placé pour moitié à Banco di Roma, avec un revenu de 5%, et pour l'autre moitié à Banco Guerrini. En fait le revenu était certainement inférieur à la dépense typographique, en dépit du profit résultant de la vente des ouvrages de 1882 à 1893, puisqu'en 1884 le pape donne 10.000,00 L pour l'impression du deuxième volume.

138 Nous ne savons si ce sont les difficultés financières, ou certaines incidences du processus de transfert engagé de fait avant avril 1892 par le cardinal Zigliara, qui expliquent la note suivante du père Mackey pour le mois de mars 1892:

"Ora passano due anni interi senza che sia permesso di riprendere la stampa, cioè sino a Marzo 1894. Intanto si fa qualche preparazione." On constate en tout cas que le travail typographique pour le t. VIII ne commença en effet qu'en mars 1894; après une interruption à cause d'un désaccord sur le papier, il s'acheva le 14 mai 1895 sauf pour ce qui concerne la préface.

139 Le 15 juillet 1892, le cardinal Zigliara verse au père Frühwirth 8.000,00 L pour l'édiition Léonine. Le 25 juillet 1892, le compte géré par le cardinal Simeoni et Mgr Jacobini est fermé: 81.691,80 L de capital sont transmis à Mgr Mario Mocenni, secrétaire de la commission cardinalice pour l'administration des biens du Saint-Siège; 1.601,80 L représentant le revenu produit par le capital précédent sont remis au cardinal Zigliara qui les transmet le 27 juillet au père Frühwirth.

D'autre part, une décision du 2 septembre 1892 ordonne le transfert des fonds gérés par le cardinal Simeoni, fonds prévus pour l'impression et les dépenses adjacentes, au même Mgr Mocenni. C'est cette décision qui nous révèle ce qui reste du capital de 300.000,00 L constitué à l'origine par Léon XIII: il subsiste alors 21.736,80 L à Banco di Roma et 80.090 à Banco Guerrini, soit au total 101.826,00 L. Mais le document précise "Il fruttato di questo fondo che verrà aumentato da Sua Santità per far fronte alle spese per la continuazione della sudetta edizione dovrà passarsi d'ora innanzi, per ordine della stessa Santità Sua al padre Generale dell' Ordine de'

Le processus reprend un an après, alors que le cardinal Zigliara était mort le 10 mai 1893. Le procureur général des Dominicains fait le 11 novembre 1893 un rapport sur l'affaire du transfert. Le 4 octobre, le pape Léon XIII adresse une lettre apostolique au Père Général de l'Ordre par laquelle se trouve transférée au Maître Général des Dominicains la mission qui avait été confiée en 1879 aux trois cardinaux.[140] Cette décision ne va pas sans soulever de graves inquiétudes mais cette fois encore on ne considère que les incidences financières de l'affaire;[141] il ne semble pas que d'autres problèmes aient été soulevés. Quoi qu'il en soit, la décision du pape est mise en application: le secrétaire de la commission pour l'administration des biens du Saint Siège transfére au Maître de l'Ordre l'administration financière[142] et les

Predicatori. Si prega la S.V. (i. e. Mgr Mario Mocenni) ad accusare ricevuta di questa consegna al sottoscritto." Au même moment, juillet 1892, avait eu lieu la liquidation des comptes typographiques à la Propagande et de la gérance du cavaliere Melandri qui en avait été chargé et qui reste débiteur de 5.000,00 L envers la Léonine, note le père Mackey. Enfin, le 2 septembre 1892, une lettre de Mgr Mocenni informe l'Ordre dominicain qu'il y a en banque 101.826,80 L et que les intérêts de ce fonds seront versés tous les six mois au Maître de l'Ordre "per far fronte alle spese per la continuazione della suddetta edizione."

140 Voici le texte, que l'on trouve dans l'Edition léonine, t. VIII, pp. vii-viii:

"Quum certa Nobis spes esset fructus uberrimi qui promanaret ad studia provehenda rerum divinarum solidaeque philosophiae, si nova accuraretur editio operum S. Thomae Aquinatis, partibus omnibus expleta, eo appulimus animum ab ipsis Nostri Pontificatus exordiis. Atque hoc cogitatum Nostrum litteris explicavimus quas idibus Octobris anno MDCCCLXXIX dedimus ad clarae memoriae Virum Cardinalem Antoninum de Luca Praefectum Sacro Consilio Studiis disciplinarum regundis. Ibi et illud adiecimus, placuisse Nobis ut ea ederentur opera cum probatissimis interpretum illorum commentariis. Tum pressius rem urgentes anno subinde insequto a.d. XV Kalendas Februarias, per alias litteras Nostras motu proprio datas huic editioni curandae praefecimus memoratum Cardinalem de Luca, aliosque duos ex eodem Sacro Collegio delectos Viros, Ioannem Simeoni et Thomam Zigliara, quibus ius potestatemque fecimus statuendi Nostro nomine quidquid ad eam rem pertinere intelligerent. Nec segniter illi manus rei gerendae admoverunt, et septem quae jam prodiere volumina dilucide studium demonstrant quo illi contenderint Nostris obtemperare mandatis. Quum vero mors eos praeripuerit, opere nondum absoluto, hujus incepti persequendi perficiendique munus Dominiciano Ordini, cui praes, mandare decrevimus. Tanta est enim in eius alumnis peritia doctrinarum quas summus ille Magister christianae sapientiae tradidit, tanta eorum studia in Illum, cuius nomine ordo universus honestatur mirifice, ut efficiatur. Viris itaque a Te, Dilecte Fili, ex religiosa Familia tua eligendis eam curam demandamus, eosque volumus iis uti praesidiis quae in praedictis Litteris nostris a.d. XV Kalendas Februarias datis anno MDCCCLXXX significavimus, operique sui perfunctionem ad eas normas exigere quas a tribus quos diximus S. R. E. Cardinalibus rereperint constitutas. Laeta interim spe erecti operi progresso favorem non defore opemque Divinam quae benigne aggredientibus adfuit, Apostolicam Benedictionem paternae caritatis testem Tibi, Dilecte Fili, et Ordini universo cui praesides peramanter impertimus."

141 Recopiant une lettre du père Cicognani au Maître de l'Ordre, du 22 octobre 1893, le père Mackey note "Si trattava della questione finanziaria." Voici cette note:

"...L'affare dell'edizione delle Opere di San Tommaso, come giace al presente, sarebbe un onere insopportabile per l'Ordine. Al momento, Rmo Padre, non ho che adoperarmi per avere mezzi da mantenere i Padri, e battere, battere forte per ottenere un fondo o un assegno sicuro dal S. Padre..."

142 Le 26 octobre 1893, le directeur de la typographie de la Propagande informe le père Cicognani, procureur général des Dominicains, que de 1880 jusqu'au milieu de l'année 1893 la vente a produit 93.239,15 L.

Chaque tome était tiré en trois qualités différentes, à raison de 500 ex. pour la 1re, 500 ex. la 2e et

fonds concernant l'édition léonine.[143] Enfin, toujours comme conséquence de la décision pontificale, le 8 janvier 1894, l'équipe de Dominicains travaillant à l'édition quitte l'Académie pour retourner s'installer à l'Ospizio de la Minerve. C'est d'ailleurs une équipe bien réduite qui rejoint cette maison dominicaine: il ne reste plus que trois Léonins, Le P. Huysman ayant regagné la Hollande le 20 juin 1892.[144]

En continuité avec la commission primitive mais sous un statut administratif tout différent,[145] une nouvelle commission pauvre en nombre d'hommes et également en ressources financières allait courageusement poursuivre l'entreprise.

Epilogue.

Le déménagement de l'équipe léonine quittant les locaux de l'Académie Pontificale des nobles ecclésiastiques, le 8 janvier 1894, pour aller s'installer dans des bâtiments réguliers au milieu d'une communauté dominicaine canonique est le dernier acte, mais que l'on peut considérer comme particulièrement symbolique, du long processus qui fit passer la Commission léonine du statut de groupe de trois cardinaux, ou plus réellement d'un cardinal directeur, dirigeant une équipe de travail, à celui d'un groupe structuré de religieux travaillant sous la responsabilité des autorités supérieures de leur Ordre. Ce processus était sans doute inéluctable: la responsabilité passe d'un homme responsable à une institution, par là est assurée la pérennité de l'entreprise mais au risque de la dévitaliser et de la fonctionnariser. En tout cas, il

1.000 la 3e. Voici quelques-uns des prix de vente à cette époque: t. II, 10,69-8,15-7.09; t. IV, 11,50-9,00-7,90; t. V, 12,88-10,08-8,81; t. VII, 7,95-6,15-5,35.

143 D'après le père Mackey, le père Cicognani aurait reçu nominalement, c'est-à-dire fictivement, une somme de 100.000,00 L. Cette dernière précision paraît très vraisemblable à qui fait l'effort de combiner ensemble les chiffres cités ci-dessus nn. 105, 120, 137, 139 et 142, afin de reconstruire approximativement le bilan financier de l'affaire pour les treize premières années de son administration. Il est possible que les 80.000,00 L dont on ne trouve pas trace de transmission représentent la valeur estimée alors du stock des volumes imprimés à l'Ordre. Ce stock devait être assez considérable puisque les volumes étaient tirés à 2.000 exemplaires et que les ventes avaient été les suivantes: t. I, imprimé en 1882, 610 ex. vendus en juin 1885 et 814 au total à la fin de 1888; t. II, imprimé en 1884, 493 ex. vendus en juin 1885 et 734 au total fin 1888; t. III, imprimé en 1884, 547 ex. vendus à la fin de 1888.

144 Le promotion du père Mackey à la maîtrise en théologie en juin 1892 ne pouvait malheureusement pas tenir lieu d'un renforcement de l'équipe en travailleurs.

145 Désormais c'est le Maître de l'Ordre qui passe contrat avec la Propagande pour l'impression: le nouveau contrat est conclu le 15 février 1894 et il sera modifié le 12 décembre 1894. Pour l'essentiel, le statut administratif de la Commission dominicaine pour l'édition des œuvres de S. Thomas n'a plus connu de nouvelles mutations jusqu'à maintenant, exceptées la mise à sa disposition de ressources nouvelles purement locales au Canada pour la section d'Ottawa créée après le chapitre général des Dominicains de 1949, et la création de la Saint Thomas Aquinas Foundation qui soutient financièrement toutes les autres sections depuis 1964.

semble bien qu'à toutes les étapes de ce processus le grand projet de Léon XIII se soit heurté aux mêmes difficultés: tension entre l'autorité qui désire une production rapide et les techniciens au travail qui veulent produire un travail de qualité, difficulté permanente pour avoir une équipe assez nombreuse et assez qualifiée, enfin problèmes financiers insolubles sinon par des expédients. L'histoire ultérieure de la Commission léonine devait bien montrer qu'aucune de ces difficultés ne se trouvait éliminée par l'établissement complet et définitif dans un nouveau statut administratif et un nouveau style de vie quotidienne.

Célébrant le septième centenaire de S. Thomas en commémorant à retardement les quatre-vingt-dix ans de l'Edition léonine et de son équipe d'éditeurs, nous espérons avoir choisi une voie qui ajoute quelques bribes à la documentation déjà mise à la disposition des historiens de métier, leur permettant par là de mieux situer dans leur contexte et dans leurs détails certains actes de Léon XIII et de son entourage. Nous formons en outre le voeu que cette publication de certains documents extraits des archives de la Commission léonine, à vrai dire d'intérêt historique limité, incite au moins les responsables d'autres archives ou dépôts de documents à révéler les trésors qui dorment peut-être dans leurs casiers, ou en tout cas à signaler leur existence. Telle pièce en apparence insignifiante prend en effet beaucoup plus d'intérêt une fois remise dans son contexte et rapprochée éventuellement d'autres pièces conservées ailleurs mais relevant du même ensemble historique.

Mais nous n'avons pas écrit seulement pour les historiens et archivistes, nous osons penser que notre travail permettra à tous de mieux mesurer le travail considérable et les mérites des premiers ouvriers et chefs d'équipe de l'entreprise d'édition critique des œuvres de S. Thomas. Il nous a paru que c'était pour le responsable actuel de cette édition un devoir de tirer les devanciers de l'oubli où les enfonce inexorablement le cours du temps et de leur rendre un hommage qui leur a parfois été mesuré bien chichement, sinon même refusé avec beaucoup d'injustice. Ceci tenant surtout, nous l'espérons, à une ignorance des véritables conditions dans lequelles les premiers léonins avaient dû travailler pendant de longues années, tout en étant contraints précisément, pour sauver l'avenir, de rester discrets sur ces conditions imposées par l'autorité.

Nous sommes en outre tout à fait convaincu que les difficultés et contradictions qui ont affecté, même avant sa naissance mais ensuite tout au long de son développement, l'entreprise léonine d'une nouvelle édition des *Opera omnia* de S. Thomas ne sont pas purement fortuites.

Bien au contraire, à la lumière des développements qui se sont produits ultérieurement, ces difficultés et contradictions paraissent bien substantiellement liées à la nature d'un tel projet; on doit donc toujours les considérer comme imminentes. Une étude consacrée à ces épisodes déjà anciens mériterait donc de retenir aussi l'attention de ceux qui se soucient peu du passé comme tel mais qui ont des responsabilités sur le présent et l'avenir de l'édition critique de S. Thomas. Peut-être même, par analogie, une telle étude pourrait-elle être instructive pour tous les directeurs d'entreprises de même type. Il est vrai qu'il est peut-être naïf d'espérer que les leçons d'un passé même à peine centenaire pourraient être mises à profit par ceux qui aujourd'hui construisent le futur, tant il est clair qu'il est difficile d'échapper au fatal déterminisme en vertu duquel les mêmes causes produisent les mêmes effets. Et c'est bien pourquoi, en ce domaine de l'édition critique comme en tant d'autres qui entrent pourtant dans le champ de la liberté humaine, on voit d'époque en époque se reproduire les mêmes erreurs et se propager les mêmes illusions. Mais, corrélativement, on voit aussi se déployer, dans ce même domaine, des efforts patients et une ténacité qui, envers et contre tout, assurent quand même la continuité du projet.[146]

146 Au terme de ces pages, il est juste que j'exprime ma gratitude au père A. Dondaine qui m'a signalé l'existence des dossiers des archives léonines exploités ici, aux membres de la section du Saulchoir de la Léonine qui ont bien voulu lire son manuscrit et me communiquer leurs remarques, à H. Shooner qui a mis toute son expérience de paléographe à mon service pour le déchiffrement de certains documents qui pour n'être pas médiévaux n'en étaient pas moins difficiles à lire, au père A. Duval, archiviste de la Province de France (Paris) de l'Ordre dominicain, pour ses renseignements et remarques, à Madame Yannick Joubert enfin pour les dactylographies de très nombreux textes cités ici.

VII

ST. THOMAS IN THE 20TH CENTURY

CRÉATION ET HISTOIRE

M. D. Chenu O.P.

CE n'est pas seulement dans la commune sensibilité du peuple chrétien que la création est exprimée par des images et représentations étrangères à l'histoire; les énoncés métaphysiques eux-mêmes ne sont pas sans prêter à une interprétation de la création — soit l'acte créateur, du côté de Dieu, soit la dépendance ontologique, du côté de la créature — comme en dehors du temps. Même à qui a su coordonner une vision évolutive du cosmos avec l'Absolu créateur, la création comme telle, à l'état pur, comme relation de Créateur à créature, n'est pas liée au temps. On sait avec quelle tenace assurance saint Thomas d'Aquin a enseigné, au grand scandale des *murmurantes*, qu'un "commencement" du monde n'est pas inclu dans l'intelligibilité de la création. L'histoire semble donc n'être qu'un élément adventice, si urgent soi-il de fait, à la conception de l'acte créateur. Ainsi se présente l'image de la transcendance, dans ce Dieu "éternel", en sa toute suffisance. N'est-ce pas déjà le faux dieu, immobile et muet, du déisme de Voltaire et de Sartre?

Sans céder à un superficiel concordisme avec le problème contemporain de l'historicité du monde et de l'homme, il est permis de repérer dans l'analyse des maîtres spéculatifs du moyen âge, en particulier de saint Thomas d'Aquin, les points d'appel à fonder dans la Création même la réalité *historique* de l'univers, l'origine *théologique* de l'histoire.[1]

FONDEMENT ANTHROPOLOGIQUE DE L'HISTOIRE

L'économie de la création ne peut être comprise sans l'homme, qui lui donne avec son accomplissement sa signification, terrestre et "céleste". Voici: l'homme, créé pour lui-même, mais aussi comme maître du monde et de son histoire, participe ainsi à la création. Il est partenaire

1 D'un bout à l'autre, référence sera faite aux chapitres de l'ouvrage de M. Seckler, *Das Heil in der Geschichte. Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin* (München 1964), trad. fr. *Le salut dans l'histoire* (Paris 1967), où il aborde ce problème. Ainsi répondrai-je, en communion de pensée, à la référence qu'il fait généreusement à ma propre reflexion, en particulier dans mon article "Situation humaine: corporalité et temporalité," 2e éd. dans *L'Evangile dans le temps* (Paris 1964), 411-436.

de Dieu dans la construction du monde. La réalisation de cette virtualité de l'homme implique corrélativement l'expérience de la réalité en tant qu'histoire. L'homme est impensable en dehors de l'histoire, en même temps qu'il confère à l'univers une dimension historique.

Ce n'est pas là caprice de Prakhriti. L'acte de créer implique dans sa "production" une "multiplication", une "distinction"[2]: c'est-à-dire que Dieu ne peut émaner "quelque chose" sans que ce soit, au sens originel du mot, un *univers*. En effet la raison de l'entreprise divine se trouve dans l'urgence d'un Amour qui éprouve le besoin — si l'on ose dire — de se communiquer à un autre, en lequel il mette sa complaisance, comme en une représentation à la fois autonome et immanente, puisque aucun être ne peut être hors de l'Etre ou en une quelconque addition. "Dieu créa l'homme à son image, à l'image de Dieu il le créa": telle est la densité rationnelle du texte religieux de la Genèse (1: 27).

Or qui dit représentation de Dieu se trouve devant l'inévitable multiplicité: Dieu ne peut être représenté suffisamment par une créature finie; la multiplication diversifiée des créatures est la suppléance de leur débilité. "Dieu a produit les choses dans l'être pour communiquer sa bonté aux créatures, et la représenter en elles. Et parce qu'elle ne peut être représentée efficacement par une seule créature, il a créé des choses multiples et diverses, de telle manière que ce qui manque à l'une pour représenter la divine bonté, soit suppléé par l'autre. Ainsi la bonté qui est en Dieu simple et unique, se trouve dans les créatures démultipliée et différenciée. En conséquence, c'est tout l'univers qui participe parfaitement la bonté de Dieu et la représente, plus qu'aucune créature".[3] Cette Unité, en puissance d'émanation, dans la conjonction de l'Un et du Bien, est la raison de la souveraineté du Créateur, pour laquelle Bonaventure crée le mot de *primitas*.[4]

Cette nécessité métaphysique est ressentie par certains mystiques, chrétiens ou non, comme une défaillance radicale, et par les néoplatoniciens comme l'origine d'une dispersion, d'une chute permanente, que l'incessante prolifération des êtres ne peut ressaisir.[5] La

2 "Productio" et "distinctio": c'est à partir de ces deux catégories que saint Thomas développe son traité de la création dans la *Somme*, I pars, qu. 47, et tous les chapitres 40 à 46 de la *Somme contre les Gentils*, livre II.

3 "Utrum rerum multitudo et distinctio sint a Deo", *Summa Theologiae* I, 47, 1. Cf. *Contra Gentiles* II, 45.

4 Cf. J. G. Bougerol, *Lexique de saint Bonaventure* (Paris 1969), s. v.

5 Analyse technique de cette admirable tentation, dans l'histoire de la pensée grecque et arabe, par saint Thomas, *De Potentia* 3, 16: "Utrum ab Uno primo possit procedere multitudo." Réponse: La perfection de chaque individu dans l'unité, n'est réalisable que dans un univers lui-même unifié: "Sicut Deus est unus, ita et unum produxit, non solum quia unumquodque in se est unum, sed etiam quia omnia quodammodo sunt unum perfectum, quae quidem unitas diversitatem partium requirit". Ibid. ad 1.

"dyade"—entendez la rupture première de l'Unité—est au principe de la détresse, de la malédiction originelle du monde.[6] Que l'homme soit ainsi livré au flux de l'histoire est le signe d'un irréparable échec à son unité. D'où la répugnance de certains théologiens à l'histoire, fût-ce l'histoire du salut.

Saint Thomas ne cède pas à cette interprétation pessimiste. L'entreprise est au contraire œuvre de "sagesse": réaliser l'émanation de son Etre dans une coordination de ces êtres finis, c'est "l'univers", qui est un *ordo*.

Au sommet de cet univers, de cette "hiérarchie", *ordo sacer* (Denys), l'homme en récapitule les "degrés", en être et en valeur, auxquels il imprime leur dynamisme ontologique, dans une articulation progressive de leurs niveaux. En lui, toutes les énergies, de la matière à l'esprit, accèdent à la conscience. L'homme humanise la nature. L'histoire est ainsi le lieu humain de la Création. Vision biblique du monde, sous son appareillage grec, et non vision antique.

Histoire et Sociabilité

De cette réalisation progressive de l'image de Dieu dans le monde, la constitution même de l'homme — ce "microcosme" — est effectivement le centre névralgique, là où la divinisation s'investit dans l'humanité, non seulement en ses individus éphémères, mais dans la continuité de l'*univers* — matière comprise — et de son histoire.

Car la multiplication, à ce haut niveau aussi, est dans la logique de l'entreprise créatrice. Certes les individus humains sont des "personnes", dignes d'amour comme telles, dans la communion de l'image de Dieu; elles sont voulues pour elles-mêmes, et la multiplication des personnes est une fin en soi. Cependant, chaque individu est radicalement insuffisant à réaliser sa nature en plénitude: l'homme n'est homme que dans la communauté de tous les hommes. C'est à ce point qu'il est, par nature, "social": articulation rigoureuse de l'individu et de l'espèce pour que soit réalisable, concrètement, la perfection. Ce n'est pas par une vague suppléance que la nature est assouvie par le génie de l'espèce, dans une prolifération permanente: l'intention de la nature rencontre le but de la Création, représentation durable du Créateur dans une réalité extra-divine. Le maintien biologique de l'espèce n'est

6 Entre tant d'expressions de ce grand thème néoplatonicien, banalisé au moyen âge, cf. le manuel du temps *Historia scolastica* de Pierre Comestor, Gen. c. 4; PL 198, 1059: "Binarius infamis numerus est in theologia, quia primus ab unitate recedit; Deus autem Unitas est, et sectionem et discordiam detestatur".

point la manifestation matérielle d'un éternel recommencement, dans des individus juxtaposés; il compose la trame d'une multiplication qui donne son sens à l'évolution temporelle. Le temps n'est plus seulement la succession ponctuelle d'instants physiques, nombre immanent du mouvement; il est la mesure intérieure d'une destinée, incluse en quelque manière dans le dessein éternel d'une providence transcendante, actualisée dans la conscience, personnelle et collective.

Or, pour saint Thomas, à l'encontre de ses contemporains qui le condamnèrent pour ce "matérialisme", cette genèse de l'histoire par l'articulation de l'espèce et de l'individu se fait par et dans la matière; la matière est le principe de l'individuation. L'homme ne devient une personne que dans un corps; son "incarnation" est à la fois le principe d'individualité, de sociabilité, d'historicité. L'ange n'a ni sociabilité ni histoire; il est stérile, dans sa suffisance. Parce qu'il n'est pas un pur esprit, mais un esprit qui s'anime dans la matière, l'homme n'est présent à lui-même qu'en sortant de soi. Il ne se voit dans sa réalité intérieure qu'en se tournant vers le monde des objets et des hommes. Il n'est personne que lorsqu'il est avec une autre personne; la conscience de soi est la conscience d'un soi-dans-le-monde, une conscience d'être avec les autres hommes. Ainsi la structure métaphysique de l'homme comporte une ouverture radicale à l'histoire et une dépendance de l'histoire. C'est donc dans le tissu social élémentaire que s'exerce historiquement l'acte créateur, si'il est vrai que l'homme est, par son corps, non seulement un être-dans-le-monde, mais un individu qui ne s'accomplit que par son ouverture à l'autre.[7]

Un certain personnalisme, tout centré sur l'intériorité, ne rend pas compte du devenir social, malgré l'exaltation des amours intersubjectifs. De fait, ce spiritualisme est insensible, en même temps qu'à la réalité de l'histoire et à son intérêt humain, à la dureté objective des rapports de justice sur lesquels la société structure ses droits. Le bien commun, dit au contraire saint Thomas, *divinius est* que la somme des libertés personnelles. "Bonum ordinis diversorum est melius quolibet illorum ordinatorum per se sumpto; est enim formale respectu singularium sicut perfectio totius respectu partium".[8]

La conception hylémorphique aristotélicienne, à laquelle recourt saint Thomas dans son anthropologie, radicalise à ce point, de manière imprévisible pour le Philosophe, l'historicité de l'homme. La densité du

7 Cf. K. Rahner, *Hörer des Wortes*, 2e ed. (München 1963), p. 147 ff. Ed. Schillebeckx, *Intelligence de la foi et interprétation de soi*, dans *Théologie d'aujourd'hui et de demain*. Congrès de Chicago, 1966 (Paris 1967), 122-125.

8 *Summa contra Gentiles* II, 45.

temps vécu se double de la densité des générations qui composent la société. L'histoire est, par définition, sociale. Histoire de l'homme, elle embraye sur l'histoire de la nature. Les instants du temps et les libertés des individus ne deviennent une histoire que par et dans une sociabilité des hommes qui vivent dans ce temps. L'histoire est le lieu humain de la Création.

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Ainsi mesurons-nous la double dimension de la Création, dans l'*ordo* qui manifeste son émanation, l'unité de son émanation. Les choses créées sont non seulement en relation avec l'Etre créateur (*ordo ad deum*), mais en relation entre elles (*ordo ad invicem*). Sans doute cette seconde articulation est-elle réductible à la première, puisqu'elle a pour raison d'être de conduire l'univers à sa fin, la représentation analogique de la perfection de l'Etre pur; mais elle a sa consistance propre. La perfection de l'univers est entièrement immanente au monde. "Post bonitatem divinam, quae est finis a rebus separatus, principale bonum *in ipsis rebus existens* est perfectio universi".[9] Cet *ordo rebus inditus* a un sens déchiffrable, sans détriment pour le sens transcendant, dans la réalité de Dieu dans l'au-delà, *bonum separatum*. Tel est précisément le "mystère" de la Création.

Tout ceci implique que, si la relation absolue et unique à Dieu forme l'horizon fondamental et co-conscient de nos multiples relations conscientes avec le monde et à l'intérieur de celles-ci, cette relation absolue entre dans la conscience qu'a l'homme de lui-même dans et par les relations relatives à nos semblables et au monde. Aussi ne pouvons-nous pas séparer cette relation absolue à Dieu de nos relations historiquement conditionnées et intramondaines, à ce monde et à ces semblables. Nous ne pouvons donc pas formaliser cette relation à Dieu et l'abstraire de la trame historique de notre existence.[10]

Un double courant anime ainsi la Création, l'un qui aimante directement chaque chose vers son Créateur ("Ad hoc unaquaeque res tendit ut participet ipsum, et assimiletur ei inquantum potest"[11]); l'autre qui

9 *Summa Theol.* I, 22, 3; et on ajoute: "...perfectio universi, quae quidem non esset si non omnes gradus essendi invenirentur in rebus". Une fois de plus, la Création implique démultiplication, dans l'unité hiérarchique de l'univers.

Cf. aussi *Summa Theol.* I, 103, 2, ad 3m: "Finis universi est aliquod bonum *in ipso existens*, scilicet *ordo* ipsius universi."

10 Cf. Ed. Schillebeckx, op. cit., p. 125, qui continue: "Par rapport à moi, Dieu, le Transcendant, n'a d'autre fondement que la contingence et la gratuité de mon existence historique".

11 *Summa Theol.* I, 103, 2.

ordonne les choses à la perfection de l'ensemble créé, dont elles sont des parties. L'infidelité au corps social en tant que tel, dans la construction de l'univers, au delà du contrat des individus et de la liberté des amours, est un échec à la Création, dont l'humanité est le démiurge.[12] Telle est la loi du "retour" vers Dieu, selon la dynamique même de l'émanation.

Fondement théologique de l'Histoire

Emanation-retour: c'est le grand thème néoplatonicien de l'*exitus*, qui vient donc ici sous-tendre l'intelligence de l'historicité de l'homme. A l'encontre d'une interprétation strictement aristotélicienne de la philosophie de saint Thomas, on a remis en place et en valeur, dans sa vision du monde, les éléments néoplatoniciens. Non seulement on a rendu leur fécondité aux sources vives que furent pour lui Denys et le *Liber de causis*, sans parler d'Avicenne, tous les deux commentés en pleine page, non seulement on a reconnu dans le plan de la *Somme théologique* l'architecture et le dynamisme de l'*exitus-reditus*, mais on a décelé dans le tissu même de la pensée de l'Aquinate des trames soutenues de métaphysique néoplatonicienne. Le traité de la création est le secteur le plus propice à ce discernement. L'opération est d'autant plus significative que ce recours au néoplatonisme pour fonder le dynamisme historique de la création, pour articuler temporalité et éternité, va à l'encontre de la logique idéaliste et essentialiste du système. Paradoxe d'autant plus vif que l'opération est menée en concurrence avec l'aristotélisme, étranger pour sa part à toute ouverture au créationnisme dans une divinité Acte pur. Ce paradoxe animait déjà la prétention de Boèce, dans son projet de faire concorder Platon et Aristote.

Il ne faudrait certes pas céder à une réaction inverse: la notion thomiste de création reste élaborée sur l'axe de l'être, et non sur une émanation à partir de l'Un, inaccessible au delà de la multiplicité des "idées", créatrices et créées à la fois, théophanies de cet Un qui, dans sa surexistentialité, ne peut être engagé dans une création des êtres, pas plus qu'il n'en peut être connu. *Superexaltata unitas* (Denys, *De divinis nominibus*, c. 5). Si plein de révérence soit-il pour Denys, saint Thomas se dégage de ce transcendantalisme absolu, et assure l'individualisation des relations des créatures à Dieu.

Denys cependant demeure présent, en sous-œuvre, pour écarter, comme incompatible avec la doctrine de l'Un, une représentation trop

12 Bonhoeffer dit aujourd'hui, dans son *Ethique*: "Il s'agit d'avoir part aujourd'hui à la réalité de Dieu et du monde, de telle manière que je n'éprouve jamais la réalité de Dieu sans celle du monde, et vice versa."

humaine de l'intelligence divine traitée comme le lieu des "idées", dans des déterminations et des multiplications produites par une activité idéologique. Il n'y a pas des "vérités éternelles", dont les réalités temporelles, dans l'univers et dans l'humanité, ne seraient qu'une projection sans consistance propre, tout étant déjà fait en Dieu. Les créatures préexistent en Dieu, mais leur idée n'est autre que l'essence créatrice. L'Un n'est aucunement une réserve d'essence. Il n'y a en Dieu aucune complexité, parce qu'il n'y a aucune référence réelle à ses créatures; leur connaissance, et avec elle, leur participabilité, est impliquée dans la connaissance que Dieu a de lui-même. Ainsi la relation de créature a ceci de déconcertant pour la logique humaine des relations, qu'elle est unilatérale, du seul côté de la créature. Dieu ne peut être relatif à un autre, car, si un autre est, il est en Dieu. La diversité et la multiplication, loi de l'émanation créatrice et de la perfection de l'univers, ne contredisent point l'Ab-solu du Créateur. La transcendance est dialectiquement la garantie de l'immanence. Ces deux dimensions de l'acte créateur composent, en même temps que la vérité de la nature, la densité de l'histoire. Parce que l'emprise créatrice est totale, *profundens totum esse*, elle n'entre pas en concurrence avec la créature: "impermixtio causae primae ad res alias".[13] La transcendance garantit, avec la pureté totale de l'acte créateur, l'auto-réalisation de l'être créé, qui dans l'homme accède à la conscience et à l'histoire.

On saisira mieux les ressources du néoplatonisme dionysien, sous les nécessaires rectifications que lui apporte saint Thomas, en le comparant au platonisme augustinien, alors excellemment exploité dans l'exemplarisme de saint Bonaventure. Autant Augustin, comme chrétien, est pénétré de l'immanence de Dieu dans la nature et dans l'histoire, personnelle et collective, autant il reste court, en instrumentation philosophique, dans son ontologie de l'immuable transcendance de l'Essence, pour rendre raison d'un devenir où le temps n'est que la décomposition inintelligible de l'éternité, seul lieu de l'être et de la vérité. Les activités et la croissance des êtres ne sont que le déploiement de ce que les formes éternelles précontiennent. L'existence de chaque chose et la durée qui la mesure ne sont que la réfraction visible des essences invisibles, qui, elles, dans leur vérité, ne naissent ni ne périssent. L'histoire n'est plus qu'une ombre. Le monde n'est pas la demeure de l'homme.[14]

13 *Expositio super Librum de causis*, prop. 20. Lire tout le chapitre. "Unde, cum essentia (causae primae) sit maxime una, quia primum principium est secundum se unum et bonum, consequens est quod causa prima uno modo, quantum est ex parte sua, agat in res et influat in eas. Sed ex ejus influxu res diversimode recipiunt, quaedam plus et quaedam minus, unaquaeque secundum suam proprietatem."

14 Cf. E. Gilson, *Le thomisme*, 4° éd. (Paris 1942), 190-191.

Saint Thomas n'a rien d'un historien; mais sa conception de l'homme-dans-le-monde fournit les bases d'une sociologie où l'efficacité et l'intelligibilité des causes secondes, loin de concurrencer l'éternelle Providence de Dieu, la réalisent dans le temps et dans la vérité terrestre de l'histoire, la sainte et la profane. Dans le thomisme, "l'emprise créatrice de Dieu donne consistance à la durée temporelle".[15]

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Si Dieu n'a aucune relation réelle avec la créature comme avec un objet, on ne peut chercher dans la créature la cause de l'initiative créatrice: elle est toute entière en Dieu. Dieu ne peut vouloir que soi-même, lors même que, par surabondance, il se veut et s'aime dans les participations finies de sa propre perfection. Si motif il y a, il lui est coessentiel. Son vouloir, sa bonté en expansion, sont son être même et son essence.[16]

Mais précisément la bonté est par essence communicative; la suprême Bonté est suprêmement communicative. *Bonum est diffusivum sui.* De cet axiome dionysien, qui pourrait incliner à une "naturelle" émanation, saint Thomas tire admirablement parti, pour manifester la suprême gratuité de la création dans la liberté souveraine du Créateur. L'initiative procédant de l'amour va rompre l'apparente antinomie de la transcendance et de l'immanence, et donner un sens au monstre logique d'une relation unilatérale de la créature à son Créateur. Telle est en effet la toute puissance ce cette communication du Bien, que les créatures ne sont pas la projection d'un égoïsme, mais des êtres voulus, réalisés, aimés, pour eux-mêmes. L'univers, en cela encore, a consistance en ses natures, dont la "propriété" n'est point dissoute, ni instrumentalisée, ce qui serait une dérision de l'amour.[17] L'Amour, ici, porté selon sa loi à son incandescence, confère à "l'autre" totalement émané de lui, une consistance telle que cet autre est vraiment autre, comme si Dieu entrait dans la dépendance de celui qu'il aime. Le contraire d'une aliénation de

15 A. Hayen, "La connaissance humaine selon saint Thomas," *Rev. phil. de Louvain*, 1956, 589.

16 *Expositio super Librum de causis*, prop. 20: "Habet enim causa prima bonitatem bonificam, id est quae est principium bonitatis in omnibus. Bonitas autem cause primae est ipsum suum esse et sua essentia, quia causa prima est ipsa essentia bonitatis."

17 *De potentia* 5, 4: "Deus creaturarum universitatem vult *propter seipsam*, licet et *propter seipsum* eam vult esse; haec enim duo non repugnant. Vult enim Deus ut creaturae sint propter ejus bonitatem, ut eam scilicet suo modo imitentur et repraesentant; quod quidem faciunt in quantum ab ea esse habent et *in suis naturis subsistunt*.... Sic enim Deus unamquamque naturam instituit, ut ei non auferat *suam proprietatem*."

la créature. Par le mystère de l'acte créateur, nous nous élevons au mystère de l'amour gratuit et libre. Identité de l'Etre et de l'Amour: c'est le sens de la genèse créatrice. La dépendance ontologique est transmuée par la certitude d'un amour.

Si toute chose est saisie par un pareil amour, ainsi inviscéré en toute créature, "le mouvement universel de la nature se définit à la fois comme une auto-réalisation et comme un dépassement de soi. Tout être est habité par un sens de transcendance. Dans la terminologie que reprend saint Thomas, ce sens de transcendance s'appelle *amour*. Toute créature aime donc le tout plus que soi-même, et Dieu plus que le tout".[18] Ce comportement "extatique" fait partie de la condition vécue de la créature, c'est-à-dire d'un être fini, dépendant, qui trouve dans cette dépendance même le seul achèvement possible et adéquat à sa nature. Le "retour", par le dynamisme même des natures, selon leur "émanation".

Que si, dans cet univers des êtres et des natures, nous considérons et nous situons l'homme, qui en est le démiurge et la conscience (cf. notre première réflexion), nous franchissons le seuil de l'instinct de l'esprit, *voluntas ut natura*, de l'intelligence, de la liberté, de la responsabilité. Toutes choses, toutes formes, toutes valeurs, en lui récapitulées, revêtent une nouvelle existence, dans l'unité de l'univers, macrocosme et microcosme, où la Nature et l'Histoire embrayent l'une sur l'autre. "L'homme achève, à son niveau, le processus d'intériorisation et de réflexion qu'esquissait déjà la dialectique du mouvement. Il l'achève dans une immanence spirituelle dont les affinités avec le tout confèrent aux choses d'ici-bas une nouvelle unité et une nouvelle existence".[19] Quand le chrétien investit sa foi en l'Incarnation de Dieu dans "cette créature en attente de sa libération" (Rom. 8: 22), il l'appellera la Nouvelle Création.

En débouchant ainsi sur la foi chrétienne, nous sortons en quelque sorte de la ligne de notre méditation sur la Création. Nous ne pouvons faire autrement, si la Création implique Histoire, dès lors que Dieu est lui-même entré dans l'Histoire. Mais dès avant cela, la notion de Création a débordé la pure analyse philosophique de la causalité et de l'Acte pur: elle s'est ouverte à la "religion" — relation de la créature au Créateur — disons, hors toute ambiguité, au "mystère". Sans doute est-ce le mot adéquat, s'il est vrai que l'Amour résout seul l'antinomie entre un Dieu qui, s'il est Dieu, est incommunicable et inaccessible dans sa suffisance, et un Dieu dont la Bonté est substantiellement communicable de soi. *Unum et Bonum.*

18 St. Breton, *Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1965), 51-52.
19 St. Breton, op. cit., p. 59.

ST. THOMAS' DOCTRINE OF SUBJECT AND PREDICATE

A POSSIBLE STARTING POINT FOR LOGICAL REFORM AND RENEWAL

Henry Veatch

LOGIC was hardly St. Thomas' forte. Apart from his commentaries on Aristotle's *Perihermeneias* (which only goes through Ch. II of Book II) and the *Posterior Analytics*, the passages are comparatively[1] few and far between in which St. Thomas might be said to have given anything like an *ex professo* treatment of questions of logic. Nor, as far as we know, is there any place in his writings where he seems to have shown any special competence in, much less made any distinctive contribution to, what today would be called formal logic in the strict sense.

No doubt, the immediate effect of such an admission can only be to make St. Thomas lose caste with most, if not all, of today's formal logicians — supposing that he ever enjoyed caste with them in the first place. Still, discredit in such quarters need not necessarily mean that St. Thomas should simply be written off as a lost soul in matters of logic. For one thing, doctrinaire logicians to the contrary notwithstanding, there surely is more to logic than formal logic; and that more could even be well-nigh all-important. For another thing, so far as St. Thomas' own scattered and various comments of a non-formal nature on the subject of logic are concerned, these have not only borne a not inconsiderable fruit in the past, but they also — a fact which may not be so generally known — have begun to bear a kind of fruit among logicians even in the present day. Thus, witness the writings of Professor Geach. For we have his own word for it that he wishes to bear unmistakeable, even if rather solitary, testimony to the importance of St. Thomas as a non-formal logician. And although some may find the

1 This term we use quite advisedly, particularly in view of the remarkable array of citations having to do with logic that Father Robert Schmidt has assembled in his book *The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas* (The Hague 1951). The author explains that the aim of his study is "to present the doctrine of St. Thomas on the domain of logic and on the nature of this science directly from the works of St. Thomas." Nor can it be denied that the aim is impressively borne out by the performance.

logical fruit that is thus produced by the graft of Geach upon Aquinas to be a rather strange fruit, it at least is not a forbidden fruit save only perhaps in respect of its comparative unintelligibility.

a. *St. Thomas' Principle of Predication: Wholes Must be Predicated of Wholes*

Be this as it may, in this present study we should like to single out a particular feature of St. Thomas' teaching in regard to the logical relation of subject-predicate,[2] which we believe merits a more careful consideration and perhaps even a long overdue exploitation. Unhappily, it would appear to be a feature that has been largely passed over in silence by most contemporary authorities whose judgment is especially deserving of respect. Thus Geach,[3] directly in his various and highly sophisticated attempts to rehabilitate St. Thomas' teaching in regard to subject and predicate, and to approximate that teaching to the more recent views of Frege, seems to have studiously avoided even mentioning this particular point in St. Thomas' treatment of the topic. No more does Father Schmidt — to mention a scholar of very different interests and background from Geach — consider that this point merits any special discussion or treatment in his monumental study of *The Domain of Logic according to Saint Thomas Aquinas.*[4]

Could it be, though, that the not inconsequential remark about "the stone which the builders rejected" etc. might have a figurative, and hopefully a not irreverent, application even in the history of logic! In any case this neglected point which we have chosen to single out is one which St. Thomas seems to enunciate most clearly in Chapter II of the *De Ente et Essentia.*[5] There the principle emerges — and certainly it does not sound like a very significant principle when it does first emerge — that in the matter of predication, it is never a part that is

2 In the ensuing discussion, we shall speak more or less indifferently of the relation of subject to predicate and of predicate to subject. Not that the two are the same; rather it is as Fr. Schmidt notes: One can speak of "the relation of attribution or predication, in which the predicate of the proposition is the subject of the relation. It would be possible to consider the relation in the other direction, making the subject of the proposition its subject. We should then have the relation of *subjicibility* or of *subjection*. Since subject and predicate are correlative, we always have the two relations at the same time." (Op. cit., p. 239, n. 169).

3 The only essays of Geach to which we shall have occasion to refer in this study are "Subject and Predicate" in *Reference and Generality* (Ithaca 1962) 22-46, and "Form and Existence" in *God and the Soul* (New York 1969) 42-64.

4 See the reference given in note 1 above.

5 Unless otherwise indicated, our references to this work will be to the second edition of Father Maurer's translation, *On Being and Essence* (Toronto 1968).

predicated of a whole, but always a whole of a whole.[6] And the illustration used is of the term "humanity" which, St. Thomas explains, "signifies" man's very nature or essence, or "that by which man is man."[7] At the same time, "humanity" may not be predicated of any individual man. One cannot say, for example, "Socrates is humanity"; rather one has to say "Socrates is human" or "is a man."

Moreover, the explanation which St. Thomas gives of this seemingly trivial fact of logic, or even of grammar, is that since "humanity" signifies the essence of man just as such — i.e. taken in precision both from designated matter as well as from such accidental features and characteristics as pertain to individual men like Socrates[8] — Socrates' human nature or essence, considered in this way, is but a part of the concrete whole which is the individual man, Socrates. Accordingly, our not being able to predicate "humanity" of "Socrates" may be taken to exemplify that first part of Aquinas' general logical principle in regard to predication, viz. that a part cannot be predicated of a whole.

But now contrast the term "man" or "human being." Although this term, no less than "humanity," does indeed signify the essence of man, it nevertheless "expresses it as a whole, because it does not prescind from the designation of matter, but contains it implicitly and indistinctly ... that is why the term 'man' can be predicated of individuals."[9] Here, then, we have an explanation of that other half of St. Thomas' principle, viz. that in the matter of predications only wholes may be predicated of wholes.

b. *Three Points of Commentary on the Principle*

What, though, is one to make of this rather odd-sounding principle that St. Thomas seems thus to have enunciated in the *De Ente et Essentia*? In answer, we propose to put forward and discuss three major considerations which we hope may serve more or less as commentaries on the principle.

6 Although it might be supposed that in matters of logic Aquinas did little more than follow the lead of Aristotle, the fact is that on any number of points St. Thomas went far beyond his master in an effort to clarify, expand, and interpret Aristotle's teaching. Certainly, unless we be very much mistaken, on this very point about the necessity of predicating wholes of wholes, St. Thomas is putting forward a logical principle which is nowhere explicit in Aristotle, if it is even so much as implicit with him.

7 Maurer translation (op. cit.), Ch. II, n. 11, p. 43.

8 For an alternative statement of the same point, cf. St. Thomas, *In Meta.*, Liber VII, lectio V, nn. 1378-1380.

9 Maurer, op. cit., n. 13, p. 44.

1. Clearly, the principle is one which St. Thomas appears to think is proper to logic and to logic alone. For not only does he advance it as a principle governing the distinctively logical relation of predicate to subject[10] in propositions; but in addition, he chooses to exhibit the distinctive character of this logical relation by contrasting it with what one might not improperly call "ontological" relations.[11]

Specifically, in the passage which we have cited from the *De Ente et Essentia*, the contrast is drawn between the relation of predication in "Socrates is a human being" and the relation of Socrates to his humanity. The latter relation, presumably, is one which holds between an individual man, Socrates, and his nature or essence, or that in virtue of which he is a man, viz. his humanity. Now surely, such a relation must be of the kind we have termed "ontological." That is to say, it is a real relation, or a relation that may be said to hold *in rerum natura*.[12] In fact, it is just such a relation as the scholastics later came to call that of essence to supposit, and which Aristotle seems to have worried himself sick over, to say nothing of his readers, in Book Z of the *Metaphysics*.

However, it is not merely the ontological relation of supposit to essence that could have been used to point the contrast with a properly logical relation like that of subject to predicate. No, for the ontological relation of substance to accident might have done just as well, or even that of matter to form or of potency to act. For example, just as one may say "Socrates is a man," but not "Socrates is humanity," so also one may perfectly well say "Socrates is bald," but not "Socrates is baldness." Baldness, indeed, is but an accident[13] of the substance, Socrates.

10 Cf. note 2 above.

11 This is clearly not a Thomistic term. Yet in view of the use of the word "ontology" by any number of contemporary American philosophers, we thought it not unilluminating to speak of "ontological relations," in contrast to "logical relations," as a way of pointing up much the same contrast as interpreters of St. Thomas are wont to draw between "real relations" and "relations of reason" or "rationate relations," as Father Schmidt would call them (op. cit. Part II, ch. VI).

12 Since it is definitely not within our competence, it is fortunate that it happens not to be within our responsibility in this paper on the logical relation of predication to discuss the nature and kinds of real or ontological relations. That so-called predicamental relations would be examples of the latter would certainly be beyond dispute. Yet in pointing up the contrast between a logical relation like that of subject-predicate and various real relations, St. Thomas does not tend to use examples of predicamental relations. Instead, he uses examples more like those of supposit-essence or substance-accident. Now formerly it was not unusual for interpreters of St. Thomas, following John of St. Thomas, to call relations of the latter type "transcendental relations." After Krempel's strictures, however (see his *La Doctrine de la relation chez Saint Thomas*, Paris 1952), both this term, as well as the notion which it expresses, seem to have fallen into rather bad odor. As a result, it has become somewhat difficult accurately to characterize the exact ontological status that St. Thomas would ascribe to such relations as were formerly called "transcendental." For our purposes, though, it is enough if we simply consider them as real relations in contrast to logical relations and let it go at that.

13 Of course, in strictness "baldness' is not an accident at all, being only a privation and not

Moreover, such an accident might be said to have been no less a part of the total complex of substance-plus-accidents that comprised the man, Socrates, than was Socrates' essence, considered just as such, a mere part of that total concrete whole that was the man Socrates. Accordingly, both of these ontological relationships would exemplify what in Aquinas' terminology would be relations of whole to part, whereas, as we have seen, what is requisite for a logical relationship such as that of subject-predicate is that it be a relation of whole to whole.

Besides, so long as we are drawing upon a somewhat rough and ready Aristotelian and Thomistic ontology for examples, we might well have used, as we have already remarked, examples of matter-form or potency-act, no less than those of supposit-essence or substance-accident. Here again, one might say, these are examples of real relations: matter is really related to form, as is potency to act. Presumably, also, just because they are real relations, they cannot and must not be taken to be relations of subjects to predicates. Thus matter cannot, strictly speaking, even be said to be its form, any more than a substance can ever be its accident. Indeed, if a substance were an accident — say, a quantity or a quality or what not, — then it would truly be an accident and not a substance at all. So also if the ontological distinction between matter and form is to be maintained, then matter can never as such be said to be a form.

So much, then, for our first point of commentary on St. Thomas' principle of predication that only wholes may be predicated of wholes.

2. As for our second consideration, it bears more directly on the somewhat awkward terminology involved in saying that one has to predicate wholes of wholes. For what can St. Thomas mean by this? It can hardly be said to be idiomatic English — though this, doubtless, could hardly be reckoned a disability, so far as St. Thomas is concerned. What is more disturbing, though, is that even as technical jargon it is none-too-illuminating. Happily on this score, though, St. Thomas seems not to have been content with mere jargon. Instead, he undertakes to clarify the notion of a relation of whole to whole in terms of what he holds is a certain identity between the two. What is being propounded or asserted, he says, in any affirmative subject-predicate proposition is a kind of identity as between subject and predicate:

> ... sciendum est quod in qualibet propositione affirmativa vera oportet quod praedicatum et subjectum significent idem secundum rem

properly subsumable under any of the ten categories. (Cf. *On Being and Essence*, Ch. I, nn. 2 and 3). However, there can be no objection to our treating baldness as if it were an accident, just for purposes of illustration.

> aliquo modo, et diversum secundum rationem ... Manifestum est enim quod *homo* et *albus* sunt idem subjecto et differunt ratione; alia enim est *ratio hominis* et *ratio albi*.[14]

Note that St. Thomas does not say here that the relation of subject to predicate simply is one of identity, in the sense that the subject may be said to be identical with the predicate.[15] Rather what he says is that such a relation signifies a kind of (*aliquo modo*) identity *secundum rem*. And even this is puzzling. Still, it is not hard to see in a general way what Aquinas is driving at here. For to say of a man, for example, that he is white is not to say that he is a white peacock or a white elephant or a white monkey or a white whale, or even a white anything else, but simply that he is a white man.[16] Not only that, but the white man that one might be said to be talking about or to be referring to in the predicate of the proposition, "the man is white," can only be the same identical man as the one referred to in the subject of the proposition. In other words, so far as one is concerned to know what the subject and predicate terms in the proposition refér to or are about,[17] they are about

14 St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 13, 12.

15 It is on just such a misunderstanding that Prof. Grossmann's criticisms of such a doctrine of predication are based. Despite, or perhaps because of the misunderstanding, however, the criticisms are exceedingly illuminating. Cf. *Reflections on Frege's Philosophy* (Evanston 1969), 98-104.

16 Geach is very scornful of this way of construing what might be called the identity-factor in affirmative predications. Thus in "Form and Existence" (op. cit. p. 43) he takes Lewis Carroll to task for having committed just such an error: "Lewis Carroll professes to find a difficulty over saying 'some pigs are pink'; as it stands, this suggests an impossible identity between certain things (pigs) and a certain attribute (signified by 'pink')! He seeks to remove this difficulty by expounding the proposition as meaning 'some pigs are pink pigs,' where 'are' signifies real identity. But 'pink pigs' means 'pigs that are pink', and there is as much or as little difficulty about this phrase as about the predication 'pigs are pink' at which he stumbles."

Surely if this criticism is meant to apply to Aquinas as well as to Lewis Carroll, then it does seem nothing if not gratuitous. Aquinas never even supposes "an impossible identity between certain things (pigs) and a certain attribute (signified by 'pink')"; rather he insists that the identity can never be between certain substances and their attributes, but only between substances. And once one is clear on this score, then what of it if "some pigs are pink" means "some pigs are pink pigs"? If Geach counters by saying that "pink pigs" means "pigs that are pink," of course it means this, and more: it means "pigs that are pink pigs." The supposed circularity in the explanation, in short, is only in Geach's imagination.

17 It is just here that Geach would doubtless take violent exception. For as he understands the relation between subject and predicate, it is only subject terms that can be said to name or refer to anything, whereas predicates never refer, but are only "true of" their subjects. Hence even to raise the question as to what a predicate term in a proposition may be supposed to be referring to is simply rediculous. Cf. "Subject and Predicate," op. cit., especially pp. 31-34.

However, the answer to this objection would seem fairly obvious. Making all due allowance for the possibility that Geach may be using "refer" in a somewhat Geachian, not to say Pickwickian, sense, it would nonetheless seem that for a predicate to be true of its subject, it would surely have to be about that subject; and how could it be about its subject without in some way or other making reference to it?

This is not to say, of course, that the predicate refers to the same thing the subject does in exac-

the very same thing, viz. in this instance a particular human being who happens to be white.

Very well, if we let this suffice as an explanation of how subject and predicate terms can signify the same thing *secundum rem,* just how are we to understand, directly in conjunction with it, the further suggestion that subject and predicate signify something different *secundum rationem*? Perhaps we might avail ourselves of a kind of metaphor here and say that this difference *secundum rationem* really means no more than that the same thing is being viewed or considered under a new or different guise or aspect. Thus in terms of our examples thus far, we might say that in speaking of a man as being white, we are really considering him under the guise of his being white; or to say that Socrates is bald is to consider him simply under this particular aspect.

Now the point of this somewhat metaphorical way of putting the matter is to bring out the peculiar significance of the expression *secundum rationem.* For Socrates is not really different from the bald Socrates; nor is the man referred to in the other example really different from the man who is white. Rather in each case it is one and the same thing in fact (*secundum rem*) that is nevertheless considered somewhat differently — i.e. it is considered under a different guise or aspect (*secundum rationem*).

To sharpen the point, we might contrast such a situation in which one and the same thing is considered under a different guise or aspect with a situation in which one and the same thing has in fact become different. As an example of the latter, Socrates, we might say, from not having been bald, became bald. Here the difference is surely a real difference, and not a mere logical difference or rationate difference: at one time Socrates was without the property or accident of baldness; at another time he had changed, so as actually to have this accident. In contrast, in the assertion "Socrates is bald" the difference between what is signified or understood by the subject term and what by the predicate is not a difference between one and the same thing that has become really and in fact different. Rather it is exactly the same whole (say, Socrates plus the accident of baldness) that is referred to by the predicate as well as by the subject: the only difference is that in the subject Socrates is not considered or recognized or understood as being bald, whereas in the predicate he is. In other words, the difference is

tly the same way as the subject does. For the one does so in the manner of a subject and the other in the manner of a predicate. Thus in an affirmative predication one is saying something about something else (*dicit intellectus aliquid de aliquo. In III De An.,* 11, n. 760); hence the predicate only refers to the same thing as the subject *via* the subject or through the subject, whereas the subject refers directly.

only a difference of consideration, or a difference in what might be called the guise or aspect under which the same identical thing is seen or viewed.

Moreover, this very capability according to which one and the same thing (*secundum rem*) can nevertheless be considered or understood or recognized under different guises (*secundum rationem*) is a distinctive capability of the human intellect, a capability which renders possible just such logical relations or relations of reason as that of subject-predicate.

3. Our points of commentary thus far have sufficed, we would hope, to make it clear both how the subject-predicate relation of whole to whole is a purely logical relation that needs to be sharply distinguished from all ontological or real relations, as well as how this logical relation must needs be construed as a rather special kind of relation of identity. What it now remains for us to do in this our third consideration is to try to make clear just how this subject-predicate relation functions as a tool or instrument of knowledge. For it is basic to St. Thomas' entire conception of logic that "logic as an instrumental science [should be] ordained to the knowledge of things" (*logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam*).[18] Accordingly, the subject-predicate relation that is involved in propositions can hardly be an exception to this rule: it too must be ordained to a knowledge of things. Not only that, but sharply as this purely logical relation of subject-predicate has to be contrasted with ontological relations like that of matter-form, or essence-supposit, or substance-accident, etc., it must at the same time be recognized that it is precisely in and through such a relation, that relations of this latter type can come to be known. How, though, can this be? How is it that in order to know and to formulate our knowledge of so-called ontological relations, which, as we have seen, do not involve the identity factor[19] that is present in subject-predicate relations, we must needs employ precisely that logical relation of subject-predicate in which the identity factor is a most prominent feature? Or to put the question a little differently: supposing that subject-predicate relations in logic are thus ordained to a knowledge of real relations in things and in *rerum natura*,

18 Schmidt, op. cit., 83-84. The reference for the quotation from Aquinas that Fr. Schmidt cites is *In I Peri.*, 2, n. 3.

19 We are embarrassed to know how best to designate that factor of identity which is present in affirmative subject-predicate propositions and which we sought to explicate in section 2 above. Sometimes we shall speak simply of an "identity relation" between subject-predicate, and sometimes of an "identity factor" in the relation of subject-predicate. Such designations or labels can unfortunately be misleading; but some sort of designation has to be used and we would hope that what we have said in section 2 may be a sufficient guard against misunderstanding.

just what is the source and character of that instrumentality which these logical relations of predication would appear to have that thus enables them to mediate a knowledge of such real relations as substance-accident, matter-form, etc.?

c. *The Relevance of St. Thomas' Principle of Predication to Some Contemporary Theories of Meaning*

Apparently, to judge from what we have said thus far in the foregoing section, our point about predication is turning out to be not so much a point of commentary as of question. And so it is. What's more, to speak of this question we propose to make something of a detour through various theories of meaning that are closely associated with modern developments in logic, and which by way of contrast should enable us to appreciate rather better the distinctive instrumentality which the logical relation of predication, as St. Thomas conceives it, definitely affords. For if we are not mistaken there is no current theory of meaning which allows a place for a subject-predicate relation of the peculiar kind which St. Thomas had in mind; and unless we be even further mistaken, it is precisely because they lack a logical relation of just this kind that modern theories of meaning find themselves in the straits they do.

To be sure, in current discussions of either logic or semantics it may not be the habit immediately to juxtapose questions of logic to questions of meaning. Yet there is surely nothing amiss with approaching so-called theories of meaning precisely with a view to seeing just how, if at all, they would suppose various logical relations — such as that of subject-predicate, for example — to be "ordained to a knowledge of things." In other words, just how do logical relations mean, and what is there about them that enables them to mean or signify in the way they do?

Now the first such theory of meaning in the context of which we should like to consider such a question as to how subject-predicate propositions mean, or how they are ordained to a knowledge of things, is none other than the theory which has been called "the referential theory of meaning," or sometimes the "picture theory." And although this theory in its strict and proper sense should be associated solely with Wittgenstein in his earlier period, it might not be too far wrong to say that what is roughly characteristic of such a theory of meaning is simply that it holds that the meaning of a word or term in a language is just that thing or entity in fact or in reality which it names or to which it refers. Thus the meaning of the term "St. Thomas Aquinas" would simply be the real St. Thomas. Indeed, as is well known, Ryle later came to designate the theory rather derisively as the "'Fido'-Fido theory."

In any case what is interesting about this theory for our purposes is that under its aegis any number of modern logicians were influenced in the direction of supposing that the structure of logical propositions should ultimately be such as merely to picture or mirror the structure of the corresponding facts. Or put a little differently, one could say that on this view all of the various elements in a proposition had to be such that they could be set in one-to-one correspondence with elements in the corresponding fact. Thus consider such well-known pronouncements of the early Wittgenstein as:

> In a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable parts as in the situation it represents.[20] The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign.[21]

Perhaps, though, a quotation from Russell might serve even better to bring out the import of this theory of meaning, so far as the structure of logical propositions is concerned:

> Take (say) the proposition, 'Socrates was before Aristotle'. Here it seems obvious that we have a relation between two terms, and that the constituents of the proposition (as well as of the corresponding fact) are simply the two terms and the relation, i.e. Socrates, Aristotle, and *before*... We may represent the general form of such propositions by 'x Ry', which may be read 'x has the relation R to y'.[22]

Quite patently, here is an account of propositions and of the relation of subjects and predicates in propositions that is very different from that of St. Thomas. An immediate and superficial difference is that on Russell's view — and the same would be true for Wittgenstein and Frege as well — a proposition may well have not just one subject but several. Thus in Russell's example of the proposition "Socrates was before Aristotle," "Socrates" and "Aristotle" are both of them subjects of the proposition, and the predicate which joins or relates them is the relation of the one being "before" the other. In fact, to borrow Wittgenstein's terminology, those elements of the proposition which he calls the "simple signs" and which may be taken to refer to what he calls the "objects" in the corresponding real "situation" — these might be considered to be the subjects of the proposition; and likewise, that element in the proposition which Wittgenstein calls "the configuration" of "simple signs" and which is held to refer to "the configuration of objects" in

20 L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, trans. by Pears and McGuiness (London and New York 1961), 4.04.

21 Ibid., 3.21.

22 B. Russell, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (2nd edition, London 1920), 198.

the real situation — this element might be considered to be the predicate of the proposition.

No sooner, though, is the relation of subject, or of subjects, to the predicate in a proposition conceived in this way, than St. Thomas' view of the subject-predicate relation as being a kind of relation of identity is ruled out altogether. For quite patently it makes no sense to speak of any sort of identity *secundum rem* as between the subjects, "Socrates" and "Aristotle" on the one hand, and the predicate "before" on the other.[23] But further, as we saw, it was just such a purely logical relation of identity as between subject and predicate that in St. Thomas' eyes served to distinguish such logical subject-predicate relations from any and all ontological relations in the real world. Once, though, the relation between subject and predicate ceases to be thought of as a relation of identity in this sense, and immediately the bar is removed to conceiving of subject-predicate relations as being on all fours with relations in the real world. And this was just as Russell and Wittgenstein intended that it should be. For as they saw things, the logical structure of a logical proposition, so far from having to be different from, needed to be exactly the same as, or to be isomorphic with, the corresponding ontological structure of that fact or state of affairs in the real world which that proposition was supposed to represent or be about.

With this, though, we begin to see just how this particular view of subject-predicate relations in propositions turns out to be peculiarly congenial to a referential theory of meaning of the kind here being considered. For if it be asked just how it is that propositions so structured are able to mean or signify the things they are supposed to mean or signify, the answer is that they do so simply in virtue of that isomorphism or sameness of structure as between the subject-predicate structure of the proposition and the structure of the corresponding fact that the proposition is supposed to mean or represent. How diametrically opposed, then, is such a referential theory of meaning to the Thomistic theory. For St. Thomas, a logical proposition is ordained to a knowledge of things precisely because, the relation between subject and predicate being one of identity, it is therefore never to be confused with those relations in the real world which such a logical relation is designed to signify or intend.[24] With the advocates of the referential

23 This point of criticism we have developed at much greater length in our book *Two Logics* (Evanston 1969), ch. I.

24 Needless to say, we are using this term in what we take to be its Thomistic sense. Cf. *In II Sent.*, 38, 1, 2 sol.: *Intendere enim dictur quasi in aliud tendere.* See Father Schmidt's discussion, op. cit., chapter V.

theory, however, it is quite otherwise: only in so far as logical relations are isomorphic with real relations, are they able to serve as instruments for our knowing the things of the real world. In other words, on this theory of meaning the entire case for the instrumentality of logic, so far as meaning or knowledge is concerned, turns just on such an isomorphism.

d. *The Inadequacy of a Mere Isomorphism as a Vehicle of Meaning*

Given this opposition, then, between the referential theory of meaning and the Thomistic theory, which of the two is the better? Well, it should not be difficult to see how the referential theory simply breaks down as an adequate account of meaning. Moreover, the inadequacy would appear to be traceable simply to an excessive reliance upon that supposed isomorphism between logical structures and real structures, which on the referential theory is taken to be the sole ground for understanding just how and why logical relations and devices are able to function as vehicles or instruments of meaning.

For example, take just a crude illustration, say, the two uprights of a six-foot wooden ladder. To say that these two pieces of wood are quite alike could well be true: they might be of the same length, have the same breadth and thickness, could be made of exactly the same kind of wood, etc. Not only that, but it could also be the case, that the holes for the rungs in the one upright exactly corresponded to those in the other. In fact, though it is unlikely that we should ever speak of it this way, there could indeed be said to be a genuine isomorphism as between the one upright and the other. And yet surely it would be absurd to suppose that the one knows the other, or even represents the other, simply in virtue of the isomorphism between them. But so likewise, a mere isomorphism between the form of a proposition and the form of the corresponding fact would not of itself suffice for anyone to say that there was a knowledge of the one by the other.

Of course, one could respond to this by insisting that we have explicated the example of the sides of the ladder at once improperly and unfairly. For indeed it is ridiculous to say that no more is needed than that two things should be alike, or isomorphic, for the one thing to be said to know the other. Rather it is the case that when two things are alike, then the one can perhaps come to be known not so much by the other as *through* the other. Thus through a knowledge of a proposition I can come to know a fact that corresponds to it and is isomorphic with it. And even as regards the clumsy example of the two uprights of the ladder, it is surely the case that through a knowledge of the one I can indeed come to know something about the other that is just like it.

All well and good. And yet just how is it that through one thing we can come to know another like it? The mere fact of a likeness or similarity between the two does not suffice to explain a knowledge of the one by the other. This we have just seen. Nor can one suppose that for there to be such a knowledge, both the thing and its likeness must somehow first come to be known, and then compared the one with the other. Not only would this plunge one very quickly into the morass of the old copy theory of knowledge, but in addition as an explanation of knowledge it simply begs the question. If to come to know something I must do so by first coming to know its likeness, or something that is isomorphic with it, then how is this latter knowledge to be brought off? Must it be in terms of a still prior likeness or isomorphism? But this must seemingly lead to an infinite regress.

No, it is clearly necessary to give over entirely this kind of reliance upon isomorphism and proceed on a very different tack if we are ever to get clear just what sort of a logical instrumentality[25] is requisite in order that knowledge may be achieved. And is not the tack to be followed just that which St. Thomas proposes in his account of predication? For take anything that I, or that anyone else for that matter, might wish to know about, be it fish or fowl, be it substantival or adjectival, be it material or spiritual, be it universal or particular, be it absolute or relative, or whatever. Surely, the procedure toward knowledge in such cases cannot be one of first constructing a logical simulacrum of that which one seeks to know about, and then somehow coming to know the one through the other. Instead, the procedure would seem to have to be based on the very elementary consideration that whatever it is that I am seeking to know about, I can only come to know it in terms of what it is. That is to say, I must attempt to determine what that subject[26] is that I am thus subjecting[27] to my investigation. Suppose, for instance, that it is Socrates that I wish to know about. Presumably I will come to recognize

25 It should be noted perhaps that in this essay we are not attempting to address ourselves to more fundamental epistemological issues. Instead, we are considering only certain logical doctrines as being ancillary to various theories of meaning or knowledge.

26 The term "subject," of course, is ambiguous as between what might be called the logical subject and the real subject. For example, Geach simply lays down the rule that, as he uses the terms "subject" and "predicate," they will always be linguistic terms; I shall never call a man a logical subject, but only the name of a man — the name 'Peter,' not the Apostle, is the subject of 'Peter was an Apostle'..." ("Subject and Predicate," op. cit., p. 22). Although it is, of course, entirely proper for Geach thus to restrict his use of "subject," since the ordinary use of the term is ambiguous, we shall find it convenient in this essay not to limit the meaning to a single meaning, but rather to play on the ambiguity as far as possible. Of course, if it is not clear from the context which meaning is the relevant one, we shall then indicate as much. For example, in the present instance the subject meant is clearly the real subject.

27 On this use of "subjection," cf. the reference to Fr. Schmidt in note 2 above.

or to acknowledge him to be a human being and not a god or a torpedo fish, or to be bald and snub-nosed rather than aristocratic-looking or with an Afro-hair-do. But in any case, whether it be in terms of what he is essentially or accidentally, my learning and coming to know about Socrates has to be in terms of what he is.

e. *The Reaffirmation of the Subject-Predicate Relation and its Relevance to the Theory of Meaning as Use*

Must not this, though, bring us right around again to the subject-predicate relation in St. Thomas' sense, as being the only proper instrument of knowledge so conceived? That is to say, rather than that the proposition should have a structure that is isomorphic with that of which the proposition is supposed to be about, it is important instead that the proposition have a structure that will serve to relate by a kind of identity that which the proposition is about (the subject)[28] and that which that subject is understood as being (the predicate). Or put a bit differently, rather than a correspondence with the real, what is needed is that the proposition should set up a kind of identity between the real and that which it is being thought or understood or conceived to be. And what is this if not to understand that very thing which one is seeking to find out or know about, but to understand it (i.e. *idem secundum rem*) under a particular guise or aspect (i.e. according to a particular *ratio*)?

Perhaps we may go even further and suggest that by restoring again to its once central position in logic the subject-predicate relation as St. Thomas understood it, it might be possible to rescue the theory of meaning from the sort of impasse which it seems to have reached largely at the hands of the partisans of the old referential or picture theory. For while it is true that the picture theory has pretty much gone out of fashion largely as a result of Wittgenstein's own conversion from a referential theory to a theory of meaning-as-use, one wonders if the replacement of the former by the latter may not have involved throwing the baby out with the bath.

What seems to have happened is something like this. Isomorphism having been given up as the resource for explaining how logic could be ordained to a knowledge of things, it is as if the latter-day champions of

28 Here clearly the real subject is meant. As Geach remarks, just as "the name 'Peter,' not the Apostle is the subject of 'Peter was an Apostle,'" so also "what the predicate in 'Peter was an Apostle' is predicated of is Peter, not his name; for it is Peter, not his name, that is being said to have been an Apostle" ("Subject and Predicate," op. cit., pp. 22-23). Cf. note 26 above.

meaning-as-use[29] had decided that perhaps language or logic need not be ordained to a knowledge of things at all — at least not in any realistic sense.[30] Instead, the various logical and linguistic uses that we employ, not just in our efforts to know, but in living our lives generally, are but so many "language games" that we play. And these language games, by the very fact that they are games and that we play them, are considered to have their origin in us and in what Wittgenstein called our basic and rudimentary "forms of life." In other words, instead of trying to account for the character of our language games, and more generally of our language and logic as a whole, in terms of their suitability and appropriateness for disclosing the independently existing structures of nature and of the way things are, these thinkers tend rather to account for things being the way they are on the ground of their being so structured and ordered by our language forms and ultimately by our so-called form of life.

And so it is that the currently fashionable theory of meaning-as-use would seem to boil down to little more than a variant on Kant's theme of Copernican revolution in philosophy, with the result that the role of logic must cease to be understood in terms of its being ordained to a knowledge of things, and must instead be understood ultimately in terms of its capacity for being elevated to a transcendental logic.[31] That is why if logic is ever to return to its more traditional role of being ordained to a knowledge of things, the first step must be to revive St.

29 Although it is certainly true to say that the neo-Wittgensteinians have given up the isomorphism of the old picture theory, we would not wish to imply that they gave it up as a result of quite the same criticisms of isomorphism as we ourselves sought to detail in section d above.

30 Needless to say, "realism" as it is here being used does not signify realism as opposed to nominalism, but rather realism as opposed to various forms of idealism. It is what Prof. Bergmann would call realism2, as contrasted with realism1. Cf. *Logic and Reality,* passim (Madison 1964).

31 This interpretation of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning-as-use is confirmed by a most interesting discussion which W. D. Hudson gives in his *Modern Moral Philosophy* (New York 1970) 51-52: "Every language game goes down in the last analysis to certain concepts, or rules of inference, or both, which are tacitly presupposed and which logically constitute that universe of discourse. An example would be the concept of a physical object. The empirical evidence, on the basis of which we talk about physical objects, is discontinuous. Now we see the table; now we go into the next room and see it no longer; now we return and there it is. Though there has been a break between our observations of it, we nevertheless think of it as identical on the two occasions. Someone may raise the question: are we entitled to do so?... There is a logical gap here, then, between evidence which is *discontinuous* and what it is invoked to support which is continuous. Are we entitled to jump this gap as we do?... Professor P. F. Strawson, dealing with the skeptic who answers that question in the negative, points out that "a condition of our having this conceptual scheme is the unquestioning acceptance of particular-identity in at least some cases of non-continuous observation." The skeptic, says Strawson, "... pretends to accept a conceptual scheme (sc. that of common sense or natural science in which we speak of physical objects on the strength of empirical observation) but at the same time quietly rejects one of the conditions of its employment. Thus his doubts are unreal ... because they amount to the rejection of the whole conceptual scheme within which alone such doubts make sense."

Thomas' ancient principle of predication that only wholes may be predicated of wholes. For it is precisely the identity factor that is involved in predication as so conceived that enables the subject-predicate proposition to serve as the vehicle and instrument of our knowledge of things in terms of what they are. In short, it is just this subject-predicate relation no less that would seem to be the very gage and surety of a genuinely realistic theory of meaning.

f. *A Final Note on Professor Geach*

Now is this not a properly eloquent note on which to end this paper? How we wish that it might be! But unhappily it is certain to strike many as being a false note for no other reason than that our entire exposition and defense of St. Thomas' doctrine of subject-predicate would appear to be radically at variance with what the formidable Professor Geach has had to say on the same topic. Now it is neither possible nor appropriate to try to deal with Geach's views regarding the matter either of subject-predicate in general or of St. Thomas' views thereon in particular in any mere addendum to an otherwise completed discussion. But at least some indication and comment as to the major points at issue would seem called for.

And to bring the issue directly to a head, the following quotation from Geach should suffice:

> For Aquinas, the real distinction between a form and the self-subsistent individual (suppositum) whose form it is comes out in the logical distinction between subject and predicate (I a, q. 12, art. 12; q. 85, art. 5, ad 3um).[32]

Surely, such a flat pronouncement cannot fail to strike anyone as other than astonishing in view of the analyses and arguments which we have presented thus far. For does it not fly directly in the face of St. Thomas' careful differentiation of (1) the logical distinction between subject and predicate (e.g. "Socrates" and "human being") from (2) the real distinction between a form (e.g. humanity) and the self-subsistent individual (e.g. Socrates)? How, then, can Geach possibly equate the logical relation of subject-predicate with an ontological or real relation like that of supposit-essence (or form)? And must not such an equation have the unhappily retrograde effect of leading us right back into the toils of the referential theory of meaning, when as a matter of fact our only hope of progress out of these toils would seem to lie in following

32 "Form and Existence," op. cit., p. 47.

Aquinas along the lines of what we have called the identity theory of predication — a theory which Geach, it would seem, not only denies, but denies even to Aquinas?

But is this quite fair to Geach? After all, in the passage quoted he does not say that the real distinction of essence (*sc.* form) from supposit *is the same as* the logical distinction between subject and predicate; instead, he says only that the former distinction "comes out" in the latter. And certainly this somewhat metaphorical way of putting the matter is quite unobjectionable, provided it be rightly understood and interpreted. But does Geach anywhere or in any way make provision for such a "right" understanding and interpretation?

To this question we rather suspect that the answer can only be negative and this for two reasons. For one thing, Geach nowhere to our knowledge either mentions or explains what Aquinas is most careful not just to point out, but to lay stress upon, viz. that while one can quite properly speak of the relation of predicate to subject on the analogy[33] of the relation of form to matter, it is nevertheless equally important to recognize that the two relations are not the same. Quite the contrary, in one of the two passages that Geach refers to, Aquinas underlines this very difference — a fact which Geach passes over in silence. Thus in I, 85, 5, ad 3, St. Thomas remarks:

> Unde compositioni et divisioni intellectus respondet quidem aliquid ex parte rei: *tamen non eodem modo se habet in re sicut in intellectu.*[34]

Now it is quite clear from the context that the respective compositions and divisions *in re* and *in intellectu* that St. Thomas is here referring to are compositions and divisions of matter and form. And what is the reason that Aquinas gives for insisting that these respective compositions and divisions of matter and form *in re* and *in intellectu* must be carefully distinguished from one another? The answer is stated clearly and unequivocally directly in the same passage:

> Tamen differt compositio intellectus a compositione rei: nam ea quae componuntur in re sunt diversa; compositio autem intellectus est signum *identitatis*[35] eorum quae componuntur.

33 Father Schmidt uses this very notion in one place: "... by an analogical application of matter and form to intellectual composition, the predicate serves as the formal part of the proposition and the subject as the material: "Praedicatum est quasi pars formalis enuntiationis, subjectum autem est pars materialis ipsius."" Op. cit., p. 225. The quotation is from *In I Perih.*, 10, n. 23.

34 Our italics.

35 Our italics.

But this brings us to our second reason for thinking that Geach is not concerned to distinguish the matter-form relation *in re* from the matter-form relation in the case of subject-predicate, but rather is content to leave the impression that the two relations are structurally the same, or at least are isomorphic with one another. For not only does Geach pass over in silence all evidence to the effect that Aquinas considered the matter-form relation in the case of subject-predicate to be little more than metaphorical; but he also studiously avoids ever mentioning that identity factor in the relation of subject-predicate, which we have been at pains to show is the real ground for St. Thomas' insistence that a logical relation like that of predicate to subject must never be confused with a real or ontological relation like that of form to matter. Thus as we have seen in the one passage that Geach himself refers to (I, 85, 5, ad 3), St. Thomas explicitly declares that *compositio intellectus est signum identitatis eorum quae componuntur.* Not only that, but in that other passage to which Geach makes explicit reference, viz. I, 13, 12, we have already noted how Aquinas says that what is signified by the subject and the predicate in an affirmative proposition is *idem secundum rem,* although *diversum secundum rationem.*

Why, then, is it that Geach in his reference to both of these passages never gives his readers any intimation that they both contain unequivocal assertions as to the presence of an identity factor in affirmative predication? We believe that the answer is that Geach is doubtless radically suspicious of St. Thomas' way of understanding predication in terms of identity and would like to play down as much as possible this particular feature of his teaching. Nor is it to be denied that superficially at least Geach's suspicions on this score — supposing that he really does harbor them[36] — are perhaps not altogether gratuitous. For Geach is doubtless worried lest any attempt at understanding subject-predicate in terms of identity is likely to lead to what he calls "the old two-name or identity theory of predication, which flourished in the Middle Ages, and still keeps appearing in new guises:

36 This qualification has to be added, because Geach does say at one point that if a predicative expression can be treated as a name, then "it *is* possible to state the truth-condition of an affirmative predication as an identity of reference between two names ... Aquinas uses this way of stating truth-condition quite often, and has in consequence been wrongly regarded as holding the two-name theory" ("Form and Existence," op. cit., pp. 43-44). Unfortunately, Geach never explains how then Aquinas manages to avoid the two-name theory. Not only that, but since Geach seems to consider that a necessary condition of subscribing to such an identity of reference between two names is to treat the predicate as a name, this must mean that in his eyes St. Thomas does treat the predicate as a name. But this last, Geach seems to feel, is almost the beginning of all evil in logic. It is puzzling, therefore, to know just why and how Geach can consider his own views on subject and predicate to be so consonant with those of St. Thomas.

the theory that a true predication is effected by joining different names of the same thing or things, the copula being the sign of this real identity."[37]

Needless to say, in this present discussion we cannot go into Geach's many and varied strictures upon the two-name theory. Suffice it only to say that one could well accept many of his criticisms and still insist that the identity theory of predication, at least as Aquinas expounds it, just does not lead to such enormities. Indeed, Geach would seem even to admit as much himself.[38] Besides, if the commanding error of the two-name theory is simply that in effect it really denies that in predication we ever say anything of significance about the subject at all, the predicate being no more than a new name or a new word for the same thing, then clearly St. Thomas' theory of predication does not fall afoul of any such error. For although, according to him, subject and predicate do signify the same thing *secundum rem,* they also signify something different *secundum rationem.* Moreover, as we have construed such diversity *secundum rationem,* what it means is that the predicate term serves to point up features in the subject which the subject term did not specify, but which nevertheless are really there in the subject.

In other words, Geach's worry lest the identity-factor in predication lead inescapably to the two-name theory is surely a gratuitous worry, so far as St. Thomas' doctrine is concerned. But gratuitous or not, it is a real worry so far as Geach is concerned and would appear to have led him into a very dubious interpretation of St. Thomas. For in effect what Geach would seem to have done is to have retained only a part of St. Thomas' teaching in regard to subject and predicate, viz. that part in which St. Thomas insists that subject and predicate signify things that are different *secundum rationem.* But the other part of the same doctrine where Aquinas insists that subject and predicate signify the same thing *secundum rem* — this Geach plays down so conspicuously that one wonders if he does not mean to repudiate it altogether.

Besides, there is still another reason why Geach might have reason to be suspicious of the identity factor in predication. For his own doctrine of subject and predicate being no less profoundly influenced by Frege than it is by Aquinas, Geach is most anxious to maintain what he calls "an absolute distinction between names and predicables."[39] And the im-

37 Ibid., p. 43.
38 Cf. note 36 above.
39 "Subject and Predicate," op. cit., p. 34. The word "predicables" here Geach is using as roughly synonymous with "predicates" in the usual sense.
For Geach's explanation of his preference of "predicable" over "predicate," see ibid., pp. 23-24.

port of the distinction's being taken to be thus "absolute" is that "a name can occur in a proposition only as a logical subject";[40] and as for what Geach calls "predicables":

> A predicable applies to or is true of things; for example 'Peter struck ________'[41] applies to Malchus (whether it is actually predicated of Malchus or not). This relation must be sharply distinguished from the relation of name to bearer, which is confounded with it in the 'Aristotelian' tradition under the term 'denoting.' A predicable never names what it is true of, and 'Peter struck ________' does not even look like a name for Malchus.[42]

Now apparently what Geach is aiming at here is indeed the quite dubious view that there is a ready and easy interchangeability and perhaps mutual substitutivity of subject and predicate terms in propositions. As Geach himself puts it: "A term, as conceived in Aristotelian logic, is supposed capable of being a subject in one proposition and a predicate in another."[43] And that is bad!

Nor is there any doubt but that this is bad, if as a logical doctrine it leads to the consequence that one fails to recognize that a subject term has a very different function to perform in a proposition from a predicate, and a predicate from a subject. For the subject serves to point up what in the proposition one is concerned to know about or to find out about; and the predicate serves to indicate what one has come to recognize or see or understand that subject as being. Clearly, given this difference of function, a term in a proposition, in so far as it is functioning as a subject, could not possibly function as a predicate. And similarly, as we have already had occasion to note, a predicate term in a proposition, although it could hardly be denied that it must at least in some sense be taken to refer to that which it is being predicated of, still does not refer to that which the subject refers to in quite the same manner as the subject. It refers to it, as we suggested earlier,[44] *via* the subject, or perhaps through the medium of the subject.

Now if this is all that Geach means by his insistence that a predicate in a proposition can never be said to "name" what the subject names, but only to be "true of" what is thus named by the subject,[45] all well and

40 Ibid., p. 31.

41 The example here may seem a bit odd-sounding. However, Geach is careful to explain that a proposition must not be thought to admit of "only one subject-predicate analysis. 'Peter struck Malchus' is at once a predication about Peter and a (different) predication about Malchus; either 'Peter' or 'Malchus' may be taken as a logical subject..." Ibid., p. 28.

42 Ibid., p. 32.

43 Ibid., p. 34.

44 See note 17 above.

45 A remark that perhaps should be made not only with reference to the point which Geach is

good. Yet Geach does not stop here. For in wishing to make the difference between subject and predicate an "absolute" one, as he calls it, he would appear to be confusing a very proper difference in function between subject and predicate terms in propositions with an absolute ontological difference between the sorts of things *in re* that such subject and predicate terms can mean or signify. Put crudely, it is as if for Geach a subject term could never signify anything but a primary substance or a "self-subsistent individual (*suppositum*)"; whereas a predicate could never signify anything but a form.

Surely, though, this is simply preposterous. Indeed, it reminds one of the predicament that Frege got into with his absolute distinction between what he called "concepts" and "objects," and as a result of which he found himself compelled to admit that a concept could never be the subject (*sc.* object) of a proposition — that is to say it was not anything that an assertion could ever be made about. Even Geach acknowledges that Frege went too far here.[46] And yet he seems not to be aware of just how Frege went astray or how he, Geach, might be able to avoid getting into a like predicament.

Actually, though, neither the truth of the matter nor the way it is to be explained would seem so very difficult. For surely, when it comes to possible subjects of propositions, in the sense of possible things that propositions might be about, just anything and everything might be the subject of a proposition — individuals or universals, accidents or substances, "concepts" or "objects," possibles or actuals, real beings or beings of reason, you name it, and at once it can become the subject of a

here making, but with reference to any number of other such points as well is that St. Thomas' theory of subject-predicate is almost bound to give rise to misunderstandings in the present day, particularly since no adequate symbolism (at least not by modern standards) has ever been devised to represent all the facets that are involved in St. Thomas' view of subject-predicate propositions. Lacking this symbolism, it is impossible to formalize such propositions so as to be able to determine just what their so-called logical powers may be. Nevertheless, for an extremely interesting beginning at providing something like an adequate symbolism for subject-predicate propositions, we should like to refer to a brilliant, but as yet unpublished article entitled "Substance Logic" by Eddy M. Zemach and Eric Walther.

Of course, one can hardly devise an adequate means for symbolizing such propositions, unless one first has a right understanding of just what such subject-predicate propositions were conceived to be by St. Thomas. To such an understanding we would hope that this present paper may make some slight contribution.

46 For the relevant quotation from Frege, as well as Geach's discussion of it, see "Form and Existence," op. cit., p. 47. The trouble with Geach's discussion is that he seems never to face up to what we should imagine is the real issue here, viz. how the real subject of a proposition can ever be other than simply a self-subsistent individual or *suppositum*. Instead, in a commendable effort to avoid the extremes of both realism (Bergmann's realism!) and nominalism, Geach develops a most labored account of predicates as forms. The only trouble is that all of this would seem to have but little to do with the case, at least not with the case of how things other than self-subsistent individuals can ever be real subjects of propositions.

proposition! Nevertheless, even though in this respect there can be no restrictions of any kind on what can be the subject of a proposition, there are of course quite definite restrictions on the way in which terms in propositions can function as subjects (or as predicates for that matter). In other words, in trying to set up his absolute difference between subject and predicate, Geach would seem to be making the same mistake as Frege: he confuses the difference between the way subjects and predicates function in propositions with an absolute ontological difference between the kinds of things that subjects and predicates are able to signify. Moreover, this confusion would seem to spring ultimately from Geach's failure to appreciate the identity-factor in subject-predicate propositions. Not realizing that this identity-factor does not need to be, and certainly ought not to be, interpreted as eliminating all difference between subject and predicate, Geach would seem to want to disregard it altogether. But disregard this factor, and the structure of propositions begins to appear indistinguishable from the corresponding ontological structures which the former are supposed to signify or represent. Unfortunately, though, to interpret St. Thomas in this light is but to implicate Thomistic realism in the difficulties of the so-called referential theory of meaning. Is it any wonder, then, that Professor Geach's proffered guidance through the arcana, alike of St. Thomas' teaching and of the logical doctrine of subject and predicate, should perhaps be eyed with no little suspicion?

IL NUOVO PROBLEMA DELL'ESSERE E LA FONDAZIONE DELLA METAFISICA

Cornelio Fabro C.S.S.

I tentativi di "conciliare" la posizione di Heidegger in generale con la concezione della verità del Cristianesimo ed in particolare con la concezione dell'essere di S. Tommaso non vanno aldilà della buona volontà alla quale lo stesso Heidegger non ha prestato alcuna attenzione.[1] Diverso è invece il giudizio se il problema è portato sul piano critico-teoretico del "significato" delle istanze di Heidegger, lasciando da parte ogni velleità di concordismo esteriore di semantiche superficiali. A nostro avviso, come per gli altri filosofi essenziali dell'epoca moderna, l'opposizione radicale che Heidegger, nella linea del pensiero moderno, ha creduto di oppore al realismo, sfociando nella critica radicale ad ogni dualismo metafisico ed in particolare al creazionismo cristiano, presenta dei pretesti e delle istanze positivi ma esattamente nel senso opposto a quello voluto dai concordisti. Cioè non si tratta tanto di accordo dottrinale fra Heidegger e S. Tommaso, che non ci può essere su nessun punto, quanto di convergenza d'istanze nella tematica e problematica di fondo e quindi nella rottura di una situazione com'è il pensiero contemporaneo che ha superato l'ultimo punto di resistenza ed è precipitato nel nichilismo. Si tratta, se la formula può andare, di una divergenza convergente o convergenza divergente che stimola a nostro avviso un confronto di estrema tensione per una dialettica positiva fra Heidegger e S. Tommaso: convergenza di istanze, divergenza di prospettive — ma più che le formule, sono i problemi stessi che devono guidare il confronto. E sui problemi la convergenza fra i due pensatori non può rivelarsi che a livello sempre più profondo, malgrado la distanza nel tempo e la differenza nella cultura.

Possiamo infatti dire che ambedue "pensano a ritroso" ossia seguono il metodo regressivo di "ritorno al fondamento" (*Rückgang in den*

1 Questo tipo di "concordismo" estrinseco è stato diffuso ad opera della scuola maréchaliana, fedele alla metafisica di Suarez, il quale ha sostituito alla distinzione tomistica reale di *essentia* ed *esse* la distinzione modale estrinseca di *essentia* ed *existentia* a cui Heidegger attribuisce con ragione la perdita della verità dell'essere in Occidente.

Grund)[2] ch'è proprio dei pensatori essenziali. Ambedue vedono questo fondamento nella riduzione all'essere ossia mediante l'illuminazione dell'ente o essente nell'essere. In ambedue la (conoscenza della) verità dell'essere precede la (conoscenza della) dipendenza causale ossia non identificano realtà (esistenza) con effettualità e non fondano la realtà sulla causalità. Di conseguenza ambedue rifiutano la distinzione (modale) di *essentia* ed *existentia* e la considerano la principale responsabile sul piano teoretico dell'oblio dell'essere e del volontarismo assoluto del nichilismo occidentale. Infine ambedue, in quanto convengono nel riportare (fondare) la realtà-verità dell'essente e dell' essenza all'essere, distinguono nel modo più netto la natura dalla grazia e la ragione dalla rivelazione.[3] In questo senso, anche se può sembrare paradossale, nessun pensatore presenta una convergenza di istanze speculative così profonda e radicale con S. Tommaso come Heidegger: è impossibile oggi pensare ad una ripresa veramente operante del tomismo passando sopra alla lezione heideggeriana. E questo per una duplice ragione: anzitutto perché Heidegger ha scrutato a fondo l'istanza positivo-negativa del pensiero moderno — quella del *cogito* che si attua come *volo* — che ha portato alla sostituzione della verità con la "certezza" (*Gewissheit*) ed allo svuotamento della distinzione di *essentia-existentia* precipitando nel nichilismo della volontà di potenza; poi, perché ha rilevato nell'intrico e nell'opposizione dei sistemi la permanente unità di fondo dei problemi.

Il vigore speculativo dell'istanza di Heidegger viene dalla ripresa del plesso di ente-essere (*ἐόν-εἶναι*) di Parmenide, offuscato subito a vantaggio dell'essenza nel pensiero greco e portato al completo oblio nel pensiero moderno: orbene esso è stato riscoperto nella linea speculativa pura da S. Tommaso che ne ha garantito l'emergenza originale con la distinzione (reale) di *essentia* ed *esse* con la quale intendiamo riassumere sia il valore ad un tempo dell'istanza heideggeriana, sia l'impertinenza della sua critica nei confronti del tomismo ed infine la soddisfazione che ha la sua istanza nella concezione tomistica dell'*esse* come *actus essendi* partecipato di cui la dipendenza causale è una "proprietà" non la realtà, come invece accade nell'estrinsecismo di tipo agostinista-nominalista-suareziano. In questa ripresa del plesso *ἐόν-εἶναι* di Parmenide, l'*ἔστιν* non è l'"è" come copula della proposizione,[4]

2 Cf. M. Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik?*, Einleitung, V. Aufl. (Frankfurt a.M. 1949), p. 7 ss.

3 Ambedue perciò si oppongono alla caduta del pensiero nella "scienza" (*Wissenschaft*) come si fa oggi, o nella "fede" (*Glaube*) come nel nominalismo ed in larghi strati del pensiero moderno da Cartesio a Jaspers, oppure nella "speranza" (*Hoffnung*) come il neo-marxismo utopista di E. Bloch e la teologia neo-luterana della speranza (Moltmann, Pannenberg...).

4 Per questa protesta e rivendicazione, vedi: M. Heidegger, *Der Spruch des Anaximander*, in "Holzwege", (Frankfurt a.M. 1950), spec. p. 323 s.

come l'intende il pensiero moderno (e già prima il nominalismo) con la risoluzione della verità a certezza: esso nomina lo *εἶναι* dello *ἐόν*, l'essere presente del presente. L'*ἔστιν* corrisponde alla pura pretesa dell'essere e perciò vien prima della distinzione della *οὐσία* in prima e seconda, in *essentia* ed *existentia*...L'*ἐόν* di Parmenide pertanto è pensato a partire dalla nascosta e non rilevata pienezza del non-nascondimento, ch'era familiare alla prima Grecità, anche se non si poteva ancora, né si sentiva la necessità, di sperimentare sotto ogni aspetto questa pienezza essenziale: ma, per miserando destino, nel corso della storia del pensiero l'essere (dell'essente) fu ridotto al rango del concetto più vuoto e generico. Bene, è questo ricupero che tocca realizzare fino in fondo. Ora Heidegger osserva che le altre parole fondamentali del primo pensiero greco quali *φύσις*, *λόγος*, *μοῖρα* ed *ἔρις*, *ἀλήθεια* ed *ἕν* sono scaturite dall'esperienza dello *ἐόν* degli *ἐόντα* ch'è espresso senza ausilio di concetti: il *λόγος* (*λέγειν* : raccogliere, riunire) è sperimentato [a partire] dalla *ἀλήθεια*, ch'è il nascondere-disvelante e così all' *ἐόν* si appaia lo *ἕν*. Mettiamo allora in chiaro come punto di partenza il problema decisivo per l'eventuale salvezza della metafisica dal fallimento in cui si trova, mediante un ripensamento della "storia dell'essere" (*Geschichte des Seins*) che non è affatto un tornare al passato ma un riportarsi a ciò che si è mostrato come l'iniziale (*das Anfängliche*). Questo ritorno Heidegger lo chiama — con un termine preso da Hölderlin — "ricordo" (*Andenken*) e, sfruttando l'etimologia del termine tedesco, usa anche: *Erinnerung* (interiorizzazione intensificata = *Er-innerung*) che dà il senso del compito. Di qui il titolo ambivalente ma efficace: *Die Erinnerung in die Metaphysik* il quale esige la comprensione simultanea di "la memoria nella metafisica" e di "interiorizzazione nella metafisica" poiché il panorama storico (del primo compito) deve portare alla realizzazione del secondo per la salvezza della metafisica e dell'uomo in essa.

Heidegger perciò può scrivere che "... la memoria nella metafisica si dà a pensare come un'epoca necessaria nella storia dell'essere, che e come di volta in volta l'essere determina la verità dell'essente, che e come l'essere da tale determinazione apre un campo di progetti per la spiegazione dell'essente, che e come tale determinazione spinge dall'interno (*stimmt*) anzitutto alla pretesa dell'essere e da tale spinta interiore costringe un pensatore a parlare dell'essere."[5] Tale ricordo della storia dell'essere esige sempre dall'essenza dell'umanità storica che, prima della dipendenza dell'uomo da forze ed energie, l'essenza dell'uomo sia fatta entrare nella verità dell'essere. L'essente è, così conclude Heidegger come aveva cominciato. Il suo essere contiene la verità,

5 M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche* (Pfullingen 1961), Bd. II, p. 481s.

ch'esso "è". E qui egli tocca il punto critico della sua ricerca che abbiamo già individuato in apertura, sfuggito (mi sembra) all'esuberante letteratura heideggeriana, e che tocca tenere ben fermo per afferrare l'inserzione dell'istanza originale tomistica sul fondamento dell'ente sfuggita sempre ad Heidegger.

Il fatto, egli osserva d'accordo con Aristotele e S. Tommaso, che (*Dass*) l'essente è, questo dà all'essente il privilegio d'indubitabilità dal quale si eleva alla questione di "ciò" (*Was*) che l'essente è. L'essenza (*Was-sein*) è così l'essere ch'è attinto anzitutto a partire dall'essente. In questo si manifesta che l'essere stesso si dà soltanto alla determinazione nella forma dell'entità per portare mediante tale determinatezza stessa soltanto l'essente come tale nell'essenza. Perciò contro l'essenza (*Was-sein* = idea) si distingue allora anzitutto espressamente l'esistenza (*Dass-sein*). E' la distinzione, che già conosciamo, di *essentia* ed *existentia* che porta secondo Heidegger tutta la metafisica e che ha il suo peso nel sigillo essenziale della *existentia*, ma mediante la quale — aggiunge Heidegger — non si può mai attingere la distinzione iniziale che porta e connette tutta la metafisica.

Nella denunzia dell'influsso nefasto che ha avuto nella civiltà e cultura dell'Occidente il predominio della distinzione di essenza ed esistenza sta il merito di Heidegger con l'invito a ripensare a ritroso il problema di Parmenide ed a recuperarne l'intima esigenza speculativa. Quand'egli poi afferma che "... la storia dell'essere non è né la storia dell'uomo e di un'umanità, né la storia del rapporto umano all'essente e all'essere"[6] per concludere che "la storia dell'essere è l'essere stesso e soltanto questo": l'essere per Heidegger — per l'ultimo Heidegger dopo la *Kehre* di *Zeit und Sein* come per il primo di *Sein und Zeit* — è l'accadere puro come essere puro, l'eventarsi dell'evento, nella medesimezza del darsi dell'essere dell'ente all'uomo e dell'apprendere dell' essere da parte dell'uomo, dove l'unica distinzione è quella dell' essente e dell'essere (*Seiende-Sein*).

Parlare di una "concordanza" fra S. Tommaso ed Heidegger non ha senso, non più che per Hegel, Kant, Spinoza e qualsiasi filosofo moderno: quelli che l'hanno tentato, hanno potuto farlo badando soltanto ai semantemi di essere-ente ma trascurando l'accusa fondamentale in cui Heidegger coinvolge, a torto come vedremo, lo stesso S. Tommaso con tutta la tradizione filosofica occidentale: l'oblio dell'essere a causa della distinzione di *essentia* ed *existentia*, come si è detto. Soltanto mostrando il distacco di S. Tommaso da quella tradizione e l'opposizione che quella tradizione ha fatto a S. Tommaso,

6 M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed. cit., Bd. II, p. 488s.

si può aprire il passaggio a quel confronto: un confronto, come si è detto, di convergenza-divergente, di convergenza nella radicalità delle istanze, di divergenza altrettanto radicale nella prospettiva speculativa. Questa divergenza ha il suo nodo nel rifiuto totale da parte di Heidegger della dipendenza causale. Procederemo, per questo confronto, secondo il metodo genetico nella scia di Heidegger.

La Prospettiva di Sviluppo

Dopo il lampo illuminante dell'essere di Parmenide è seguito, per Heidegger, il progressivo oblio (della verità) dell'essere fino alla sua totale scomparsa. Per S. Tommaso viceversa, assistiamo nell'avanzare del pensiero umano alla scoperta progressiva della verità dell'essere dell'ente[7] in una crescente consapevolezza della sua struttura e della sua prima origine: "Antiqui philosophi paulatim et quasi pedetentim intraverunt ad cognitionem veritatis." Nella descrizione delle tappe di questo cammino ascendente egli segue il modello aristotelico circa il *naturalismo* dei primi filosofi: "A principio enim quasi grossiores existentes non existimabant esse entia nisi corpora sensibilia. Quorum qui ponebant in eis motum, non considerabant motum nisi secundum aliqua accidentia, ut puta secundum raritatem et densitatem, congregationem et segregationem." Al fondo resta la materia increata, ciò che vale anche per Platone ed Aristotele: "Et supponentes ipsam substantiam corporum increatam, assignabant aliquas causas huiusmodi accidentalium transmutationum, ut puta amicitiam, litem, intellectum, aut aliquid huiusmodi."

(La scoperta del plesso materia-forma). La seconda tappa è la scoperta della forma sostanziale, principio dell'essere e della sua unità e perfezione: "Ulterius vero procedentes, distinxerunt per intellectum inter formam substantialem et materiam, quam ponebant increatam; et perceperunt transmutationem fieri in corporibus secundum formas essentiales. Quarum transmutationum quasdam causas universaliores ponebant, ut obliquum circulum, secundum Aristotelem, vel ideas, secundum Platonem." Nessun sospetto quindi, ancora in S. Tommaso, dell'importanza di Parmenide ed Eraclito, sepolti dalla storiografia aristotelica nella categoria semplicistica di naturalismo e riscoperti nel loro effettivo contributo speculativo dalla critica moderna. E' esplicita però anche in lui, non meno che in Heidegger e con riferimento

7 Cf. *S. Th.* I, 44, 2 ("Utrum materia prima sit creata a Deo"). Vedi anche: *De Pot.* III, 5 ove però S. Tommaso fa fermare lo sviluppo — come terza tappa — a Platone e ad Aristotele e divide la prima tappa della *S. Theol.* in due (forme accidentali, forme sostanziali individuali) attribuendo a Platone ed Aristotele la scoperta dello *ipsum esse* universale.

teoretico più pertinente, come diremo, l'avvertenza del "limite" della posizione platonico-aristotelica della scoperta della forma da parte di Platone ed Aristotele: "Sed considerandum est quod materia per formam contrahitur ad determinatam speciem; sicut substantia alicuius speciei per accidens ei adveniens contrahitur ad determinatum modum essendi, ut *homo* contrahitur per *album*. Utrique igitur consideraverunt ens particulari quadam consideratione, vel inquantum est *hoc ens*, vel inquantum est *tale ens*. Et sic rebus causas agentes particulares assignaverunt." La requisitoria di S. Tommaso che insiste sulla determinazione dei principi va molto più a fondo di quella di Heidegger che si limita alla denunzia del plesso estrinseco di *essentia-existentia* per cogliere l'oblio dell'essere. S. Tommaso coglie questo oblio da parte dei due massimi filosofi agli antipodi di Heidegger, nella mancata "origine" della materia prima la quale, rimanendo in sé senza principio, del tutto inintelligibile, finisce per rendere impossibile l'afferramento della verità dell'essere.

Perciò l'Angelico ammette una terza epoca filosofica nella fondazione dell'essere: (La scoperta del plesso *ens-esse* e la creazione della materia prima) "Et ulterius aliqui erexerunt se ad considerandum ens inquantum est ens: et consideraverunt causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt *haec* vel *talia*, sed secundum quod sunt *entia*. Hoc igitur quod est causa rerum inquantum sunt entia, oportet esse causam rerum, non solum secundum quod sunt *talia* per formas accidentales, nec secundum quod sunt *haec* per formas substantiales, sed etiam secundum omne illud quod pertinet ad esse illorum quocumque modo. Et sic oportet ponere etiam materiam primam creatam ab universali causa entium."[8] Certamente qui gli "aliqui" sono i neoplatonici greci, arabi e latini.

Ciò che anzitutto risulta da questo primo passo del confronto è la convergenza di S. Tommaso e Heidegger secondo un tipo di metodo

8 Questa terza tappa, attribuita nella *S. Th.* alla filosofia ch'è seguita a Platone ed Aristotele e mancante nel *De Potentia*, sembra contraddire con la tesi dell'art. 1 ("Utrum sit necessarium omne ens esse creatum a Deo") che attribuisce espressamente il principio della creazione totale (partecipazione dell'essere) a Platone e ad Aristotele. La cosa più sorprendente è che nel *De Substantiis separatis* (1270-73) lo schema storiografico è di nuovo rivoluzionato e diventato più complesso, ma è conservata la divisione triadica secondo la successione: Anassagora, Platone, Aristotele, ove i "Naturales", che sono i Presocratici della storiografia moderna, formano ora il "prologo" della *triplex via* (cc. 1-2). Il netto distacco posto ora fra Platone ed Aristotele ha portato ad un confronto di accordo di fondo (*convenientia*) e di disaccordo su punti particolari (*differentia*) fra i due filosofi (cc. 3-4). L'accordo, oltre alla creazione, qui comprende la composizione di essenza ed *esse* (anche nelle creature spirituali) e la provvidenza universale (ed. Leon., Roma 1969, p. 46 s.). Sul "metodo regressivo-intensivo", usato da S. Tommaso nel riferimento alle sue fonti, vedi: C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, III ed. (Torino 1963), p. 43ss., 75ss.

regressivo intensivo in quanto l'uno e l'altro vedono nei predecessori, assieme alle lacune, la presenza ascendente del "proprio" principio speculativo (l'*esse* come atto primo fondante per S. Tommaso, il *Sein* come presenza del presente per Heidegger). Una convergenza che sottende la divergenza ovvero l'antitesi radicale. S. Tommaso si muove riportando l'ente ai suoi principi operando per tappe, cioè dall'apparire che l'ente presenta mediante gli accidenti alla sua costituzione essenziale *ut tale ens* (essenza come sinolo di materia e forma, di sostanza e accidenti) alla costituzione radicale di *ens ut ens* (di *essentia* ed *esse*). Heidegger, che ha portato il principio moderno dell'identità di essere e conoscere alla sua esigenza radicale di avvertimento di presenza e assenza non conosce che l'opposizione di essere e non-essere (nulla). Perciò, mentre S. Tommaso sprofonda l'*esse* ad atto fondamentale ed unico della stessa forma pura e di tutto ciò che è ed appare nel reale, il *Sein* heideggeriano s'identifica con l'apparire puro ed il non-essere con lo scomparire.

Il significato pertanto del plesso *ens-esse*, già al primo passo di orientamento storiografico, è interpretato da Heidegger e S. Tommaso in senso diametralmente opposto e non poteva essere diversamente data la divergenza radicale dell'orientamento iniziale, realista in S. Tommaso, immanentista in Heidegger. S. Tommaso distingue tre livelli: l'apparire rispetto alle mutazioni accidentali sul fondamento della sostanza che contiene gli accidenti, il divenire rispetto alle mutazioni sostanziali sul fondamento della composizione di materia e forma grazie all'immanenza-emergenza della forma sulla materia e sul sinolo, l'origine prima della creazione grazie all'immanenza-emergenza dello *esse* sulla forma e sull'ente. Heidegger non conosce che il plesso di *Sein-Seiendes* e l'unico tipo di attuarsi nell'evento temporale ossia come puro apparire, unico contenuto (se così si può dire) neutrale e inesauribile (*Sein und Zeit, Zeit und Sein*) della verità. Già in questo primo confronto la somiglianza-dissomiglianza, fra i due pensatori, sembra chiarirsi in una somiglianza puramente esteriore ed in una dissomiglianza reale: a nostro avviso il loro incontro-scontro ha un significato più profondo e i due momenti non vanno separati ma devono convivere. Si tratta infatti che il problema teoretico della fondazione della verità del reale sorge, sia in S. Tommaso come in Heidegger, da esigenze similari ma è orientato in prospettive opposte. La stessa situazione si ripete nello svolgimento del confronto.

Il Punto di Partenza o "Cominciamento"

In Heidegger, come si è visto, il cominciamento è fatto con il plesso "l'essente è" poiché "nell'essente appare l'essere" e così "l'essente è il reale." In realtà però Heidegger è d'accordo con Hegel poiché quell'essere dell'essente è identico al non-essere e sta quindi per il semplice (essere dell') "apparire." Quando infatti Heidegger procede spiegando che "... nell'essente appare l'essere,"[9] l'essenza dell'essere è questo puro apparire (*erscheinen*) dispiegantesi mediante la temporalità del *Dasein* ch'è l'uomo. Ma mentre Hegel considera l'essere e il nulla come momenti astratti (dell'indeterminatezza dell'immediatezza) da superare col ricorso (mediazione) all'Infinito come fondamento e principio che sta "dietro le spalle," per Heidegger l'essere coincide con l'apparire ed il non-essere con lo scomparire, esso è principio e fine ad un tempo *nel* tempo ch'è senza fine. Per questo "...l'essere stesso è nell' essenza finito e si manifesta soltanto nella trascendenza della realtà umana (*Dasein*) che si è mantenuta fuori nel nulla."[10] Per Hegel il cominciamento è l'essere vuoto (dell'apparire puro) dell'immediatezza e perciò in questa sua astrazione è identico al nulla: si tratta perciò qui di un cominciamento apparente, provvisorio e didattico, per così dire, perché il cominciamento reale è fatto con l'Assoluto ed in virtù dell'Assoluto che "sta alle spalle" del soggetto conoscente e dà perciò la "spinta"[11] alla riflessione speculativa per attingere l'ultimo fondamento. Per Heidegger invece l'essere è il tempo come attuarsi dell'uomo nel mondo: così non c'è che il divenire storico, orizzontale ch'è identità di compresenza di essere e non-essere[12] nel rispettivo mutuo condizionarsi secondo la struttura dell'evento (*Er-Eignis*), come si è visto. Trascendenza e "metafisica" sono allora sinonimi anche per Heidegger, ma con significato capovolto: essi indicano il portarsi della coscienza (ovvero del *Dasein* ch'è la realtà umana) alla natura (*φύσις*, mondo...), il suo

9 "Im Seienden erscheint das Sein" (M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed. cit., Bd. II, p. 339, 488).

10 "Sein und Nichts gehören zusammen, aber nicht weil sie beide — vom Hegelschen Begriff des Denkens aus gesehen — in ihrer Unbestimmtheit und Unmittelbarkeit übereinkommen, sondern weil das Sein selbst im Wesen endlicht ist und sich nur in der Transzendenz des in das Nichts hinausgehaltenen Daseins offenbart" (M. Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik?*, ed. cit., p. 36).

11 Ed Hegel infatti parla di "impulso" (*Trieb*) che corrisponde al *conatus* di Spinoza, alla *vis activa* o *nisus* della monade di Leibniz... come Hegel stesso ricorda (cf. *Wissenschaft der Logik*, II. Buch, 1. Abschn., 1. Kap.; Lasson II, 59). E' un punto dell'hegelismo che merita di essere approfondito.

12 Di lì a poco infatti Heidegger con chiarezza esemplare: "Das menschliche Dasein kann sich nur zu Seiendem verhalten, wenn es sich in das Nichts hineinhält. Das Hinausgehen über das Seiende geschieht im Wesen des Dasein s. Dieses Hinausgehen aber ist die Metaphysik selbst" (*Was ist Metaphysik?*, ed. cit., p. 37).

farsi mondo e farsi nel mondo.[13] Non c'è più per Heidegger, come per nessun filosofo dopo il capovolgimento che l'idealismo ha fatto di Kant, un problema della conoscenza distinto dal problema metafisico: *Sein und Zeit* infatti non è che un'analisi di fenomenologia trascendentale del comportamento,[14] nel senso di una completa estroflessione della soggettività ch'è dissolta nella neutralità dello "es gibt" dell'evento.

Assai più complessa è la semantica del plesso tomistico di *ens-esse*, che corrisponde alla lettera al *Seiende-Sein* di Heidegger, sulla quale non si è fatta ancora completa luce da parte dei tomisti: a noi interessa questa volta rilevare soltanto i momenti principali della sua progressione teoretica.

A differenza di Hegel e Heidegger (e forse dello stesso Parmenide), che scivolano sul plesso intensivo del *Seiende* e fanno il cominciamento con il *Sein* come presenza vuota, S. Tommaso comincia con lo *ens* come il nodo di presa della realtà da parte della mente. Nei primi scritti il suggerimento (o pretesto) sembra venire da Avicenna, ma nello sfondo domina la posizione di Aristotele che attribuisce alla metafisica come oggetto proprio d'indagare sullo ὂν ᾗ ὄν.[15] La ragione di questa precedenza assoluta che lo *ens* ha su tutti i semantemi sembra proprio la proprietà che lo ὄν ha di stare al vertice dei concetti; ma qui soccorre, a salvare lo *ens* dalla riduzione ad un prodotto di pura astrazione logica, l'affermazione aristotelica, decisiva per la metafisica tomistica, che "... l'ente non è un genere."[16] Ma il modo di arrivare alla posizione dello *ens*, in questo primo periodo almeno, sembra decisamente di natura logica ossia "riduttivo" formale. Ecco il testo forse più completo:

> Dicendum quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum. Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod omnes conceptiones resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio *Metaphysicae* suae [lib. I, c. IX]. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens. Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum

13 Questa nozione di "trascendenza" può anche considerarsi come la risposta — e la sconfessione drastica — al progetto kantiano di passare dalla Critica della ragion pura alla cosidetta "Metafisica della natura" (cf. *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Vorrede, A XXI).

14 Di qui il favore che *Sein und Zeit* ha trovato presso alcuni psichiatri (Binswanger, H. Müller-Suur, J. Meinertz...).

15 "Ens et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in principio suae Metaphysicae" (*De ente et essentia*, Prol.; Baur 11, 3-6). Il richiamo ad Avicenna sembra di obbligo in questo periodo: *In I Sent.* 25, I, 4; 38, I, 4, 4^m; *De Ver.* I, 1. C'è ancora nel più tardo commento alla Metafisica: lib. I, l. 2, nr. 40. Per la formula di Aristotele, vedi: *Metaph.* IV, 1, 1003a21.

16 *Metaph.* III, 8, 998b22.

quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens; unde etiam probat Philosophus in III *Metaphys.* [com. 10], quod ens non potest esse genus.[17]

Il testo è complesso perché ha tutta l'apparenza di una deduzione formalista e contenutistica soprattutto con l'inciso: "Sed enti non potest addi aliquid quasi extranea natura, per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura essentialiter est ens." E'vero che qui l'analisi è presentata nell'ambito formale delle categorie: nel primo momento la divisione dell'ente è presa a partire dai modi di essere che sono la sostanza e gli accidenti, quella è presa dall'essere principale e questi indicano le essenze o forme secondarie. L'*esse*, come *actus essendi*, che qui sembra lasciato nell'ombra, emerge invece subito nella deduzione seguente dei trascendentali ove spicca l'apporto neoplatonico e S. Tommaso torna infatti a richiamarsi ad Avicenna. L'*ens* è espressamente distinto dalla *res* proprio per questo che "... ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quiditatem vel essentiam entis."[18] La distinzione fra atto (*esse*) e contenuto (*essentia*) è qui ormai esplicita ed è posta a fondamento della struttura della metafisica.

Sembra, questo procedimento, una deduzione di tipo logico essenzialistico, come farebbe pensare il prologo del nostro testo: "Sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando *quid est* unumquodque, alias utrobique in infinitum iretur..." Il "quid est" infatti fa subito pensare al *τί ἐστιν* aristotelico, richiamato anche da Heidegger, e perciò all'essenza, così che la riduzione ultima debba terminare nel concetto del contenuto più indeterminato qual è appunto lo *ens generalissimum* della Scolastica giustamente deprecata da Heidegger. Questo però è già escluso dallo sviluppo e dal seguito del testo tomistico, come si è visto, che mette in evidenza l'*actus essendi* il quale conferisce al semantema *ens* la struttura paradossale di plesso il più concreto e comunissimo ad un tempo. Una formulazione stimolante in questa direzione è contemporanea al *De ente*: "Primum quod cadit in imaginatione intellectus est ens, sine quo nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu, sicut id quod primum cadit in credulitate intellectus sunt dignitates et praecipue ista, contradictoria non esse simul vera; unde omnia alia includuntur quodammodo in ente unite et distincte, sicut in principio."[19] L'espressione "unite et distincte" è un lampo di genio del giovane baccelliere che contiene la problematica dell'intera metafisica. E si può chiarire allora il significato che può avere la *additio* per il semantema *ens*: altra è la con-

17 *De Ver.* I, 1; ed. leon. (Romae 1970), p. 4b-5a.
18 *De Ver.* I, 1; ed. cit., p. 5b.
19 *In I Sent.* 8, I, 3; Mandonnet I, p. 200.

dizione (del concetto) di Dio, spiega S. Tommaso, il quale è in sé perfetto e non può ricevere aggiunta; altra è la condizione (del concetto) di *ens commune* che astrae da ogni aggiunta "...ita quod non sit de ratione eius quod fiat additio, neque quod non fiat, et hoc modo ens commune est sine additione." E spiega: "In intellectu enim entis non includitur ista conditio, sine additione; alias numquam posset sibi fieri additio, quia esset contra rationem eius; et ideo commune est, quia in sui ratione non dicit aliquam additionem, sed potest sibi fieri ut determinetur ad proprium."[20] E questo avviene p. es. come nel genere animale comune che prescinde dalle determinazioni che sono le differenze di *rationale* e *irrationale*. La spiegazione è esemplificativa, perché S. Tommaso tiene sempre saldo fin da principio che l'ente non è un genere. Ed è sotto la spinta di questo principio aristotelico, combinato ancora con un riferimento ad Avicenna, che l'Angelico arriva alla sua formulazione originale del semantema *ens*:

> Ista definitio, secundum Avicennam, non potest esse substantiae: substantia est quae non est in subiecto. Ens enim non est genus. Haec autem negatio "non in subiecto" nihil ponit; unde hoc quod dico, ens non est in subiecto, non dicit aliquod genus: quia in quolibet genere oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de cuius intellectu non est esse. Ens autem non dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum; et ideo non sequitur: est non in subiecto, ergo est in genere substantiae; sed oportet addi: est habens quidditatem quam consequitur esse non in subiecto; ergo est in genere substantiae.[21]

E' chiaro quindi che l'impressione dell'origine essenzialistica del nostro semantema va abbandonata, anche se si può forse ammettere che in questo primo periodo gli influssi aristotelici e platonici non sembrano ancora giunti ad una completa fusione come si può osservare negli scritti della maturità. Comunque fin da principio la prima *Diremtion* trascendentale di *ens* e *res* per S. Tommaso è chiara: quello rimanda all'*esse* e questa all'*essentia* come preciserà il *De Veritate*.[22] Qui allora si fa evidente la differenza radicale iniziale fra Heidegger e S. Tommaso e con essa si chiarifica la mediazione funesta che la distinzione scolastica di *essentia* ed *existentia* ha operato per l'oblio dell'essere consumato dal pensiero moderno con la risoluzione dell'essere nell'identità di pensiero-volontà. Per Heidegger si presenta soltanto il plesso di essente-essere (*Seiende-Sein*), ove l'essere dice la presenza dell'essente e pertanto la sua *illuminazione*: il concetto di *essentia* — come "contenuto" dell'ente derivato dalla *ἰδέα* — è il sot-

20 *In I Sent.* 8, IV, 1 ad 1; Mandonnet I, p. 219.
21 *In I Sent.* 8, IV, 2 ad 2; Mandonnet I, p. 222s.
22 Cf. *De Ver.* I, 1.

toprodotto del separatismo platonico assunto poi dal Cristianesimo, la *existentia* in quanto fondata sulla causalità estrinseca deriva dal creazionismo cristiano. Per S. Tommaso però è altrettanto saldo, quanto per Heidegger, che l'*esse* è l'atto dello *ens* nel senso forte di ἐνέργεια come si è detto e come l'Angelico ha mantenuto da principio alla fine: "Esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens."[23] L'emergenza dell'*esse* (*actus essendi*) vale quindi per S. Tommaso come l'affermazione della consistenza primaria della realtà nel suo immediato presentarsi come verità dell'ente. L'istanza e la semantica dell'inizio, che implica insieme quella del fondamento, coincidono quindi in Heidegger e S. Tommaso: il loro significato però sta agli antipodi. L'ente e l'*esse* di cui parla S. Tommaso precede e fonda il pensiero e l'attuarsi della coscienza in generale; per Heidegger invece, anche se sembra respingere il soggettivismo immanentistico, l'essere del soggetto umano è il suo ec-sistere come trascendersi nel mondo — perciò può dirsi immanentismo ontologico e quindi monismo metafisico, come si è visto sopra. Abbagliato dall'estrinsecismo del plesso di *essentia-existentia*, Heidegger si è fermato al *Sein* come apparire e presentarsi che si risolve nel rapporto (*Bezug*) scambievole di uomo e mondo.

Per S. Tommaso invece l'*ens* è fondato in profondità nel duplice riferimento alla "essentia" come contenuto e allo "esse" come atto di cui risulta la sintesi in atto di ente come plesso semantico originario del reale esistente. La *existentia* dice perciò soltanto la realtà di "fatto" dello *ens*, attestato dall'esperienza: ossia la *actualitas* ch'è l'oggetto del giudizio di effettualità esistenziale: p.es. l'esistenza del mondo, dell'anima, di Dio, dei pianeti e degli astri... ed anche degli accidenti come salute, scienza, ricchezza, bellezza... e perfino delle privazioni come malattie e morte, ignoranza e vizio — "esistono" anch'esse, e come! Ma sia degli accidenti e tanto più delle privazioni non si può dire che abbiano l'*esse* e quindi che siano propriamente *entia*. *Ens* secondo S. Tommaso ha significato forte e si dice in senso proprio soltanto la "sostanza" che sussiste nella sua essenza in virtù del suo *actus essendi*. Il principio della sostanza è perciò il pilastro del realismo metafisico, che sta perciò agli antipodi dello storicismo ontologico dell'evento (*Ereignis*) di Heidegger. La sostanza è infatti — come *ens* a titolo primario — il portatore proprio dello *esse*: "Nam cum ens dicat aliquid

23 *Quodl.* IX, II, 3. Alcuni testi: "Nomen entis ab esse imponitur" (*In I Sent.* 19, V, 1); "Nomen entis nullo modo sumitur ab aliqua relatione sed ab esse... sed nomen rei imponitur a quidditate vel forma" (Ibid. 25, I, 4 ad 1); "Ipsum esse est quo substantia denominatur ens" (*C. Gent.* II, 54); "Res et ens significant omnino idem sed sec. diversas rationes. Hoc nomen res imponitur a quidditate tantum; hoc vero nomen ens imponitur ab actu essendi" (*In IV Metaph.*, 1, 2, nr. 553. Cf. nr. 558); "Esse idem est quod actus entis" (*Quodl.* XII, I, 1 ad 1).

proprie esse in actu, actus autem proprie ordinem habeat ad potentiam, secundum hoc simpliciter aliquid dicitur ens secundum quod primo discernitur ab eo quod est in potentia tantum. Hoc autem est esse substantiale rei uniuscuiusque. Unde per suum esse substantiale dicitur unumquodque ens simpliciter: per actus superadditos dicitur esse secundum quid."[24] Lo schema aristotelico delle categorie resta quindi dominante, ma lo *esse* vi compare come principio attuale fondante che attua la sostanza come un tutto mentre per Aristotele l'atto della sostanza era la forma sostanziale.[25] E questo ci riporta alla riflessione iniziale ossia che l'*ens* è il semantema ad un tempo il più comune ed insieme il più concreto: "Ens quamvis sit communissimum tamen concretive dicitur."[26] Per Heidegger invece il plesso *Seiende-Sein* è e si esaurisce in un rapporto di comportamento trascendentale (*Bezug*), non fa capo ad un atto e ad un contenuto di una realtà ma al manifestarsi del comportamento di un soggetto e per un oggetto ch'è l'uomo storico nella dinamica del tempo.

Il parallelismo antitetico di Heidegger-S. Tommaso prosegue e si approfondisce. Nel plesso *Seiende-Sein* di Heidegger, la verità del *Seiende* è il *Sein* ossia il presentarsi come accadere puro e così il *Seiende* "cade" nel *Sein*. Il plesso invece di *ens* si biforca in *essentia* ed *esse* e così diventa il plesso trascendentale per la conoscenza della verità. Questo principio tomistico è di un'estrema densità d'implicazioni il cui sviluppo costituisce la messa in opera delle strutture portanti, non solo della conoscenza immediata e della scienza in generale e delle scienze applicate sia della natura come dello spirito, ma anzitutto e soprattutto della metafisica.

L'*ens* come plesso trascendentale dell'intelligibilità del reale: "Primum quod cadit in imaginatione intellectus est ens, sine quo nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu, sicut primum quod cadit in credulitate intellectus sunt dignitates et praecipue ista, contradictoria non esse simul vera: unde omnia alia includuntur quodammodo in ente unite et distincte, sicut in principio."[27] Rileviamo i momenti fondamentali di questa trascendentalità, che corrisponde per antitesi a quella del *cogito-volo* moderno.

L'*ens* — come si è visto nei testi già citati — è certamente il *primum*

24 *S. Th.* I, 5, 1 ad 1. Così p. es. anche nel commento alla Metafisica: "Ens simpliciter dicitur id quod in se habet esse, scilicet substantia" (*In lib. XI*, 1. 3, nr. 2197); "Nam ens dicitur quasi esse habens, hoc autem solum est substantia quae subsistit" (*In lib. XII*, 1. 1, nr. 2419).

25 Perciò in uno degli ultimi commenti, S. Tommaso scrive: "Ens nihil aliud est quam quod est... significat rem quae habet esse" (*In Periherm.* c. 1, lect. 5).

26 *In Boeth. De Hebd.*, lect. 2.

27 *In I Sent.* 8, I, 3; Mandonnet I, p. 200.

nella sfera ontico-fenomenologica cioè il fondamento: "...*primum* quod cadit in imaginatione"; "*primum* quod cadit in intellectu... quod intellectus intelligit"; "*primum* quod cadit in conceptione humana."[28] La ragione di questa priorità è che *ens* dice l'essere in atto e l'essere in atto è essere nella propria verità e perfezione e corrispondere perciò al proprio destino (*Geschick*) come direbbe Heidegger. Questo destino per le realtà naturali e per l'uomo, in quanto si trova e opera nel tempo, si attua certamente nel tempo, ma non è detto che abbia nel tempo il suo primo fondamento e che ottenga nel tempo il suo ultimo compimento, come pretende Heidegger e l'antropologia trascendentale post-hegeliana. Per S. Tommaso al *transcendentale fundans originarium*, nel senso intensivo di ciò ch'è insieme il primo dato alla (della) coscienza e ciò che fa pensare ossia che mette in movimento il pensiero per il conseguimento della verità del reale, è l'afferramento primordiale del plesso di "ens": "Id quod primo acquiritur ab intellectu est ens et id in quo non invenitur ratio entis non est capibile ab intellectu."[29] In questa genesi trascendentale del conoscere le conoscenze posteriori, si badi bene, restano immanenti al plesso originario di *ens*, non soltanto — come presto si dirà — come "punto di partenza" da lasciare alle spalle ma come il principio di fondazione a cui si deve restare sempre attaccati come la garanzia dell'attacco con la realtà. "Hoc verbum *Est* consignificat compositionem quia non eam principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim illud quod cadit in intellęctu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam Est simpliciter dictum significat in

28 *In Boeth. De Trin.*, q. I, a. 3 ad 3. Rileggiamo ancora: "Ens est prima intentio intellectus" (*In I Sent.* 19, V. 1 ad ult.); "Primum cadens in apprehensione est ens..." (*In I Sent.* 25, I, 4); "Illud quod primum intellectus concipit quasi notissimum est ens" (*De Ver.* I, 1); "Cum ens sit quod primo cadit in conceptione mentis" (*De Ver.* XXI, 1); "Illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione intellectus est ens..." (*De Ver.* XXI, 4 ad 4); "Primum in conceptione cadit ens" (*S. Th.* I, 5, 2); "Intellectus per prius apprehendit ipsum ens..." (*S. Th.* I, 16, 4 ad 2); "Primum quod in intellectum cadit est ens" (*De Pot.* IX, 7 ad 15); "Cum autem ens sit primum quod in intellectu concipitur" (ibid.: "Ad ea quae in oppositum").

29 *In lib. De causis*, lect. 6; Saffrey 47, Pera nr. 174. Qui, alla fine della sua carriera, S. Tommaso s'ispira espressamente al principio di Proclo: "*Πᾶν τὸ θεῖον αὐτὸ μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπερούσιον ἕνωσιν ἄρρητόν ἐστι καὶ ἄγνωστον πᾶσι τοῖς δευτέροις*".(Proclus, *Elementatio Theologica*, Prop. 123; Dodds 108). E' la ripresa, ora approfondita col neoplatonismo greco, dell' intuizione giovanile sopra ricordata, mantenuta nella maturità: "Primum quod cadit in imaginatione est ens, *sine quod nihil potest apprehendi ab intellectu" (In I Sent.* 8, I, 3); "*...et in quod omnes conceptiones resolvit" (De Ver.* I, 1); "*...unde unicuique apprehenso a nobis attribuimus quod sit ens" (S. Th.* I-II, 55, 4 ad 1); "In his quae in apprehensione hominis cadunt, quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione est *ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit" (S. Th.* I-II, 94, 2).

actu esse."[30] Così si può dire che la posizione del cosidetto problema critico del conoscere coincide, per S. Tommaso, come a loro modo anche in Hegel e Heidegger, con la stessa posizione radicale della verità dell'essere.

LA DEDUZIONE TRASCENDENTALE DELLO "ENS" TOMISTICO

Essa si presenta in tre momenti o fasi di fondazione del conoscere nel suo articolarsi interiore e costitutivo primario: per le forme o essenze, per i trascendentali, per i primi principi.

a) *Le forme o essenze.*

Infatti l'ente esprime un contenuto in atto ch'è precisamente l'essenza reale, come si è visto nella prima *Diremtion* dello *ens*. Perciò l'essenza appartiene all'*ens* e come ha la sua realtà grazie allo *esse* dello *ens*, così trae da esso la sua intelligibilità: "Illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione intellectus est ens; unde oportet quod cuicumque apprehenso per intellectum, intellectus attribuat hoc quod est ens. Et ideo cum apprehendit essentiam alicuius entis, dicit illam essentiam esse ens; et similiter unamquamque formam generalem vel specialem, ut bonitas est ens, albedo est ens, et sic de aliis."[31] L'osservazione prepara l'emergenza intensiva dello *esse*, come atto di tutti gli atti e perfezione di tutte le perfezioni, come si dirà più avanti. E' questo il momento metafisico della *res*, come primo trascendentale, accennato sopra. S. Tommaso presenta la *res* come il primo "modo" (*modus*) "... secundum quod consequitur omne ens in se" in forma affermativa: "Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente nisi essentia eius secundum quam esse dicitur: et sic imponitur hoc nomen *res*; quod in hoc differt ab ente secundum Avicennam in principio *Metaphysicae* quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis."[32]

Qui però sorge un problema di fondo, rimasto finora nell'ombra. E' noto che S. Tommaso, fedele all'antropologia di Aristotele, attribuisce come oggetto proprio dell'intelletto umano l'essenza delle cose materiali conosciuta per astrazione, la quale sembra costituire così il

30 *In lib. Periherm.* c. 1, lect. 5.
31 *De Ver.* XXI, 4 ad 4.
32 *De Ver.* I, 1. Per il testo di Avicenna, cf. *Metaph.* I, 6 (ed. Veneta 1508, fol. 72rb). Assieme allo *ens*, fra i *primum cognita*, Avicenna include la *res* e il *necesse esse*.

punto di partenza per la conoscenza del reale: invece si è visto che l'oggetto proprio dell'intelletto è il plesso di *ens*.

Ma il problema ci sembra soltanto apparente, qualora sia visto all'interno della struttura del pensiero tomistico. La conoscenza per astrazione riguarda il "contenuto" cioè l'essenza ed è perciò una conoscenza che esige appunto la riflessione astrattiva, mentre l'apprensione dello *ens* è immediata e costituisce il primo passo di apprensione del reale.[33] Là si tratta di una conoscenza riflessa specifica cioè esplicita dell'essenza (*res*) come tale, limitata perciò ai costitutivi propri del suo contenuto come sono presenti nell'astrazione (dalla singolarità in cui si trovano nella realtà); qui invece si ha la apprensione implicita *globale* che mette il soggetto nel primo contatto *diretto* con la realtà. Il rapporto fra questi due momenti del conoscere non è di esclusione ma d'integrazione e di fondazione: cioè è quella del tutto alla parte e di pensiero spontaneo al pensiero riflesso. Questa connessione sembra suggerita da S. Tommaso con esplicito riferimento ad Aristotele: "Ens autem dicitur id quod finite participat esse et hoc est proportionatum intellectui nostro, cuius obiectum est "quod quid est" ut dicitur in III De Anima.[34] Unde illud solum est capibile ab intellectu nostro quod habet quidditatem participantem esse."[35] L'apprensione dello *ens* porta sull'affermazione della realtà in quanto nella sua complessità è presente e data alla vita cosciente del conoscente; la conoscenza dell'essenza è di natura specializzata e suppone come sostegno e punto di partenza quella di *ens*. Questo vale soprattutto nella concezione tomistica che esige nell'attuarsi dell'astrazione la "conversio ad phantasmata" ossia il riferimento al singolare esistente che è appunto tale in quanto è *ens*. Il progresso di S. Tommaso, anche questa volta, avviene in modo mirabile all'interno dei principi aristotelici:

> Intellectus autem humani, qui est coniunctus corpori, proprium obiectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corporali existens; et per huiusmodi naturas visibilium rerum etiam in invisibilium rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem huius naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali: sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cuiuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulare autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem. Et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus

33 "Simpliciter enim dicitur res quod habet esse ratum et firmum in natura... sec. quod habet quidditatem vel essentiam quamdam; ens vero sec. quod habet esse, ut dicit Avicenna" (*In II Sent.* 37, I, 1; Mandonnet II, p. 944).

34 *De an.* III, 4, 429b10ss.

35 *In lib. De causis*, lect. 6; Saffrey 47, Pera nr. 175.

actu intelligat suum obiectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem.[36]

L'apprensione originaria dello *ens* è solidale con l'intero dinamismo della coscienza ed è presente perciò a tutti i livelli dell'attività dello spirito teoretico e pratico.

b) *I trascendentali.*

La rappresentazione (e la rappresentabilità) appartiene alla *res*, all'essenza, grazie al contenuto ch'essa "presenta" mediante il quale si pone nella realtà e l'una cosa si distingue dall'altra. La cosa si presenta anzitutto mediante l'esperienza nella propria situazione spaziotemporale e con le caratteristiche sensibili immediate p. es. le qualità caratteristiche dell'albero, della casa, del cavallo... La rappresentazione sensibile (e la rappresentabilità) sta pertanto a fondamento dell'oggettività (e dell'oggettivazione) del conoscere: nel realismo aristotelico essa fa capo, come si è visto, alla *conversio ad phantasmata* ch'è la mutua necessaria implicanza di senso e intelletto nella conoscenza della realtà. Questa implicanza indica la dipendenza stretta, continua e indispensabile, dei concetti puri ad ogni livello (sia generico e specifico, sia fisico, morale, estetico, religioso...) dai contenuti di esperienza interna ed esterna. Tale dipendenza radicale e sostitutiva dell'attività intellettuale noetica formale dalla sfera sensibile caratterizza, nel suo momento dinamico, il realismo del conoscere, il quale come comincia dal contatto diretto con le cose riguarda le cose che il mondo presenta al soggetto e termina alle cose stesse. La *conversio ad phantasmata* costituisce pertanto il processo di oggettivazione in *actu exercito* nel suo momento fondamentale il quale rivela (ed attua) ad un tempo la struttura trascendentale del soggetto di senso e intelletto e la struttura dell'oggetto ai suoi vari livelli intenzionali: di essente ed essere, di essente ed essenza, di essenza ed *esse*, di sostanza ed accidenti, di materia e forma... secondo l'intero intreccio costitutivo della realtà. Ma qui trascendentale ha il senso opposto a quello kantiano: esso indica la dipendenza dell'intelligibile dal sensibile, della rappresentazione dalla presentazione, del soggetto dall'oggetto...Secondo Kant invece — al quale si richiama ovvero ritorna Heidegger —

spazio e tempo sono soltanto forme dell'intuizione sensibile, quindi soltanto condizioni dell'esistenza (*Existenz*) delle cose come ap-

36 *S. Th.* I, 84, 7. Sulla connessione di questa dottrina con la concezione tomistica (finora trascurata) della *cogitativa*, cf. C. Fabro, *Percezione e pensiero*, II ed. (Brescia 1962), p. 198ss., spec. pp. 208-234.

parizioni (*Erscheinungen*); inoltre noi non abbiamo nessun concetto dell'intelletto quindi anche nessun elemento (*Elemente*) per la conoscenza delle cose se non in quanto può essere data un'intuizione corrispondente a questi concetti; di conseguenza noi non possiamo avere conoscenza di alcun oggetto (*Gegenstand*) in quanto cosa in se stessa ma soltanto in quanto esso è oggetto (*Objekt*) dell'intuizione sensibile cioè in quanto apparizione.[37]

Il trascendentale moderno ripete quindi, ma con movimento inverso e con significato opposto, la funzione della *conversio ad phantasmata*: qui infatti il momento formale (detto a priori) è tutto da parte del soggetto ed il conoscere perciò non termina alla cosa in sé ed all'essere ma all'apparizione. Il trascendentale moderno, come ha precisato con acume Heidegger, non è identico all'a priori ma è l'a priori che determina l'oggetto *come* oggetto, l'oggettività. Di qui il capovolgimento del concetto di "trascendenza," come si è visto sopra, nel senso di oggettività ossia di riferirsi del soggetto al mondo e (di avvertire) di essere-nel-mondo come essere storico. Questo avviene, si badi bene, mediante la rappresentazione dell'oggetto che ha nel soggetto l'origine (la possibilità) della sua rappresentabilità: quindi la sua oggettività è fondata a partire da qualcosa (l'a priori = spazio e tempo, le categorie, l'io penso...) che "gli viene-prima" e precisamente nel rappresentare. La pensabilità è perciò la rappresentabilità di qualcosa come condizione del conoscere. Io penso qualcosa.[38] Kant, ed il pensiero moderno in genere, cominciano con la *res* e non conoscono l'*ens*: stretto in quest'essenzialismo, il pensiero è anzitutto e soltanto presenza di contenuto ch'è sostenuto dalla rappresentazione e condizionato nel suo fondamento dalla capacità rappresentativa del soggetto, la *Denkbarkeit* come *Vor-stellbarkeit*. Perciò da questo deriva anche il significato opposto, osserva Heidegger, che ha l'intuizione (*Anschauung*) in Kant in quanto essa rimane fondata nella posizione fondamentale dello "Io penso" che attua l'oggettivazione come rappresentare.[39] Perciò alla domanda: che significa lo "Ich denke" di Kant? — Heidegger risponde, questo: "Io rappresento qualcosa come qualcosa"[40] e questo comporta l'unificazione (dei dati sensibili e dell'a priori). L'essere è la loro unità. Pensare è quindi unificare nel senso di rappresentare l'unità dell'essente.

37 Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Vorrede zur zweiten Aufl., B XXVs.

38 M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed. cit., Bd. II, p. 466.

39 Il "rappresentare" italiano non rende l'efficacia del tedesco *Vorstellen* che è il "porre prima cioè in anticipo" (*vor-stellen*) o "darsi-in-anticipo" (*Vor-sich-brungen*) come insiste Heidegger (l.c.).

40 "Was heisst dann das Kantische 'Ich denke'? Soviel wie: Ich stelle etwas als etwas vor" (op. cit., Bd. II, p. 461).

Ma questo è sempre un muoversi nella scia e dentro il formalismo (essenzialismo) scolastico della distinzione di *essentia* ed *existentia* che dà la priorità noetica al contenuto e la qualifica di attualità al fatto di produzione (dell'oggetto): da parte di Dio nel formalismo scolastico, da parte del soggetto conoscente nel pensiero moderno. Di qui la preminenza che assume l'uno, l'unità e l'unificazione, in quanto è a partire dal soggetto che sorge l'unità dell'oggetto ed è perciò reso possibile il suo presentarsi. Pensare è essenzialmente afferrare l'uno dei (nei) molti (*ἓν παρὰ τὰ πολλά*), nella linea dell'essenzialismo classico (Platone), raccolto nella *ἰδέα*. Esattamente all'opposto di S. Tommaso, per il quale l'uno viene al terzo posto, dopo l'*ens* e la *res* ed è quindi doppiamente fondato, come contenuto nella costituzione della *res* e come atto nella presenza dello *ens* portatore dello *esse* ch'è l'atto fondante. Pertanto si può dire che come la *conversio ad phantasmata* è la via della fondazione trascendentale della verità del contenuto (*essentia*) dell'ente, così la corrispondenza delle proprietà o modi dell'ente ovvero dei trascendentali è la via della chiarificazione dell'esplicitazione e dell'accrescimento interno che il reale ottiene nel soggetto spirituale. La *Diremtion* dei trascendentali non è affatto uniforme, essa però comporta un distinguere (restando) *dentro* l'ente: ciò significa che l'ente resta il presupposto e il fondamento, indispensabile ed inesauribile, ed insieme quindi che l'ente è il punto di arrivo delle determinazioni come dell'arricchimento portato dai trascendentali.[41]

La deduzione tomistica dei trascendentali non avviene quindi per "anticipazione" delle condizioni dell'unità oggettiva, ma per lo sviluppo dell'implicito nell'esplicito in modo però che l'esplicito è immanente nell'implicito e sta sempre saldamente attinente ad esso, gli appartiene necessariamente. La prima *Diremtion* non a caso è quella della *res*, di cui si è detto: essa esprime, come si è visto, la determinazione all'interno dell'ente del momento statico del contenuto nella sua distinzione dall'atto ch'è l'*esse*. Solo nel secondo momento interviene l'unità (*unum*) come determinazione dell'indivisione e integrità dell'ente ed è perciò una proprietà dell'ente stesso, fondata quindi sulla realtà dell'ente in atto: unità ch'è certamente, ai vari livelli, unificazione di essenza ed *esse*, di sostanza ed accidenti, di materia e forma, di anima e facoltà... e in generale di atto e potenza, ma è un'unità di unificazione che è compresa dal soggetto a partire dall'*ens* in quanto presentantesi nel presentarsi dell'*ens* a partire dalla riflessione sullo *ens* stesso come plesso sintetico originario. Il plesso allora di *ens-res-unum* costituisce

41 Cf. C. Fabro, *L'esse tomistico e la ripresa della metafisica,* in "Tomismo e pensiero moderno", (Roma 1969), p. 381ss.

una triade in sé assoluta ossia che si fa presente al soggetto come il plesso di esplicitazione statica del "fondamento": la *res* dice la realtà dell'essenza che appartiene all'*ens* e l'*unum* (con l'*aliquid*) dice il carattere intrinseco cioè costitutivo necessario di tale appartenenza a tutti i livelli. S. Tommaso perciò parla di "additio" per indicare che tutte le altre concezioni della mente sono posteriori all'ente e quindi non fanno che "aggiungere" all'*ens* nel senso di precisare l'uno o l'altro "modo" di essere e quindi si tratta sempre di un'aggiunta — nozionale soltanto, com'è ovvio — che appartiene e perciò resta intrinseca all'ente stesso che detiene il primato indiscusso del fondamento. L'*unum* ch'è la *negatio divisionis in ente* lungi dal fondare l'ente, come nel pensiero moderno, si fonda sull'ente e dice anzitutto l'*ens* (ma) in quanto si presenta in sé indiviso.[42]

L'"addere" allora, in cui consiste la funzione dei trascendentali tomistici, è fondato nell'ente e non fondante, è scoperto nella realtà dell'ente e non prodotto: si potrebbe dire che essi pongono il nuovo modo dell'ente con l'evento-intervento (*Ereignis*) della propria *additio*, in quanto lo suppongono: "Unum quod convertitur cum ente, quod quidem ponit aliquid, *in quantum ponit ipsum ens* cui solam negationem superaddit,"[43] cioè la negazione della divisione ch'è un modo positivo e perciò una perfezione assoluta dell'ente stesso. Fin qui allora assolutamente nulla di soggettivo in questi due tipi di "aggiunte," poiché esse sono assolute e imposte dall'ente stesso. La *additio* soggettiva, se così si può dire, avviene nei due ultimi trascendentali, il *verum* ed il *bonum* ma qui la soggettività di cui si parla nasce all'interno della realtà primordiale, oggettiva e oggettivante dell'ente, la precisa e l'arricchisce: perciò S. Tommaso afferma che "... verum et bonum *positive* dicuntur."[44] Tale positività consiste nel rapporto allo spirito che il *verum* ed il *bonum* conferiscono (esprimono) all'*ens*, in quanto lo mettono in rapporto con l'intelletto e la volontà; si tratta evidentemente di un carattere nuovo e perfettivo che così si aggiunge allo *ens*. Ora perché ciò avvenga, occorre che il soggetto di tale relazione sia equicomprensivo come l'ente e questo è soltanto lo spirito, la *mens*, l'anima spirituale, secondo l'indicazione aristotelica che "l'anima è in qualche modo tutte le cose"[45] mediante l'intelletto e la volontà. La

42 "Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente non addit supra ens nisi negationem divisionis, non quod significat ipsam indivisionem tantum, sed substantiam eius cum ipsa [importante per il realismo questo "substantia"]: est enim unum idem quod ens indivisum" (*De Pot.* IX, 7). È perciò "...inter ista quattuor prima primum est ens: et ideo oportet quod positive praedicetur; negatio vero vel privatio non potest esse primum quod intellectu concipitur, cum semper quod negatur vel privatur sit de intellectu negationis vel privationis" (Ibid., ad 6).

43 *De Pot.* IX, 7 ad 8.

44 *De Ver.* XXI, 1.

45 *De an.* III, 8, 431b21.

deduzione tomistica può ben essere interpretata come un'antropologia trascendentale, come oggi si dice, purché la trascendentalità dell'anima (nelle funzioni dell'intelletto e della volontà) sia intesa e fondata a partire dallo *ens* come fondamento oggettivo del conoscere e del volere e quindi precontenente, come recettività pura e libertà, la realtà e perfezione della verità e la realtà della perfezione del bene. Un'esposizione fra le più complete di questo altissimo momento teoretico è certamente la seguente:

> Oportet igitur quod verum et bonum super intellectum entis addant respectum perfectivi. In quolibet autem ente est *duo* considerare: scilicet ipsam rationem speciei, et esse ipsum quo aliquid subsistit in specie illa; et sic aliquod ens potest esse perfectivum dupliciter. *Uno modo* secundum rationem speciei tantum. Et sic ab ente perficitur intellectus, qui perficitur per rationem entis. Nec tamen ens est in eo secundum esse naturale; et ideo hunc modum perficiendi addit verum super ens. Verum enim est in mente, ut Philosophus dicit in VI *Metaphys.*; et unumquodque ens in tantum dicitur verum, in quantum conformatum est vel conformabile intellectui; et ideo omnes recte definientes verum, ponunt in eius definitione intellectum. *Alio modo* ens est perfectivum alterius non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed etiam secundum esse quod habet in rerum natura. Et per hunc modum est perfectivum bonum. Bonum enim in rebus est, ut Philosophus dicit in VI *Metaphys.* [comm. 8]. In quantum autem unum ens est secundum esse suum perfectivum alterius et conservativum, habet rationem finis respectu illius quod ab eo perficitur; et inde est quod omnes recte definientes bonum ponunt in ratione eius aliquid quod pertineat ad habitudinem finis; unde Philosophus dicit in I *Ethic.*, quod bonum optime definiunt dicentes, quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt.[46]

Così nel tomismo si parla di trascendentali al plurale come prospettive di determinazione in sé della realtà e espansione intenzionale della realtà nel suo rapporto allo spirito.

Facendo pertanto un breve bilancio della dialettica tomistica dei trascendentali, possiamo senz'altro meravigliarci del fatto che Heidegger mostri d'ignorarla completamente: essa infatti smentisce in pieno, e lo vedremo tra poco in modo più preciso, la sua denunzia dell'oblio dell'essere. Nella posizione tomistica infatti:

1. *Il fondamento* e primo oggetto del conoscere è l'*ens* nel senso forte in quanto esprime il plesso di soggetto ch'è il contenuto (*essentia*) e di atto (*esse*): l'*ens* quindi in quanto porta e contiene l'*esse*. Così lo porta e

46 *De Ver.* XXI, 1. Più concise sono le deduzioni di: *In I Sent.* 8, I, 3; ibid. 19, V, 1 ad 2; *De Ver.* I, 1; *De Pot.* IX, 7; *S. Th.* I-II, 94, 2.

lo manifesta. L'*ens-esse* è perciò da riconoscere il plesso intenzionale dell'appartenenza originaria ossia il *transcendentale fundans*.

2. *Il momento statico* ossia analitico del trascendentale è indicato dalla *res* che esprime il contenuto e dall'*unum* che esprime l'appartenenza intrinseca dei costitutivi dell'*ens*. La derivazione di questi due primi trascendentali è interiore all'*ens* ed è sostenuta dall'*esse*:[47] è in vista dell'*esse*, cioè per poter essere, che l'*ens* deve avere un contenuto (l'essenza) e deve risultare di principi che si appartengono.

3. *Il momento dinamico* o espansivo dell'*ens* riguarda la sua appartenenza al soggetto spirituale che si attua nel conoscere e nel volere: qui si attua in varie guise la dialettica d'immanenza e trascendenza ai vari livelli della riflessione e dell'azione. Qui prende rilievo il momento della libertà nella formazione del soggetto spirituale ch'è la persona responsabile del proprio destino, che non è amorfo ed estrinseco come il *Geschick* di cui parla Heidegger.

La conclusione immediata e sorprendente è che l'*ens* ed i trascendentali tomistici stanno agli antipodi della concezione della scolastica suareziana, a cui si rifà il kantiano Heidegger. Essi infatti unificano in sé l'estrema universalità e la massima concretezza: "Cum autem ens sit primum quod in intellectu concipitur oportet quod quidquid in intellectum cadit, intelligatur ut ens, et per consequens ut unum, et bonum. Unde cum intellectus apprehendat essentiam, unitatem, veritatem et bonitatem in abstracto, oportet quod de quolibet eorum praedicetur ens, et alia tria concreta. Et inde est quod ista denominant seipsa, non autem alia quae non convertuntur cum ente."[48] Una metafisica tomistica che intenda rispondere alle istanze del pensiero moderno dovrà approfondire questa dialettica e dinamica che i trascendentali attuano all'interno dello *ens*. Il fatto poi che i trascendentali si distinguono dallo *ens* solo *secundum rationem*, e non realmente, questo garantisce la pienezza e necessità intrinseca dell'appartenenza, dentro la distinzione,[49] di ciascuno con l'*ens* e di ciascuno con gli altri ponendo

47 La priorità dell'*ens* non ostacola né diminuisce ma fonda la realtà e universalità, pari a quella di *ens*, degli altri trascendentali: "Inter ista quatuor prima [ens, unum, verum, bonum] maxime primum est ens: et ideo oportet quod positive praedicetur; negatio enim vel privatio non potest esse primum quod intellectu concipitur, cum semper quod negatur vel privatur sit de intellectu negationis vel privationis. Oportet autem quod alia tria super ens addant aliquid quod ens non contrahat; si enim contraherent ens, iam non essent prima. Hoc autem esse non potest nisi addant aliquid secundum rationem tantum; hoc autem est vel negatio, quam addit unum, vel relatio, vel aliquid quod natum sit referri universaliter ad ens; et hoc est vel intellectus, ad quem importat relationem verum, aut appetitus, ad quem importat relationem bonum; nam bonum est quod omnia appetunt, ut dicitur in *I Ethic.*" (*De Pot.* IX, 7 ad 6).

48 *De Pot.* IX, 7 ad ea quae in oppositum objiciuntur.

49 A questo proposito S. Tommaso scrive: "Dupliciter potest intelligi aliquid sine altero. Uno

ad un tempo l'appartenenza intrinseca, nella distinzione, di verità e libertà a tutti i livelli della vita dello spirito. L'elevarsi poi alla considerazione dei trascendentali significa non soltanto porre le basi della metafisica operando il "ricupero" (*Verwindung*) proposto da Heidegger, ma comporta il porsi sul piano della considerazione assoluta che permette il passaggio alla sfera della "trascendenza" autentica, come S. Tommaso osserva distinguendo l'uno numerico dall'uno trascendentale: "Unum secundum quod est principium numeri, non praedicatur de Deo; sed solum de his quae habent esse in materia. Unum enim quod est principium numeri, est de genere mathematicorum; quae habent esse in materia, sed sunt secundum rationem a materia abstracta. Unum vero quod convertitur cum ente, est quoddam metaphysicum, quod secundum esse non dependet a materia."[50] Qui allora l'immanenza perfettiva richiama la trascendenza e questa s'integra in quella e la fonda nella pienezza dell'appartenenza come nella forma autentica di "presenza," affermata da Heidegger, ma non al modo di Heidegger, come l'essenza della verità dell'essere.

c) *La conoscenza dei primi principi.*

Heidegger ha denunziato con ragione l'identificazione e lo scambio di certezza e verità come la radice del capovolgimento del conoscere nell'agire e dell'intelletto nella volontà operata nel pensiero moderno a partire dal *cogito-volo* di Cartesio fino al *Wille zur Macht* di Nietzsche. Kant lo dichiara espressamente: "*Certezza e chiarezza*, due elementi che riguardano la forma della medesima [ricerca critica], sono da considerare come esigenze essenziali che si possono con ragione richiedere all'autore che osa affrontare un'impresa così scivolosa."[51] Orbene la connessione fra certezza e chiarezza ha luogo nella sfera della conoscenza determinata e perciò è posteriore al primo passo (cominciamento) rispetto al costituirsi del fondamento del conoscere. Sembra infatti che certezza e chiarezza, come sono nel linguaggio ordinario, non si possano applicare all'*ens* e ai trascendentali perché sono comprensivi di tutta la realtà e a tutti i livelli. Eppure l'*ens*, come si è visto, fa il cominciamento oggettivo sintetico del conoscere e si presenta come il

modo per modum enuntiandi, dum scilicet intelligitur unum esse sine altero; et hoc modo quidquid intellectus potest intelligere sine altero Deus potest facere. Sic autem ens non potest intelligi sine bono, ut scilicet intellectus intelligat aliquid existens non esse bonum. Alio modo potest intelligi aliquid sine altero per modum definiendi, ut scilicet intelligatur unum, non tamen intellecto altero; sicut animal intelligitur sine homine, et omnibus aliis speciebus: et sic ens potest intelligi sine bono. Nec tamen sequitur quod Deus possit facere ens sine bono, quia hoc ipsum quod est facere, est procedere aliquid in esse" (*De Ver.* XXI, 1 ad 2 quod in contrario objicitur).

50 *S. Th.* I, 11, 3 ad 2.

51 Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Vorrede, I Aufl., A 15.

plesso oggettivante veritativo fondamentale e perciò come il plesso evidente assolutamente e come la fonte per la fondazione di ogni evidenza sia nella sfera teoretica come in quella pratica. Nella posizione tomistica il primo passo con l'*ens* precontiene in modo implicito e perciò confuso tanto il momento dell'oggettività (*verum*) quanto quello della soggettività (*bonum*), tanto la sfera dell'essere (intelletto) quanto quella della volontà (libertà); però essi sono resi espliciti soltanto nel momento dinamico mediante la riflessione sulla vita dello spirito la quale conserva a questo modo la sua originalità e la distinzione delle due sfere della conoscenza e della libertà. Non ogni conoscenza è quindi trascendentale ma solo quella che porta sul fondamento e sui fondamenti di tutto il sapere prima del dirimersi nelle sue varie forme. Sta perciò agli antipodi Kant quando scrive: "Io chiamo trascendentale ogni conoscenza che in generale non si occupa tanto di oggetti, ma del nostro modo di conoscere gli oggetti in generale, in quanto questi devono essere possibili a priori."[52] Invece l'*ens* e i trascendentali i quali sono ad un tempo sintetici e necessari, sintetici mediante il plesso di appartenenza di una duplicità ch'è anzitutto propria ad ognuno e che poi si reduplica in quanto ognuno di essi (*unum, verum, bonum*...) contiene l'*ens*, poiché ognuno è implicito nell'*ens*; necessari poi in quanto ciascuno si presenta come un modo (di essere) che procede dall'*ens* così che ogni trascendentale nella sua nozione ha per soggetto l'*ens* ossia esprime prima l'*ens* e poi la modificazione che lo costituisce in proprio e lo distingue. Nulla vieta, se è questione soltanto di termini, che questa apprensione dello *ens* si possa anche chiamare *appercezione trascendentale* ed anzi con molta più ragione che non lo *Ich denke überhaupt* di Kant ch'è bensì *forma formarum* del conoscere ma analitica e vuota come già lo era il *cogito* di Cartesio. Kant, com'è noto, ricorda nell'Analitica "... la proposizione così invocata presso gli scolastici: quodlibet ens est *unum, verum, bonum*" (unità, verità, perfezione), ma dalla sua esposizione come dalla sua critica risulta il carattere puramente essenzialistico della sua interpretazione[53] legata alla Scolastica

52 Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Einleitung VI, A 12, B 25.

53 Kant infatti ignora completamente il carattere di fondamento che spetta al plesso di *ens*, anzi lo salta a piè pari e interpreta i tre trascendentali seguenti (*unum, verum, bonum*) come esigenze e criteri logici di ogni conoscenza delle cose in generale ossia come categorie della qualità cioè "... dell'*unità, pluralità* e *totalità*" — ossia come unità del concetto, come pluralità dei caratteri del concetto ed infine come totalità ossia compiutezza del concetto stesso. La critica di Kant è che non si può partire da un principio omogeneo come la quantità "... con lo scopo di collegare in una sola coscienza elementi conoscitivi *eterogenei*" (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Elementarlehre, II. Teil, 1. Abt., § 12, B. 113). Per un confronto fra il trascendentale tomistico e quello kantiano cf.: C. Fabro, "The Transcendentality of *ens-esse* and the Ground of Metaphysics," *International Philosophical Quarterly* VI (1966), 389-427 (rist. in "Tomismo e pensiero moderno," ed. cit., p. 319ss.).

formalista ch'era giunta fino alla filosofia wolffiana dei suoi maestri. Per questo Kant inventa il giudizio sintetico a priori che tale non è, poiché i due elementi — data la loro origine completamente eterogenea, la materia dall'intuizione sensibile e la forma dall'intelletto (Io penso puro) — continuano a restare estranei l'un l'altro: di qui l'inevitabilità della risoluzione idealistica del pensare nell' agire (Fichte, Schelling).

Per S. Tommaso invece l'*ens* "... dicit aliquid proprie esse in actu,"[54] e l'atto non solo fa esistere ma è con ciò principio d'intelligibilità; perciò l'*ens* è il plesso trascendentale di ogni intelligibilità non solo rispetto ai concetti dai più generali fino ai più determinati, ma anche come il plesso trascendentale di validità di tutti i principi a cominciare dal primo ch'è il principio di non contraddizione. Un testo sintetico:

> In his quae in apprehensione omnium cadunt, quidam ordo invenitur. Nam illud quod primo cadit in apprehensione, est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus quaecumque quis apprehendit. Et ideo primum pincipium indemonstrabile est quod non est simul affirmare et negare, quod fundatur supra rationem entis et non entis: et super hoc principio omnia alia fundantur, ut dicitur in IV *Metaphys*. Sicut autem ens est primum quod cadit in apprehensione simpliciter, ita bonum est primum quod cadit in apprehensione practicae rationis, quae ordinatur ad opus: omne enim agens agit propter finem, qui habet rationem boni. Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, Bonum est quod omnia appetunt.[55]

Ed ora un testo analitico non meno sorprendente e comprensivo:

> Cum duplex sit operatio intellectus: una, qua cognoscit quod quid est, quae vocatur indivisibilium intelligentia: alia, qua componit et dividit: in utroque est aliquod primum: in prima quidem operatione est aliquod primum, quod cadit in conceptione intellectus, scilicet hoc quod dico ens; nec aliquid hac operatione potest mente concipi, nisi intelligatur ens. Et quia hoc principium, impossibile est esse et non esse simul, dependet ex intellectu entis, sicut hoc principium, omne totum est maius sua parte, ex intellectu totius et partis: ideo hoc etiam principium est naturaliter primum in secunda operatione intellectus, scilicet componentis et dividentis. Nec aliquis potest secundum hanc operationem intellectus aliquid intelligere, nisi hoc principio intellecto. Sicut enim totum et partes non intelliguntur nisi intellecto ente, ita nec hoc principium omne totum est maius sua parte, nisi intellecto praedicto principio firmissimo.[56]

I due testi suggeriscono, ci sembra, le seguenti considerazioni.

54 *S. Th.* I, 5, 1 ad 1.
55 *S. Th.* I-II, 94, 2.
56 *In IV Metaph.*, l. 6, nr. 605.

a) *Contro l'apriori di Kant ed il cogito moderno.*

Il primo passo dello spirito, l'*Anfang*, è *cogito ens* nel senso primario fondante ossia di *cogito* anzitutto *ens* e *cogito* in quanto *menti adest* (è e si fa presente) l'*ens*. L'*ens* si potrebbe dire il plesso noetico fondamentale illuminante nel senso più attuale. Un altro testo tomista, precedente ai due citati, fa il punto con assoluto rigore speculativo:

> Cum natura semper ordinetur ad unum, unius virtutis oportet esse naturaliter unum obiectum: sicut visus colorem, et auditus sonum. Intellectus igitur cum sit una vis, est eius unum naturale obiectum, cuius per se et naturaliter cognitionem habet. Hoc autem oportet esse id sub quo comprehenduntur omnia ab intellectu cognita: sicut sub colore comprehenduntur omnes colores, qui sunt per se visibiles. Quod non est aliud quam ens. Naturaliter igitur intellectus noster cognoscit ens, et ea quae sunt per se entis inquantum huiusmodi; in qua cognitione fundatur primorum principiorum notitia, ut non esse simul affirmare et negare, et alia huiusmodi. Haec igitur sola principia intellectus noster naturaliter cognoscit, conclusiones autem per ipsa: sicut per colorem cognoscit visus tam communia quam sensibilia per accidens.[57]

Così l'*ens* non è soltanto come il trascendentale fondamentale kantiano (lo *Ich denke*) che deve poter "accompagnare" (*begleiten*) tutte le rappresentazioni e conoscenze e perciò resta estrinseco al contenuto, ma costituisce la prima origine permanente della intelligibilità dei contenuti stessi secondo la gamma dell'analogia: non solo però delle rappresentazioni e conoscenze, ma anche degli stessi primi principi e di quanto ad essi fa capo nella fondazione e struttura del sapere. Lungi perciò dall'essere il relitto ed il concetto vuoto dell'ultima astrazione, com'è nella tradizione formalistica, bisogna riconoscere che l'*ens* è non semplicemente un contenuto astratto ma il "contenente" di tutti i concetti in quanto esprime il plesso di contenuto (*res*) e di atto (*esse*) nella concretezza della loro sintesi.

b) *Contro il sintetismo formale della neoscolastica kantiana.*

Il nucleo di questa posizione è che l'*esse* è colto soltanto e propriamente mediante la copula del giudizio. Così l'essere dello *ens* da una parte, nel primo momento come concetto, non è che l'astratto formale dell'essenza e perciò comune a potenza ed atto, sostanza e accidenti, materia e forma, finito e infinito, contingente e necessario... e perciò è l'astratto dell'essenza che astrae ovviamente dall'esistenza. Dall'altra parte, e di conseguenza, l'essere come atto di esistenza è manifestato anzitutto e propriamente dalla funzione copulante del

57 *C. Gent.* II, 83 (ed. Taur. nr. 1678).

giudizio la quale si risolve sempre in una affermazione (o negazione) di essere in forma diretta col verbo essere e indiretta con gli altri verbi, in modo esplicito con il tempo presente indicativo e implicito con gli altri tempi e modi.[58] Quest'interpretazione sembra abbia dalla sua parte alcuni testi tomistici espliciti soprattutto delle opere giovanili i quali sembrano seguire lo schema ora indicato, cioè di far corrispondere alla *simplex apprehensio* l'afferramento dell'essenza ed al giudizio l'*affirmatio* (*et negatio*) dell'essere. Ecco:

> Cum sit duplex operatio intellectus: una quarum dicitur a quibusdam imaginatio intellectus, quam Philosophus, III *De Anima*, text. 21, nominat intelligentiam indivisibilium, quae consistit in apprehensione quidditatis simplicis quae alio etiam nomine formatio dicitur; alia est quam dicunt fidem, quae consistit in compositione vel divisione propositionis: prima operatio respicit quidditatem rei; secunda respicit esse ipsius. Et quia ratio veritatis fundatur in esse, et non in quidditate, ut dictum est, ideo veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo eius quod est enuntiatio, et non in prima, vel signo eius quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid; sicut etiam quidditatis esse est quoddam esse rationis, et secundum istud esse dicitur veritas in prima operatione intellectus: per quem etiam modum dicitur definitio vera.[59]

Se non che è sufficiente tenere presente il contesto perché il significato di questo testo, così come degli altri che lo ricalcano, risulti nella sua effettiva collocazione. Osserviamo pertanto che il problema dell'apprensione dello *esse* (come *actus essendi*) è qui fuori causa.

1. Vi si parla infatti della conoscenza nella sua sfera ordinaria e non dell'apprensione dello *ens* ch'è del tutto privilegiata. Nella conoscenza ordinaria dell'astrazione formale la essenza o *quidditas* è appresa nel suo contenuto oggettivo, prescindendo dall'esistenza e dallo *esse* che l'attua in concreto: posso pensare p. es. il cavallo, astraendo dalla sua esistenza di fatto e quindi senza pensare il suo *esse*.

2. D'altra parte anche il giudizio è considerato nella sua funzione puramente formale di sintesi, mediante la copula *è*, di S e P. Ma S e P

58 La posizione più esplicita di questa deformazione radicale del tomismo, ridotto ad heideggerismo, si trova nelle opere di K. Rahner: *Geist in Welt* (Innsbruk 1939) e *Hörer des Wortes* (München 1940). Cf. C. Fabro, *K. Rahner e l'ermeneutica tomistica*, II ed. (Milano 1973).

59 *In I Sent.* 19, V, 1 ad 7; Mandonnet I, p. 489. Nella stessa opera questa esposizione ritorna ancora con le stesse espressioni: "Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse eius, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III *De anima*, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum" (*In I Sent.* 38, I, 3; Mandonnet I, p. 903).

possono trovarsi a tutti livelli del conoscere — non solo reale, ma anche possibile, fantastico, puramente logico... — e la copula *è* compie sempre la sua funzione di unire S e P anche quando non c'è nulla di essere a cui corrisponda nella realtà.

3. Di conseguenza l'essere della predicazione nel giudizio è puramente formale funzionale e non reale, tanto che può predicare l'essere anche di ciò che non ha realtà o essere alcuno ma è pura negazione o privazione (*mors est, bos non est leo...*). La "qualità" di essere della copula dipende pertanto dalla qualità (cioè dalla realtà costitutiva) del S e P e quindi dalla realtà del rapporto di S e P e qui vale il principio aristotelico che l'essere (predicativo) come tale non significa nulla. Nella considerazione formale la sede della verità è il giudizio il quale si attua mediante la copula *è* e quindi il giudizio è l'operazione ch'è sede (funzione) della predicazione dell'essere. Ma la "qualità" o sfera di tale essere deve risultare prima e altrove. Perciò S. Tommaso nello stesso contesto un po' prima scrive: "Cum autem in re sit quidditas eius et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus."[60] L'essere della copula come tale ha significato (esistenziale) formale, non reale: afferma cioè l'esistenza del rapporto di S e P, ma la copula è in funzione della realtà del soggetto e del rapporto col predicato:[61] se questo è reale, reale è l'essere; se fantastico o solo logico, tale sarà anche il significato e valore dell'essere della copula. I due significati di *esse*, reale e logico, vanno nettamente distinti: "Esse dupliciter dicitur: uno modo significat actum essendi; alio modo significat compositionem propositionis quam anima adinvenit coniungens praedicatum subjecto."[62]

Perciò al fondo di tutti questi vari significati che può assumere l'essere nella riflessione, sta il significato fondamentale reale di *esse* qual è contenuto nell'apprensione del plesso originario di *ens* che va

60 *In I Sent.* 19, I, 1; Mandonnet I, p. 486. Più avanti, S. Tommaso distingue un triplice *esse*: la *quidditas*, l'*actus essentiae* e, al terzo posto, la *veritas compositionis in propositionibus* cioè dello *est* della copula. Di quest'ultima si legge: "Et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae, sicut supra de veritate dictum est" (*In I Sent.* 33, I, 1 ad 1; Mandonnet I, p. 766).

61 Si può dire pertanto che la *veritas formalis* del giudizio è fondata sulla *veritas materialis* dell'apprensione: "Veritas quae in anima causatur a rebus, non sequitur aestimationem animae, sed existentiam rerum" (*De Ver.* I, 2 ad 3).

62 *S. Th.* I, 3, 4 ad 2.

detto perciò in questo senso, un'apprensione "prelogica":[63] tale infatti è il senso da dare all'espressione base della nostra ricerca che "... id quod primum intellectus intelligit est ens." L'apprensione dello *ens* costituisce infatti il primo avvertimento che la mente ha della realtà e l'aggancio primo e fondante del soggetto con la realtà a cui si deve riferire ogni seguente attività spirituale.

La Distinzione Reale di "Essentia" Esistente (*Quod est*) ed Atto di Essere (*Esse, Actus Essendi*)

Ma il primo e più nevralgico punto di confronto fra Heidegger e S. Tommaso è la "fondazione" del primo plesso speculativo che ha affogato l'essere nel fare rimandando l'essere, ch'è in sé presenza e presenzialità, al fare e causare ossia risolvendo la presenza ch'è la realtà propria dell'essere, nella relazione di dipendenza ch'è estrinsecità ed estraneità. La formula classica di siffatta perdita radicale dell'essere è, come si è notato, la distinzione di *essentia* ed *existentia* della Scolastica decadente che Heidegger con ragione trova — come si è visto — anche a fondamento del pensiero moderno da Cartesio a Kant e fino a Nietzsche.[64] Il momento è di estrema importanza perché risolutivo per la fondazione della metafisica che intende ancorarsi al plesso di *ens* ed alla dialettica dei trascendentali: senza la distinzione reale di *essentia* ed *esse* — come (di) due principi immanenti allo *ens* stesso — manca il fondamento per la distinzione di *ens-res*, cioè di concreto reale e astratto formale, e di *ens-unum-bonum* cioè di concreto indeterminato e di concreto specificato per il soggetto spirituale ossia per la conoscenza (intelletto) e di determinato per la libertà (volontà). Si badi bene: è in questo momento che si deve superare, come vuole Hegel contro Kant, il condizionamento della metafisica dalla critica della conoscenza (*Erkenntnistheorie*)[65] e che si deve affermare, come vuole Heidegger, la priorità dell'essere sulla coscienza.[66] Ma la posizione di Heidegger non è facile e non è stata senza oscillazioni.

63 "Prelogico" è espressamente da intendere il *Sein* a cui rimanda il *Dasein* heideggeriano secondo le ricerche dell'ontologia fenomenologica di *Sein und Zeit*, messa in evidenza suprattutto da E. Fink (cf. *Zur ontologischen Frühgeschichte von Raum, Zeit, Bewegung*, Den Haag 1957; *Sein, Wahrheit, Welt*, ibid. 1958; *Alles und Nichts*, ibid. 1959).

64 "Die Einheit von Wille zur Macht und ewiger Wiederkehr des Gleichen beruht in Zusammengehörigkeit von essentia und existentia, deren Unter scheidung hinsichtlich ihrer Wesensherkunft im Dunkel bleibt" (M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed cit., Bd. I, p. 381s.).

65 Cf. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, Einleitung; ed. Hoffmeister, spec. p. 63ss. Heidegger ne ha dato un mirabile commento nel saggio: *Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung*, in "Holzwege," ed. cit., p. 105ss.

66 La priorità dell'essere sul pensiero è un punto saldo per Heidegger: "Aber das Sein ist kein Erzeugnis des Denkens. Wohl dagegen ist das wesentliche Denken ein Ereignis des Seins" (*Was ist*

Heidegger sta fermo al plesso *Sein-Seiende*, come si è detto, e si mantiene nella tensione dell'ambito ontico (*Seiende*) ontologico (*Sein*) del puro apparire-accadere: si tratta appunto di risolvere e fondare il *Seiende* nel *Sein*, il plesso empirico dell'immediatezza hegeliana (*Unmittelbarkeit*) nel puro accadere dell'evento. Perciò Heidegger vede sempre il plesso dell'essere-ente dall'interno dell'atteggiarsi della soggettività umana trascendentale, ma egli ha anche capovolto la posizione hegeliana: per Hegel il *Sein* del *Seiende* è il momento dell'immediatezza astratta che deve "passare" al (nel) *Begriff*, per Heidegger il *Begriff* sarebbe un ritorno al *Seiende* e non la seconda autentica immediatezza, questa è il *Sein* come farsi presente del presente e come l'adeguarsi analitico-sintetico della presenza con se stessa dell'identità (*Sein*) con la diversità (*Seiende*), del permanente col transeunte. Heidegger infatti scrive:

> Ciò che è, ciò che accade. Ciò che accade è già accaduto. Ciò non significa ch'esso sia passato. Ciò ch'è già accaduto è soltanto ciò che si è raccolto nella essenza dell'essere, l'essenza di ciò e come ciò[67] ch'è la venuta dell'essere stesso — e sia pure nella forma del sottrarsi cessante. La venuta mantiene l'essente come tale nel suo non-nascondimento e questo resta per lui come l'essere non pensato dell'essente. Ciò che accade è la storia dell'essere, è l'essere come la storia del cessare.[68]

E' sempre la dialettica dell'apparire e scomparire dell'essente (plesso ontico) che rimanda pertanto al plesso (ontologico) di *Sein-Seiende* a quello più originario (metafisico?) di *Sein-Nichts* che Heidegger prende da Hegel ma in senso capovolto come si è detto.

Ora per Heidegger la *Diremtion* originaria di *Sein-Nichts*, che sottende e fonda quella di *Sein-Seiende* è svelata non da processi propriamente né conoscitivi né affettivi, ma grazie ad una impressione fondamentale ch'egli con un termine preso da Kierkegaard ha chiamato "angoscia" (*Angst*). Qui si vede, alla sua radice, la coerenza di Heidegger col vuoto ch'è costitutivo del *cogito* moderno e la sua antitesi di fondo con la posizione tomistica. Per S. Tommaso, come si è visto, il *primum quod intelligitur* come positività in sé di presenza reale che si

Metaphysik?, Nachwort; ed. cit., p. 43). Però si deve sempre tener presente che l'essere si disvela a partire dal comportamento (*Angst, Sorge* = angoscia, sollecitudine) dell'esistente ch'è sempre e solo l'uomo, non gli altri enti e neppure Dio: "Das Seiende, das in der Weise der Existenz ist, ist der Mensch. Der Mensch allein existiert. Der Fels ist, aber er existiert nicht. Der Baum ist, aber er existiert nicht. Das Pferd ist, aber es existiert nicht. Der Engel ist, aber er existiert nicht. Gott ist, aber er existiert nicht" (*Op. cit.*, Einleitung; ed. cit., p. 14 s. Cf. anche più sotto: Nachwort, p. 42).

67 Heidegger fa un gioco di termini riportando (e spiegando) il *Wesen* con il *Ge-Wesen*: qui il *Wesen* è sostantivo e infinito insieme e così *Ge-wesen* è participio (passato) e sostantivo. L'accostamento c'è già in Hegel e c'era già nel τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι di Aristotele.

68 M. Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, ed. cit., Bd. I, p. 388.

dà all'intelletto è l'*ens* in quanto ha l'*esse* ch'è l'atto per essenza e l'antitesi assoluta del nulla. Per Heidegger invece il *Sein* rimanda al *Nichts* e il *Nichts* è rivelato e attestato dall'angoscia: essa così costituisce l'unico aggancio per il *Sein*. Nell'ordine quindi bisogna dire: *Seiende-Sein-Nichts-Angst*, secondo un legame inscindibile e secondo un'appartenenza intenzionale che va percorsa in ambedue i sensi da *Seiende* ad *Angst* e da *Angst* a *Seiende*: è "... l'angoscia che fornisce l'esperienza dell'essere come dell'altro di ogni essente,"[69] dove si vede chiara la simultanea appartenenza di essere-essente e di essere-nulla. Heidegger fa quindi con Hegel una operazione ovvero riduzione analoga a quella della sinistra hegeliana con la decapitazione dell'Assoluto, ma in un certo senso la sua è ancor più radicale perché esige la negazione di tutti i valori in quanto questi sono contenuti e qualità del *Seiende* che formano invece lo scopo esplicito della rivoluzione marxistica. Due negazioni comunque — quella heideggeriana all'interno del *Sein* (come *Nichts*) e quella marxista — che convergono nell'appartenenza scambievole di *Sein-Seiende* e che restano all' interno del *Seiende* come abbattimento dello *statu quo* così da identificare la verità dell'essere con l'esistenza e stanno perciò agli antipodi della posizione tomistica.

Tale appartenenza scambievole, e la conseguente dialettica circolare, è negata per principio dal plesso tomistico di *ens-esse* in virtù della priorità che ha l'atto sulla potenza e del conseguente compito di fondamento che ha il reale sulla coscienza, sull'attività del conoscere e del volere. E' il darsi allora dello *ens* perché è *id quod habet esse* che attua il conoscere e mette la libertà dell'esistente spirituale in condizione di fare le sue scelte.

Ecco allora la progressione metafisica:

1. L'*ens* è il plesso trascendentale (concreto) originario che rimanda all'atto di essere (*esse*) che è doppio, come si è visto, ossia come principio di determinazione di un contenuto ed è l'essenza e come principio

69 "Eine Erfahrung des Seins als des Anderen [= Nichts] zu allem Seienden verschenkt die Angst." Il "nulla" di cui Heidegger parla non è vuota negazione ma — se così possiamo dire — l'intenzionalità ultima totale che scaturisce dall'angoscia, ciò quindi grazie a cui appare l'essente: "... questo nulla si mostra come l'essere" (*Aber dieses Nichts west als das Sein*). Quest'appartenenza doppia unitaria di Essere-Essente ed Essere-Nulla è costitutiva del plesso stesso della verità dell'essere: "Ohne das Sein, dessen abgründiges, aber noch unentfaltetes Wesen uns das Nichts in der wesenhaften Angst zuschickt, bliebe alles Seiende in der Seinlosigkeit. Allein auch diese ist als die Seinsverlassenheit wiederum nicht ein nichtiges Nichts, wenn anders zur Wahrheit des Seins gehört, dass das Sein nie west ohne das Seiende, dass niemals ein Seiendes ist ohne das Sein" (*Was ist Metaphysik?*, Nachwort; ed. cit., p. 41). La terza tappa, che sanziona l'appartenenza scambievole del doppio plesso di *Sein* e *Zeit* della filosofia antica e di *Seiendes* e *Nichts* del pensiero moderno, si legge nell'intervista di Heidegger con R. Wisser: *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch* (München 1970), p. 74s.

di attuazione come tale. Ossia l'essenza è il principio come contenuto intrinseco realizzato e l'*actus essendi* è il principio come atto realizzato e l'*actus essendi* è il principio come atto realizzante intrinseco. L'*ens* e l'*esse* certamente si appartengono — come si appartengono l'*essentia* e l'*esse* — ma non secondo una corrispondenza scambievole inscindibile: in questo caso si fa del piano fenomenologico il riferimento fondamentale e l'essere si dissolve come l'attuarsi del puro presentarsi, così come l'essenza dell'essere è dall'angoscia fatta emergere come il Nulla. Il tentativo, sferrato dagli scolastici heideggeriani, di recuperare il *Sein* heideggeriano allo *esse* tomistico, è compromesso perciò al suo primo punto di partenza: *Sein*=*Anwesenheit* cioè "presenza di coscienza."

2. Il plesso primo tomistico di *ens-esse* è perciò provvisorio e non costitutivo, come è invece in Hegel e Heidegger, poiché esso si esplicita nella coppia reale di *essentia-esse*. Questo *esse* va davvero preso come principio realizzante in senso forte e dominante quindi l'essenza ch'è il principio (contenuto) realizzato nell'ente: a questo livello metafisico di riflessione che può essere detta riduttiva fondamentale, l'*esse* è l'atto e la *essentia* è la potenza. Atto e potenza hanno qui il senso aristotelico originario che comporta la *emergenza* dell'atto sulla potenza: la prima istanza di questa emergenza è la composizione-distinzione reale di *essentia* ed *esse* la quale esprime secondo S. Tommaso il senso ultimo e fondamentale della "differenza ontologica" fra l'*ens* e l'*esse* ed in ultima radice fra la creatura ed il Creatore. Erra quindi Heidegger quando accomuna S. Tommaso alla Scolastica la quale intende l'*esse* come *existentia* e lo riduce perciò alla dipendenza causale.[70] L'*esse* è immanente all'*ens* come *atto* reale intrinseco all'essenza concreta ch'è perciò la sua *potenza* reale: la loro scambievole presenza e appartenenza originaria è solidale con la creazione. Ma l'*esse* di cui si parla non è la semplice dipendenza causale bensì il suo effetto che resta intrinseco all'ente, così come la *essentia* che compone con l'*esse* non è il semplice possibile — che Heidegger con Hegel interpreta come il nulla — ma è il contenuto reale dell'ente. Questa è una posizione assolutamente originale combattuta e abbandonata dalla Scolastica e ignota ad Heidegger.

3. Lo *esse* dello *ens* tomistico che fa composizione reale con la *essentia*, non va perciò confuso con la *existentia*. La *existentia*, bisogna affermarlo con forza, è un termine estraneo alla semantica della

70 Ma più errano quegli Scolastici che pretendono accordare Heidegger e S. Tommaso muovendo dall'identità di *esse* ed *existere* che porta alla negazione della distinzione reale di essenza ed *esse* (cf. p.es. H. Meyer, *M. Heidegger und Thomas von Aquin*, München 1964, p. 22ss.). Sulla medesima linea formalista sembra muoversi anche B. Rioux: *L'être et la vérite chez Heidegger et Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris-Montréal 1963), spec. p. 248s.

metafisica tomistica: il suo apparire con la controversia fra Enrico di Gand e Egidio Romano (*esse essentiae, esse existentiae*) ha segnato la perdita della novità rivoluzionaria dello *esse* tomistico e l'inizio della *Seinsvergessenheit*, giustamente rilevata e deplorata da Heidegger. *Existentia*, come già si è accennato, è un fatto, una condizione di fatto, il fatto della realtà e della realizzazione (causazione) dello *ens* ed esso è comune perciò tanto all'essenza quanto allo *esse*, tanto alla sostanza come agli accidenti. In questo senso, riassumendo il peccato originale della deviazione speculativa dell'Occidente, Kant aveva ragione di affermare il più grave paradosso e assurdo che "... l'essere non è un predicato reale."[71] Per S. Tommaso, all'opposto, ogni realtà di verità, vita, bellezza, bontà... fa capo all'*esse* dell'*ens* come atto primo e fondamentale ch'è insieme immanenza assoluta (*actus essendi* dell'*ens* = *esse per participationem, esse commune* della creatura) e trascendenza assoluta (*esse purum, per essentiam* = Dio).

Questa risoluzione speculativa della verità dello *ens* tomistico, si chiarifica all'interno di tre eventi decisivi che confluiscono nella formazione del tomismo ignorati e trascurati sia dalla Scolastica come dal pensiero moderno e da Heidegger.

1. *L'emergenza dell'Uno sui molti con Platone mediante la nozione platonica di partecipazione* (*μίμησις, μέθεξις*) che innalza al di sopra del mondo mutevole degli enti della *δόξα* la verità immutabile di essere degli *εἴδη* raccolti nell'Uno: mentre il *Sein* di Heidegger elimina la distinzione di *ἀλήθεια* e *δόξα*.[72]

2. *L'emergenza dell'atto* (*ἐνέργεια*) *sulla potenza*, affermata da Aristotele e giustamente ripresa da Heidegger, realizzatore ed insieme emergente sulla potenza che raccoglie in sé perciò l'esigenza simultanea d'immanenza e trascendenza, mentre il *Sein* di Heidegger non può essere senza il *Seiende*. S. Tommaso, che arriva allo *esse* come atto primo, fonde mirabilmente l'istanza della trascendenza platonica con l'immanenza aristotelica: il tentativo fu ripreso da Hegel, ma l'esito era

71 Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 598, B 626.

72 Ha interpretato l'*esse* di S. Tommaso nella linea stretta del panenteismo di Proclo-Ps. Dionigi lo studio di K.Kremer, *Die neuplatonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin*, (Leiden 1966). L'A. suppone che l'*esse commune* di cui parla S. Tommaso è identico con Dio (*Ipsum esse subsistens*) con la conseguenza di rivalutare espressamente l'argomento ontologico e di negare altrettanto espressamente la distinzione di *essentia* ed *esse* (p. 384 ss., 447 s.). L'A. però, sia detto a suo onore, dichiara il suo imbarazzo di fronte ai testi espliciti di S. Tommaso contrari alla sua interpretazione (p. 430). Per un'analisi più approfondita su questo punto cf. C. Fabro, "Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Thomismus: Convergencies and Divergencies," *The New Scholasticism*, 44 (1970), I, pp. 69-100 (rist. in "Tomismo e pensiero moderno," ed. cit., p. 435ss.).

compromesso dall'inizio con il *Sein* vuoto ch'era il peso morto della perdita dell'essere già consumata.[73]

3. *La rivendicazione della emergenza dello spirito sulla materia*, in cui ancora "concordano" Platone et Aristotele contro il materialismo (preteso o reale) dei Presocratici. Non così però una direzione del neoplatonismo medievale iniziata dal filosofo arabo-giudeo Avicebron e seguita da gran parte della scuola agostinista tradizionale la quale, per distinguere la creatura dal creatore sul piano metafisico, introdusse la composizione di materia e forma anche negli angeli e nell'anima umana. La contropartita di questa tesi nel tomismo è precisamente la distinzione reale, non più *in ratione essentiae* — poiché lo spirito è semplice per definizione — ma *in ratione entis*, ch'è precisamente la composizione reale di *essentia* ed *esse*,[74] di cui S. Tommaso è stato il primo ed è rimasto l'unico assertore nel suo tempo: una posizione di cui ora, dopo l'avventura del pensiero moderno, cominciamo a comprendere il pieno valore speculativo di fondamento. Da una parte infatti questa tesi è strettamente connessa alla furibonda polemica sulla unità o molteplicità delle forme sostanziali che divise i teologi specialmente tra la fine del sec. XIII e la prima metà del sec. XIV[75]; dall'altra parte, con l'affermazione della consistenza metafisica della creatura spirituale, dotata di un proprio *esse* che aderisce necessariamente all'essenza o forma assolutamente spirituale, essa permette il confronto diretto col trascendentale moderno ed il suo deciso superamento: esso si attua con l'affermazione della libertà radicale come capacità originaria di decidere del proprio essere con la scelta dell'ultimo fine.

A questo modo la distinzione reale di *essentia* ed *esse* è la chiave dell'originalità speculativa del tomismo e l'unica risposta radicale, all'interno del tomismo speculativo, della richiesta heideggeriana della "differenza ontologica" per il disvelamento dell'essere dell'ente che Heidegger per coerenza al suo immanentismo ha dovuto confessare di tenere legato nel plesso temporale dell'evento; non si vede allora come, con la proclamazione dell'orizzonte finito dell'essere dell'ente,

73 Alla ricerca dell'originalità della posizione tomistica come sintesi-superamento, nel senso della *Aufhebung* hegeliana, abbiamo dedicato la maggior parte dei nostri studi (cf. *La nozione tomistica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino*, I ed. Milano 1939, III ed. Torino 1963; *Participation et causalité*, Paris-Louvain 1960, ed. it. Torino 1961).

74 I testi classici della maturità sono spec.: *Q. De Spir. creat.*, a. 1 ("Utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma"); *Q. De Anima*, a. 6. L'esposizione critica più analitica e drastica della posizione di Avicebron e dell'itinerario platonico-aristotelico della sua nuova nozione di partecipazione, culminante nella tesi della distinzione reale di *essentia* ed *esse*, S. Tommaso l'ha data nell'opuscolo incompiuto *De substantiis separatis* (cf. C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione*[3], ed. cit., p. 62ss.).


75 Cf. F. J. Roensch, *Early Thomistic School*, (Dubuque Iowa 1964), spec. p. 188s.

Heidegger possa superare il limite dell'Estetica trascendentale di Kant ed aprire un varco per la metafisica. La richiesta heideggeriana della differenza ontologica non poteva certamente essere soddisfatta dalla sola distinzione aristotelica (fatta valere dagli Averroisti contro la distinzione tomistica di *essentia* ed *esse*) di sostanza ed accidenti ch'è puramente predicamentale. Né era più soddisfacente il ricorso unilaterale alla dipendenza causale estrinseca in cui si rifugiarono l'agostinismo teologico e la Scolastica barocca con la distinzione di *essentia* ed *existentia*, a cui ritornano oggi con flessioni neoplatoniche i fautori del nuovo trascendentalismo cattolico filokantiano e heideggeriano che Heidegger stesso ha confutato in antecedenza.

In conclusione: il problema radicale sul piano sia storico come speculativo per la fondazione della metafisica è quello sollevato da Heidegger, il ricupero dello *esse* come atto fondamentale, ma non però al modo di Heidegger ossia come "presenza del presente" ch'è il presentarsi transitorio dentro e mediante il tempo e quindi semplice presenza di (e come) *existentia*. L'*esse* è presenza di atto metafisico profondo come prima partecipazione dell'attualità assoluta, immanente all'essenza (finita), grazie al quale lo stesso *Esse per essentiam* ch'è Dio diventa immanente al finito "per essenza, per potenza e per presenza."[76] E' all'interno di questa formula, ancora enigmatica e audace, che s'inserisce la concezione tomistica della dinamica dello spirito finito per l'attuazione radicale della sua libertà, come ha visto giustamente il pensiero moderno. Ma il pensiero moderno era partito male, con l'astrazione totale dell'essenza ch'è il vuoto di coscienza ed è finito perciò nella dialettica orizzontale di essere-nulla, dell'apparire e scomparire dell'effimero gioco degli eventi in un mondo diventato senza senso.

Liberata dalle polemiche e dalle incrostazioni di un tipo di cultura, ch'era insieme troppo legata alla fisica e troppo teologizzante, la concezione tomistica dello *esse*, come atto intensivo emergente, è in grado di evitare sia la Scilla di una creaturalità statica di predestinazionismo assoluto della teologia statica, sia il Cariddi di una libertà come trascendentale puro della filosofia moderna ch'è il presentarsi dell'atto come apparire e scomparire in uno scorrere infinito, senza principio e senza fine.

76 *S. Th.* I, 8, 1-4.



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ANALEKTIK UND DIALEKTIK

Zur Methode des Thomistischen und Hegelschen Denkens

Bernhard Lakebrink

Es kann keinem Zweifel unterliegen, dass das Thomistische Denken, wie es sich in den grossen Systemen der *Summa Theologiae*, der *Summa contra gentiles,* in den Quästionen *De veritate* und *De potentia* darstellt, nach strenger Methode verläuft, deren Geist diese breit angelegten und diffizil ausgeführten Konstruktionen bis in die letzten Winkel hinein inspiriert. Thomas selbst hat ebenso wie sein grosses Vorbild Aristoteles diese Methode mit sicherem Griff gehandhabt, ohne sie jedoch, wie etwa Kant die seinige, ausdrücklich zu reflektieren. So fehlt im Werk des Aquinaten ein gesondertes Kapitel, in dem seine Methodenlehre in aller Form entwickelt würde. Mehr noch als Kant hat Hegel — vor allem zum Schluss seiner Grossen Logik — mit höchstem Anspruch an unser philosophisches Nachdenken nicht eine "transzendentale" (im Vorblick auf mögliche Erfahrung angelegte), also bloss endliche Methode entwickelt, sondern eine Form des Denkens konzipiert, die er als absolut-unendliche oder als spekulative Methode begriffen hat.

Aber wenn Thomas und Aristoteles die Methode ihres Denkens und Systematisierens nicht ausdrücklich auf den Begriff gebracht haben, so heisst das nicht, dass sie bei der Kompliziertheit ihrer summativen Begriffsgefüge keinerlei Methode angewandt und benutzt hätten. Sie haben in der Fülle ihres Schrifttums auch hier und da, wenn auch noch so sporadisch, methodologische Erwägungen angestellt, die uns einen gewissen Einblick in die Konstruktionsgesetze ihres Denkens und in den Stil ihrer Systematik verstatten. So können wir die innere, zweifellos vorhandene Systematisierung ihrer Systeme herausanalysieren, um sie näher zu bestimmen und gegen andere Methoden — in unserem Fall gegen die Hegelsche Dialektik — abzugrenzen.

Wir bezeichnen nun die Thomistische Methode als "*Analektik*" im Unterschied zur *Dialektik* Hegels, zumal der Begriff der Analektik in

der Analogielehre des Aquinaten seine greifbarste und einsichtigste Verwirklichung erfährt. Daher erscheint es als durchaus legitim, den ontologisch-sachhaften Begriff der Analogie zu dem der Analektik zu formalisieren, wobei aber stets festzuhalten ist, dass die Analektik nicht nur auf die Analogielehre des Aquinaten, wie er sie in der *Summa Theologiae* I, 13 entwickelt, beschränkt bleiben darf. Die Gesamtheit der Thomistischen Philosophie und Theologie ist von dieser Analektik als Methode beseelt; sie ist gleichsam deren Stilform, die das Gesamt des summativen Vertikalgefüges ebenso wie alle seine Einzelheiten und Gliedformen bestimmt, so wie ja auch die gotische Kathedrale bis in all ihre Strebepfeiler, Fialen und Arabesken hinein von dem einen Geist der Gotik inspiriert erscheint.

Das neuzeitliche Denken ist ganz besonders am Problem der Methodologie interessiert. Der rationalistische Deduktionalismus, die transzendentale Methode Kants, die spekulative Dialektik Hegels, die marxistische Ideologie, das positivistische Denken, die phänomenologische Methode Husserls — sie alle fordern immer wieder das Nach-denken unserer Tage heraus. Alles, was seit Schleiermacher und Dilthey um das Problem der sogenannten Hermeneutik in Geschichte und theologischer Exegese kreist, das alles hat mit dem Phänomen des Methodologischen zu tun. Erst der Existentialismus der Nachkriegszeit suchte sich dem *wissenschaftlichen* Bemühen um das Methodologische überhaupt zu entziehen, indem er die Philosophie und ihr strenges Denken der Willkür quasi-dichterischer Einfälle auslieferte und so die Wissenschaftlichkeit der Methode und damit alle systematische Philosophie aufhob. "Das Denken ist [nach Heidegger] kein Mittel für das Erkennen," zumal das Denken mehr und mehr in die Nachbarschaft des Dichtens hereingerät: "Beide, Dichten und Denken, brauchen einander."[1]

Die Methode der philosophischen *Wissenschaft* wird unter Missbrauch des Hegelschen Begriffs vom "Vorstellen" und unter Benutzung Nietzsche'scher Motive einem auch von Heidegger abgewerteten bloss "wissenschaftlichen *Vorstellen*" zugesprochen, wie es sich vor allem in Metaphysik und Technik ereignen soll. Im existentialen Denken hingegen "gibt es weder die Methode noch das [gegenständliche] Thema, während in den Wissenschaften... das Thema nicht nur durch die Methode gestellt [wird], sondern es wird zugleich in die Methode hereingestellt und bleibt in ihr untergestellt".[2] Diese "Nach-

1 Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (Pfullingen, 1969), 173.
2 *Ibid.*, 178.

barschaft des Denkens und Dichtens"[3] zerstört natürlich den wissenschaftlichen Charakter allen Philosophierens von Grund auf. Allgemeingiltigkeit, Objektivität und Lehrbarkeit geprägter Aussagen (Dogmen) werden unmöglich. Daher das auch für die moderne Theologie verbindlich gewordene Wort Heideggers: "Alle Formeln sind gefährlich".[4]

Auch die existentiale Theologie, vor allem die der Rahner und seiner Anhänger, hat sich dem objektiv verpflichtenden Gesetz einer bestimmten einheitlichen Methode längst entzogen. Rahner wirbelt transzendentalistisches und existentiales, dialektisches und Thomistisches Denken unbekümmert durcheinander (vgl. *Geist in Welt* und *Hörer des Wortes*), nachdem Maréchal bereits auf unglückselige Weise den Kantischen Transzendentalismus mit Thomistischer Methode auszusöhnen versucht hatte. Die verderblichen Folgen dieser Vernachlässigung methodologischer Redlichkeit und exakter Innehaltung eines von der Sache selbst her geforderten "modus procedendi" erleben wir heute angesichts der Tragödie nicht nur des philosophischen, sondern vor allem auch des theologischen Denkens.

Um so mehr sollten wir uns nicht nur immer wieder auf die unerschütterlichen Fundamente der philosophia perennis, insonderheit der Thomistischen Philosophie zurückbesinnen, sondern ineins damit auch die Orientierungsmacht und die zeit- bzw. geschichtslose Leuchtkraft seiner Methode, die versöhnliche und wahrhaft vermittelnde Milde, den Geist der Gerechtigkeit, d. i. des "suum cuique", ebendieses Denkens zu bedenken versuchen. Vor dem feindseligen Extremismus gedachter Positionen, vor der Unerbittlichkeit jäher Umschwünge im Begrifflichen überhaupt, vor dem "wilden Wechsel"[5] in Ding und Denken, der "das wesentlich Feste wankend" macht,[6] vor dieser selbst von Hegel gefürchteten Gefahr aller Dialektik weiss uns die Analektik Thomistischer Methode sehr wohl zu bewahren. Nicht von ungefähr begreift Hegel im Zeichen der grossen Französischen Revolution "das Wahre... als den bacchantischen Taumel, an dem kein Glied nicht trunken ist".[7] Nun will sich allerdings "die durchsichtige und einfache Ruhe", ohne die selbst in dialektischem Betracht keine Wahrheit möglich ist, nur schlecht wiederherstellen lassen, zumal ja nicht nur die logischen, sondern auch die "sittlichen Bestimmungen" in das dialektische Entstehen und Vergehen hineingerissen werden. Hegel

3 *Ibid.*, 189.
4 *Ibid.*, 81.
5 Hegel, *Wissenschaft der Logik* (Leipzig, 1932), II, 112.
6 *Ibid.*, 493.
7 Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes* (Leipzig, 1937), 39.

verlangt deshalb eine Art irrationalen Fiduzialglaubens an den dialektischen Logos, zumal er uns keinen besseren Trostgrund an die Hand zu geben vermag als den Zuspruch: "Insofern die Dialektik... sittliche Bestimmungen aufhebt, [so muss man] zur Vernunft das Vertrauen haben, dass sie dieselben, aber in ihrer Wahrheit und dem Bewusstsein ihres Rechts, aber auch ihrer *Schranke* [!], wiederherzustellen wissen werde".[8]

Es sollte nicht lange dauern, bis der Durchbruch des geschichtlichen Denkens im 19. Jahrhundert alle feste Wahrheit in einen relativistischen Historizismus aufzulösen versuchte, und das mit einer nicht unberechtigten Berufung auf die Hegelsche Dialektik. Hegel selbst hat über seine dialektische Methode nun nicht nur in der Vorrede zur "Phänomenologie des Geistes" reflektiert. Vollends auf den Begriff gebracht erscheint sie erst zum Schluss der Grossen Logik, und zwar in der Lehre von der "absoluten Idee".[9] Auf dem Wege ihrer logischen Selbstvollendung hat die Idee alle bestimmten, d.h. inhaltlich-objektiven und somit begrenzten Entfaltungsphasen ihrer selbst durchlaufen, ähnlich wie das Lebewesen die Stadien von Jugend, Reifezeit und Alter. Am Ende ihrer selbst hat sich die Idee völlig in sich selbst zurückgezogen, alle Reichtümer ihres gedanklichen Lebens in sich hineinerinnert. Sein, Wesen und Begriff sind gleichsam ihre logischen Reifestadien, wobei der Begriff in seiner höchst vollendeten Gestalt als reine Form oder "*absolute Methode*" aufscheint.

Nunmehr ist alles an Inhalt, Objektivität, alle äussere Reflexion, die bisher noch in *unser* Wissen fiel, auf- und untergegangen in ebendiesen Schluss der reinen Idee als des vollendeten Begriffs.[10] Jetzt ist aller bisherige logische Inhalt mit seinen vielfachen Bestimmungen aufgezehrt, aufgehoben, einverwandelt in die *Inhaltslosigkeit,* als welche die *absolute Form* oder die reine Idee selbst ist. Die ganze Logik mit der Fülle ihres Nacheinanders an Bestimmungen war nichts anderes als die deduktionale Selbstvollendung bzw. Selbstverwirklichung der absoluten Idee. "Das ursprüngliche *Wort*..., das eine Äusserung ist, [ist] eine solche, die als Äusseres unmittelbar wieder verschwunden ist, indem sie ist; die Idee ist also nur in dieser Selbstbestimmung, *sich zu vernehmen*; sie ist in dem *reinen Gedanken,* worin der Unterschied noch kein *Anderssein* [erlangt hat], sondern sich vollkommen durchsichtig ist und bleibt."[11]

Die *logische* Idee hat sich also noch nicht in das *wirkliche* Anderssein in der Gestalt von Natur und Geist (Geschichte) entäussert. Sie

8 Hegel, *Logik* II, 493.
9 *Ibid.,* 483.
10 Vgl. *ibid.,* 505.
11 *Ibid.,* 485.

ist zunächst noch mit all ihren andershaften Bestimmungen ganz und gar in das Element ihrer selbst, d. h. des reinen Denkens, beschlossen und so immer noch bei sich. Die absolute oder vollendete Idee ist als das reine Denken ihrer selbst in diesen ihren Denken- bzw. Selbstbestimmungen (Sein, Wesen, Begriff) nur als das reine "*Wort*",[12] worin sie sich selbst nur für sich selbst ausspricht, ohne sich schon in dieser im Denken einbehaltenen Andersheit in das ganz Andere von Natur und Geist entlassen zu haben. Nachdem sich die Idee *innerhalb* des Denkens also ausgesprochen und den so gedachten Ausspruch oder das "ewige Wort" wiederum vernommen, d. h. in sich zurückgenommen und aufgehoben hat, allen andershaften Inhalt verflüchtigt und seine Mannigfaltigkeit von Bestimmungen wieder eingefangen hat in die reine *Form* des Denkens als den *aufgehobenen Inhalt*, so bleibt als dieser aufgehobene Inhalt die nunmehr reine Form noch zu bedenken. Das reine Denken ist jetzt nur noch als aufgehobener, überwundener, durch und durch zerdachter Inhalt seiner selbst. Das Denken als diese absolute Form, als Nicht-mehr-Inhalt, ist aber nichts anderes als die absolute Methode selbst, die alles Inhaltlich-Gedachte überwunden hat und sich nur noch in dieser Negativität des aufgehobenen Inhalts, d. h. als reine Form, bedenkt.

Die logische Wissenschaft oder das reine Denken schliesst damit, in der Fülle der geäusserten und im "Worte" ausgesprochenen Sach- und Inhaltsbestimmungen seiner selbst (Sein, Wesen, Begriff), sich nunmehr abschliessend, d.h. im *vollendeten* Begriff als dem zuletzt Gedachten, zu entdecken. Im Gedachten (Begriff) entdeckt das Denken (Begreifen) sein Selbst als die alle voraufliegenden Bestimmungen und Denkinhalte durchdringende und aufhebende "Seele und Substanz", als die "absolute Negativität", als "absolute Form", als die "*allgemeine absolute Tätigkeit*",[13] als die "*absolute Methode*".[14] Der reine Begriff hatte sich im Verlauf der Logik selbst zum Gegenstand (Inhalt) und schliesst nunmehr damit, "dies Begreifen seiner selbst [das in dem Inhaltlich-Gedachten verschlüsselte Denken selbst] zu erfassen, somit seine Stellung als Inhalt und Gegenstand aufzuheben und den Begriff der Wissenschaft zu erkennen",[15] d. h. ihre "Seele", "Tätigkeit", "Form" als "Methode" zu erfahren; denn alles das sind die Weisen des Begriffs selbst, die er als sich selbst oder sein Leben in der Wirklichkeit der logischen Wissenschaft zu erkennen vermag. Die Methode oder ab-

12 *Ibid.*
13 *Ibid.*, 486.
14 *Ibid.*, 490 f.
15 *Ibid.*, 505.

solute Form ist mithin das Leben des Logos selbst, seine absolute *Negativität*, weil er am Ende der Logik alle Gedankenbestimmungen seiner selbst (Sein, Wesen, Begriff) in sich zurückgefürht und *aufgehoben* hat.

Die analektische Methode des hl. Thomas hält demgegenüber jeden Hauch von Negativität aus Gottes Leben fern, mithin auch alle Veränderlichkeit und alles, was geschichtlich ist. Die Wirklichkeit Gottes ist analektisch die *absolute Positivität* seiner alles umgreifenden und in sich bergenden Form selbst. Während alle endliche Form (umgrenzte Wesenheit) das relative Nichts des Andersseins an sich trägt und deshalb von dem ihr an- und zugemessenen Sein selbst ("actu esse") real unterschieden ist, fallen Gottes unendliche Form und somit seine unbegrenzte Wirklichkeit der Fülle ineins. Daher ist keinerlei Differenz, auch keine Grenze bzw. Negation und Andersheit in ihm zu finden. "Cum Deus sit ipsa forma, vel potius ipsum esse, nullo modo compositus esse potest. Et hanc rationem tangit Hilarius 7 de Trinitate dicens: "Deus, qui virtus est, ex infirmis non continetur; *neque qui lux est, ex obscuris coaptatur*"".[16]

Das analektische Denken lebt von der uneingeschränkten Priorität des Affirmativen bzw. Positiven. Das gilt sowohl für seine logische Formalität als auch für das Prinzip seiner Ontologie. "Semper enim in rebus negatio fundatur super aliqua affirmatione, quae est quodammodo causa eius".[17] Es fehlt der Negation bzw. Privation jedwede Art von affirmativem Ansichsein, so dass sie ohne eine ihr zugrundeliegende, apriorische Positivität von Wirklichkeit nicht zu sein vermag. "Nam negatio vel privatio non est ens naturae, sed rationis",[18] oder "privatio entis fundatur in ente".[19] Analektisch lebt alle Ontologie ebenso wie die ihr zugeordnete Logik von der Priorität des Positiven. "Denn durch die Bejahung [*κατάφασις*] wird die Verneinung [*ἀπόφασις*] erkannt, und die Bejahung ist *früher* [*προτέρα*], wie auch das Sein früher ist als das Nichtsein [*ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι*]".[20] Alles Negative als solches hat keinerlei Seiendheit oder Wahrheit aus sich selbst, sondern empfängt beides allemal vom Verstande. In der *Wirklichkeit* der Dinge gibt es keine Negativität als solche, ebensowenig wie ein Allgemeines-an-sich ausserhalb unseres Verstandes anzutreffen ist. Weil das absolute Nichts alles Sein ein für allemal aus sich ausschliesst, so kann ihm auch keine Wahrheit innewohnen. Beides wird hier allenfalls vom Verstande

16 *Summa theologiae* I, 3, 7, c.
17 *Summa theol.* I-II, 72, 6, c.
18 *In IV Meta.* lect. 2, nr. 560.
19 *Summa theol.* I, 11, 2, c.
20 Aristoteles, *Anal. post.* I, 25, 86 b 34-36.

gleichsam ausgeliehen, so dass er über das Nichts zu urteilen vermag, *als ob* es so etwas wie ein Seiendes bzw. Wahres wäre. "Quod [non-ens] intellectui cuicumque aequetur, non est ex seipso non ente, sed ex seipso intellectu, qui rationem non entis accipit in seipso".[21]

Alle Seiendheit und Aussagbarkeit verdankt das Nichts somit dem göttlichen oder menschlichen Verstande. "Ens enim aliquo modo acceptum dicitur de non ente, secundum quod non ens est apprehensum ab intellectu".[22] Damit ist das fundamentalste Grundgesetz analektischen Denkens ausgesprochen: das Sein als solches schliesst alles Nichts ein für allemal aus sich aus, und zwar in logischem wie ontologischem Betracht. Das Widerspruchsprinzip in seiner Negativität und Exklusivität bildet nicht von ungefähr den *Anfang* unserer Denkbewegung. Dialektisch aber sind Negativität (Nichts) und Sein selbst bis zur Identität ineinander verschränkt. "Sein und Nichts ist dasselbe", heisst es im § 88 der Hegelschen Enzyklopädie. Für das analektische Denken aber ist die Negativität im Widerspruchsprinzip (Das Sein ist nicht Nichts) nur der verschärfte Ausdruck der totalen unaufhebbaren, unvermittelbaren Entfremdung von Sein und Nichts. Was aber für den *Begriff* des Seins gilt, das trifft erst recht zu für die *Wirklichkeit* des Seins selbst, das "esse subsistens", als welches Gott selber ist. Wenn für das dialektische Denken die absolute Idee so etwas ist wie die "absolute Form",[23] die "absolute Methode,[24] so gilt auch analektisch: Gott ist "*forma*... per se subsistens",[25] aus der alle Negativität, Potentialität, Veränderlichkeit, Geschichtlichkeit ausgeschlossen sind, eben weil Gott das Sein selbst ist. "Deus est actus purus, non habens aliquid de potentialitate".[26]

Die analektische Logik vertreibt mittels des Widerspruchsprinzips aus dem Sein selbst radikal jedwede Art von Nichtigkeit, so dass nicht die leiseste Vermittlung zwischen Sein und Nichts statthaben kann. "Inter contradictoria non est medium". Alle Negativität gilt nur als der verschärfte Ausdruck für diese Unmöglichkeit jedweder Art von Vermittlung zwischen Sein und Nichts. Ähnlich dienen auch alle negativen Aussagen über Gott nur dem unendlichen Über-Hinaus seiner Positivität und Seinsvollkommenheit. "Deus non sic dicitur non existens, quasi nullo modo existens, sed quia est *supra omne existens,* inquantum est suum esse".[27] Wenn analektisch von der Un-endlichkeit

21 St. Thomas, *De veritate* I, 5, ad 2.
22 *De veritate* I, 1, ad 7; vgl. *Summa theol.* I, 16, 7, ad 4.
23 Hegel, *Logik* II, 486, 501.
24 *Ibid.*, 490.
25 *Summa theol.*, I, 3, 2, ad 3.
26 *Ibid.*, c.
27 *Summa theol.*, I, 12, 1, ad 3.

Gottes die Rede ist, so ist auch hier die gedoppelte Negativität des "Un" und "endlich" (un-begrenzt, in-finit) nur ein bescheidenes Ausdrucksmittel unseres menschlichen Sprechens, um das uneinholbare Über-Hinaus von Gottes ursprünglicher und verströmender Fülle aufzuzeigen, als welche er analog zu unserem Seinsbegriff wahrhaft der unvermittelte Anfang selbst ist. "Deus, cum sit *infinitus,* comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid, ad quod prius non pertingebat. Unde nullo modo sibi competit motus. Et inde est quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti, posuerunt, primum principium esse immobile".[28]

Dialektisch hingegen leben die Negativität und damit der Widerspruch im Herzen Gottes selbst und auch zutiefst in allen Dingen dieser Welt. "Das *Nichtsein* des Endlichen [das "Un" des Endlichen] ist das *Sein* des Absoluten".[29] Und wenn man dialektisch zwischen Positivität und Negativität wertend unterscheiden will, so wäre "der Widerspruch für das Tiefere und Wesenhaftere zu nehmen. Denn die Identität ihm gegenüber ist nur die Bestimmung des einfachen Unmittelbaren, des toten Seins; er aber ist die Wurzel aller Bewegung und Lebendigkeit".[30] Je negativer und zugeschärfter der Widerspruch im Inneren von Gott und Dingen revoltiert, um so jäher ist sein Umschlag in die Identität bzw. Positivität. Die Identität ist somit niemals Ursprung und Voraussetzung (Causa) der Negation, sondern umgekehrt: Die Identität ist dialektisch allemal nur als das "*Resultat*"[31] der Negation, als die "Negation der Negation", als das "Andere des Anderen".[32] So und nur so ist beispielsweise das *Fürsichsein* möglich, sei es in Gestalt des mechanisch-numerischen Eins (des Atoms, der Monade), des "Ich", des "Geistes" oder "Gottes".[33]

In allem ist die Negativität, besser die "absolute Negativität", "das Negative des Negativen",[34] das konstitutive Prinzip. Alles ist somit der "absoluten Methode" underworfen. Die Methode ist also alles andere als die des analektischen Denkens, das sich allemal im behutsamen Nachgang der Wirklichkeit des Wirklichen anzugleichen sucht, ja—um des Seins und der Wahrheit willen — sich ihr in Botmässigkeit und Dienstschaft zugeordnet (proportioniert) und verpflichtet weiss. "Scibile

28 *Summa theol.* I, 9, 1, c.
29 Hegel, *Logik* II, 62.
30 *Ibid.,* 58.
31 *Ibid.,* 499.
32 Hegel, *Enzyklopädie,* § 95; *Logik* II, 496.
33 *Logik* I, 149.
34 *Logik* II, 496.

non dependet a scientia, sed e converso".[35] Nicht der Geist und die Methode sind das Mass der Dinge, sondern "res est mensura intellectus nostri".[36] Dialektisch ist die absolute Methode das endliche Denken des Menschen, aber so, dass es in seiner Widersprüchlichkeit und Negativität (Endlichkeit) über sich hinaus getrieben und aufgehoben wird in das Denken Gottes selber, so dass Letzteres nicht Ursprung, wohl aber *Resultat* des endlichen Denkens ist. Der Fortgang, die Entwicklung des Denkens oder Begriffs über alle Endlichkeit hinaus, vollzieht sich nicht als "*eine Art von Überfluss*".[37] Gott ist nicht der absolute, aktuose Anfang, "actus purus", "diffusivum sui",[38] Gott ist dialektisch vielmehr immer nur das *Ende*. "Nur in seiner *Vollendung* ist es [das Sein des Anfangs] das Absolute".[39]

Die absolute Methode ist jenes Leben, das seinen Ausgang nimmt von seiner Anfangsbestimmung, als welche das Sein ist, das soviel wie Nichts bedeutet. Von dieser leeren Unmittelbarkeit und "abstraktesten und dürftigsten"[40] Äusserlichkeit als ihrer armseligen Vorausbestimmung geht die absolute Methode aus, wobei ihr zunächst unser Denken als "äusserliche Reflexion" als bloss "verständiges endliches Erkennen"[41] zuschauend beiwohnt. Kraft des ihm immanenten Widerspruchs wird dieser Anfang (Sein als Nichts, Identität als Nicht-Identität) über sich hinaus getrieben in sein Anderes, in seine erste Negation, als welche sich das *Wesen* zeitigt. Das *Sein* wird dialektisch als Unmittelbarkeit, abstrakter Anfang, als "Nichts, welches das Sein ist"[42] begriffen, besser noch als die "*Einheit* des Seins und Nichtseins... oder der *Identität* der Identität und Nicht-Identität".[43] "Dieser Begriff könnte als die erste, reinste, d. i. abstrakteste Definition des Absoluten angesehen werden".[44]

Diese Abwertung des höchsten und vollkommensten Begriffs, den das analektische Denken kennt, macht jede Versöhnung zwischen Analektik und Dialektik von vornherein unmöglich. Die katholische Theologie des 19. Jahrhunderts hatte durchaus recht, wenn sie — von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen — im Gegensatz zum Heute zu einer Rezeption Hegelscher Denkmotive nicht bereit war. Auch analektisch

35 St. Thomas, *In I Sent.* d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3.
36 *Summa theol.* I-II, 65, 3, c.
37 *Logik* II, 490.
38 *Summa theol.* I, 5, 4, ad 2.
39 *Logik* II, 490.
40 *Enzyklopädie*, § 86.
41 *Logik* II, 491.
42 *Enzyklopädie*, § 89.
43 *Logik* I, 59.
44 *Ibid.*

ist das Sein der uranfängliche, erste und gerade so alles einbehaltende Begriff, der allem, wenn auch auf die verschiedenste Weise, also analogisch zukommt, mag es sich um Gott oder um die Materie, ja sogar um das Nichts als ein "ens rationis" handeln. Wenn unserem Denken der Aufstieg in die unendliche Weite des Transzendentalen und des Transzendenten möglich ist, so nur, weil es über diesen ganz und gar undialektischen, eben analektischen Begriff des Seins verfügt. Das Sein ist durch und durch analektisch eingefärbt und zwar aus zweierlei Gründen:

1) Weil es durch und durch analogischer Natur ist und so alle kategorialen, artlichen und "Einzel"-Begriffe *aktuell*, d. h. unmittelbar in sich selber trägt, im Gegensatz zu Art und Gattung, die ihre Unterschiede nur *potentiell*, also nicht unmittelbar *in* sich selbst enthalten. Diesen analektischen Primat des Begrifflich-Analogen überhaupt drückt Thomas also aus: "In praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum non univocum, sed *analogicum*, quod est ens";[45]

2) Das Sein selbst ist ebenso wie die ihm kongruenten Transzendentalbestimmungen ganz und gar undialektischer Natur, d. h. sie sind analektisch strukturiert, sofern sie als solche keinerlei Negativität in sich tragen. "Quaedam nomina significant ipsas perfectiones absolute *absque hoc quod aliquis modus participandi* claudatur in eorum significatione, ut ens, bonum, vivens, et huiusmodi; et talia *proprie* dicuntur de Deo".[46]

Das Sein selbst, als welches Gott ist, steht in seiner Fülle und Vollendung immer schon am Anfang, nicht aber am Ende seiner eigenen oder gar einer menschlichen Denk- und Seinsbewegung. "Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens".[47] Daher ist es die natürliche Folge, dass Gott und nur Gott als das Sein selbst auch in den Dingen dieser Welt als die allein ihm gemässe Wirkung das *Sein* selbst erwirkt. "Cum Deus sit ipsum *esse* per suam essentiam, oportet quod *esse* creatum sit proprius effectus eius, sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis".[48] Gerade um des Seins willen wohnt Gott nicht ausserhalb, sondern in der Herzmitte der Dinge selbst. "Esse est illud quod est *magis intimum* cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt... Unde oportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus — *et intime*".[49]

Obwohl Gott als Prinzip der Dinge dank seiner unendlichen Entität und einmaligen Aseität unendlich über sie hinaus ist, verlangt dieses

45 *Summa theol.* I, 13, 5, ad 1.
46 *Summa theol.* I, 13, 4, ad 1. Vgl. auch *De veritate* 2, 11, c; *De potentia* 7, 2, ad 9.
47 *Summa theol.* I, 4, 2, c.
48 *Summa theol.* I, 8, 1, c.
49 *Ibid.*

Über-Hinaus dennoch sein innerstes Insein in der Kreatur. Diese widerspruchsfreie, eben seinsgemässe Spannung des Über-In ("supra-in") gehört zum Wesen der "analogia entis".[50] "Deus est *supra* omnia per excellentiam suae naturae, et tamen est *in* omnibus rebus ut causans omnium esse".[51] Alle Art von dialektischer Identität, also einer Identität von Identität und Nicht-Identität, eine *Unendlichkeit als Resultat* von transzendenter (metaphysischer) "Verstandes"-Unendlichkeit und hinfälliger Endlichkeit ist analektisch absurd. Daher kann es auch kein Werden oder gar eine Geschichte in Gott selber geben, wie die modernen Theologen wollen. Gott ist niemals in pantheistischem Sinn das Wesen von Welt, wie sehr er ihr auch — als ihre Wirklichkeit wirkend — zuinnerst innewohnt. "Deus est in omnibus rebus, non quidem sicut *pars essentiae*".[52] Der dialektische Pantheismus Hegels verflicht Endliches und Unendliches in die Einheit eines einzigen, in sich gegenläufigen Prozesses bzw. ein- und derselben Methode. "Das Endliche wird nicht vom Unendlichen als einer ausser ihm vorhandenen Macht aufgehoben, sondern es ist seine [des Endlichen] Unendlichkeit, sich selbst aufzuheben".[53] "Es ist nur die *Negation* [des Endlichen selbst], die sich in der *Negation aufhebt*".[54]

Statt des analektischen "*Über-In*" strukturiert dialektisch das "*Heraus-Hinein*" das Gott-Welt-Verhältnis. Dadurch werden Gott und Welt zu einer einzigen Einheit verschlungen, in eine *Identität* von Nicht-Identischen hineingezwungen. Die Dialektik behauptet, "das Unendliche [Gott] gehe zur Endlichkeit [Welt] *heraus*, darum weil es keine Wahrheit, kein Bestehen an ihm, wie es als abstrakte Einheit [von der alten Metaphysik] gefasst ist, hat; so umgekehrt geht das Endliche aus demselben Grunde seiner Nichtigkeit in das Unendliche *hinein*. Oder vielmehr ist zu sagen, dass das Unendliche ewig zur Endlichkeit herausgegangen, dass es schlechthin nicht ist, so wenig als das reine Sein, allein für sich, ohne sein Anderes an ihm selbst zu haben".[55]

Es zeugt von einem unentschuldbaren Missverständnis der Hegelschen Dialektik, wenn man heutzutage versucht, eine derartige Ontologie des Widerspruchs zu so etwas wie den "Prolegomena zu einer künftigen Christologie" aufzuwerten, um zugleich den — angeblich neuen — christlichen Gottesbegriff von dem "der griechischen Meta-

50 Vgl. E. Przywara, *Analogia entis* (München 1932).
51 *Summa theol.* I, 8, 1, ad 1.
52 *Ibid.*, c.
53 *Logik* I, 135.
54 *Ibid.*
55 *Ibid.*, 144.

physik" wegzuführen, "da sich dieser [angeblich] als zu statisch und zu transzendent erwies".[56]

Die "absolute Methode" oder die "unendliche Form", welche alle Inhaltsbestimmungen, deren dialektisches Auseinander- Hervorgehen, also den gesamten Verlauf der Logik bestimmt, erfasst erst am Ende der Logik als deren krönenden Beschluss sich selbst, denn aller Inhalt hat sich zur reinen Form, d.i. ins absolute Denken, selbst verwandelt. Nachdem sich die absolute Methode aus der anfänglichen Gedankenbestimmung des Seins zum Wesen entfaltet hat, setzt sie ebendieses Wesen als die "Negation des Seins". Weil nun das Wesen "das Negative des Ersten" (des Seins) ist, so ist es zugleich, "indem wir auf den weiteren Verlauf zum voraus Bedacht nehmen", das "*erste Negative*".[57] Dieses erste Negative ist mithin nicht mehr der Anfang oder das Unmittelbare (Sein), sondern "*das* [vom Sein her] *Vermittelte*" und "*enthält* überhaupt die *Bestimmung des Ersten* in sich. Das Erste ist somit wesentlich auch im Andern *aufbewahrt* und *erhalten*".[58]

Wir haben hier als Beispiele für die Formalität der dialektischen Methode die Bestimmungen von Sein und Wesen gebraucht. Natürlich könnten wir ebensogut als Beleginhalte für den Anfang bzw. die Unmittelbarkeit etwa das "Einzelne" (Logik II, S. 495) oder den "Keim des Lebendigen", die "Ursache", ja sogar die "Sonne"[59] benutzen, denn die "ganze Logik" enthält zahllose "*Beispiele*"[60] dieser Art. Aber wie unterschiedlich die inhaltlichen Bestimmungen für die Form der Unmittelbarkeit oder des Anfangs auch sein mögen, hier steht ausschliesslich die *allgemeine* Form, die absolute Methode selbst in Frage, die all' jene Inhalte durchherrscht und in gedanklicher Bewegung hält. Das Erste (Sein) ist im Zweiten, seiner Negation, oder in dem so *Vermittelten* (Wesen) nicht nur enthalten, aufgegangen, sondern auch untergegangen. Was nun die positive Seite des Enthaltenseins anlangt, so kann zunächst einmal diese "*Einheit* als ein Satz ausgedrückt werden, worin das [jeweilige] Unmittelbare [z. B. Sein, Endliches, Eins, Einzelnes] als Subjekt, das Vermittelte [als die Negation jener Unmittelbarkeiten] als dessen Prädikat gestellt ist, z.B. *das Endliche ist unendlich, Eins ist Vieles, das Einzelne ist das Allgemeine*",[61] oder auch: Das Sein ist das Wesen u.s.f., wobei jedesmal das Prädikat als die Negation des Subjekts erscheint.

56 H. Küng, *Menschwerdung Gottes* (Freiburg, 1970), 553.
57 *Logik* II, 494.
58 *Logik* II, 495.
59 *Ibid.*, 490.
60 *Ibid.*, 495.
61 *Ibid.*

Weil nun hier das Unmittelbar-Anfängliche in dem Vermittelten, d.h. in seiner Negation, enthalten und aufbewahrt wird, si sind jene *positiven* Urteile gerechtfertigt. Da aber das Negative jenes Erste (Subjekt) nicht nur positiv erhält und aufbewahrt, sondern auch nichtet und in negativem Sinne aufgehoben, also destruiert hat, so erweist sich jene *positive* Form des Urteils als höchst einseitig und "unfähig..., das Spekulative und die Wahrheit in sich zu fassen. Die nächste Ergänzung desselben, das *negative* Urteil, müsste wenigstens ebensosehr beigefügt werden. Im Urteil hat das Erste als Subjekt den Schein eines selbständigen Bestehens, da es vielmehr in seinem Prädikate als seinem Andern aufgehoben ist; diese Negation ist in dem Inhalte jener Sätze wohl enthalten, aber ihre positive Form widerspricht demselben; es wird somit das nicht gesetzt, was darin enthalten ist; was gerade die Absicht, einen Satz zu gebrauchen, wäre".[62]

Mit anderen Worten: Jedes *positive* Urteil fordert sein entsprechend *negatives*, das jenes erstere aufhebt. Denn schon in der Zweiheit und damit Andersheit von Subjekt und Prädikat, die durch die Kopula (das Einzelne *ist* das Allgemeine) identifiziert werden, ereignet sich dialektisch der Widerspruch oder die Negativität als Konstituens auch des positiven Urteils. Wenn dem so ist, bleibt an die modernistischen Theologen von heute die verfängliche Frage zu richten, wie sie unter solchen Umständen die Hegelsche Dialektik für eine katholische Dogmatik nutzbar machen wollen. Wir werden übrigens in der Folge sehen, wie das analektische Denken des hl. Thomas uns die Urteilsstruktur und die innere Verspannung von Subjekt und Prädikat ohne die Zuhilfenahme von dialektischer Negativität zu deuten weiss.

Aber kehren wir zu Hegel zurück. Wir sahen, wie das Unmittelbare (Sein) auf seine Negation (das Wesen) hinbezogen, in diesem auf- und unterging. Die zweite Bestimmung (Wesen) ist so die vom Ersten her *vermittelte,* zugleich aber auch die weiterhin *vermittelnde.* Sie umschliesst nämlich das Erste als das aufgehobene Andere in sich selbst. Sie ist so das "zweite Negative" als das "*Andere eines Andern*" und ist so "*die gesetzte Dialektik ihrer selbst*".[63] Hier erst, am Schluss der Logik, tritt die Methode selbst, von allem inhaltlichen Ballast nunmehr befreit, offen zutage und erscheint erstmals als solche im Wissen als reine Form, so dass es sich in ihr jetzt erst als Methode oder als verflüssigte Formalität entdeckt. In dieser Form begreift das Wissen sich selbst als Wissen, so dass nunmehr die Aristotelische " νόησις τῆς

62 *Ibid.*
63 *Ibid.*, 496.

νοήσεως"[64] oder das "ταὐτον νοῦς καὶ νοητόν"[65] auch dialektisch zum Ereignis wird. Das Denken ist mehr als Inhalt, Gegenstand, Objekt bezw. durch diese begrenztes Subjekt, es ist reine Form, absolute Methode, Geist und Leben in allen Dingen, "unendlicher Progress",[66] "*allgemeine absolute Tätigkeit*, die [sich] selbstbestimmende und selbst realisierende Bewegung", die "*Substantialität der Dinge*, — d.h. der Begriffe, insofern sie der *Vorstellung* und der *Reflexion* zunächst als *Andere* erscheinen".[67] Hier wird der idealistische Grundzug der Hegelschen Dialektik besonders deutlich, und man fragt sich, wie dieser Idealismus mit dem Realismus des christlichen Schöpfungsbegriffes in Einklang gebracht werden soll.

Jenes zweite Negative erwies sich, nachdem es das Erste bzw. Unmittelbare in sich hineingenommen hat, nunmehr als das "*Andere eines Andern*". Diese in sich revolvierende Negativität und Andersheit erweist sich nun als der "*einfache Punkt der negativen Beziehung auf sich*",[68] die ins Einfach-Punktuelle gleichsam eingezwängte unendliche Energie einer absoluten Negativität, das "Negative des Negativen"[69] in absoluter Konzentration.

Damit aber setzt der "*Wendungspunkt* der Bewegung der Begriffes"[70] ein, sofern die "Negation der Negation" analog dem grammatischen Prinzip: Gedoppelte Negation ergibt verstärkte Affirmation, sich nunmehr als das "Aufheben des Widerspruches"[71] zu vollbringen beginnt. Der Widerspruch als solcher ereignet sich zunächst als die Aktuosität des Gedoppelt-Negativen, als die Feindseligkeit des Anderen *gegen* das Andere, und ist gerade so als diese *intime* Revolution "der innerste Quell aller Tätigkeit, lebendiger und geistiger Selbstbewegung, die dialektische Seele, die alles Wahre an ihm selbst hat, durch die es allein Wahres ist".[72]

Sofern nun dieser Widerspruch (dieses "Negative des Negativen") zugleich gerade wegen seiner verschärften Intensität in das Aufheben seiner selbst umschlägt, so vollbringt er zugleich im Widersprechen die *Einheit* seines Grundes als "das *innerste, objektivste Moment* des Lebens und Geistes, wodurch ein *Subjekt, Person, Freies* ist".[73] "Das Ding, das Subjekt, der Begriff ist nun ebendiese negative *Einheit* selbst;

64 *Enzyklopädie*, § 552.
65 *Ibid.*, § 577.
66 *Logik* II, 500.
67 *Ibid.*, 486.
68 *Ibid.*, 496.
69 *Ibid.*
70 *Ibid.*
71 *Ibid.*, 497.
72 *Ibid.*, 496.
73 *Ibid.*, 497.

es ist ein sich selbst Widersprechendes, aber ebensosehr der *aufgelöste Widerspruch*: es ist der *Grund*, der seine Bestimmungen enthält und trägt".[74] Es ist diese absolute Negativität, welche zum Ende der Logik sich in die *Einheit* einer übergreifenden *Subjektivität* erinnert und beruhigt, welche damit aber auch die letzte Spur von Endlichkeit, d. i. von "Gegensatz zwischen Begriff [endlichem Subjekt] und Realität [Objekt]" liquidiert und "die Einheit [setzt], welche die Wahrheit ist",[75] "den adäquaten Begriff",[76] "die sich wissende Wahrheit"[77] oder das "*erfüllte* Sein"[78] selbst erwirkt.

Was wäre die absolute Idee somit anderes als die Selbstverwirklichung des Begriffes im Medium der Wissenschaft (Logik), die "Causa sui",[79] die "*Realisierung des Begriffs*"[80] durch sich selbst und für sich selbst. Die allem Inhaltlichen "immanente Form"[81] hat sich zum Schluss ihrer systematisierenden Tätigkeit und logischen Selbstvermittlung als "der *eine identische Begriff*" realisiert, in dem "Subjekt, Methode und Objekt"[82] eins wurden und jetzt nur noch die absolute Form als solche herrscht, als die "höchste zugeschärfteste Spitze", als die "*reine Persönlichkeit*, die allein durch die absolute Dialektik, die ihre Natur ist, ebensosehr *alles in sich befasst* and hält".[83]

Damit ist nunmehr das "*Dritte*"[84] erstanden, die jetzt endlich *perfekte* Aufhebung von Vermittlung und Widerspruch, "der Begriff, der sich durch das Anderssein [Sein, Nichts, Werden, Dasein, Etwas, Anderes, Fürsichsein, Quantität, Mass, Wesen, Grund, Existenz, Inneres, Äusseres, Möglichkeit, Wirklichkeit, Substanz, Ursache, subjektiver Begriff, objektive Welt, Leben, Erkennen, Tun] realisiert hat und durch Aufheben dieser [inhaltichen] Realität [Andersheit] mit sich zusammengegangen ist und seine *absolute* Realität, seine *einfache* Beziehung auf sich, hergestellt hat. Dies *Resultat* ist daher die *Wahrheit*".[85] Dieses realisierte "Dritte" ist nun die absolute Persönlichkeit, das geeinzelte Allgemeine, das reine Wissen; zugleich aber ist es um seiner wiedergewonnenen Unmittelbarkeit willen erneut der Anfang, von dem die logische Methode ihren Ausgang nahm. Daher ist das göttliche

74 *Ibid.*, 62.
75 *Ibid.*, 496.
76 *Ibid.*, 407.
77 *Ibid.*, 484.
78 *Ibid.*, 504.
79 *Enzyklopädie*, § 153.
80 *Logik* II, 489.
81 *Ibid.*
82 *Ibid.*, 487.
83 *Ibid.*, 502.
84 *Ibid.*, 498.
85 *Ibid.*, 498 f.

Leben (absolute Methode) so etwas wie der "in sich geschlungene Kreis",[86] der in sich zirkelt ohne Ende, zu welchem auch die zwei realen Kreise von Natur- und Geistgeschehen immerzu zurückkehren. Natur und Geist (Geschichte) sind nämlich im Gegensatz zu "Sein" und "Wesen" nicht immanent-logische, sondern *transient-reale Andersheiten* der Idee, in welchen sie sich mehr noch als im Medium der Logik, diesem "Reich der Schatten",[87] selbst realisiert.

Die Logik vollbringt sich innerhalb ihrer selbst als die "Triplizität"[88] von Anfang (Sein), Vermittlung (Wesen) und aufgehobener Vermittlung (Begriff), d. h. als Anfang, Mitte und Ende. Die Triplizität erscheint aber auch als das Gesamt der Logik, das sich in die zwei anderen Kreise von Natur und Geist entäussert hat, um aus ihnen in sich selbst zurückzukehren. Eine einzige absolute Methode durchherrscht also diese ideal-logische und real-geistige Triplizität, macht alles und jedes zu immer schon aufgehobenen Momenten, zum Vermittelten in dieser einen grossen Strömung, die "*als Kreis von Kreisen*"[89] in sich selber zirkelt.

Das Denken des Endlichen ist um dieser Endlichkeit seines Gegenstandes willen selber endlich[90] und verbleibt so, bis sich zum Schluss der Logik die Endlichkeit des Inhaltlich-Objektiven überhaupt in die absolute Methode formalisiert hat. Nunmehr ist unser endliches Denken oder unsere "äusserliche... subjektive Reflexion"[91] in die Unendlichkeit der methodischen Formalität hineinverwandelt, weil es in dem aufgehobenen Inhalt als der reinen Form ein Begrenzend- Äusserlich-Anderes nicht mehr gibt, sondern das Denken sich im *aufgehobenen* Inhalt selbst gewahrt. Im Begriffenen begreift sich der Begriff, und der Begriff begreift das Begriffene als sein Selbst und innerstes Wesen. Dieses Sich- Begreifen ohne trennende Grenze zwischen Begriff und Begriffenem hat sich aufgeklärt zur reinen Form. Es handelt sich somit um "das Wissen des Menschen *von* Gott, das fortgeht zum Sichwissen des Menschen *in* Gott",[92] oder auch um das Sichwissen des Menschen *als* Gott, sofern der Mensch sich selbst durch die Negation seines endlichen Denkens, also von sich aus, als die freie Unendlichkeit Gottes selbst erwirkt hat.

Mit dieser unendlichen Form des sich selbst denkenden Denkens ist das Reich der Wahrheit angebrochen, "*wie sie ohne Hülle an und für*

86 *Ibid.*, 504.
87 *Logik* I, 41.
88 *Logik* II, 498.
89 *Ibid.*, 504.
90 Vgl. *ibid.*, 437.
91 *Ibid.*, 505.
92 *Enzyklopädie*, § 564.

sich selbst ist. Man kann sich deswegen ausdrücken, dass dieser Inhalt die *Darstellung Gottes* ist, *wie er in seinem ewigen Wesen vor der Erschaffung der Natur und eines enlichen Geistes ist*".[93] Wir müssen aber hinzufügen, dass dieses ewige Wesen, d. h. der Logos, als unendliche Form oder Methode nicht nur *vor* Erschaffung von Welt und Mensch, sondern ebensosehr *nach* ihnen als ihrer beider *Resultat* ist.[94]

Was hat nun angesichts dieser mystisch-pantheistischen Spekulation der Dialektik die Thomistische Analektik auszusagen? Nach Thomas ist der Zentral- bzw. Wendepunkt aller dialektischen Methode in der Gestalt der "Negation der Negation" eine an sich selbst unmögliche Sache. Eine "privatio privationis" oder "negatio negationis" kann sich nicht in den Dingen, auch nicht im gedachten Inhalt als solchem, sondern allenfalls in der abstrakten Formalität unseres Denkens selbst als "ens rationis" ereignen. "Unde relatio qua refertur ens ad non ens, non est nisi tantum in ratione: et similiter privatio, qua de ente negatur non ens, est in ratione tantum, ut privatio privationis, vel negatio negationis".[95] Wenn schon die einfache privatio bzw. negatio ihr Sein dem setzenden Verstande zu verdanken hat, um wieviel mehr also die gedoppelte Negation als "negatio negationis"!? Die Folge ist, dass diese Seinsanleihe des Negativen beim Verstande und die Aufwertung des Negativen zum ens rationis eine solch' in sich verbissene wechselseitige Intensität zweier Negationen gar nicht zulässt, wie sie die Dialektik verstattet. Denn durch die Einbildung des Seins ins Negative mildern sich zum Beispiel die *Kontradiktorien* von Sein und Nichts, soweit sie vom Verstande als zugleich bedachte seinem Einen Wissen innewohnen, zur Kontrarietät.

So bleibt nach Thomas für die jähe Härte des kontradiktorischen Gegensatzes nur der Raum des Sachhaft-Objektiven. Hier mögen sich Sein und Nichts unversöhnlich verfeinden oder besser, einander meiden und sich soweit als möglich aus dem Wege gehen ("elongatio"): das Denken umgreift dennoch beide und macht sie eben dadurch zu *Gedachten*. Was in Wirklichkeit einander *widerspricht*, im Denken wird es — weil Gedachtes — zur Kontrarietät herabgesetzt. "Quamvis enim *esse* et *non esse* non sint contraria, sed contradictorie opposita, si considerentur ipsa significata, prout sunt in rebus, quia alterum est ens et alterum est pure non ens, tamen si referantur ad actum animae, utrumque ponit aliquid esse. Unde *esse* et *non esse* sunt contradictoria".[96]

93 *Logik* I, 31.
94 Vgl. *Enzyklopädie*, § 574.
95 *In I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.
96 *Summa theol.* I-II, 64, 3, ad 3; vgl. auch I-II, 35, 5, ad 2.

Das will besagen, dass die Realität der "contradictio" im Verstande zur "contrarietas affirmationis et negationis" entschärft wird. Es entspricht dem "sanften Gesetz" (media via) analektischen Denkens, dass das Wesen des kontradiktorischen Gegensatzes nicht so sehr im verbissenen Kampf des Gedoppelt-Negativen besteht, als vielmehr im stillen Ausweichen und in der maximalen Entfernung des Negativen vom Positiven oder des Möglichen vom Wirklichen. "Et isto modo in oppositione contradictoria *elongatur* potentia ab actu, quia in non ente simpliciter nihil potentiae est ad esse".[97]

Schon Platon — von der existentialen Theologie des Heute nicht mehr geschätzt — begreift das Verhältnis des Gegensätzlichen keineswegs als den "*einfachen Punkt* der negativen Beziehung auf sich",[98] als das Ineins zweier Negationen, sondern gerade umgekehrt als *Auseinanderstreben* der Kontradiktorien, als "elongatio" im Thomistischen Sinn, als die Nicht-Annahme des einen Gegensatzes durch den andern: "*τὸ ἐναντίον τὸ ἐναντίον μὴ δέχεσθαι*".[99] Niemals wird das eine Gegenteil zu dem anderen, sondern es flieht vor ihm oder löst sich beim Zusammentreffen beider restlos auf: "*ἀπέρχεται ἢ ἀπολλύται*".[100] Ganz im Sinne des Aristotelischen Widerspruchsprinzips kann und wird niemals eine Versöhnung bzw. Vermittlung des Gegensätzlichen als solchen durch Umschlag in ein Drittes erzwungen: "*μηδέποτε ἐναντίον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἔσεσθαι*".[101]

Eine aller Dialektik überlegene Besinnung stellt Thomas an, wenn er die Kontradiktorien von Sein und Nichts in das Gedachte an sich verlegt, das Denken selbst aber von ihnen vollends freihält. Ergibt sich aber dann nicht das folgende Problem, d. h. werden beide Kontradiktorien (Sein und Nichts) in dem objektiven Bereich des Dinglichen nicht selbst zu Seiendheiten, wird nicht trotz allem das Nichts wiederum aus einem blossen "ens rationis" zu einem "ens reale" angehoben? Thomas findet eine überraschende Lösung, die zudem ob ihrer präzisen Formulierung auch innerhalb der Dialektik kaum ihresgleichen hat. Die Thomistische Antwort lautet bündig: "In contradictoriis vero absolute *non* sunt *extrema realiter diversa*, quia non ens non est aliqua res. Sunt tamen extrema contradictionis semper *realiter non eadem*".[102] Sein und Nichts sind keine gleichgewichtigen gegensätzlichen Realitäten, weil das Nichts an sich selbst eben

97 *De IV oppositis*, cap. 1, nr. 622/Marietti.
98 *Logik* II, 496.
99 *Phaidon* 105 a, 2; ferner 104 b, 7-8.
100 *Ibid.*, 103 a, 1.
101 *Ibid.*, 103 b, 7-8.
102 *De IV oppositis*, cap. 3, nr. 594.

ausschliesslich nur Nichts ist. Zwischen beiden besteht nicht nur ein Seins-, sondern auch ein bestürzendes Wertgefälle, sofern das Sein als "nobilius extremum" vom Nichts als dem "extremum vilius"[103] allzeits geschieden bleibt, zumal nicht einmal der leiseste Ansatz ("potentia") von Seiendheit im Nichts erscheinen will. Aber das Sein in seiner Unvermittelbarkeit, Ausschliesslichkeit und Alleinheit genügt ja vollends, um seine *reale Nicht-Identität* ("realiter non eadem") mit allem Nichts uns in unüberbietbarer Evidenz schlicht und einfach in den Blick zu bringen. Das Widerspruchsprinzip bestimmt machtvoll die Objektivität des Dinglichen, ist dessen schlechthin prinzipiierendes Gesetz, die metaphysisch-transzendentale Bedingung aller Möglichkeit und Wirklichkeit, alles Endlichen und Unendlichen, sofern es zu seiner objektiven Giltigkeit nicht der *gegensätzlichen Realitäten*, wohl aber der *realen Gegensätzlichkeit* (Nicht-Identität) bedarf, die durch die Ausschliesslichkeit und Alleinigkeit des Seienden selbst unaufhebbar verbürgt und ein für allemal garantiert ist.

Die Dialektiker aller Zeiten, die der Antike wie die der Neuzeit, sind nach Thomas allemal "Sophisten", da sie Sein und Nichts im Grunde als gegensätzliche Sachheiten begreifen, die letzten Endes *generisch* ein und dasselbe sind. "Inde est quod sophistae decepti sunt putantes alterum extremum contradictionis, non esse scilicet, *in genere contineri*".[104] Das analektische Denken weiss sich selbst und seine ihm proportionierte Sache des Seins überhaupt auf unerschütterlichen Grund gestellt. Es gilt der Satz: Alles philosophische wie auch theologische Denken, das vom Widerspruche lebt, stirbt auch daran. Jedes Seiende ist seiner Natur nach sehr viel mehr auf die Proportionalität seiner immanenten Prinzipien, auf die Tranzendentalität von Frieden und Einheit im Inneren ("unitas sive pax")[105] seiner selbst so wie auf den Einklang mit dem Insgesamt von Welt gegründet. Das Endlich-Seiende ist analektisch alles andere als in tödlicher Ruhe erstarrt. Es wird in Atem gehalten durch die ihm einwohnende "virtus essendi",[106] weil Wesenheit und Sein, Potenz und Akt einander immer schon angemessen sind. "Potentia, cum sit receptiva actus, oportet quod actui *proportionetur*".[107] Aber die Proportion von Akt und Potenz verhindert nicht, dass sie *an sich* einander auch entgegengesetzt sind. "Id autem quod est in potentia tantum, non potest esse pars actus; cum potentia *repugnet* actui, utpote contra actum divisa".[108]

103 *Ibid.*, cap. 2, nr. 590.
104 *Ibid.*, nr. 592.
105 *Summa theol.* I, 103, 3, c.
106 *Summa contra gentiles* I, 20.
107 *Summa theol.* I, 75, 5, ad 1.
108 *Ibid.*, c.

Ebendiese in aller Zuordnung nicht aufgehobene Gegensätzlichkeit von Akt und Potenz, von Wesenheit und Sein, von Materie und Form stiftet jenes lebendige Zusammenspiel im Inneren der Dinge, damit ihre Wirklichkeit Ereignis werde. "Nulla res, in qua est aliud essentia et aliud esse, potest esse nisi *concurrentibus pluribus*, scilicet essentia et esse".[109] Längst bevor das existentiale Denken seine "ontologische Differenz" entdeckt zu haben glaubte, war sie als "distinctio realis" eine der Grundvoraussetzungen der analektischen Philosophie. Es ist nicht die Dialektik des zwangsgeeinten Widerspruchs, der inmitten der Dinge pulsiert als vielmehr der Einklang im Zusammenspiel ihrer physischen (Materie-Form) und metaphysischen (Wesenheit-Sein) Prinzipien, die — ohne die Spannung in ihrer Andersheit und Gegensätzlichkeit zu verlieren — die notwendige Voraussetzung hergeben, damit das harmonische Zusammenspiel oder die Konvenienz im Sein des Seienden und der immanenten Vielfalt seiner Momente sich vollbringen kann, denn: "Ens inquantum ens non habet rationem repugnantis, sed magis convenientis".[110]

Aber gilt nicht auch analektisch der — angeblich dialektische — Satz des Spinoza: "Omnis determinatio est negatio"?[111] Wir antworten: Längst vor Spinoza hat Thomas festgestellt: "In ratione distinctionis est negatio",[112] in aller Vielheit steckt auch analektisch Negativität und Andersheit. Thomas spricht in diesem Zusammenhang sogar von einer "negatio realis": "In multitudine est negatio vel privatio realis, secundum quod una res non dicitur esse alia, et huiusmodi distinctionem per negationem negat negatio importata in ratione unitatis. Unde dico, quod negatio ista in qua perficitur ratio unitatis, non est nisi *negatio rationis tantum*. Omnis enim respectus qui est entis ad negationem vel ad non ens, non est nisi rationis".[113] Im übrigen: was dialektisch von konstitutiver Bedeutung ist für Ding und Denken, die Wechselseitigkeit des Negativen nämlich, ist analektisch eine Absurdität. Denn jede Art von Negation, erst recht die gedoppelte Negation, die "negatio negationis", ist analektisch nur ein "ens rationis". Ebenso erweist sich das grammatische Prinzip, wonach gedoppelte Negation verstärkte Affirmation ergibt, allenfalls als ein "modus significandi", keinesfalls aber als ein "modus essendi".

Die Dialektik der "absoluten Negativität" erwies sich uns im Verlaufe der Methode als das "Zweite"[114] nach dem Sein als der "*ersten Un-*

109 *Summa contra gentiles* I, 22.
110 *Summa theol.* I-II, 29, 1, ad 1.
111 *Logik* I, 100.
112 *Summa contra gentiles* I, 71.
113 *In I Sent.* d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.
114 *Logik* II, 494.

mittelbarkeit",[115] oder als das "*Negative* des Ersten"[116] und damit als das "Negative des Negativen" oder als das "*Andre eines Andern*".[117] Nirgendwo im methodischen Verlauf der logischen Bestimmungen gibt es ein markanteres Beispiel für ebendieses "Negative des Negativen" als das *Wesen selbst.*[118] Als die Negation des Seins und damit seines Negativen, kurz als das aufgehobene Sein (Schein) ist das dialektische Wesen aller Wesenheiten in seiner Reinform diese gedoppelte Negation oder besser noch "*diese Bewegung von Nichts zu Nichts und dadurch zu sich selbst zurück*".[119] In Gestalt dieser Rückkehr vollbringt sich die Identität dieser absoluten Negativität mit sich als das zum "Schein" gewordene oder aufgehobene Sein.

Analektisch ist allenfalls *im Denken* des reflektierenden Verstandes eine solche "negatio negationis" möglich, aber keinesfalls vermag sich im Bereich des Sachhaft-Objektiven oder gar des Physikalischen diese Art von negativer Reflexionsbewegung zu ereignen. Statt der dialektischen "Bewegung von Nichts zu Nichts" gilt analektisch: "Ex negatione in negationem non est *mutatio per se*".[120] Es dürfte auch heute im Zeitalter der Relativitätstheorie, wonach Masse-Energie angesetzt wird, keinen Physiker geben, der diese dialektische "Bewegung von Nichts zu Nichts" als physikalisches oder gar metaphysisches Prinzip zu akzeptieren vermöchte. Es bleibt dabei: Alle Verneinung als solche und erst recht das Kreiselspiel des Nichts zu Nichts hat immer nur als "ens rationis" im Verstande statt.

Mag sich auch die Vielzahl der Dinge als *Mangel* an Einheit oder die Blindheit als ein schmerzlicher Augen*fehler* erweisen, jedes dieser Defizientien hat seinen tragenden *Grund* in der Positivität des Einzel-Seienden oder in dem, was von der Wirklichkeit des Auges selbst noch übrig ist. Die Integrität der Wirklichkeit ist zwar jeweils angegriffen, sie hat je ihren echten Mangel, es fehlt an Sein, so dass der Verstand dieses fehlende Sein als seiendes Fehlen vor sich hinstellen und begreifen kann. Die Wirklichkeit leidet Mangel, ohne dass dieser Mangel selbst mit jener Wirklichkeit *gleichwirklich* wäre, an der er als dunkler Schatten haftet. Analektisch sind Sein und Bejahung allemal *früher* als Nichts und Verneinung, die allemal in jenen ihren positiven Grund haben müssen. Ohne dieses Fundierungs-Verhältnis wären sie (Vielheit-Blindheit) Nichts, absolutes Nichts. So gilt denn analektisch

115 *Ibid.*, 490.
116 *Ibid.*, 494.
117 *Ibid.*, 496.
118 *Ibid.*, 7 ff.
119 *Ibid.*, 13.
120 *In V Phys.* lect. 2, nr. 652.

unumstösslich: "Privatio entis *fundatur* in ente... et exinde contingit quod multitudo est quoddam unum, et malum est quoddam bonum, et non ens est quoddam ens".[121]

Das alles aber besagt nicht, dass das jeweils Positive mit dem Negativen dialektisch, d.h. als "negatio negationis", jemals *identisch* würde, nicht einmal, dass sie einander gegensätzlich gegenüberstünden, sondern nur, dass das Negative das Positive zu seinem Grund und Boden hat, der es begründet, und zwar dergestalt, dass unser Verstand dank dieses positiven Grundes auch das Negativ-Begründete als solches *sein* lässt. Die dialektische Methode verschärft die zweite Bestimmung, das Negative des Ersten, zum Negativen des Negativen, zum "Andern eines Andern," das ins *Dritte*, d.i. zu neuer Unmittelbarkeit, umschlägt, in der jenes "*Andere an sich selbst*"[122] aufgehoben und doch zuinnerst weiter pocht. In Wahrheit ist das "Andre des Andern" nicht in den wahren Frieden einer ausgewogenen Einheit überführt. Endlich und (abstrakt oder transzendent-) Unendlich, Mensch und Gott, werden dialektisch in die Gewaltsamkeit eines angeblich Wahrhaft-Unendlichen und damit in eine *Identität der Unruhe* hineingezwungen, die nur als absolute *Negativität* ihr Leben hat. Vermag dieses "Wahrhaft-Unendliche", die "absolute Idee", in dieser Not ihrer selbst zu existieren? Natürlich nicht! Die Not der Negativität zwingt die absolute Idee zu dem "*Entschluss*", sich in die Freiheit von Natur und Geist zu "entlassen,"[123] um alsdann aus beiden "Schlüssen"[124] in den der Logik zurückzuschwingen, die selbst nur als diese Rückkehr, als ihr eigenes *Resultat*, d.i. als absoluter Geist, zu sein vermag.[125]

Diese "Not Gottes" ist analektisch eine Absurdität, ja mehr noch: eine Blasphemie. Das "Andre *des* Andern" ist analektisch allemal zum "*ἄλλο πρὸς ἄλλο*,"[126] zum "aliud *ad* aliud"[127] und somit zum *Verhältnis* gegenseitigen Andersseins *auseinander*genommen und aufgrund dieser Distanzierung so verständigt, dass beide Andere eben nicht zur *Identität* umschlagen können. Identität und Nicht-Identität, (abstrakt-) Unendliches und Endliches, Positives und Negatives, das Andere hier und das ganz Andere dort koinzidieren analektisch niemals zu einer übergreifenden Identität absoluter Negativität, sondern erscheinen als wahrhaft vermittelt in einer *Mitte*, die auf höchst seinsgerechte Weise

121 *Summa theol.* I, 11, 2, ad 1.
122 *Logik* II, 496.
123 *Enzykopädie*, § 244.
124 *Ibid.*, § 571, 574 ff.
125 *Ibid.*, § 577.
126 Aristoteles, *Met.* 5, 1016 b 35.
127 St. Thomas, *In V Meta.* lect. 8, nr. 879.

dem Unendlichen gibt, was des Unendlichen ist, und dem Endlichen, was ihm gebührt. Erneut erweist sich: nicht der *Wider*-spruch, sondern der *Ent*-spruch als Konvenienz und Proportion beherrscht als allversöhnendes Prinzip das Seiende im Ganzen. In dieser Mitte werden nicht zwangshaft die Extreme von Identität und Nicht-Identität, von Unendlich und Endlich zusammengepresst zur Identität als absoluter Negativität, in jener Mitte sind sie zum voraus immer schon versöhnt. Jedes der Extreme bleibt, was es ist, so dass Unendliches dem Unendlichen und Endliches dem Endlichen höchst angemessen zugesprochen werden kann. "Medium enim inquantum habet convenientiam cum utroque extremorum, est quoddammodo [!] utrumque eorum; et ideo potest dici hoc ad illud, et illud ad hoc".[128]

Was ist diese Mitte als Konvenienz, als Proportion und Angemessenheit ihrer Extreme anderes als die Ähnlichkeit oder die Analogie, welche als wahrhafte Vermittlung zwischen Unendlich und Endlich, zwischen Gott und Mensch oder logisch-formell zwischen Identität und Nicht-Identität hin- und widerspielt? Gott bleibt Gott, Mensch bleibt Mensch, und dennoch hat ein analektisches Ineinanderscheinen statt, dem alle dialektische Identität zuwider ist. Nicht die Identität von Nicht-Identischen, sondern das begütigende Verhältnis der Ähnlichkeit garantiert die unberührbare Identität Gottes mit sich selbst, sichert aber auch der Kreatur ihr "proprium esse",[129] die Eigentlichkeit des "per se esse", des geschenkten Selbstseins, das nicht in der deduktionalen Strömung einer absoluten Methode untergeht und sich verliert. Das analektische Denken liebt die Dinge, zumal alles Sein mit dem Guten, d.h. seiner Appetibilität konvertibel ist. Die von der Dialektik abgewiesene "Zärtlichkeit für die Dinge"[130] umwirbt geradezu alle Kreatur, respektiert den Reichtum ihrer Eigenheit. Die Analektik entfernt alles dialektische Zugleich von Identität und Nicht- Identität, von Endlich und Unendlich, kurzum den Widerspruch selbst aus dem Herzen der Dinge. Das "proprium esse" der Welt lichtet sich zum "esse similitudinarium",[131] zum Ähnlichsein mit Gott. Selbst die Materie leuchtet noch im Lichte des unendlichen Seins, als welches Gott selber ist. "Materia... similitudinem quandam retinet divini esse".[132] Das analektische Denken ist nicht hairetisch, es zerreisst nicht die Proportion von Dingen und Denken in einen transzendentalen Verstand hie und ein unerkennbares Ding-an-sich dort, wie Kant und Maréchal,

128 *In V Phys.* lect. 1, nr. 648.
129 *Summa theol.* I, 6, 4, sed contra; *Summa contra gentiles* III, 107; *De veritate* 22, 10, c.
130 *Logik* II, 40.
131 *Summa theol.* I-II, 5, 6, ad 2.
132 *Summa theol.* I, 14, 11, ad 3.

Rahner und andere das möchten, sofern sie alle dem verfallen sind, was selbst Hegel als "subjektiven Idealismus"[133] brandmarkt. Die transzendentale Ähnlichkeit mit Gott verdankt alle Kreatur ihrer Teilhabe an seinem ewigen Sein. Daher gilt: Je vollkommener ihre kreatürliche Seinsverfassung, um so grösser ihre Ähnlichkeit mit Gott. "Quanto enim est aliquid perfectius, tanto est Deo similius".[134] Ähnlichkeit und Unähnlichkeit gehören als "per se entis accidentia",[135] als Modifikationen des Seins als solchen, in den allumfassenden Bereich der Transzendentalien. Im Lichte der Gottähnlichkeit leuchtet die Welt, und ein jedes Einzel-Seiende ist dem Insgesamt dessen, was ist, harmonisch eingefügt und zugeordnet. "Deus unamquamque creaturam fecit proportionatam universo".[136] Nicht in der *Identität* mit dem unendlichen Gott, der so als die Negation des Endlichen begriffen wird, besteht das Sinnziel des Geschaffenen, sondern das Höchstmass an Verähnlichung mit ihm beherrscht alles Sollen und Sich-regen dessen, was ist. "Id quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intendit, est bonum quod consistit in *assimilatione* ad Deum".[137]

Die Ähnlichkeit ist das Seins- und Wirkgesetz der Welt. Sie sichert den geschaffenen Dingen ihr Je-Einzelsein, ja macht die unsterbliche Geistperson des Menschen zum Herrn der Schöpfung. "Ipsa individua sunt de principali intentione naturae".[138] Überhaupt gilt analektisch der Primat des Einzelnen vor allem Allgemeinen, zumal das Endlich-Einzelne ein Mehr an Wirklichkeit besitzt denn alles Allgemeine. "Singularia sunt entia, et magis quam universalia, quia universalia non subsistunt per se, sed sunt solum in singularibus".[139] Und was die Sozialnatur des Menschen selbst und alle menschliche Gesellschaft überhaupt anlangt, so stehen sie analektisch im Dienste der geeinzelten Persönlichkeit. Wie beglückend, in Zeiten eines übersteigerten Sozialismus und einer sich verabsolutierenden Soziologie von Thomas zu hören: "Cum homo sit naturaliter animal sociale, indiget ab aliis hominibus adiuvari ad consequendum *proprium finem*".[140] Dieser analektische Sozialismus ist um des Einzelnen, der dialektische um der *Allgemeinheit* willen, mag sie in der Gestalt der Identität von Gott und Welt oder in der des dialektischen Kommunismus marxistischer Prägung begriffen werden. Ob der Unterdrückung und Aufhebung des

133 *Logik* I, 146.
134 *Summa theol.* III, 93, 1, ad 1, suppl.
135 *In IV Meta.* lect. 4, nr. 587.
136 *Summa theol.* I, 56, 2, ad 4.
137 *Summa theol.* I, 50, 1, c.
138 *Summa theol.* I, 98, 1, c.
139 *Summa contra gentiles* III, 75.
140 *Ibid.*, III, 112.

Einzel-Seienden ist Gott dialektisch so etwas wie mit und durch die Endlichkeit "*erfülltes Sein*",[141] analektisch aber ist es aufgrund der uneinholbaren Transzendenz Gottes gerade umgekehrt: "Non est Deus ipsum *esse commune omnium*",[142] denn dann wäre er die *Eine Allgemeinheit* der absoluten Methode oder der unendlichen Form selbst, die alles Endlich-Seiende im Sog ihrer Negativität zugrunderichtet. "Si igitur esse divinum esset formale esse omnium, oportet omnia simpliciter esse unum".[143]

Wenn nun das Einzelne dem Allgemeinen gegenüber ein Mehr an Wirklichkeit bedeutet, wie ist dann überhaupt ein *Urteil* möglich, das ja gerade vom Einzelnen das Allgemeine aussagt, weil beide *sachlich* identisch sind. "Oportet quod praedicatum et subiectum significent idem secundum rem *aliquo modo*, et diversum secundum rationem".[144] Diese Urteilsform, mit Inhalt aufgefüllt, ergibt etwa folgendes Beispiel: "Homo est animal; illud enim ipsum quod est homo, vere animal est".[145] Thomas setzt die Verschiedenheit von Subjekt und Prädikat auf das Konto unseres ur-teilenden Verstandes, aber so, dass er zugleich in deren Verbindung (*compositio*) durch die Copula die Identität der geurteilten Sache mit sich selbst zum Ausdruck bringt. "Identitas vero rei significat intellectus per ipsam compositionem".[146] Hegel hat uns bereits gesagt, dass diese Identifizierung von Verschiedenheit ("identitas diversitatis") oder der Satz: "Das Einzelne ist das Allgemeine"[147] der Widerspruch selbst sei.

Weil Denken und Sein dialektisch dasselbe sind, können sich Identität und Verschiedenheit nicht in den zwei verschiedenen Ebenen von "ratio" und "res", sondern nur in *ein- und derselben*, d. h. in "der absoluten *Einheit* der reinen Begriffs und seiner Realität"[148] ereignen. Diese "absolute Einheit" ("absolute Methode") durchherrscht ja dialektisch alles Geschehen, wenn jene Einheit auch in *unserem* abstrakten Verstandes-Urteil noch nicht in ihrer Vollendung sichtbar wird. Nach Hegel ist jedes affirmative Urteil ein Widerspruch und verlangt, wie bereits erwähnt, zu seiner Ergänzung sein negatives Gegenstück. Das analektische Denken hingegen bietet uns eine sehr viel sachgemässere Lösung, zumal es auch das logische Urteilen im Zusammenhange mit dem Seingeschehen überhaupt bedenkt. Das ἀνάλογον

141 *Logik* II, 504.
142 *Summa contra gentiles* I, 26.
143 *Ibid.*
144 *Summa theol.* I, 13, 12 c.
145 *Ibid.* Vgl. auch *Summa theol.* I, 83, 5, c.
146 *Summa theol.* I, 13, 12, c.
147 *Logik* II, 495.
148 *Ibid.*, 505.

συνορᾶν" ("proportionale conspicere"),[149] die Totalität des Seienden im Lichte der allwaltenden Ähnlichkeit zu betrachten, ist ein analektisches Grundgesetz. Danach hat unsere Ur-teilung von Subjekt und Prädikat in der *konkreten Identität* der Sache mit sich selbst ihren existentiellen Grund. Die geurteilte Sache selbst birgt eine ganze Fülle von Seinsbestimmungen in sich, die unser menschlich-diskursives, keineswegs intuitives Denken nicht auf einmal, sondern nur im Nacheinander logisch aufzugliedern vermag. Vor allem das organische Geschehen reflektiert sich in der Artikulation unseres ur-teilenden Verstandestuns. Im organischen Bereich verbirgt sich unter der Gestalt des *unentfalteten* Keimes ebendieselbe *ganze* Pflanze, die zur Hoch-zeit ihres Blühens den differenzierten Reichtum ihrer selbst in voller Pracht *entfaltet*.

"Id quod est genus prout praedicabatur de specie *implicabat* in sua significatione, quamvis *indistincte*, totum quod *determinate* est in specie, ita etiam et illud quod est species, secundum id quod praedicatur de individuo, oportet quod significet totum illud quod essentialiter est in individuo, licet *indistincte*; et hoc modo essentia Socratis significatur nomine hominis: unde homo de Socrate praedicatur."[150] In der Zweiheit der Begriffsgestalten von Subjekt und Prädikat (Einzelheit und Allgemeinheit) präsentiert uns der ur-teilende Verstand *ein- und dieselbe* Sache, aber in der *Unterschiedenheit* der Seinsweisen von Explizit und Implizit, von Differenz und Indifferenz, von Akt und Potenz. Die sich in der Zweiheit von Subjekt und Prädikat durchhaltende Identität der Sache selbst blitzt in der Copula des Urteils auf. Wie nun alles Urteilen und Begreifen, mit dem Seinsgeschehen überhaupt ineins gesehen, aus der Ähnlichkeit und Konvenienz der Dinge insgesamt gedeutet wird, das bezeugt das Wort des hl. Thomas: "Et ex hoc patet ratio quare genus et species et differentia se habeant *proportionaliter* ad materiam et formam et compositum in natura, quamvis non sint idem quod illa".[151] Keine dialektische Identität zwingt hier Denken und Sein, Begriff und Realität ineins, sondern die analektische Proportionalität belässt jeder dieser Ordnungen ihr volles Recht und ihre Eigenart und vermag sie gerade so zu Affinität und Wahlverwandtschaft mitsammen zu vermitteln.

Seinen höchsten Triumph feiert das analektische Denken bzw. sein Gesetz der Ähnlichkeit im Verhältnis von Gott und Welt, Endlich und Unendlich. Auch hier erweist sich alle dialektische Identität, wonach das *Sein* des Absoluten nur so etwas sein soll wie das *Nichtsein* des

149 Aristoteles, *Met.* IX, 6, 1048 a 39.
150 *De ente et essentia*, cap. II, 11.
151 *Ibid.*, II, 10.

Endlichen,[152] als unannehmbar. Gott ist analektisch so unendlich über alle Welt hinaus, bedarf in seiner Vollkommenheit nicht im mindesten irgendwelcher Andersheit, kennt in seinem ewigen Jetzt ("nunc stans") keinerlei Vergangenheit und Zukunft, ist somit in seiner absoluten Ungeschichtlichkeit allem Weltgeschehen immer schon vorweg. "Deus, cum sit infinitus, comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid ad quod prius non pertingebat".[153] Es gibt analektisch keinen Gott der Zukunft. Gott bedarf nicht der Natur und der Geschichte, um sich als das Nichtsein dieser Nichtigkeiten zu verwirklichen. Gott ist der absolute Anfang und *nur* der Anfang, niemals aber Resultat. "Deus est prima omnium causa, *excedens* omnia causata".[154] Alle Kreatur ist deswegen von ihm ganz und gar unterschieden, weil er selbst keine seiner Wirkungen essentiell zu sein vermag. Das besagt aber keineswegs eine Negativität von Ermangelung und Defizienz an ihm selbst, sondern die Positivität seines unendlichen Exzesses ("superexcedit")[155] über alles Geschaffene weit hinaus.

Aber wie sollen wir ob der Endlichkeit unseres Denkens dieses "excellens principium a cuius forma effectus deficiunt",[156] wie können wir dieses "pelagus substantiae infinitum"[157] überhaupt erkennen? Etwa so, dass wir jene unsere Defizienz und Endlichkeit auf Gott selber übertragen? Wir vermögen Gott nicht in seiner Absolutheit zu erfassen oder gar sein absolutes Selbst zu werden, wie die Dialektik will. Wir verbleiben im Umkreis dieser Welt, auch in unserem Gotterkennen. Aber weil die Welt von ihm verursacht und geschaffen, also seine *Wirkung* ist, vermögen wir im reflexen Schein ("similitudo refulgens")[158] dieser Wirkung doch irgendwie, d.h. analogisch, ihre "Causa prima" zu erkennen. Analektisch brauchen wir, um Gott zu erkennen, die Welt, weil sie seine gewirkte Schöpfung ist, nicht einmal zu verlassen, geschweige denn sie dialektisch zu nichten. Der "sursum ductrix analogia"[159] vertrauen wir uns denkend an, wobei sich uns ein dreifacher Weg eröffnet: die "via affirmationis, negationis et supereminentiae". "Deus est sapiens, non sapiens et supersapiens".[160]

Wir sprechen Gottes Wesenheit affirmativ jene transzendentalen

152 Vgl. *Logik* II, 62.
153 *Summa theol.* I, 9, 1, c.
154 *Summa theol.* I, 12, 12, c.
155 *Ibid.*
156 *Summa theol.* I, 13, 2, c.
157 *Summa theol.* I, 14, 11, c.
158 *Summa theol.* I, 12, 4, ad 1.
159 *Summa theol.* I, 106, 1, c.
160 Vgl. *De potentia,* 7, 5, ad 2.

Vollkommenheiten zu, die wir in seiner Schöpfung antreffen. "Cognoscimus eam [essentiam Dei], secundum quod repraesentatur in perfectionibus creaturarum".[161] Nachdem wir aber alle Endlichkeit und Geschöpflichkeit ebendieser innerweltlichen Seinsvollkommenheiten negiert haben, übersteigern wir die mittels jener Negation von aller Endlichkeit geläuterten Seinsbestimmungen noch dazu ins Ungemessene. Hegel hat dieser analektischen Methode entgegengehalten, dass solcherlei Verunendlichung des Endlichen durch unseren abstrakten Verstand nichts anderes als einen sinnlosen *Verstandeswiderspruch* ergeben müsse. "Dieser Widerspruch lässt auf diesem [analektischen] Standpunkte nur die nebulose Auflösung durch quantitative Steigerung zu, sie [die Seinsvollkommenheiten] ins Bestimmungslose, in den sensum eminentiorem zu treiben. Hierdurch aber wird die Eigenschaft in der Tat zu nichte gemacht und ihr bloss ein Name gelassen".[162] Hegel entwertet somit die Analogie zu einer blossen Aquivokation. In Wahrheit hat sein dialektischer Einwand die Transzendentalität der Ähnlichkeit, insonderheit die "analogia proportionalitatis" nicht erfasst. Danach ist die Welt Gott ähnlich und unähnlich zugleich. Aber diese "similis dissimilitudo" ist keineswegs ein Widerspruch, denn er wird gerade durch die Behutsamkeit und Subtilität analektischen Beziehungsdenkens, d.h. durch die von aller Dialektik nicht umsonst misskreditierten "*Insoferns, Seiten und Rücksichten*"[163] vollends ausgeräumt.

"Cum sacra scriptura dicit aliquid non esse simile Deo, non est contrarium assimilationi ad ipsum. *Eadem enim sunt similia Deo, et dissimilia; similia quidem secundum quod imitantur ipsum, prout contingit eum imitari, qui non perfecte imitabilis est; dissimilia vero, secundum quod deficiunt a sua causa*".[164] Trotz aller unendlichen Distanz und der je grösseren Unähnlichkeit zwischen Gott und Mensch reisst dennoch die kausative Beziehung des "Von-Gott-her" niemals ab. In aller Unähnlichkeit, sofern auch sie noch ein Verhältnis von Andersheit (Kreatur) zu Andersheit (Gott) besagt, bleibt ein Stück Ähnlichkeit erhalten, zumal die Formalität eines Verhältnisses von Verhältnissen (proportio proportionum) das an sich Un-endliche nicht ins Endlos-Unbestimmte entschweben lässt. Verhältnis hie und Verhältnis da bewahren *wesenhaft* die Formalität ihrer Verhältnismässigkeit zueinander, wie immer auch ihr Inhalt sich in dieser Formalität des "aliud ad

161 *Summa theol.* I, 13, 2, ad 3.
162 *Enzyklopädie*, § 36.
163 *Logik* II, 36, 40.
164 *Summa theol.*, I, 4, 3, ad 1.

aliud" bewähren mag. Verhältnisse als solche garantieren essentiell ein unmittelbares Verhältnis zueinander, sei ihr Abstand als Unverhältnismässigkeit auch noch so gross. Wenn schon *unsere* Weisheit nicht *Gottes* Weisheit ist, so verhält sich doch unser *Verhältnis* zu unserer Weisheit unmittelbar zu dem *Verhältnis*, das Gott zu seiner supereminenten Weisheit hat. So scheint ja auch die Unendlichkeit des Abstandes die Parallelität zweier Parallelen nicht zufzuheben. Daher gilt in all' unserer Endlichkeit von Sein und Denken dennoch das überaus beglückende analektische Prinzip: "*Sicut* infinitum est aequale infinito, *ita* finitum finito".[165] Eine Steigerung ins *Bestimmungslose* kann sich analektisch nie ereignen, weil die Steigerung ins Superlativisch-Eminente den Positiv des Ausgangs nie vollends negiert und auslöscht, sondern in der Verhältnismässigkeit der Verhältnisse von Endlich zu Endlich und Unendlich zu Unendlich allezeit salviert.

Die Analogie hält allemal die *Mitte* zwischen Univokation und Äquivokation, zwischen Identität und Nicht-Identität. Diese ùngebrochene Mitte ergab sich uns als das bestimmende Gesetz analektischen Denkens, mag es sich nun in Gestalt von Philosophie oder von Theologie ereignen. Daher gilt auch für die Philosophie und ihre Methode das Thomistische Prinzip: "Fides autem catholica *media via* incedit".[166]

165 *De veritate* 23, 7, ad 9; *Summa theol.* III, 92, 1, ad 6, suppl.
166 *De veritate* 24, 12, c.

GUIDE-LINES FROM ST. THOMAS FOR THEOLOGY TODAY

E. L. Mascall

Should auld Aquinas be forgot
And never brought to mind?

IN view of the extent to which Roman Catholic theology and philosophy had for several centuries, and more especially since the encyclical *Aeterni Patris* of Pope Leo XIII in 1879, been dominated by something which at any rate believed itself to be authentic Thomism, it is perhaps not surprising that, in the ampler climate of Post-Vatican-II, it is widely assumed, within as well as without the Roman communion, that there is very little that we can learn from the Angelic Doctor at the present time and very little help that we can derive from him for the solution of our contemporary problems. To the question at the head of this paper many would reply with a confident and resounding "Yes!" This reaction I believe to be mistaken and, without either claiming that St. Thomas was infallible or forgetting that the middle of the thirteenth century is not the end of the twentieth, I believe that he can give us a great deal of assistance in the terribly confused intellectual situation in which we find ourselves today. With M. Gilson I would say that I value my intellectual freedom as much as anyone and that I claim the right to agree with a man when he says what seems to me to be true.

And first of all, in my opinion, St. Thomas provides us with an admirable example of the way in which a Christian thinker should make use of a philosophical system which has not itself emerged from the womb of the Christian revelation. Up to St. Thomas's time Christian theologians, in so far as they had made use of philosophy at all, had been much more attracted to Platonism than to Aristotelianism; St. Augustine and St. Anselm are, of course, the outstanding examples of this. In the mid-thirteenth century, however, the fashionable newcomer to the West was Aristotelianism; and it is understandable that, to old-fashioned people, it was highly suspect, not only because of its pagan origin (after all, Plato was pagan too) but also because of the Muslim

medium through which it had been transmitted. In adopting it as a vehicle for Christian thought and communication, therefore, St. Thomas was manifesting that astounding intellectual audacity which, to quote M. Gilson again, was as marked an aspect of his character as was his equally astounding intellectual modesty. Partly, no doubt, this was due to his desire to argue with unbelievers in a language which they could understand; one of his two greatest works was explicitly written *contra Gentiles*. He was of all men the least likely to imitate the Bellman in *The Hunting of the Snark*, who addressed his hearers in four languages with which he himself was acquainted but entirely forget to address them in their own. Nevertheless, it is also clear that he believed the Aristotelian philosophy to provide, if not a perfect, at least a fairly adequate instrument for Christian purposes. What, however, I find most instructive is the way in which he handled his Aristotelian material; so far from bringing Christian doctrine in line with the modern thought of his day, he almost brutally brought the modern thought in line with Christian doctrine. I will give several examples of this.

The first is in the realm of cosmology. Modern writers, in their celebration of the victory of Copernicus and Galileo over Aristotle and Ptolemy, often overlook the fact that throughout the Middle Ages there was a spirited contest between the two geocentric systems of Aristotle and Ptolemy themselves. Briefly, the trouble was that Aristotle's system, while theoretically simple and attractive, was very unsuccessful in predicting the actual movements and positions of the planets, whereas the Ptolemaic system, while almost entirely successful (with one glaring exception) from the standpoint of prediction, was highly untidy and intricate. St. Thomas appears to have accepted Aristotle's arguments as providing the ultimate *physical* truth about the celestial bodies and their operations, but he was perfectly ready to accept the Ptolemaic system as a calculus for practical purposes, or indeed any other system which would perform with equal or superior efficiency the function of "saving the appearances".[1] What is of most importance, however, is the way in which the Angelic Doctor changes the whole metaphysical basis of the Aristotelian cosmogony. For Aristotle, the celestial orbs continue their uniform gyrations because uniform circular motion is theoretically the most perfect and therefore needs no further explanation or justification; it will therefore go on for ever. For St. Thomas, on the other hand, while he accepts the reality of secondary causality in the created realm, the orbs continue their motions just as long as God intends that they shall do so, and when his purposes for the

1 Cf. my *Christian Theology and Natural Science* (London, New York 1956) 51ff.

world have been achieved, their motions will come to an end.[2] Beneath a superficial identity it would be difficult to conceive a greater difference than this which is found between the cosmology of Aristotle and Aquinas. And beyond this there is a radical opposition between the two thinkers about the relation between God and the universe.

For Aristotle the first unmoved mover has no conscious concern with the world and is occupied solely with the contemplation of his own perfection, *noesis noeseos*. He is in no way responsible for the existence of the prime matter out of which the world is composed; it is as eternal and uncreated as he is himself. He is in a certain way responsible for the changes which the prime matter undergoes, for it constantly strives to imitate his perfection, but he is entirely unconscious of this and all the effort, so to speak, is on the world's side and not on his. He is the formal or exemplary cause of the world's development; he is in no way its efficient cause. Now the interesting point in this is that, when arguing for the existence of God in the *Contra Gentiles*, St. Thomas reproduces in great detail the arguments which Aristotle himself gives for the existence of a first unmoved mover,[3] but the unmoved mover at which he arrives is very different from that of Aristotle. I am not concerned here to argue whether St. Thomas or Aristotle or either of them is right in the conclusion which he reaches, but only to stress the way in which St. Thomas, even while he pays Aristotle the compliment of lifting his argument bodily, firmly and respectfully puts him right. It is as if he were saying "You mistakenly suppose that your argument leads to a first unmoved mover entirely concerned with admiring his own perfection; but I will show that it leads in fact to the God of Judaism and Christianity, without whose knowledge not even a sparrow falls to the ground."

An even more striking example of St. Thomas's obstinate loyalty to Christian belief is provided by his doctrine of the human soul. He quite complacently takes over Aristotle's teaching that the soul is the form of a man and the body is his matter. This immediately raises problems for the Christian which do not exist for the pagan. To begin with, this view seems to deny to the individual man that unique personal status which is involved both in the Christian emphasis on personal responsibility and in the Christian doctrine of salvation. If the different human beings that exist are merely so many numerically diverse particular instances of the universal "manhood", in the same kind of way as a number of

2 Cf. *De Potentia* 5, 5.

3 *Contra Gentiles* I, 13. Aristotle, *Physics* V-VIII, *Metaphysics* XI, XII. Cf. my *He Who Is* (London, New York 1943) ch. v.

lumps of cooking-salt are so many particular instances of the universal "sodium chloride", I can hardly be considered to have any ultimate significance. In the second place, what happens to the individual when the body dies? When the salt has decomposed, where is its saltness? And thirdly, all those personal characteristics and idiosyncrasies which make human beings at once so different and so interesting seem to be reduced to a purely trivial and accidental status. Are the things in which we differ from one another really of as little importance as this?

Now St. Thomas has an answer to all these objections, but it is one which does considerable violence to Aristotle. There is first the doctrine of the unity of the substantial form in man, for which the Angelic Doctor contended so stubbornly. Although the soul is united to the body as form to matter, its penetration of the individual does not stop there. As form, the soul subsumes into itself all those lower formalities which the body as an organised entity, animate, vegetative and corporeal, already possesses, so that the matter which it ultimately embraces is not merely the body of an animal but the fundamental *materia prima* itself. The soul, as human, penetrates to the deepest metaphysical root of the man; it does not just confer rationality on an ape or galvanise a corpse. Again, we are told that the soul does not merely *acquire* a temporary substantiality from its union with a particular particle of signate matter; it is a form existing *in se*, which *confers* substantiality upon the composite being. And finally, against the Averroists with their denial of personal immortality, we are told that the soul possesses individuality in itself and not through the matter which it informs, though it possesses it in virtue of its aptness to inform matter.

Now the objections which can be urged from the strictly Aristotelian standpoint to St. Thomas's modification of the Aristotelian doctrine are obvious. This, it will be said, is a philosophy in which only particulars exist and in which, at any rate as regards corporeal beings, forms are particularised only in union with matter; surely, therefore, the notion that the form can exist when the matter has departed is ridiculous. If, as is asserted, the soul is the form of the man, survival is impossible; we die like cows or cabbages. And even if this objection can be somehow rebutted, the difficulties are by no means over. For, if the form goes on existing after it is separated from the body, it must then exist either individualised or not. If it exists in separation individualised, then humanity as a universal has vanished; each soul is a different form and hence a different species, men are angels in disguise, and Descartes will be right after all. But if the form exists in separation unindividualised, then personal identity has gone; we merge at death into a universal soul and the Averroists are vindicated against St. Thomas. Has St. Thomas

for once committed the dreadful crime of allowing his faith not to perfect his reason but to destroy it?

In chapter four of my book *Existence and Analogy* I have tried to answer these objections and I shall here only remark that it seems to me that when one has been forced to take account of them one arrives at a metaphysic of form and matter that is both more coherent and more profound than before. That, however, is not my present concern, which is with St. Thomas's deliberate refusal to alter Christian doctrine in order to bring it into superficial agreement with a fashionable philosophy of secularist type. It may be argued, not implausibly, that it is impossible to bring the Aristotelian doctrine of form and matter into line with the Christian belief about man, and that all that St. Thomas achieved was to make the Aristotelian doctrine incoherent. What cannot be denied is that St. Thomas was determined that the Christian belief must be preserved and that if the Aristotelian doctrine cannot be brought into line with it (though St. Thomas thought that it could) it is the Aristotelian doctrine that must give way. And here he has, I would hold, a lesson for us today, who are faced with the impact of other philosophical systems of secularist provenance than that of thirteenth-century Aristotelianism.

St. Thomas has often been criticised for having, as is alleged, compromised, or even identified, Christian theology with one particular philosophical system of his day. Both the drastic modifications to which he subjected Aristotelianism and the skilfull adoptions which he made of many of the features of Platonism sufficiently answer this charge. We may, however, note in passing the strange fact that this criticism has often proceeded from persons who are only too anxious to implicate Christian belief with some one particular philosophical system of their own time, as for example, Charles Gore with Kantianism, Paul van Buren with linguistic empiricism and Rudolf Bultmann with Heideggerian existentialism. Now it seems plain that, as they stand, some philosophical systems are flatly incompatible with Christian belief, such as the dialectical materialism of Marxism or the metaphysical nihilism of Buddhism. I would, however, emphasise the words "as they stand" in the previous sentence. It may conceivably be found, on careful and sympathetic investigation, that the features which appear to be inconsistent with Christianity are capable of modification or are merely superficial and accidental, and that their correction or removal makes the system not less but more adequate and coherent. On the other hand, a system may turn out to be incorrigible and quite incapable of reconciliation with Christian belief. The only way to settle the matter is to consider each case on its merits. We have certainly no

reason to assume that only one philosophical system is consistent with Christianity or that only one can be a profitable partner for it. Some would certainly appear to be incompatible with Christianity, though this ought not to be hastily assumed. Some may have to be rejected, not because they are clearly incompatible with Christian belief but because they can be shown to be false on purely rational grounds. And even those mutually competing systems which are acceptable from the standpoint of Christian theology are likely to be mutually compatible in their most profound depths; for truths can never ultimately contradict one another. Furthermore we must not forget that both philosophical systems and Christian understanding are always in a state of development if they are healthy at all.

That there is a kind of philosophical pluralism that is theologically acceptable may be illustrated from the fact that St. Thomas incorporated into his theological structure many features of Platonism; perhaps the most striking instance is his doctrine of the ideas in the mind of God. A much more comprehensive example is provided by a comparison between the "Aristotelian" theology of St. Thomas in the thirteenth century and the "Platonic" theology of St. Gregory Palamas in the fourteenth. At first sight — and indeed at second and third sight as well — they would seem to be not only philosophically but also theologically incompatible; nevertheless it is, I think, clear that, beneath extremely different linguistic and conceptual structures, these two great figures of West and East respectively were dealing with the same fundamental problems and giving ultimately the same Christian and Biblical answers.[4] Both Aquinas and Palamas give us luminous examples of the way in which a Christian theologian should handle a philosophical system which is not itself of Christian provenance. And I shall now give two modern instances which seem to me to be thoroughly in line with St. Thomas's attitude.

The first is provided by the massive and now little-known work *The Incarnate Lord* by Lionel Thornton, which appeared in 1928. Thornton had been much impressed by the "philosophy of organism" of Alfred North Whitehead, which was based on a first-hand acquaintance with the method and outlook of contemporary science and which was to receive monumental and definitive statement in Whitehead's Gifford Lectures *Process and Reality*. It seemed to Thornton that Whitehead's metaphysical system might provide the medium for a presentation of the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation that would be intelligible and attractive to thinking persons in a scientific and technological age.

4 Cf. my *The Openness of Being* (London 1971) 221 ff.

(That Thornton's laudable intention was largely frustrated by his unmanageable literary style does not affect my present point). The weakness of Whitehead's system lay in his thoroughly immanentist doctrine of God, an obstacle as formidable to Thornton's exploit as Aristotle's doctrine had been to St. Thomas's. Thornton was, however, convinced that this obstacle could be removed and that Whitehead's system would be more adequate as a metaphysic and more amenable as a medium of Christian doctrine after its removal. Thus, while Whitehead wrote "It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God",[5] Thornton insisted that "the essence of religion consists in the concrete dependence of incomplete created individuality upon absolute individuality as it exists in God."[6] Thornton was able, by making this drastic revision of Whitehead's system, to produce a formulation of Christology which, while expressed in a contemporary idiom, was thoroughly orthodox. It is, in my opinion, an almost perfect example of expressing Christian truth in a modern idiom, as contrasted with distorting Christian truth in order to bring it into line with modern thought. It is perhaps revealing that Dr. W. N. Pittenger, who is a whole-hearted supporter of "process-theology", has taken Thornton to task for thinking it necessary, as a Christian thinker, to make modifications in Whitehead's doctrine.[7]

My second instance will be that of Fr. Karl Rahner, who has been described by Dr. John Macquarrie as the most outstanding of living theologians.[8] The school to which he belongs draws its origin from the work in the 1920s of Joseph Maréchal, who in an immense work entitled *Le Point de Départ de la Métaphysique* attempted to reconstruct Thomism by a quasi-Kantian critique in a way which he hoped would lead to a more definitely theistic position than that of the Sage of Königsberg. This "transcendental Thomism", as it has come to be called, is alleged by strict Thomists such as M. Gilson to have no right to the label "Thomist" at all. Nevertheless, Fr. Rahner's largest work *Spirit in the World* is professedly a development of one of the basic epistemological doctrines of St.Thomas, that the human mind in its perception of the world abstracts from, and returns to, the phenomena of the senses. Whether or not it is genuinely Thomist in inspiration, Rahner's system is certainly not Thomist in its idiom, for the latter is derived from the German existentialist Martin Heidegger. What Rahner is doing in all this is seeking to find or construct a philosophical

5 *Process and Reality* (Cambridge 1929) 492.
6 *The Incarnate Lord* (London 1942) 362.
7 *The Word Incarnate* (London 1959) 107ff; *Christology Reconsidered* (London 1970) 19f, 101f.
8 *Principles of Christian Theology* (New York 1966) ix.

system which will be loyal to Christian truth and at the same time more congenial and intelligible to contemporary men and women than the traditional Catholic formulations. It thus presupposes the pluralist axiom, that Christian truth is capable of expression in more than one philosophical idiom. In practice one is sometimes inclined to doubt whether those who clamour for a healthy plurality in Christian theology really wish to do more than substitute one singularity for another. Certainly there is nothing particularly pluralistic about the impressive theological encyclopaedia *Sacramentum Mundi*, the most voluminous product of the Rahnerian school, which is almost entirely written in the idiom of transcendental Thomism. This is not, however, relevant to my present point, which is that Fr. Rahner and those associated with him, such as Coreth, Metz and Lotz, are quite deliberately and conscientiously attempting to make the existentialist idiom an adequate vehicle for the expression of Christian truth and are not trying to force the Christian faith into the predetermined mould of a secularist philosophy. Whether this particular attempt is altogether happy I am occasionally disposed to doubt. Whether or not the existentialist idiom comes with an immediate note of relevance and intelligibility to the average educated German I do not know, but it certainly fails to ring a bell with the average educated Englishman or American. Furthermore, so far as the English-speaking philosophical world is concerned, the idiom of existentialism is, if anything, rather less attractive than is that of traditional scholasticism. In the time of St. Thomas there were a number of philosophical schools, but they did at least talk the same language and they were able to argue with one another; whereas today if you put a British linguistic empiricist and a Continental existentialist or phenomenologist together in the same room each of them will have the greatest difficulty in recognising that the other is a philosopher at all. If we are to have pluralism in the theological and philosophical world, let us try at least to see that it is a genuine pluralism and not the substitution of one singularism for another. But, having said all this, I repeat that it is clear that, with whatever degree of success, Rahner and most of his school are trying to bring one contemporary philosophical system into the service of the Christian faith and are not, like some of the more radical of the *Avant-garde*, trying to force the Christian faith into the narrow and rigid mould of a quite intransigent secularism.

Thus, to summarise, the first lesson which St. Thomas has to teach us today is simply how we should go about the task of speaking Christian truth in a secular climate, while recognising that, whereas for St. Thomas the secular climate was that of a newly fashionable philosophical system, for us it is the climate of the whole culture in

which we live. Behind this there lies, of course, St. Thomas's basic conception of the relation of the natural to the supernatural, with its view of the two orders as distinct yet organically related. It must be admitted that the theological manuals have frequently spoken as if grace and nature were comparable to two apartments on successive floors of a building, separated by a soundproof floor and ceiling and possessing no means of mutual communication, so that nature's sole function with respect to grace is to provide a support for the latter. Such a view inevitably leads to a dichotomy in which grace is concerned only with "religious" matters, in the narrowest sense of the term, and nature—the realm of the "secular"—first of all claims to be entirely autonomous and then claims to be the whole of reality. This view, however, can claim no support from St. Thomas. He did not, of course, work out the matter in detail with applications to our twentieth-century situation, but the basic principles for the discussion are quite explicit. "Grace does not destroy nature but perfects it",[9] and this not in the sense of making an extrinsic addition to it, for "grace presupposes nature"[10] and "grace is related to nature as the act of perfecting to that which is to be perfected";[11] this is the sense in which "nature is a preamble to grace".[12] Paradoxically, it is, I think, because of his firm conviction of the organic relationship of nature and grace that St. Thomas was unable to reach a satisfactory solution to the question of man's orientation to the beatific vision. Just because nature needed grace to perfect it, it must have some tendency, however inchoative and unthematic, towards grace and supernature; yet, precisely because grace is *gratuitous*, nature can neither expect, deserve nor demand it. Fr. Henri de Lubac's historical studies have done a good deal to elucidate the problem;[13] so have Fr. Rahner's exploration of the notion of a "supernatural existential"[14] and Fr. Robert W. Gleason's exposition of sanctifying grace as participation in the life of God himself.[15] Much still remains to be done, but without St. Thomas's principles as our guide-lines I do not see how we can avoid either sentimental religiosity and escapism on the one hand or downright secularism leading to atheism on the other.

Closely related to this is St. Thomas's doctrine about truth and our perception of reality. In insisting that truth consists in the conformity of

9 *Summa theol.* I, 1, 8, ad 2; *De Veritate* 27, 6, ad 1.
10 *Summa theol.* I, 2, 2, ad 1.
11 *De Veritate* 27, 5, obj. 17.
12 *In Boethium de Trinitate*, 2, 3.
13 E. g. *The Mystery of the Supernatural* (New York 1967) passim.
14 *Theological Investigations* (Baltimore 1961) I, chh. ix, x.
15 *Grace in Freedom* (New York 1969) passim.

the mind to reality — *adaequatio rei et intellectus*[16] — he might seem to be uttering a platitude, but, if so, it is a platitude that has been vigorously denied quite recently. Dr. Leslie Dewart's books *The Future of Belief* and *The Foundations of Belief* expound at great length the view that truth is purely subjective and relative. He repudiates both "the epistemological position that truth is the adequation of mind to things and... the metaphysical position that being is intelligible as such."[17] "Truth and falsity", he tells us, "thus pertain neither to subject as such nor to object as such. They pertain to the relation in which we render ourselves present to ourselves and to the world."[18] The upshot of this is that God himself has no reality outside our consciousness; he does not *exist*, but he can be *present* in our consciousness and he cannot be present anywhere else.[19] I have devoted a complete chapter of my book *The Openness of Being* to an examination of Dewart's argument; here I shall only point out that his doctrine is inherently self-destructive, for, if truth does not consist in the conformity of the mind to reality, Dewart's own mind, when he states his own peculiar view of what he calls "truth", presumably does not conform to reality either. And so there is no reason why we should believe what he says. He does apply the word "reality" to God, but, as he uses the term, a *reality* is not a *being* that *exists* but merely something that is *present* in, and only in, our consciousness. Perhaps the chief value of Dewart's books lies in the dreadful warning which they give of what happens when one abandons the traditional view of the nature of truth.

To say that truth consists in the conformity of mind to reality — of *intellectus* to *res* — carries with it the implication that the mind can know reality and is not simply shut up in the enjoyment of its own feelings. It is significant that the phase of the empiricist movement which began with Locke and culminated with Hume discovered that, in spite of its claim to be in line with the achievements and endeavours of experimental science, it had eliminated from the realm of human knowledge not only God but the physical world as well. Physical objects became for Hume simply concatenations of impressions in the mind, though Hume never managed to give a satisfactory account of the mind in which they were concatenated. Nor have his successors been more successful. Even Kant's attempt to preserve a *Ding an sich* or *noumenon* which is wholly real and non-subjective suffers defeat at the hands of his doctrine that all we can know is the *phenomenon* which the

16 *Summa theol.* I, 16, 2, c.
17 *The Foundations of Belief* (New York 1969) 246.
18 Ibid. 270.
19 Ibid. 443.

mind has constructed in the act of perceiving. Dr. Errol Harris has recently drawn attention to the remarkable fact that the movement in philosophy which, above all else, prides itself on being in tune with empirical science has totally failed to give a plausible account of the inductive method which it has alleged to be the chief tool used by empirical science.[20] (He has also condemned the empiricist philosophers for misunderstanding the role played in science by the inductive method, but that is another story.) Dr. A. Boyce Gibson, in his recent work *Theism and Empiricism* has significantly listed at the head of his catalogue of "the Misadventures of Empiricism" the "empirical misadventure" which consisted in equating empiricism with sensation. He adds that "it is the linking of empiricism with sensationalism which, more than anything else, has made it implausible to talk about the empirical approach to God."[21] It would be an exaggeration to describe Boyce Gibson as a Thomist, but I find his remark all the more penetrating for this. For it is, I think, very remarkable that the one doctrine of perception which modern philosophers hardly ever discuss, and of which indeed most of them seem to be totally ignorant, is the one doctrine which provides just that kind of objectivity in perception which empirical science both needs and, more or less unconsciously, assumes. And this is, in its central features, the doctrine of St. Thomas. It holds that perception is an activity in which sense and intellect are both involved. This does not mean that in an act of perception there are really two acts performed by two different subjects, a sense which senses and an intellect which understands. There is one subject, the human being, who in one act of perception senses by his senses and apprehends by his intellect, the sensible impression being the *objectum quo* and the intelligible extra-mental thing the *objectum quod.* Provided this basic formulation is accepted, its elaboration and ornamentation, as we find them in St. Thomas and in such modern Thomists as M. Gilson and M. Maritain, seem to me to be secondary and optional; this does not mean that they are uninteresting or trivial, but it does mean that the central doctrine can stand without them. That the basic Thomist doctrine can hold up its head in the world of today and is capable of new and exciting development is demonstrated by Fr. Bernard Lonergan's monumental work in which he sets out to answer the two questions "What is happening when we are knowing?" and "What is known when that is happening?" Its title *Insight* is nothing but a translation of the

20 *Hypothesis and Perception* (London 1970) esp. ch. ii.

21 *Theism and Empiricism* (London 1970) 20. I have discussed this work at length in Appendix I to my book *The Openness of Being.*

Latin *intellectus*, stressing the power of the human mind to penetrate beneath the sensible surface of things to reach their intelligible essence.

Correlative with the Thomist doctrine of the understanding mind is the Thomist doctrine of the object understood. The proper object of the understanding, St. Thomas says, is being, and the correlative object of our human minds in their corporeal condition is the being of corporeal things. And to know beings other than oneself is a highly mysterious activity. As I have written elsewhere:

> To know a being is not to achieve some kind of external contact with it analogous to the impact of one material object on another. It is to achieve a real union with the being, to get it "into one's mental skin" or, from another aspect, to become identified, however imperfectly, with it. This is what is implied by the scholastic assertion that in knowledge the knower *becomes* the thing known, not entitatively but "intentionally". This is...highly mysterious, but it is a fact. It pertains inchoatively, on the level of pure sensation, even to sub-human animals, but it is on the level of spirit that this capacity to penetrate other beings, not physically but none the less really, reaches its full manifestation, and it comes to its climax in the mutual communication of spirits with one another. In us humans, compounded as we are of spirit and matter, it is not only mysterious but extremely complex. There is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses; the mind spontaneously turns to sensory representations, but, simply as mind, as intellect, as spirit, it can (intentionally) "become" all things. *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu; mens convertit se ad phantasmata; mens quodammodo fit omnia:* these well-worn tags are not statements of a theory about knowledge, they are a description of what human knowledge is.[22]

It is, I suggest, extremely important to stress that the correlative object of our minds in their embodied condition is extra-mental corporeal being. One hesitates to generalise about so protean a movement as existentialism, but it is, I think, a serious weakness of most forms of existentialism, Christian as well as atheistic, that they treat the human mind as if it was altogether detached from the rest of the universe. The universe appears as a mere environment, hostile or at best indifferent, into which the human subject finds himself "flung" (*geworfen*). This view of man and his situation is equally contrary to Christian dogma and (what may disquiet most of our contemporaries more) to modern science. For, in the physical aspect of his being, man is not *surrounded* by the material world, he is actually *part* of it. It is a most astonishing fact that, whereas the Middle Ages, for all their limited knowledge of the details of the physical realm, held firmly together the physical and

22 *The Openness of Being*, 190. I have added the word "human" to the last sentence.

the mental constituents of human nature, the last four centuries have seen an ever increasing divergence between the scientific and the philosophical realm, the former discovering more and more truths about the world of matter while philosophy has retreated more and more into the human subjectivity. It has often been remarked that Kant's so-called "Copernican revolution" was in fact about as un-Copernican as anything could be; for Copernicus removed man from the centre of the physical universe, while Kant began by placing him at the centre of the mental universe and never managed to get him away from it. St. Thomas's insistence that what we know in the first instance is not ourselves but extra-mental material beings is not only true in itself but, I would maintain, highly important for Christian apologetic today. It is, of course, fully compatible with that concern of God for man's welfare which is manifested in the Incarnation and in redemption. But without it we are in danger of that isolation of the doctrine of redemption from any doctrine of creation which almost inevitably leads to an introverted and escapist type of religion.

It would not be difficult to list a great number of individual points concerning which St. Thomas may have much to teach the world of the late twentieth century and to defend him against criticism and misunderstandings. For example, in reply to the common accusation that the category of substance ought to be abandoned as static and outmoded, it could plausibly be affirmed that, substance in its philosophical sense being equivalent to the Greek *ousia* or "being", it is difficult to see how one can do without it, and that if (which is doubtful) St. Thomas's doctrine of substance was too static, what is needed is not no doctrine of substance but a more dynamic one. I have, however, felt it better to concentrate on a few broad and basic issues and indeed space would not permit of anything more. Many of St. Thomas's views were, of course, not peculiar to him and some of them were not even peculiar to Thomists. But there is about him a serene urbanity and a patient sureness of touch which has much to teach us in these days of journalistic theology, when one slogan succeeds another with breathless rapidity and when it is apparently assumed that it is more important that one's views should be startling than that they should be true. In the last resort, I do not think it matters a jot whether our theology is Thomist; what matters is that it should be true. And this was in fact the precise position of St. Thomas. The most famous of the Augustinians may have shouted "Tell them Dr. Martin Luther will have it so!" But, whatever may have been the attitude of some of his disciples, I do not think that the most famous of the Dominicans ever settled an argument by saying "As the Angelic Doctor reminds us...."

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